STATE/CULTURE

State-Formation after the Cultural Turn

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Introduction: Culture and the State

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Mass ritual was not a device to shore up the state, but rather the state . . . was a device for the enactment of mass ritual. Power served pomp, not pomp power.

—CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Negara, p. 13

A state exists chiefly in the hearts and minds of its people; if they do not believe it is there, no logical exercise will bring it to life."
—JOSEPH STRAYER, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, v. 5

This book examines processes of state formation in light of the ongoing "cultural turn" in the social sciences.¹ The cultural turn encompasses a wide array of new theoretical impulses coming from fields formerly peripheral to the social sciences, as well as submerged traditions within the social sciences themselves.²

I want to thank the participants in the 1993 conference for helping me think through the issues raised in this introduction, with special thanks to Bill Sewell Jr. and David Laitin. In addition to commenting generously on this chapter in several settings, both have contributed signally to promoting the cultural turn in U.S. social science. Others who commented on this chapter include Julia Adams, Peggy Somers, Lisa Weden, Gary Herrigel, the Wilder House editors and graduate student interns, and the contributors to this book.

¹The term social sciences as I use it here refers not to any analytically or normatively defined unity but simply to the assemblage of existing disciplines clustered into university divisions, arranged together under the purview of specific funding agencies, and also defined by the sharing of certain discursive regularities (including self-understandings). Although my comments implicitly take the academic field of the United States as their main point of reference, many statements apply to other sociolinguistic academic worlds as well. My use of the term human sciences signals a more normative understanding — one in which, inter alia, the distance between the humanities and the social sciences recedes.

²The former include poststructuralism, narrative theory, and other forms of textual analysis. Submerged social science traditions that have been rediscovered include constructivist epistemology, the sociology of knowledge, and psychoanalytic cultural theory (see Berger and Luckmann 1966; Žižek
Long-standing barriers against the humanities or *Geisteswissenschaften* in the social sciences are eroding. This cultural turn has disrupted entrenched ways of thinking about familiar objects of social research by emphasizing the causal and socially constitutive role of cultural processes and systems of signification.

What exactly do we mean by the cultural turn? It is a more recent phenomenon than the “linguistic turn” in Anglo-American philosophy (Rorty 1967) and is not limited to linguistic approaches. This cultural turn is also more general than the poststructuralist movement of recent decades. Rather than argue for a specific theory of meaning and interpretation, the cultural turn in the social sciences involves a more general assertion of the constitutive role of culture. It is directed against still-powerful social-science paradigms that present meaning and subjectivity as epiphenomenal or causally unimportant. The main divisions within the social sciences revolve increasingly around methodological, epistemological, or ontological issues. “Objectivism” of various stripes is arrayed against perspectives that view human practice as inextricably cultural, as an entanglement of a material “substrate” and its meaning (Taylor 1979: 33; Wittgenstein 1933; Weber 1978: 4–24). Objectivist approaches within the human sciences do not necessarily ignore cultural phenomena, but they treat culture as ultimately determined by material or noncultural factors that are considered more basic. Objectivism in the human sciences also refers by extension to theoretical approaches that project a homogeneous form of human subjectivity across time and place. Within the context of these prevailing conceptual divisions, all theorists who insist on culture’s socially constitutive role, who reject assumptions of cultural homogeneity as an analytical starting point, can be seen as part of a common “culturalist” project, regardless of whether they conceptualize culture in linguistic, poststructuralist, psychoanalytic, or hermeneutic terms. From the standpoint of a social-scientific universe still dominated by empiricism and the materialism of “brute facts,” the differences between structuralist discourse analysis, *verstehende Soziologie*, and theorists such as Bourdieu, Foucault, Gramsci, and Geertz seem less significant than their similarities.

A more difficult issue involves the relationship between this development in the social sciences and the burgeoning field of “cultural studies.” Contemporary cultural studies operates as much within the humanities as the social sciences, even if its professed goal is to break down that disciplinary distinction (see Hall 1994; Grossberg, Nelson, and Treichler 1992; During 1993; Dirks, Eley, and Ortner 1994). Within the humanities, cultural studies stands opposed to deconstruction and a literature-centered curriculum (Berman 1995; Bahti 1997). Yet when these debates are remapped onto the terrain of the social sciences, cultural studies and its deconstructionist opponents end up on the same side of the more

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2This is not to say that culturalists may not theorize tendencies toward cultural homogenization, perhaps as a result of the growth of the mass media and standardized commodities. But homogenization is an outcome here, not an a priori starting point.
central division between objectivism and culturalism. In this sense it is accurate to describe the cultural turn as more or less synonymous with cultural studies within the field of the social sciences.

Culturalist perspectives are unequally represented across the various social-science disciplines and areas. Cultural theories have made deep inroads into fields such as the sociology of sexuality, gender, popular culture, and social movements and the social and historical study of science. Yet the study of the state has remained relatively aloof from these discussions. If culture has been considered in this context, it has typically been viewed as a product of the state, whereas the strands of causality running from culture to the state have been ignored, marginalized, or declared illegitimate objects of investigation. States might create “concepts” but they were not themselves “concept-dependent” entities (Bhaskar 1979, 1986). Where mainstream social science has allowed culture to play a significant role in the constitution of the state, it has been in the watered-down guise of quantitatively measured “values” (MacIntyre [1967] 1978; Taylor 1979) or as an essentialized national culture. The problems with these approaches are discussed below.

A partial erosion of the barriers to cultural theories and processes is nevertheless visible even in the field of state studies. But until now, research on the culture/state nexus has been scattered across different disciplines and discursive communities. This book brings together some of the pioneers and innovators in this multidisciplinary project. Because the cultural study of the state is still relatively underdeveloped, this book does not focus on a particular theoretical perspective but instead juxtaposes divergent theoretical and methodological approaches in an effort to map the contours of debate. Some of the writers represented in this collection make powerful claims for the shaping of states by culture, whereas others emphasize causal flows running in both directions—and some reject the analytical distinction between culture and nonculture altogether. Some emphasize linguistically mediated culture, and others focus on nonlinguistic forms of subjectivity. Some analyze culture in structuralist terms; others deconstruct the categories and meanings of the state. What all the contributions share is a willingness to take culture seriously, to view it as more than simply a “dependent variable” or product of supposedly more fundamental, acultural phenomena.

*On sexuality, see Butler (1993) and Sedgwick (1993); on gender, see Scott (1988); on popular culture, see During (1993); on class formation, see Sewell (1995) and the essays in that issue; on social movements, see Snow and Benford (1988); on science, see Latour (1987).

*This essay and volume are more concerned with the effects of this partial erosion than with its causes. The forms of resistance to culture, meaning, and interpretation vary across social-science disciplines and objects of study. In the leftish field of the sociology of social movements, for example, the turn away from culture in the 1970s toward a more utilitarian and materialist approach was presented as a rejection of attributions of irrationality to social movements by an earlier generation of theorists. In more conservative fields such as economics or international relations the resistance took a different form, in which culture itself has been associated with leftist. A presenter at a University of Chicago economics seminar in the late 1960s who mentioned the word *culture* provoked a Nobel-prize winning economist to ask his neighbor whether the presenter was a “Marxist” (this story was reported to me by the economist’s interlocutor).
Before discussing the relationship between states and culture we need to clarify these two terms, and this is the principal aim of the first two sections of this introduction. The first section, Culture, attempts to delimit the term culture while retaining enough openness to accommodate the diverse theoretical perspectives represented in this volume. The second section, The State/State Formation, proposes a working definition of the state and also asks whether the state should continue to occupy a privileged position in social analysis during an era that has seen both theoretical challenges to its primacy (Foucault) and practical attacks on its sovereignty (due to economic globalization).

The third section, Culture/State Relations in Earlier Social Theory, reconstructs some of the ways in which culture and the state have been articulated, conceptually and causally, within classical and contemporary theory. Here we find that interest in the cultural underpinnings of states tends to decline as we approach Western modernity and increases as we move away from the West and backwards in time. Classical social theory—including Max Weber’s—rarely understood culture as a central determinant or constitutive element of the modern Western state. At the limit, culture was a product of the state. Theoretical approaches dominant within more recent discussions of the state—particularly the neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian perspectives—have also tended to marginalize culture or to restrict its purview. This section concludes that cultural themes have emerged symptomatically in these recent debates without being discussed explicitly.

Foundationalist Decontextualization in the Study of the State, the fourth section, specifies in greater theoretical detail the differences between contemporary cultural analyses of the state and culturally decontextualized approaches. The most familiar sort of decontextualized social science, rational-choice theory, starts from an assumption of human subjectivity as a universal rational form. Surprisingly, some ostensibly cultural approaches are also decontextualized, though in a different manner, treating culture itself as a foundational essence. Here the argument that cultural factors have typically been granted central importance only in the interpretation of premodern and non-Western states is developed further. Next, Culture as Symptom develops the argument from Culture/State Relations that cultural themes have emerged symptomatically in recent state debates, giving examples of the ways in which discussions of specific states or state forms have reached a theoretical standstill due to the failure to thematize cultural factors explicitly. The Theoretical Terrain of Culture/State Relations maps out the main lines of variation among the culturalist approaches to the state represented in the volume, and the final section provides an overview of the essays in the volume.

Culture

Culture, according to Raymond Williams’s celebrated essay, is “one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language” (1983: 87). Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s (1952) historical overview of the shifting meanings of the word
culture/Kultur in German, French, and English estimated that there were more than 160 definitions in use (Brownstein 1995: 313). Cutting through this semantic profusion, Williams identified four main strands during the modern era (1983: 90). The first refers to the “intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development” of the individual and is derived by metaphor from earlier definitions concerning the cultivation of the land, crops, and animals (Williams 1977: 11). A second, Enlightenment, usage indicates a “general process of social development” or “culture as a universal process”; this usage is close to modern definitions of “civilization” (Bocock 1996: 133). In the third, more recent, definition culture denotes the objects of artistic production (Williams 1983: 90; also Williams 1977: 14).

The fourth sense of culture discussed by Williams, and the one that is closest to the purposes of this volume, emerges from modern anthropological and sociological thought. It begins within late-eighteenth-century German philosophy of history as a view of cultures as plural, against the Enlightenment view of a Universal History culminating in a unified civilized state (Williams 1977: 17). As Kroeber and Kluckhohn note (1952: 286), the use of “culture” by Herder and other eighteenth-century German writers such as Adelung has a “modern ring”—even as it continues to draw on the older connotations: “their approach was historical, pluralistic, relativistic, and yet aiming to cover the totality of the known world of custom and ideology.” Herder opposes the use of “European culture as a universal standard of human values,” insisting that “the culture of man is not the culture of the European; it manifests itself according to time and place in every people.” Culture in Herder’s view included not just artistic achievements but also language, education, clothing, forms of governance, and general customs (“die unbestimmte Lebensart”; quoted in Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952: 40).

Most commentators trace the more proximate origin of the contemporary anthropological understanding of culture to Tylor’s 1877 definition of “Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, [as] that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (1). This definition was reproduced in anthropology texts for decades (for example, Lowie 1947: 3). Even Parsons, who insisted on a separation of cultural and social systems, retained Tylor’s emphasis on culture as a unified totality which is “transmitted, learned, and shared” (1951: 13); in some of Parsons’ writing, culture also included “the artifacts produced” (Kroeber and Parsons 1958: 583). Levi-Strauss led many postwar anthropological theorists to adopt structural linguistics in order to specify the ways in which culture’s symbolic matter was created, organized, and transformed. Culture consisted of integrated systems of symbols articulated in artifacts and in public, social practices. These symbolic practices had to be inter-

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4 Herder also writes that “The picture of nations (Völker) has infinite shades, changing with place and time. But as in all pictures, everything depends on the point of view or perspective from which we examine it” (first quote, in the text, from Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind [1784–1791], second from Letters for the Advancement of Mankind [1793–1797], both in Barnard [1969: 24]).

7 On the German roots of the modern use of culture, see Elias 1994 [1939].
interpreted in relationship to more general codes on which they drew and which they helped to reproduce and transform (Geertz 1973a).

More recent versions of this fourth "socioanthropological" strand have seen further shifts in accent. According to Stuart Hall, culture encompasses "both the meanings and values which arise amongst distinctive social groups and classes...[and] the lived traditions and practices through which those 'understandings' are expressed and in which they are embodied" (Hall 1994: 327). Hall's emphasis on "distinctive social groups and classes" signals an important break with earlier views of culture as an integrated whole. Recent approaches to the analysis of symbolic meaning have expanded the older Herderian emphasis on the plurality of cultures, finding such diversity not just between one society and the next but also within supposedly unified Völker. Social units in traditional cultural theory were delimited along geographic lines in a quasinaaturalistic fashion, as nation-states, nations, or tribes, and cultural unity was assumed to prevail within each spatial unit. Today, by contrast, cultures are seen as divided along lines of class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, age, and so on. Debate concerns the relationship among these multiple cultural systems and with the overarching common culture (if the latter is even assumed to exist; see Laitin 1988). Continuing this line of thought to its logical conclusion, poststructuralists have argued that one should not expect to find stabilized semiotic systems even within these narrower social groups. Any stabilization of meaning is contested, temporary, and contingent (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Culture here loses any semblance of structural systematicity.

Two other important changes in the anthropological understanding of culture during the past half century have been signalled by Dirks, Eley and Ortner (1994: 3). One has involved increased attention to the ways in which power, inequality, conflict, and systemic logics of domination shape symbolic systems. This theme arose during the first half of the twentieth century in the writing of Marxists such as Lukács (1971), Gramsci (1971), Benjamin (1969), Volosinov (1985), and Horkheimer and Adorno (1944] 1972) and was carried forward in the postwar period by theorists of "ideology" (see especially Althusser 1971a; Macherey 1978; Barthes [1957] 1972) and by the British school of cultural studies (During 1993). More recently, Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1984) has detailed the ways in which cultural classification schemes, including apparently disinterested categories of aesthetic judgement, serve to mask and to reproduce inequality. Post-Kuhnian theorists of science have made similar arguments concerning the permeation of scientific discourse by structures of power and conflict (Kuhn 1962] 1970; Bourdieu 1988; Foucault 1970; Latour 1987; Woolgar 1988). Finally, there has been increased attention to fundamental historical transformations of culture—a possibility that was ignored or marginalized in the Herderian "national culture" literature and structuralist worldview (see Sahlins 1981). Increased attention to the historicity of culture was stimulated in different ways by Marxist literature (in addition to the authors cited above, see Thompson 1993 and Postone 1993) and by the writings of Foucault (especially 1970, 1972, 1979).

How do these contemporary views of culture relate to the more substantive arguments about "culturalism"? It is not apparent at first glance that the updated
socioanthropological definition takes any stand at all on the question of culture’s causal or constitutive role. The definition of culture as “systems of meaning and the practices in which they are embedded” is perfectly compatible with a view of these “meaning systems” as derivative of more fundamental practices or material forces—as in some of the Marxist versions. This definition of culture does support the other main tenet of culturalism, however: its opposition to assumptions of universal, equivalent subjectivity (the view that, at bottom, people are all the same).

Many twentieth-century sociologists and anthropologists have rejected the term culture altogether on account of its vagueness and polysemy. Some favor concepts such as ideology, discourse, hegemony, meaning, interpretation, subjectivity, identity, and the unconscious, yet these are no less multivocal. Culture seems best able to capture the epistemological, methodological, and substantive distance of these approaches from the hard materialism and cultural homogenization of objectivistic social sciences. Indeed, rejection of the term culture itself is sometimes coupled with a strong “naturalist” epistemology, which assimilates the social sciences to the natural sciences. The term culture will continue to provoke disagreement as long as basic issues such as the autonomy of the human sciences remain contested.

The field of social theories encompassed by the cultural turn is thus broad, but not impossibly so. They are distinct from much of what is commonly referred to as “cultural sociology” to the extent that the latter explains culture in terms of

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8 The cultural turn in the social sciences should not, of course, be defined by the specific employment of the word culture. More important is an understanding of systems of signification and subjectivity as importantly constitutive of social reality. As we will see later, there are at least three widespread uses of the term culture within social science studies of the state that do not seem to conform to this definition. Social theory is often forced to rely on semiotically overloaded terms such as culture whose meaning is overdetermined by changing historical usage, struggles among discourse communities, and simultaneous existence within lay and academic communities. Anthropologists are most aware of the theoretical pitfalls of the term culture, especially cultural essentialism, and some have urged me to drop the term altogether. Yet I see no alternative to culture as a portmanteau word for the diverse conceptual languages employed in this pandraul on discussion.

9 This is not the place to provide a history of these different terms. For the development of the concept of ideology, the reader is referred to Eagleton (1991), McLellan (1991), Larrain (1979), Žižek (1989), and Laclau (1997); on discourse, see Thompson (1984), Foucault (1972), Laclau and Mouffe (1985), van Dijk (1983), and Volosinov (1985); on the culture concept in anthropology, see Geertz (1973b) and Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952); on political culture, see Almond and Verba (1963, 1966) and Somers (1995); on subjectivity and identity see Taylor (1989) and Cullough (1994). Bourdieu’s terminological system includes the concepts of doxa/heterodoxy/orthodoxy and cultural capital; when Bourdieu uses culture unmodified it usually corresponds to Williams’ third semantic field. On cultural capital, see Bourdieu (1984, 1986). The psychoanalytic literature on subjectivity and the unconscious is too enormous even to begin referencing, but see Lefort (1986), Žižek (1989, 1991), and Hell (1997) for the relationship to the state. See the essays by Adams and Orlolff below for alternative disentanglements of these terms; other efforts to systematize these concepts can be found in Comaroff and Comaroff (1997) and Bourdieu (1997). Some of these terms and vocabularies are mutually incompatible. Poststructuralist theory, for instance, usually rejects “the deep psychological self of the Freudians” (as implied by the “unconscious”) in favor of a “culturally mediated . . . self which finds itself in a continuously changing world of meaning” (Rabinow 1977: 6). The theoretical and terminological openness of this volume is justified not only by the objectivism of mainstream social science but also by the unsettled nature of cultural theory itself.
the noncultural or focuses on cultural objects more narrowly (in Williams’s third sense of “culture”), rather than analyzing ostensibly noncultural practices in cultural terms. And they also differ from “political culture” models (discussed below) in which culture is allowed to have autonomous effects, but only at the cost of defining it narrowly as values or preferences. But this still leaves room for enormous variation in the exact definition and explanation of culture. The organizing premise of this book retains this terminological and theoretical openness to provide a space for comparing across the alternative culturalist approaches.

The State/State-Formation

Before we begin exploring the relationship between cultural theory and state formation, we also need a general working definition of the state. In an influential recent statement, Charles Tilly has defined states as “coercion wielding organizations” that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories.” Note that this definition includes city-states and does not insist (in contrast to Weber, for instance) on a complete monopoly of coercion.\(^{10}\) This is a baseline definition to which many social scientists would assent.

Does culture come into the definition of the state, or only into theories of state formation? In his contribution to this book, Tilly notes that his definition incorporates “culture—seen as shared understandings and their representations—at each step along the way.” Going even further, Timothy Mitchell (1991, this volume) argues that a cultural “state effect”—a perceived distinction between state and society—is produced through various symbolic and ideological techniques. This cultural effect is no less part of the phenomenon “state” than the organizations and agents controlling coercion and exercising jurisdiction within a given territory.\(^{11}\) A maximal definition of the state would thus include not just the reference to “coercion wielding organizations,” but also the claim that the distinctness of the state and its priority over other entities is the result of cultural techniques.

What then is meant by state formation? The study of state-formation is inherently historical, because it focuses on the creation of durable states and the transformations of basic structural features of these states.\(^{12}\) Sometimes

\(^{10}\)The emphasis on the territorial dimension of states distinguishes them from firms, MNCs, and lineage groups, for example, with their larger, smaller, or more diffuse territorial reach. The focus on the state as coercion-wielding organization distinguishes it from economic power.

\(^{11}\)Note that including Mitchell’s state effect in the definition of the state need not require a reintroduction to the definition of the problematic Weberian criterion of legitimacy. Mitchell’s argument also helps to clarify why, as Tilly suggests, “kinship groups” should be considered distinct from states (even if they are sometimes coercion-wielding organizations exercising clear priority over other organizations within substantial territories); kinship groups do not necessarily strive to create a sense of their distinctness from society.

\(^{12}\)Note that “structural features” are defined here to include patterned material practices as well as the intersubjective understandings in which they are embedded.
state-formation is understood as a mythic initial moment in which centralized, coercion-wielding, hegemonic organizations are created within a given territory. All activities that follow this original era are then described as “policymaking” rather than “state-formation.” But states are never “formed” once and for all. It is more fruitful to view state-formation as an ongoing process of structural change and not as a one-time event. Structural features of states involve the entire set of rules and institutions that are involved in making and implementing policies: the arrangement of ministries or departments, the set of rules for the allocation of individual positions within these departments, systems for generating revenues, legal codes and constitutions, electoral rules, forms of control over lower bodies of government, the nature and location of boundaries between state and society, and so forth. This suggests that the commonplace contrast between state-formation and policymaking is often more a matter of “cross-sectional” versus “longitudinal” studies than of a well-grounded distinction between theoretical objects. It is more accurate to say that “policies” that affect the very structure of the state are part of the ongoing process of state-formation. A structure-changing policy is one that alters the state in a way that systematically affects the production of subsequent policies; a structure-reproducing policy expresses and affirms the existing state form. If a state drafts new cohorts of soldiers on an annual basis, for example, each act of conscription does not necessarily represent an episode in the process of state formation; but a shift from the use of conscription to mercenaries or a significant broadening of the social groups that are subject to conscription would be more likely candidates for inclusion. Defined in these terms, all the essays in this book are concerned with dimensions of state-formation.

Before turning to the specific issues at stake in this book, we must respond briefly to two challenges to the basic legitimacy of the study of the state. Following the resurgence of state theory and the state concept in the 1960s and 1970s, various theorists began to raise new challenges to the emphasis on the state in the analysis of modern power. Many heeded Foucault’s dictum that power is widely dispersed throughout capillary networks and not “localised in the State apparatus.” Writers such as Rose and Miller (1992) and Dean (1994a, 1994b)

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13 A more difficult distinction is between an understanding of state-formation in terms of shifts from one major state “form” to the next, as opposed to a more gradual and multilayered process without any clear dividing lines. Many analyses of state-formation focus on key transitions, such as the emergence of the absolutist state or the Keynesian welfare state. Those who focus on less dramatic structural changes are often skeptical of all-encompassing conceptual distinctions between state types.

14 In practice, of course, it is often exceedingly difficult to distinguish between structure-transforming and structure-reproducing policies. Moreover, one of the only ways of even identifying state “structures” is to study policy formation and implementation. On structure-reproducing versus structure-transforming practices, see Bhaskar (1979); also Giddens (1979).

15 Foucault, (1980a: 60). Elsewhere Foucault claimed that “we should direct our researches on the nature of power not towards the juridical edifice of sovereignty, the State apparatuses and the ideologies which accompany them, but towards domination and the material operators of power, towards forms of subjection and the inflections and utilizations of their localised systems, and towards strategic apparatuses.” Foucault (1980b: 102). See also Deleuze and Guattari (1986).
criticize state theory for underestimating the decentralized and molecular nature of power. In this respect contemporary (post-Foucauldian) theoretical approaches join forces with older systems theory, which has consistently rejected an emphasis on the state (Easton 1953). According to Luhmann (1989: 88), “there is little sense in attributing a special social position to the political system, [something] like a leading role . . . .” Luhmann describes the political system in contemporary, differentiated societies as just one among many “function systems” with no privileges of command or knowledge over the other systems. The notion of an “apex” of power “made sense in the context of stratified differentiation,” writes Luhmann, but “these [premodern] conditions . . . have changed” (85).16

Many network theorists visualize power as a web of shifting ties among a changing set of actors, which leads them to reject the concept of the state as overly unitary (Laumann and Knocke 1987).17

A second challenge to state theory focuses not on the entire modern era but on the period since the 1970s. Here the argument is that states are declining in power due to economic globalization, neoliberal hegemony, and the increasing importance of deterritorialized political spaces (see Omae 1990, 1995; Sassen 1996; Ruggie 1991; Brenner 1997). The putative decline of the nation-state is driven and accompanied by systematic “debordering”: “the network of systematic and spontaneous trans-border phenomena extending over the system of states has become much denser, and the domain in which the . . . territorial state . . . can still function as itself has become ever smaller” (Brock and Albert 1995: 3; see also Kratochwil 1986). The literature on globalization and post-Fordism suggests that the nation-state is simultaneously too small and too weak to control the increasingly transnational flows of capital, and too large and centralized to coordinate the transition to more flexible forms of production and regulation. The overall result is that nation-states are being downsized, decentralized, or “hollowed out” (Jessop 1994, this volume). Many of the central state’s erstwhile functions are being assumed by transnational and nongovernmental organizations (Campbell, Hollingsworth, and Lindberg 1991) or by local and regional governments, or else they are simply lost, as in the dismantling of Keynesian welfare states (Teeple 1995). Nonstate institutions assume the regulation of such diverse areas as law, punishment, education, religion, spatial planning, “welfare,” and war making. Thatcherism is only the most obvious example of this evisceration of the central state, and similar trends can be seen through-

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16 Luhmann is nonetheless in many ways less historical than Foucault. Luhmann’s theory equates structural differentiation with modernization, and therefore can understand the reemergence of centralized states as a historical regression. State socialism, for instance, is seen as an example of structural de-differentiation.

17 One perplexed network theorist even asked me what a course on the “state” and “state theory” might concern. This suspicion of the state concept is clearly justified; as many state theorists, Marxists and poststructuralists alike, have noted, the state-society boundary is traversed by numerous strands of power. Yet what both the Marxists (see the “state derivation” debate of the 1970s; Holloway and Picton 1978) and the cultural state theorists (see Mitchell 1991; Abrams 1988; Correll 1997) recognize is that while the state-society is in some sense fictional, it is nonetheless a very powerful fiction that concentrates certain kinds of power on the “state” side of the equation.
out Western Europe and North America. Even more dramatic is the disappearance or decline in relative importance of socialist states in Eastern Europe and East Asia—states that only a decade ago controlled most of the property and information within their respective territories. Various African states have lost any semblance of a “monopoly of violence” within their borders. A global wave of democratization, from South Korea to Latin America, is also said to have reduced the state’s earlier preeminence.

Current perceptions of state decline are also driven by the shifting tides of political culture, especially the increasing hegemony of neoliberalism. American political science in the 1950s had already insisted that the state was a pre-scientific continental European “myth” (see Nettl 1968; Almond 1988). In the context of the Vietnam War, oppositional social movements, and the expansion of the welfare state during the 1960s and early 1970s, the idea of the state was revived in mainstream political culture as well as academic discourse. In a striking reversal of intellectual fashions since the 1980s, academic arguments against the state gained ground again, as antistatism came to dominate mainstream political discourse. The net result of these intellectual and political changes is that reference to “the state” has once again become somewhat suspect in mainstream social science, and anyone writing on it is obligated to defend the topic’s legitimacy.

Even if the present-day state has lost some of its erstwhile importance, it can hardly be said to be “withering away.” The state may have relinquished some of its earlier capacity to control the movement of capital across its own borders, but it is still the key actor in a number of arenas, including the definition of access to citizenship and its benefits, the control and production of violence, and the metacoordination of the diverse nongovernmental institutions involved in “governance.” The strong version of the globalization thesis is also too pessimistic about states’ ability to control the movements of capital, confusing a failure of political will with a loss of structural capacity. The state still has crucial advantages over other actors in the effort to construct hegemonic identities and to unify the centrifugal identifications within any given territory along nationalist lines. Some contemporary theories allow that the state may come to occupy a

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18 By the same token, it is no coincidence that much radical right-wing antistate discourse in the United States today is associated with a militarized mercenary and vigilante culture that can be traced to the Vietnam War. American radical right-wing discourse attributes much more solidity to the central state than does mainstream political folk culture.

19 Skocpol (1996) traces the rise of pervasive antistatism with respect to the Clinton Health Security bill. Social-democratic parties in Europe have also adopted antistatist rhetoric and monetarist policies (see Kitzchelt 1994). See also Rueben (1988: 324), who argues that “the end of the welfare state is also the end of the classical model of political science . . . and undermines the symbolism of the state’s . . .power.”

20 The concept of the state was always comparatively weak in the United States anyway, as noted by writers like Badie and Birnbaum (1983). Holloway suggests that this is less true of British political theory, where even today “the state, as a category, is simply assumed” (1994: 52). Perhaps the eagerness of British Foucauldians to denounce the state concept actually confirms this judgment.

central position among various sites of social power, even if this is not a foregone conclusion. In *The Sources of Social Power*, Michael Mann suggests that the state may "crystallize as the center . . . of a number of power networks" (1993: 75). Pierre Bourdieu (this volume) argues that the state is the "culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital," a process that "constitutes the state as the holder of a sort of metacapital." Unlike him, he conceded that the state retained a special status even after the "disciplinary" revolution of the nineteenth century, although some of his followers fail to recognize this. Finally, a deeper historical perspective on the long waves of state expansion and contraction across the centuries should caution us against rashly declaring "the end of history" and consigning states to the historical waste heap.

Although the more sweeping arguments for the state's irrelevance can be rejected, this book does not attempt to "reinstate" the state or to put it back on the pedestal it has occupied in some of the macrosociological literature. Indeed, one recurrent argument in many of the essays collected here is that states are not "autonomous" from extrastate cultural forces, but are shot through with circuits of meaning that cut across the state-society frontier. Nonetheless, these essays grant the state a central place within complex sociocultural formations and within contemporary social theory.

**Culture/State Relations in Earlier Social Theory: Some False Leads**

Culture has hardly been ignored in social-scientific writing on the state, but the ways in which culture/state relations have been conceptualized have been quite problematic. This section criticizes three widespread but flawed approaches to this topic. First are various theoretical approaches that deal with culture not as a significant determinant of the state but rather as a sort of "dependent variable" or effect of the state. Second, where cultural influences on the state are acknowledged, they are often framed in restrictive terms as the formally elaborated ideas of academics and other expert elites or as the more generalized features of so-called political culture. Finally, even where culture has been conceptualized more broadly and been allowed to play a central explanatory role, it has been understood in foundationalist terms as a universal homogeneous rationality or as timeless national essence.

Social scientists have tended to explain the form and activities of the state with reference to instrumentally rational calculations, such as the official calculus of

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23 According to Lefort (1986), even the limit case of state expansion, "totalitarianism," cannot be assumed to be a thing of the past; totalitarian possibilities may even be built into the very structure of liberal democracy.

24 I have deliberately chosen the formulation "culture/state" rather than "culture and the state" to emphasize the openness of the investigation, an unwillingness to privilege a priori one of the terms in the pair, and also to suggest the interpenetration of the two categories. For this reason I have also consciously varied the order of the two terms.
dominant class interests, party politics, or international security. But they have
downplayed the role of what Weber called “substantive rationality,” of cultural
systems such as nationalism and religion. Tendencies to focus on the more in-
strumental wellsprings of politics have been further strengthened by the recent
expansion of “rational-choice” theory in the social sciences. This latter de-
velopment, which represents almost a mirror image of the cultural turn, has been
especially strong in political science, where research on the state has long been
centered.25
Theoretical debates on state-formation in recent decades have been domi-
nated by Marxist/neo-Marxist and Weberian/neo-Weberian perspectives.26 Cul-
ture has not been ignored by either of these perspectives but neither has it been
analyzed adequately. For Marxists and neo-Marxists, culture has figured primar-
ily as an effect of the state and/or economic forces, and not as a major deter-
minant in its own right. For Weber, cultural factors play a central role in the
analysis of non-Western and premodern states but a vastly reduced role in the in-
terpretation of modern Western states. The neo-Weberian “state-centered” per-
spective, like Marxism, has tended to treat cultural factors as effects of the state
or has permitted culture to influence state-formation only in the limited guise of
formally organized systems of “ideas.”27

Marxism and Neo-Marxism: The State’s Impact on Culture

The relationship between culture and the state varies in Marx’s writings ac-
cording to the level of abstraction governing a particular analysis. The state
emerges in Marx’s earlier, neo-Hegelian writing as a key instance governing the
production of powerful ideological representations (1964).28 As in the later

25According to one recent estimate, nearly 40 percent of the articles in the American Political
Science Review now have “a clear rational-choice orientation” (Hedström 1996: 278).
26On neo-Marxist state theory, see Gold, Lo, and Wright (1979); Jessop (1982, 1990a); Carney
(1984); and Barrows (1993); on neo-Weberian perspectives, see Skocpol (1985). Political philosophy
will not be considered here, even if a Hegelian tradition on the state (with its origins in Hegel’s Phi-
losophy of Right) does represent an important strand of “culturalist” thinking on the state. This strand
is related only indirectly to current discussions of culture within substantive political theory; Hegel
is much more important to discussions of civil society (see Cohen and Arato 1992; Castri de 1946).
27The other tradition within substantive social theory that has explicitly theorized state/culture
relations is Durkheimian (see Durkheim 1992; Shils 1972; Eisenstadt 1963). Like traditional Marxism,
Durkheimian sociology tends to explain cultural forms in terms of social structure. In The Elemen-
tary Forms of the Religious Life, Durkheim analyzes religion as the original source of the basic catego-
ries of thought; yet at a deeper level, totemism and religious ritual are traced back to more basic
social structures and functions. In Profesional Ethics and Civic Morals, Durkheim argues that the
state in modern society represents the ultimate source of authoritative “representations”: its “prin-
cipal function is to think” (1992: 31). More specifically, the state is the supreme “organ of moral dis-
cipline,” whose purpose is to bring about a “communion of minds and wills” (72, 69). Whereas re-
ligion fulfilled certain functions of social cohesion in “simpler” societies, the modern state’s function
is to combat the anomie tendencies resulting from social differentiation, the division of labor. As in
Marxist theory, the cultural forms produced by the state play a central role in social reproduction,
but extricate culture has no independent causal power.
28The state for the early Marx represents an “abstract system of political domination which de-
nies the social nature of man and alienates him from genuine involvement in public life” (Jessop 1982:
7; Marx 1964).
work, ideology is described here as contributing to the reproduction of capitalist social relations. At the same time, ideology is itself ultimately determined by this selfsame capitalist mode of production (see Marx 1970a; Cohen 1978; Elster 1985). Cultural systems thus are on one level causally efficacious, but at a deeper level they represent an effect, however indirect and mediated, of more fundamental social processes. In his essays on specific political events, Marx attributes more power to cultural factors. Marx evokes the cultural "backwardness" of the German bourgeoisie, for example, in accounting for the continuing control of the Prussian/German state by the "feudal" Junker class well into the bourgeois era (Steinmetz 1993), and he traces "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" partly to the Napoleon cult and the lack of class consciousness among the French peasantry (Marx 1970b). Cultural arguments do not structure Marx's theory in a systematic way, however, even if efforts have been made to reinterpret his theory along these lines (for example, Postone 1993).

Twentieth-century "Western Marxism" has of course been intensely interested in cultural analysis (Anderson 1976: 75–76; Laclau and Mouffe 1987: chapters 1–2). But until recently, even "cultural" Marxists have described culture as the product of other, more basic structural instances, such as capital, class relations, or modes of production. Two important exceptions, Marxists who construe culture as an important independent shaper of state-formation, are Antonio Gramsci and one of Gramsci's most trenchant critics, Perry Anderson (see Anderson 1977). Gramsci's writings on hegemony are tangled and ambiguous enough to have produced a huge exegetical literature. Yet Gramsci clearly believed that a prerequisite for the successful assumption of state power by a revolutionary party was the prior construction of cultural counterhegemony outside the state, within the "trenches" of civil society. Contrary to the expectations of orthodox Marxism, the success of this counterhegemonic project was, for Gramsci, far from guaranteed by any objective contradictions between the forces and relations of production. Nor were the contents of the counterhegemonic cultural project a mere translation of fundamentally economic interests. According to one commentator on Gramsci, "the subjects of hegemonic practice understood at the level of their discursive constitution will not necessarily have a class character. . . . to hegemonize as a class would simply imply either a limited or an unsuccessful attempt" (Rosenthal 1988: 47). Successful hegemonizing agents must abandon their "sectional" class interests, organizing ideologies around more general signifiers such as nationalism, religion, or the "people" (Gramsci 1971; also see Laclau 1977).

Anderson's historical studies of antiquity, feudalism, and absolutism (1978, 1979) are unusual within the Marxist literature for the degree of causal power

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29 For an especially clear expression of this, see Engels' letters to Joseph Bloch and Franz Mehring in Tucker (1972: 760–67). In other formulations, ideology for Marx is little more than an epiphenomenal reflection of economic foundations and does not even have this "conveyor belt" efficacy. See Marx (1970a) and discussion in Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (1977).

30 Although the Althusserians saw ideology as playing a key role in the imaginary resolution of real contradictions, the content of ideology itself was determined—in the "last instance"—by the capitalist mode of production.
they grant to autonomous political and military motives in shaping systems of authority and rule. What often goes unnoticed is the significance Anderson also attaches to cultural determinants of states. One example is his emphasis on the central contribution of Latin civilization to the formation of the imperial Roman state even in the third and fourth centuries, as its center of gravity shifted eastward (1978: 89–90). Another, more familiar argument—but one not often given pride of place in the Marxist literature—concerns the Roman Law tradition, which was a key contributor to the growth of centralized European monarchies (Anderson 1979: 25–27).31 Unlike some Marxists, Anderson recognizes that the availability of a revived and modernized version of Roman Law in Renaissance Europe was historically contingent and cannot be explained functionally as the effect of a capitalist economy that did not yet exist.32

Weber and the Relegation of Culture to Non-Western and Premodern Sites

We might expect a more culturally inflected account of state-formation from Weber, given his advocacy of interpretive social analysis. Weber famously integrated hermeneutic and causal methods in his studies of the relations between religion and economic practices, yet he never completed a full-scale comparative study of state-formation.33 Weber’s many scattered remarks about states do suggest that traditional and non-Western states are profoundly shaped by religious cultural systems. Confucianism was locked into a mutually reinforcing embrace with the Chinese state and acted as a barrier to “political rationalization” (see Weber 1951, 1978: 1049–50).34 Hindu ethics allowed for the development of an autonomous “Machiavellian” art of politics in India (Weber 1958: p. 123). These “Oriental” states were examples of the patrimonial form of domination, which is underwritten by a culture in which “the most fundamental obligation of the subjects is the material maintenance of the ruler” (Weber 1978: 1074). Turning to Europe, Weber notes that early Protestantism similarly “legitimated the state as a divine institution” (1958: 124).

31 An especially important facet of Roman Law, according to this narrative, was its recognition of private property. But compare Strayer (1970: 26) and Badie (1981: 63), who criticizes Anderson for ignoring the changes in Roman Law over time.

32 Contrast Poulantzas (1978: 61–67), whose discussion of the absolutist state suggests that the rules of public law “can be dated from the emergence of this power” (163), a state whose character is fundamentally capitalist (p. 166). Because Roman Law was functionally necessary, it would have been invented if it had not already existed.

33 Johannes Winckelmann notes that Weber’s writing during the last three years of his life was concerned with the theme “sociology of the state” and that Weber’s penultimate outline for the work that came to be called Economy and Society encompassed a final section on “formation of the rational state” and “the modern political powers” (Winckelmann 1956a: 9–13; 1956b: xii). The section on state-formation was to include a discussion of “the rationalism of the modern state and its relationship to the churchly powers.” Winckelmann tried to reconstruct this missing section in an edition of Economy and Society published in 1956 (Weber 1956a) by combining sections of Weber’s Wirtschaftsgeschichte and his essays “Politics and Government in a Reconstructed Germany” and “Politics as a Vocation.”

34 For a neo-Weberian argument (via Parsons) about the positive effects of Confucianism and Shintoism on state rationalization in Tokugawa Japan, see Bellah (1957) 1969.
Cultural factors are thus accorded a central part in Weber’s interpretations of premodern and non-Western states. When we turn to the modern Western state, however, a peculiar shift occurs, one that is linked to Weber’s overarching conception of rationality (Schluchter 1981, 1989; Kalberg 1980). The most general characteristic of the modern state, according to Weber, is its formal-legal rationality. The ideal-typical modern state has removed itself from the sway of the “substantively rational” cultural systems that pervaded earlier European and non-Western states.66 Weber’s claim that authority strives for legitimation would seem to build culture into the very definition and mode of operation of the state. Weber acknowledges, of course, that actual modern Western states do not always correspond to this ideal type (see his discussion of the English state, with its basis in common law; 1978: 977). One might also counter that formal or instrumental rationality is itself simply another form of culture. Yet in much of Weber’s work it functions as a sort of nonculture, a privileged baseline of “pure rationality” against which other action-orientations can be highlighted (6–7). Weber repeatedly describes the modern European style of state as technically superior and rational, with no qualifier (1966a: 17). This Orientalist political teleology complements Weber’s larger contrast between capitalism’s emergence in Europe and its failure to arise autochthonously in the “East” (Turner 1996: 257–86; 1974; Parsons 1949).

Elsewhere Weber does bring cultural processes into the explanation of modern states, but as in Marx, these arguments do not disturb the central structure of his theoretical system. The most important example may be his discussion of charisma as an alternative basis for the legitimation of domination, even in modern societies. Weber accounts for the rise of charismatic rulership in “cultural” terms, as originating in “collective excitement produced by extraordinary events” (1978: 1121). The “action orientation” of charismatic authority is radically opposed to economic or utilitarian rationality (1133). Calling charisma “the specifically creative revolutionary force in history,” Weber recognizes its ability to found a new state, perhaps one based on charismatic kingship (117, 1121, 1142). Yet the concept of charismatic authority does not undercut Weber’s overarching contrast between the modern/Western and the premodern/Oriental. Granting that charisma is “by no means limited to primitive stages of development” (1133), Weber nonetheless argues that it is much more common “the further we go back into history” (1133).

66Weber does not directly suggest a parallel in the realm of state-formation to his analysis of the way in which the substantive rationality of aesthetic Protestantism gave rise to the formal rationality of modern capitalism. Rarely does he allude to linkages between specific earlier substantive cultures and the formal rationality of the modern legal state (but see, e.g., Weber 1966a: 18). Such an approach seems completely compatible with Weber’s general line of argumentation, however, as Gorski (this volume) and others (e.g., Schilling 1994) have suggested. Of course, Gorski substitutes a vocabulary of “disciplining,” avoiding the implication of empty formal rationality as the telos of state formation.

68 Another place where culture enters the analysis of the modern state is Weber’s discussion of the nation, which he defines as a subjective sense of belonging, common political memories, and expectations of solidarity (Weber 1978: 922–23). It is significant in this context that Weber did not view national sentiment, at least in Germany, as chiefly a product of the state (Weber 1989).
Neo-Weberian Theory and the Impact of “Ideas” on the State

Weber’s “interpretivism” was thus more fully realized in his writing on economic history and the premodern/Oriental than in his work on the modern state. Much post-Weberian research on the state has reinforced this tendency to understand Western states as basically rational and non-Western states as embedded within exotic cultural systems (Edelman 1995). It is perhaps not surprising then that one of the most influential schools of state theory, which arose in the 1970s, the “state-centered” perspective, was able to draw heavily on Weber while explicitly rejecting cultural analysis. The most influential example of this perspective, Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions, called on analysts to “rise above” the “viewpoints of the participants” (1979: 18), in direct contrast to Weber’s interpretivist starting point in Economy and Society.

To understand the state-centered analysts’ resistance to cultural arguments we need to recall the way in which their challenge to Marxist theory originally emerged during the 1980s. A key programmatic statement of this perspective was Skocpol’s introduction to Bringing the State Back In (1985). In response to this book, a generation of doctoral dissertations in the social sciences was structured around arguments for or against the state’s autonomy from dominant classes and other “socioeconomic” forces. The neo-Weberian understanding of the state as actor and institution began to supplant the neo-Marxian view of the state as a “collective capitalist.” State-centered theory was successful partly because it was able to explain anomalies in orthodox Marxist accounts of the state, particularly those cases in which state structures and policies failed to correspond to dominant class interests. State-centered theorists asserted that states were not just “relatively” autonomous from dominant social classes, but that in some instances they were fully autonomous.

The state-centered theorists’ efforts to carve out greater space for autonomous state action were thus directed primarily against economic and class-centered approaches. By reducing the alternatives to the simple binary choice between “state-centered” and “society-centered” explanation, however, state-centered theory was led almost inexorably to reject or to marginalize cultural determinations of the state as well, because most of what we call culture in the anthropological sense is located on the “society” side of the posited boundary. There was some interest in what Skocpol called the “Tocquevillian” problem of the state’s “pattern of social conflict” (1985). But here again culture figured primarily as an effect and not a determinant of the state.

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37Other key works in this “school” were consecrated by Skocpol herself. Of course, there were other writers on the state whose thinking cut obliquely across these lines of debate. Charles Tilly presented an approach to the state which, although associated with the state-centered approach through its inclusion in Bringing the State Back In (Tilly 1985) and its emphasis on state predation and warmaking, was equally attentive to social-structural determinants (see Tilly 1990).

38The state’s “capacities” or “strength” were the central determinant of the realization of the state’s potential autonomy (Skocpol 1985). Other factors precipitating the autonomization of the state included economic crises, which were argued to lessen the ability of socioeconomic structures to censor state policies (Block 1988a).
Introduction

The debate between neo-Marxist and state-centered approaches pointed symptomatically to cultural determinants of the state. Questions about the influence of culture on the state were suppressed or raised only indirectly. Below I look briefly at the evolution of two debates on specific state forms to illustrate this symptomatic emergence of the cultural problematic. Several commentators have noted that whereas the state-centered approach elucidates the structural conditions under which state-makers and public officials free themselves from the demands of dominant class actors, it offers only ad hoc explanations of the specific contents of the policies these actors seek to implement. In a partial effort to correct this shortcoming, state-centered writers occasionally point to the impact of ideas or intellectuals on state policy. This move gestures toward (official) decision making as an important causal mechanism; and almost inevitably, any attention to decision making opens up the Pandora’s box of subjectivity and culture. Any overt emphasis on culture as constitutive of social reality seemed to violate the original strictures of the state-centric approach. Instead, culture played a largely unacknowledged explanatory part in the guise of the subjectivity of state officials (Cammock 1989; Mitchell 1991, this volume). Rather than engaging frontally in a full-scale theorization of the nature and role of cultural determination, state-centered theorists adopted the Whiggish or technocratic language of “political learning” or, as Sewell (1985) pointed out, fell back on a sociologically impoverished conception of ideology as simply ideas, ignoring the role of broader, impersonal cultural systems, including those not organized as formal intellectual bodies of thought.

It is worth noting in this context that the state-centered literature was hardly alone in ignoring broader cultural formations while acknowledging the impact of “ideas” or formally articulated bodies of knowledge on the state. Karl Polanyi (1944: 111–29), for example, argued that the ideas of early political economy accounted for changes in eighteenth and nineteenth century English Poor Law. Linkages of these sorts are often suggested in historical writing: the Encyclopédistes incited the French Revolution; the construction of the “well-ordered police state” in early modern Germany and Russia was driven by Cameralist writings (Raeff 1983); Confucian texts undergird the Chinese state; the blueprint for the Nazi state can be found in Mein Kampf or in the grumbling of right-wing Weimar academics (Stern 1961).

What is wrong with concentrating on “expert” ideas, formally constituted bodies of thought? First, the mere fact that experts hope that their ideas will influence the state does not mean that these ideas are in fact more powerful than anonymous, impersonal ideologies. Academic analysts who assume that forms of writing that more closely resemble their own are more causally efficacious in the real world seem to be suffering from a sort of professional narcissism. Second, even if one does focus on expert writing and speech, it may be the formal aspects

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Footnote: For examples of this approach within political research, see Heelo (1974); Haas, Williams, and Babi (1977); Haas (1990); Yee (1990); and Rose and Miller (1992). For related critiques of this work, see Curtis (1995: 88) and On (1996).
of this discourse rather than its explicit contents that are most significant (Foucault 1972). Finally, it is not obvious that the relevant conceptual or cultural phenomena are necessarily expressed in formal discourse. The “conceptual” aspects of reality that shape the state may also “include tacit conceptual skills and tacitly followed rules . . . unrecognized beliefs and needs, unconscious motives and attitudes, etc.” (Collier 1994: 232).

“Political Culture and Political Development”: An Excursus

The “political culture” framework of the 1960s and 1970s might seem to resonate with our own present agenda. Following Parsons’s injunction to “avoid any appearance of a cognitive bias” (1965: 965) in the study of the “cultural system,” political culture was said to encompass “evaluative” and “affective” orientations along with cognitive material (Verba 1965: 316). Nor did the political culture approach ignore non-elite ideas or internal differentiation within a given “culture.” Indeed, the political culture approach was committed to using the most “recent advances in the sociological techniques for measuring attitudes” (Pye 1965: 8) and statistical analysis, which led researchers to seek representative samples and to foreground variation (see Almond and Verba 1963; Inkeles 1974).

Alongside these advances over the “elite ideas” approach, however, the political culture approach suffered from a series of assumptions that distinguish it sharply from the current cultural turn. First, it was committed to an essentially “behavioral” form of analysis in which the individual was the privileged unit of analysis, even if individual responses were subsequently aggregated for statistical processing. This individualistic bias was at odds with the point made even by Parsons that culture is not (or not primarily) a property of individuals. The political culture literature misleadingly wrenched “ideas” such as “national pride” from the social conditions in which they were embedded and within which they received their specific meaning (Pateeman 1980: 60; Scheuch 1968). As MacIntyre observed in a critique of this approach, “we identify and define attitudes in terms of the objects toward which they are directed,” and “no institution or practice is what it is, or does what it does, independently of what anyone whatsoever thinks or feels about it” ([1967] 1978: 262–63).

Another set of drawbacks derived from the interweaving of modernization theory with the political culture approach. Researchers were mainly interested in adherence to a narrow syndrome of attitudes thought to characterize the Anglo-American “civic culture” and deemed relevant to “political development” (Verba 1965: 527; Almond and Verba 1963: vii). While political culture researchers did not fall into the trap of assuming homogeneity within cultures, they projected across the globe a common homogeneous scale along which individual respondents were arrayed. Political culture was defined as “orientations toward the political

40 My decision to expand my discussion of the political culture literature, which many now view as little more than a footnote in the history of political research, is due to the urging of Peggy Somers. For a contemporary assessment of the political culture literature from a different perspective, see Somers (1995); for an important earlier critique, see Pateeman (1973).
system." This starting point dramatically restricted the range of questions and topics thought to be important. Cultural orientations toward ostensibly "non-political" issues were ignored. Yet these orientations might well influence state formation. Feminist research, for instance, has traced the ways categories of gender and assumptions about sexuality have shaped the policies and structure of the state (for example, Sylvester 1994; Peterson 1992; Elshtain 1992; Enloe 1989, 1993; Cohn 1987). Racial classification schemes and racist beliefs played a central causal role, above and beyond calculations of economic interest, in the formation of overseas colonial states (Steinmetz 1997b, forthcoming), the Nazi state (Burleigh and Wippermann 1991), and the antebellum and Jim Crow Southern U.S. polity (Wilson 1980). Even the proponents of the political culture perspective acknowledged that "much of what . . . we have assumed to be the political culture of a society may in fact be the . . . political theory of political scientists" (Verba 1965: 523 n. 11).

The most serious shortcoming of the political culture school in our present context, however, was its failure to unpack the dialectical relations between states and culture. Commentators have noted that this literature frequently asserts a relationship between political culture and political structure without ever investigating or even defining it (Pateman 1980: 75). Political culture was sometimes described as a "connecting link" between "discrete individuals" and the "political systems" (Almond and Verba 1963: 33). Rather than making causal statements about this "link," however, Almond and Verba emphasized the degree of "congruency" between the two terms (21–22). Democratic political culture tends to become part of the very definition of democracy, making it difficult even to pose questions about the connection. In sum, political culture was mobilized to explain "the ways in which people act within these political institutions" (Verba 1965: 514) but not the "institutions" themselves.41

Foundationalist Decontextualization in the Study of the State

This section develops in greater detail the earlier argument that Weber granted central importance to cultural factors only in the interpretation of premodern and non-Western states. Such Orientalism in state studies (and its allied "Orientalism"; see Carrier 1995; Coronil 1997) is not unique to Weber, but can be linked to a broader strategy of foundationalist decontextualization. The latter can be defined as a view of human subjectivity as determinable outside its social and historical context.

The linchpin of decontextualized social theory is typically some founding assumption about human nature, such as instrumental rationality, a propensity to violence, or territorialism. Rorty (1979) calls this style of thought "social naturalism." Some privileged institution—the individual, the market, the contract—

41 For a later self-critical discussion of this failure to connect survey data to macropolitical outcomes, see Verba (1980).
is postulated as a presocial foundation. When the assumptions remain implicit, as they do in most contemporary social sciences, they are usually utilitarian. Rational-choice theory consciously embraces this particular version of foundationalism (Wacquant and Calhoun 1989). Within state theory, rational-choice perspectives exaggerate tendencies toward cultural decontextualization that were already present within the state-centered perspective, emphasizing the “state as predator” motif while marginalizing cultural processes to an even greater extent (see Adams this volume).  

Sometimes cultural difference is so obvious that it cannot convincingly be subsumed under a decontextualized model. Here other strategies are used to construct foundations. One approach has been to make culture itself into a timeless base by positing the existence of unified and static national (or religious, racial, or ethnic) cultures. As Badic remarks, “political analysts have not always known how to differentiate between a scientific apprehension of the cultural factor and the common-sense discourse on the ‘soul of the people’ or the national character” (1983: 11). National character is thus a culturalist version of social naturalism. The proliferation of “national character” arguments in earlier culturalist social science was one reason for the rejection of cultural approaches tout court. Yet this view of national culture as timeless tradition, internally coherent and shared equally by all members of the society, is antithetical to the cultural turn (Dirks, Eley, and Ortner 1994: 3).  

National culture arguments were rejected for other reasons. Most of these arguments were not truly relativistic, but arranged the various cultures hierarchically along a unilinear developmental scale. Non-Western and colonized cultures were redescribed as earlier stages in a universal teleological path. This allowed cultural theory to preserve a solid foundation in the face of unequivocal cultural otherness and historical change. The notion of a universal historical trajectory is made explicit within social evolutionary and modernization theory, traditional Marxism, and systems theory; it is usually implicit whenever the terms traditional and modern are used without a specific chronological reference. Past cultural forms that fit poorly with “modern rationality” are lumped together in the category of “tradition”; and where the “traditional” cultures are contemporaneous, space is recoded as time. Even contemporary Western societies sometimes pre-

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43 Arguments for the causal importance of human agency in rational-choice theory should not be equated with claims for cultural determinism. At the limit, rational-choice theory specifies the workings of a particular cultural system.  
44 Much of the systems-theoretical social science of the 1950s and 1960s took this form, describing national cultures as monolithic and timeless entities. See for example Parsons’s own essays on German culture (1991); Inkeles (1961); Doob (1964); and Pye (1962). Recent examples of this style of cultural foundationalism include Huntington (1993; 1996) and Goldhagen (1996).  
45 Contrast, for instance, Sohri’s account in this volume of the multiple readings of constitutionalism in 1996 Iran with the comments of Verba on the same topic, which imply a singular national culture: “a new constitution... will be perceived and evaluated in terms of the political culture of a people” (Verba 1995: 517; my emphasis).  
46 The locus classicus in the social sciences of treating contemporary non-Western societies as earlier stages of the modern West is Durkheim ([1915] 1965). This conflation of idealized Western cul-
sent a disruptive otherness that can be countered only by a “self-orientalizing” application of the developmental scheme. The “exceptionalist” literature on the rise of Nazism provides a clear example of this strategy. Germany is said to have deviated from the West due to the peculiar coexistence of “traditional” political elites and cultural forms with modern industrial capitalism before 1933 (see Dahrendorf 1967; Wehler 1985). As has been pointed out, this explanation distracts from Nazism’s “modern” character and its roots in developments that were more contemporary with the rise of Nazism (Eley 1986a; Bauman 1989; Prinz and Zitelmann 1991; Dahrendorf 1967). But by drawing a clear line between Germany and the “West,” the exceptionalist narrative rescues Western modernity from the taint of barbarism.

State theory has its own variant of this syndrome, a quasi-Orientalist juxtaposition of the rational, modern West with the “cultural” rest, as discussed above with respect to Weber. Frazer’s argument ([1900] 1922, [1905] 1920) about the primitive unity of kingship and religion/magic has been reformulated numerous times. On the one hand, the political and cultural spheres in Western societies are seen as functionally differentiated. Within premodern, non-Western, and socialist societies, on the other hand, culture and politics are seen as hopelessly intermingled, even indistinguishable. The unity of culture and polity is a commonplace in the political anthropology of older and non-Western polities (for example, Balandier 1991: 46–47). In Geertz’s description of the Balinese Negara, quoted in the epigraph to this chapter, political ritual did not simply exist to legitimate social inequalities: “power served pomp, not pomp power.” Additional “theater states” have been discovered in Java (Anderson 1990) and the southern Indian princely state of Pudukkottai (Dirks 1993: 8); Tambiah’s Siamese

tive with modernity tout court is hardly restricted to academic social science. Yang (1994) notes that many contemporary Chinese understand their own country as hampered by “tradition,” in contrast to the “modern” West. Badiou discusses a similar relationship to the West among intellectuals in “developing” countries (1992: 160f).

47 This argument does not contradict the one made later about the influence of German anti-Semitism, which was a distinctly modern product of electoral politics and mass media since the late nineteenth century. On the uses of the German Sonderweg thesis to “normalize” postwar West Germany, see Eley (1986b) and Steinmetz (1997a).

48 The clearest statement of this thesis is in the work of Luhmann (for example, 1989), whose systems theory occupies a curious position with respect to discussions of the state and culture. On the one hand, Luhmann accords a central place to discourse, or more accurately, communication, in the functioning of the state (“political system”). Communication within any of the “function systems,” including the political system, operates according to specific binary codes. At the same time, Luhmann insists on the mutual incomensurability of the various subsystem-specific codes. Subsystems cannot communicate directly with one another; “perturbations” originating in external subsystems must be translated into the local code. Luhmann thus effectively defines the impact of extrastate codes on the state as abnormal, as an indicator of the system’s antimodern “de-differentiation.” Luhmann (1995) chides theories that assume such interpenetration for their obsolences.

49 Similarly, Salinas (1981: 80) analyzes the “mythical exploits and social disruptions common to . . . successive inventories of divine kings” as symbolic recapitulations of the “initial constitution of social life.” Refusing to see such rituals of royal installation as mere mystifications of more fundamental social interests, Salinas echoes Geertz in insisting that “the rationalization of power is not at issue so much as the representation of a general scheme of social life” (81; my emphasis).
“galactic polity” (1976, 1977) is similar. The separation of culture and politics is sometimes argued to be an effect of colonialism (Dirks 1993: 106, 261).

The problem is not that these writers question the separateness of cultural and political systems but that the same doubts are not typically raised when attention is turned to modern Western states. Theorists seem to assume that the subjectivity and motives of officials in modern states are basically the same everywhere. Even Geertz occupies a complex position with respect to this apparently Orientalist division of theoretical labor within state studies. On the one hand, Geertz insists that we must write the “political theology” of twentieth-century states (1983: 143). On the other hand, as some critics have noted, Geertz’s reversal of the causal arrows between “pomp” and “power” in Nogara does not automatically imply that “political action everywhere is a work of symbolic display.” Instead, the book’s “claim that Balinese political life is theatrical” relies on a “difference between theatrical performance and other kinds of action” (Thomas 1994: 94). As Dirks notes, “The choice of thespian metaphors makes Bali, with all the anthropological romance of the island, seem even more special a case than is perhaps justified” (1993: 402; see also Skalnick 1987).

As methodologically diverse as they are in other respects, theorists associated with the cultural turn reject such simplifying assumptions about human subjectivity, the explanatory primacy of utilitarian or material determinants, the directionality of history, and the inexorable differentiation of politics from broader cultural systems in the process of modernization. Social practices and objects such as states or state officials have to be situated in specific historical and cultural settings.

Culture as Symptom: State-Formation and the Need for an Explicit Discussion of Culture

I argued above that one reason for the unsatisfactory condition of state theory has to do with the way in which existing debates have pointed obliquely to the importance of cultural processes while avoiding a direct confrontation with cultural theory. Marxist, state-centric theories and rational-choice theories of the state have seemed congenitally ill-suited to address this problem, although adherents of these perspectives are beginning to pursue cultural themes.

The first example of the symptomatic emergence of the cultural problematic concerns the literature on the formation of the welfare state. Marxist approaches minimized the impact of culture on welfare state formation, tracing ideology to objective economic interests.49 State-centered theory was primarily interested in demonstrating that welfare policies developed independently of the interests of

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49 For a typical class-theoretic account of welfare state formation that ignores cultural processes, see Esping-Andersen (1990). Baldwin (1990) attempted to resuscitate the economic class approach by shifting attention from the working class and capital to the middle classes, but his account is similarly uninterested in cultural factors.
capital, labor, or other “social” forces (for example, Skocpol and Finegold 1982; Skocpol and Ikenberry 1983). Reference was sometimes made to the “political learning” of state managers to explain the kinds of welfare policies adopted, but minimal attention was paid to the sources of the specific contents or form of subjectivity beyond the immediate administrative context. It soon became obvious, however, that features of welfare states such as cross-national differences in the treatment of gender or the overall classification of social problems could not be explained without reference to broader social discourses.

The shifts in Ann Orloff’s work illustrate the way in which some state-centered theorists have moved beyond the anticulturalism of the earlier perspective by making cultural discourse a full-fledged determinant of state-formation. In 1984, Orloff and Skocpol argued that differences in the social policy history of Britain and the United States could not be explained in terms of cultural “values.” American social policy backwardness was attributed instead to a sort of political memory concerning the corrupting effects of the Civil War pensions. Clearly, this argument was in some sense a “cultural” one. The problem was to clarify the status of cultural determinants within a theoretical perspective that had set out to minimize the space for “social” determinants of the state. Did this mean that the only relevant cultural determinants were those that were “internal” to the state? And if not, what became of the foundational “state-centered” versus “society-centered” polarity? Orloff’s more recent work (this volume), along with the work of Nancy Fraser (1987) and others, has emphasized the impact of society-wide gender discourses on the form of welfare policies (see the discussion in the last section of this chapter).

To take another example, my own work on the sources of national and local social policies and state regulation of the social in Germany before 1914 suggests that it is necessary to reconstruct the ideology of state officials and the broader cultural discourses in which they participate before one can make sense of their social-political interventions and reactions (Steinmetz 1993). Bureaucratic elites’ understandings of society in Imperial Germany were shaped by historically layered discourses about the nature of social danger and the appropriate methods for regulating the social. Responses to social disturbances associated with the inchoate masses “the poor” were structured by an older discourse on pauperism which had crystallized in the period before 1848. Official reactions to pressure from organized labor were channeled by more recent class-centered paradigms which emerged during the last third of the century. The key point for our present purposes is that the impact of a given “variable” on policy formation can be understood only by reconstructing what it meant to the relevant actors—in this case, state officials. Failure to culturally embed political or economic factors is a central reason for the proliferation of contradictory findings in multivariate statistical studies of welfare states.

50Weir and Skocpol (1985), for example, present the adoption of Keynesian ideology by political elites as a process divorced from broader cultural developments.
Interpretations of the Nazi regime provide another example of a debate that became locked into an unfortunate contest between Marxist and state-centric approaches, creating an impasse that could be transcended only through explicit cultural analysis. Orthodox Marxists analyzed the Nazi state as a creature of the monopolies or as the “dictatorship of the most reactionary, the most chauvinistic, the most imperialistic elements of finance capital” (Dimitrov). Those who disagreed with the Marxist approach felt compelled to demonstrate the “primacy of politics” and the Nazi state’s autonomy from big business (Bracher 1973; Bracher, Sauer, and Schulz 1979; Kershaw 1993: chap. 3). By limiting debate to these alternatives, however, attention was diverted from the Nazi regime’s most distinctive activities, its racial and genocidal politics. The Nazi state’s decision to divert limited resources in the middle of the war in order to carry out the “Final Solution” can hardly be explained without reference to ideological processes, since the Holocaust was neither economically nor politically rational (but compare Aly et al. 1987). Both of the main contenders in the recent German historians’ debate, Browning (1992) and Goldhagen (1996), agree that a deep culture of modern anti-Semitism was a “necessary condition” in preparing masses of “ordinary men” to perform the killing. It is important to stress that this cultural formation was forged before the Nazis’ rise to power, and largely outside the state.

Cultural theory is also necessary to transcend the impasse in state theoretic debates with respect to conceptual issues, including the very definition of the state. Several authors have pointed out that state-centered theory, in its attempt to criticize Marxist theory, posited an easily identifiable boundary between state and society. This objectified what is in fact a mobile demarcation, subject to continual construction and deconstruction (see Block 1988b; Jessop 1990b). Marxists have at least recognized that the state-economy border is ambiguous and in some sense illusory (see Jessop 1982; Holloway and Picciotto 1978). The Marxist approach avoided exaggerating the solidary of the state-society boundary, even if it erred in the opposite direction. Clarification had to await the opening of state

51 Dimitrov’s 1935 report to the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, quoted in Ayoğobey (1981: 33). Mandel described the Nazi regime as a capitalist state engaged in increasing the rate of surplus value by breaking the back of organized labor (1973: 199–202). Of course, there have been various unorthodox Marxist accounts, starting with those of the Frankfurt School. More sophisticated structural neo-Marxists moved away from simple accounts, granting more autonomy to the (Weimar) political system and focusing on the overall class structure and divisions of interest within the business class (Poulantzas 1974; Abraham 1986). These shifts were not registered in the main lines of theoretical debate, which still tended to move back and forth between capital-analytic and “autonomy of politics” approaches.

52 The differences between the two revolve partly around whether anti-Semitism was a sufficient and not just a necessary condition. Goldhagen also weakens his argument severely by falling back on the homogenizing “national character” trope discussed above.

53 Poulantzas (1979), however, was unable to solve the problem of delimiting the state. He locates state power with the dominant class which holds power; and like Althusser, he defines the state in terms of its functions. The functional definition leads to the famous absurdity (see Althusser 1971; Poulantzas 1978: 36) that the state encompasses institutions such as the family and literature insofar
theory to cultural analysis, which allowed the boundary between the state and the nonstate to be seen as a variable discursive effect (Mitchell 1991, this volume) rather than an ontological constant or a functional requirement of capital.

The Theoretical Terrain of Culture/State Relations

In an overview of the political culture literature, Sidney Verba warned against an "unfortunate tendency in the social sciences to oversell new concepts" (1965: 515). It would indeed be exaggerated to argue that culture, even in the fuller sense described above, has been completely absent from the analysis of state-formation. In addition to the writers represented in this collection, many others have turned to this topic in recent decades. The burgeoning literature on nationalism usually looks at the effects of the state on identities, but sometimes the relations between culture and state are dialectical (for example, Anderson 1983). Lynn Hunt's (1992) proto-Freudian analysis of the French Revolution as a "family romance" argues that key political events, artistic representations, and transformations of the state during the revolution were shaped by a "collective political unconscious" that was itself "structured by narratives of family relationships" (xiii). The most radical aspects of the revolution are explained as a "fraternal" attack on the tyrannical father within both state and family. Claude Lefort (1986) proposes an ambitious Freudian theory of totalitarian regimes and their intimate relationship to democracy. In contrast to historic kingship-based societies, modern democratic regimes are centered around an "empty place of power" and characterized by extreme social heterogeneity. The disappearance of an image of the unified body politic parallels the psychoanalytic account of the "ordeal of the division of the subject" (306). Totalitarianism promises to heal that division, filling the empty center with the image of the leader and the party, radically simplifying social space, and restoring the unity of the community-body.

as these institutions are reproductive of capitalist relations. Still, the Althusserian approach had the salutary effect of disrupting commonsense understandings of the state as little more than buildings, men, and machines.

Texts that interpret the modern state as constituted by systems of signification include Geertz (1983); Glassner (1974); Arendt (1968); Badic and Bornbaum (1983); and Corrigan and Sayer (1983). Baudrillard (1983a, 1983b) and Edelman (1982, 1993) connect contemporary politics to the mass media and theatrical representation. Habermas's Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989 [1962]) is not primarily concerned with the state in the sense discussed here: his "bourgeois public sphere" is located outside the state. Hobsbawm and Ranger's Invention of Tradition (1983) is an important precursor to this volume, but its excellent essays focus principally on the effects of states on culture and less on causality running in the opposite direction.

Lefort historicizes the Freudian concept of the split subject, however cursorily (1986: 106), thus avoiding the universalizing claims found in some Freudian accounts and the critique of foundationism outlined above.

Julia Hell (1992, 1997) provides a psychoanalytically informed analysis of East German literature and political culture, starting with what she calls the foundational narratives of the immediate post-war period and continuing into the 1980s. Combining narrative analysis and psychoanalysis, she traces the unconscious fantasies about the "pure" postfascist body emerging in identification with the iconic
Many other examples of serious cultural analyses of state formation could be given. This book brings together several differing approaches to the problem. It was not designed as a presentation of a single theoretical framework but as an overview of some of the most interesting cultural work on the state. The overarching goal is to shift the terms of debate by demonstrating how developments in cultural theory can push theoretical and empirical work beyond the stalemate that resulted from the Marxist-Weberian dispute and the rational choice non-solution. This collection has both a dialogic and a critical orientation. The dialogic face involves staging discussion among the various cultural perspectives. The critical face is directed against cultural and historical decontextualization. Within this broad definition, however, each author follows a different path, and no effort was made to enforce a unified theoretical framework or terminology.

Broadly speaking, the essays here can be arrayed along a continuum of increasingly thoroughgoing culturalism. At one end of the continuum is a radical culturalism that rejects the distinction between cultural and noncultural objects altogether, at least within the human sciences. Social objects and practices are inextricably cultural and cannot be understood outside their subjective meaning. Objects like the state or the economy are not just causally determined by cultural systems, but are themselves fully "cultural." Social objects are never just "brute facts" (Taylor 1979, 1985); they cannot even be said to exist in any socially relevant sense outside their discursive or meaningful construction (see Foucault 1980d; Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 1987; Mitchell 1991, this volume; Sismondo 1993). From this perspective, the state could represent "a complex and mobile resultant of the discourses and techniques of rule," "a specific way in which the problem of government is discursively codified, a way of dividing a ‘political sphere,’ with its particular characteristics of rule, from other ‘non-political spheres’ to which it must be related" (Rose and Miller 1992: 176–77). In this book, Tim Mitchell's essay is closest to this strong version of cultural constructivism. But an approach that retains the distinction between the discursive and extradiscursive dimensions of social life while insisting on the absolute causal primacy of the former is often indistinguishable in its analysis from the more unadulterated versions of cultural constructivism.

At the other end of our continuum are arguments that combine a view of strategic action reminiscent of the rational-choice perspective with the claim that culture sets the overall context of constitutive rules, the ideological terrain of taken-for-granted assumptions, within which strategic action occurs. At this pole we also find different views of the extent to which strategic action is culturally embedded so that there is really something more than a simple continuum. All theorists at this pole might agree that human action has a certain strategic reasonableness (if not rationality) within an overall context that is determined cul-

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57 There is, of course, a difference between theories that focus on the "discursive" construction of social reality and the less linguistic approaches (hermeneutic or phenomenological).
Cultural systems define the goals of action, the expectations about other actors, and even what it means to be an “actor” (that is, whether the relevant actors in a system are individuals, groups, families, and so on). The difference is that for some analysts, this strategic rationality is unconscious and habitual, involving a “feel for the game” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 128); for others, strategy involves conscious calculation and choices (for example, Ermakoff 1997). Bourdieu, for example, evokes a quasi-Hobbesian world of struggle for competitive advantage, one that in many ways recalls microeconomic descriptions of rational actors pursuing their material interests. At the same time, however, Bourdieu insists that “strategy” is partly unconscious and habitual and that the crucial conditions for any form of strategic practice—the forms of capital that count as valid and their relative worth, the stakes struggled over, and so on—are utterly “conventional,” contextually specific to a given field. Bourdieu’s approach can be contrasted in this respect with Laitin’s (1986, 1988, this volume). Laitin writes that “culture is Janus-faced: people are both guided by the symbols of their culture and instrumental in using culture to gain wealth and power” (1988: 589; my emphasis). For Laitin, hegemonic culture defines relevant actors and the preferences and choices available to them; in a second analytic phase, individual behavior can be modeled using game theory and categories of strategic rationality.

Clearly, this is not a one-dimensional space. In addition to the differing understandings of “strategy” suggested in the preceding paragraph, there are differences in the dimensions of culture that count as central. Some theorists conceptualize culture in linguistic terms, while others extend the analysis to nonlinguistic semiosis. Some authors shift the emphasis from ideas to emotions (see the essays in this volume by Berezin and Adams). Some pose the problem as one of drawing out the cultural subtext of earlier work on the state that was not ostensibly culturalist (see the essays by Jessop and Tilly in this volume). For some, cultures are relatively unified and coherent, if not unchanging (see Sohrabi and Gorski, this volume), while others describe semiotic systems as inherently unstable and subject to continual rearticulation and disintegration (see Mitchell and Apter, this volume). Yet all the approaches here differ significantly from dominant versions of decontextualized and culturally foundationalist social analysis. And all the authors included here understand culture as more than a conveyor belt for deeper, more fundamental, or more “material” forces.

The selection of cases in this book is meant to illuminate the typically unspoken distinction between the “modern” world and those historical and non-Western societies that are the usual domain of cultural analysis. Above all, this book attempts to demonstrate how taking culture seriously can change the way we understand states that have not been steroptyped as “traditional.” This set includes, first of all, modern and Western states, along with their colonial and postcolonial extensions. It also seemed crucial to compare state forms at the historical, geographic, and conceptual borders of this modern/Western universe. Deliberately excluded from this collection are the premodern and precolonial (or never-colonized) states, which have long been within the province of cultural analysis according to conventional understandings. Our cases thus fall into three main groups: (1) Western states in their early-modern formative period (Adams,
Gorski, and Pincus); (2) non-Western states at moments of deliberate Westernization and modernization (Apter, Meyer, and Sohrabi); and (3) states that are part of the supposedly rational and postideological modern world (Berezin, Jessop, Laitin, Mitchell and Orloff).

The Essays in This Volume

None of the essays in this volume are purely theoretical, but those in the first section stake out four differing approaches to the culture-state problematic, drawing on a range of empirical material in developing their arguments.  

In recent writing Pierre Bourdieu has directly confronted the question of the state (Bourdieu 1989), tracing the emergence of what he calls an "autonomous bureaucratic field" in the modern world. The state is analyzed as the universe of a new noblesse de robe, one based on scholarly titles rather than pedigrees of noble birth. This scholarly aristocracy works to establish "bureaucratic power positions relatively independent of already established temporal or spiritual powers." The state guarantees this nobility's reproduction by recognizing its credentials and legitimating its claims to dominate the state. In Bourdieu's terminology, the state thus becomes an autonomous "field" with its own indigenous form of "capital." More strikingly, Bourdieu argues that the state actually represents the culmination of a long process of concentrating the diverse types of capital. The state thus emerges over time as the superordinate classifier, underwriting the values of all other fields and transforming their specific forms of capital into legitimate, "symbolic" capital. The state ratifies the value, indeed the very existence, of social relations or events such as marriages, births, accidents, and illnesses, making such events undergo "a veritable ontological promotion, a transmutation, a change of nature or essence." Bourdieu's expansion of the state's importance thus stands in sharp contrast to much current theory, discussed above, which sees the state as declining in significance.

As suggested above, the place of the concept of the state within Foucault's writing is problematic. Some commentators (e.g., Rose and Miller 1992, 1995) insist that the state has relinquished any erstwhile sovereignty to the dispersed webs and sites of "disciplinary" power (see also Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991). Others have called attention to Foucault's continuing use of the term state, especially in his writings on "governmentality" (cf. Foucault 1981, 1988, 1991, and 1980: 167; Curtis 1995; Engelstein 1994; Mitchell 1992; Steinmetz 1993).

Timothy Mitchell's essay (Chapter 2) accepts Foucault's imagery of power as capillary and dispersed while acknowledging that these practices also cohere into an apparently independent and abstract structure with practical effects—the

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83 One area not represented here in which the cultural turn has made a large impact is the study of international relations and security issues. See Sylvester (1994); Peterson (1992); Enloe (1989, 1993); Der Derian (1994).
state. Michell’s goal is to understand how this “state effect”\textsuperscript{89} is created. According to Mitchell, “the phenomenon we name the state arises from techniques that enable mundane material practices to take on the appearance of an abstract, non-material form,” making an “internal distinction appear as though it were the external boundary between separate objects.” Mitchell suggests that the boundary between state and society first emerged as a result of specific tactics of power, which Foucault called \textit{government}, that took “population” as their primary object. Against Foucault, however, Mitchell argues that this object, “population,” is not the same as “the economy.” The modern idea of the economy as a self-contained and internally dynamic entity emerged only in the twentieth century. The state was imagined as “the most important thing” standing outside of the economy, and was now defined against both the economy and society.

Julia Adams’s paper is both a theoretical diagnosis of the missing cultural dimension in rational-choice theories of early modern state-formation and a constructive analysis of the cultural components of this process. Adams argues that rational-choice approaches have successfully identified middle-range causal mechanisms involved in state-formation: the structural factors compelling all rulers, “whatever their preferences or set of values,” to pursue economic resources, the strategies rulers tend to embrace in seeking these resources, the social dilemmas that arise among different factions, and the mechanisms evolved to produce “political equilibria, or relatively stable collective outcomes of individual choices.” But these approaches ignore the broader “cultural patterns institutionalized in discursive patterns.” Culture in this sense does not just determine the ends or “values” that rulers pursue; more important, it shapes the causally prior stage of identifications—who counts as a ruler—and of how rulers classify the social world. Adams draws attention to the \textit{emotional} investment of patrimonial rulers in lineage honor, their own reputations, and a particular form of the family. The explanatory weakness of rational-choice theory emerges most clearly in historical situations in which shifts in “incentives, information, or resources” fail to incite rulers to modify their behavior accordingly. In such situations, Adams suggests that patrimonial elites would instead “struggle to maintain their family footholds” in the state, even where this was irrational from a more narrowly conceived strategic rationality. Moreover, Adams points out that the structuring of these states around familial culture helps explain aspects of popular imagination that emerge in revolutionary situations, such as the symbolic politics of the French revolution analyzed by Lynn Hunt. Adams concludes that the insights of rational-choice theory should be integrated into a broader perspective in which “cultural meaning is a basic analytical starting point on a par with information and resources.”

More than a decade ago, Thomas and Meyer insisted that “more work is needed... in which the state is viewed as an institution that is essentially cultural in nature” (1984: 461). Political theorists have argued that global cultural

\textsuperscript{89}Mitchell’s notion of “effects” carries definite echoes of Althusser’s “knowledge effect,” “society effect,” and “aesthetic effect” (Althusser 1971b; Althusser and Balibar 1979).
The essays in part two concern the formation of the early modern European state in relation to cultural processes. By variously focusing on religion (Gorski) and early nationalism (Pincus), these essays help us understand processes of early modern state-formation in much more complex ways, while leaving open the question of the relative causal importance of these factors.

As noted above, state-centered work on the early modern state has been most interested in refuting Marxian explanations. State-centered theorists concentrated on state-building “entrepreneurs” and their efforts to aggrandize their territory and coffers, the bargaining between monarchs and nobles, and military relations between states. Little attention was paid to the diverse hegemonic strategies used by monarchs to consolidate their power—the processes of civilizing (Elias 1994), disciplining (Oestreich 1982; Schilling 1994), and ordering (Raeff 1983) society—or to the sources of these cultural projects outside the state. Like Adams, Philip Gorski reframes the sociological discussion of early modern state formation by bringing these previously excluded aspects to the fore. Specifically, he extends Weber’s Protestant ethic thesis to the realm of state formation, arguing that Calvinism was an essential component in the successful consolidation of the “infrastructural power” (Mann 1986) of the early Dutch and Prussian states over their subjects.

Not religion, but nationalism, Steven Pincus suggests, was the key factor in the rationalization of the English state in the late seventeenth century. Although social scientists have sometimes equated nationalism with state-produced “offi-
cial nationalism” (see Anderson 1983), recent writing has explored the ways in which nationalist culture and discourse shape states, territorial boundaries, and patterns of inclusion and exclusion among states-in-formation (see Renault 1991; Brubaker 1992). Benedict Anderson (1983) argued that the cultural conditions for the rise of nationalism—and hence for the rise the nationally defined state—included, inter alia, the end of universal religion, and the advent of “print capitalism.” Against Anderson, Pincus argues that the English began imagining themselves as a nation before the eighteenth century’s “dusk of religious modes of thought”—although nationalism was linked to the end of religious universalism in Europe. English nationalism arose in the seventeenth century as part of a vigorous discussion of what was perceived as the grave threat of “universal monarchy”—first associated with the Habsburgs, then the Dutch and the French. This nationalism contributed to the defeat of the “French style of government” in the English state in 1688–1689 and the subsequent creation of a “new type of state.”

The preceding essays concern the transition to “modern” political forms in Europe; those following look at the modernization of states in non-European settings. More specifically, these essays explore the effect of Western political ideologies and state forms in non-Western, colonial, and postcolonial settings.

Andrew Apter’s essay examines the genealogy of the Nigerian Durbar. This state ceremonial has roots in the precolonial period, but as Apter shows, it was reconfigured by the British colonizers. Some components of the Nigerian Durbar were imported from colonial India; these were in turn derived partly from the techniques and imagery of Victorian monarchical rule (Cohn 1983). The colonial-era Nigerian Durbar also put on display the discourse that underpinned British colonial rule. This was particularly evident in the Durbar’s organization around displays of Nigerian culture and its ethnic and social divisions. British rule rested culturally on the reinvention of tradition and indirect rule, and the Durbar’s form reflected British as well as local culture. In the postcolonial era, finally, the Durbar has been recreated once again, but it has also retained many of the components introduced by the British. Apter’s densely textured study throws into clear relief the dialectical relations between culture and state formation: Even as the Nigerian state attempts to invent a precolonial tradition, it is constrained by cultural raw materials that are inherited from the colonial era.

Nader Sohrabi’s chapter examines the interplay between Persian sociopolitical discourse and European political models in the unfolding of the 1906 constitutional revolution in Iran. Various writers have focused on the adoption of Western political models by modernizing non-Western countries (see Badie 1992; Meyer this volume). Arjomand (1992), for instance, shows that the contents of each new wave of constitutions reflect the dominant political culture of the

See also Baye (1993) and Davidson (1992), who argue that the Western-style forms of rule prescribed as ideals for postcolonial Africa have been destructive and less appropriate than select precolonial forms.
world-historical era in which they were adopted. Sohrabi’s study destabilizes the notion of simple diffusion or emulation by showing in close historical detail how European (specifically French) models of revolution and constitutionalism were articulated with deeply entrenched Iranian political discourses in the new revolutionary setting. Western political ideas were reinterpreted through the conceptual lens of the “Circle of Justice.” Sohrabi also demonstrates how the complex interplay between different readings of the constitutionalist model shaped the day-by-day course of revolutionary action and the ongoing transformations of the state. Like Apter, Sohrabi opens up a space for more nuanced approaches to diffusion, cultural modeling, and the reinvention of tradition. In a more general sense this essay illustrates how studies of non-Western state formation can avoid both the Scylla of essentialism found in the Weberian and national culture traditions and the Charybdis of ignoring cultural difference, characteristic of the utilitarian and Marxist traditions.61

The essays in the final section turn their attention to the modern West and its post-Soviet periphery; that is, to the universe of states that are typically seen as “beyond culture.”

David Laitin’s essay explores the reciprocal relations between states and ethnic or linguistic cultures in the context of the post-Soviet successor states. Laitin’s approach combines discourse analysis and rational-choice theory, theorizing the relationship between cultural constraint and strategic choices. Laitin’s point of departure is the apparent rise of a diasporic Russian-speaking identity group in states controlled by non-Russian-speaking “titular nationalities.” Through a discourse analysis of ordinary language, Laitin is able to demonstrate the unforeseen and counterintuitive emergence of this linguistically delimited “national” group. Laitin argues that the nationality and language policies of the former Soviet Union created the identities of the titular nationalities that dominate post-Soviet states and politics (1995; Kaiser 1994). These inherited identities are in turn shaping the formation of the successor states, especially the processes by which they delimit their citizenry. But the long-term development of these states is shaped not only by these cultural legacies; the cultural strategies currently pursued by titular nationals and Russian speakers also make a difference. Laitin explores the microlevel choices made by Russian speakers when confronted with regimes controlled by either culturally nationalist titular elites or those who adopt a more tolerant civic nationalism.

Feminists have written extensively on the impact of ideologies of gender on social policy (Pateman 1988; Connell 1987, 1990). Nelson (1984), Fraser (1987), and Gordon (1988) argue that the division of contemporary social policy systems into male and female “streams” cannot be reduced to economic interests, but expresses culturally specific understandings of appropriate gender roles for women.

61 It may not be exaggerated to see Sohrabi’s analytical stance as exemplifying what Rabinow (1986: 358; cited in Beal 1995: 301) has called “critical cosmopolitanism,” which is “highly attentive to (and respectful of) difference, but is also wary of the tendency to essentialize difference.”
and men.62 In an influential article, Jenson (1986) demonstrated that French and British social policies differed as a function of the "universe of political discourse," especially nationally specific gender ideologies. In an effort to systematize research on gender regimes, Ann Orloff develops a detailed typology for analyzing the different gender-relevant dimensions of welfare states (see Orloff, this volume). Social policies can exhibit contradictory positions with respect to three main gender-relevant dimensions: (1) sameness versus difference; (2) equality versus inequality; and (3) women's autonomy versus their dependency. Her article then provides a densely layered historical comparison of the gender regimes of the Australian, Canadian, British, and American welfare states. This article makes an important contribution to current feminist debates about issues of equality versus difference, redrawing the central question in more complex ways and intervening in the discussion about appropriate political strategies.

Mabel Berezin's essay looks at fascist Italy, the state that pioneered many of the political rituals that we associate with the Nazi state (or contemporary electoral campaigns). Recalling the Geertzian literature on non-Western "theatre states," Berezin argues that twentieth-century states shifted from a textually based "politics of prose," focused on literacy, the rights of man, and the rule of law, to a "politics of theater." The Italian fascists attempted to build a nation through public ritual. Unlike much current writing on nationalism, Berezin focuses not on ideas but on rituals, spaces, actions, and emotions that brought together Italians from different regions. Although political ritual did not achieve its express purpose, the creation of enduring new identities, it was able to communicate to the people and to allow the state to speak to itself. Berezin provides a subtle analysis of the ways states both exploit and are constrained by preexisting discourses, such as the Catholic culture of family and motherhood.

Where Adams's paper brings out the "cultural repressed" of the explicitly anticultur al rational-choice approach, Bob Jessop's piece draws out the culturalist subtext of his own regulation theoretic account of postwar political economy and the state. Jessop points to the "implicit constructivism" of the ostensibly economistic regulationist perspective. Fordism—the dominant postwar mode of regulation, according to regulation theory—involved not only a much greater degree of state involvement in the regulation of financial and labor markets, welfare provision, and production. At the level of political-economic discourse, Fordism was also centered around imagining relatively closed national economies as the natural objects of economic regulation. Fordism was characterized by a strong degree of correspondence between the geographic space of economic regulation and the territory of the nation-state, in ways that reinforced the central state's claim to be the penultimate source of power. By the same token, the emerging post-Fordist regulatory mode represents not only a political-economic shift but also a process of cultural innovation. The most salient aspects of this

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62 Women are especially concentrated in the public assistance sector (Nelson 1984: 210), which assigns them the disempowered role of "client." Men, by contrast, tend to be beneficiaries of the social insurance stream, which grants them the right to social benefits and the relative empowerment that goes with that right.
cultural production are for Jessop discourses of enterprise culture, privatization, and political-economic organization at the subnational level and across national boundaries.

Epilogue

The conclusion is by Charles Tilly, probably the single most important contributor to the literature on state-formation in recent decades. Rather than reviewing the preceding essays, Tilly’s intervention is more general and much more ambitious. He argues that the place of culture in political and social analysis can be properly specified only by rejecting individualism and holism as ontological positions and by embracing a position similar to that of contemporary critical realism (see Steinmetz 1998). Tilly then sketches an entire “relational sociology” and its analysis of four central forms of state-culture interaction.

References


Introduction


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