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Major Contributions to Sociological Theory
and Research on Empire, 1830s–Present

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INTRODUCTION: A HIDDEN GENEALOGY

Sociologists have analyzed empires throughout the entire history of their discipline.1 This chapter offers an overview of the major theoretical and conceptual developments in sociological research on empires, imperial states, and colonial societies during the past two centuries. I will focus on sociologists’ theoretical and empirical contributions to understanding the forms and developmental trajectories of these political entities.

The genealogy of sociological research on empires is largely a hidden one. The most general reason for this invisibility is disciplinary amnesia (Agger 2000: 168), that is, sociology’s general lack of interest in its own past. Another reason is the ritualized practices of training sociologists, undergirded by references to a handful of founders (Connell 1997). Sociology often seems committed to a vestigial view of science as progressing in a linear fashion, and this approach discourages investigations of earlier thinkers. Even among sociological specialists in empire there is little knowledge of the contents and the contours of sociological work on empires.2 Colonial researchers who were seen as full-fledged participants in the sociological field during their lifetimes, such as Roger Bastide or Richard Thurnwald, are retroactively reassigned to anthropology. Thus sociologists attribute theories of colonial syncretism and transculturation to cultural anthropology and literary criticism, for example, even though these theories were partly pioneered by sociologists. A more detailed investigation, as inaugurated in the first part of this volume, finds that sociologists have conducted imperial research since the beginning of the intellectual field of sociology in the nineteenth
century. There have been huge changes in emphasis and argumentation over time, of course. Sociological interest in ancient empires declined after the 1920s and resurfaced briefly during and after World War II (Eisenstadt 1963; Freyer 1948; Rüstow [1950–1957] 1980; Weber 1935) and again with the resurgence of historical sociology in the 1980s (Goldstone and Haldon 2010; Mann 1986). There have also been geographical shifts in the center of sociological interest in empire, with a concentration in France, Germany, and Italy during the interwar and immediate post-1945 periods and in the United States since the 1990s. This chapter will not map out these geographical shifts in much detail, much less try to explain them, but the chapters in the first section will fill some of these lacunae.

What follows is an overview of sociological resources for research on empires and the intellectual history of sociological research on empires. I am especially interested in the ways sociologists have analyzed the forms, developmental trajectories, determinants, and effects of empires. Let me briefly clarify these terms. “Forms of empire” concerns definitions of empires, colonies, and related imperial formations. Here the major sociological contributions include theories of colonialism and models of twentieth-century empires in which the sovereignty of dominated states is left largely intact even as they are brought under the sway of an imperial power. The word trajectory refers to the ways sociologists have described the developmental paths of geopolitical history. Theories of “alternative,” “multiple,” and “entangled” modernities have largely replaced earlier views of societies as moving along a common path from tribe to state to empire, or from tradition to modernity.

With regard to the determinants and effects of empires, I identify four main theoretical developments. First, earlier theories of empire typically sought to identify a single, primary, determining source of imperial politics. Contemporary sociological work, by contrast, emphasizes conjunctural, contingent, multicausal patterns of causality. Second, earlier theories tended to foreground political, military, or economic causal mechanisms, whereas current work integrates all these factors with attention to ideological, linguistic, psychic, and cultural processes. Third, earlier theories tended to be “metrocentric,” locating the driving source of imperial expansion and techniques of colonial governance in the global core. A more recent set of theorists twisted the stick in the opposite, “ex-centric,” direction, emphasizing the power of events, processes, and structures in the peripheries to shape the forms and even the very existence of colonialism (Robinson 1986). Most recently, analysts have integrated the metrocentric and ex-centric optics,
analyzing imperial systems as complex, overdetermined totalities in which powerful impulses may come from both directions, with cores shaping peripheries and vice versa. Theorists of imperial “fields” of social action, including colonial science (Petitjean et al. 1992; Steinmetz 2009a), development policy (Garth and Dezalay 2002), and the colonial state (Steinmetz 2008a), see those fields as sometimes being located entirely within the core or the periphery and at other times spanning these imperial spaces (Go 2008b; Steinmetz 2012c). The fourth, overarching development is the movement within political and historical sociology away from a focus on states as the highest-level order of political organization. Empires are increasingly understood as encompassing states and as having emergent properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of states (see chapter 9).

Since I am interested in charting theoretical contributions to the study of empires here and not in conducting a sociology of sociology, I will follow a diachronic organizational scheme. A diachronic approach is especially appropriate since it allows us to see how theorists and researchers are drawing on, rejecting, reconstructing, suppressing, or simply overlooking earlier members of their discipline. These patterns of disciplinary memory and amnesia, continuity and disavowal, can yield valuable insights for the sociology of science. Even if transdisciplinarity (Steinmetz 2007c) is a necessary goal in the human sciences, sociologists are best advised to enter into transdisciplinary encounters with a good understanding of their own discipline and its history. A diachronic analysis is useful for restoring to sociology some sense of its own accomplishments. This is especially important in the field of empire and colonial studies, which have been completely dominated in recent years by other disciplines. As we will see, several insights that have been claimed in recent years by postcolonial theory, anthropology, or history were actually pioneered by sociologists.

Of course, a transnational approach to the history of modern sociology (e.g., Heilbrun 1995; Platt 2010; Schrecker 2010) needs to be combined with nation-based comparisons (e.g., Abend 2006; Levine 1995; Wagner et al. 1999) if we are interested in understanding the field’s evolution. National intellectual fields are often distinct enough to produce radical misunderstandings when exiles or texts circulate without their original contexts (Bourdieu 1991b). The symbolic capital of sociological ideas or individual sociologists undergoes radical devaluation or inflation due to migration (Cusset 2003; Steinmetz 2010c). Each imperial state had a nationally specific system of higher education and unique intellectual traditions. Sociologists were recruited from a differing array of disciplines in each country during
each period of disciplinary foundation and refoundation. Sociology has therefore often had strong national peculiarities (Heilbron 2008) in spite of streams of international and transnational circulation. At the same time, because of the central role of emigration, exile, and scholarly exchange in many scholars’ lives, it can be highly misleading to assign sociologists or their schools and ideas to one or the other national tradition. The dangers of error due to a nation-state-based approach are exacerbated in the case of imperial sociologists, many of whom spend a great deal of time overseas in research sites or historical archives, interacting with scholars and laypeople from the colonized population and from other metropolitan nations. The socio-spatial contours of imperial social-scientific fields are shaped by the analytic object itself—by the empires being studied.

The discussion that follows is broken into four periods: 1830–1890, 1890–1918, 1918–1945, and 1945 to the present. Each period corresponds to important global developments and events in imperial practice and to developments in sociological theories of empire. It is important to caution against two possible readings of this periodizing scheme. Most of the imperial sociologists I discuss lived through more than one of these four periods, and some, including Alfred Weber and Richard Thurnwald, were active scientifically in at least three of them. In the discussion that follows, I usually introduce individual scholars in the context of the historical period when they first entered the intellectual or academic field. If I were engaged in an explanation rather than a presentation of their work, I would also discuss their social and psychic background before they entered the sociological field, since, pace Pierre Bourdieu, the professional field is not the only field “with which and against which one has been formed” (2007: 4). Second, this periodization is not meant to suggest any necessary or direct connection between science and imperial politics, each of which is usually able to remain relatively independent of the other. Indeed, patterns of sociological attentiveness to questions of colonialism and empire have often been extremely independent of ongoing geopolitics. For example, German sociologists became more, not less, interested in colonialism after World War I, even though Germany had lost its colonies and stood little chance of regaining them (Steinmetz 2009b). Nonetheless, ongoing imperial events do often shape intellectual thinking about empire.

Some of the most original sociological contributors to the study of empires and colonialisms include Ludwig Gumplowicz, Friedrich Ratzel, Gabriel Tarde, J. A. Hobson, Max and Alfred Weber, Maurice Leenhardt, René Maunier, Carl Schmitt, Paul Mus, Roger Bastide, Jacques Berque, Albert
Memmi, Georges Balandier, Paul Mercier, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Michael Mann. It is their contributions that I emphasize here, rather than the work of the many sociologists involved in practical imperial policymaking or anti-colonial activism.5

WHO IS A “SOCIOLOGIST”?

Who counts as a sociologist? Any disciplinary history must offer a working definition of the discipline in question. The extant research presents a spectrum of minimalist and maximalist definitional strategies. At one extreme, a discipline like sociology is defined as including anyone who defines himself or herself as a sociologist or who conducts research or teaches on topics he or she designates as “sociological.” This approach has the drawback of willfully ignoring the social processes of boundary creation that are emphasized in all social theories and that are especially prominent in intellectual and scientific life (Bourdieu 1993a; Luhmann 1995: 28–31). Equally problematic, I think, are studies that count as a sociologist anyone who publishes in a predefined list of sociological journals or uses the word or the language of sociology in their publication titles (Fleck 2007: 189; Hardin 1977). This approach begs the methodological question of determining which journals count as sociological and how these journals are hierarchically arranged—questions that are stakes in the sociology field itself. This approach ignores the complexities of interactions across disciplines rather than directly thematizing and theorizing these interactions (Bourdieu 1991b; Steinmetz 2011b).

A third approach counts as a sociologist only those with a doctorate or advanced degree in sociology or holding a professorship or research position in the field.6 This approach might seem more realistic, since, as Bourdieu (1996a: 226) notes, “one of the most characteristic properties of a field is the degree to which its dynamic limits . . . are converted into a juridical frontier, protected by a right of entry, which is explicitly codified, such as the possession of scholarly titles, success in competition, etc., or by measures of exclusion and discrimination, such as laws intended to assure a numerus clausus.” But scientific and academic fields vary historically and geographically in their divisions and degree of specialization and codification. A strict definition based on “juridical frontiers” would imply that before the 1960s sociology existed only in the United States, where it “became a university and college supported discipline much earlier and to a much greater extent . . . than it did elsewhere” (Morgan 1970: 170) and where there were already about a thousand sociology professors in the interwar period (Walther 1927: 1).
The only sociology post in a British university before 1945 was at the London School of Economics, however, and before 1961 "there were chairs of sociology in only five universities" (Platt 2002: 181). In France and Germany, two of the three countries—along with the United States—in which sociology is usually seen as having first emerged as an intellectual and academic discipline, there were no advanced sociology degrees until the last third of the twentieth century. In France there were only four sociology professorships in 1952 (Clark 1973: 33). In Germany there were fewer than fifty full-time or part-time sociology professors before 1933, even if we include teachers in the technical, commercial, labor union, women's, and "people's" colleges (Frauenhochschulen and Volkshochschulen; Fleck 2007; Lepsius 1983). Many of the founders of sociological associations and journals never held university positions in sociology. Max Weber obtained a professorship with "Soziologie" in its title only at the very end of his life, but he was widely acknowledged as a sociologist during his own lifetime and was seen as the discipline's most important figure by German sociologists during the Weimar Republic. Pierre Bourdieu, who was recognized in a survey of British sociologists in 2001 as one of the ten most important sociologists of the twentieth century (Halsey 2004: 171), earned an agrégation in philosophy at the École normale supérieure but never wrote a doctoral thesis (Lane 2000: 9; Lescourret 2009) and never studied sociology while a student. Indeed, most of the great French sociologists of the mid-twentieth century earned an agrégation in philosophy but not a sociology degree. Treatments of the history of sociology by American sociologists before 1945 focused on European, especially French and German, thinkers, as evidenced by Eubank's project on the "makers" of sociology and by overviews by Albion Small (1923–1924) and Harry Barnes and Howard Becker (1938). It would be a definitional absurdity if none of the founders or masters of sociology counted as sociologists.

What these examples illustrate is that there is no formal or deductive methodological rule that can adequately define membership in an academic field. Pierre Bourdieu's theory of semiautonomous fields offers a preferable solution to the problem (Bourdieu 1993b). As with any other kind of field, a scientific or academic discipline can best be understood through a historical reconstruction of its genesis, starting with its founders or nomothets—the founders of the scientific nomos (Bourdieu 1996a)—and tracing it forward. There is a constant process of genealogical reconstruction through which new figures are recognized and included by subsequent generations as disciplinary members or founders while others are expunged from the field's history or forgotten. Scientific genealogies and canons are therefore con-
stantly being revised. Decisions on inclusion in and exclusion from the field can be discerned only by reconstructing the judgments of acknowledged members of a field at any given moment. These “acknowledged members” will usually be direct “descendents” of the field’s nomothets. Reconstructing the horizon of recognition and nonrecognition according to contemporary actors’ own understandings of the situation is the only realistic criterion for determining who actually belongs to a specific sociological field, in order to avoid anachronistic oversights or inclusions. These considerations suggest that a discipline cannot be defined according to a priori definitions, strict academic credentials, precise institutional affiliations, or some arbitrary chronological cutoff point.

A field historical approach reveals that scholars’ membership in sociology can change drastically from one period to the next. In The Structure of Social Action, Talcott Parsons included as one of his four disciplinary founders Alfred Marshall, who is rarely read by sociologists today. The reverse process, by which previously ignored figures are inducted into a field, is illustrated by the reception of Siegfried Kracauer in German sociology. Kracauer “went largely unnoticed in sociological circles…in the scholarly world” of Weimar Germany (Frisby 1986: 161), even though he had studied with Georg Simmel and published on “sociology as a science” and on the white-collar masses (Kracauer 1922, 1928). This began to change after 1945, when a German sociology lexicon noted that his works “had not been sufficiently explored by German sociology until now” (Mierendorff 1959: 280). Nowadays Kracauer is included in German collections of the key works of sociology (e.g., Käsler and Vogt 2000: 230–233) and in some sociological encyclopedias (Gilloch 2006), and he figures both as a topic and as a theorist in current sociological research (Schroer 2007; Staubmann 1999). An extreme example of a fluctuating membership in the field is presented by Alfred Weber, Max Weber’s brother. Alfred Weber taught and supervised many of the rising stars of German sociology and social science at Heidelberg between 1918 and 1933 (Demm 1997). He also made a number of lasting contributions, including the very concepts of historical and cultural sociology (Geschichts-Soziologie and Kultursoziologie). Alfred Weber is credited with the concept, popularized by Karl Mannheim, of a “socially free-floating intelligentsia” (sozial freischwebende Intelligenz; Demm 2000a: 264). After 1945, however, Talcott Parsons joined forces with the new rising star in German sociology, René König, to marginalize Alfred Weber, declaring him a nonsociologist (Demm 2000a: 220). Alfred Weber’s ostracism from the field was enhanced by the combined forces of postwar Americanization, political
conservatism, and suspicion of any and all German intellectual traditions, including those of someone like Weber, who had renounced his professorship when the Nazis came to power and moved from liberalism to Social Democracy after the war. Most recently a small countermovement has succeeded in publishing Alfred Weber’s collected works and pushed to reestablish him as a founding sociologist (Bräu et al. 1997–2003; Demm 2000b; Kruse 1990, 1999).

Field autonomy is, of course, always relative autonomy—relative to external forces, institutions, and movements. Because of the vulnerability of field dynamics to external determination, it is sometimes possible to determine the membership of a field using information other than the judgments of direct field participants. One familiar form of external determination is when a university administration overturns a department’s department to hire or grant tenure to a scholar who has also been endorsed by referees from the disciplinary field. An even more extreme instance of external determination of scientific fields is the Nazi purge of German universities starting in 1933. This led to a dramatic narrowing not just of the personnel in sociology through the firing of Jewish and Leftist academics but also of the styles and topics of acceptable research and teaching (Klingemann 1989, 2009; Paulsen 1988). The German sociology field effectively lost almost all of its autonomy. After 1945, membership in the (west) German sociological field was influenced not just by patterns of emigration and return but also by American foundations and universities and policy decisions of the American occupiers. For example, Siegfried Landshut earned his doctorate under Alfred Weber and wrote an ill-fated habilitation thesis on the “critique of sociology” (Landshut 1929; see Nicolaysen 1997: 103–115). In 1933 Landshut emigrated to Egypt and then to Palestine and then taught at Hebrew University. He returned to Hamburg in 1951 as a professor of political science, a new discipline that was being heavily promoted by Americans at the time (Bleek 2001: ch. 8).

Goudsblom and Heilbron (2001) distinguish between two periods of sociology’s formation: as an intellectual discipline (1830–1890) and as an academic discipline (1890–1930). The latter is defined in terms of shared ideas and the existence of “units of teaching, research, and professional organization” (Heilbron 1995: 3). This suggests that sociology existed as a field before it had dedicated professorships, departments, or courses of university study, and that we need to extend our analysis back to at least 1830. The word sociologie was used as early as the 1780s, by the Abbé Sièyes (Guilhaumou 2006) and was popularized by Auguste Comte in the early nineteenth century.
Academic sociology emerged in the late nineteenth century in the United States, Japan (Akimoto 2004), Russia (see chapter 2), and in most other European countries and somewhat later in the colonized countries and the global peripheries: after the 1911 Republican Revolution in China (Gransow 1992), during the 1920s in India (Mukherjee 1979), and after 1945 in Australia (Germov 2005; Macintyre 2010), for example.\textsuperscript{10}

In sum, the boundaries of "sociology" in each geographic or historical instance can best be established by considering the dual processes of recognition and institutionalization. The first of these criteria refers to practices of inclusion and exclusion of potential members by the founders of the disciplinary field and by each subsequent group of insiders. The second criterion refers to institutional mechanisms such as the attainment of an advanced degree that can strengthen claims to membership in a given field and, equally important, strengthen an individual's investment in that field.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{EMPIRE, IMPERIALISM, COLONIALISM, AND THE STATE: WORKING DEFINITIONS}

The overarching concept in any discussion of imperialism and colonialism is empire. An empire can be defined minimally as a relationship "of political control imposed by some political societies over the effective sovereignty of other political societies" (Doyle 1986: 19; see also Eisenstadt 2010: xxii–xxiii). Empires are also defined by a restless expansionism, which, \textit{pace} Gumplowicz (see below), is not characteristic of all nation-states. The word empire initially referred to large agrarian political organizations formed by conquest (Goldstone and Haldon 2010: 18; Koebner 1955, 1961; Pagden 2003). Rome was the prototype and original referent of this "watchword" (Koebner 1954: 122),\textsuperscript{12} but it became conventional for historians to extend the word to such diverse polities as Achaemenid Persia, Akkad, and China from the Qin Dynasty to the Qing. Ancient empires typically combined militaristic expansion with mechanisms aimed at stabilizing conquered populations by offering peace and prosperity in exchange for subjection and tribute (Mann 1986: 145; Pagden 2003: xvi–xxiii, 13, 26). One result of the endless waves of territorial conquest and political incorporation in the ancient world was that empires were multicultural or cosmopolitan, although some integrated the conquered populations into the core culture to a greater extent than others.

The second keyword in the present discussion is imperialism. This polemical neologism was coined in the nineteenth century to decry Napoleon's despotic militarism. It was subsequently applied to the regimes of
Napoleon III and other oppressive rulers (Koebner and Schmidt 1964: 1–26; Spann 1923: 838). As Arthur Salz noted, the addition of -ism to Imperium added connotations of illegitimacy and anachronism and suggested “a sort of hubris and extravagance” (1931: 4). Historians quickly extended the word backward in time to Rome itself (Jones and Phillips 2005), which was now cast in seemingly redundant terms as an “imperialist Imperium.” Eventually imperialism was used to describe the behavior of empires at all times and places (e.g., Mann 1986: 176). The contributors to the often authoritative Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Fisch, Groh, and Walther 1982) contend that the word imperialism remained semantically frozen as a “counterconcept” serving only “to vehemently attack the political strategies of others” (Jordheim 2007: 125). This is largely accurate for the nineteenth century, but the idea was transformed into a more objective concept around the turn of the century. Arthur Salz defined as imperialist all efforts by a state to increase its power through territorial conquest.

A different definition of imperialism, associated with J. A. Hobson, Achille Loria, Rudolf Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg, Nikolai Bukharin, Vladimir Lenin, and a host of Marxists (Brewer 1990), recast the political word imperialism in economic terms. Imperialism came to mean, for many people, capitalism’s quest for investment opportunities, raw materials, or sources of lower-cost labor power outside its national boundaries. Several German writers including Otto Hintze ([1907] 1970), Joseph Schumpeter ([1919] 1951), Walter Sulzbach (1926), and Arthur Salz (1931) immediately pushed back against this economic narrowing of imperialism by reasserting the concept’s political character and attacking the idea that capitalists were inherently warmongering (Sulzbach 1942).

In order to retain the original meaning of imperialism as geopolitics while also differentiating it from colonialism, it should be understood as a form of political control of foreign lands that does not necessarily entail conquest, occupation, and permanent foreign rule. Imperialism is thus “a more comprehensive concept” than colonialism, since it “presupposes the will and the ability of an imperial center to define as imperial its own national interests and enforce them worldwide in the anarchy of the international system.” This means that empires often treat colonies “not just as ends in themselves, but also [as] pawns in global power games” (Osterhammel 2005: 21–22).

The third keyword in this discussion, colonialism, is based on the Latin verb colere (meaning to inhabit, till, cultivate, care for) and on the related word colonus (meaning tiller of the soil), which points in the present context
to the Roman *colonii* (Weber 1891, 1998a). The words *colony* and *colonization* are also linked to the expansion of the Roman Republic. Colonialism as a word and a modern practice emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Colonialism is distinguished from both imperialism and settler “colonization” (Belich 2009; Elkins and Pedersen 2005) in three main ways. First, in colonialism, territorial takeover through conquest or purchase is followed by the seizure of sovereignty and durable foreign rule over the annexed space. Imperialism, by contrast, leaves sovereignty largely in the hands of the dominated polities and may not involve any movement by the imperial power into foreign territory. Second, modern colonialism does not necessarily involve the installation of settlers in conquered territories. This stands in contrast to “colonization,” which always involves settlement in and as a “colony.” Third, modern colonial rule is organized around assumptions of racial or civilizational hierarchy that are enforced through law and administrative policy. These official inequalities prevent almost all colonized subjects from attaining citizenship status and rights equal to the colonizers. By contrast, ancient empires often integrated the conquered completely into their culture. Since modern imperialism does not claim sovereignty over the dominated peripheries, it is in no position to implement policies there, except in short-term emergency situations. Of course there is a spectrum of variations of sovereignty and legal-political differentiations between conquerors and conquered, dominant and dominated. Many political situations are located in an intermediate zone between colonialism and imperialism. Indeed, powerful modern states almost always combine different imperialist and colonialist strategies rather than choosing between them (Steinmetz 2005a). Colonial strategies sometimes morphed into imperialist ones, and vice versa.

A final key term in the present discussion is the *state*. During the second half of the twentieth century most sociologists used the word *state* when referring to political organizations that had historically been called empires. An entire subfield of “the sociology of the state” emerged on the heels of the earlier German *Staatswissenschaft*, or state science, in which concepts of empire were almost entirely absent. Whereas early sociological textbooks like Giddings’s *Elements of Sociology* (1915: 284–287) and Park and Burgess’s *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924: 725–726) had included discussions of empires, comparable textbooks and encyclopedias after 1945 avoided the topic. This started to change only very recently (e.g., Ritzer 2007).

Any discussion of empire needs to specify the place of the *state*, just as the sociology of the state often cannot grasp its object fully without also
attending to empires. States figure at three main points in the analysis of empires. First, there is always a state at the core of every empire (Schmitt [1941] 1991: 67). An empire, as Friedrich Naumann ([1915] 1964) suggested, can be imagined as a solar system, with the core state representing the sun and the colonial or imperial peripheries in the role of planets. The planets in the imperial solar system may themselves possess two different kinds of states. On the one hand, colonizers usually smash existing native polities or refunction them to create colonial states. Colonial states are controlled by the foreign invaders but are also relatively autonomous from the core metropolitan state and the conquered population (Steinmetz 2008a). On the other hand, colonial powers typically rely on some version of indirect rule. Residual native polities (homelands, Bantustans, tribal reservations, etc.) therefore coexist with colonial states (Lugard 1928; Mamdani 1996); the colonized retain some influence over their own internal affairs, even if they cannot participate in the affairs of the central colonial state. The third way in which states figure into discussions of empire concerns imperial developmental trajectories. States may eventually obtain empires, as was the case for the United States. Conversely, empire-possessing states may devolve into states *simpliciter*, as with the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires after World War I. The relationship between empire and state needs to be clarified before one can begin the discussion of empires. But sociologists have often ignored this distinction, referring to empires as states. In fact, one of the greatest sociological analysts of empire formation, Ludwig Gumplowicz, framed his entire analysis as a study of “states.” My main topic is colonialism, imperialism, and empires, but states will also be considered here as the coordinating centers of empires, as the origins and endpoints of empires’ historical trajectories, and as offshoots of metropolitan power in the colonies. As mentioned above, my specific topics are the origins, forms, developmental trajectories, and effects of empires. Sociological analyses of these objects fall roughly into four broad classes, variably emphasizing political, economic, cultural, or social processes and causal mechanisms. Historical sociologists since Max Weber have recognized that social events and objects are almost always conjuncturally overdetermined and cannot be explained by a single causal mechanism or law (Steinmetz 2010a; Tilly 1995). An adequate explanation of any aspect of an empire will therefore need to combine political, economic, cultural, and social mechanisms. The theories presented here should be understood not as mutually exclusive but as potential building blocks for a more adequate, multicausal account of imperial history.
FOUR PERIODS OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON EMPIRE
1830–1890

The first period was bookmarked at one end by the French invasion of Algeria, which signaled the onset of the second wave of European colonialism, and at the other by the parceling out of Africa among the European powers.\textsuperscript{20} This period also saw the founding of sociology as an intellectual disciplinary field (if not yet an academic one). Several of the key founders of the intellectual field of sociology, including Auguste Comte, analyzed colonialism, while others directly advised imperial governments or participated in colonial policymaking (e.g., John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville).

Proto-Sociologists as Colonial Analysts, Critics, and Policymakers:
Comte, Tocqueville, and Marx

Auguste Comte and Alexis de Tocqueville, who are today generally considered to be two of the founders of modern sociology, also represent two poles in the discipline’s permanent struggle between critics and supporters of empire and over sociologists’ proper relationship to politics. Comte tutored a student who participated in the French expeditionary force to Algeria in 1830 (Burke 2002: 41) and anticipated Durkheim ([1912] 1995) and Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg (1915) in using evidence from contemporaneous non-Western cultures as proxies for earlier stages of European development. But Comte was no supporter of colonialism. In the *Cours de philosophie positive* he argued that early-modern colonialism “opened new opportunities for the warrior spirit by land and sea,” thereby prolonging “the military and theological régime” and delaying “the time of the final reorganization” (Comte [1830–1842] 1975: 128–129). Comte believed that “Catholicism, in its decay, not only sanctioned but even instigated the primitive extermination of entire races” and created a system of colonial slavery, which he called “a political monstrosity.” Countries in which investors became “personally interested” in overseas colonies saw an increase in “retrograde thought and social immobility” (720). Comte concluded his discussion with an optimistic diagnosis of the cunning of history, however, reasoning that while colonialism “systematically destroyed the races of men,” it simultaneously undermined the belief in racial inequality by demonstrating to Europeans that positive science and industry were “destined to include the whole human race” (129–130). Comte’s argument about the negative effects of colonialism on metropolitan political culture was repeated by British liberal social thinkers like Herbert Spencer, Leonard Hobhouse, and J. A. Hobson and was taken up by more recent critics of “empire as a way of life” (Maskovsky
and Susser 2009; Steinmetz 2003a; Williams 1980) and in postcolonial discussions of the centrality of the imperial margin in metropolitan culture (Said 1993).

Like Comte and later Hobson, Tocqueville warned against the creation of a large class of French military heroes returning home from colonial wars and assuming “distorted proportions in the public imagination” (2001: 78). But while some readers of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America have mistakenly believed that its author rejected “every system of rule by outsiders no matter how benevolent” (Berlin 1965: 204), this was far from the case. After visiting the Algerian colony, Tocqueville wrote several reports on it for the French Parliament. In a long essay in 1842 he insisted that France could not abandon the Algerian colony without signaling its own “decline” and “falling to the second rank.” The Algerians, he wrote, must be fought “with the utmost violence and in the Turkish manner, that is to say, by killing everything we meet” and employing “all means of desolating these tribes” (Tocqueville 2001: 59, 70–71). Securing French control of the colony would require the creation of a sizable settler community. Tocqueville’s study of British rule in India ([1843] 1962) confirmed his strong support for European colonialism. He rejected the social evolutionary view of the colonized as an earlier version of the colonizer in favor of a theory of unbridgeable difference and asymmetry, arguing that the fusion of Arabs and French into “a single people from the two races” was a chimerical goal (Tocqueville 2001: 25, 111). This antievolutionary stance pointed toward European native policies of “indirect rule” or “associationism” in which the colonizer tries to preserve cultural difference within a hierarchical, dualistic legal framework.

Karl Marx offered an influential account of the sources of European global expansion and the effects of colonial rule on the colonies. Capital accumulation for Marx is an inherently expansive process, leading to the “entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market, and with this, the growth of the international character of the capitalist regime” (Marx 1976: 929). In the final chapters of volume 1 of Capital, Marx connected the processes of primitive accumulation occurring at the “dawn of the era of capitalist production” to “the discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blacksins.” These “idyllic proceedings” overseas, according to Marx, were “the chief moments of primitive accumulation.” The colonial system spurred the concentration of capital, as the “treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement, and murder

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flowed back to the mother-country and were turned into capital there.” Marx suggested that colonialism played a “preponderant role” in the period of manufacture but that its importance receded in the era of machinofacture (Marx 1976: 915, 918). Marx died in 1883, however, just when the second scramble for overseas colonies was beginning and too late to comment on the new forms of colonial expansion. His comments on imperialism as the centerpiece of primitive accumulation and colonies as sites for high rates of exploitation and profit (Marx 1967: 150–151) were picked up by later Marxists (e.g., Harvey 2003).

Marx also wrote a series of articles for the New York Post in which he described colonialism as clearing away the cobwebs of Oriental despotism and feudalism and allowing capitalism to take root in the peripheries (Marx 1969). Although this more “optimistic” reading of colonialism has been rejected by most twentieth-century Marxists (but see Warren 1980), Marx’s comments on the Chinese Taiping Rebellion in 1853 seem less in thrall to nineteenth-century civilizational prejudices. In an article entitled “Revolution in China and Europe,” Marx prophesied that “the next uprising of the people of Europe . . . may depend more probably on what is now passing in the Celestial Empire . . . than on any other political cause that now exists” ([1853b] 1969: 67). This was a precocious statement of the thesis of the “colonial boomerang,” described by Jean-Paul Sartre (1963: 20) as a form of violence that “comes back” at the colonizers “who have launched it.” Herbert Marcuse restated this thesis, arguing that “by virtue of the evolution of imperialism, the developments in the Third World pertain to the dynamic of the First World,” and that “the external revolution has become an essential part of the opposition within the capitalist metropoles” (1969: 80, 82). More recent versions of the boomerang thesis include Michael Mann on the ways in which imperial Rome provided the “semicivilized” Germanic tribes with the military and economic techniques that sustained Rome’s “assassination” (1986: 294) and Chalmers Johnson (2000) on “blowback” against the American Empire.

*Gumplowicz and the Origins of the Nonbiological Militarist Theory of the Formation of States (and Empires)*

A signal contribution to the analysis of empire was made by the Polish-Austrian sociologist Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838–1909). To my knowledge, Gumplowicz was the first writer to use the adjective “sociological” (soziologische) in a German language book title (Gumplowicz 1883). Gumplowicz’s understanding of geopolitics was shaped by his personal experience as a
subject of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires (Barnes 1919a: 401–402). Some commentators have misleadingly characterized Gumpowicz as a proponent of “nineteenth century racist theory” (Mann 1986: 54), a Social Darwinist (Johnston 1972: 323–326), or even a forerunner of fascism (Lukács 1981: 691). In fact, after his very early book Rasse und Staat (1875), Gumpowicz “distanced himself... from the anthropological-biological concept of race” (Mozetić 1985: 199) and criticized thinkers like Spencer and Schäffle who compared society to a biological organism. He insisted that the “laws of social life were not reducible to biological... factors, but constituted a field of investigation sui generis” (Weiler 2007: 2039). Although Gumpowicz did describe human history as an eternal “race struggle” (Rassenkampf), he defined “race” [Rasse] not in biological terms but as as a “social product, the result of social development.” Although race was a sociological phenomenon, Gumpowicz argued that the social classes in Western countries “nonetheless behave toward one another as races, carrying out a social race struggle” (1909: 196–197, note 1). Warfare was not determined by racial differences; instead, warfare imposed a racial format on struggles between groups and nations (Gumpowicz 1883: 194).

Like many other nineteenth-century thinkers influenced by Darwinism Gumpowicz argued that society was “an aggregate of groups continuously struggling against each other since time immemorial.” Each group feels superior to and tries to exploit every other group—a process Gumpowicz called “ethnocentrism” (Ethnocentrismus; Gumpowicz 1879: 254). Warfare was the “compelling” (Zwingende) force in human history, domination (Herrschaft) “the pivot of all events in the historical process” (Gumpowicz 1883: 194, 218). The “wars of civilized nations are essentially nothing but the ‘higher forms’ of... primitive wars of plunder and pillage” (166). The culmination of a history of “almost uninterrupted warfare” was the creation of states, which tend to grow ever larger (176). Following Gumpowicz, sociologists like Tilly (1975: 73–76; 1990: ch. 3), Collins (1978: 26), and Mann (1984) have argued warfare drives state expansion, in a process limited only by resource constraints and the countervailing force of other states pursuing the same goals.

Gumpowicz did not, however, refer to the largest or highest-order political organizations as empires. He typically used the word Reich, or empire, only when referring to the polities that historians had always called empires, such as Rome. Intriguingly, Gumpowicz broke with this pattern only once, when discussing the United States, which he saw as “seeking today to unify itself with the South American states into a large American Reich” (1910: 157). Gumpowicz’s failure to develop a systematic conceptual language
to talk about empires probably stemmed from his association with the discipline of *Staatswissenschaft* (Gumplowicz 1875: iv), an academic field that avoided the topics of colonialism and imperialism, according to Lindenfeld (1997: 292). Central European “state theory” from Hegel to Max Weber largely aligned the idea of empire with ancient history and the idea of the state with modernity.

Reading Gumplowicz *symptomatically*, however, we can extract some useful ideas for distinguishing between modern states, empires, and overseas colonies. Territorial political organizations that originate in conquest are almost always confronted with problems of ethnic or cultural heterogeneity. Gumplowicz distinguished between the subset of “national states” in which “a more or less general culture has covered up the originally heterogeneous component parts” and another subset of “states with a ‘nationally more mixed’ population,” like the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Gumplowicz 1883: 206). This second group of states was characterized by the fact “that the heterogeneous ethnic components relate to one another in a condition of super- and subordination, that is, in a relationship of domination” (*Herrschaftsverhältnis*; Gumplowicz 1883: 206). The ongoing subjection of conquered territories or minorities, along with restless political expansiveness, is the defining characteristic of empires as opposed to nation-states.

*Friedrich Ratzel: World History as a Tendency Toward the Formation of Giant Empires*

Friedrich Ratzel, who described his work as being located at the “border region between geography and sociology” (1897: 3), saw giant empires as the starting point and culmination of all political development. Ratzel grounded his analysis in a supposed general “natural” law reminiscent of Gumplowicz according to which all peoples are animated by the impetus to expand and conquer: “Nature,” he wrote, “does not allow a people to stand still in the long run” (Ratzel 1882, vol. 1: 116). Ratzel added a cultural dimension to this argument, suggesting that “the more nations become conscious of global spatial relations, the more they engage in the struggle for space” (Hell forthcoming; Ratzel 1923: 264–267). For Ratzel, world history was a succession of “politically expansive powers” or empires, all of them modeled on Rome, although many of these were “larger than Rome.” He rejected the idea, popular in Europe since Polybius (1979), of a “deeply rooted law of dissolution of large empires” and did not believe in “some inexorable law of rise and decline, but in the alternation of expansion and contraction of spaces across time” (Hell forthcoming).
1890–1918

The second period began with the completion of Africa’s partition and ended with the collapse of the Ottoman, Russian, and Austrian empires and the transfer of the German colonies and Ottoman provinces to new northern overseers under the League of Nations Mandate system. This period also saw the creation of the first university chairs in sociology and the founding of sociological associations and departments. Key figures in each national sociological field contributed to the study of empire during this period, including Franklin Giddings (1900) and William Graham Sumner (1911) in the United States; Max Weber (1998a, 1998b, 2010), Alfred Weber (1904), and Leopold von Wiese (1914a, 1914b, 1915) in Germany; René Worms (1908) and Gabriel Tarde (1899) in France; and Hobson (1902) and Patrick Geddes (1917) in Britain. An international “congress of colonial sociology” was held in Paris in 1900 (Congrès international de sociologie coloniale 1901). René Worms, founder of the Institut international de sociologie, presided over the Sociology and Ethnography section of the annual French Colonial Congress starting in 1907 (Anonymous 1907).

Sociologists and Practical Imperial Policy, 1890–1918

In the British, French, German, and American overseas colonies, policies for governing the colonized—so-called native policy—was largely elaborated in situ by colonial officials at the level of the colony’s headquarters or even at the district and local levels (Delavignette 1939; Goh 2007b; Steinmetz 2007b). Professional social scientific research played only a minor role in colonial policymaking before 1918, however, even if native policies drew on ideas from a broader archive of ethnographic representations that included but was not limited to anthropological texts (Steinmetz 2007b). Nonetheless, metropolitan social scientists began to reflect seriously on the practical aspects of colonial policy and to propose ideas to government officials. Between the 1870s and the 1890s the geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen corresponded with German statesmen and published detailed guidelines for seizing and governing a future German colony in China (Steinmetz 2007b). Friedrich Ratzel elaborated on his preference for “colonies of settlement” over “colonies of exploitation” (1923: 102–105), a preference linked to Ratzel’s notorious concept of Lebensraum, or living space (Neumann 2009: 136). Ratzel’s main statement on the idea of Lebensraum appeared in a Festschrift for the founding German sociologist Albert Schäffle (Ratzel 1901). In his book-length essay on colonialism, Schäffle distinguished between what he called “passive colonization” and
the forms of “active political colonization” (*politische Aktivkolonisation*) that Germany was involved in at the time of his writing (Schäffle 1886–1888, part 2: 126). Passive colonization designated the kinds of activities undertaken by German missionaries, traders, and explorers in the decades and centuries leading up to the Scramble of the 1880s. Alfred Vierkandt, who held the first sociology chair at Berlin University, published a book on two of the categories that played a central role in the formation of German colonial policies: the ideas of *Kulturvölker* and *Naturvölker*, or “cultural and natural peoples” (1896). Richard Thurnwald, who would go on to teach sociology and ethnology at Berlin University after World War I, carried out field research before the war in the German colony of New Guinea (Figure 1.1).

Max Weber’s hyperimperialist political views were directed mainly toward support of Germany’s projection of its power on a world stage (*Weltpolitik*); he was largely indifferent to overseas colonialism (Mommsen 1984). Alfred Weber argued that German capitalists could profit handily by doing business in other countries’ empires and did not need German colonies (Weber 1904). During World War I, Max and Alfred Weber lent active support to plans hatched by Liberal politician Friedrich Naumann ([1915] 1964) for
indirect German hegemony over the countries to the east. Germany would lead this “transnational federation of states” while “respecting the freedom of the smaller nations and renouncing annexation” (Alfred Weber, in Demm 1990: 207, 209). Dutch sociologist S. R. Steinmetz (1903) extensively analyzed indigenous “customary law” in European colonies. Patrick Geddes, the most frequently cited sociologist before 1950 in the pages of the British Sociological Review (Halsey 2004: 174) and the first sociology professor in India at the University of Bombay, devised a theory of imperial urbanism (Geddes 1917: ch. 11) and a program of ameliorative colonial urban planning (Geddes 1918). Geddes’s work was promoted by British officials in India who believed that blight was a source of growing anticolonial sentiment (Meller 1990: 299).

The Comparative Method, Evolutionary Social Theory, and Imperialism

The comparative method, as it used to be called (Steinmetz forthcoming-a), was rooted in the assumption that sociology should seek general laws, following the example of the natural sciences—or at least, emulating the natural sciences as they were incorrectly understood. Pareto (1893: 677) wrote that “it is by comparing civilized with savage society that modern sociologists ... have been able to lay the basis for a new science.” Many of the members of Émile Durkheim’s inner circle were connected to colonialism as an analytic object, research setting, or source of information. Durkheim relied on information gathered by European colonial officials, travelers, and missionaries on non-Western and colonized peoples to build an evolutionary theory of society. Maksim Kovalevsky, a sociologist and legal historian at St. Petersburg University, followed Sir Henry Maine (Mantena 2010) in framing his comparative research at the scale of the Russian Empire, understood as a “diverse space that could accommodate the comparative exploration of social forms” and the different temporalities of a universal process of social evolution (chapter 2; Timasheff 1948).

Although sociologists now disparage evolutionary and modernization theories as empirically feeble and politically conservative, these ideas were politically progressive in certain contexts. In Third Republic France after the Dreyfus affair, Durkheim’s evolutionary analysis in Elementary Forms of Religious Life suggested a commonality among all cultures, from Australian Aborigines to contemporary French. According to early Russian sociologist Evgenii de Roberti, an evolutionary sociology offered a powerful critique of “superstitions and errors” by suggesting that even backward Russia would one day converge with liberal Western societies (Resis 1970: 226).
Evolutionary social theories were revived after 1945 under the guise of modernization theory. The modernization framework was also partially progressive in its rejection of European colonialism and colonialism's "rule of difference" (Chatterjee 1986), although it simultaneously laid the intellectual groundwork for the global American Empire (Gilman 2003). The idea of modernity as a singular "point of convergence" (Taylor 2001: 181) has long accompanied empire. The opposite perspective, which sees civilizations as developing along differing paths, already emerged in the eighteenth century (Herder [1784] 1985) and the Romantic era. I will defer discussion of these ideas until later, since they have again emerged in full force.

_Empire as a "World State": Gabriel Tarde_

Gabriel Tarde was perhaps the first sociologist to envision the culmination of political history as a unitary world state, which he called an "empire." In _Les transformations du pouvoir_ (1899) and _Psychologie économique_ (1902), Tarde claimed to discern a general tendency toward the centralization of political powers and the "agglomeration of states into larger units" (Lazzarato 2002: 382–385; Toscano 2007: 601). While criticizing French colonial conquest as a "veritable national cannibalism" and a "collective form of slavery," Tarde praised the Roman Empire for encouraging "competition open to all creative and generous small nations, whose inventions would remain sterile and unperceived without [the empire]" (1899: 161). Like Rome, a future centralized empire would transform "an illogical diversity into a logical diversity," systemizing and intensifying the many "unruly differences and oppositions" (177; Toscano 2007: 600). Although the idea of a world state had been advocated by many earlier theorists of international relations, from Francisco Suárez to Christian Wolf and Immanuel Kant, they all had rejected the idea of universal empire "in the Roman sense" (Hill 1911: 116). Tarde, however, suggested that the preservation of "diversity" within a global political organization had a specifically imperial dimension. Tarde distinguished this form of empire from _imperialism_, which, although it "may have been the only method for pacifying populations by crushing them two millennia ago" was now "nothing more than a... monstrous despotism combined with a gigantic and collective rapaciousness" (1902, vol. 2: 441). More recent theories of global political unification have been divided as to whether political history will end in a megastate (Naroll 1966) or giant empire (C. Schmitt [1955] 1995), and whether such unification will preserve cultural difference or eliminate it.
J. A. Hobson: Imperialism as a Function of Capitalism and as the Ruin of Democracy

The most famous contribution to the study of empire from this period is Hobson's *Imperialism*, published in 1902 and still in print. Although Hobson never held a university position, he was a member of the editorial committee of the British Sociological Papers, attended the meetings of the British Sociological Society, and published in journals like *Jahrbuch für Soziologie* and the *American Journal of Sociology*. Hobson wrote in his autobiography that he “might wish to claim the title of sociologist” (1938: 64, 71–81). He had a far-reaching influence on subsequent discussions by redefining imperialism as a mainly economic phenomenon rather than a primarily political one. According to Hobson, imperialism was driven by overaccumulation, under-consumption, and finance capital’s search for new markets and investment outlets. Imperialism signaled a repudiation of free trade. It did not benefit capitalism as a whole but only sectional interests (Hobson [1902] 1965: 49, 59, 67). Imperialism could be eliminated, he suggested, by redistributing wealth domestically and thereby raising consumption levels (75, 81, 83).

The second half of *Imperialism* focused on the wider effects of empire, especially in Britain itself. Contrary to Marx, Hobson argued that imperialism’s impact on the global periphery was catastrophic. The sources of the “incomes expended in the Home Counties and other large districts of Southern Britain,” he wrote, “were in large measure wrung from the enforced toil of vast multitudes of black, brown, or yellow natives, by arts not differing essentially from those which supported in idleness and luxury imperial Rome” (Hobson [1902] 1965: 151). Politically, the trend in the colonies was toward “unfreedom” and “British despotism,” except with regard to white settlers (151). Turning to the imperial homeland, Hobson echoed Spencer (1902a, 1902b) and many other British Radicals and New Liberals (Porter 1968) in arguing that imperialism struck “at the very root of popular liberty and ordinary civic virtues” in Britain and checked “the very course of civilization” (Hobson [1902] 1965: 133, 162). Governments use “foreign wars and the glamour of empire-making, in order to bemuse the popular mind and divert rising resentment against domestic abuses” and to distract attention from “the vested interests, which, on our analysis, are shown to be chief prompters of an imperialist policy” (142). Imperialism overawes the citizenry “by continual suggestions of unknown and incalculable gains and perils the . . . sober processes of domestic policy,” demanding a “blind vote of confidence” (147–148). Jingoistic ideology cements a hegemonic bloc that unites various social classes in support of imperial adventures (Hobson
Empire degrades daily life in the metropole by cultivating a military habitus that “unfits a man for civil life,” training him to become “a perfect killer” (Hobson [1902] 1965: 133–134). British children are taught a “geocentric’ view of the moral universe” and their playtime is turned “into the routine of military drill” (217).

Hobson’s argument that “autocratic government in imperial politics naturally reacts upon domestic government” ([1902] 1965: 146–147) was echoed by his sociologist colleague Leonard Hobhouse (1899, 1902, 1904). It anticipated Arendt’s (1958) argument about imperialism’s corrosive effect on democracy and more recent discussions of the reflux of empire into metropolitan culture by postcolonial theorists (Said 1993). Hobson continued to revise his analysis of imperialism between the wars in response to criticisms of his economic narrowing of the concept. By 1926 he argued that “power-politics furnish the largest volume of imperialist energy, though narrow economic considerations mainly determine its concrete application” (Hobson 1926: 192–193).

_Even though he acknowledges Otto Hintze, Max Weber, Robert Michels, and the Noneconomic Explanation of Ancient Empires and Modern Imperialism_ Resistance to the economically straitened definition of imperialism set in swiftly among German-speaking social scientists. German sociologist Robert Michels explained Italy’s turn toward colonial aggression with reference to population pressure, national pride, and the “natural instinct for political expansion” (1912: 470, 495). In his 1907 essay “Imperialismus und Weltpolitik,” historian Otto Hintze insisted on imperialism’s inherently political character. Hintze also distinguished between Roman “ancient imperialism” and “modern imperialism.” Ancient imperialism had been oriented toward political expansion and conquest and was based on a “relatively closed civilization,” one “that refuses the right to exist of everything foreign that cannot be assimilated” (Hintze 1970). Modern imperialism overcomes the ancient orientation toward world domination, seeking instead a balance among the great powers. Napoleon promoted a “great federative system” of empires that would “give the world its laws,” rather than accept a British global domination of politics and trade. After 1815 a liberal era of free trade and industrialism “seemed to replace the era of mercantilism and militarism.” Toward the end of the century, however, Britain began to reorganize its colonial empire in the face of mounting challenges to its global domination. Other colonial empires were created in response to the British one and in competition with one another. The goal of present-day imperialism was not a single world.
empire but a system of smaller world empires coexisting side by side—a sort of Westphalian system of larger units, on a grander scale. Hintze’s analysis here resonated with Hobson’s discussion of “Imperial Federation” in the penultimate chapter of Imperialism (Hobson [1902] 1965: 328–355).

The nonlinear path of social scientific history is sharply illustrated by the case of Max Weber, whose work staked out many of the arguments currently being rediscovered by sociologists of empire. Weber came to be known as a theorist of the state and bureaucracy in U.S. sociology, but he was just as much a historical sociologist of empires. Weber’s work on empires and imperialism is spread across many different texts, starting with his 1891 habilitation thesis on Rome (Weber 2010) and continuing through Economy and Society (Weber 1978). Weber defended a nonteleological and nonlinear approach to civilizational history, exploring the reasons for Rome’s decline, arguing that the great world civilizations each followed distinct developmental paths, and describing the West’s modernity as a mix of progress and dystopia. In his writing on the Roman Empire he paid equal attention to core and periphery, centralizing and decentralizing impulses. Perhaps most important, Weber distinguished carefully among different types of higher-order political organization, including states and empires. Although his careful definition of the state is widely accepted, Weber’s work is also a corrective to a historical sociology that is organized exclusively around states rather than empires.

At the center of Weber’s analysis of Rome was the movement away from a compact, contained central state and outward toward the far-flung empire of conquests and the decentralized structure of manorial power. Another key theme for Weber was the political determination of economic facts, and this informed his analysis of Rome.25 “Ancient capitalism was based on politics,” he wrote (Weber 1998b: 364). The network of Roman roads “served the army, not commerce.” Rome’s decline resulted from the shift in the political center of gravity from the cities to the countryside, which was at the same time a move from a predominantly commercial economy to a static, subsistence-oriented “natural economy” concentrated in the latifundia. Weber signaled his argument about the primacy of politics by altering the normal Marxist usage of the words “superstructure” and “infrastructure,” describing the expansion of the Roman exchange economy and international trade as “a sort of superstructure [Überbau],” “a thin net,” resting on the “infrastructure [Unterbau] of natural economy” ([1896] 1924: 294). Over time the Roman slavery-based rural estate became an autarkic “oikos,” “independent of markets” and satisfying its own consumption needs (Weber 1998b: 359;
Landowners and *colonii* began to flee the cities for the rural manors (Weber 2010: 163–164). Whereas the earlier “basis of Roman public administration” had been located in the cities, over time the rural estates were “removed from urban jurisdiction” and “great numbers of rural properties . . . started to appear alongside the cities as administrative units.” The large landowners and their interests gained a “new prominence in the policies of the Later Roman Empire” (Weber 1998a: 401; 1998b: 360). The central state was increasingly organized along “a natural economy basis,” with the fiscus “producing as much as possible what it needed” and relying on in-kind payments and tribute (Weber 1998a: 405). As the army was dispersed to the peripheries to protect the great landowners, it was increasingly professionalized and de-Romanized, its members recruited locally (Weber 1998b: 361). The Roman cities “crumbled” and “came to rest on [the rural manors]” like “leeches” (Weber 2010: 164, 166). Weber thus attributed the empire’s collapse to the “shift of society’s centre from the coasts to the hinterland” and the “throttling” of capitalism (Weber 1998b: 358), rather than to the barbarian invasions, the rise of Christianity, or any of the other proximate causes emphasized in the literature of his own era.

Weber also analyzed Rome’s expansion as a process of conquests and colonial settlement. Most of Rome’s growth occurred under the Republic, which actually became an empire, analytically speaking. At least a third of the land in the conquered polities was “divided among Rome and its allies” (Weber 1998b: 306). The impetus for Roman expansion was both political and economic: “Rome provided for her landless citizens (*cives proletarii*), the peasantry’s offspring,” through “distributions of land and colonial foundations.” Indeed, distribution of conquered land was “what the hoplite army fought for” (307). The inhabitants were treated differently in each of the “citizen colonies,” sometimes being “simply incorporated into the ranks of the colonists,” elsewhere being “reduced to the status of commoners” or some other unequal status (Weber 2010: 46–47).

Weber’s discussion of imperialism in *Economy and Society* adopted some of the arguments of writers like Hobson. He allowed that “one might be inclined to believe that the formation as well as the expansion of Great Power structures is always and primarily determined economically” (Weber 1978: 913). Capitalism in the present had shifted from a generally pacifist orientation to an aggressively imperialist stance, Weber asserted. At the same time, Weber continued, that while “the economic importance of trade was not altogether absent; yet other motives have played their part in every overland political expansion of the past.” “Empire formation” in general “does not
always follow the routes of export trade” (914–915). Territorial political organizations were motivated toward expansion by concerns deriving from the “realm of ‘honor’” or the quest for the “prestige of power,” even if they “vary in the extent to which they are turned outward” (910). The specifically “political drives for expansion” might be reinforced by capitalist interests, but at the same time “the evolution of capitalism may be strangled by the manner in which a unified political structure is administrated,” as in the late Roman Empire (915). Echoing Ibn Khaldun’s theory of imperial overstretch, and Alfred Weber’s refutation of the economic benefits to German capitalists of a colonial empire (Weber 1904), Max Weber suggested that “countries little burdened by military expenses... often experience a stronger economic expansion than do some of the Great Powers” (901). The relations between economic and political impulses varied over time; sometimes they were mutually reinforcing, but other times politics trumped or violated economic imperatives.

1918–1945
The third period saw the consolidation of European colonialism and the rise of anticolonial movements, especially in India. At the beginning of this period, discourses of cultural pessimism and degeneration combined with the collapse of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and German empires to reinvigorate ancient theories of imperial cycles. Sociologists continued to propose theories of imperialism that avoided economic reductionism. A sizable group of ethnologists, sociologists, and ethno-sociologists theorized colonial cultural syncretism and anticolonial resistance. At the end of the period social scientists began analyzing Nazism as a form of empire. Some discussed geospatial spheres of influence without territorial annexation as the dominant emerging form of empire.

Discourses of Degeneration and the Cyclical Rise and Fall of Empires
The early twentieth century saw a revival of ancient theories about cycles of empires. Since Polybius (1979), empires have been shadowed by discourses about their inevitable demise (Hell 2008, 2009, forthcoming). These arguments gained a new urgency at the end of the nineteenth century with the rising tide of theories of cultural degeneration. One of the most influential statements of cultural pessimism was Oswald Spengler’s (1920–1922) Decline of the West, a wide-ranging narrative of the rise and fall of civilizations and their crystallization as empires in their final, degenerate phases. The idea of the cyclical rise and fall of nations and empires was elaborated by the

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fascist demographer and sociologist Corrado Gini (Gillette 2002: 40–41; see chapter 4). Indeed, there has been a periodic—dare I say cyclical?—return of the idea of cycles of empire (see Eisenstadt 1963; Ferrari 1896; Gini 1938, 1941a, 1941b; Mann 1986: 168; Naroll 1966) and of the inexorable demise of empires (Eisenstadt 1967; Kennedy 1987; Motyl 2001; Tilly 1997a; Wallerstein 2003), as well as continuing sociological fascination with the reasons for the decline of empires (Sassen 2006: 92, note 35).

*Sociological Accounts of Imperialism: Oppenheimer versus Schumpeter, Salz, Sulzbach, and Davy*

At least one leading sociologist from the interwar period, Franz Oppenheimer, accepted the Marxist argument about the capitalist roots of imperialism. Where Oppenheimer’s thought diverged from Marxism was in combining the militaristic theory of the state with an approach that privileged economics causally and politically. Oppenheimer also followed Gumpowicz, whom he called a “pathfinder,” in arguing that the state is a “social institution that is forced by a victorious group of men on a defeated group, with the sole purpose of regulating the dominion of the former over the latter and securing itself against revolt from within and attacks from abroad” (Oppenheimer 1919: 10). This was a universal theory: “all States of world-history have to run the same course or gauntlet, torn by the same class-struggles . . . through the same stages of development following the same inexorable laws” (Oppenheimer 1944: 551). The second volume of Oppenheimer’s *System der Soziologie* was entitled Der Staat. Like his short 1919 book with the same title, this was organized according to a historical sequence running from the primitive “conquest state” through maritime, feudal, Ständestaat, and absolutist forms of the state. Rather than culminating in constitutionalism, however, as in the 1919 book, Oppenheimer now concluded with a utopian vision of a “classless society,” a “true ‘democracy’” (1926: 795), one in which capitalist landlord ownership would be abolished and large industrial firms would be owned by the workers (740, 744). By reforming land tenure patterns and encouraging communal colonization, the living standards of the poorest classes would be raised and class differences abolished (Oppenheimer 1926: 764, 772; 1958: 87, 90). His utopia’s political form would be a consensually governed federative republic at the national level and a “federation of free federations” or *Eidgenossenschaft der Staaten* at the global level (Oppenheimer 1926: 731, 795, 794, 797). Centralized states, with their emphasis on sovereignty and monopolization of violence, would cease to exist (773–774). The “sovereign” in this world federation would be the law (804).
Although Oppenheimer referred to Rome as a Reich and a Kaiserreich (Oppenheimer 1929: 401, 382) and to the formation of a number of medieval Reiche (Oppenheimer 1933), he used the word Reich mainly as a name, not as a concept. The only generalization Oppenheimer offered was in his definition of “primitive giant empires” as collections of even more primitive conquest states, and his argument that these empires typically collapse back into a “pile of individual states” (1926: 584). But Oppenheimer did discuss “imperialism” at some length. The medieval Arab empires engaged in “aristocratic exclusive imperialism” (Oppenheimer 1933: 692). The final volume of System der Soziologie described colonialism as a continuation of a “politics of plunder” (Oppenheimer 1935: 1292). “Capitalism” in its highest stage, which was the penultimate stage before the classless society, was essentially imperialist (Oppenheimer 1926: 788). Wages in capitalist countries were too low to ensure that workers could “buy back their products,” so capitalists were driven to seek foreign markets and to seek surplus profits from the “proletarians of foreign countries” (789–790). The “struggle over the world market” was therefore a “vital need of the capitalist bourgeoisie” (790), leading to war and protectionism. The Roman Empire, Oppenheimer now claimed, had also been driven toward expansion by the limited capacity of the “domestic market” (1929: 332).

Most members of the second generation of German sociologists—those who earned their doctorates or obtained their first university posts during the Weimar Republic—amplified the critique of economicist accounts of colonialism and empire. Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, who moved to Bonn University in 1925 (and from there to Harvard in 1932), published an influential essay on imperialism in 1919 in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, the leading journal in the nascent German field of academic sociology. Schumpeter defined imperialism here as the “objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion” (1951: 6). He traced the “birth and life of imperialism” not to capitalist economic motives but to the atavistic drives of the declining aristocratic ruling class and to appeals to “instincts that carry over from the life habits of the dim past,” especially the “instinctive urge to domination” (7, 12). Schumpeter claimed that imperialism was “best illustrated by examples from antiquity” (23). Against Hobson and the Marxists, Schumpeter insisted that “the bourgeois is unwarlike” and that imperialism could “never been have evolved by the ‘inner logic’ of capitalism itself” (97). For Schumpeter, Marxist accounts were part of a broader rationalizing disavowal of the irrational sources of the primitive urge to dominate.
Schumpeter’s arguments were adopted by the Frankfurt University sociologist Walter Sulzbach, who argued that “the imperialism of modern capitalist countries can be regarded as an out-flow of the policies of military and political leaders who, pretending to represent the vital national interests of their peoples, are using entrepreneurs and foreign investors as pawns in order to justify their policy of aggression.” Sulzbach distinguished “sharply between the political elite and the business leaders and stipulate[d] antagonistic interests of the two” (Hoselitz 1951: 363; Sulzbach 1926). Nationalist fervor rather than capitalism was responsible for imperialism (Sulzbach 1929). From the 1920s through the 1960s Sulzbach continued to argue that the bourgeoisie “everywhere defended disarmament and agreement between nations” and that “really big capitalists” had very little interest in territorial expansion (Sulzbach 1959: 168, 210). Along similar lines, the Heidelberg social scientist Arthur Salz published a synthetic study of imperialism that defined it in political terms as encompassing efforts by a state to expand its power through the conquest of territory.28 The economic definition of imperialism was misleading, Salz insisted: imperialism existed before capitalism; capitalist accumulation is often peaceful (Salz 1931).

French sociologist Georges Davy, a member of the original grouping around Durkheim, rejected the economic approach to empire in From Tribe to Empire: Social Organization among Primitives and in the Ancient East, a study coauthored with Egyptologist Alexandre Moret. Their central argument, as summarized by historian Henri Berr, was that “the enlargement of societies is accomplished by violence” and that “imperialism” was itself “inspired by the ‘will to growth’—a brutal will” (1926: xix, xxiv). They also relied on Durkheim’s theory of totemism to make sense of the centralization and monopolization of power in ancient Egypt, adding a symbolic dimension to discussions that had hitherto foregrounded politics and economics (Moret and Davy 1926).

Theories of Colonial Transculturation, Mimicry, and Anticolonial Resistance
Theories of colonial hybridity, syncretism, and transculturation might seem peripheral to the history of sociology if one limited one’s vision to recent decades, when these discussions have been dominated by literary theorists and cultural anthropologists. The pioneers of these theories, however, were mainly students of Marcel Mauss who defined themselves as sociologists or ethno-sociologists, or British social anthropologists, many of them students of Max Gluckman, who were equally at home in the two disciplines.29
In the middle decades of the twentieth century, colonial sociologists and social scientists stopped looking for pristine, untouched native cultures and became interested in processes of colonial transculturation. The background for this shift is complex. Colonial governments had been less concerned with “primitivism” among their subjects than with the danger of large numbers of partially assimilated “natives.” Concern about the “illegibility” of culturally mixed subjects was a key motivation behind the colonial state’s focus on “native policy,” whose aim was to urge the colonized to adhere to a stable, uniform definition of their own culture (Steinmetz 2003b). Most native policy sought to restrict the colonized to a codified version of their “traditional” culture. Social scientists oriented their research toward discovering the coherent “traditional” culture that native policy would try to reinforce. Colonial social scientists therefore typically sought out informants familiar with tradition or untouched by Western culture, around whom they could construct their narratives. In British-ruled Tanganyika in the 1920s, for example, colonial governor Donald Cameron instructed his district officials to become amateur anthropologists and to gather information on ancient tribal traditions, which colonial policy would then seek to resurrect (Austen 1967). More autonomous social scientists, like Durkheim, were also most interested in unassimilated natives, albeit for different reasons—as evidence for theories of evolutionary development.

By the time Claude Lévi-Strauss published Tristes tropiques in 1955, the idealized figure of the “noble savage” had been dismantled. Lévi-Strauss could only allude wistfully to his “great disappointment” in the Brazilian Indians, who were “less unspoiled than [he] had hoped.” Their culture was now “a compromise,” entirely lacking in “poetry” (Lévi-Strauss 1997: 154, 172). For most of the colonial social researchers who started calling themselves sociologists during the middle decades of the twentieth century, however, it was these less “poetic,” syncretic cultures that proved most interesting.

One of the first sociological analysts of colonial transculturation and resistance was Maurice Leenhardt, who interpreted the messianic “Ethiopian” church movement in southern Africa as a form of subaltern resistance via appropriation of the colonizer’s culture (Leenhardt [1902] 1976). In his subsequent work Leenhardt interpreted indigenous New Caledonian culture along similar lines. Following an initial period of brutal expropriation and cultural decimation, the French Oceanic colony had become a syncretic society. Transculturation ran in both directions between Europeans and Melanesians, in a process Leenhardt called a jeu des transferts (play of cultural transfers; Leenhardt 1953: 213). Along similar lines, sociologist
Gilberto Freyre, a student of Franz Boas, analyzed colonial Brazil as a “hybrid society” ([1933] 1946). Anthropologist Melville Herskovits developed a theory of “acculturation” under conditions of colonial slavery and argued that the mixing of European and African traditions was a “fundamental ... mechanism in the acculturative process undergone by New World Negroes” (1941: 184–185; 1937, 1938).30 Herskovits eventually replaced the concept of syncretism with reinterpretation, defined as forms of “cultural borrowing” that “permit a people to retain the inner meanings of traditionally sanctioned modes of behavior while adopting new outer institutional forms” (Herskovits and Herskovits [1947] 1964: vi).

Many ethno-sociologists contributed to theories of the culturally transformative effects of colonialism in the interwar period. Richard Thurnwald addressed the “crisis” in native life that had been precipitated by sustained contact with the colonizer’s culture and technology (Thurnwald 1931–1935, vol. 1: 21–22). Thurnwald analyzed cultural mixing by distinguishing between “culture” and “civilization,” echoing Alfred Weber (1920–1921). Societies could be arranged along a scale in terms of their “civilizational” level, defined in terms of technology and technical knowledge, but such linear comparisons were impossible at the “cultural” level (Thurnwald 1935: 4; 1939b: 422–423). In 1936 Thurnwald discussed the “crisis of imperialism” and the emergence of anticolonialism in an “awakening Africa” (1936: 80), and argued that “inherent in imperialism is the ‘hybris,’ the overbearing insolence of the dominant stratum,” which “inescapably leads to its nemesis,” in the guise of “a new generation of natives ... which has been educated in schools by Europeans, in ways of thought that are European, and in using devices introduced by Europeans” (84).31

Many of Marcel Mauss’s students began focusing on colonial hybridity between the wars. As mentioned above, Durkheim had been uninterested in the partly Westernized Other or cultural métissage resulting from imperial contact. The publications that resulted from expeditions sponsored by the Paris Ethnological Institute tended to ignore “everything that did not correspond to the image of a preserved Africa” (De l’Estoile 2007: 148). But in L’Afrique fantôme (Leiris 1934) and “The Ethnographer Faced with Colonialism,” Michel Leiris attacked “the tendency to attach oneself by preference to peoples one can qualify as relatively intact, either out of a love of a certain ‘primitivism’ or ... exoticism.” The most “authentic” Africans, Leiris insisted, “the most interesting, humanly,” were the ones that ethnographers usually saw as “mere imitators” of Western culture (Leiris 1989: 124–127). René Maunier, promoter of a field he called colonistics (la colonistique) and
author of *Sociology of Colonies*, was another forerunner of theories of anti-colonial resistance and cultural melding. Maunier conceptualized colonization as a “social fact” involving “contact” between two “hitherto separated” societies (Maunier 1949: 5–6). Although Maunier’s definition of colonialism did not emphasize the centrality of racism or the colonial “rule of difference,” he specified that colonialism was always based on a “doctrine of domination” (29, 19). Analyzing the rise of independence movements in the colonies, Maunier argued that “colonization itself organized the space of Algerian nationalism and gave it its main idea” (Henry 1989: 143). Maunier also discussed the reciprocal imitation between colonizer and colonized, adumbrating a theory of colonial mimicry (*mixité*). For Maunier, colonial cultural mixing included not just the “fusion” or “racial and . . . social blending of the two groups” but also the “conversion of the conqueror by the conquered” (1949: 124, 535). Roger Bastide, a specialist in Afro-Brazilian religion, developed a “sociology of the interpenetration of cultures” (1948, 1960) based on the concepts of *bricolage* from Lévi-Strauss. According to Bastide, the “gaps” in collective memory resulting from the collective trauma of the uprooting of African slaves from their homeland were selectively filled in by homologous or structurally similar materials found in the new culture (Bastide 1970–1971). The Afro-Brazilian *candomblé*, which resembled a mystical trance, was for Bastide a coherent religious system (Bastide 1958, 1970–1971). Mexicanist Jacques Soustelle studied the Otomi Indians, whose culture he described as a veritable “clash of civilizations” and “an original synthesis” (1937: 253; 1971: 132, 137). Indian converts “were not so much renouncing their old beliefs as incorporating them into a new body of faith and ritual,” forging a “Hispano-Indian and Christiano-pagan syncretism” (Soustelle 1971: 137, 121). If many of these ideas sound familiar today it is because they were articulated so powerfully during the middle decades of the twentieth century by a number of anthropologists and ethno-sociologists (Steinmetz 2009a).

A final twist was the integration of psychoanalytic concepts to the analysis of colonized consciousness and anticolonial movements. Although this approach is usually associated nowadays with authors like Wulf Sachs, Octave Mannoni, and Frantz Fanon, it was also developed by sociologists working in French colonial North Africa. Jacques Berque, a sociologist specialized in Northern African societies, argued that the Algerian war was “not just ‘sociological’ . . . but also . . . psychoanalytical: reaffirmation of a mutilated unconscious” (Berque 1958: 102). Sociologist Albert Memmi framed his analysis of the “sociology of relations between the colonizer and
the colonized” (1957) explicitly around the question of the importance of adding a psychoanalytic to a Marxist economic lens (Memmi 1967: xiii). Sociologist André Adam explored the “contribution of psychoanalysis to the knowledge of North African societies” (1965).

Nazi Germany and the Postwar United States as Empires: Arendt, Neumann, Schmitt, and Aron

In the middle decades of the twentieth century some social scientists began arguing that empires were increasingly based on indirect and informal control of peripheries rather than permanent occupation and foreign overrule. This theory of informal empire developed largely as a reflection on the geopolitics of the United States and pre-World War II Nazi Germany. In the early 1920s Arthur Salz discussed the new, highly “elastic” form of U.S. imperialism in Latin America that “leaves its victims with the appearance of political autonomy and is satisfied with a minimal amount of political violence” (1923: 569). After World War II Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (1953: 205) described the American strategy as one in which “one power may seek to expand its military area of control by establishing naval and air bases abroad without assuming overt political responsibility” over “foreign political bodies.” Franz Neumann (2009: 136) noted that empires often eschew conquest altogether in favor of something “midway between influence and outright domination.” Starting in 1942 Carl Schmitt discussed the new American nomos that would install itself “upon the ruins of the old” ([1942] 1997: 59). In a postwar discussion of “the new nomoi of the earth,” Schmitt held out the possibility of a “combination of several independent Großräume or blocs” that could counterbalance the American and Soviet nomoi (Schmitt [1950] 2003: 355). Schmitt developed his concepts of the Großräume (great space) and the nomoi of the earth as a modern form of empire in which the controlling state renounces “open territorial annexation of the controlled state” but absorbs a “space far exceeding the boundaries of the state proper” into its own “spatial sphere” (252, 281). René Maunier echoed Schmitt in comparing U.S. hegemony over the Western hemisphere to German plans to dominate Central Europe (Maunier 1943: 141). Similar ideas underlay discussions after the war of a future European federation as a counterweight to the United States (Anter 2008; Joerges 2003; Kaiser 1968; Masala 2004). Alexandre Kojève proposed a Mediterranean, French-led nomos that would encompass northern Africa and provide a counterweight to American dominance (Howse 2006; Kojève 2002). Raymond Aron suggested that France should unify the European nation-states against the three great

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“empires”—the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom—by “coordinating them, tightening their relations to one another, and to instill in them little by little the idea of a larger order” (1945: 358–360, 368). Although Aron insisted that France itself would not “rise to the level of the empires,” his vision of a French-led hegemonic federation closely resembled Schmitt’s model of empire as Großräum or nomos. More recent discussions of unified Europe as a nomos or counterempire have their origins in these wartime and immediate postwar discussions.

Many of the same ideas were used to analyze Nazi Germany as a kind of empire. Hannah Arendt (1945–1946, 1950) analyzed overseas imperialism as a “prefiguration” of Nazi totalitarianism. Franz Neumann’s Behemoth compared Hitler’s foreign policy to the U.S. Monroe Doctrine and sketched out a theory of “great spaces” as empires (Neumann 2009: 130–218). Nazi geopolitical theory traced its lineage back to Ratzel, who shattered “traditional conceptions of the state” and emphasized the need “to develop a popular consciousness of large spaces” (Neumann 2009: 139). Geographer Karl Haushofer argued that “the category of great power must be replaced by world power” (Neumann 2009: 144). German world power, for Haushofer, would be anticolonial, supporting the self-determination of colonized and racial minorities (Neumann 2009: 144). “Geo-jurisprudence” would “reformulate international law in terms of vassals, dependencies, protectorates, and federations worked out on geopolitical principles” (151). The culmination of this analytic move from states to empires was represented by Schmitt, with whom Neumann had studied in Germany. Schmitt had already analyzed imperialism as a practice of ordering transnational space prior to the Nazi seizure of power (Schmitt [1932] 1940). In 1941 Schmitt proposed a model of the Monroe Doctrine for Germany, shortly before Hitler himself proclaimed a “German Monroe Doctrine” (Schmitt [1941] 1991). Schmitt labeled this supranational political order Großräum, or greater space; subsequently he introduced the concept of the geopolitical nomos ([1942] 1997: 371; [1950] 2003). Schmitt contrasted “the regional, anti-universalist space principle” of the Germans with the universalistic, abstract space principle of the British empire (Neumann 2009: 158). This meant that “there is no longer one international law but as many as there are empires, that is, large spaces” (158). Schmitt argued that “the decline of the state . . . represents a major practical trend,” and he refused “to call the legal relations between the rival empires international law,” a term that had “been misused for imperialistic aims” (159–160). Within a given empire or Großräum, Schmitt argued, “the conqueror imposes a hierarchy of races,” and within “countries dominated by
Germany,” the “German minority receives the status of a dominant minority” (163, 165).

Sociologist Wilhelm Mühlmann, a student of Richard Thurnwald, developed a program for distinguishing the ethnic groups in the Nazi-occupied eastern territories that were amenable to re-Germanization and absorption—a process he called “trans-folking” (Umvolkung).³⁵ According to Mühlmann, “Subjective ethnic conversion under the superior weight of the foreign ethnic gradient corresponds to surrendering to the enemy in war. . . . The suffering ethnus constitutes small . . . ethnic islands that become ever more tightly surrounded and finally give way before the flood of the stronger ethnic group” (1942: 296). This was a theory for German domination of the east that stopped just short of advocating racial extermination of those not suited for assimilation.³⁶ It resembled the European colonial practice of evaluating individuals on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they could receive “white” or European legal status (and be employed as collaborators).³⁷

1945–PRESENT

After 1945 the United States and Soviet Union struggled for influence over the newly independent postcolonies. Since 1990 there has been a shift to a unipolar global system. Most recently, China has started to challenge American hegemony (chapter 10). Sociological thinking about empire and related topics was dominated initially in this period by modernization theory, which was then challenged by theories of dependency, underdevelopment, and the world system. Social scientists from the former colonies became increasingly prominent in these discussions (e.g., Alavi 1981; Appadurai 1991; Chatterjee 1993; Gaonkar 2001; Goh 2005; Hermassi 1972; Mamdani 1996; Mazrui 1968). The most recent period has seen a proliferation of multicausal, historical analyses of empires, exemplified by the work of Michael Mann (1986, 2003; chapter 7), and of colonies.

Modernization Theory and Neo-Marxist Responses

After 1945 modernization theory was closely associated with American foreign policy, which eventually came to reject European colonialism (Louis and Robinson 1993; Sulzbach 1963; Williams 1959) in favor of a view of all cultures as equally suited for democracy, capitalism, and the American way of life. Modernization theory itself subsequently came under attack as imperialist and neocolonialist (Hermassi 1972: 3; Mazrui 1968; Tipps 1973). Marxists began analyzing the exploitation of the global peripheries through
mechanisms that bypassed colonial rule, such as unequal conditions of exchange (Frank 1969).

A powerful alternative approach was developed by Immanuel Wallerstein. After working for more than a decade as an Africanist, Wallerstein began to examine the structural constraints preventing postcolonial Africa from succeeding economically and politically (Wallerstein 1971). His answer was presented in *The Modern World System* (1974–2011), whose historical arc swept from the conquest of the New World to the nineteenth-century “settler decolonization of the Americas.” Wallerstein argued that there are two kinds of world systems or intersocietal divisions of labor: *world-empires*, with a single political authority, and *world-economies*, organized politically as a plurality of competing sovereign nation-states (Wallerstein 1979: 5; 2004: 57). The capitalistic world economy initially treated Africa as an “external area”; after about 1750 Africa became a “periphery” providing slaves; after 1800 “the slave trade was gradually abolished,” facilitating “the reconversion of [African] production to cash cropping” and preparing the continent for the “imposition of colonial administration,” which “made it possible to establish [European] primacy” in African “economic transactions” (Wallerstein [1970] 1986: 14–16). World system theory explains the historical ebb and flow of waves of colonial annexation and decolonization in terms of shifts in the degree of hegemonic centralization within the global core. If a single state (or group of states) dominates the core economically and politically, it enforces free trade and eschews colonialism; when there is no hegemon, each core state throws up protectionist barriers and tries to secure exclusive access to markets and raw materials in the periphery, which often involves setting up colonies (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980; Boswell 1989).

**The Historical Sociology of Colonialism after 1945**

A new historical sociology of colonialism started to emerge during the 1950s and 1960s among French sociologists. Georges Balandier (1951) analyzed colonialism as a unique, overdetermined social formation, a Sartrian “situation.” In *Sociologie actuelle de l’Afrique noire*, Balandier compared the differing responses to colonialism by the Gabonese Fang and the Bakongo of the French Congo (Balandier 1955a: 14–15). The differences were due to a mix of internal and European-induced factors. The Fang had become “unemployed conquerors” lacking any central leadership; the Bakongo had been involved in the slave trade and were more rooted in their territory, more hierarchical, and better acquainted with other tribes. The French government attempted to curtail the prominence of Bakongo in the colonial administration dur-
ing the 1930s but ended up strengthening the modernist elite’s anticolonialism, which filled “the ‘political void’ that resulted from the diminished authority of the traditional chiefs” (Balandier 1955a: 354–355). Balandier’s *Sociologie des Brazzavilles noires* focused on Bakongo urbanites who had resettled in Brazzaville. He found that urban Bakongo did not abandon their traditional culture or their connections to rural countrymen and that they developed a “precocious awareness of the inferiority created by the colonial situation” (Balandier 1955b: 388). Balandier’s coauthor Paul Mercier rejected linear developmental models, emphasizing the “considerable discontinuities in the development of colonial societies” and “multiple determinants, sometimes in contradiction with one another” (Mercier 1954: 65, 57). Cultural practices “that seem to be ‘traditional’ in these societies actually represented ‘responses’ to relatively recent ‘challenges’” (Mercier 1966, p. 168, note 1). Mercier criticized the application to African societies of Western and Marxist concepts like social class and nationalism (Mercier 1954, 1965a, 1965b).

In his earliest publications, Pierre Bourdieu blamed Algerian underdevelopment not on the Algerians’ own shortcomings but on the “shock effect of a clash between an archaic economy and a modern one” (1959: 55). In *Sociologie de l’Algérie* he asked how different groups of Algerians reacted to this “clash of civilizations” (Bourdieu 1958: 119). Bourdieu described the Kabyle as a historical society that had been continuously reshaped by episodes of conquest by Arabs and Europeans (16). Discussing Algeria’s Arab speakers, he argued that few societies “pose the problem of the relations between sociology and history more sharply,” since they had “suffered the most directly and the most profoundly from the shock of colonization” (60). The second edition of *Sociologie de l’Algérie* included a discussion of French land annexations and settlements, which produced a “tabula rasa of a civilization that could no longer be discussed except in the past tense” (Bourdieu 1961b: 125, 107–118). Bourdieu insisted on the “special form this war acquired because of its being waged in this unique situation,” namely, a colonial one (1961a: 28–29). The radical transformation effected by uprooting, resettlement, and war was the subject of a book Bourdieu coauthored with his Algerian student and colleague, sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad (Bourdieu and Sayad 1964).

According to the Althusserian theory of the *articulation of modes of production* (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1969; Rey 1973; Wolpe 1980), colonialism typically combined capitalist and noncapitalist modes of production in ways that were functional for capitalism, lowering the costs of reproducing labor power and yielding higher profits (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1988). Hamza Alavi (1981) called the combined social formation a *colonial mode of production*.
Despite this theory's residual economic reductionism and functionalism, it was more open to the complexity and uniqueness of historical processes and events than were earlier Marxist approaches (Berman and Lonsdale 1992; Dederer 1988).

The “peripheralist” or “excentric” approach argued that resistance and collaboration by the colonized is at least as important as impulses coming from the core in determining whether European states engage in colonialism at all and in shaping colonial rule (Robinson 1972, 1986). Collaboration by the colonized provides an explanation for the colonial state's frequent decisions to preserve traditional social structures (Robinson 1986: 272, 280). The peripheralist approach drew on the earlier studies of creative reinterpretation of Western culture by Herskovits, Leenhardt, and other students of Mauss.

Since the 1960s, historical sociologists of empire have drawn on various elements of this diverse theoretical legacy. In an excellent study of nationalist movements in French North Africa, Elbaki Hermass (1972) emphasized the effects of the differing length of colonial occupation, the class identities of colonial rulers, the character of native policies, and the strength of the precolonial autochthonous state. Mahmood Mamdani’s analysis (1996) of South African apartheid built on the articulation of modes of production framework, arguing that the traditional mode of production in South Africa—“decentralized despotism”—was produced by the colonizers’ reliance on collaborators and “indirect rule” and was accompanied by “customary law” and “tribalization.” The capitalist structure of South African urban zones, by contrast, was a result of direct colonial rule. Here Africans were excluded from civil freedoms and subjected to racialization rather than tribalization (Mamdani 1996: 18–19).

Other recent historical studies of empire by sociologists have drawn on neoinstitutionalist theory. In Bandits and Bureaucrats (1994), Karen Barkey showed how endemic banditry challenged the Ottoman state and how that state managed its relations with these former mercenary soldiers through deals and patronage. In Empire of Difference (2008), Barkey developed a “hub and spoke” model of the Ottoman Empire’s approach to ruling. In an empire shaped like a rimless wheel (Motyl 2001), the cultures located at the end of each “spoke” are connected only to the core but not to one another, explaining the empire’s ability to persist for such a long time.

Another set of approaches are broadly culturalist. David Strang (1990) analyzed decolonization by using a cultural world systems approach. Julia Adams (1994, 2005a) drew on principal-agent theory and combined it with a cultural analysis of the meanings of family and gender in the early modern
Netherlands in order to understand the form of colonial merchant capitalism and state formation. In *Orientalism*, Edward Said posited an "absolute unanimity" between Orientalism and empire, in which "from travelers' tales, and not only from great institutions like the various India companies, colonies were created" (1978: 104, 117). An outpouring of work inspired by Said and Michel Foucault emphasized the effects of European representations of the non-West on subsequent colonial and imperial activities. Some applications of this theory greatly exaggerate the homogeneity of Western discourse about the non-West and underestimate the role of nondiscursive mechanisms in shaping colonial rule. Nonetheless, this approach provided an essential corrective to earlier theories of empire that ignored or failed to specify the independent effect of discursive and cultural processes. In *Colonizing Egypt*, Timothy Mitchell (1988) argues that a generic European modern consciousness was replicated in the self-modernization of nineteenth-century Egypt and other parts of the colonized world. Steinmetz (2003b, 2007) demonstrated that precolonial archives of ethnographic images and texts codetermined subsequent colonial native policies (see also Goh 2005, 2007b, 2008). Go (2008a), in a study of American colonialism in the Philippines and Puerto Rico, reframed Herskovits's reinterpretation theory, looking at the ways the uniform American colonial project of "democratic tutelage," that is, efforts to restructure domestic politics in these two colonies, was differentially interpreted by two groups of colonized elites and at the ways in which these reinterpretations shaped the formation of divergent colonial states. One type of response by these native elites involved accepting the language of the imported concepts while reinterpreting them in terms of familiar concepts and practices; another response by the colonized accepted both the language and the meaning of the imposed concepts. Theories of cultural "incommensurability" (Steinmetz 2004) and "multiple" or "alternative" modernities (Appadurai 1991: 192–194; Eisenstadt 2002; Gaonkar 2001a) returned to earlier arguments against uniform models of social development, first presented by Herder and elaborated during the initial decades of the twentieth century by the *Kulturkreislehre*, or theory of cultural regions, an anthropological school based in central Europe.

Historical sociologists now recognize that powerful states usually pursue a mix of imperialist and colonialist strategies (Steinmetz 2005a). During the eighteenth century the Austro-Hungarian Empire treated Belgium (the Austrian Netherlands) in an imperialist manner as a pawn in a future game of "territorial barter," while treating Hungary as a colony whose best lands were redistributed "to foreigners, mostly German nobles" (Kann 1974: 89, 74).
American foreign policy at the end of the nineteenth century similarly reveals a combination of imperial technologies. After subjecting most Native Americans to formal colonial rule under the system of Indian reservations, the United States embarked on a career of overseas colonialism in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Pacific (Go 2008a) while pursuing a noncolonial imperial approach in China (the “Open Door” policy) and Latin America (the Monroe Doctrine).

Historians and sociologists have called attention to the ways in which generic European state formation resembled colonial conquest (Bartlett 1993; Given 1990; Lustick 1993; see also chapter 9). Unlike colonial state formation, however, state formation inside Europe usually involved territorial annexation followed by the effacement of hierarchical legal distinctions between conqueror and conquered. The distinction between European state-making and overseas colonial state-making is to some extent a question of the duration of foreign domination. European colonizers deferred their colonies’ independence far into the nebulous future in their imaginations and did everything possible to squelch the growth of Asian or African nationalism (Steinmetz 2007b). Conquerors in modern Europe, by contrast, usually set out immediately after territorial annexations to convert, assimilate, and nationalize the conquered populations. Within Europe the conquering state tried to turn “peasants into Frenchmen” (E. Weber 1976), or into Britons or Germans, as the case may be. In modern colonies, however, the goal was most often to turn “peasants into tribesmen.” State formation in this respect was fundamentally different in the core and in the colonized periphery.

Most recently, colonial historians have drawn on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social fields. If the metropolitan state is analyzed as a field, as Bourdieu (1996b; 2012) suggested, overseas colonial states may represent a distinct type of field characterized by competition for specific forms of symbolic capital and by particular forms of relative autonomy from the metropolitan state and other fields in the colony (Steinmetz 2008a). Colony and metropole are also linked via additional transnational fields, such as scientific ones (Steinmetz 2012c). Bourdieusian field theory can also be reconstructed to make sense of imperial global relations (Steinmetz 2012c).

Michael Mann’s Theory of the Sources of Social Power and the Question of Ancient and Modern Empires

One of the most comprehensive approaches to empire has been developed by sociologist Michael Mann. The first volume of Mann’s Sources of Social Power provides a subtle and multifaceted account of ancient empires that
avoids the temptation of forcing imperial history into a single, linear evolutionary box. If Mann's key causal mechanisms and certain "higher-order crystallizations of power" are repeated over time, the specific events and power formations are the result of contingent accidents and nonuniversal patterns (Mann 1986: 503). Mann draws on Marx and Hobson for his theory of the profitability of empire, on Weber for his historicist methodology of contingent multicausality, on historical sociologist Wolfram Eberhard (1965) for his notion of world time (Mann 1986: 30), and on Polybius for his analysis of imperial cycles. Mann defines the state in Weberian terms (Mann 1993: 55) and notes that states' territorial boundaries "give rise to an area of regulated interstate relations," which take two forms—"hegemonic empire" and "multistate civilization" (1986: 27). Empires' expansion, like that of states, is driven by warfare and conquest. Imperial power increases via the "caging" of populations. Mann distinguishes between "empires of domination," which lack a true core and "extensive" control over the entire imperial territory, and "territorial empires," which spread their power over an entire imperial space. Rome was the first and last true territorial empire in Europe (338). The existence of empires led to greater prosperity via a sort of "welfare state imperialism," at least in the ancient world (257, 265). Ancient empires employed four strategies of domination: rule through clients (indirect rule); direct rule through the army; "compulsory cooperation"; and the development of a common ruling-class culture. Mann rejects any notion of general evolutionary paths but treats the historical development of empires "dialectically," tracing the production of countertendencies to imperial strategy. At the most general level, he identifies a dialectic of centralization and decentralization—also described as a cycling between empires and "multi-power-actor civilization" (the latter defined as a decentralized international society governed by diplomacy, shared rules, and cosmopolitan difference). This multi-power-actor civilization may in turn "generate its own antithetical, interstitial force," leading to a new round of empire formation (161, 167, 537). In addition to centralization versus decentralization, empires generate four specific contradictions: (1) between particularism and a countervailing universalism; (2) between the project of cultural uniformity—the "development of a common ruling-class culture"—and the cultural diversity or "cosmopolitanism" of the various conquered peoples; (3) between hierarchical organization and egalitarianism; and (4) between drawing a sharp line against external "barbarians" and a civilizing orientation toward the barbarians. Empires encourage these countervailing practices "unconsciously" or "unintentionally" (363, 537). World religions like Christianity and Islam are
the interstitially emergent products of imperial rule. Such religions are *transcendent* powers that cut across empire’s concentrated military, political, and economic power networks. They are contrasted to the *immanent* imperial ideologies that cement ruling-class culture within empires.

In *The Sources of Social Power*, Mann implies that the category of empire belongs mainly to the ancient world, and that the modern world is a world of states rather than of empires. This seemingly arbitrary sorting conforms to the linear evolutionary thinking common to most postwar Anglo-American “historical sociology,” and it seems to violate Mann’s own antievolutionary strictures, which are closer to pre-1933 German sociological historicism (Steinmetz 2008c). For example, Mann states that “a territorial empire was never resurrected in Europe” after Rome (Mann 1986: 338). If central Europe had some “would-be empires of domination” there were no genuine ones (Mann 1993: 274). Mann qualifies as “states” (300) several polities that historians typically refer to as Reiche or empires (e.g., the Burgundian, Habsburg, and Austrian empires). He mentions that Prussia/Germany created itself by “mopping” up smaller states (288), but he does not compare this process to the violent expansion of the Roman Empire. European overseas colonialism, which was ignored in volume 1 of *Sources*, is dealt with only peripherally in volume 2.

This changed in *Incoherent Empire* and other recent work, in which Mann analyzes the American Empire by using the earlier model of the four sources of social power—ideological, economic, military, and political—as well as a “dialectical” method similar to the one he employed so effectively in his analysis of ancient empires. In terms of military power, Mann argues, the United States vastly outguns its rivals, but its interventions lead to the proliferation of guerrillas, terrorists, and weapons of mass destruction among rogue states (Mann 2003: 29–45). With respect to economic power, Mann notes that U.S. protectionism, neoliberalism, and unwillingness to finance postinvasion “nation building” all combine to “produce political turmoil and anti-Americanism” (70). “American political powers,” Mann continues, “are schizophrenic: in international politics they are large, but oscillating unsteadily between multilateralism and unilateralism; and when trying to interfere inside individual nation states they are small” (97). American ideological power, finally, is weakened by a contradiction between “democratic values” and “an imperialism which is strong on military offense, but weak on the ability to bring order, peace and democracy afterwards” (120). By distinguishing between the four sources of social power Mann is able to mount a critique of world system theory and other approaches that see economic and military imperialism as being closely con-

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nected. He argues that the American neoliberal, floating dollar offensive that began during the 1970s and the military imperialism that has intensified since the late 1990s were pushed by different interest groups with different motivations and had very different consequences: "Whereas the economic intensification was carefully calibrated to American interests and succeeded in preserving American global dominance, military intensification was more ideologically and emotionally driven and has failed," partially undermining American dominance (Mann 2008: 149).

OVERVIEW OF SOCIOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO DATE

Throughout the discipline's history sociologists have been writing about the (1) forms, (2) trajectories, (3) effects, and (4) determinants of empires. With respect to the first dimension, Hintze and Weber distinguished between ancient empires and modern imperialism. Mann (1986) developed a useful distinction between empires of domination and territorial empires. Tarde and Schmitt discussed the possibility of a singular world empire qua "world state" or "global nomos." Hintze and Schmitt also considered the alternative possibility, a system of multiple coexisting empires. Various theorists identified the emergence of a new form of empire in the twentieth century, that of "informal imperialism," one that "leaves its victims with the appearance of political autonomy" and constrains them only with "a minimal amount of political violence" and "intimidation" (Mann 2008; Salz 1923: 569). This informal model first appeared as a project for a German Mitteleuropa around World War I and was transformed into a theory of and for the Nazi Empire. The supposedly anticolonial United States (Gerth and Mills 1953) and mid-nineteenth-century Britain (Gallagher and Robinson 1953) were both described as informal empires. The concept of "colonialism" was distinguished from ancient and informal empires in terms of the permanent seizure of foreign sovereignty by the conqueror and the implementation of a "rule of colonial difference" (Chatterjee 1993; Steinmetz 2007b, 2008a). Ratzel (1923) codified nineteenth-century debates among colonial advocates by distinguishing between settler and exploitation colonies. A number of historians inspired by Althusser and Poulantzas theorized colonial societies by using the concept of articulation of modes of production. Mamdani (1996) described South African apartheid as an articulation of both political and economic models: nationalizing, capitalist direct urban rule combined with tribalizing, noncapitalist, indirect rural rule. Perhaps the most general lesson is that the state is not necessarily, or even typically, the
dominant form of political organization. The “historical sociology of the state” needs to be closely articulated with the “historical sociology of empires.”

The theorists discussed in this chapter also offered differing accounts of the developmental trajectories of empires. Gumpowicz and Ratzel claimed that warfare led to the centralization of political power and the “agglomeration of states into larger units.” Arendt identified a passage from overseas imperialism to continental totalitarianism. Other writers focused on cycles of empire (Gini), patterns of the rise and fall of empire (Spengler), or waves of hegemony and nonhegemony correlating with different articulations of the global core and periphery (Wallerstein). According to Mann (1986: 168), the ancient world was characterized by both a cycling of empires and an upward historical trend in the overall accumulation of collective social power. Steinmetz (2005a) argued that Great Powers typically engaged in a mixture of different imperial strategies vis-à-vis different parts of the world, rather than alternating between colonialism and informal imperialism as world system theory suggested.

Some discussions of imperial trajectories focus on empire’s impact on the metropoles. Comte, Hobson, and others noted that imperialism strengthened militarization and despotism in the core countries. Writers from Ibn Khaldun (1967: 128–129) to René Maunier (1949: 201) and Paul Kennedy (1987) analyzed imperial overreach. Theories of imperial blowback (Johnson 2000; Sartre 1963) see imperial interventions returning to haunt the core, in ways ranging from the contagion of revolution from south to north (Marx [1853b] 1969) to more diffuse cultural effects. Other discussions of the effects of empire focus on the peripheries. Karl Marx ([1853a] 1969) argued that colonial exploitation paradoxically paves the way for the development of capitalism and modernity in the colony (Warren 1980). This prediction, if not the details of Marx’s analytic model, echoed arguments by mainstream colonial propagandists and missionaries throughout the modern colonial era and recalled historians’ descriptions of the Romans’ civilizing impact on the conquered barbarians. Rejecting these theories of empire as the road to improvement, other social scientists thematized the “development of underdevelopment” and “dependency.” Berque saw colonialism as “deconstructing a structure without [being] able to restructure it” (Bouhdiba 1964: 179), creating “une nuit structurale de la planète” (“a planetary structural night”; Berque 1964: 106). A distinct group of writers from Herder to Appadurai have described civilizations as moving along separate paths, rather than being arranged along a uniform path. Colonialism is condemned
here for imposing hierarchy and uniformity. Compatible arguments were made by theorists of colonial transculturation (Leenhardt, Freyre, Herskovits, Leiris, Thurnwald, Bastide, Maunier, and Bhabha).

Finally, this chapter has reviewed a number of explanatory theories of the forms and trajectories of empire, explanations focused on political, economic, cultural, and/or social mechanisms. Broadly economic theories trace imperialism back to capitalist interests, including the need for new markets, investment opportunities, sources of cheaper labor power, or sites for new rounds of primitive accumulation. Broadly political theories emphasize a general tendency toward warfare and expansion (Gumpowicz, Ratzel, Oppenheimer) and the impetus to create “great spaces” or nomoi (Schmitt). Theorists of “social imperialism” trace the ways in which empire is used to integrate masses and classes within the imperial core (Mann 1993; Weber 1998a; Wehler 1972). Broadly sociological theories of empire emphasize four main causal processes: (i) an atavistic urge to domination rooted in the class habitus of older social strata (Schumpeter); (2) patterns of collaboration and resistance and other social structural features of the peripheries as determinants of imperialism (Balandier, Robinson, Go); (3) principal-agent relations (Adams) or network structures (Barkey); and (4) the colonial state as a Bourdieusian field of competition over field-specific symbolic capital (Steinmetz). Theories of cultural forces driving empire emphasize the impact of dreams of conquest (Hobhouse, Thurnwald), racism and Orientalism (Said), or precolonial ethnographic representations of the colonized (Steinmetz, Goh).

These political, economic, cultural, and social determinants should not be understood as mutually exclusive. Michael Mann, like Max Weber, rejects the idea of transhistorical general laws and pseudoexperimentalist comparison in favor of a more historicist (Steinmetz 2011a) strategy that identifies contextual patterns and contingent concatenations of mechanisms as the sources of imperial strategies and forms (Bhaskar 1986). Future research on empires should remain open to comparison but should not emulate a poorly understood form of natural science (Goldstone 1991: 40; Steinmetz 2005b). Comparisons can be carried out across empirical features of empires (Osterhammel 2009) or causal mechanisms (Steinmetz 2004). Causal mechanism tracing can explore the differing ways in which a single mechanism works in diverse contexts. Comparison may also be used to “focus on what is of central importance in a society, despite all analogies, and use the similarities of two societies to highlight the specific individuality of each” (Weber 1998b: 341). With these more historicist forms of comparison
in hand, social scientists should be well equipped to push imperial analysis in new directions.

NOTES

1. Sociologists have also admired, advised, criticized, and openly opposed empires. This chapter is not intended as a complete historical sociology of imperial sociology, so I bracket sociologists' political postures and projects vis-à-vis empires here. My forthcoming book will provide a more complete intellectual, political, and institutional history of sociology from this standpoint (Steinmetz forthcoming-b).

2. For an important exception see André Adam's critical bibliography of sociology, ethnology, and human geography of Morocco, which examines "the condition of sociology in the colonial situation" (1968: 18).

3. Of course, Bourdieu explicitly cautions that his Sketch for a Self-Analysis is "not an autobiography" but rather a "sociological analysis, excluding psychology, except for some moods" (2007: epigram and "preparatory notes" included in "Publisher's Note to the French Edition"). For a more detailed discussion of Bourdieu's sketch and its strained relation to psychoanalysis, see Steinmetz (2013).

4. In this chapter I do not have room to explore the conditions of production of sociological knowledge of empire and the patterns of heteronomy and autonomy (see Steinmetz 2007a, 2009a) or the effects of scientific knowledge on empire (Steinmetz 2003a, 2007a).

5. The largest group of heteronomous policy-making colonial sociologists were those working for the French Organization for Colonial Scientific Research (ORSC, later renamed ORSTOM) and French Institute of Black Africa (IFAN); see Steinmetz (2012a).

6. In a study of American sociology during and after World War II, Abbott and Sparrow (2007: 287) define as sociologists only those with PhDs in sociology. This approach would exclude as sociologists many people who were in fact recognized members of it, including those who were imported from government and wartime agencies after 1945 (Turner and Turner 1990: 88). At the University of Michigan alone, it would exclude anthropologists Horace Miner and David Aberle and historian William Sewell, all of them hired in sociology under the initiative of the Sociology department at the time (Steinmetz 2007b: 344–345). It would exclude all of the refugee sociologists from Nazi Germany, none of whom had sociology doctorates (Steinmetz 2010a).

7. Max Weber was the most frequently mentioned name at all of the meetings of the German Sociological Association between 1910 and 1933 (Käsler 1984) and was called the most important "maker of sociology" by the German sociologists interviewed by Earle Edward Eubank in 1934 (Käsler 1984: 41; 1991). His fame continued through the Nazi period but lapsed after 1945 in West Germany and reemerged in the 1960s. A survey of British sociologists in 2001 found that Weber was named far more often than anyone else as the sociologist in the twentieth century who had contributed most to the subject (Halsey 2004: 171).
8. Conversely, those who hold sociology doctorates may fail to find employment in the discipline or move into other disciplines and professions. From a field-theoretic standpoint they will usually not be counted as members unless they continue publishing and participating in the disciplinary field. It is important to recall that field theory does not argue that individuals can participate in only a single specialized field, although it is impossible to participate in a large number of different fields given the costs of admission, the psychic burden of investment, and the corporeal tasks of adjusting one’s habitus to each new domain. As Lacan (1991: 141) writes, “libidinal investment is what makes an object become desirable.” On “investment” in fields, see Bourdieu (2000: 166) and Steinmetz (2013).

9. As for the “predisciplinary history” of (Western) sociology, it covers the period “from about 1600 to the middle of the nineteenth century” (Heilbron 1995: 3). Covering this period would have stretched the current volume beyond acceptable limits. Wickham and Freemantle (2008) distinguish between sociological thinking in the period 1550–1700 and the emergence of sociology as a discipline in the late nineteenth century.

10. On university sociology in France see Karady (1976, 1979) and Mucchielli (1998); for Germany see Käsler (1984); for Austria see Fleck (1990); for Britain see Abrams (1968), Halliday (1968), Soffer (1982), and Halsey (2004); for Italy see Nese (1993) and Santoro (chapter 4 of this volume); on sociology in Arab counties see Sabagh and Ghazalla (1986); for Tunisia see Zeghidi (1976) and Ben Salem (2009); for Algeria see Madoui (2007); for Egypt and Morocco see Roussillon (2003); for brief case studies of sociology in a number of countries during the 1990s, see Mohan and Wilke (1994).

11. Charles Tilly’s relations to the academic history field provide a good example of disciplinary membership strengthening a scholar’s investment in a field and members’ recognition of the newcomer. Before coming to the University of Michigan in 1968, Tilly’s main connections to historians had been in the French archives and through isolated publications in French Historical Studies and History and Theory (Tilly and Stave 1998). Starting in 1968, however, Tilly was a full, paid member of a leading history department, at the University of Michigan, where he supervised history PhD candidates. His recognition as a historian reached the point that he was described in 1997 by Eric Hobsbawm as “almost certainly the [sociologist] most respected by historians and political scientists” (Hobsbawm blurb on the back cover of Tilly 1997b). Tilly’s own identification with history reached the point where he described himself as having “become much more historicist over time” (Tilly and Stave 1998: 189).

12. The noun imperium originally signified the power to command and punish, specifically the power of princes, magistrates, and officials (M. Weber 1978: 650, 839).

13. The intentions of imperial planners and dominant groups in the local colonial state are more central to this definitional issue than the actual duration of foreign rule. Nazi-occupied Poland was clearly colonial, for example, even though the general government in Poland lasted just five years and even though the general government “witnessed a conflict between the two ideal types of colonialism, the settlement-oriented SS and the exploitation-oriented civil administration” (Furber and Lower 2008: 377). By contrast the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was never intended to
become a permanent colonial occupation, even though the United States deployed certain techniques and terminology reminiscent of colonialism (Steinmetz 2005a).

14. As with all rules, there were of course many exceptions to the so-called rule of colonial difference (Chatterjee 1993) involving individuals or entire groups among the colonized (Steinmetz 2007: 218–239).

15. The U.S., of course, maintains status of forces agreements with all countries in which its troops are stationed in its “empire of bases.”

16. Skocpol (1979: 47), for example, describes Czarist Russia and Qing China as “old-regime states” rather than empires, thereby eliding some of the specifically imperial determinants of these empires’ revolutions, which is her object of investigation. An imperial optic would emphasize sources of the weakening of the French ancien régime that remain invisible in Skocpol’s metrocentric analysis, including the uprisings in France’s overseas colonies. The Chinese state is better understood as an empire than as a state even in the nineteenth century. Here an imperial optic would read the Taiping and Xinhai revolutions as doubly anti-imperial, directed against both Manchu rule (Gasster 1998) and European pressure. Skocpol’s third case, Russia, was of the three the most obviously an empire even in the Roman sense, ruled by a czar (Caesar) and encompassing “most of the space over which the Empire of Genghis Khan formerly extended” (Aron 1945: 358); it was also a colonial power vis-à-vis many of its indigenous populations, as Sorokin, founder of Skocpol’s own Harvard Sociology department, had argued in his earliest work (see Sorokin 1990, discussed in chapter 2 of the present volume).

17. The possible exception to this rule is the ancient “empire of domination,” a formation that was “in almost perpetual campaigning motion” (Mann 1986: 145) and had no statelike center.

18. This is true in the cases analyzed by Dirks (1987) and Gowda (2007).

19. Centeno and Enríquez (2010) incorrectly suggest that “such distinctions as ‘empires’ and ‘states’ are artificial, imposed upon what is clear only in hindsight, and that the distinction may have not made much sense to anyone even as late as the nineteenth century.” In fact, the opposite is the case: it is social scientists themselves who have elided the distinction, starting with Central European Staatswissenschaft and continuing to the historical sociology of the state in the last third of the twentieth century. Political leaders and jurists clearly recognized the difference, as demonstrated by the nomenclature used to distinguish the levels of the Reich (empire) and the constitutive states in post-1870 Germany, for example. As Chae (see chapter 14) notes, the “Great Japanese Empire” was explicitly named after Western empires, such as the British, and this nomenclature was even adopted in (precolonial) Korea, as the “Great Korean Empire” (1897–1910). Specialized Colonial Offices existed in the British, French, German, and other European states to govern empires, and they were quite distinct from these state’s non-colonial departments. The American Bureau of Indian Affairs was an office long specialized in the regulation of the internal colonial empire over Native Americans.

21. Marx was obviously not a sociologist during his lifetime, and he died before the language of sociology had entered the German language. But Marx has been adopted as a founder of the disciplinary field.

22. Constantin-François Volney (1796) had also discussed this possibility.

23. In terms of the definitions I set out at the beginning, Tarde's "empire" was actually a "state," since it involved not a hierarchy between centers and peripheries but pluralistic cultural coexistence.

24. Although Hobson did not refer to Marx in *Imperialism*, elsewhere he discussed *Capital* and referred to "the constructive economic theory of Marx and his followers" (1898: 195).

25. As Christ (1982: 112) notes, Weber's discussions of ancient history paid little attention to the cultural processes like charisma and religion that later preoccupied him so intensely.

26. According to Ibn Khaldun, the earliest exponent of this theory (Maunier 1949: 201), "if the dynasty then undertakes to expand beyond its holdings, its widening territory remains without military protection and is laid open to any chance attack by enemy or neighbour.... A dynasty is stronger at its centre than it is at its border regions. When it has reached its farthest expansion, it becomes too weak and incapable to go any farther" (Ibn Khaldun 1967: 128–129).

27. Oppenheimer's emphasis on communal colonization was also central to his contributions to early Zionist discussions (Oppenheimer 1958).

28. Salz's disciplinary affiliation once he came to the United States was with economics (Kettler 2003), but while still in Heidelberg he was categorized more broadly as a social scientist (Mussgnug 1988).

29. On the interactions between sociology and social anthropology in British colonial research from the 1940s through the 1960s see Steinmetz (2012a, forthcoming b).

30. Anthropologist Herskovits published extensively in the three leading American sociology journals (e.g., Herskovits and Willey 1923).

31. Thurnwald returned from a leave of absence in the United States and East Africa to Berlin University in 1936 and immediately began accommodating himself to Nazism; see Thurnwald (1938); Timm (1977); Steinmetz (2009a). In 1942 Thurnwald asked the university's Dekan for a reduction in his teaching load because he was working on "a series of reports on the labor deployment of foreign workers" for the Ministry for Armaments and Munition (Reichsministerium für Bewaffnung und Munition). Thurnwald to Dekan, Oct. 31, 1942, Thurnwald personnel file, Humboldt University Archive, Berlin, vol. 6, p. 200. Thurnwald became a member of the Nazi Party's Colonial-Political Office in 1939 and a Nazi Party member in 1940. Thurnwald to Westermann, Feb.–May 1946, in Thurnwald personnel file, Humboldt University Archive, Berlin, vol. 6, p. 238.

32. On Soustelle's later political roles in Algeria, see Le Sueur (2001).

34. An exhibition at the European Commission headquarters in Brussels in 2004 described the European Union (EU) as the return of the Roman Empire, and in July 2007, the president of the European Commission suggested that the EU could be likened to a "nonimperial empire." See Evans-Pritchard (2004) and "Barroso: European Union Is 'Non-imperial' Empire (long version)," uploaded by BUXTTV on July 10, 2007, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-l8MjtGgRU&mode=user&search=/.  
35. The project of assimilating ethnic Germans in Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe ultimately failed but not for want of trying (E. R. Harvey 2005). Within the Auslandswissenschaftliche Fakultät at Berlin University, Mühlmann's strategies were ultimately marginalized by the even more radical "racial faction," which was strengthened by the impending loss of the war and mounting Polish resistance (Klingemann 1989: 21).  
36. Mühlmann went on to head one of the most prestigious departments of sociology and anthropology at Heidelberg starting in 1960 (Michel 2005), and was highly regarded as an analyst of the Mau-Mau and other late colonial uprisings. His 1961 edited volume on "revolutionary third world messianisms" was translated from German into French by Jean Baudrillard (Mühlmann 1968). He struck an apologetic tone when discussing colonialism, however (Mühlmann 1962: 187), and his racist ideas soon became public and led to a mounting wave of criticism against him (Sigrist and Kössler 1985).  
37. French colonizers in Algeria had treated Algerian Jews as requiring "regeneration" to qualify for assimilation (Birnbaum 2003).  
38. Another example of mixed strategies can be seen in the German Kaiserreich. The Kaiserreich's sovereign was called the Kaiser, his title a Germanization of "Caesar"; the literal translation of the name Kaiserreich is "Emperor's Empire." The Kaiserreich constituted an "empire" vis-à-vis its constituent kingdoms, duchies, principalities, and free cities, which were subject to the emperor but independent in certain respects. The Kaiserreich engaged in a variety of imperialist but noncolonial practices, such as the efforts to influence Turkey and China through military advisers and scientific and cultural missions (Kaske 2002; Kloosterhuis 1994; Kreissler 1989). The Kaiserreich also became a full-fledged Kolonialreich (colonial empire) after 1884 through the annexation of overseas colonies in Africa, Oceania, and China.  
39. More recently Michael Mann (2004: 83) suggested that "only Austria possessed a European empire," apparently unwilling to acknowledge the imperial status of Germany.  
40. Michael Mann's (1993) sketch of ancient Athenian imperialism resembled this model.