Democracy and Education: Are the Connections a Myth?

Gary D Fenstermacher
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

It is a privilege to be here with you today, and I thank OVPES President Eugenie Potter for her invitation to present this paper. When she told me that the theme for her presidential address would be myth and its role in education, I thought it appropriate to frame my own thinking in these terms. I was ill prepared, however, for what I encountered when seeking some assistance with the concept of myth. It has been the subject of study by minds far more imposing than mine. I was humbled to encounter the work of Franz Boaz, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Rollo May, and Joseph Campbell, to name just a few of the exemplary students of myth. On seeing for the first time the steep slope of learning before me, I almost decided to abandon working within the theme set by the Society's president. I persisted, however, and hope that the result does not prove me too much of a fool.

I would like to explore some of the mythical aspects of the connections we so often make between democracy and education. I shall go right to the heart of the matter, then back out of it rather more slowly. Those who comment on the relationships between democracy and education appear to divide into two camps: Those who grasp and make a place for the mythical properties of these relationships and those who do not. I realize that this contention is not very profound, for it merely offers a choice between a state of affairs and its simple negation. Yet if we follow it along for a bit, it reveals some things that are of more than passing interest.

Take, for example, the work of Henry Giroux. Giroux is among a category of scholars known as critical pedagogues. Although the work of the critical pedagogues has the stamp of the Frankfurt School and neo-Marxism, it has its roots in the ideas of Paulo Freire and some of the early revisionists in American educational history. Giroux has carried his own thinking well into domains of postmodern thought, and has written, insightfully and provocatively, on the impaired relationships between democracy and education. He argues¹ that neither the ideals nor the practices of democracy any longer characterize the purposes or practices of schooling—or if they do, they are so weak as to be near insignificance.

Others who have expressed a lament similar to Giroux's include Benjamin Barber, Noam Chomsky, Jean Bethke Elshtain, John Goodlad, and Thomas Pangle, and, I must confess, yours truly.² All have written lamentations on the eroded connections between democracy and education. Each of these writers has expressed regret at the loss of vitality in the democracy-education nexus, and has expressed despair for the future of both schooling and democracy as a result of this loss of vitality. What is interesting about what I will call the lamenters, those who decry the absence of vigorous bonds between democracy and education, is their inattention to the mythical aspects of these bonds. The lamenters typically look for evidence of actual bonds, and on not finding them, express their chagrin...
and their fear at what is happening in America. I think of them as literalists, for they have
to actually see many people frequently acting in accord with the democracy-education
nexus before they admit to the vitality of this connection.

While we are well-advised to take these writers seriously, as they offer useful
insights into the state of American democracy and its relationships to education, there is
another way to examine the links between democracy and education. This second way is
to examine not what we do but what we say, to turn an old phrase on its head. It is to look
at our stories, our songs, our rituals and artifacts, our taboos and traditions, to detect in all
of these in what regard we hold democratic principles and ideals. In so doing, we inquire
into the mythology that so intimately connects democracy and education, and we ask
whether this mythology retains its power to direct our thinking, and particularly our
sentiments.

The notion of sentiments is crucial in this context, and to show why that it is the
case, I turn to some of the ongoing work of Thomas Green. In his 1984 John Dewey
lecture, *The Formation of Conscience in an Age of Technology*, and more
recently in his latest book, *Voices*, Green embarks on an inquiry into the notion of
education as normation. Normation is the acquiring of norms, a way of coming to be a
person of a certain kind. Norms typically express expectations or preferences for behavior,
and thus in aggregate reveal much about what a society regards as proper deportment
among its members. Green, following Durkheim, argues that norms do not describe how
people should behave, but rather prescribe conduct, thereby indicating how people
should or ought to behave. After establishing this sense of ‘norm’, Green then states,
“We should note finally that whether norms prevail in any setting is most clearly displayed
not when the behavior of members conforms to what the norm requires, but when it
does not.”

On this view, the presence or absence of a norm is revealed on determining how we
feel after failing to comply with or actually defying the norm. If we feel bad, sad, regretful,
ashamed, embarrassed, contrite, and so forth, on violating a norm, then we are in
possession of that norm. In Green’s view, and that of Durkheim, if on breaking the norm we
have such feelings, then the norm has moral authority for us. Note the fascinating
redirection of thought that takes place here: We do not ascertain the presence or absence of
norms by looking for conduct that conforms to these norms; we detect the presence of
norms by noting the feelings—what I have called sentiments—of those who do not comply
with the norm. For example, there are those who detect diminished voter participation in
American elections, and conclude thereby that democracy is in great peril. However,
another way to look at this phenomenon is to inquire into the sentiments of those who do
not vote, asking how they feel about their absence from the polling places. If they are
regretful, embarrassed, ashamed, saddened, then the norm has moral authority for them,
permitting us to conclude that democracy may be in better health than it appears to be if
one looks only at actual conduct.
An analysis of this kind permits a deeper understanding of the standing of democracy than we typically obtain on listening to the lamenters. For example, if citizens do not vote in large numbers, but feel guilty, angry, ashamed or embarrassed at not doing so, then the voting norm continues to hold moral authority for these citizens. In such an instance, it may be more the case that government, not democracy, is imperilled. That is, the failure to vote may express a strong disenchantment with the operational and procedural characteristics of government, while saying little about the people's faith in and commitment to democracy as a way of “doing” government.

I broach this discussion of norms for the purpose of showing how sentiments figure into another view of the bonds between democracy and education. The question at hand is whether the collective mythology surrounding the links between democracy and education continues to direct the flow of public sentiment about the point and purpose of education in America. To put the point crudely, and in but one dimension, do we feel bad when we act contrary to social expectations about democratic schooling? This question is one I will try to answer shortly, and my answers may surprise you. First it is important to the validity of my argument to close the loop between norms and myth.

Myth encompasses stories, songs, celebratory events, heros and heroines, revered texts and artifacts, powerful symbols, taboos and traditions, as well as enemies and evildoers. Myths are powerful devices for the propagation of norms. In the telling of fairy and epic tales, in relating a family history, in extolling a distant past, we are not only revealing the substance of our myths, we are cultivating norms of conduct. Much the same may be said for the songs we sing with our children, the injunctions and imperatives we issue to them, and the symbols we hold dear when retelling our heritage. These constituents of our myths are powerful bases for the normation of the young. Recall your reactions on first reading Robert Fulghum's essay, *All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten.* For so many of us, these words brought smiles and sweet memories, as we recalled the course of our own normation in the early grades of school. This normation is deeply rooted in the myths that construct our views of fairness, caring, tolerance, and happiness.

Perhaps the most recent attempt to link democracy and education as myth is Neil Postman’s discussion in *The End of Education.* Using the terms ‘myth’ and ‘narrative’ nearly synonymously, Postman writes: “All narratives conceal or sanitize unsavory if not indefensible chapters. Narratives are not exactly histories at all, but a special genre of storytelling that uses history to give form to ideals.” Postman goes on to say that on this version of narrative or myth, the uplifting story of Christianity is not seriously harmed by learning about ambitious popes or hideous inquisitions. Then, apropos our topic, he states:

The same is true of the American story of democracy. To point out that the Constitution, when written, permitted the exclusion of women and
nonproperty owners from voting, and did not regard slaves as fully human, is not to make a mockery of the story. The creation of the Constitution, including the limitations of the men who wrote it, is only an early chapter of a two-hundred-year-old narrative whose theme is the gradual and often painful expansion of the concepts of freedom and humanity."

Myths, or narratives, contribute profoundly to normation. To understand how this works, we have to look away from what people actually do to how people feel about what they do. We have to inquire whether certain ideas are normative for people, in contrast to whether certain ideas are enacted by people. To use an example much in the news: President Clinton, if one believes his public acts of contrition, is clearly normed to the taboo against extramarital sex, even though his conduct leads us to wonder about his family values. In other words, that the president of the United States has a sexual relationship with a White House intern does not mean that the old morality is riddled beyond repair, if it remains the case that the president feels shame and remorse for his actions.

This line of reasoning takes us to a fascinating place. I hope you will forgive me for dragging you away from the main line of the argument for a few moments, but I want to make a point that will prove quite useful a bit later. Over these last several paragraphs I have been casting something of a tension between the myths of a culture and the facts acquired by that culture. Although this distinction will choke on its multiple ambiguities if pressed too far, I want to follow it for just a short distance. As noted, in attending to myth and its role in normation, our interest is not only in what people actually do, but in what ideas have moral authority for the people. What people do, the “facts of the matter,” though marvelous grist for the thinking mind, is not a sufficient basis for understanding the bonds between democracy and education. The facts, at least as developed by the lamenters, are quite different from the stories and the songs, the symbols and the rituals, the homilies and the proverbs. Indeed, the facts often are in conflict with the myths, as they derive from different sources and serve different ends. Too often we think that when the facts are contrary the myths, we are compelled to abandon the myths. But note that Postman contends that one does not abandon the narratives because the facts sometimes show the narratives to contain falsehoods or corruptions. I believe that he argues this way because he recognizes that the abandonment of our narratives, our mythology, can carry frightful consequences for the normation of the young—indeed for all of us.

Does it strike you as odd that I am suggesting that our myths may deserve a measure of protection from our facts? If it does, consider what we learned about the relations between scientific narratives and scientific facts from Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Much of the argument of that book addresses the development of science as a non-rational activity, wherein the myths take on a force of their own, often overhelming the facts. For example, take the case of the neutrino, a subatomic particle literally invented in the 1930’s to spare physicists the grief of having to drastically revise or even abandon the law of conservation of energy. This law, a keystone
narrative in particle physics, was placed at risk when scientists discovered that in the atomic decay of matter, they could not detect an equal and corresponding increment in energy for the loss of matter being measured. They then faced a choice of whether to discard a crucial law of physics, or presume that they were simply missing something in the decay phenomenon. They chose the latter course, hoping that in time they would be able to account for this mystery energy they called the neutrino. You are probably aware that they eventually did find such a particle, and that the neutrino is today among the verified particles of atomic physics.

As we ponder the lamenters’ critique of the links between democracy and education, a critique strongly fashioned on assembling facts that dispute extant narratives, it may be well for us to keep in mind the importance of narratives in the normation of the young, and thereby consider the possibility that our facts may be made to accord to our narratives as we have for so long expected our narratives to accord with our facts.

If you are a good and faithful Cartesian rationalist, you are likely to think me guilty of heresy here. I am indeed arguing what you may be sitting there asking yourself right now: “Is this guy going where I think he is going with this? Does he really have the chutzpah to suggest that our myths ought to have the power to trump our facts in cases where the two conflict?” Before I answer that question in too bold a fashion, it is probably well to note, as the neutrino example illustrates, that our myths sometimes do trump our facts—even in domains where we think of facts as the aces in the deck. So it may be less a matter of what I think ought to happen, and more a matter that it does indeed happen.

Ought such things to happen? Is it a good thing that myth sometimes trumps fact, as fact often trumps myth? Yes, I believe so, and why I believe so is a part of the larger argument of this paper. But before I respond in detail, let us take a moment to review the argument so far. My first contention is that there are two ways to examine the state of the relationship between democracy and education. The first is to examine what people actually do, inferring the state of the relationship from these actions. That is what many of the lamenters do, and in so doing they find considerable decay in the democracy-education nexus. The second way to examine the relationship is to look at how people feel about what they do, especially in cases where they act contrary to social norms. If people feel bad about violating the norms that characterize the democracy-education nexus, then these norms have moral authority for them. As such, they remain powerful norms, even when broken, and thus may signal a more healthy bond between democracy and education than the lamenters suggest.

If we examine the nexus between democracy and education through the normation lens, then myths become a central feature of the analysis because they constitute a powerful source for the propagation of norms. Myths, or narratives as Postman calls them, are formed and shaped through story, song, the observance of holidays, revered texts and artifacts, as well as homilies and injunctions. They are the basis for a great deal of
normation of the young. To understand what norms a group or a society holds, and how they come to be held as they are, one learns much by examining the myths or narratives that are dominant in that group or society. Because myths are such potent sources of normation, I have suggested that we have a duty to care for them in the same that, as rationalists, we have for four centuries argued that we have a duty to care for the facts. We must be sensitive to how myths construct norms, and must look, as Postman encourages us to look, for myths or narratives that engender norms we value for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

So much for summary. I recognize that a few ends are loose, and I turn now to these to see if I might not finish the weave so that we can stand back and judge the finished piece.

The first loose end is to note the ambiguity of the term 'myth', and clarify on which side of that ambiguity I am positioning myself. Recall the lamenters, such as Giroux, Elshtain, and Barber. Note that they seem to regard the connections between democracy and education as a myth, in the sense of ‘myth’ wherein a putative claim is not true; it is merely a “myth.” Thus the lamenters might agree that there is a lot of mythology in the democracy-education nexus, but in so stating they mean to point to a very different spot than Postman and other students of mythology point. The lamenters say “myth” and mean to pick out deception or dreamy disregard of what is real, while the mythologists say “myth” in order to pick out the songs, stories, rituals, and symbols of a group or culture. The two positions trade nicely on the ambiguity of the term ‘myth’, an ambiguity that I have exploited in drawing the distinction between two ways of examining the democracy-education nexus: the lamenters’ (or literal) way and the mythical way.

I trust that I have been sufficiently clear that you know which side of this ambiguity I am on. Having declared my side, however, does not mean that you must, too. It would be sufficient for me if, at this point, you are open to the possibility of two different conceptions of how we might examine the state the bonds between democracy and education. If you can maintain that perspective, I shall chase down the second dangling thread.

Given the way I have set up this inquiry, you might infer that I am constructing opposing sides, with the lamenters-literalists on one side and the mythologist-normationists on the other. You may be puzzling over whether this is indeed a fair and proper representation of the issues at hand. Indeed you may be wondering whether one or both of these views is substantive in its own right. That is, have I got hold of something worthy and profound here, or am I merely blowing cosmic bubbles? To answer this question, I turn to the work of Roger Kimball, whose enlightening history of liberal education in Western Civilization, Orators and Philosophers, offers useful insight into the tension I have posed.
In tracing the history of conceptions of liberal education in Western thought, Kimball argues that there are two distinct traditions of liberal education. The first of these, rooted in the Roman concept of oratio, is founded on the power of speech or rhetoric as a civilizing device. The second tradition, rooted in ratio, is based on the power of reason. Through Western history, Kimball contends, oratio and ratio have variously accounted for the liberal educations provided to each generation of students. In the tradition of oratio, the virtues are clear and serve as standards for conduct, text is studied as writ, elites are formed and respected, and spoken discourse is basis for social development. In the tradition of ratio, a skeptical, questioning attitude is paramount, wherein persons are believed to be free of the restraining influences of elites, and the point of text is to allow for the unfettered pursuit of truth rather than to form the mind and heart according to a received ideology or tradition.

The oratio tradition is held by the rhetoricians, while the ratio tradition is carried by the philosophers. Kimball contends that if this were a battle, we would declare the philosophers the winners, at least in 19th and 20th century Western education. That conclusion is revealing, in the context of my earlier claim that rationalists appear to believe that facts should trump myths, but that myths should not be allowed to trump facts. That is certainly, I think, the philosopher’s view, at least in all but the more extreme neo-pragmatist and postmodern positions. Caring for the myths seems more suitable to the tradition of oratio, where talk and texts are valued over doubt and equality.

The force of these distinctions is amplified, in my view, in such work as Walter Ong’s study of oral and literate cultures, and in analyses of religious speech, such as Walter Brueggemann’s The Creative Word: Canon as a Model for Biblical Education. Despite what many would regard as their inherent integrity, there is a tendency to want to resolve the tensions between oratio and ratio, searching for their common ground. The picture is of oratio as a kind of thesis, and ratio as a kind of antithesis, with a synthesis to emerge from their combination. That was at one time my own inclination. Now, however, I wonder if these are not inherent tensions of our species, expressive of different ways we are helped to become competent, moral, thinking persons. Rather than seek their resolution or their integration, more seems to me to be revealed in regarding them as a kind of yin and yang of existence, wherein we acknowledge their opposition and seek harmony in their relationship one to the other.

What does this distinction between ratio and oratio amount to in the present case? It means that narratives, myths, stories, songs, customs, traditions, revered artifacts and celebratory occasions are vital to our development as decent, flourishing members of families, work sites, communities, and nations. So, indeed, is our capacity to think independently and critically, to nourish skepticism and ceaseless wonder, to seek our freedom as persons and hail its attainment in others. Yet in seeking our freedom and in reasoning skeptically and dispassionately, we must exercise care not to gratuitously destroy valued narratives and traditions. But in nurturing our myths, customs, and artifacts, we
must not bar the thinking, deliberating mind from seeing possible harm and deformity in what custom or narrative commands. In the parlance of our times, the logic of those who would burn America’s flag in protest to America’s treatment of its disadvantaged or disenfranchised must be respected. But so must the narratives of those who protest such desecration of sacred symbols. Our challenge is not to sharpen the mind so that it slices our myths to pieces, nor to embrace our myths so grandly as to suffocate reason, but to find the balance that permits us to flourish as members of different normative communities as well as free persons in constant deliberation of our relationship to these normative communities.

You might now inquire of the bearing of these ruminations on the links between democracy and education. If I have set forth my case with clarity, my conclusions will come as no surprise. Our health as persons, as cultures and communities, as a nation depends on sustaining both the literal and the mythical, on cultivating both reason and custom. We are in need of the compelling criticisms and empirical studies that detail a certain lack of democratic ideal in education and schooling, but these must be done without corroding and dissolving the vital narratives that lead us to value and revere democratic ideals in educational settings. The lamenters have a duty to care in their critique, for they must be careful not to destroy the narratives and myths that assist in creating and sustaining the norms of democratic education. At times, their rebukes, particularly of the critical theory stripe, can be so stinging and vitriolic that they risk shattering our faith in the very narratives we so depend upon for rearing the young and staying a course on life’s journey.

Assuming that this analysis of the role of fact and myth in appraising the democracy-education nexus has merit, what might be said about the present health of the connection? If we join with the lamenters, there are many reasons to be concerned. As Benjamin Barber remarks, democracy is an extraordinary and rare contrivance; we must learn what he calls “the lessons of liberty” if we are to preserve and protect it.14 As one looks at the literalists’ literature on democracy in the schools, for example, the work of Donald Arnstine, Elizabeth Kelly, Walter Parker, Paul Theobald, and Patricia White,15 and of course the social transformationists and critical pedagogues, such as Daniel Liston and Kenneth Zeichner, Michael Apple, Henry Giroux, and Peter McLaren,16 one can become quite concerned by these compelling arguments for the dissolving bonds between democracy and education.

On the other hand, if you spend time in school classrooms, you hear primary school teachers impress upon their students the lessons described by Fulghum in All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten. You hear stories and songs about liberty and freedom, though these are modified now to encompass a far more diverse and robust history of many different American peoples. Certainly the ground upon which we teach and learn is more contested, but it remains a ground where the values of love, liberty and justice appear to be vigorously promoted. In the sense of myth as story, song and sentiment, democracy, as I see it, is strong in our schools. The teachers I observe continue to be powerful propagators of norms and myths. They do much to ensure the democratic
norms of listening, sharing, compromise, consensus building, and community. Moreover, honesty, independence of thought and deed, fairness, and mutual consideration are ideals given high priority in the classrooms I visit, in upscale Ann Arbor and in the far less affluent center of Detroit.

Even at the level of parent and public, I sense the norms that interconnect democracy and education remain strong. I know that the lamenters fret about the drift towards schools of choice, particularly private schools. On the other hand, the desire for choice could be viewed as an exercise of liberty, a desire to regain a measure of influence in the schooling of children and youth that has been lost in an increasingly legalistic and regulated public school environment—regulation that stems not only from the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, but also from cadres of teachers and administrators claiming that their professionalism and expertise must be heeded in decisions about what is in the best educational interests of children. In parent-teacher collaboration, site-based managements, and the exercise of choice, one sees a vitality to the democracy-education nexus that is not perceived if one looks only at some of the more visible indicators, such as newspaper subscriptions, attendance at political events, or voter participation in off-year elections.

To argue in this manner is not to assert that the lamenters are wrong, that there is nothing to worry about in the democracy-education relationship. There are indeed difficulties with the diminution of attention to the complex, interwoven nature of civil societies and democratic governance. Among the lamenters are those who worry deeply about the loss of public that may accompany the loss of public schooling, said public believed to be requisite for the maintenance of a democracy. Indeed, it may be that the reason so many emerging democracies are having such difficulty perfecting the concept is that they are without a population that understands itself as a public, as a body politic for the transaction of affairs central to the good of the polity. One of the more remarkable achievements of American public schools, according to many of the literalists, is that they have contributed so much to the forming of a public, to readying the young to think and act in ways conducive to democratic deliberation and conduct.\textsuperscript{17}

While this view is fascinating for its insight into how a public is formed, I wonder whether publicly funded schools are required for the formation of a democratic public. Why cannot private schools propagate the panoply of myth believed so necessary to normation for democracy? After all, we became a democratic nation at a time when there were no public schools in the sense we know them now. Moreover, as the work of Tony Bryk and Valerie Lee strongly suggests, Catholic schools do an exceptional job of cultivating norms needed for effective democratic life.\textsuperscript{18}

I acknowledge that I am on shaky ground here, as little is known about the consequences of privatizing K-12 schooling in the U.S. My point in raising this controversial notion is that strong, healthy private settings may be a critical ingredient in
the formation of a democratic public, for it is in these settings that norms necessary for public life are promulgated and practiced. As such, it may not be so much a matter of whether a school site is publicly or privately funded, as it is a matter of what narratives and norms that school site embraces. Perhaps this is why some worry so much about the loss of publicly funded schooling, believing that the risk of alternative narratives poses too great a threat to democracy. On the other hand, America's history is replete with examples of just how undemocratic publicly funded schooling can be—for indigenous populations, members of minority groups, women, persons with handicaps and disabilities, and other categories of divergence from white, middle class, European beliefs.

The path just taken is a path many of us have traveled before, hence I will not belabor the point. Indeed, I must depart from it entirely, as it is time to bring this exploration to a close. I have argued that by looking at myth, and its manifestations in norms, we see a different view of the state of the connections between democracy and education than we see when looking at literal interpretations of conduct. To examine only what people do or do not do, within a rational framework of what democracy requires of them may be to miss much of what is actually the case about how people regard democracy and the links between democracy and education. To reveal more, it is necessary to look beyond conduct, to sentiments; to look beyond what people do to how they are normed. In this normation we begin to gain a fuller appreciation for the mythology that characterizes the nexus of democracy and education.

In such things as flag burnings, censorship cases, hate crimes, and anti-immigrant ballot propositions, we have literal evidence of what seems like a breakdown of democracy. But if, behind these actions, are sentiments that serve as evidence that the norms are strong and healthy, there may be far less cause for concern than the alarmists suggest. My sense is that we should be far more concerned, as educators, for how people feel about what they do, and for the care and cultivation of a mythology that directs our sentiments to support the ends we seek.

Implicit in what I have argued is the thesis that reason is not the sole basis for education, and that myth, and perhaps its sustenance through practices we could think of as impositional and indoctrinatory, even perhaps as somewhat imperialistic and hegemonic, is also important to education, and particularly to the connections between democracy and education. However, to defend such a thesis would require another paper, even a book, and perhaps, too, a very sturdy set of armor, so I shall close on safer ground, asking that we attend carefully to Eugenie Potter’s considerations on the point and purpose of myth, for it is here that we reveal much of what has remained hidden when attending only to a literal interpretation of human conduct.
ENDNOTES


3. Forthcoming from the University of Notre Dame Press.


5. Green, *Formation of Conscience*, p. 9; emphasis in original.


