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FORDISM AND THE (IM)MORAL ECONOMY OF RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE IN CONTEMPORARY GERMANY

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A specter is haunting Germany, but it is not the specter of Communism. Instead, the past five years have seen the reemergence of a form of right-wing street violence that for many people strongly recalls the last years of the Weimar Republic. The goal of this article is to move toward an explanation of the wave of extreme right-wing violence that has been gaining momentum in Germany since the 1980s. The starting point for such an analysis must be with the actual activities of the far right—the movement's victims, symbols, and aims. The present article is based on the systematic reading of a variety of newspapers and other media concerning these day-by-day attacks over the course of a one-year period (from July 1992 to July 1993), and on the already immense, but mainly feuilletonistic, literature on German right-wing extremism.¹ The central conclusion is that right-wing violence in Germany is driven largely by a yearning for an imagined golden age of Fordism. The privileges of male manual German workers during the Fordist era are currently being undermined by the radical social and economic restructuring of labor markets, of forms of production,
consumption, culture, and family, and of welfare state provisions. This is not to argue that the right-wing *Menschenjagd* (“manhunt”; cf. Enzensberger 1992) is a coherent or strategically rational movement. On the contrary, right-wing assaults are usually unplanned, and most participants are not formally organized. With the exception of a handful of leaders, most movement “activists” are incapable of articulating a formal ideology or “program” that corresponds to their actual practices. Nor can the right-wing movement in Germany be reduced to the formal neo-Nazi organizations. The attacks tend to flow directly from a subjectivity shaped by the expectations and values of Fordism (or more specifically, the specific East and West German variants of Fordism), combined with fragments of historical Nazi ideology handed down since 1945. The unexamined, unconscious subjectivity shaped by Fordism can be described as an “immoral economy.” In other words, I will argue that current right-wing subjectivity is analogous to E.P. Thompson’s notion of the “moral economy of the crowd” (Thompson 1971)—which generates in its bearers a sense of customary rights—even if it is much less pleasant than the forms of moral economy typically analyzed by social historians.

The analysis of the complex form of social organization known as Fordism within the perspective of regulation theory (discussed later) provides the basis for understanding the patterning of interests, grievances, and victims within the violent wing of the current far right movement. Most of the article will be devoted to arguing that both East and West Germany went through a phase of Fordism in the 1960s and 1970s. Although the contours of East and West German Fordism differed in certain significant ways, the similarities are strong enough to provide the experiential underpinning for convergent forms of subjectivity among workers from both parts of the formerly divided country. The perceived deterioration resulting from the ongoing transition from Fordism to “flexible post-Fordism” explains the timing and intensity of the reaction. I will also try to show that many of the specific emphases of current right-wing violence can best be understood with respect to the specific *sites* of the most intense change. These emphases include symbols of masculinity with “workerist” codes, an exaggerated puritanism, and violence against foreigners and groups accused of avoiding work. In addition to the Fordist radicals, there is a growing segment of the far right that *embraces* the shift to postfordism. The regulationist perspective therefore can also shed light on an important fault line running through the present-day far right movement in Germany, a division that is often poorly understood and even ignored. While emphasizing the more violent, “Fordist” stream of the far right movement, I will suggest that the German Republican party (or some similar organization) is likely to emerge ever more strongly as the voice of the “progressive,” modernizing extreme right.

Concepts from regulation theory are therefore very helpful in illuminating the rise of the movement and its choice of targets. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that Fordism and its collapse cannot provide a
complete account of the kinds of far-right assaults or the definition of the victims in contemporary Germany. Nor can regulation theory explain why the violence is more intense in Germany than in other countries undergoing similar (or even more severe) transitions away from Fordism. Two other factors need to be brought into an explanation. These factors are related to what in the sociological literature on social movements are known as “political culture” and the “structure of political opportunities” (Tilly 1978). First, one can only make sense of the entire range of targets and themes within the current movement by attending to the circulation and reproduction of Nazi ideology in postwar Germany. By this is meant an informal ideological system as opposed to some sort of codified, formal worldview. This informal Nazi ideological system, which is not reducible to Fordism, has given shape to grievances that were initially defined by Fordism and activated by its collapse. Nazi ideology overdetermines the Fordist *Frond*, extending its catalogue of enemies and providing the movement with a nationalist elan. The result is a historically novel cultural formation that is much more than a recrudescence of historical Nazism.

The concept of “opportunity structure” from social movement theory also needs to be integrated into an explanation of contemporary far right violence. The opportunity structure needs to be understood broadly in the present case, as encompassing both strategic and ideological elements. Most important in this regard is the comparatively weak response to right-wing crime by German security forces (see Siegler, Tolmein, Wiedemann 1993). Also important are recent openings for ideological mobilization by extreme-right parties. This began with the open articulation of certain German nationalist themes by Christian Democratic government leaders starting in 1982, themes that had been the province of the extreme right until then; it continued with the national euphoria around German unification. The collapse of Communism eliminated what for many West Germans was a central reason for their acceptance of the liberal Western democratic system installed after 1945 (Klöhn 1985).

This article is intended as a theoretical intervention and impetus for further research, and not as a survey of the far right movement. The rest of the article will concentrate on the key component of the explanation: the creation of working-class subjectivities and interests by Fordism and its collapse, and the emergence of extreme-right interests from this subjectivity. A necessary part of the argument involves developing a model of East German Fordism, something that has only been partially accomplished in the extant literature (cf. Voskamp and Wittke 1991; Maier 1991), in contrast to the outpouring of work on West German Fordism (cf. Hirsch and Roth 1986; Hirsch 1990). The other two elements of the explanation, political culture and opportunity structure, will only be dealt with in passing, since they have been extensively dealt with in the social movement literature. An adequate explanation cannot ignore these factors, however.
I. THE EXPLOSION OF VIOLENCE AND ITS CONTEXT

The new violence in Germany is directed against an extremely broad range of victims, including Turkish “guest workers” and their children, seekers of political asylum, Jews (or people taken for Jewish), Gypsies, people of color (regardless of nationality), gays, the handicapped, the homeless, antifascists, punks, and leftists. Inanimate objects that are offensive to extreme right-wing sensibilities are also targeted: sex shops, Jewish and Soviet cemeteries, Holocaust monuments, and so forth. Even more stunning than this variety of targets is the movement’s viciousness, as illustrated by a few incidents chosen almost at random:

- In Düsseldorf, right-wing extremists attacked a young Greek woman and carved a swastika in her forehead (December 1992).^5
- A handicapped person was fatally beaten by skinheads in a department store in Siegen (January 1993).^4
- A group of five neo-Nazis in Cologne brutalized a passer-by who refused to return their “Hitler salute” (February 1990).^5
- In Brandenburg, two skinheads knifed a refugee from Ghana and threw him from a moving train (Tagesszeitung, 24 September 1994).
- After severely beating a 52-year-old homeless man, three young men proceeded to drown and set fire to their victim (at the Kölpinsee, Brandenburg, November 1992).^6

The most dramatic effect of these changes has been to make it increasingly dangerous for foreigners, Jews, people of color, and others defined as falling outside of the “racial” and national “community” to live in Germany—to attend school, go to work, or even venture outside of their homes. The terror tactics of the far right have increased to such an extent, along with the government’s signs of hostility to foreigners (see below), that many people have decided to emigrate. The Jewish Agency in Frankfurt has noted a rising interest in emigration to Israel, and some Africans with German citizenship have started to return to the countries they originally fled fearing political repression.^7

The current exposition of far-right violence can be traced back to the early 1980s, when membership in neo-Nazi parties started to rise. In West Germany, the rate of right-wing offenses increased sharply at the end of the 1970s, and the first neo-Nazi murders occurred in 1985 in Hamburg (Seidel-Pielen 1993; Zimmermann and Saalfeld 1993, p. 63). Far right activism also emerged in the former GDR during the 1980s, culminating in a skinhead attack on a rock concert in the Zion Church in East Berlin on October 17, 1987.^8 The frequency of hate crimes increased dramatically after 1989 in both parts of the soon-to-be-united Germany. Between January 1991 and the time of writing (July 1993), there were at least 6,336 incidents and 25 killings with extreme right-wing
motives in Germany, according to the Federal Bureau of Crime (BKA). Although the statistics of the German Verfassungsschutz (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) are notoriously incomplete for right-wing offenses, its figures also show a rise in such violence from an average of less that one incident daily in 1990 to 2.71 in 1991 and 4.83 incidents in 1992.

The most visible participants in the current German Menschenjagd are young working-class men, mainly apprentices and unskilled workers (Germany 1993, p. 52). Some have neo-Nazi affiliations or a skinhead style, but this is a minority (Schröder 1992, pp. 186-187). According to the head of the Hamburg Verfassungsschutz, Ernst Uhrlau, about 80% of the suspects of hate crimes in 1992 were “neither active in right-wing extremist organizations, had any contact with these organizations, nor could even be classified as skinheads.” Indeed, part of the difficulty in identifying the new movement is that, like the protest movements of earlier decades around environmentalism, peace, and nuclear power, contemporary right-wing violence is often based in loose subcultural networks rather than organized parties. Studies of arrest records suggest that the majority of right-wing attacks are unplanned and undertaken after the consumption of large amounts of alcohol. As one close observer of the scene points out, no orders are given for most of the attacks; the actions have “no leaders, only initiators” (Schröder 1992, p. 44). Even in the organized neo-Nazi groups the leaders often seem to be following their rank and file rather than directing them:

The leaders are only able to articulate what the others want anyway….In order to properly carry out their role, they must fulfill the functions that the group assigns to them….there is an enormous risk that the mob will not listen to the leaders….The self-designated authorities therefore do not give directions, but approvingly put up with such actions.

The circle of sympathizers with the movement suggests that the violence is emanating from the “middle of society.” It draws on the support of people of all ages and both sexes, most of whom are neither skinheads nor members of extreme-right organizations. The most brutal illustrations of the normaley of right-wing violence were the pogroms against hostels for foreign workers and political refugees in Hoyerswerda (September 1991) and Rostock (August 1992). Older people from the Lichtenhagen district in Rostock applauded from their balconies and the sidelines (in front of television cameras) as their sons threw firebombs at a house full of Vietnamese immigrants. Another indicator of popular support for the assaults is that most occur in close proximity to the attackers’ homes, where they are more likely to be recognized (Leenen 1992, p. 1044). A broad level of support is also suggested by the increase in extreme right-wing attitudes in opinion surveys. In September 1992, 51 percent of all Germans surveyed by INFAS were sympathetic to the right-wing slogan “Germany for the Germans” (Schmidt 1993, p. 10). Extreme right-wing
attitudes have gone up among the young in particular. Urlau estimates that “more than twenty percent of young people sympathize with the parties of the extreme right” (Schmidt 1993, p. 156). Between 1988 and 1992, agreement with statements like “The Germans were always the greatest in history” and “National Socialism also had its good sides” increased markedly in surveys of secondary school pupils in the new federal states of eastern Germany (Müller and Schubarth 1992; Golz 1993).

Even if investigations of recent hate crimes have found few connections to Neonazi parties, some writers have suggested that the organized Neonazis may be playing a more important role in directing the violence than is recognized. Most importantly, they provide the movement with resources and ideas. The neo-Nazis deliberately stay in the background in order to elude the state’s attempts to ban them. The fragmentation of the neo-Nazi movement can also be seen as a strategic response to government repression that obscures a deeper unity among the various leaders and militants. By retaining a variety of separate organizations it becomes possible for members of banned parties to quickly regroup. More than 70 Neo-Nazi formations are thought to exist in Germany today. Membership in both neo-Nazi and ultra-right-wing parties has been growing in recent years, from around 19,000 in 1982 to 40,000 in 1991 and 55,000 or 65,000 in 1992. Promoting overt Neonazi themes like Holocaust denial and hostility to foreign immigrants, parties such as the German People’s Union (DVU) and the National Democratic Party (NPD) are also closely associated with the smaller neo-Nazi formations. The German fraternities (Burschenschaften), with their 26,000 members and “new right” intellectual leadership, must also be included in an inventory of ideologically committed far rightists.

Despite its strivings for mainstream political legitimacy, the Republikaner party should also be considered in this context. The “Reps” currently have about 25,000 members. Although Republican leaders try to dissociate their party from Hitler and the more militant sectors of contemporary fascism, there are clear connections. The Republicans propose “subordination of trade unions to the state, compulsory training of girls for the roles of wife and mother, censorship, and withholding social security and political rights from foreigners.” Individual Reps have argued that “HIV virus carriers should have their genitals tattooed and that the...nuclear power plant at Wackersdorf should be transformed into a labour camp for political opponents.” Republican party members have been involved in deadly assaults on foreigners. The Republicans managed to attract over two million voters in the June 1989 elections for the European Parliament after campaigning against the “exaggerations and forgeries of history” caused by the “war propaganda” of the Soviet and American victors, and pleading for a “decriminalization of German culture, history, and people” (Stiller 1989, p. 111). In January 1989, the Reps gained 7.5 percent of the vote in the West Berlin election. Despite
predictions that they would become less attractive after the collapse of Communism, the Reps received 10.9 percent in the Baden-Württemburg state elections and 8.3 percent in Berlin in 1992, and obtained even larger percentages in the Hessian municipal elections in March 1993 (Jung 1993).

Extreme-right skinheads are a separate actor in the Menschenjagd alongside neo-Nazis and “normal” German right-wingers. The media have relentlessly associated racist hate crimes with images of brutal young men with heavy boots and shaved heads, ignoring the existence of large numbers of apolitical, left-wing, gay, and antiracist skinheads. Nevertheless, there are between 3,000 and 6,000 right-wing skinheads in Germany today, most of them extremely violent and hostile to foreigners and leftists. Many skinheads resist neo-Nazi recruitment efforts and are associated only through loose friendship networks. They are still exposed to explicit fascist ideology, however, through “skinzines” and right-wing rock bands. To take a representative example, the band Endstufe sings:

Doc Martens, short hair, that’s Aryan, no question! Down with mish-mash blood, ’cause that’s not good for the fatherland! Keep the German race pure, ’cause we are the Aryan class! Hold your ground, we are the power, Germany will triumph in every battle! Oi! Oi! Oi! Oi!”

A number of “modernized” right-wing journals have gained a broad, young readership in recent years. The journal Junge Freiheit portrays itself as a right-wing version of the tageszeitung (the daily newspaper of the German alternative political and culture scene). Other far right publications include wir selbst, MUT, student, Deutsche Annalen, Criticón, and Nation und Europa-Deutsche Monatshefte—a monthly journal, long associated with the NPD, whose current goal is “to unify the diverse nationalist currents” (Ködderitzsch and Müller 1990, p. 129). Nation und Europa runs monthly columns with titles like “Neues von der Überfremdungsfront” (“News from the racial alienation front”) and “Gewalt gegen Deutsche” (“Violence against Germans”—by foreigners). These journals have followed the lead of the French new right in ostensibly distancing themselves from historical Nazi ideology and promoting a form of racism based on notions of unbridgeable cultural distinctiveness (“ethnopluralism”) rather than on arguments about biologically-based racial hierarchy (cf. Taguieff 1988, 1991; Assheuer and Sarkowicz 1992, pp. 179-184). As Rancière notes, the “new” racism is less concerned with heredity than with the supposed “insurmountability of cultural differences [and] the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions” (1991, p. 21).

The absence of an effective police force during the Rostock pogrom in 1992 called attention to one factor contributing to the movement: the state. The police were somehow unable to quell the rioting in Rostock even as it entered its fourth day. In 1990, local police looked on as a gang of “normal kids”
fattally beat an Angolan in Eberwalde. The German state has been surprisingly
willing to relinquish its monopoly of violence when faced with right-wing terror,
in contrast to its typical eager pursuit of left terrorists (Enzensberger 1992).
In the eastern provinces, such passivity is often blamed on the incompetence
or right-wing sympathies of the police. There is extensive evidence (including
a report by Amnesty International) of German police violence and hatred
directed against foreigners and asylum seekers in Hamburg and other cities.
The Verfassungsschutz exhibited a “blind right eye” until recently when it began
systematic observation of right extremists. The justice system started seeking
serious sentences for right-wing offenders only after the fatal burning of a
Turkish family in Mölln in November 1992.

The wave of violence must also be seen in the context of the overall
development of German nationalism and the rightward drift of mainstream
political culture since the beginning of the 1980s. These changes were solidified
with the rise of Kohl and the Christian Democrats to power in 1982. The CDU
electoral campaign promised to “reduce unemployment and the proportion of
foreigners living in the Federal Republic” (Seidel-Pielen 1993). Although the
first decade of the Kohl government was less radical than Reaganism or
Thatcherism in terms of social welfare cutbacks, it represented a virtual “passive
revolution” in terms of political culture. Prominent politicians and academics
stepped up the campaign to strengthen German national pride by putting an
end to the “obsession with the Nazi era.” Kohl tried to normalize the SS through
his visit to Bitburg with Reagan in 1985, and followed the lead of historians
such as Ernst Nolte in relativizing the Nazi crimes. The German national
anthem was reintroduced with all three verses into school books and soccer
stadiums. The 1981 “Heidelberg manifesto” of a group of conservative
German academics warned against the dangers of a “durchrasste Gesellschaft”
(roughly, a racially mixed-up society), a phrase picked up by prominent
politicians such as the Bavarian Minister of the Interior Edmund Stoiber.
Leading Christian Democratic members of the “Deutschland Forum” attacked
the notion of Germany as a “multicultural society” and defended the traditional
ius sanguinis definition of German citizenship. And in May 1993, the CDU,
CSU, and SPD rewarded the mob violence by voting to restrict the right to
political asylum, arguing that such a revision of the constitution was necessary
to preserve “inner peace and peaceful coexistence” (Schäuble-CDU) and a
“stable democracy” (Klose-SPD). The new rash of firebombings against
foreigners that swept the country after the end of May 1993, culminating in
the Solingen murders, suggested that the move to restrict political asylum
actually encouraged the far right rather than calming it.

In spite of these continuities between the ideology of the neofascist right
and certain trends within mainstream party politics, it is important not to elide
the two. Even the most cynical view of the governing parties must recognize
the contradictory pressures they face. While both the CDU and the SPD are
terrified of losing voters to the Reps, every assault on foreigners threatens Germany’s international political standing and its exports. Not surprisingly, German employers associations have joined liberals and the alternative left in a peculiar alliance against the current violence.\textsuperscript{35}

II. TOWARD AN EXPLANATION

Before moving to the regulation theoretical perspective, I will sketch the major contending explanations of right-wing movements. The first requirement, however, even prior to this survey, is a working definition of right-wing extremism. My definition largely follows Heitmeyer (1988, 1992b), who defines right-wing extremism first in terms of an ideology of fundamental inequality—inequality of nations, ethnic groups, political tendencies, and so on. This belief in essential inequality is coupled with demands for the exclusion or elimination of the supposedly inferior groups. Right extremism is social Darwinist, emphasizing the ubiquity of the everyday struggle for existence. It adopts military manners and style. It is antidemocratic, recognizing strength and authoritarian leaders as the basis for decisionmaking. Finally, it embraces the use of violence—both state violence and private vigilante violence.

Other Theoretical Approaches

I will spare the reader a detailed survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on extreme-right movements, since several overviews are available.\textsuperscript{36} Classical analyses of Nazism as a revolt of the displaced middle class—running from Geiger (1930) and Bloch in the 1930s, to Parsons (1993) in the 1940s and Lipset (1963) in the 1960s—are of little help in making sense of the current movements, dominated as they are by workers and apprentices.\textsuperscript{37} Other structural-functional explanations see right-wing extremism as a “normal” pathology found among individuals from various sectors in industrial societies “undergoing rapid change” (Scheuch and Klingemann 1967, p. 29). The contradiction between primary groups’ “values and behavioral forms” and the “functional demands of secondary institutions” leads some individuals to become rigidly “closed-minded.” This approach has the advantage of not specifying a priori which social classes will support extreme right-wing movements, but it cannot explain why right-wing extremism should be more likely than other responses (e.g., psychological depression, property crime, left extremism) in periods of social stress. Nor does it account for the content of right-wing movements or the political factors favoring their emergence.

Current socioeconomic explanations of right-wing extremism typically focus on the young extremists, casting them in the role of “victims of modernization” (Rommelspacher 1991). The studies of Wilhelm Heitmeyer and his colleagues
(1988, 1989, 1992b) trace neo-Nazism to the excessive levels of competitive individualization and social isolation characteristic of contemporary “risk society,” and to the instrumentalism which is extended from the realm of work to interpersonal relationships (see also Beck 1986; Matthesius 1992). The sense of powerlessness that emerges under hypercompetitive conditions gives rise to a need to “document one’s own superiority” (Heitmeyer 1992b, p. 597). The heightened sense of social isolation is countered by an emphasis on the “naturalness of the national Volksgemeinschaft” to which one belongs and from which others are excluded. Along similar lines, Butterwege (1992, p. 50) argues that the structural violence of the contemporary achievement society, with its heightened levels of inequality, promotes a social Darwinist cult of strength and masculinity.

The most serious problem with this perspective is that it ignores the role of nationally-specific political culture (Pfahl-Traughber 1993b). This means that it cannot explain the peculiarly high levels of right-wing violence in Germany compared to similar countries. The theory also rests on an oversimplified and teleological conceptualization of socioeconomic development. It fails to recognize the degree to which individualization, isolation, and instrumentalism have characterized earlier phases of capitalist society as well as the current one, without always provoking comparable levels and forms of violence. Nor can Heitmeyer account for individual variation in the “instrumental attitude towards work” among workers. His comparative biographies of young workers in Bielefeld (1992) seem to suggest that “good” workers will be able to overcome the instrumentalism of work under capitalism through a sheer act of will. Finally, as Heitmeyer himself has acknowledged (1992a), the theory is unable to account for the rise of neo-Nazism in the former GDR, where the traumatic processes of individualizing competition were absent before 1989.

Another set of current theories focuses on social-psychological mechanisms. Some writers trace right-wing violence to inadequate socialization—broken, abusive, or overly permissive families. The difficulty is that only a minority of those involved in attacks on foreigners come from “dysfunctional” or abusive families, while even fewer come from the educated, middle-class families that are the most “guilty” of overpermissiveness. Theories that blame the violence on a supposedly innate xenophobia or an attraction to violence among young men or small groups are unable to explain historical or cross-cultural variations. Theories that trace right-wing violence to “natural” masculine traits cannot account for women’s support for the movement (although ideologies of gender play a central role in the current violence; see below). References to the growing violence in the media seem particularly ill-suited for explaining far right violence in Germany (or is Hitler’s rise to power to be blamed on expressionist films?).

Much of the writing on far-right activism focuses on political events in recent German history. Some writers emphasize the absence of an effective antifascist
restructuring and reeducation in postwar East and West Germany (Siegler 1991; Borchers 1992; Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1975). While this is clearly an important factor in keeping Nazi ideology alive, it is inadequate for explaining the specific social distribution of the right-wing appeal or the timing of far-right upsurges.44 Other writers see the current neofascist tumult as the logical outcome of the general rightward shift in German society during the 1980s, when today’s skinheads were being socialized (Butterwege 1993, p. 17; Funke 1991). While these changes are probably important, they are as much part of the phenomenon to be explained as part of the explanation.45 A final argument emphasizes the nationalist pathos surrounding unification. While clearly important, this again cannot bear the full weight of the explanation, since the far-right upsurge was gaining momentum in both parts of Germany before 1989.

A subset of these political accounts concentrates specifically on aspects of the political culture of the GDR before 1989, including the country’s ethnic homogeneity and insularity (especially the lack of opportunities for travel); its authoritarian system of socialization; and its official emphasis on political ritual and friend-foe dichotomies.46 The collapse of the East German state is seen either as releasing long-suppressed Nazi tendencies or as leading to a recoding of the earlier official political imagery, whereby non-Germans replace the capitalist West as the enemy. Other variants see the debacle of privatization and West German “colonization” of the east as provoking feelings of inferiority among the easterners, which are then taken out on minority groups. The obvious shortcoming of all these approaches is that they ignore the simultaneous rise of neofascism in Western Germany.47

Habermas (1992) and others (e.g., Bude 1993; Pfahl-Traughber 1993b) have put forward the most convincing thesis, one that is more historically and geographically specific than Heitmeyer’s perspective while reversing its terms. Here neofascist violence is not located with the “victims” of modernization, but instead represents the “chauvinism of the wealthy” (Wohlstandsschauvinismus).48 The neofascist movement is part of an attempt by the “haves” to protect their national prosperity against the onslaught of the various “have-nots.” Post-war West German affluence was based on a nationally-defined political economy, and is therefore defended on a nationalist basis. Habermas connects prosperity chauvinism to the propagation of the Federal Republic’s “second life-fiction” (Lebenslüge): the idea that “we are finally normal again.”49 The question is why “normalcy” looks so different in Germany than elsewhere. Borrowing Norbert Elias’ term “decivilization” (Entzivilisierung) to describe the current state of affairs, Habermas suggests that something quite radical is going on in Germany.50 Habermas also uses the word “Gleichschaltung” with respect to the media, hinting at further parallels between the present state of affairs and the Nazi era.
While helpfully calling attention to the importance of historical Nazism, the concept of a “second life-fiction” does not clarify the exact role of these ideologies in the violence, which is more than simply a repetition of the 1930s. And while the concept of “prosperity chauvinism” helpfully focuses on the movement’s defensive protectionism and its economic rationality, it is too general. West German Wohlstandsauvinismus in recent years has been directed as much against the “Ossis” (former East Germans) as against foreigners, yet easterners account for a disproportionate number of the attackers. Nor can Wohlstandsauvinismus account for the social distribution of the movement’s appeal, particularly its attractiveness for groups that currently have little “prosperity” to defend. Finally, the inclusion of groups like the handicapped and gays among the targets of right-wing extremists cannot be reduced to economic protectionism. The relationship between Nazism and prosperity chauvinism remains unclear in Habermas’ discussion.

Each of these explanations fails to encompass certain dimensions of the current explosion of violence. An adequate explanation must account for the simultaneous rise of extreme right-wing activities in East and West Germany during the 1980s, the sharp upswing in violence after 1989, the movement’s disproportionately working-class base, the specific cluster of “ideologemes” in current far right discourse, and the unusual deadliness of the German movement in comparison to other countries.

Longing for an Idealized Fordism

Briefly stated, I will argue that the movement of extreme right-wing violence is a rebellion of classes and groups who are losing out in the ongoing collapse of Fordism in Germany and its replacement by a regime of “flexible accumulation” and a postfordist mode of social regulation. Viewing neofascism in relation to Fordism and Postfordism makes clear that what is typically seen as a monolithic neofascist right is actually divided into two streams, one “reactionary” and the other “forward-looking.”51 As used here, the term “reactionary” is analogous to the notion of “reactionary radicalism” among eighteenth- and nineteenth-century artisans, who tried to defend their traditional form of life and work against the encroachments of industrial capitalism (cf. Calhoun 1983). The neofascist violence that has been at the center of attention recently is a “backward-looking” movement, engaged in a desperate effort to reestablish the now obsolete social conditions of what I will refer to as an “imaginary Fordism.” Their movement represents a sort of nostalgia expressed as violence and intended to restore a past remembered in a mediated and transfigured form. I will focus on this strand of the extreme right movement for the remainder of this essay, returning to the “progressive” far right only at the very end.
The logic of Fordism thus underpins the current far right movement's (im)moral economy. As noted earlier, the term (im)moral economy is adopted from Thompson's concept of the "moral economy," which drew attention to the sense of customary rights and obligations embedded in popular consciousness. It is a specific aspect of popular culture, concerned with a sense of justice, with law in the broadest sense. By the same token, German workers during the Fordist era came to view the conditions of Fordism, particularly the promise of an ever-increasing standard of living, as a right, not a utopia. This sense of entitlement to improvement is due partly to the heavy legitimatory use of social policy by rulers of both West and East Germany (see below), following a tradition going back to the nineteenth century (cf. Steinmetz 1993). Many commentators have noted that postwar West German national pride was based largely on the country's economic performance, leading to what Habermas called a "Deutschmark nationalism" (see also Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1975).52

More specifically, the imaginary status quo which right-wing extremists are trying to reintroduce is one in which, inter alia,

- Manual workers' wages were relatively high, and rising.
- The welfare state brought working-class consumption up to hitherto unheard-of levels and kept it there during periods of unemployment (although unemployment was irrelevant in the GDR, of course) (again, the GDR differed in this respect).
- The nuclear family, with men as the main bread-winners and women occupied primarily in the home, was the official ideal.
- Leisure time was spent consuming homogenized cultural goods, rather than struggling for distinction in a stratified competitive market of symbolic goods. 53
- The economy was defined more in national than in global terms.
- Foreign migrants were engaged mainly in jobs that were avoided by German workers.

These conditions make up the core of the specific German variant of Fordism (a concept that will be explained in more detail later).

Post-Fordism corrosively undermines these mainstays of Fordism. Job security and wages are declining for manual unskilled workers; there are increased pressures to migrate domestically in search of employment and a real influx of foreign migrants; national identities are being eroded by the globalization of the economy and the declining significance of the nation state; the provisions of the welfare state are being scaled back; consumption is becoming more stratified and competitive; the norm of the patriarchal nuclear family is less attainable than ever for most people; and the political representation of group interests is moving from established political parties and corporatist organizations to single-issue movements and campaigns.
Economic, political, and cultural conditions are becoming more “flexible,” personal identities less secure. Although some social groups welcome these changes, others experience them more or less clearly as deterioration and insecurity. These groups are not the vaguely defined “losers in the process of modernization” evoked by many German scholars, however (cf. Beck 1986; Heitmeyer 1988, 1992b). The next section will explore the difference between the unidirectional language of “modernization” and the more open-ended historical processes and periods described by the regulation-theoretical approach from which the concepts of Fordism and Post-Fordism are derived.

The new racist violence is thus a protest by Fordist subjects against the end of Fordism and the unstable, “flexible” world that is taking its place. Given this starting point, we can reject from the outset facile characterizations of the neofascist violence as a continuation of the “new social movements” of the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., the ecological and peace movements). Apart from obvious differences in the two movements’ relationship to the state and in the targets of violence (while the NSMs mainly attacked symbols of power, the neofascists attack defenseless victims), they differ fundamentally in terms of their origins. On the one hand, the new social movements can be analyzed as revolts against the Fordist mode of regulation by Fordist subjects (Hirsch and Roth 1986); by contrast, the current neofascist violence is better interpreted as a revolt in favor of Fordism. The typical new social movement supporter was not associated with Fordism either directly—that is, through membership in one of the core industrial-productivist social classes—or indirectly, as a satisfied consumer of mass-produced commodities or willing participant in a standardized life style. In contrast, the new right-wing revolt is borne by sectors of society that were central to Fordism and that internalized its culture.

One problem that was less central to writing on the new social movements but that is of pressing concern to the current right-wing movements concerns the similarities and differences between eastern and western Germany. Since a large proportion of the neofascist assaults are being committed by former citizens of the GDR, it is important to determine whether the concept of Fordism can be usefully applied to a state-socialist society. I will argue that it can, and that the similarities between the West and East German variants of Fordism are especially visible in areas that are decisive for the genesis of right-wing subjectivity in both regions. Establishing such similarities is a crucial step in the argument, since ideological “framing” works best if it resonates with real conditions, historical or present-day. As Stuart Hall remarks (with respect to Thatcherism), “the first thing to ask about an ‘organic ideology’ that, however unexpectedly, succeeds in organizing substantial sections of the masses and mobilizing them for political action, is not what is false about it, but what about it is true” (1988, p. 46). Some of the Fordist conditions which constitute the utopia of reactionary neofascism existed in the GDR as well, and the memory of this “real-existing Fordism” is an important basis for current right-wing mobilization in the East.
Some writers attribute an allegedly higher rate of right-wing offenses in the east after 1989 to the specific social conditions of the GDR: its cradle-to-grave social “security,” its segregation of foreign workers, and its homogeneity and isolation. The problem with this argument is its premise: the notion that right-wing crimes are more frequent or more serious in the East. In light of the historical and organizational primacy of West German neofascists, it is difficult to determine whether the claim that “the new right-wing extremist violence originated in eastern Germany” (Veen et al. 1993, p. 71) is an instance of West German self-exculpation through blaming the Ossis or of active disinformation. With regard to sheer numbers, the single most brutal fact is that more people have been killed in right-wing attacks in Western Germany since 1989. The majority of right-wing incidents have occurred in the federal states of the West, even though opportunities for violence are greater in the east due to the unmotivated and underprepared police force. On the other hand, some figures show that there have recently been more attacks per capita in the eastern states, but the differences are not overwhelming, and vary over time. Some surveys indicate higher levels of support for extreme right-wing attitudes in the eastern provinces, but there are no clear tendencies. Such differences may also be due to greater experience in the West with surveys and a correspondingly heightened awareness of socially desirable answers. A 1991 Allensbach survey suggested that East Germans over 16 were less prone to agree that “German Jews are more loyal to Israel than to Germany” (32% versus 46% in the West), that Nazism was “not so bad” (16% versus 23%), that there are “too many foreigners in our country” (65% versus 66%), and that the German-Polish border was unacceptable. In a June 1992 survey, respondents in the eastern Länder revealed a lower level of hostility to asylum seekers than western respondents. In sum, what needs to be explained is a broad similarity between the eastern and western federal states, rather than a difference. The difference that needs explaining is between Germany and the other advanced industrial countries.

The Contribution of Historical Nazism to the Current Wave of Violence

If longing for an idealized Fordism is the crucial impetus behind the current rebellion, it cannot account for the movement’s precise form and content. Nor can it explain why levels of right-wing violence have been so much higher in Germany than in other countries undergoing similar transitions to Post-Fordism (cf. European Parliament 1991). Part of the answer certainly has to do with the different forms of Fordism and the relative disruptiveness of postfordist restructuring in each country. However, only with reference to differences in political culture and ideology can we explain the German right’s targeting of groups like Jews and the handicapped. These are groups whose relationship to the restructuring process is tenuous at best—or rather, whose presumed relationship to Post-Fordist restructuring is not inscribed within the Fordist ideological system.
Even if the new fascism cannot be seen as a simple reemergence of Nazism, it reveals a marked continuity of themes and ideologemes with historical Nazism. The only way to understand the current lumping together of handicapped people, Jews, the homeless, leftists, Turks, and Gypsies is in terms of the actual ideological system of German Nazism. The core elements of this discourse are extreme racism, German nationalism, anti-Semitism, social Darwinism, militarism, sexism, exaggerated violence, and a tendency to reverse the roles of victim and perpetrator. Certainly, current extreme-right ideology adds elements that were less prominent or historically irrelevant in the Nazi era, such as the focus on labor migrants and political asylum. For obvious reasons, themes such as opposition to the Soviet Union are less salient today. Many contemporary right-wing extremists also distance themselves from Hitler and the Holocaust (Kowalsky 1993, p. 18). The individual ideologemes of Nazi ideology are combined in new ways, with different weights attached to specific elements. For example, there is a greater stress in contemporary neo-Nazism on the “socialist” ideas of the “national revolutionary” wing of the original Nazi party, represented by Ernst Röhm and the Strasser brothers (Stöss 1991, p. 169).

What differentiates Germany from, say, Britain in this regard is the very existence of a well-grounded far right discourse, the “naturalness” of a domestic fascist ideology. The availability of historical Nazism as an indigenous far-right ideological system helps the German movement attain a certain level of cultural coherence even when its formal organization is weak. Public opinion polls during the postwar period showed that a rising proportion of Germans rejected Hitler, the Holocaust, and many of the Nazis’ specific policies. At the same time there was continuing widespread approval of certain aspects of Nazism, especially among the older generations. Due to either a basic agreement with Nazism or to a psychological “inability to mourn” (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1975), the result was that assumptions of hegemonic Nazi culture were reproduced intact. There has also been a consistent solid core of Germans with extreme right-wing views throughout the postwar period.\(^6\) This does not mean that there is broad support for explicit Nazi ideology, but rather that for many people the assumptions and individual elements of this ideology are familiar and unexamined. Historical Nazism is thus a cultural “resource,” akin to money or printing presses in other social movements (cf. Tilly 1978; Jenkins 1983), which confers an advantage on German neofascists in comparison to comparable movements elsewhere.\(^6\)

The preceding sketch of an explanation leaves unresolved the problem of the applicability of the regulation perspective to state-socialist societies. In order to address this issue it is necessary to introduce the regulation approach in more detail.
III. REGULATION THEORY, FORDISM, AND THE NEW VIOLENCE

The concept of Fordism employed here is adopted from regulation theory. This perspective presents itself as having remedied many of the shortcomings of older versions of Marxism without abandoning Marxism's emphasis on the dynamics of capital accumulation. Regulation theory avoids teleology and functionalism, exchanging the figure of historical necessity for an insistence on contingency and accidents. The only assumption about historical change is that social arrangements for capitalist accumulation repeatedly fall apart and profit rates eventually decline, leading to a frantic, trial-and-error search for solutions by diverse social actors. The only historical constant in the regulationist view of capitalism is the eventual collapse of social arrangements for capital accumulation (i.e., regulatory crises; cf. Lipietz 1990, p. 153), and the strong incentives many people have to find a solution allowing further accumulation, given private property and the profit motive. But while the search for mechanisms to expand capital accumulation operates with great insistence in contemporary societies, engaging many individuals and groups, regulation theory recognizes that the outcome of crisis is always unpredictable, the product of multiple wills and forces intersecting in unforeseeable ways. The kind of outcome that is of most interest here is the temporarily stabilized "mode of regulation": a set of social norms, institutions, and patterns of practice that permit further economic growth and capital accumulation. But regulation theory offers no guarantee that an ordered resolution of this sort will emerge.

A final crucial difference from traditional forms of Marxism is the assumption that Fordism does not create the institutions and social practices that it uses, nor does it fully control them. Fordism is a historic bricolage of components from diverse social fields that both preexist it and survive it, and develop nonsynchronously and in partial autonomy from the other fields.

The most important use of regulation theory in the present context is the possibility of interpreting the interests and subjectivities expressed in social movements in relation to dominant, waning, or emergent modes of regulation. But while several writers have attempted to relate the rise of the new social movements to the Fordist mode of regulation, none have built a convincing explanation of the current extreme-right upsurge in these terms.

Fordism and Post-Fordism as Modes of Regulation

The regulation approach works with concepts located at several different levels of abstraction. At the most abstract level is the notion of regulation itself, which refers to the institutions and norms that allow conflictual and contradictory social relations to continue existing. At a middle-range level are specific modes of regulation, such as Fordism and Post-Fordism. Finally, there
are empirical descriptions of the geographically and historically specific forms in which regulatory modes are realized, with their distinct emphases, subtractions, and additions.

More recent writings characterize Fordism as a specific mode of regulation articulated with a particular regime of accumulation. A regime of accumulation is defined as a set of rules determining the distribution and allocation of the social product between investment/accumulation and consumption. A mode of regulation is a set of “rules and procedures, of norms, institutions, procedures, and modes of calculation through which the accumulation regime is secured. It comprises all of the institutional forms and norms which secure the compatibility of typical modes of economic conduct” (Jessop 1989). In addition to clearly economic institutions and norms such as money, the mode of regulation typically encompasses aspects of the state, culture, and mechanisms of initial socialization, sex and gender relations, family forms, and so forth. To capture this notion of an articulated field of diverse non-“economic” institutions involved in accumulation, Jessop (1992) proposes the term “integral economy.”

As a regime of accumulation, Fordism is characterized by a systematic relation between mass production and mass consumption. As a mode of regulation, Fordism signals a broad range of changes. According to Jessop (1989, 1990b) Fordist regulation is characterized by the following broadly economic features:

- The centrality of the wage as the main mechanism for securing the reproduction of labor power;
- Collective bargaining over wage rates and working time; monopolistic price regulation;
- The predominance of mass consumption of standardized commodities and of collective consumption of goods and services supplied by the state;
- The encouragement of mass consumption by a number of techniques such as advertising;
- The importance of credit for validating full employment levels of demand.

Productivism and consumerism constitute the prevailing cultural forms under Fordism (Hirsch and Roth 1986). An ideology of individualisation is combined in a potentially contradictory way with an increasingly narrow range of “normal” lifestyle orientations. Culture is institutionally centered around the mass media. Neo-corporatism and the Keynesian welfare state represent the central political forms. According to Hirsch and Roth (1986, p. 37), Fordist politics are based on “social-democratic, bureaucratic societalization, strong unions, reformist parties of mass integration, corporatist institutionalization of class contradictions, and Keynesian state interventionism.”
Differences in the periodization of Fordism and Post-Fordism depend on specific national conditions. The rudiments of Fordism are usually described as taking shape in the United States during the interwar period, with full-blown Fordism taking root during the post-World War II years in Western Europe and the United States. It is frequently argued that Fordism began to unravel during the 1970s and that the advanced capitalist world is currently in the midst of a transition to a still vaguely-defined “Post-Fordist” mode of regulation based on “flexible accumulation” (see Jessop, et al. 1991; Harvey 1989). West German Fordism is usually seen as outlasting Fordism in the United States or Great Britain.

These differences in timing underscore the point that Fordism describes the general features of the advanced capitalist world in a certain period. Fordism does not represent a sort of essence that is instantiated in each case; nor is it a concrete description of specific countries. The nationally-specific forms of Fordist regulation depend on preexisting national conditions (Jessop 1989). Britain exhibited a weaker form of Fordism than West Germany, whose Fordism was in turn less pronounced than Sweden’s, etc. Although the United States pioneered several of the central economic elements of Fordism, its Fordism was less complete than that of most West European countries. This emphasis on nationally specific forms of a single regulatory mode allows for the elaboration of separate models for East and West German Fordism.

East German State Socialism as a Form of Derivative Fordism

With a few exceptions (Lipietz 1979, 1991; Murray 1990), most regulation theorists have focused on societies dominated by capitalist production. One reason for this neglect of state socialist societies is that many regulation theorists continue to rely on the assumptions of Marxist value theory and political economy, which are not thought to be applicable to noncapitalist societies. Another reason for this neglect is the absence of a direct parallel in state socialist societies for the conditions motivating the search for new modes of regulation under capitalism, especially private property and profits. A number of revisions are necessary in order to apply regulation theory to societies in which private property is marginal. Yet state socialist societies face problems similar to capitalist societies. Their governing classes have an interest in raising levels of production and productivity, in stabilizing the long-term allocation of the net product between production and consumption, and in creating a dispositif of institutions, norms, and habits to underpin production. Similarly, state socialist societies face crises in which the institutions and norms that regulate conflicts break down. Again, there is no guarantee that a mode of regulation will emerge in socialist societies, but this lack of guarantees does not distinguish state socialism from capitalism.
The pertinence of regulation theory to Soviet-style societies is immediately suggested by the popularity of Taylorism and Fordism in the Soviet Union during the 1920s and thereafter (Stites 1989, pp. 146-148). Elements of the broader Fordist mode of regulation are also called to mind by Stakhanovism, by campaigns to produce a new “socialist personality,” and by the importance of central planning. The overarching economic strategy in the Soviet Union included “Taylorist work organization, centralized bureaucratic organization, planning, and mass production” (Murray 1990, p. 103; Granick 1967). Alongside these elements of “economic” Fordism, various aspects of the broader Fordist mode of regulation were imported into the Soviet Union: the belief in the boundless power of reason and the “benevolence of science;” the worship of machines and speed; and the emphasis on standardized, mass-produced products (Murray 1990, p. 103).

The GDR was also characterized by a tendency to borrow from both Soviet and Western Fordism, making it possible to speak of a “derivative” East German Fordism. Voskamp and Wittke note that “socialist planning elites in the GDR during the 1950s and 1960s were enamored of the Fordist production principles that dominated Western industrial production and organization,” resulting in the “continuous extension of the division of labor, the creation of ever more specialized production tasks, the centralization of resources, and vertical integration” (1991, p. 344). The result was a constant upward spiral in economies of scale and the division of labor (Schneider and Troder 1985). In certain respects, the East German economy came to resemble the variant of Fordism found in West Germany. Exports were a central component of the national form of growth in both countries, involving a similar percentage of the national product. On both sides of the border, industry was predominant and concentrated in many of the same industrial sectors, such as mechanical engineering, chemicals, and electronics (Dennis 1988, pp. 136-139)—even if most East German products were not competitive in Western markets. For the purpose of understanding present-day German neofascism, a significant feature of the type of Fordism in both Germanies was its economic nationalism. East Germany pursued a policy of autarkic, self-sufficient “Fordism in a single country,” and positioned itself as the leading economic power in the Eastern bloc (Voskamp and Wittke 1991; Assheuer and Sarkowicz 1992, p. 136). The strong correlation of national sentiment with economic prosperity helps explain the intensity of specifically nationalist reactions to the erosion of economic prosperity.

There were also parallels between West and East German Fordism at the level of labor relations, although these were less the result of explicit modeling than a product of competition between the two states. One similarity concerned job security. The East German policy of the “right to work” was based on the state’s need to legitimize itself vis-à-vis the working class and to define itself as “socialist” in contrast to the FRG. This job security gave East German
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workers a certain degree of structural veto power over managerial and government decisions in the form of work slowdowns and absenteeism (P. Hübner 1993; Bahro 1981). Labor held no comparable employment guarantee in West Germany, but it benefited from generous unemployment benefits and extensive job retraining programs. More important in the present context is the policy of industrial codetermination, a central component of West German industrial relations which grants workers a certain measure of influence over production decisions.) One significant result of the legitimacy deficit and right to work in East Germany was that wages rose at a more rapid rate than productivity. 71 Since there was little to spend money on in the GDR, one effect of these wage increases was certainly to increase workers’ disillusionment with the East German system. Seen from a different angle, however, East German workers may have internalized a sense that wages should rise steadily.

A further parallel relates to the use of immigrant labor in the two Germanies. The GDR began importing migrant laborers from other East European countries during the 1960s, followed in the 1970s and 1980s by immigrant laborers from Vietnam, Cuba, Mozambique, Angola, China, and elsewhere. By the beginning of 1989 there were 166,419 foreigners in the GDR (Jasper 1991, p. 171; Broszinsky-Schwabe 1990). In an effort to distinguish its migrants from West German’s “guest workers,” the GDR spoke of the “interstate migration of labor power.” Yet the revelation in 1973 that thousands of Turks were working in the GDR underscored a pragmatism not fundamentally different from West German policy (Jasper 1991, pp. 163-164). Foreign labor played a similar role in the two societies, despite certain minor differences such as the GDR’s importation of groups rather than individuals. Immigrant laborers in the GDR were expected to return within a fixed number of years to their countries of origin, while immigrant workers in West Germany face restrictions in the areas of civil rights, citizenship, and social policy, and are referred to as “guests” (Gastarbeiter) in order to underscore their temporary status.

Strong similarities between West and East Germany also emerged in the field of social policy. From the 1960s onwards, the East German Socialist Unity Policy (SED) tried to emulate West Germany by making rising living standards the key tool for legitimation (Weber 1993, p. 198). 72 This started in 1963 with the “New Economic System for Planning and Management” (NÖSPL), which involved a certain devolution of economic decision-making power as well as “capitalist’ indicators like profitability and an unabashed readiness to appeal to the material interests of workers” (McAdams 1985, p. 45; cf. Weber 1988, p. 60; Bahro 1971, p. 222). Yet while a book entitled Wirtschaftswunder DDR published in 1968 seemed to signal the success of the reforms of the mid-1960s (Müller and Reißbig 1968; cf. also Schenk 1969), the Prague Spring and growing unrest in the GDR prompted a return to centralization at the end of the decade (Dennis 1992, p. 59). The GDR did not abandon the legitimatory reliance on material incentives under Honecker (1970-1989), however. Honecker’s regime
opened with an emphasis on social policy, which in practice entailed a rise in social consumption spending (McAdams 1985, p. 137). East Germans came to expect an all-embracing system of “social security.” As the GDR economy slowed down during the second half of the 1970s, Honecker began using the formula of the “unity of economic and social policy,” marking a silent return to the “New Economic System” values of management and efficiency, scientific-technical progress, and “the growth of productivity as the precondition for social policy” (Spittmann 1990, pp. 45, 70; Meuschel 1993, p. 12; Weber 1988, p. 77). Nonetheless, new social programs continued to be introduced, ranging from apartment construction to maternity leave, youth centers, universal health care, free contraception and abortion (1972), day care, and the continuing subsidization of essentials such as housing and food at very low prices (Dennis 1988, pp. 42-78; Scharf 1989). Production workers remained the main addressee of the state’s social policies throughout the Honecker period (P. Hübner 1990, p. 260).

A further area of similarities involved mass culture—a very complex area that can only be touched upon briefly here. On the surface, SED cultural policy portrayed itself as differing sharply from Western mass culture, especially during the Ulbricht era. Policies introduced in this period included the unified ten-class secondary schools (after 1959), subsidized theater tickets and books, and an emphasis on providing workers with access to higher education. The SED followed the Social Democratic tradition of bringing “bourgeois culture” to the working masses. During the early 1960s, however, the SED was torn between opposing Western mass culture as decadent and using it to pacify opposition (Rauhut 1991). Under the Honecker regime the state became more tolerant of light entertainment, jazz and rock music, discos, Western film, and most significantly, the private viewing of West German television (Dennis 1988, p. 176). Indeed, given the overriding centrality of television viewing among the various leisure-time activities (Bisky 1987), the 1970s can be seen as a period of incipient cultural convergence between West and East Germany. A final area of resemblance during this era was “the increase in the number of private cars and weekend cottages” (Bisky 1987, p. 39).

Of course, Fordism in the GDR was by no means a simple mirror image of West German Fordism. The vertically integrated combines in the GDR were even more gargantuan than in the West (Voskamp and Wittke 1991). And while the GDR resembled West Germany in entering a period of economic decline in the 1970s, it did not respond with comparable moves away from Fordist gigantism and inflexibility—even if discussions of “Post-Fordist” economic practices were under way among reform circles of managers and intellectuals before 1989 (cf. Tröger 1990; Land 1990). As Charles Maier notes, “the superiority of Western economies lay not in their immunity to these systemic challenges, but in their capacity to overcome them” (1991, p. 39). The forces that led to the creation of a Fordist society were different in the East, as were
the forces that might have led to a successor to Fordism. In the West, efforts to find a stable system of accumulation are carried by a large array of actors working in relative autonomy from one another, including capitalists, labor unions, political parties, and state managers. In the GDR, only the ruling party had a structural incentive to find a stable model for economic growth, and that same elite faced contradictory pressures that militated against reform. A prerequisite for the SED to remain in power was an extreme degree of centralization, while the necessary changes pointed in the exact opposite direction. As Maier (1991, p. 43) observes:

The reflex of centralization, the retreat back to the safe ideological priorities of centralized planning came at a moment when world economic forces made the recipe especially inappropriate. The 1970s, with its rise in the price of energy, pressures for stagflation (that worked themselves into the East as well as ravaging the West), the acceleration of electronic technologies, provided the worst moment to reinstitute even a modest centralization.

Moreover, the tentative moves towards post-Fordism in East Germany during the 1970s and 1980s were characterized by both explicit and unconscious modelling on the Federal Republic (Dennis 1993, pp. 19-20). Just as Fordism in the East had been largely derivative of Western Fordism, so the impulse to reform lacked an internal motor.

In terms of the influence of Fordism on popular subjectivity, there were several important differences between the two Germanies. The most obvious difference had to do with the constant shortages and lower quality of consumer goods in the East. The approval of unification by an overwhelming majority of East Germans in 1990 mainly reflected this comparative assessment. One needs to recall that nostalgic yearning is always for an idealized object (Lowenthal 1989). In the GDR before 1989, consumerism was already vicarious to a considerable extent, through the viewing of West German television. The desired object—Fordism—has therefore been a further step removed for former East Germans than for West Germans. The fact that this object is experienced in an indirect, mediated way does not deeply distinguish the two countries, however. Access to the Fordist supermarket is always unequal in the West, just as “memories” of the conventional single-earner nuclear family are largely mythical (Coontz 1992). This leads to the second area of differences between East and West Germany, having to do with women and the family. The extreme labor shortage in the GDR led to a more extensive integration of women into the labor force, such that more than 90 percent of East German women had an occupation by 1989 (Niethammer 1992, p. 44; Merkel 1990). As a result, the traditional nuclear family was an even less viable ideal than in West Germany, where postwar social programs were designed to prop up single-earner households and motherhood (Moeller 1993). The most obvious difference between East and West Germany lay in their overall political systems,
but this seems to have mattered surprisingly little for current proclivities toward right-wing extremism in the two parts of the country.

The similarities between East and West German Fordism were substantial enough to have endowed many manual workers in both parts of the country with broadly similar subjectivities, habitus, and expectations. These similarities can in turn account for workers’ opposition to the present conditions of Post-Fordist restructuring and the appeal of right-wing violence.\textsuperscript{80} Backward-looking opposition to present conditions is based on an idealized recollection of a time in which there were abundant jobs corresponding to workers’ skills; in which social policy provided a comforting buffer during periods of impaired work ability; in which foreigners were unseen “guests” doing the work that Germans shunned, rather than competitors for scarce jobs; and in which mass culture offered attainable leisure, and not just another field of stratified distinction. These secure conditions are all being eroded simultaneously in present-day Germany. German unification provided an opportunity to accelerate ongoing tendencies toward flexibilizing labor markets and industrial organization. Cutbacks in wages and social programs have been justified with reference to the economic recession and the costs of unification. The opening up of borders and the political and economic disruptions in Eastern Europe led to a rapid rise in the number of migrants and foreigners seeking asylum in Germany. And these developments coincide with ongoing destabilization of core Fordist institutions such as the nuclear family and clearly-defined social class cultures (Stacey 1990; Chopra and Scheller 1992; Hradil 1987; Harvey 1989, p. 156).\textsuperscript{81}

The Other Extreme Right

In an apparent act of intellectual contortionism, one author has made the neofascist thugs out to be part of a “Post-Fordist class bloc” (Roth 1992).\textsuperscript{82} The Post-Fordist bloc is dominated by small and medium-sized employers in the new technologies and “postindustrial” sectors, highly skilled workers, young academics, and the new self-employed (cf. Mayer 1991; Steinmetz and Wright 1989). The current period is one in which massive efforts are underway to discover a regulatory solution for the crisis of Fordism, efforts that are being carried out in an uncoordinated fashion across the social formation. It is thus not surprising to find one segment of the Post-Fordist class bloc embracing a “forward-looking” variant of neofascism, nor is it startling that some segments of the extreme right political-ideological scene are staking their bets on a Post-Fordist future and trying to influence its shape.\textsuperscript{83} As Roth (1992, p. 8) points out, this version of neofascist modernization wants to “cast aside the bothersome ballast [of Fordism] with dictatorial methods.” The Northern Italian Lega Lombarda is the most prominent example of this move to embrace the hypercompetitive “elbow society” of Post-Fordism by expelling or
excluding the populations of Fordism (Schmidtke and Ruzza 1993). While such tendencies exist in Germany, they have not yet been able to assume control of entire neofascist organizations. One reason for this “delay” is that German Fordism entered its crisis at a comparatively later time. The most likely carriers of a modern neofascist project in Germany are the university-educated ideologues around publications like Junge Freiheit, the new manual middle class, and the Republikaner party. It is no coincidence that the Republicans’ strongest electoral showing has been in Post-Fordist Baden-Württemburg, especially among the self-employed and blue-collar workers who have recently “risen to middle-class status” as a result of the business upswing in that state (Veen et al. 1993, p. 39). 84

There are thus two different strands of neofascism, one reactionary and Fordist, the other modernizing and Post-Fordist. Within actual political organizations and movements, the boundaries between the two are blurry. Moreover, they share certain core ideologemes such as a völkish German nationalism and opposition to the various practices and discourses gathered under the term “multiculturalism.” 85 Since the halcyon days of Fordism are gone forever, it is likely that the reactionary wing of the extreme-right will eventually disappear and that the modernizing neofascists will be the more lasting threat. For the moment, however, the backwards-looking strand is stronger and more pernicious.

IV. CONCLUSION: CONNECTING FORDIST NOSTALGIA AND NAZI IDEOLOGY

The key factor driving the current far right movement in Germany is the erosion of Fordist subjectivity and the conditions that undergirded it. (1) The supporters of the new right-wing movement are drawn disproportionately from the social groups that were favored by the Fordist formation—male manual laborers and apprentices. The predominance of males in the present movement is one reflection of Fordism’s traditional gender roles. 86 Even more telling in this regard is the caricatured masculinity of the young right-wingers. (2) The fact that most of the activists in the movement are young reflects a pragmatic division of labor between street-fighters and their adult supporters rather than a generation-specific array of interests. (3) The low educational level of most far-right offenders is relevant not in terms of some putative underdevelopment of “civilization” among the less educated but because of the decline in jobs for unskilled manual workers.

Although the agents of violence are fairly inarticulate, their actions speak clearly. The most frequent victims are the formerly invisible guest workers and other “foreigners.” They are seen as threats to the German economy and therefore, because of the correlation between national sentiment and the
economy, as threats to the German nation. The aim of these attacks is the coercive exclusion of persons, institutions, or ideas defined as foreign from the narrowly defined national community. Members of the alternative left and the NSMs are also favored targets of right-wing hatred, because they stand for a rejection of stable Fordism. Their combination of unemployment and a form of subjectivity based on the Fordist work-centered culture explains the neofascists' hostility to allegedly "work-shy" populations such as Gypsies, asylum-seekers, and punks.

The contending theories discussed earlier touch on important determinants of right-wing extremism, even if they are incomplete and unable to account for the differences between "reactionary" and "forward-looking" neofascism. Habermas' (1992) notion of "prosperity chauvinism" suggests that the right extremists are defending present-day prosperity. While this may be correct for the Post-Fordist wing of the movement, adherents of the tendencies under discussion here have already lost many of their advantages or are on the verge of doing so. Heitmeyer (1989, 1992) is correct in focusing attention on broad political-economic transformations, but his approach has many drawbacks. He cannot account for the differential participation of various social strata in the "manhunt." Even if we accept his terms of debate, it is clear that the main activists—unskilled male manual laborers and apprentices—are not the only groups in contemporary society experiencing isolation, extreme individualization, and an instrumental relationship to their work. Nor can Heitmeyer's approach account for the emergence of a far right movement in the GDR before 1989.

The most illuminating suggestions from Habermas and other analysts of the contemporary far right focus on dimensions of recent German history and politics that cannot be fully grasped by the regulation framework. The state's lax attitude with respect to right-wing extremism has created an important "structure of opportunity" allowing the movement to expand. The most important factor, however, is the survival of elements of Nazism in German political culture. Many people who support the ongoing pogrom in Germany are not members of neo-Nazi parties, but the latter have managed to connect the popular themes of extreme nationalism and anti-foreigner sentiment to other ideologemes. Their success in doing so depends on the reproduction of Nazi ideology during the post-1945 period, in ways that have yet to be fully elucidated. Just as reactions to Fordism can only partially account for the new social movements (Steinmetz 1994), the embrace of Fordism cannot explain the inclusion of certain themes and enemies within the far right worldview. Nonetheless, regulation theory goes beyond the other approaches in explaining the timing, social base, and substantive orientation (the word "demands" would be too strong) of the current extreme right-wing movement. Future research on the neofascist movement needs to focus on the mechanisms by which Nazi ideology has been reproduced within families and groups during the postwar
period, the mediations between modes of regulation and forms of subjectivity, and the details of the specific East German form of Fordism.

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NOTES

1. The main works are listed in the bibliography and discussed in part III below; the periodicals consulted regularly over the one-year period were Süddeutsche Zeitung and Le Monde (both on the on-line Lexis system), tageszeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Zeit, and Der Spiegel.

2. For a more detailed discussion of the epistemological status of the concept of explanation, and the difference between explanation and theory, see Steinmetz (1993, pp. 15-18).

3. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 Dec. 1992. Such incidents are so common that very few are reported in the press; see the story of a pupil in a school in Marzahn having his arm forcibly "painted" with a swastika in November 1992 (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16 Dec. 1992).


9. Paul Lersch, “Gastfrei, offen, fremdenfreundlich,” Der Spiegel 47:24 (1993), p. 24. The statistics on right-wing extremist incidents encompass any of the following activities with proven or suspected right-wing motivation: terrorist actions, threats of violence, illegal possession of weapons, ammunition, or explosives, distribution of propaganda, the use of Nazi symbols, insults and defamations to the memory of victims of Nazism, actions intended to incite people to violence and racial hatred (Volksverhetzung).

10. For consistency, the figures given here refer only to the “old federal states” of West Germany. The 1992 figure is an estimate, obtained by applying the percentage of all incidents in the “old” states to the 1992 figure (2,285 incidents), which is not broken down by region. Data for 1990 and 1991 from Bundesministerium des Innern, Verfassungsschutzbericht Vol. 54 (1991), p. 76; for 1992 from Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15 April 1994. The Verfassungsschutz figures are not to be strictly comparable with the national police statistics of the Bundeskriminalamt: the Verfassungsschutz counts only the total number of incidents, regardless of whether different laws were broken in the course of a single incident, while the police statistics may register more than one incident if several laws are broken simultaneously. Although the number of recorded violent right-wing incidents declined slightly in 1993, the overall number of criminal episodes with suspected or established right-wing motives continued to rise.

decision by a group of right-wing youths to attack a rival left-wing youth center and the reaction
of their "leaders."

13. For similar uses of this phrase, see Brumlik (1993); interviews with the Hamburg
Verfassungsschutz leader Urlau, in \textit{tageszeitung}, 11 June 1993; and statement from the Interior
Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, in ibid., 8 July 1993. On the prevalence of working-class
sympathizers of the Reps in both Bremen and Hamburg, see Sander (1993). In 1992, 28 percent
of the union members surveyed in the Western Länder said they had voted or would vote for
a party to the right of the CDU (Jaschke 1993). As noted below, the Reps' class bias is somewhat
different in Southern Germany, but these voters are probably supporting a somewhat different
project, as discussed below.

on 1,400 suspected and convicted of right-wing crimes; interview with Ingo Hasselbach, National
Alternative party founder \textit{(tageszeitung} 18 June 1993); interviews with "Otto" and "Till" in
Heitmeyer (1992, parts 6.3.6 and 6.3.7), both of them extremely racist and nationalistic, but opposed
to Nazism and Hitler.

15. Lorenz (1993); Tolmein (1993). The best recent studies of organized Neonazism are
Schröder (1992) and Schmidt (1993); see also Stöß (1991); Dudek and Jaschke (1984); and Paul

16. \textit{Spiegel} 47:29 (1993), pp. 33-34; In principle, all German neo-Nazis are registered with and
belong to the NSDAP-AO (National Socialist Unity Building-Up Organization), based in Lincoln,
Nebraska (an apparent exception was the now banned Nationale Alternative; see \textit{tageszeitung},
18 June 1993, interview with co-founder of the NA).

17. \textit{Verfassungsschutzbericht} 1991, p. 73. \textit{The Verfassungsschutz} gives a figure of 40,000 for
1991 and 1992 (ibid., p. 73; \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung}, Nov. 26, 1992); Stöß (1993, p. 51) gives the
figure 55,000 for 1991; the higher figure is from \textit{Der Spiegel} 47:23 (1993), p. 25.

to the Nationale Alternative founder Ingo Hasselbach, the Burschenschaften assist with the
"education" of new neo-Nazis \textit{(tageszeitung} 18 April 1993).

19. European Parliament (1991, p. 24); see also Leggewie (1989); Schröder (1992:19); Schomers
(1991); Funke (1989); Jaschke (1993); Stöß (1990); \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung} Nov. 26 1992; Geißler


21. On differentiation within the skinhead scene, see \textit{tageszeitung} (7 June 1993), and Farin

22. The lowest figure is 3,280, estimated by Farin and Seidel-Pielen (1993, pp. 183, 201); the
highest figures are from Kramer (1993, p. 53) (relying on Verfassungsschutz and Bundeskriminalamt estimates). Figures on the numbers of right extremist skins vary widely because they are not organized and because of the difficulties in distinguishing right-wing from left, liberal,
or unpolitical skinheads.

23. Although Farin and Seidel-Pielen try to play down the importance of Nazi ideology among
contemporary skinheads, the respondents to their own survey placed the bands Skrewdriver, Böhse
Onkelz, Endstufe, Störrkraft, and Radikahl among the 20 "best bands of all time" (1993, p. 193).
See Annaas and Christoph (1993).

24. In Farin and Seidel-Pielen (1993), p. 66. In its "swastika song" the group Radikahl (Radical-
Bald) sings:

\begin{verbatim}
Hang the Nobel Prize around Adolf Hitler's neck
Raise the red flag with the swastika
Even today my values are still:
Race, pride, and the swastika!
\end{verbatim}
The “Kanacken-Song” by the group Endsieg (Final Victory) calls for putting Turks in concentration camps, killing Turkish children, and raping Turkish women (Verfassungsschutzbericht 1991, p. 92). The band incites its listeners:

If you see a Turk in the street car;
If he looks like he’s trying to provoke you somehow;
Then just get up and punch him out;
Pull your knife and stab him seventeen times. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 December 1992).

The refrain of the song “Blood and Honor” by the popular skinhead band Störkraft (Disturbance Power) runs:

Loyal, unified, and hand in hand, we fight for our fatherland:
Rage, pride within each man, blood and honor for your homeland. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 December 1992).


27. Amadeu Antonio was in a coma from the beating in November 1990 until his death two weeks later; see Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 October 1992, 14 November 1992, 12 December 1992.


30. On a trip to Israel in 1984, Kohl claimed the “grace of a late birth” for himself and, implicitly, for all other Germans who came of age after 1945 (Schmidt 1993, Ch. 9). Alfred Dregger, general secretary of the CDU until 1991, urged the nation to “step out of Adolf Hitler’s shadow” (Schmidt 1993, p. 122).


33. They also protested against demonstrations against hostility to foreigners. One founding CDU member of the Forum, Heinrich Lummer, went so far as to say that the demonstrations made him “puke” (quoted in tageszeitung, January 11, 1993). Another prominent speaker for the Deutschland Forum, Rudolf Krause (Bundestag member for the CDU until 1993, and now the sole Rep delegate) described the “seduction” of young people by such demonstrations as a sign of their “spiritual demoralization” (geistige Verwahrlosung) (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Feb. 3, 1993).


36. For presentations of the major explanations see Butterwegge and Isola (1991); Heitmeyer (1988, pp. 23-62); and Rommelspacher (1991).

37. Lipset does briefly discuss “Peronism” as a “fascism of the lower class” (1963, pp. 173-176) but he fails to explain why workers would turn to fascism rather than leftist “authoritarianism,” i.e., Communism (pp. 87-126).


40. See tageszeitung 30 June 1993. A study from the 1980s found that those on the extreme right described their fathers as "extremely strong-willed" (Noelle-Neumann and Ring 1985, p. 94).

41. See the comments of Antje Vollmer in tageszeitung, 3 July 1993.


43. See the comments of Freimut Duve in tageszeitung 27 November 1992.

44. In Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5-6 Dec. 1992, Heidenreich argued that right-wing radicalism is mainly an educational problem.

45. Conservatives warn that the injuries to German national pride increase the danger of abrupt swings in sentiments and political attitudes (Noelle-Neumann 1987, pp. 17-47). It would follow that the cure for right-wing extremism is the creation of a conservative party with which right-wingers could identify (Noelle-Neumann and Ring 1985, p. 100), and the destigmatization of German national feelings.


47. Heitmeyer (1992a) correctly emphasizes that it is by no means necessary that the same constellation of determinants explain the explosion of far right violence in the east and the west. His sharp separation of the two processes fails to explain the ideological convergence in east and west, however.

48. This key term is poorly rendered as "welfare chauvinism" in the English translation of Habermas' essay (New Left Review Nr. 197, Jan-Feb. 1993).

49. The first "life-fiction" of West Germany, according to Habermas, was the notion that "we are all democrats."

50. Elias used the term (1992) in describing the Nazi regime as a reversal of the "civilizing process."

51. Although the existence of a deep ideological split within the extreme right movement recalls the Nazi movement of the 1920s, the content of the split is different. The Röhm/Strasser wing was "forward-looking" within the context of the NSDAP, in the sense that it anticipated actual developments in social policy after 1945. (This does not imply that the triumphant SS.Hitler wing of the movement was "traditionalist" in its actual policies, of course, as recent discussions of the "modernization" of Germany under the Nazi regime have shown; see Prinz and Zitelmann 1991). By contrast, the Fordist tendency within current neo-Nazism, ideologically closest to Strasserism, is now the more "traditional" pole.

52. Franz Joseph Strauss once demanded that the rest of the world should finally stop talking about Auschwitz in recognition of West Germany's economic achievements.

53. The Fordist consumer game of "keeping up with the Joneses" was one-dimensional and quantitative, differing sharply from the post-Fordist game of qualitative struggle for distinction, of symbolic projection tous azimuts. While many Fordist subjects tried to escape from cultural homogenization, they did so against the system's imperatives, while post-Fordism virtually requires such "inventiveness" (flexible consumerism). On the Fordist "cookie monsters" and their consumption habits, see Lüscher (n.d.); on the post-Fordist speed-up in consumerism, see Lash and Urry (1994).

54. This pseudo-argument recurs in different guises, with the new Nazism being characterized as a "molecular reaction"—as opposed to the "molecular revolution" after 1968 (Diederichsen 1993)—or as a "youth revolt from the right" (Rutschky 1991).

55. I will not be able to deal with sub-regional variation in far right activity within the eastern and western regions; on the fruitfulness of exploring such differences, see Noakes (1993).

57. One also frequently reads that the eastern provinces show more attacks per foreigner. On closer inspection it is clear that this figure is irrelevant. Its implicit assumption is that right-wing attacks are always a response to actual foreigners.

58. See Deutsches Jugendinstitut (1992), a survey of 15-17 year old pupils in east and west German cities in summer 1990. East German students were more likely to be proud to be a German (64% versus 48% in the West), to admire Hitler (10% versus 7.6% in the west), to want a strong Führer back again (16% versus 7% in the west), and to experience foreigners as disturbing (over 40% versus 30% in the west). In the West, however, 13% found that fascism was basically a good thing that was merely poorly carried out, a higher percentage than in the east.

59. Figures from Weil (1992), tables, items A5, J1, L2 and L3. On the other hand, Easterners were more likely to say they would prefer not to have immigrants, foreign workers, “people of a different race,” and Muslims as neighbors, although they were slightly more tolerant than Westerners of Jews as neighbors (table F 3).


61. This hardcore far-right section of the population appears only periodically in voting results (cf. Zimmermann and Saalfeld 1992, p. 59), but this can be attributed more to the “supply” side of the political system rather than the “demand” side of the electorate. In many periods there have simply been no credible far right electoral alternatives; in other eras (e.g., at the end of the 1960s) the CDU and CSU effectively wooed these voters. On the right-wing electorate, see Assheuer and Sarkowicz (1992), Noelle-Neumann and Ring (1985), Haug (1987), SINUS (1981).

62. The Achilles heel of the Nazi ideological legacy is German guilt around the Holocaust. It could be argued that these guilt feelings would cancel out the “advantage” to German neo-Nazis of an indigenous and familiar fascist worldview. Holocaust denial propaganda is therefore tactically necessary to attain “desensitization” for neo-fascist ideas (Schmidt 1993).


64. In fact, whether regulation theory is Marxist rather than “post-Marxist” depends on the individual regulation theorist. In some variants, modes of regulation are described as emerging quasi-automatically in response to crises, recalling the functionalism of traditional Marxism. In other versions, the quest for a stable set of arrangements for capital accumulation is seen as a more uncertain process with no guarantees. Regulation theorists are also differ in their ontological and epistemological assumptions. For Jessop, the regulationist emphasis on the contribution of social arrangements to capital accumulation does not imply that the economy is an ontologically privileged “base.” The focus on the economy merely reflects a contingent political preference, not an Archimedean epistemological standpoint. See Jessop (1990b) for a discussion of different strands of regulation theory and Jessop (1992) for the suggestion of a regulationist analysis of the state.

65. Weir and Skocpol (1985) detail the international variations and contingencies involved in the diffusion of Keynesianism, one of the key elements of the Fordist ensemble.


67. The welfare state and neocorporatism were underdeveloped in U.S. Fordism, and vast sectors of society were not encompassed by even the partial version of Fordism that did exist (Lipietz 1986, p. 19).

68. The economic collapse of state socialist societies suggests that they were less successful in discovering effective regulatory models. This does not mean that the concept of regulation is inapplicable, however.

69. Disregarding the question whether planning was more an ideal than a reality (cf. Nove 1983, pp. 79-81).
70. Murray (1990) synthesizes the Soviet version of Fordism as containing three key elements: (1) work discipline and the “real subsumption of the worker” (pp. 92, 95) through rationalization (fragmentation, piece rates, the assembly line), (2) centralized management, (3) centralized planning, and (4) mass production. Lipietz (1991, pp. 88-89) suggests that the main innovations of the Soviet Union’s variant of Fordism (which he calls “iron Fordism”) were guaranteed employment and the use of central planning. This overlooks the importance of ideas of planning in Taylorized firms, as well as government economic planning in countries like France (see Harvey 1989, p. 127).

71. This is one finding of Alf Lüdtke’s ongoing research on workers and meanings of work in the GDR. Although independent labor unions were eliminated in the GDR, we need to await further research in the recently opened archives to understand the level and nature of workers’ bargaining power. I am grateful to Alf Lüdtke for this information.

72. I cannot deal with the west German welfare state here in any detail. Social policy was keystone of Christian Democratic governance and West German legitimacy from the 1950s onward, and received a strong fillip during the Brandt era (cf. Albers 1989; Zöllner 1982).

73. *Geborgenheit* was the key term in Honecker’s hegemonic strategy (cf. Weber 1988, p. 97; Spittmann 1990, p. 48).

74. It could be argued, of course, that these SED policies actually eroded the distinction between elite and mass culture, rather than opposing mass culture. This would differ from the situation in Western Fordism, in which the capitalist culture industry produced “degraded” translations of elite culture, while elite culture and systems of cultural distinction continued to operate (see Bourdieu 1984). The relationship between elite and mass culture under Fordism also varied between western industrialized countries, however.

75. Naturally this assessment must be read in the context of East German productive capacity, that lagged far behind the West (see below).

76. Exploring the reasons for the feebleness of post-Fordist impulses in the GDR before 1989 would take us far beyond the bounds of this paper. They would have to be sought in the political reactions to the New Economic System at the end of the 1960s and the perceived political threat to SED domination of economic decentralization and increased use of markets.

77. This is related to a crucial difference in the functioning of mass culture in the two societies: while East Germans tended to watch West German television, West Germans did not reciprocate.

78. For an exemplary story of one GDR citizen’s frustrated consumerism, see Bornemann (1991, pp. 71-79).

79. The 1976 East German policies on the “baby year” and reduced work hours for mothers of children under 16 attempted to strengthen the conventional family (Behrend 1990).

80. It is also possible to see the extraparliamentary oppositional movements in the GDR before 1989 as an eastern counterpart of the western NSMs, despite certain obvious differences such as the greater levels of repression faced by the Eastern Germans and their lower levels of sympathy to anticapitalist arguments, and to interpret both in terms of rejections of Fordism. In both countries, the extraparliamentary opposition was opposed to Fordist externalities such as environmental destruction, standardization of mass culture, loss of spirituality, masculinism and militarism, etc. There were also marked similarities in social movement style, such as the use of countercultural symbols, informal networks, and the eschewing of grand societal utopian visions. The fact that Bündnis 90/Neues Forum and the West German Greens finally united in 1993 after a long and difficult courtship underscored the basic convergence of the GDR opposition and the West German new social movements. On opposition in the GDR in the second half of the 1980s, see Rüddenklau (1992); for an overview of similar analyses, see Rink and Hofmann (1991).

81. The stratification of cultural consumption had already been proceeding apace throughout the 1980s, even in the GDR (Bisky and Wiedemann 1985, pp. 147ff.).

82. This claim is not so much wrong as it is too generally applied. Although Roth’s (1992) argument encompasses all of West Europe, he explicitly includes Germany. At the same time,
he argues that because the collapse of Fordism has not progressed as far in Germany as elsewhere (e.g., Italy or France), “the formation of a wider social basis [for neofascism] is still in its beginning stages” (p. 9). Although it may be the case that the specific “post-Fordist” form of neofascism is less developed in Germany, this is certainly not true of Fordist neofascism.

83. Not surprising, since there are strands within all sectors of the German political spectrum that are embracing post-Fordism. For left Post-Fordism, see Hall and Jacques (1990). In Germany, this tendency is represented by the (hegemonic) “Realo” wing of the Greens and the Frankfurt journal Pflasterstrand, which has carried articles calling for more tolerance of ethnic minorities—so that they can do Germans’ domestic work. Social Democratic post-Fordism is best represented by Oskar Lafontaine and his “Tuscany” fraction of the SPD; center-conservative post-Fordism in crystallized by Lothar Späth and the “model state” of Baden-Württemburg.

84. For a typical modernized German neofascist tract, see Wolfschlag (1991).

85. It is no paradox that the same ideas can be articulated with different economic programs and social utopias; such political polymorphousness has long been recognized as characteristic of most, if not all, ideological units (cf. Hall 1982, 1983; Laclau 1977; Laclau and Mouffe 1985).

86. According to the Trier University study, men accounted for 95 percent of those convicted for offenses with an extreme-right background (Spiegel 47:17 [1993], pp. 91ff.).

87. Regulation theory is best able to explain the formation of certain forms of subjectivity and constellations of interests. It cannot explain how these interests and subjectivities get turned into actual social movements—a process that is the province of resource mobilization approaches. (Regulation theory can partially illuminate the structure of objective and subjective resources).

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Fordism and the (Im)moral Economy