

# Allan Gibbard, Publications

## BOOKS

*Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment* (1990. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, and Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Translated by Sandra Laugier as *Sagesse des choix, justesse des sentiments: une théorie du jugement normatif* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996).

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Co-edited with Stephen Darwall and Peter Railton: *Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

*Thinking How to Live* (Harvard University Press, 2003).

*Reconciling our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

My 2006 U. C. Berkeley Tanner Lectures on Human Values, revised, with an Introduction by Barry Stroud, extended comments by Michael Bratman, John Broome, and F. M. Kamm, and my reply.

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Revised version in Peter Gärdenfors and Nils-Eric Sahlin (eds.), *Decision, Probability, and Utility* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
- “Economic Models”, with Hal R. Varian (1978). *Journal of Philosophy* **75**, 664–677.  
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