On Restoring Public and Private Life*

Gary D Fenstermacher
University of Michigan

For generations Americans have lived two lives, one private, the other, public. This dual existence was not a sign of some lamentable schizophrenia. It was, rather, a condition of health. The private life was lived with loved ones, dear friends, and perhaps one's spiritual guide and confessor. The public life was experienced beyond the home and confessional; it occurred where one was not generally well known save perhaps in a single role, such as teacher, plumber or attorney. Private life was often composed, frequently genial, consisting as it did of persons bound by blood, love, long periods of shared experience, or an intimate access to one's God. Public life was not so composed, as it consisted of many different kinds of persons seeking some sort of cooperative existence without benefit of the binding forces of family, love, or religious spirit.

These descriptions are framed in the past tense to alert us to the possibility that the difference between public and private life has disappeared from American culture. For some, including this writer, the disappearance of difference is a bad sign for democracy. For others, as we shall see, it may open newer and more exciting possibilities for life in a democratic society. Before becoming enmeshed in the issues, it would be well to clarify further the notions of public and private.

As a child, I recall hearing quite often the expression, "Such things are not done in public," or some similarly worded caution. It was usually my mother who said it. But I also recall my father, on hearing one of his children say something troubling, comment with a frown, "I trust that will not become public." At the time, I did not wonder much about these admonitions. I cannot ever recall asking, "What's the public?" Somehow I was aware of what my parents were saying to me. They were telling me that certain behavior is not revealed beyond the threshold of one's home, that the expectations for my conduct changed when I walked out the front door. Thus I came to have a sense that "out there" is different from "in here."

*This is the manuscript version of an article that appears in The Public Purpose of Education and Schooling, ed. J. I. Goodlad & T. J. McMannon (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997), pp. 55-71.
"In here" we talked, though not often and without much detail, about my father's salary, and how his income was expended. But that topic was not allowed to be continued "out there." "In here" we discussed sex and intimacy--again not often or in much detail--with the understanding that such talk would not resume when we stepped off the front porch. I recall my mother's enjoyment of off-color, though not vulgar, jokes. She delighted in sharing these with us, but would briefly reprove us when we told such jokes to her, this reproof tucked neatly into her laughter just after we delivered the punch line. We spoke, too, of troublesome relatives and exasperating friends, always with the understanding that such talk would never be repeated "out there."

It is of more than passing interest that it was usually my mother who cautioned my brothers and me about the differences between private and public speech and conduct. It is a role mothers played for many generations. The historian Joel Spring points out that "one effect of the American Revolution was to link the domestic responsibilities of women with broader public purposes.... Women, as mothers, were seen as having the responsibility for shaping the character of their sons as future republicans."1 As we shall have occasion to note a bit later, this feature of motherhood provides a provocative point of contrast to the conception of public and private I am describing here. For the moment, however, let us stick to the line of argument with which this essay began.

As my parents drew the distinction between in here and out there, out there became a quite different place from in here. Out there was a place that called for caution in what one said or did, a place that required a degree of care not needed in here. It was a place where quick judgments were unhelpful and tolerance was needed, because people out there did not know you as well as your family did, and thus were not so likely to understand hastily expressed thoughts or to forgive unkind actions. In here I was known and loved, and given great range to explore forms of speech and conduct; out there I was not so well known, and there were far more expectations about how to fit in and act than there were in here.

From the vantage point of a child, out there seemed to have many more rules for participation, and called for special kinds of behavior. Such words as "civil," "propriety," "credible," and "decorum," appeared to have far more importance out there than in here. And though we, as children, were taught lessons about fairness, equality, and freedom in here, these words made more sense to us as "out there" words. Other notions, such as compassion, courage, and respect received attention as "in here" words--although it was expected that we would exhibit such traits on both sides of the threshold.
As I recall these aspects of my childhood, I am struck by their apparent absence from these times. The language of film, video, and popular music seems to carry no distinction between in here and out there, as words once thought unfit for public discourse are now commonly heard. Of course, such language was not thought fit for private discourse either, but it was permitted in that context in ways it was not in public discourse. Visual images of intimate sexual conduct and of hideous violence, once thought so indecent or in such bad taste as to be banned from the public arena, are now an everyday part of that sphere. Civility and decorum seem no longer to be features of the public setting, as automobile drivers exchange once-obscene gestures, magazine advertisements appeal to the prurient or feral sides of human nature, and certain forms of popular music call for disobedience that could not by any stretch be called civil.

As one ponders these cultural transformations, it is relatively easy to surmise that we have lost "out there." There does not appear to be a distinct form of public life in our culture. Instead our private lives seem to have become our public life. In his *The Fall of Public Man* Richard Sennett attends in remarkable scholarly detail to this very point. He argues that public life has been corrupted by the private realm. It is as if that which was once private has "leaked into" that which was once public, producing a kind of corrosion that has as its result the loss of what, in an earlier time, was called the public morality.

The American press certainly seems to think that something of this sort has occurred. The June 12, 1995, cover of *Time* asks, in bold letters "ARE MUSIC AND MOVIES KILLING AMERICA'S SOUL? A recent *Newsweek* column by Meg Greenfield is entitled, "It's Time for Some Civility." A July, 1994, Op-Ed piece in the *New York Times* carried the title, "The Death of Civility." Syndicated columnist Molly Ivins has written about what she calls the "new incivility." These are but a small sample of recent writing on such related topics as the decline in this nation's moral standards, the lament at the loss of family values, the destruction of the common good, the disappearance of a common language, and the disintegration of a national identity for all Americans.

There seems little doubt that our culture has been transformed. Though I am less sure than Richard Sennett that this transformation comes about though the corruption of public life by the private, it is clear that whatever the public life of today is, it is not at all like the public life we thought existed prior to, say, World War II. Various scholars have commented on this fact, calling what we have today "anomic democracy" or "deficit democracy." Television has had an enormous impact on reshaping notions of public life, as have the psychological and spiritual consequences of living in an age when our existence on this planet could be crippled or ended by nuclear madness or careless disregard for the environment.
We have, in comparison to the past, become knife-edged in our discourse, excessively dramatic in our conduct, and indiscriminate in the auditory and visual imagery we employ. There are far fewer controls "out there" to temper speech and deed, and to moderate conflicting views. Political theorist Benjamin Barber notes the importance of civility to the preservation of our democratic way of life when he remarks that "the autonomy and dignity no less than the rights and freedoms of all Americans depend on the survival of democracy; not just democratic government, but a democratic civil society and a democratic civic culture." Yet this civil society and civic culture are in trouble. Jean Bethke Elshtain, another political theorist, contends that "we are in danger of losing democratic civil society. It is that simple and that dangerous, springing, as it does, not from a generous openness to sharp disagreement--democratic feistiness--but from a cynical and resentful closing off of others."

This disintegration of public life suggests a bleak future for the well-being of our nation. To understand why, consider this cogent analysis by the respected philosopher and political theorist, John Rawls:

A modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or nearly all, citizens. Given this characterization of a modern democratic society, how is such a society ever to work out its differences in the absence of the norms of discourse and participation that were once associated with life in the public context? That is, if we are a nation of "incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines," how do we establish the common ground upon which we must stand if we are to negotiate our differences in reasonable and peaceful ways?

There have been many arguments of late, Barber's and Elshtain's among them, that we cannot do so without some sense of public, some place in our social lives where civility, decorum, and reasonableness constitute the agreed-upon rules of participation. If there is no longer a public aspect to our social lives, and there is only the private, then it appears that the resolution of problems arising from difference is all the more difficult to achieve--if it is possible at all. Within the private realm, we may feel entitled to our differences without a sense of need to work through what it means to retain these differences within a community, on behalf of the commonweal. In the private realm, we may not only expect to be tolerated for our differences, we may seek to be loved for them, or perhaps in spite of them.

An attitude of this kind bodes ill for a liberal democracy. In a liberal
democracy, primacy is awarded to the individual's freedom to pursue his or her own vision of the good life. A government in a liberal democracy is instituted, in part, to ensure that one individual's pursuit of the good life does not unduly restrict another individual's freedom to pursue a different vision of the good life. A government's capacity to achieve a just balance among conflicting pursuits of different individuals or groups of individuals is dependent on some shared, common conception of the point and purpose of human existence within a political boundary (and, increasingly, on the planet as a whole).

Without a public place to carry out the debate on whether your vision of the good and my vision of the good can be achieved without our injuring one another, our differences may readily become occasions for anger, conflict, and perhaps, as we now see so dramatically in what was once Yugoslavia, armed hostilities of a most brutal and inhuman kind. A "public place" is not merely a geographic location; it is also a set of traits and skills possessed by those who would occupy this place, as well as a shared understanding of what must be common to all if each is to have the greatest possible opportunity to pursue his or her own vision. This sense of what constitutes a public place, as well as its critical importance to democracy, has led a number of scholars to argue for the importance of restoring public life in America. Here "public life" takes the form of an "out there," as my childhood recollection would frame it, where norms, standards, values, and rules are held in common for the purpose of sustaining a society where each is free to peacefully pursue life, liberty and happiness, to such an extent that someone else's pursuit of these same good is not unduly curtailed.

Education performs a crucial role in forming this public setting. The norms, standards, values and rules just mentioned are taught and practiced in the course of gaining an education. Indeed, this point accounts for a democratic nation's compelling interest in education, for it is in a nation's schools that the norms, standards, values and rules for participation in the public arena are taught and practiced. Historian Robert Westbrook begins a recent essay on public schooling and American democracy with these words: "The relationship between public schooling and democracy is a conceptually tight one." Walter Feinberg, an educational philosopher, contends that "the role of public education is to create and recreate a public by giving voice to an otherwise inarticulate, uninformed mass.”

In these times, many educational policymakers and practitioners give little consideration to the critical links between education and democracy. While this nation is in the midst of cultural hurricanes engendered by bitter divisions over race, language, religion, and moral values, educational policy makers force the debate over America's schools into a teapot of comparatively puny issues such as academic standards, measures of academic achievement, and getting all children
ready for school (though with hardly a thought to the point and purpose of the school they are presumably getting ready for). In Westbrook's words:

American democracy is now weak and its prospects dim. The anemia of public life in the United States... is reflected in public schooling that, despite lip service to education for democratic citizenship, has devoted few resources or even much thought to its requirements.  

The recent work of David Berliner and Bruce Biddle argues that many educational policymakers justify their teapot agenda for the schools for reasons unrelated to the educational benefit of children or the strengthening of democracy. As Berliner and Biddle put it, powerful people are "pursuing a political agenda designed to weaken the nation's public schools, redistribute support for those schools so that privileged students are favored over needy students, or even abolish those schools altogether. To this end," say Berliner and Biddle, these persons "have been prepared to tell lies, suppress evidence, scapegoat educators, and sow endless confusion." At a time when so many political theorists, philosophers, and historians are issuing warnings about the fragile state of democracy in America, the flummery of so many educational policymakers must be recognized for being just that. Many theorists argue that the rhetoric of standards, goals, and test scores must be halted, in favor of a far more proactive agenda on behalf of a "civil society and civic culture" (to use Barber's words).

Unfortunately we are not in quite so fine a position for this restorative work as some seem to think. If we merely return to older conceptions of private and public, little ground will have been gained. Older conceptions of public and private are freighted with presumptions about public life being superior to private life, about the role of women in private and public space, and whether there are multiple versions of the common good and, if so, whose version will prevail. For these reasons it is important to reconsider past and current conceptions of private and public, asking whether we can revise them so that they exhibit a better fit with these times. Let us begin with the place of the private in relation to the public.

In the lament over the dissolution of a common and constructive public life in America, we have, perhaps, been too quick to either blame the private realm or ignore its role in the formation of a healthy public. Sennett's analysis, as well-argued as it is, views the private as a kind of ill wind for the public, wherein the quality of public life is diminished by its assuming more the character of private life. This way of framing the problem is rooted in a perspective of the private as something less important and noble to human attainment than the public. This view of the private may be the legacy of Hannah Arendt's analysis of the public-private distinction as developed in one of her most well-known works, The Human Condition.
Arendt leads us to a view of the private that is grounded in the household and to the oversight of one's property and wealth. As she recounts the conduct of the classical Greeks, the private is a place to be escaped in order to participate in the public realm. On reading Arendt's descriptions of the private and public realms, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the goodness and nobility of the species is made manifest in the public, not the private realm. Although there can be no public without the private, the public is where the grandeur and potential of humankind is situated. Many of today's advocates for the restoration of a healthy, constructive public life appear to hold something of the same views of private and public as Arendt does.

Judith Swanson's insightful analysis of the public and the private in Aristotle's philosophy points us to a very different interpretation. Swanson develops her thesis by using Arendt's analysis of the public and the private as something of a foil. On Swanson's view, Arendt errs in describing Aristotle's view of the private as something to be escaped in order to experience the freedom and opportunities for virtue that are available only in the polis. For Swanson, the private and the public are much more interactive, and far more interdependent, than Arendt portrays. Swanson argues that the public sphere has a responsibility to nurture the private sphere, for it is in the private sphere that so many of the virtues needed for effective participation in the polis are developed. It is particularly in the rearing of children, in the development of discourse and dialogue in the household, and in the coparticipation of family members in the life of the household that Swanson believes the very capacities and dispositions for constructive public participation are formed.

Swanson's thesis suggests a reconsideration of Arendt's, and perhaps Sennett's, views of the private. The present malaise of the public is due, in part, to a malaise in the private; the private realm is simply not in a sufficiently healthy condition to prompt and sustain an invigorated public. Assuming that this point has merit, one does not then go about the restoration of the public merely by reforming or revitalizing public practices and institutions; one must attend as well to the reinvigoration of private life. Hence the restoration of the public calls for a consideration of many things private, such as the nature of the household (for example, the character and quality of adult-child interactions that take place there), the possibility for and character of work (in the sense of employment and jobs), and the role and place of spiritual sustenance (particularly religion).

In contending that the restoration of a public requires equal consideration to the restoration of the private, I am maintaining a substantial distinction between these two entities. However there are those whose find this division between public and private a troubling one, even with the refurbished image of the private suggested here. Their arguments raise the question of whether a strong difference between private and public life is really as important to the health of democracy as
is believed by so many of the theorists previously cited. A sympathetic consideration of these alternative arguments provides a fascinating look at how deeply the issues surrounding public and private penetrate into the general conditions for human flourishing.

Let us begin to look at the contrary position by imagining a critic of the proposition that healthy private and public spheres are jointly necessary for a high quality of life in a democracy. We shall give the critic a name, "Virginia," even though she is quite fictitious. Consider her contention that the values required to sustain healthy private and public spaces are the same, as are the mechanisms for acquiring these values. Given this sameness, there is no need to distinguish between public and private life. Indeed to do so benefits primarily men, as they have typically been the ones who occupy the public spaces. In occupying the public spaces, men gain and hold the authority to rule, and thereby come into possession of the means to limit membership in the public sphere. This limiting of membership frequently takes the form of excluding women, as well as other males who do not share the views, traits, or identifying marks of the men with power.

Continuing her critique, Virginia asserts distinct advantages for a single sphere. This sphere would be founded on one or a very few extremely important values to be held in common by all members of the sphere. Candidates for such values include caring, nurturance, respect, love, and regard. If these values characterized human beings and their relationships to one another, there would be little need to draw the public-private distinction, for public life would be a mere extrapolation of the good private life, and vice versa. As matters now stand, these values are more evident in the private sphere, while values such as fairness, justice, and equality are the evident values in the public sphere. This bifurcation is morally wrong, argues Virginia, because it permits, perhaps even encourages, forms of domination and subjugation that no truly civil, properly democratic society should tolerate.

Virginia's criticism foreshadows the critique offered by several feminist writers, although these writers touch only occasionally on the distinction between public and private. Donna Kerr, for example, contends that "liberalism does not help us understand how to nurture our own lives, or the lives of others." Kerr believes that nurturance ought to be the core concept for sustaining civility. In so arguing, she finds liberal conceptions of democracy wanting, and thereby casts considerable doubt on the need to separate the private from the public life.

In arguing for a reconstructed view of domestic tranquility, Jane Roland Martin develops a thesis that also rejects the split between public and private. Martin states that "social reality demands that we expand the founding fathers' understanding of domestic tranquility and that we reclaim the civic or public realm
as a domestic domain."  In Martin's view, to the extent that school is conceived as a place that prepares the young for civic or public life, it "teaches them to devalue that place called home and the things associated with it."  She argues that it would be far better if the values and responsibilities of enlightened domestic life became the values of an enlightened civic life.

In her ground-breaking efforts to develop a feminine basis for ethics and moral education, Nel Noddings’ work on caring contains notions that bear on the public-private distinction in much the same way that Kerr’s and Martin’s do (although there are important differences among their respective philosophical positions). Noddings finds that the currently dominant political values of justice and fairness permit persons to engage in a range of inhumane acts towards one another. In their place, she would adopt the ethic of caring, a form of relational regard between and among persons that would prohibit the moral travesties that today’s civic morality appears to allow. Although she does not specifically address the public-private distinction, Noddings’ argument clearly implies the inappropriateness of separating the two. The ethic of caring, properly applied, obviates the need for a difference between public and private.

The work of Kerr, Martin, and Noddings raises a fascinating set of questions, questions that must be tackled before we too blithely engage in the work of restoring public life in American society, or in revitalizing the difference between public and private life. Among these questions is the one posed by Rodney King after the violence that erupted when a jury found innocent the police who were video taped beating him with clubs: "Can't we all just get along?" he asked. A moment's reflection on this question suggests that we have a number of options for how we might all just get along.

For example, suppose that nurturance, domestic tranquility, or caring is sufficient for us to "all just get along." In this case, it seems unnecessary to pose a dual life, one private and largely domestic, the other public and largely civic. We can get along in the public sphere in the same way we get along in the private sphere, wherein what permits us to act in common with one another is a mutual desire to know, understand, care for, and sustain one another. On the other hand, suppose that the values argued for most strongly by feminist scholars are dependent on a sort of pre-existing relational bond, such as family, love, or close friendship. In this case, we would need different values in order to forge a relationship with those who are outside our circles of family, loved ones, and good friends. On what basis do we all just get along with those outside these circles?

One way to answer this question rather effectively is to posit a difference between private and public spheres, wherein a public sphere is created in order to transact human affairs grounded in relationships outside the boundaries of family,
loved ones, and close friends. Indeed a public sphere of this kind may be required to realize many of the promises of democratic life, wherein we are often required to transact affairs with people with whom we disagree, are in competition, or differ with on religious, racial, social, sexual, or other grounds. To transact these human affairs in ways most likely to allow each of us as individuals to pursue our own conceptions of the good life calls for a public realm of some kind, a place where we may meet, and while agreeing to disagree, we employ common speech, common values, and common sense to maintain and nourish both neighborhood and nationhood.

There appear to be two views of human nature and human possibility here. One view, represented by several of the feminist scholars mentioned above, believes very strongly in the classic, ideal values of home and hearth, positing these values as foundational for all human relationships. On this view, there is no need for a difference between private and public life; and there is a grave possibility that the persistence of this distinction is harmful to the true ideals of democratic life. The other view holds that the values so intimately associated with hearth and home will not serve well to sustain the transaction of political, social, and economic affairs. These values, it is argued, are dependent on certain forms of human relationship that do not obtain in the public sphere. Absent these relationships, the values will not work as a basis for regulation human interaction.

It is almost as if the protagonists, those who argue for a refurbished differentiation between private and public, are positioning themselves as hard-nosed empiricists, saying something like, "Sure, it would be wonderful if ideal domestic values could regulate human exchange in public settings, but it just doesn't work. And because it doesn't work, we need to build our public spaces on norms and values that will work there." The antagonists, those who argue against the private-public distinction by proposing a universality of ideal domestic values, rebut this claim with the contention that the antagonists settle too easily for the world as it is, rather than how it might be. They argue, "You say it will not work, but it could if we aspired to it, if we were willing to try. We agree that it does not work now, but we disagree that it cannot work. Consider what is gained by trying, for our position holds far more potential for ultimate human flourishing than what you say are the facts of the matter."

The issues posed by this dispute are important, powerful, and provocative. They demand that we ponder the public-private distinction with great care. At the same time, we are not free to sit by, watching the fabric of democratic life unravel while we deliberate on various possibilities for eliciting human goodness. Until the issues come into sharper focus, with some agreement on the grounds for resolving them, we must choose and act. For me the choice is to restore the differences between public and private, but not through some simplistic scheme to bring back
family values or to revitalize the teaching of history and civics in our schools. These are important, but they are artifacts of a restoration, not the restoration itself. The restoration itself must take place in both the private, domestic sphere, as well as in the public sphere.

In the private sphere, it must involve decent and dignified conceptions of parenting and child-rearing; it must provide time and opportunity for children and adults to build bonds of love and understanding; it must take place in settings that are safe; and it must include some minimal freedom from want. In the public sphere, it must acknowledge the value of difference while seeking the basis for commonness; it must permit us to communicate with one another without inflicting physical harm or psychological trauma; and it must challenge us to see that our individual visions of the good life are interdependent with the health of our communities, our states, our nation, and our world.

The accomplishment of these ends requires a public education that is attentive to both the private and public spheres; an education that does not glorify one and impugn the other, but serves as a bridge between them. As a result of a good public education, one ought to be better prepared for both realms of life, for as I have argued here, the success of both is requisite to the success of either. On this view, it matters not whether the education of the young is financed publicly or privately, by taxes or tuitions, by warrants or by vouchers. The point is that all schools, no matter how financed or how governed, are public schools in the sense that they bear a responsibility for the creation of public within American society.

It is vital to democratic governance that we distinguish between in here and out there. The difference is essential to realizing the promises of a liberal democracy. At the same time, we should be attentive to the possibility that a liberal democracy is not the form of democracy that ought to be continued in the United States. Nor should we necessarily continue the tight difference between private and public spheres that a liberal democracy seems to require. Thus while we are attending to the restoration of private and public realms, as a way of ameliorating the times in which we now live and that we anticipate for the near future, we must also be attentive to the possibilities for their eventual dissolution. This dissolution should come about as the result of a conception of human possibility and democratic governance superior to the ones that now regulate human transactions. Until that time is at hand, however, the better part of wisdom appears to be to restore what we have lost, in a way that does not carry the same troubling consequences of an earlier time.

Endnotes


10. It is probably not necessary to point out that the use of the term "liberal" in this context does not mean what it means when it is used to draw a distinction with "conservative." When modifying "democracy," the term "liberal" points to that form of democracy that stresses the welfare of the individual over that of the group or community. See Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, *Liberals and Communitarians* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992).


17. It is no easy matter to sort out Arendt's views on the relative standing of the private and public realms of human life. She certainly recognizes the intimate connection between the two, and acknowledges that critical life activities take place in the private realm. As best as I am able to ascertain, however, she does not see the private realm as a place where the young are prepared for participation in the public realm. The larger issue here is not whether the private is simply a logical necessity for there to be a public, but whether a private realm of a certain kind is required to have a public realm of a certain kind; i.e., whether a particular kind of private life is required for the formation of a public of the kind Arendt so obviously reveres.


23. It is tempting to point out that this other view is held primarily by males, though it would be an error to do so. Jean Bethke Elshtain and Judith Swanson are among the advocates for a distinction between public and private realms. The difference between the two views is not grounded in the sex of the scholars, but in the place they give to gender as a lens for studying and resolving this issue.