THE MYTH AND THE REALITY OF AN AUTONOMOUS STATE: INDUSTRIALISTS, JUNKERS AND SOCIAL POLICY IN IMPERIAL GERMANY

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INTRODUCTION

The Prussian state and the various historical incarnations of the state in "Germany" between 1870 and 1945 have played a prominent role in the ideal-typical unconscious of the "state-centered" theoretical tradition.¹ Skocpol's (1985, pp. 7-8) emphasis on Max Weber and Otto Hintze as central forefathers of the "state-centered" perspective underscores the theoretical centrality of Germany, since the bulk of their political writings concerned the Prussian and German states (Hintze 1962-1967; Weber 1971; Beetham 1985; Büsch and Erbe 1983; Kocka 1983). Skocpol represents the Prussian state as archetypically autonomous, calling it an "extraordinarily disciplined and efficient administrative machine" (1979, p. 108). She argues that the Junkers (the traditional landed nobility) were "in no institutional position to block concerted policy initiatives" undertaken by the state in the early nineteenth century (1979, p. 106), although they were still economically dominant.² This reading of the Prussian/German state as highly autonomous echoes the judgments of many

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nineteenth- and twentieth-century German writers. Weber and Hintze figure in a much longer social-scientific lineage reaching from Hegel to Carl Schmitt and through to several major strands in postwar West German historiography. Whatever their other differences, these writers have in common a distinctly “state-centered” approach to their own state.  

The Second German Empire or Kaiserreich (1871-1918) is one of the historical periods during which the German state is said to have plied an independent course between the major social classes. In standard treatments of the Kaiserreich, which will be outlined more fully below, leaders of the Imperial state are shown acting against the interests of German industrialists at decisive moments and in key policy areas. This is significant because industrial capitalism was the leading sector of the German economy in the Empire. Yet while many writers agree that the Imperial state failed to represent business interests, there is less consensus about what kind of state it really was (Bonham 1983, 1984, 1985). The Imperial state is alternately portrayed as beholden to the Junkers or as controlled by bureaucrats and officials pursuing their own (usually military) objectives. The historical literature on the Imperial German state can therefore be assimilated to the state-centered perspective, for which such noncorrespondence between policy and class structure is predictable and not paradoxical.

A few authors depart sharply from the prevailing view, seeing the German political system from the 1860s onwards as expressing the interests and hegemony of the bourgeoisie (Eley 1985, 1986; Machtan and Milles 1980). These writers do not disagree that the German state played an active role in the direction of nineteenth-century social development. But they insist that its interventions promoted capitalist industrialization rather than propping up precapitalist classes. One central difficulty that confronts such interpretations, familiar to those who have followed recent debates on neo-Marxist state theory, is to account for the mechanisms producing such alignments between state policy and business interests.

To clarify the questions sociologists should ask about the German state, I will briefly review the two major contending positions on the sociology of the state in the following pages, before turning to the historical debate.

Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the “Class Correspondence Thesis”

Marxist and neo-Marxist writings on the state have in common the claim that state policies in capitalist social formations tend to reproduce and promote capitalism. Some neo-Marxists make the slightly weaker argument that there are broad but powerful structural limits on dysfunctional state policies.

How do Marxists account for this complementarity between politics and the “economy”? The simplest mechanism is the dominant classes’ ability to manipulate the state directly. But the fact that parliamentary systems usually
preclude “instrumental control” by capitalists and allow nonproprietary groups opportunities to register their will has provided Marxist state theory with its central puzzle. Given that business leaders do not generally monopolize political offices in capitalist societies, what guarantees that the state will not be used against the interests of the propertied classes? States are subject to numerous pressures from subordinate groups, while business is often too fragmented to pursue a unified policy. Yet neo-Marxists have insisted that “class correspondence”—broad complementarity between public policy and dominant class interests—holds nonetheless as a sort of boundary condition, regardless of the specific relations between business and the state.

There are three main ways of accounting for “class correspondence” that do not rely on instrumental control. First, capitalist actors usually possess resource advantages over other classes, permitting them to be overrepresented in policymaking. Powerful groups’ access to the state may also be enhanced by its bureaucratic insulation. But this explanation for a specifically “capitalist” political bias is weakened in transitional societies like nineteenth-century Germany, where precapitalist classes retained resources rivaling those of the rising capitalist class.

A second claim is that a range of “structural selectivities” are built into the state apparatus itself, with the result that policy is systematically biased towards the interests of a specific class (e.g., Offe 1974, 1984b; Offe and Ronge 1984; Jessop 1982, pp. 103-111, 164-165, 1983; Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley and Ling 1988). Policies are shaped, selected and censored in class-relevant ways due to a variety of laws, institutional rules and norms. To avoid functionalism, the original implantation of such “selectivities” into the state apparatus is traced to active interventions by conflicting social classes, parties, organizations, social movements, and the like (cf. Esping-Anderson, Friedland and Wright 1976; Wright 1978, pp. 181-252). Such biases are viewed as contingent rather than necessary outcomes, and their ultimate directionality is not always the result of actors’ intentions. Once established, selectivities obviate the need for direct interventions by their beneficiaries.

The third account is an elaboration of the structural selectivity notion, focusing on the putative exclusion of the state from productive activities. Prevented from becoming self-supporting, the state is forced into dependence on taxes, credit and other revenues generated in the private economy. State policies that overstep certain boundaries of acceptability to business will normally be met by disinvestment or capital flight beyond national boundaries. State managers cannot erode business confidence without undermining their own position. Block (1977, 1980) suggests that the ability of accumulation-dependence to censure state managers’ initiatives is lowered during economic crises and wars, giving them more leeway.7

This third solution is attractive but still has several problems. First, the dependency of the state on funds generated in the private economy can only
describe the outer limits of policy, and not its content. Second, it is unclear why state managers may not occasionally sabotage the state, either inadvertently or deliberately. Perhaps such “muddling through” would inevitably lead to a business backlash. Yet even in the face of an alienated business elite, state officials could attempt to retain power, guide investment and extract revenues by force. Third, this argument relies on the subjective perceptions of class actors and state managers, and inappropriately assumes that these will coincide with economic interests. As indicated by the psychological reference in the phrase “business confidence,” the intolerability of public policies is relative and subject to ideological construction (at least up to the threshold where the state appropriates all surplus). State policy will affect investment behavior only if businessmen see it as endangering their profits. Finally, the assertion that the state cannot become financially autonomous from society has been logically derived rather than empirically demonstrated. While the state’s separation from production has certainly been the historical norm in societies dominated by capitalist property relations, no reasons have been adduced for its necessity. At the current stage of theory and research, it seems reasonable to regard tax-dependency and exclusion from production not as universals but as structural constraints and pressures that state officials often face.

State-Centered Theories and the Thesis of State Autonomy

What is the state-centered approach? Basically, it is a cluster of several perspectives and emphases: a “Hintzian” view of the state as embodying the sui generis interests of state incumbents, interests which are often derived from the geopolitical system (i.e., state as actor); an “institutionalist” focus on the ways in which state capacities, structures and discourses shape the incidence and form of policy outputs (i.e., state as structural constraint); and finally what Skocpol (1985, p. 21) calls a “Toquevillian” concern with the ways in which states shape civil society.

State-centered theorists vary in terms of the vigor of their rejection of class and societal dynamics as determinants of state action. This section will distinguish two main elaborations of the state-centered perspective and examine their treatment of business-state relations.

The first variant is compatible with the argument that states tend to promote industrial capitalism, but the reasons given for that outcome differ from those suggested by neo-Marxists. It is argued that while officials pursue their own agendas, to do so they must rely on class forces in civil society. By slightly shifting the emphasis from societal constraints to the projects of state managers, this view underscores the artificiality of upholding a rigid distinction between state- and society-centered theory.

There are different ways of visualizing the state’s dependence on business. One has already been discussed under the rubric of neo-Marxism (again
accenting the fluidity of the boundaries between statist and class theories): state elites are driven to promote accumulation in order to pursue their own goals. Other theorists trace the need to promote capitalist industry specifically to the pressures of the international system of competing states. States’ intrinsic territoriality pushes rulers to defend or expand their states’ geographic boundaries (Mann 1988, p. 139). At a minimum, state officials must promote industry at levels adequate for national defense. There are divergent understandings of the effects of such interstate pressures. Charles Tilly (1987a) maintains that European absolutist war-makers were compelled to strike bargains with merchant capitalists in order to gain the credit necessary for fighting wars (p. 4). Another possibility is that state elites believed that only private industrial capital could provide the changing technical inputs needed to survive in international military competition. As warfare became more mechanized and weaponry more sophisticated, states were increasingly tied to industrial producers.

Although they have not been emphasized in the literature, at least two other forms of pressure may have led states to foster industrialization. Rulers’ desire for domestic stability, valued as an end in itself, may have wedged them to capital. For example, state managers might accommodate private industry because they fear the destabilizing consequences of unemployment. A final source of pressure derives from international competition for standing in the international states system. This striving for prestige is exemplified by governments’ enthusiastic participation in the universal expositions and industrial fairs of the nineteenth century.10

In sum, states may seek to attain domestic peace or the resources for war-making or international political competition by overseeing profitable private capital accumulation.11 The underlying logic here is usually understood as more “state-centered” than “society-centered.” The terminus a quo is “internal” to the state. But state elites are forced to accommodate actors in civil society to attain their goals. Like neo-Marxist theories, these “attenuated” statist views imply that policies will meet the interests of major sectors of business.

A second (“strong”) version of statist theory poses a greater challenge to class theories of politics (e.g. Skocpol 1979; Orloff and Skocpol 1984). This approach suggests that officials and bureaucrats not only elaborate policies independently of social interests and pressures, but that their autonomy from dominant classes is more than just relative: it is potentially complete. States in modern capitalist societies may reach a “tipping point” (Fred Block), at which they completely free themselves from the moorings and constraints of society and are able to act against the interests of the most powerful socioeconomic actors. This “unmooring” does not require war or depression, as Block would insist.

Class correspondence theories are not damaged by evidence of the autonomous elaboration of policies, but only by the “strong” version’s assertion
of policies that directly challenge dominant class interests. If it is to be more than a (welcome) refinement of other approaches, state-centered theory ultimately rests upon showing cases of class "noncorrespondence," meaning instances when state officials and policy-makers directly contravene the interests of the class that is economically dominant. It must show that the state can be "captured" by a declining class or be used to uniquely benefit the state managers, solidifying them into a Beamtenstand or a "new bureaucratic class."

The German Welfare State as a Test of State Autonomy

Assessments of state autonomy should focus on key policy areas and critical historical cases. The most "generous" test of state-centered theory would involve examining states with high administrative capacities and strong executive leaders, both of which are alleged to be conducive to state autonomy (Evans et al. 1985). However, much of the state-centered work has focused on Anglo-American and Latin American states, with their relatively weak bureaucracies, and the Scandinavian states, which have been thoroughly penetrated by social democratic labor parties traditionally dedicated to working-class interests. The Imperial German state would seem more likely to fit a statist scenario: it had a rationalized and well-trained "Weberian" bureaucracy and was led during its first 20 years by a powerful state-maker, Bismarck. Moreover, many of the strongest "state-centered" arguments have focused on the origins of the welfare state or specific social policies (e.g., Weir and Skocpol 1985; Skocpol and Ikenberry 1983; Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Orloff 1985; Weir, Orloff and Skocpol 1988). Yet the world's first welfare state, which emerged in Germany in the 1870s and 1880s, has not yet been the object of a self-consciously statist analysis.

The central goal of this paper is to explore the relations between social policy and social classes in what can be seen as the Germanic "home territory" of statist theory. The questions that guide the analysis are: (1) Is state policy related regularly to dominant class interests, or is the state able to act independently? (2) If dominant class interests are related to state policy in a regular way, how is such correspondence achieved?

To make sense of the state's relations to dominant class interests and actions, I will focus first on the contents of state policy, and secondly on the formal and organizational aspects of state interventions. More specifically, I will evaluate the match between welfare programs and the expressed wishes of different segments of the industrial bourgeoisie and the Junker class. I examine two different policies: poor relief and social insurance. And I explore social programs at both the local and national levels of the state.

Both poor relief and social insurance policies coincided with the interests of leading fractions of the business elite. This match came about through different mechanisms at the national and local levels. One can distinguish two
different ways in which business elites related to the state: directly at the local level, and indirectly at the national level. Before 1914, German businessmen typically were in command of the urban “local state.” In the municipal realm it is possible to discern a “pristine” model of society-centered politics, meaning, one rooted in direct connections between state power and bourgeois agents. Industry and commerce provided both the personal and the social base for the urban local state.

Nationally, key industrialists took a positive stance towards various welfare policies. Yet these interventions were not the major reason for “class correspondence.” Instead, state elites’ commitment to industrialization was prompted by a dual concern with social order and international competitiveness. This resulted in an overlap of interests with capitalists, obviating direct business interventions. Nonbourgeois Imperial German officials were compelled to promote capitalist industrialization, even while they pursued ultimate goals not fundamentally different from those of classical absolutist states. One result was that even aspects of state policy that were far removed from clashes of economic interest and direct capitalist intervention assumed a “bourgeois” form. The appropriate outcome from a class-correspondence perspective thus resulted from quasi-statist dynamics, and not from a complete subordination of state to society.

While this paper is primarily structured around discussions of state theory, it is also an appraisal of the dominant view of the Imperial state among German specialists. Here I am concerned with the thesis (outlined below) that Germany was somehow exceptional, backwards or premodern in comparison with its neighbors. The demonstration that welfare policy was essentially bourgeois is a partial refutation of the thesis of “German exceptionalism.” But it is also important to establish the degree to which German policies actually foreshadowed internationally predominant forms of welfare policy in twentieth-century Europe, rather than lagging behind or merely keeping pace with them. I argue that social policies at both the urban and national levels were in the avant garde in organizational terms—a quality of the programs hereafter referred to in shorthand as their modernity.16 This is not a judgment of the programs’ value, but rather of the degree to which they anticipated features of an ideal-typical “twentieth-century” model of social policy.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: the next part reviews the historical literature on Germany’s “peculiar” history, focusing on the central state and its relation to the dominant industrial elites. The third part looks at national policymaking around poor relief and related issues, arguing that these policies originated as components of a program of industrial growth. Despite persistent attacks by agrarians on German poor relief legislation, its industrialization-favoring profile was retained. Furthermore, a comparison with Britain and a look at the implementation of poor relief in German municipalities suggests that assistance was bourgeois and “modern” in formal terms. The fourth part
turns to the Imperial welfare state, arguing that industrialists participated in shaping social insurance and triumphed over explicit Junker interests. The Bismarckian welfare state, like German poor relief, was in crucial respects formally bourgeois and more advanced than the comparable policies of its allegedly more modern British neighbor. The conclusion proposes a tentative explanation for the isomorphism between state policy and bourgeois interests.

**STATE AND SOCIAL POLICY IN IMPERIAL GERMANY AND THE EXCEPTIONALISM THESIS**

Studies of the emergence of the world's first welfare state in Germany during the 1880s have been deeply conditioned by the thesis of German exceptionalism. Eley (1981, 1985, 1986) and Blackbourn (1985) have criticized this view of Geman development as having followed a unique, "exceptional" path—a *Sonderweg*—profoundly different from the other major capitalist countries. At the core of the exceptionalism thesis is a basic décalage between the economy, class and social structures, on the one hand, and political and cultural subsystems on the other. As expressed in a standard recent formulation, "the internal structure of the Kaiserreich was riven by a discrepancy between the political and social constitution" (Düsing 1972, p. 15). According to authors as diverse as Veblen, Gerschenkron, Dahrendorf and Barrington Moore Jr., the historical development of Prussia/Germany was deeply conditioned by the absence of a bourgeois revolution against the precapitalist elite, and by the prominent position of the landed nobility in both society and the state throughout the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century.

This image of the neo-feudal survivals in recent German history leads historians to invert a number of traditional Marxist views, and to recast as atavistic certain elements of German society that were seen as specifically modern by contemporaries. Thus, for example, it is argued that the German Social-Democratic labor movement did not provide other nations with a glimpse of their own future, but was instead an indication of the backwardness of the German polity. The highly crystalized class boundaries and class identities in Imperial Germany are understood as a signal of social backwardness, and not as an exemplification of the Marxist insistence on the efficacy of class structure. Prussia's efficient bureaucracy and military and Germany's early universal male suffrage (for elections to the *Reichstag* or Parliament) are again read as indicators of a profound historical retardation rather than as models of political modernization. A final area that has elicited less discussion concerns the precocious pre-1914 German welfare state. Unlike certain contemporaneous views, later scholars have typically not seen Bismarck's social policies as appropriate to a market-based economy and modern bourgeois society, but as expressions of a neo-feudal paternalism.
The German Kaiserreich is critical for evaluating the "exceptionalism" thesis, for this was the era in which industrial capitalism became economically dominant in Germany, articulated with a variety of "earlier" modes of production. Marxist theory expects the ascendance of industrial capitalism to be accompanied by a series of parallel changes in civil society and the state. But the distinguishing feature of German development is that the most important of the expected concomitant effects allegedly failed to materialize during the height of capitalist industrialization and upheaval.

Historiography and the German State: Junkerstaat or Autonomous State?

There are at least two major interpretations of the Imperial German state that challenge the view that business interests were at the heart of state policy. The first, exemplified by Hegel, Schmoller and Hintze accepts the traditional image of the Prussian bureaucracy as "a neutral force above the competing particular interests of party and class, embodying the universal interest of society as a whole, and endowed with a special political wisdom" (Beetham 1985, p. 63). This reading provides the closest fit with the strong state autonomy thesis. Yet it often conflates the issue of attempts by state officials to sail an antibusiness course from actual successes in doing so.  

The second and more common challenge to the economy-centered analysis is what I would call the "main" version of the exceptionalism thesis. Rather than arguing for state autonomy, it is claimed here that the state was beholden to Junker interests, which it favored against industry in a number of key policy areas (Bonham 1984, p. 210). Arguments about the privileging of the agrarians are made with regard to the tariff reforms of 1878/79 and 1902, the finance reform of 1908, the granting of special state subsidies and tax breaks to agrarians, the Stock Exchange Act of 1896 and the fights from 1894 through 1901 on the construction of the Mittellandkanal (a waterway linking the western and eastern parts of Prussia). The Mittellandkanal debate, in which the agrarians gained a series of key victories, "indicated how the administration was ultimately willing to side with the Junkers against heavy industry" (Segre 1980, p. 334)  

The literature on the Sammlung between agriculture and heavy industry (the "alliance of iron and rye") often suggests that conflicts of interest between agrarians and industrial capitalists were ultimately amenable to resolution through tradeoffs—or else that the two groups' common interest in "keeping the proletariat from gaining control of state power" (Kehr 1973, p. 276) was sufficient to harness them to one another. The locus classicus of this assessment of the possibility for compromise is the literature on the 1902 tariff reforms and the Navy Bills: industry is said to have granted the former in exchange for the latter (Stegmann 1970; Wehler 1985, p. 97; Barkin 1970, 1987; Kehr 1973, p. 276). There was a difference, however, in the relative capacities
of the two economic classes to abide by such compromises. Heavy industry could survive and even flourish behind the tariff walls, and was therefore ultimately predisposed to accept tariffs for the sake of anti-Socialist unity.\textsuperscript{23} Agrarians, however, were less able to compromise. The frequent emphasis on the iron-rye alliance notwithstanding, it is clear that in many policy areas a true alliance was impossible. Policies favoring industrialization appeared to threaten the very survival of the eastern agrarian system. Most strongly opposed were programs that loosened the bonds of rural labor or raised the attractiveness or plausibility of migration to the cities and factories. As one historian puts it:

To the extent that [the Junkers] were buying fertilizers and agricultural machines they had a vested interest that industry would develop somewhere: preferably not in Germany, however, since the factories would have allured [sic] labor into the cities and away from the eastern estates. ... The manufacturers were of course oriented in the opposite direction: as they envisaged the question, industrial growth should not be discouraged even if it was bound in the long run to undermine the economic and political strength of the landed entrepreneurs. The cherished hope of the latter, that Germany would be a static grain-exporting agricultural nation under their own control, was antithetical to that of the manufacturing class (Segre 1980, p. 332).

Segre (1980, pp. 332-333) voices the orthodoxy of a wide array of historical studies of the Empire when he writes: “the administration ... pursued the alliance of all the conservative forces even at the cost of hampering the country’s industrial growth ...” Although they were allied with heavy industry, the agrarians “had it their own way” when the two interests clashed. Otto Pflanze (1983, pp. 158, 192) argues that for Bismarck “the protection of agrarian interests [was] the highest duty of economic policy” and “the course he followed was agrarian or even anticapitalist”; Bismarck attacked one branch of industry after another during the 1870s and 1880s.\textsuperscript{24}

There are divergent views of how this correspondence came about. Different authors emphasize agrarian recruitment into the upper bureaucracy, or the Junker heritage of the major Prussian and Imperial officials such as Bismarck himself. Gillis (1968, p. 127) writes that by the 1870s “the civil service was ... firmly connected to agrarian interests.” According to Ullmann (1976), the Junkers’ ability to exercise “passive influence” over German officials was enhanced by values shared by the two groups. Other writers focus on the alleged purges of the bureaucracy during the 1880s which were tied to laws compelling bureaucrats to defend the official positions of the Kaiser and Chancellor.\textsuperscript{25} Powerful agrarian pressure groups, especially the more radical ones that arose in the 1890s, are often stressed. Whatever the mechanisms, this argument differs from those which portray the state elite as autonomous from civil society—although the two theses are often merged in specific analyses.\textsuperscript{26}
The assertion that agrarian interests routinely triumphed over industrial ones in pivotal policy areas, even though industrial capitalism was the dominant mode of production, flies in the face of even the most flexible “class correspondence” theories of the state. Versions of the “agrarian state” thesis, in which state officials pursue their own interests, are consonant with the state-centered approach. Another variety of the agrarian state thesis is society-centered, but in a way that contradicts both neo-Marxist and state-system theories. This is one in which the Junkers and agrarian interest groups capture the state.

Marxist Theory and the Critique of German Exceptionalism

The elements of the exceptionalism thesis that have elicited the most commentary until now are the underdeveloped democratization of political relations and the missing “embourgeoisement” (Verbürgerlichung) of values and norms in everyday life. More central to my purposes is the concomitant image of the German state. The critics of the Sonderweg thesis, however, have paid relatively little attention to business-state relations.

Geoff Eley’s writings attempt to reformulate the questions about state and society in Imperial Germany. With respect to political liberalism, his interrogation of the Sonderweg thesis has involved a quite persuasive critique of the notion that one can identify certain liberal-democratic ideas or institutions as having an essentially bourgeois character, providing a standard by which the German middle class can then be judged. Eley (1985, pp. 58, 75-90) argues that values and ideologies are not associated in an essential, one-to-one way with social classes and modes of production, echoing Laclau (1977; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) and other critics of orthodox theories of ideology. Contrary to both modernization theorists and Marxists like Poulantzas (1978), Eley insists that parliamentary structures, liberal ideas and democratic revolution should not be conflated, nor should they be seen as having an ontological affinity with either capitalism or the bourgeoisie.

How does Eley analyze the German state and its relation to business? Rejecting “instrumentalist” theories, he insists that the bourgeoisie need not occupy the key positions in the state in order to “dominate” society as a whole. Eley suggests that analysts should be less concerned with asking who participates, and focus more on cui bono questions, such as: how well did state policies and political practices meet the interests of business? He has rightly stressed that many of the aspects of German “civil society” that had been viewed as precapitalist relics, lags and holdovers were in fact beneficial to industrial capital. The paternalism and repressiveness of German business, for example, have typically been seen as somehow premodern, and hence irrational. Yet patriarchal factory policies and outright repression were not precapitalist;
instead, both represented a “specific form of capitalist rationality” (Eley 1986, p. 47). According to Eley (1985, p. 84), the nondemocratic political forms of Germany’s “revolution from above” may in fact have been “more closely linked to the realization of bourgeois interests than elsewhere”; in Britain and France this realization “was complicated by the unruly interventions of the subordinate classes.”

Eley’s point of departure puts him on more solid ground than those who would discover the nature of Imperial Germany by measuring the behavioral participation of businessmen in government or the degree of illiberalism or paternalism in society at large. Recalling Engels, Eley (1985, pp. 127-143) suggests that the Imperial state was a particular variant of Bonapartism. He insists that “it is by no means clear that the Kaisereich actually was a state dominated by the Junkers” (1986, p. 51). Yet his treatment of the state in Imperial Germany is less elaborated than the rest of his analysis. Both Eley and Blackbourn have been more concerned to demonstrate the rationality of bourgeois practices in “civil society” than to explore the relations between public policies and business interests.

Marxists have frequently argued that the nineteenth-century German state fulfilled “bourgeois” functions while excluding manufacturing capital from political power. As Marx wrote, “the days when the [German] Bourgeoisie wept in Babylonian captivity and drooped their diminished heads, were the very days when they became the effective power of the land” (Elster 1985, p. 418). Engels, ([1895] 1970a) as always somewhat more “Marxist” than Marx himself, argued that even during the early 1870s “the bourgeoisie was ... the economically most powerful class among the population; the state had to obey its economic interests” (p. 417). But, Engels continues, the bourgeoisie “was still far from actual political domination ... for the time being, the executive depended on it, at best, in a very indirect form” (p. 418).

Two of the leading post-war Marxist state theorists, Nicos Poulantzas and Perry Anderson, have offered quite different readings of the Imperial German state. Poulantzas’ (1978) interpretation in Political Power and Social Classes at times seems to reproduce the exceptionalism thesis, using an alternative vocabulary. He suggests that the Bismarckian period was characterized by “feudal” state structures that were “dislocated relative to the economic level” (p. 82), and that “the state remained partially feudal up to 1914” (p. 181). Poulantzas makes the familiar claim that the German bourgeoisie, traumatized first by the French revolution and later by the working class movement, did not break decisively with the nobility and “left to the state the task of establishing its own political domination” (p. 180). He continues, however, that “under Bismarck, this state transformed itself from within, as it were, in the direction of a capitalist state” (p. 180). By the end of the “Bismarckian régime” at latest, the bourgeoisie was hegemonic (i.e., dominant in political and ideological relations) while the nobility remained the governing class, in charge
of the state (pp. 249, 338). The implication is that while the state secured the interests of capital, its form was dislocated with respect to (capitalist) social relations.

This differs markedly from Anderson's admittedly more cursory assessment of the Kaiserrreich. Anderson (1974) argues that the class base of the Imperial state consisted of the "two possessing classes," Junkers and capitalists (p. 276), but that the "fundamental structure of the new state was unmistakably capitalist" (p. 276).

The German state was now a capitalist apparatus, over-determined by its feudal ancestry, but fundamentally homologous with a social formation which by the early twentieth century was massively dominated by the capitalist mode of production (Anderson 1974, p. 278).

While for Poulantzas, the Imperial state was precapitalist in its structure but capitalist in its social base, Anderson nearly reverses the terms: he posits a capitalist state structure and a (partially) precapitalist social base.

For Poulantzas (1978, p. 47) the state is "relatively autonomous" from the dominant class, not preoccupied solely with it. The state should be "the official résumé of society," representing in condensed form a variety of social forces and overlapping modes of production that make up a social formation. And yet a state that regularly favored economically nondominant interests (e.g., agrarian ones, in the Imperial German case) against dominant (industrial) ones would seem to provide damaging evidence even against neo-Marxist state theories as flexible as his own.31

The key issue here is that the autonomy of a state that steadily contravenes the interests of the economically dominant class is clearly more than just "relative." The first problem is thus to specify policies that could be taken as indicating a normal (or abnormal) course of state development. To do so we must first analyze the class structure, which will allow us to identify the class whose interests should be paramount.

One can think of Imperial Germany as a "social formation" characterized by a complex "articulation of modes of production."32 The most significant modes were (1) the latifundia-type model of the great agrarian estates, capitalist agriculture with wage labor;33 (2) small subsistence peasants (a mode articulated in the east with the estates through the provision of cheap labor; (3) the petty-commodity mode (consisting of artisans, homeworkers, and the commercial farming most common in the southwest); and (4) industrial capitalism. The last was itself integrated with the agrarian modes, which provided it with labor power, material inputs and internal markets.

In Germany, the industrial capitalist mode became economically dominant in the social formation during the 1880s and 1890s at latest (Bade 1983, p. 121). Even before that time—by the 1860s and 1870s—industrial capitalism was the most dynamic, if not the largest, sector of the economy (Hoffman 1965).
Table 1. National Product and Labor Force in the Agrarian and Industrial Sectors (German Reich) (in percent)

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<th>Five-year average</th>
<th>Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing</th>
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<td>National Product</td>
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<td>1850-1854</td>
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<tr>
<td>1900-1904</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-1909</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * These figures refer to the average of years 1849, 1852, 1855 and 1858.

This transformation is indicated in Table 1, which shows the occupational structure and the national income produced in the agrarian and industrial sectors between 1880 and 1913. By the 1880s, the German class structure was perhaps even more dominated by "capitalist" social relations than France or the United States (see Steinmetz and Wright 1989, Table 3). Yet agriculture is still a non-negligible factor: fully 26 percent of Germany’s net national product derived from agrarian sources in the 1900-1913 period. Again, it should also be kept in mind that much of agrarian production was itself structured along capitalist lines. This was true even in the East, as Weber discovered in his studies of East-Elbian agriculture during the 1890s.34

A neo-Marxist theory clearly need not assert that all state structures, policies or regimes correspond to dominant class interests. A Marxist theory would expect, however, that any state that pursued policies unacceptable to the bourgeoisie for any length of time would be confronted with economic crisis, capital flight and the emergence of powerful antistate political forces. It is difficult to specify a priori exactly how long regimes, structures, or policies which are unpalatable to the economic elite can last without invalidating the theory. The nearly half-century life-span of the Kaisercab, however, would certainly seem to be of adequate duration. Furthermore, to the extent that such "limits" are based in perceptions and intentional practices, long-term political dysfunctionalism would be especially unlikely in a situation like Imperial Germany. Even the heavy industrialists who supported Bismarck complained about the Junkers’ overweening claims for social power, and businessmen frequently criticized the state’s perilously "agrarian" proclivities.
INDUSTRIAL AND AGRARIAN INTERESTS IN POOR RELIEF POLICY

In this section it will be argued that a series of key legislative decisions around poor relief and related issues favored industry rather than agriculture, benefited capitalists rather than Junkers, and promoted capitalism as a mode of production rather than the quasi-feudal form of agrarian social and property relations typified by the East-Elbian estate. Furthermore, this intrinsically capitalist form of relief persisted throughout the second Reich, despite a few small concessions to the agrarians. It continued despite rhetorical allegiance by key officials and intellectuals to the Agrarstaat (agrarian state) and it survived the upsurge of agrarian interest group politics in the 1890s. Social policy in Imperial Germany did not favor preindustrial economic interests in a manner which would contradict a class-correspondence interpretation of the Imperial state. Poor relief tended to be aligned with the long-term interests of the dominant industrial classes and class fractions.35

The National Poor Law and State-led Industrialization: 1870-1914

No study of the welfare state during the second Reich can afford to ignore poor relief—although most have.36 The first justification for emphasizing public assistance is that more money was spent on it than on national social insurance. In 1885, the year of the first reliable national survey, expenditures on poor relief were almost twice as high as social insurance benefits.37 In 1912, after the Bismarckian system had been operating for almost three decades, poor relief spending still seems to have outstripped social insurance costs. One writer roughly estimated the costs of what he called “indirect unemployment relief” through public assistance as “at least one billion marks annually” (Ostwald 1912, p. 14); spending for the three major social insurance schemes (health, workmen’s compensation and pensions) totaled less than that in the same year (Hohorst et al. 1978, pp. 154-156).38

While more people were probably directly enrolled in social insurance funds than were assisted by poor relief, the latter provided enormous opportunities for public authorities to intervene in poor people’s lives. The number of voluntary and professional social workers deploying “social knowledge” vis-à-vis workers was greater in poor relief than in social insurance. The labor movement was less able to influence the logic of its operation, while it had some impact on the implementation of national social programs (especially sickness insurance; cf. Tennstedt 1976, 1983b). Most importantly, poor relief and other local and state noninsurance programs played a crucial role in the creation and reproduction of a mobile, national-scale labor force.

The frontal clash between agrarian and industrial interests was also more direct and drawn out around poor relief and related issues than around other
forms of social policy. As the Junkers saw it, the national poor relief system favored the western and urban industrial parts of the Reich over the rural East and other agrarian regions that were losing population. Throughout the Kaiserrreich, agrarians tried to change the relief system through pressure on the Chancellor, the Reichstag and the Prussian Diet, while industrialists opposed such changes. In the end, industrial interests prevailed.

What were the laws governing poor relief, and why did they find such different degrees of support? Both of the key national-level laws originated during the period of national unification. The Law on Freedom of Movement (Gesetz über die Freizügigkeit) was passed on Nov. 1, 1867; and the Law of Settlement or "Relief Residence" Law (Gesetz über den Unterstützungswohnsitz) on June 6, 1870. Both actually involved extensions of previously existing laws to other states in the Empire. Both were passed during the years of National-Liberal dominance in the North German Reichstag and reflected the economically-liberal atmosphere of the years before the 1873 recession.

These laws were probably the most critical contributions by the state to the creation of a capitalist labor market since the Bauernbefreiung (emancipation of the serfs) in the early nineteenth century, and had long been demanded by industry (Engels [1895-96] 1970a, p. 379). They made it both legal and financially feasible for rural workers to leave the east and migrate to sites of labor demand. In essence, the new Poor Law was an undeclared form of unemployment relief. It was now more or less guaranteed that all needy German citizens—including the able-bodied—would receive relief at a certain level (unspecified in the laws, and left to the discretion of local authorities).

The Freedom of Movement Law stipulated that "every citizen has the right to ... stop or settle anywhere within the national territory where he has lodging or is able to obtain a place to stay. ..." (Gesetz über die Freizügigkeit §1). Local authorities were prohibited from evicting a newly arrived person "unless it can be proven that he does not possess the necessary powers to support himself and his dependents," and were admonished that "fears of future impoverishment do not authorize local officials to reject such a person" (Gesetz über die Freizügigkeit §4; emphasis added).

In the agrarians’ view, the 1870 Poor Law installed a system that was disproportionately financed by the rural areas that were losing population. The Law regulated the acquisition and loss of the so-called "relief residence," or Unterstützungswohnsitz, which determined which Poor Law board was to bear the financial responsibility for relief. These regulations became the primary focus of agrarian discontent. The "relief residence" of an adult (defined as anyone at least 24 years old) was transferred to the town in which he or she had lived uninterruptedly for two years without drawing relief. Two new administrative and fiscal units were created (or rather, extended over the entire Empire): the local Poor Law board (Ortsarmenverband), which was usually
coterminous with and financed by a single municipality, and the regional Poor Law board (Landarmenverband). According to paragraph 28 of the Poor Law, all local boards were legally bound to provide an “adequate level” of relief to anyone who became needy while present in the community, regardless of the place of permanent residence. Implementing statutes in most of the federal states specified that a pauper was to be granted shelter, the basic necessities for living (Lebensunterhalt), medical care in case of illness, and an appropriate burial in case of death (Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt 1887, pp. 5*-6*). Municipalities bore the relief bills of resident paupers, while the costs for aiding a non-resident could be demanded and reimbursed from the city where the outsider had “relief residence.” The regional Poor Law board covered the costs of paupers for whom no relief residence could be determined.

The significance of this legislation for the Junkers derived from their status as major local taxpayers in the eastern agrarian regions. The Junkers saw themselves as underwriting the creation of a new industrial labor force, by paying a disproportionate part of the costs of mass labor migration to the west. In principle, Junker estates and rural communities would retain their responsibility for the relief bills of former residents whom they had not seen for years—until those people lost their original Unterstüzungswohnsitz. Indeed, during the first two decades of the Law, rural communities paid several million marks to subsidize what Claus Offe (1984b) calls “active proletarianization.”43 As a commission of the quasi-official agrarian organization, Deutscher Landwirtschaftsrat [German Farmers Council] reported in 1876 (Deutscher Landwirtschaftsrat 1880):

rural workers go the cities and the industrial areas when they are 17 or 18—the girls at an even younger age .... The great burden for the countryside is that the home town must bear the costs of everything that happens to this frivolous lot until it reaches the age of 24, and still for 2 more years in the place where its labor power is exploited (p. 446).

The East-Prussian Agrarian Central Association (Landwirtschaftlicher Centralverein) complained in a petition to the Reichstag (1880, p. 944):

there is continuous emigration of young male and female workers from the countryside to the big cities, and from the agricultural East to the industrial West. ... While the countryside bears the costs of these workers’ physical and spiritual education, and suffers an unremitting loss of potential labor (Arbeitsskapital) through their exodus, they are a gift to the large cities and industrial regions, in the form of trained labor power .... They often begin their migration to these areas when they are only 16 or 17, yet the home Poor Law board ... retains responsibility for their fates until they reach the age of 26.

The financial drain was traced to the simple fact that rural districts were “producing more people than they were consuming,” as the Conservative MP Wernigerode put it in a parliamentary debate: he estimated the average costs to a locality of an individual’s primary education at 3000 marks (Reichstag 1881, p. 1300).
The agrarians also complained that the 1867 and 1870 laws exacerbated the westward emigration of rural labor, intensifying the notorious Leutenot or labor shortage. The eastern agrarian provinces suffered the highest population losses through overseas migration, and were deprived of inexpensive Polish labor replacements through harsh immigration restrictions during the 1880s (Deutscher Landwirtschaftsrat 1883, pp. 485-486; Bade 1983).

In Prussia (indeed, throughout Eastern Europe), the primary objective of the landlord class had long been “to arrest the mobility of the villager and to bind him to the estates” (Anderson 1974, p. 207). This political-economic goal was ideologically articulated with more sweeping warnings against the destructive cultural consequences of Landflucht (rural flight), “emigration fever,” urbanization and industrialization (Langewiesche 1977). In 1880 the future Prussian Minister of Agriculture and leader of the right wing of the agrarian German Conservative Party, von Hammerstein, expressed a common Junker complaint when he decried the Poor Law’s contribution to “homelessness” (Heimatlosigkeit), a menace that bore “great moral dangers” and clashed with the “German essence” (Deutscher Landwirtschaftsrat 1880, p. 444).

Soon after the founding of the Reich, eastern agrarians began pressuring the state to change the Poor Law and restrict workers’ freedom of movement (Barkin 1970, p. 28). One of the main goals of the Junker-dominated Vereinigung der Steuer- und Wirtschaftsreformer (Association of Tax- and Economic Reformers) at its first meeting in 1876 was to obtain reductions in rural laborers’ freedom of movement, along with changes in the Poor Law (Fricke et al. 1986, Vol. 4, p. 360). Its more powerful successor organization, the Bund der Landwirte, also called for revisions of the Freedom of Movement Law at its first meeting in 1893 (Fricke et al. 1983, Vol. 1, p. 224). Despite these agrarian pressures, however, no major changes were made.

In the 1891-1892 legislature, the Conservatives offered a bill that would have limited the freedom of movement of those under 21 years old; after 1894 the government was somewhat responsive to such measures.

The financial drain introduced by the reimbursement system sharpened the eastern agrarians’ opposition to the Poor Law. Gradually, they came to accept the basic notion of the relief residence system: since it was unlikely that workers could be prevented from migrating westwards, this system meant that the home towns would at least not be supporting them forever. In fact, they were interested in making it easier for migrants to obtain a new residence or to lose their old one. After a lull in agitation against the laws during the 1870s, a petition to the Reichstag from the East-Prussian Landwirtschaftlicher Centralverein in 1880 called for changes in the Poor Law. This inaugurated a steady stream of petitions and bills from the conservative parties, rural county representatives (Kreisvertretungen), the Deutscher Landwirtschaftsrat, and later the Bund der Landwirte.
The system favored by the Junkers and the Conservative Party was also Bismarck's ideal. Bismarck believed in 1877 that the best arrangement was one in which the full costs of a pauper's relief would simply be borne by the town in which he or she became needy. He also suggested making the town in which the pauper worked, rather than his or her place of residence, liable for the costs of sick relief. Finally, Bismarck stressed the need for a "workfare" regulation linking benefits to willingness to work.\textsuperscript{49} In 1881 Bismarck suggested that the regional Poor Law Boards should assume the cost of all but the able-bodied poor, whose relief would continue to be covered by the local Relief Boards.\textsuperscript{50} This idea was aired simultaneously with his attempts to implement a national social insurance system largely financed by public funds, through indirect taxes.

Bismarck was unable to gain the Reichstag's support for any of these recommendations while he was Chancellor.\textsuperscript{51} But during and after his tenure, eastern agrarian groups continued to press for a variety of changes that they hoped would lower their fiscal burden.\textsuperscript{52} They tried to transfer most of the responsibility for assistance costs to the town in which the pauper had been working. The rationale was that industry, which had profited from the pauper's labor, should also bear the burden of his or her care—through municipal taxes.\textsuperscript{53}

The Junkers were unable to alter the basic contours of the combined system of free migration and public support for the poor. They were somewhat successful in relieving their financial burden through two revisions of the 1870 law. A change in 1894 lowered the age at which relief residence could be gained or lost from 24 to 18, and transferred part of the costs to the town in which the pauper had been working.\textsuperscript{54} But the age change probably had little effect, since most of the reimbursements paid by rural Poor Law Boards were for paupers over 24 anyway, and many migrants were younger than 18 (ZstA 1, Rep. 15.01, Nr. 1274, pp. 97ff.).

In any case, Junker agitation against the Poor Law did not halt with the 1894 revision, but actually intensified along with the rise of agrarian interest group politics. However, little changed under the next two Chancellors (1894 through 1908), for reasons similar to those which had prevented major revisions during the Bismarck era. The government feared further alienating industry with changes in the Relief Residence Law, especially in light of the battles over the 1902 tariff (cf. Barkin 1970; Bonham 1985). At a 1900 meeting of the Prussian \textit{Staatssministerium}, Minister of the Interior Posadowsky (then chiefly responsible for social policy) opined that changing the Relief Residence Law was not a timely idea, because "industry would see it as directed against its interests." There was already a danger of an industrial backlash due to the new higher tariffs. According to Posadowsky, it would be especially unfortunate to introduce the bill at that moment because the discussion in the Diet had made the "tactical mistake" of tying Poor Law reforms to limits on freedom of movement (\textit{Freizügigkeit})—a change that industry opposed even
more strongly. Even the “agrarian” Prussian Finance Minister Miquel agreed that it would be better to delay introduction of a bill, given that industry was becoming “difficult” (misslich) due to the “clumsy operations of the Bund der Landwirte.” This top-level discussion suggests that the commitments of top-level officials were the proximate mechanism by which industrial interests were translated into state policy. Why officials had these commitments is a separate matter, to which I will return in the conclusion.

A second modest reform in 1908 lowered the age and the number of years for gaining and losing an Unterstützungswohnssitz to 16 years and 1 year, respectively. But until 1924, the overall contours of the system remained in place, including the seemingly inequitable subsidization of the costs of relieving the unemployment and poverty of rural migrants by the areas they had left.

Moreover, these limited pro-agrarian changes in the Poor Law were offset by the overall development of the national relief system. A network of “itinerant unemployed stations” (Naturalverpflegungsstationen and Wanderarbeitsstätten) had been set up throughout Germany during the 1880s. These were relief stations typically spaced at approximately a day’s walk apart. Unemployed laborers could obtain food and shelter, usually in exchange for several hours of work, and then continue along the road. The stations were often coupled with a labor exchange or job office. This network was meant to provide further inducements to migration towards areas of labor demand. The number of these stations declined from 1,957 in 1890 to 1,285 in 1896 (Blätter f. d. Armenwesen 1896, p. 89), but by 1901 the Prussian government decided to increase by 10 million marks state subsidies to the provincial authorities for the construction of more stations (Blätter f. d. Armenwesen 1902, Nr. 21). Together with the creation of local “labor exchanges,” urban emergency public works, public housing, and other municipal social programs (Faust 1981a, 1981b, 1982, 1986), these institutions did nothing to halt the exodus of rural labor.

The Form of Relief

One possible objection is that regardless of the economic interests that were directly promoted by poor relief (and later, by the itinerant unemployed stations and other local relief programs), the form of these policies, or the manner in which they were implemented by local elites, was eminently traditional. In the chain of connotations that has become common sense to students of German history, traditional = neofeudal = Junker.

An appropriate response to this critique would involve demonstrating that the form of poor relief was also generally “bourgeois.” This requires that we reject the collapsing of the terms “modern” and “bourgeois” and insist that they refer to separate and irreducible dimensions. The ideal-typical distinction between public assistance as “traditional” and social insurance as “modern”
does not speak directly to the issue of the policies' “class” character. Rimlinger (1971), T.H. Marshall (1970, 1977), and others assume that the welfare state is situated at a developmentally “higher” state than poor relief, an assessment that is basically normative, referring to an implicit scale of rights (e.g., “social citizenship”) and not to an analytical differentiation among forms.\(^5\)

Marshall's dimension can be contrasted with one that makes analytical distinctions among the class logics of different policy forms. Specifically, one can attempt to distinguish bourgeois and less bourgeois forms of the welfare state. In doing so one faces the complication that social insurance always represents at least a partial infringement on the purity of capitalist property relations, as recognized by both Marshall and neo-Marxist authors such as Esping-Andersen. Employers' ability to use labor markets as a disciplinary "whip" declines where workers have a right to unemployment relief, sick pay, and so forth. In an ideal "capitalist world" there would be no social policy above the basic minimum required to produce and reproduce labor power. Most aspects of the welfare state thus result at least partially from motives and forces which are not "purely bourgeois," but instead are humanitarian, social-democratic or legitimatory.

Yet, even where the impulse to engage in social reform is unavoidable, elites face choices among various alternative forms of differential attractiveness. There are three criteria according to which policies can be considered more or less adapted to the basic structures of capitalist societies. First is the dimension of commodification/decommodification: policies that encourage actors' orientation to market mechanisms can be seen as inherently more bourgeois than policies that bypass or obviate markets (Offe and Ronge, 1984; Esping-Andersen 1985a, 1985b).\(^5\) It is argued that a more developed or "pure" form of social citizenship in the welfare state generally corresponds to a less commodified, and hence less bourgeois form of social policy (Marshall 1977, p. 121; see also Turner 1986). Although such policies may be rendered compatible with capitalism, they are less "bourgeois" when measured against an abstract model of capitalist relations. It follows that supposedly "traditional" poor relief systems may in fact be more bourgeois than social insurance schemes.

Foucault's (1979) discussions of the inculcation of self-regulating forms of subjectivity during the transition to modernity direct us to a second, separate dimension of social policy.\(^5\) In the abstract, programs that require recipients to take responsibility for their own relief also lead them to "internalize the state," so to speak, thus fortifying bourgeois society.\(^6\)

Finally, programs can be evaluated as more or less bourgeois in relation to fields of class formation and conflict. Political interventions may inhibit the threats to propertied groups that are posed by working-class movements.\(^5\) From a bourgeois standpoint, policies are useful if they reinforce distinctions between subordinate individuals who might otherwise converge as a social
group, but who form only an incipient or “theoretical” group, a “class on paper.” Bourdieu’s notion of “classification struggles” provides a metaphor for thinking about the effects of social policies on class formation (or “class-making”; cf. Bourdieu 1987, p. 8, 1984). Seen from this perspective, the state’s multiplication of distinctions among subordinate groups through differentiated welfare policies can be considered “bourgeois.”

To summarize, “bourgeois” dimensions of welfare policy include commodification; the creation of self-monitoring subjects; and reclassification through accentuation of differences among the dependent poor. If these “class” characteristics of policies were defined in an essentialist manner, the criticisms leveled against the equation of democracy with the bourgeoisie would apply here with equal force. One major difference is that I am not aligning classes with ideologies, values and world views, but instead with *interests*. Even these arguments are not about necessary relations, but instead concern strong affinities between policies and class interests in a given historical conjuncture.

The following questions are then central for the analysis below: (1) to what extent did the impetus for social reform come from business? (2) Once such an impetus existed, to what extent did its specific form correspond to either the conscious interests of the bourgeoisie, or to an abstractly-derived “bourgeois” type?

The Elberfeld System: Implementation of Poor Relief at the Local Level

The actual implementation of German poor relief took place at the local level, especially the municipalities; state and national legislation specified only the broad contours of assistance. In the towns, relief took the form of the “Elberfeld system,” which was decidedly “bourgeois” according to the criteria outlined above: it stressed individual responsibility, self-monitoring and swift reintegration of the poor into labor markets. The structure of local poor relief (and local social policy more generally) illustrates an alternative, more direct relation between businessmen and the state.

The so-called Elberfeld system of poor relief was named after the city where it was first codified, although other cities were using similar systems. Most large German municipalities had adopted the system by 1914. The central tenets of the Elberfeld system, according to the slogans of its proponents, were the *decentralization* and *individualization* of relief (Tennstedt 1981, p. 77). Traditionally, each decision to honor or reject an individual’s request for aid had been made at meetings of the entire staff of poor relief officials. Once aid had been granted, however, there was comparatively little effort to monitor or reform the recipients. “Individualization” signified a vast increase in the density of the network of poor relief guardians in the field, and thus in the intensity of “individualized” treatment and surveillance; “decentralization”
referred to the devolution of decision-making authority into the hands of the guardians, who could best judge their clients’ needs. The Elberfeld system was the cornerstone of an overall strategy of increased discipline of the poor, intended to force an orientation toward the labor market and to combat welfare dependency.

Other dimensions of poor relief that were “bourgeois” in character included the increased use of cash relief rather than in-kind aid, and the greater reliance on short-term rather than ongoing grants of assistance. In 1913 a Bremen municipal official justified the commodification of relief in an altogether typical manner, writing that “it is preferred nowadays to provide the pauper with cash ... in order to help him to learn to employ it more economically and to thereby exercise a pedagogical influence on him” (Funk 1913, p. 116; emphasis added). A new set of poor relief regulations (Armenordnung) introduced in Hamburg in 1903 replaced an older guideline that 25 percent of aid should be provided as “soup coupons” with the stipulation that cash relief should be the rule, “so that the pauper remains economically independent and is able to satisfy his needs, which he himself knows best” (Buehl 1903, p. 272). The new 1901 Armenordnung in Kassel also called for more reliance on cash and stressed the “pedagogic moment, that the pauper should retain his independence and the feeling of his own responsibility.” Although Berlin was not particularly modern in terms of unemployment policy it used virtually no in-kind relief: in 1911, 86 percent of its outdoor relief was provided in cash (van Grieken 1927, p. 23).

The stress on reforming behavior and encouraging self-monitoring, through techniques like requiring the poor to keep budgets of their expenditures, corresponds to the Foucauldian image of the creation of the bourgeois (modern) subject. Besides bringing the lives of the poor in line with the core principles of the capitalist market economy, the goal of reliance on cash relief was to instill a more general sense of self-discipline.

The growing reliance upon what was called temporary (as opposed to ongoing) relief awards was also geared towards encouraging self-reliance and “recommodifying” impoverished workers. Short-term grants of aid were used as a form of relief for the conjuncturally unemployed. The director of one Berlin Public Assistance District noted already in 1878 that during the period of seasonal unemployment nearly a fifth of all relief in his district was provided in small grants, while another in 1880 complained that the guardians tended to give higher monthly awards to people who received short-term aid than to the “truly miserable and needy ... relief recipient.” By 1901, nearly as much was spent for short-term as for ongoing relief in some Berlin districts. The economically-useful, able-bodied, jobless workers seem to have generally received more generous relief. This market principle of selection would have been foreign to public poor relief of the eighteenth century.
“Bourgeois” reform efforts were especially visible at the municipal level, particularly in southern Germany (White 1976, p. 100). It is not difficult to explain why local policies such as poor relief were attuned to bourgeois interests. This convergence was overdetermined by a variety of powerful tools at the disposal of local middle classes. The most important of these was the “plutocratic” electoral franchise operative in some form in the majority of German cities, which usually weighted individuals’ votes according to their income, and frequently required them to pay a fee. This system excluded many workers from voting altogether (Hirsch and Lindemann 1905). The most grotesque results of this system were revealed in cities like Essen and Elbing, where during certain years one individual—the highest taxpayer—elected 33 percent of the city councillors with his single vote. Businessmen often had other political privileges. In Ludwigshafen, the firms paying the highest taxes had a full voice in votes on the city budget, equivalent to that of a city councillor (Breunig 1976, pp. 402-403). Local government was the only part of the state in which the bourgeoisie was able to rule directly—or nearly so, through the mediation of progressive Liberal or National Liberal parties (Sheehan 1971). It should therefore be unsurprising, except in light of assertions about the “feudalization” of the middle classes, that German urban social politics resembled or even foreshadowed those in Britain and France.

If it is difficult to determine how “bourgeois” a given policy is, it is even harder to assess the degree to which it approximates an ideal-typical model of twentieth-century welfare (or what we are calling its “modernity”). Yet it is important to grapple with this issue, given the alleged traditionalism of German policy. An acceptable alternative to essentialist definitions of “modernity” is strictly historicist: to ask whether given policies provided other states with a glimpse of their own future.

To address this issue, there is no better starting point for comparison than Germany’s supposedly more modern English rival. Reversing the familiar contrast, however, the central dimensions of the evolving poor relief system in the Kaiserrreich appear to have been more “modern” than their English counterparts. As T.H. Marshall (1970, p. 34) wrote, “Nowhere else [but in England] could you find quite the same combination of harsh deterrent principles, centralized policy control, and administration by an isolated authority. …” Paupers in England were a broad, undifferentiated category, unified only in negative terms. As Simmel noted in 1906, the English system “completely neglect[ed] the criterion of personal worthiness” and relied instead on the workhouse test, at least in principle (p. 18). In Germany, by contrast, poor relief was directed “at the individual and his condition” (Simmel 1906, p. 6). German relief officials enthusiastically multiplied the differences among categories of paupers. The German guardians’ thorough, individualized assessments and their penetration into the private dwellings of the poor signaled a much higher level of (local) state “infrastructural” power.
A final indicator of the “modernity” of the German assistance system is its popularity among reforming and business circles in Britain. During the nineteenth century, British businessmen and Poor Law officials favored the Elberfeld system (Reulecke 1986; Rose 1981, pp. 66-67; Hay 1981, p. 115). The head of the Berlin Poor Relief Board, Emil Münsterberg, was called upon to testify before hearings on the reform of the Poor Law in 1908 (Great Britain 1910). Although the workhouse had been designed as a deterrent, many reformers had come to see it as encouraging long-term dependency. The English Poor Law also lacked the elements of behavior reform and state penetration that figured prominently in the German system.

THE NATIONAL WELFARE STATE AND INDUSTRIAL INTERESTS

The preceding section showed that the regulations, legislation and local-level implementation of poor relief in the German Kaisereich were oriented towards industrial rather than agrarian interests, and that they were formally “bourgeois” in terms of commodification, individualization and self-discipline. This section explores the other major system of social policy in Imperial Germany: the national welfare state, which originated in a series of social insurance laws during the 1880s. Because more has been written on national social insurance than on local social policy or poor relief, this section is briefer and more heavily based on secondary sources than the previous one.

Recent writings on the Imperial welfare state by sociologists and historians have created a greater diversity of opinion than one finds in most other areas of scholarship on this period. This reflects the fillip given to research on the welfare state by a combination of international trends (conservative critiques of the welfare state and new academic models) and specific German factors—including the hundredth anniversary of the 1881 “Kaiser’s Message” announcing the inauguration of the welfare state (Tennstedt 1981a). Yet it is still possible to identify as a dominant thread in this work the claim that the welfare state in Imperial Germany was somehow prebourgeois. The Junkers are typically seen as the dominant component in the welfare state’s “social base,” while the bourgeois played its familiar secondary role. In the case of the welfare state, the polymorphous “exceptionalism” thesis is more concerned with the form of social policy than with its contents. Emphasis is alternately placed on the Bismarckian welfare state’s paternalism, its manipulative motives, or its “corporate” features. Bismarck pursued a variety of political motives through state social insurance: bypassing the Reichstag, splitting the Liberals and binding workers directly to the state. The split between Left and Right Liberals was indeed partially provoked by disagreements over Bismarck’s plans. Bismarck dreamed of replacing the Reichstag with a parallel but nonelected set of corporate institutions, including the administrative bodies for
social insurance (Paur 1981). Workers were to be tethered to the state through public pensions, as Napoleon III—closely observed by Bismarck—had attempted in the French Second Empire. Certainly these factors were not negligible. Because they figure centrally in most research on the welfare reforms they will not be explored here. Instead, I am interested in the relations between bourgeois agency, business interests and the welfare state, and in the question of the welfare state’s “modernity” (a criterion which here again is defined in historicist, not essentialist terms). With respect to these questions, recent German work strongly disagrees with the reigning views of the German welfare state as precapitalist and premodern. The criteria for “bourgeois” forms of social insurance are the same as those used to evaluate poor relief. Our ideal-typical model of a twentieth-century welfare state should express in nuce the modal features of national social policy in the twentieth century. These are administrative characteristics that do not seem to be strongly linked to the interests of any single class.

It has often been recognized that the Bismarckian social insurance laws of the 1880s were international models. Yet some reinterpretations of the Empire’s originality in this regard actually amplify its negatively-coded exceptionalism. Bismarck’s reforms look advanced only within a “premodern” political universe of nondemocratic regimes, neatly sealed off from the post-1914 period. Insisting that the precocious Bismarckian welfare state was primus inter pares only within an international community of conservative semimonarchies defuses its potentially damaging implications for the exceptionalism thesis.77

Establishing a model gives us a nonarbitrary criterion to assess the claim that the Imperial German welfare state was “backwards.” The features of a mid-twentieth century “modern” welfare state would include the following:

1. Compulsion (i.e., compulsory participation, and often compulsory contributions by employers)78
2. Benefits whose levels are income-related or -graded, and tend toward wage-replacement levels;
3. Administrative centralization and unification;
4. Universal (albeit differentiated) coverage;
5. Eligibility for benefits based on entitlement, not means-tests;
6. Macro-economic demand management, generalization of mass consumption norms and the coordination of capital and consumer goods through social policies.

Industry, Agrarians, and the Creation of the German Welfare State

Much of the research on Bismarck’s social insurance laws of the 1880s has been concerned with explaining the precocity of Germany’s welfare state. Yet until recently little attention was paid to the stance of the dominant social
classes and groups vis-à-vis social insurance. Did the overall course of social policy development (including the period after Bismarck’s fall in 1890) favor industry? Which sectors? Did industry support these laws? Social insurance was another major area of national policy where agrarians clashed with industrialists. The Junkers argued that the privileges granted to workers by the Bismarckian social programs made industrial life more attractive than the lot of the rural laborer. Moreover, the agrarian interest organizations were excluded from the critical initial process of policymaking. Against the energetic protests of the German Farmers Council, the original accident and sickness insurance laws excluded agricultural workers; and only in 1914 were rural laborers finally included in the sickness law (Deutscher Landwirtschaftsrat 1883, pp. 54ff.; Ritter 1985, p. 46).

Industrialists, however, not only favored the original welfare reforms of the 1880s but also played a decisive role in their introduction (Machtan 1985; Baron 1979; Ullmann 1979; White 1976, p. 99). Some of the earliest plans for compulsory social insurance for accidents were proposed by industry, and the government discussions preceding the 1884 bill were largely based on a memorandum written by the Bochum industrialist Louis Baare (Vogel 1951, p. 98). The Saarland industrialist and Reichstag deputy Stumm agitated effectively for national pension and disability insurance (Vogel 1951, pp. 39-44; Rothfels 1938, p. 298). Imperial Germany’s paramount association of heavy industries, the Centralverband Deutscher Industrieller (CDI), strongly supported the sickness, accident and old age pension insurance laws of the 1880s (Deutscher Handelstag 1889, p. 1; Bueck 1905). After the 1880s, however, prominent manufacturers and heavy industry associations, including the CDI, turned away from social policy. Hereafter they were equally influential in negative terms, urging the state not to engage in new forms of social policy like unemployment insurance and worker protection nor to expand existing programs.

As heavy manufacturing abandoned social reform, light and export industry took up the call for new welfare legislation after 1890, in organizations like the Bund der Industriellen (BdI—Federation of Industrialists; cf. Ullmann 1976), its allied Verein deutscher Arbeitgeber-Verbände (VAV—Association of German Employers’ Associations), and later the Hansa-Bund (Hanseatic Federation for Business, Commerce and Industry; cf. Mielke 1976). In 1901 the BdI supported the creation of a national labor bureau (Reichsarbeitsamt), “a social reform which would equally promote the interests of employers and employees”; the CDI refused the Reichsarbeitsamt (Fricke et al. 1983, Vol. 1, p. 223). The VAV’s original purpose was to provide financial support to struck firms, but it favored negotiations with labor unions rather than the repressive strategy preferred by the parallel strike-relief organization of heavy industry (the Hauptstelle Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände). In its 1909 founding program, the middle-class Hansa-Bund committed itself to social policies
“aimed at securing the future of all workers and the preservation of their eagerness to work” (Mielke 1976, p. 202). The umbrella organization of the German Chambers of Commerce, the Deutscher Handelstag, representing mainly small industry and merchants, also backed an activist social policy course. 

Several authors stress economic motives behind heavy industry’s support for the initial social insurance schemes. Baron argues that Bismarck’s social legislation was not a “carrot” to conciliate the working class for the “stick” of the concurrent anti-Socialist Law. Instead, social insurance was promoted by big employers in order to create the more skilled, healthier and disciplined labor force they needed to compete internationally (Baron 1979). Ullmann (1979) challenges this analysis, while agreeing on the importance of industrial patronage of social insurance. He demonstrates that the initial support for the accident insurance legislation emanated from the sector of large firms characterized by steady and continuous production processes, recruitment problems, higher accident rates and an orientation towards domestic rather than international markets. Finally, in a careful study of the social-political stances of Chambers of Commerce and industrial organizations, Breger (1984) corroborates the view that industry generally supported the welfare-state measures of the 1880s; she also confirms that sectors oriented towards the domestic market tended to be more supportive.

In addition to the endorsement by heavy industry for the legislation of the 1880s and the backing of light export industry for the social policy expansion thereafter, various Liberal parties also promoted the welfare state. This is important because the Liberals (especially the National-Liberals) were closely tied to various fractions of industry. The left-liberals were unfriendly or openly hostile to national welfare legislation during the 1880s, while the “governmental” National-Liberal party backed Bismarck. The National-Liberals’ 1884 Heidelberg program was strongly supportive of Bismarck’s social policy, and it also committed them to his Anti-Socialist legislation (White 1976, pp. 121, 169; Röhl 1967, p. 62). The final decade of the century witnessed a growing acceptance of social policy and state intervention among the other Liberal political parties (Blackbourn 1985, pp. 267-268). Indeed, the roles were reversed and the left-Liberal parties became the more resolute supporters of the social reform course. Even the Freisinnige Vereinigung moved away from the “Manchesterist” self-help doctrine, which had dictated its opposition to social insurance during the 1880s, to strong support for social policy in the 1890s (Wegner 1968, pp. 14-16; Düding 1972, p. 163; Sheehan 1978, pp. 266-269). The Vereinigung was heavily backed by banks and finance capital (Düding 1972, pp. 160 ff.).

The welfare state was thus not introduced against the interests of industrial capital, but was backed by leading sectors of German industry during the Kaiserreich. Businessmen in heavy industry played a highly public role in the
elaboration of the major laws concerning old-age and disability pensions (1889) and accident insurance (1884). The expansion of the welfare state after 1890 was less directly the result of business pressures, aside from the wave of so-called Mittelstandspolitik—the politics of economically defending the middle strata. But the government was never running completely at cross-purposes to industry. Policies introduced after 1890 generally had broad backing in the export, light manufacturing and finance sectors of capital and among the Liberal parties: the introduction of limits on the length of women's workday; the requirement that all factories have a set of labor regulations (Arbeitsordnung); the introduction of paritary, municipal Gewerbegerichte (industrial courts), first voluntary, then obligatory in cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants; the Prussian mine policy reforms; the legalization of unions; and various extensions of the social insurance laws of the 1880s (Born 1957). The policies that were least developed, like unemployment insurance, were those with the broadest opposition from various branches.\textsuperscript{86} Thus German social policy only ever offended part of the business community and was always supported by major sectors of it.

The German Welfare State as Modern and Bourgeois

The form of the German welfare state was quite modern, in terms of the criteria set out above. There are four main aspects of this “modernity.”

- \textit{Compulsory Social Insurance Plans}. Despite opposition from certain Liberal groups, German social insurance plans were compulsory: the state required and enforced the involvement of specified groups of wage-earners and employers. Although it was precisely this aspect that led British observers to initially reject the German approach, by 1911 Lloyd George and Churchill were converts to compulsory insurance (Hennock 1987).

- \textit{Income-related Benefits}. These were accepted with the 1889 old age and disablement pension law, and variable benefits were also the de facto result of the decentralized sickness insurance system instituted in 1883 (Ritter 1985, pp. 55, 76).

- \textit{Administrative Unification}. Another modern element of the prewar welfare state was its administrative unification, achieved in 1911 with the Reichsversicherungsordnung, or Imperial Insurance Regulation. The closest British parallel to this painstakingly thorough document was the Beveridge system; the U.S. system remains less unified even today.

- \textit{Legal Entitlement to Pensions and Benefits}. None of the German insurance systems were \textit{means-tested}; instead, contributors had a legal right to their pensions or benefits. This stands in contrast, for example, to the British old-age pensions introduced in 1908. Germans could also
contest decisions on their sickness benefits, workman’s compensation, and old-age pensions (Zöllner 1982, p. 30). Following a 1899 regulation, workers could be members of local pension offices with some voice in deciding the level of individual pensions (Born 1957, p. 177). 

The German welfare state was also strongly “bourgeois” in terms of the formal criteria set out above. First, most social insurance benefits were given in cash. To qualify for accident and sickness insurance, workers had to be steadily employed in industry, which provided a strong incentive to the “ commodification” of one’s labor power. There were only minimal state contributions: 50 marks per annum to worker pensions and none to the other insurance forms, meaning that “state-socialist” principles (as they were called at the time) were minimized.

That the welfare state could have encouraged a “bourgeois” form of subjectivity may sound paradoxical after the 1980s, when conservatives railed against its deleterious psychological effects. Yet the system tried to induce thrift, regularity and the idea of self-responsibility. To participate in pension and disability funds, the worker was required at periodic intervals to stick special “stamps” into a membership booklet, indicating payment. After social reformers had attempted for decades to inculcate a “Protestant” savings ethic in the working class through popular savings banks, a nearly irresistible means of drawing workers into this kind of behavior had finally been found. The evolution of sickness insurance legislation gradually undermined genuine worker self-management: first by undercutting trade union mutual funds and then, in 1911, by limiting worker representation in the administration of the public funds. But the legislation vastly expanded the number of workers who were required to regularly contribute to such funds. Finally, the “insurance” metaphor strengthened the idea that workers—like their employers—were “investing” in their own future.

Finally, the German welfare state involved reclassification through accentuation of differences among the poor. The manual working class was not only differentiated from white collar workers through the creation of separate funds with different rules and benefits (Kocka 1980, 1981). It was also differentiated in an “exclusionary” way from the poor below (Parkin 1979; Simmel 1906, p. 27). This was obviously true only to the extent that the “respectable” workers who were eligible for social insurance deployed it to this exclusionary end; otherwise it would only constitute a material difference with no further cultural-political ramifications. But I think Heide Gerstenberger (1981, p. 58) is correct in arguing that “social insurance did not destroy ‘solidarity among the working class’” as various Marxist authors have averred; rather, “what it did was organize the desire to be different.”
CONCLUSION: STATE ELITES AND THE PROMOTION OF BOURGEOIS INTERESTS

I have argued that the key dimensions of poor relief and social insurance served industry rather than agriculture, and that agrarians were unable to fundamentally change the poor relief system in their favor. I have also argued that the *forms* of poor relief and social insurance were both modern and "bourgeois"—indeed more so than contemporaneous programs in Britain. While England may have provided Germany and other nations with a glimpse of their own economic futures, the German welfare system played the same role vis-à-vis England.

The next step is to explain why national social policies were "bourgeois" in content and form. Although I have provided support for the class-correspondence thesis, the reasons for this outcome are only partially "society-centered." One must combine state- and society-centered approaches to understand the outcome. The social insurance reforms of the 1880s were bourgeois although they were ultimately elaborated not by businessmen, but by the Chancellor and upper-level Imperial and Prussian ministers (and secondarily by the Reichstag). In fact, various theories could account for the convergence. Within the limits of this paper I am not able to fully develop an explanation of the "black box," but I want to outline one possible approach.

The most apparent reason for the "class correspondence" that emerged despite the relative insulation of the central German state was that administrative elites in the Imperial state offices or ministries were strongly imbued with an ethos of promoting industrialization. As Bonham (1985) has shown in detailed biographical analysis of Imperial German and Prussian officials, this commitment derived not from social background, but above all from career experiences and location within the administration. The commitment derived secondly from the positive emphasis on industrial and commercial expansion and "modern" reforms (such as direct taxes) in the cameralistic university courses that most officials had taken (Tribe 1988; Bonham 1985, pp. 346 ff.). Moreover, generations of German higher civil servants had been trained in jurisprudence, which tended to support bourgeois notions such as the treatment of land like any other form of property (John 1988). Whatever their initial impulses, state managers who rose in the bureaucratic hierarchy were led to embrace a modernizing industrial ideology.

How did Imperial state elites retain strongly industrializing proclivities in the face of political and cultural anti-industrial pressures? Two factors are best able to account for their orientation, and thus ultimately to explain "class correspondence." First, industry represented the best ally in state officials' striving for internal social order. It is difficult to say whether the motives behind this quest were ultimately state- or society-centered, but order seems to have been valued for its own sake, and not strictly as a means of reproducing the
class structure. A secular agricultural crisis since the second third of the century, combined with seemingly inexorable industrialization, had convinced officials that capital was a more stable partner than the Junkers, if only because it was more likely to survive into the twentieth century.

Second, state elites were pushed inexorably towards industrialism by national-military motives. The Imperial German state needed industry to continue building upon its peculiar advantage. Military strength had permitted Bismarck to complete the work of unification and to raise Germany’s status to that of a new great power in Europe. Even if military production could be partially carried out by state-owned firms, private industry was important as a source of technical innovation and emergency resource mobilization. Equally significant is that not only did military depend on weapons production, but it required the creation of a certain kind of man. Disciplined “soldiers of industry” were trained in the private sphere.\(^9\)

It is clear that an allegiance to industrial modernization could lead to “modernized social policy,” but what about the order-keeping and national-military considerations? These seem to relate only indirectly, but nonetheless critically, to social policy. The connection was an overarching determination by state officials to preserve the loyalty of business (especially its heavy industrial fraction), and thus its economic health. Further research will probably show that an ideological or discursive structure within the state apparatus constantly referred officials back to the bourgeoisie.\(^9\) As a result, most national policies, including those discussed here, would be propelled in the direction of the modern capitalist economy. In future research it will be important to identify the characteristics of the intrastate ideological discourses, as well as the more mundane features like sanctions and criteria for bureaucratic promotion, which produced these systematic effects.

Perhaps the Prussian state was not autonomous after all; but as Medalen (1978, p. 93) suggests, this was its official myth. Indeed, the German/Prussian state of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was highly dependent on private industry to carry out its projects. Nonetheless, the interests that led the state to depend on industry were to some extent the state’s “own” interests, to paraphrase Skocpol, and not the result of some obscure economic determination in the last instance. Skocpol (1979, p. 30) is also correct in arguing that the state, in its search for internal order and international competition, may provoke conflicts of interest with the dominant class. Yet the nineteenth-century German state, which seems to approximate the state-centered ideal so closely, only rarely obstructed the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie. Including the full body of the state within our range of vision, including its local projections, only strengthens this conclusion. To pursue its specific goals—whether social modernization, stability, or war—the state had no choice but to ally with modern business.
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NOTES

1. I will refer to the Prussian and German states as the “German” state, although a German state actually emerged only slowly during the nineteenth century, especially after the 1860s. This shorthand is justifiable even though the Prussian state continued a separate existence after the Imperial constitution was promulgated in 1871.

2. In a significant though ambiguous elision, Skocpol (1979, p. 109) writes that the Prussian state later became the “core of . . . Imperial Germany”—rather than the core of the state in Imperial Germany—thus reducing society to state.

3. By the “state-centered approach” I am referring to the work of contemporary writers including Skocpol, Orloff, Krasner, Stepan, Skowronek, and Nordlinger. Block (1977, 1980) and Tilly 1975a, 1975b, 1987a) stand in an intermediate position between state- and society-centered theory, while the recent work of some of the above-mentioned state-centered authors has moved towards a greater acknowledgement of societal forces; see the essays in Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol (1988). While few of these writers would fully embrace the label “state-centered” theory, they do share a common set of questions, concepts, variables, and sometimes theoretical statements. Good recent discussions include Almond (1988), Brenner (1988), Jessop (forthcoming), Krasner (1984), and March and Olsen (1984); see also Evans, Skocpol, and Rueschemayer (1985). Levine (1988) caricatures the state-centered approach.

4. My use of the word “interest” does not imply some sense of “objective” interest, but instead refers to actors’ subjectively-held interests.

5. There is no space here for a detailed discussion and comparison of Marxist and neo-Marxist state theories; see the excellent treatments in Jessop (1982, 1985) and van den Berg (1988).

6. The claim that public policies in capitalist societies are functionally related to those social relations need not be equivalent to arguing that the state is explained functionally. Without repeating the familiar disputes around functionalist explanation in Marxism, suffice it to mention the following clarification (made by Cohen 1978): the state can be functional (i.e., beneficial) for production relations without being functionally explained by those relations. As will become clear, I am inclined towards a non-functionalist explanation of German state policy, but I will suggest that such policies were generally functional for capitalist industrialization.

7. After World War I, the Austrian economists Goldscheid and Schumpeter analyzed the limitations imposed upon the social policies of the modern state through its dependence upon tax revenue. As Goldscheid put it, “l'état, c'est l'état”—“the state is the budget” (Weiler [1973] 1985, pp. 137-138). See also Goldscheid (1976) and Schumpeter (1976).

8. Except in cases like Pinochet’s Chile where external sources of revenue are so generous that political leaders are genuinely liberated from reliance on the domestic economy; see Tilly (1987b).

9. I would like to thank Bob Jessop for help in formulating this summary.

10. See Plum (1977) and Ory (1982). What a nation needs to rise in international “prestige” rankings has varied historically, although military power has been a constant asset. In early- to mid-nineteenth-century Europe the key ingredient may have been a positive trade balance, quality manufactured goods or a national railroad system; later in the century overall industrial output was probably more central. From 1945 to the 1960s, the emphasis was probably as much on democracy and relative distributive equality, while the 1980s again emphasized material rather than normative values.
11. This provides a further twist to Block’s argument: War produces the conditions for state autonomization, but it also forces these autonomous states to accommodate industry. Conditions which could loosen this dependency include state takeover of the military industry and a willingness to rely on foreign arms supplies. Yet reliance on arms imports rather than indigenous arms production may create a dangerous situation of dependency and vulnerability to boycott. Where a nation monopolizes some internationally essential product, this danger may be attenuated; the obvious example is oil states, which could be the “exception which proves the rule” (Brenner 1988) of state heteronomy.

12. Note that Marxists have often claimed that states may represent the interests of ascendent or nascent classes; the clearest example is the traditional Marxist argument about the absolutist state as a transitional but essentially “bourgeois” state avant la lettre (Engels, Poulantzas). Class correspondence is preserved here by extending its time horizon, although the mechanisms by which such a “proactive” correspondence is assured are not elaborated.

13. It should also be noted that explanations of the welfare state have been the strength of the class correspondence as well, in both its more orthodox Marxist versions (e.g., Müller and Neusüss 1975; Booth 1978; Jessop 1982, pp. 78-141) and its neo- or post-Marxist guise (e.g., O’Connor 1973; Offe 1984b).

14. As Born (1972, p. 180) notes, there are probably 50 different definitions of the word “social policy” (Sozialpolitik); but as he also writes, Sozialpolitik before 1914 primarily concerned wage-workers. In this paper, social policy is defined to encompass any intervention in labor markets, the labor process or the reproduction of labor power that is regulated and/or funded by public authorities. This definition includes, inter alia, traditional poor relief as well as social insurance, and covers the local, regional and national levels of the polity.

15. It is necessary to challenge the notion of a unified state. The concept of the state must be disaggregated not only horizontally—looking separately at the military, fiscal, welfare, educational and other apparatuses (e.g., Geyer 1984)—but also vertically, distinguishing the local, regional, and central levels. My use of the term “local state” does not imply acceptance of a specific theoretical orientation, in which the local level is seen as performing certain functions in a hierarchical division of political labor among different parts of a “state system.” See Cockburn (1977) for the origin of the term “local state”; Clark and Dear (1984), Sharpe (1984), Saunders (1979, 1982), and especially Greer (1987), for an excellent discussion of different views.

While it is certainly true that local states in Germany were delegated specific tasks by central governments, they had a great deal of autonomy in the implementation of such tasks and in fiscal terms. Nonetheless, local governments were state-like on a number of dimensions: they exercised legally-binding and (generally) legitimate authority backed by violence; their sovereignty operated within a bounded territory; they were institutionally differentiated both internally and “externally” (from civil society); and their binding decisions were made “in the name of the general will” (Jessop forthcoming, p. 3).

16. These “modern” aspects of social policy were embraced for reasons of political and administrative efficiency, and do not have any obvious class logic. While referring to them as indicators of relative “modernity,” I hope that this periodization avoids insinuating any essentialist or teleological quality. “Modernity” is intended to stand in here for an historically-specific ideal type.

17. Another historian speaks of the conservative political opposition to a proper “synchronization of economic and political development” (Mielke 1976, p. 17).

18. Historians’ treatment of the “Hibernia affair” of the early 1900s is an example of a misleading reinforcement of the image of state autonomy. In 1904, the Prussian state challenged industrialists by attempting to nationalize the third-largest coal company in the country, Hibernia. The stakes in the Hibernia affair have typically been assessed as the alternative: “Would the state control the economy, or would the economy overwhelm the state?” (Medalen 1978, p. 93). The Hibernia sale was supported by the Conservative and Center Parties, the antimonopolistic
employers’ association (*Bund der Industriellen*), and most importantly, the agrarians (Mott 1968, p. 26). For some contemporaries and historians, the state’s brazenness seems to have overshadowed the fact that it failed in its bid for power: business prevailed, and the Hibernia mine was not nationalized.

19. Those who insist on the German state’s autonomy or orientation towards Junker interests often simultaneously describe it as “Bonapartist.” But this description of the Imperial German state contrasts sharply with the archetypical Bonapartism of the French Second Empire. The régime of Napoleon III, with its modernizing Saint-Simonian advisers, systematically promoted business interests (Plessis 1979, pp. 85-90). As Mommsen (1985, p. 196) writes, Bonapartism refers to a “long-term stabilization of a bourgeois system through plebiscitary means” (my emphasis; see also Draper 1977, pp. 385-463). Bonapartism is the result of a circumstance in which the bourgeoisie is unable to rule alone or to construct viable alliances, and thus “confesses that … in order to save its purse it must forfeit the crown” (Marx 1852/1970b, p. 436). By emphasizing the noncapitalist thrust of Imperial state interventions, the standard literature on the Kaiserrreich thus undermines the comparison with the French Second Empire. The use of the term seems more appropriate for writers like Eley, who insist upon the probusiness slant of the Imperial state.

20. On the battles over these reforms see: Kehr (1973, p. 283, note 4); Horn (1958, 1964); Baudis and Nussbaum (1978, p. 115); Mielke (1976, p. 22); Barkin (1970); Witt (1969); Born (1957, p. 164); and Bonham (1985).

21. It is also argued that Junker *interesse* triumphed over conservative-agrarian *ideologien* in one key area: the Russian question. Whereas Conservatives favored an alliance of the monarchies against the democratic western states, agrarians’ interests were threatened most directly by Russian grain. The German-Russian alliance of course eventually collapsed, and the key *domestic* factor contributing to this was the new trade treaty which was “extorted” from the Russian government under duress, following the 1905 revolution. Thus agrarians’ *economic* interests took the upper hand over their *political* interests. See Kehr (1973, pp. 273-274, esp. note 3).

22. On the Sammlung see Stegmann (1970) and Wehler (1985, pp. 94-99); recent critical discussions of the model include Pflanze (1983) and Eley (1986, pp. 110-153). Kehr’s (1973) uneasy combination of the *Junkerstaat* and Sammlung theses is characteristic of later writers. Even “without open public demand,” he wrote, “Germany was guided according to the desires of capitalist economy” (p. 261); elsewhere, however, he throws into question the functionality of the state’s interventions for industry (e.g., 1973, p. 277).

23. This is despite the complaints of organizations such as the heavy-industrial Centralverband deutscher Industrieller (CDI), whose congresses in the post-1900 period are filled with complaints about agrarians. See CDI, *Verhandlungen, Mitteilungen u. Berichte*, Nr. 100 (1905), “Sitzung des Ausschusses” on 5.5. (1905, pp. 22-23, 28-29). As the CDI chief Buck complained, the CDI had inspired the creation of a *Wirtschaftlicher Ausschuss* (an advisory council similar to the Zollheirat of the 1880s), but the government “has stuffed it with the most extreme agrarian interests” (p. 31). In general, however, heavy industry does not seem to have strongly opposed the tariffs (cf. Kehr 1973, pp. 297 ff).

24. Earlier in the century, Robert Michels claimed that it was “not the legitimate representatives of the industrial-capitalist economic order, the ‘bourgeoisie,’ but the legitimate representatives of an essentially antiquated economic system, feudalism, [who] set for the empire its policy abroad, and also and especially its internal direction and goal” (Kehr 1973, p. 277).

25. Kehr (1965) argued that there was a purge of the bureaucracy during von Puttkammers’ tenure as Prussian Minister of the Interior. See Anderson and Barkin (1982) for an important critique of this thesis, and Morsey (1957, esp. pp. 186-242).

26. There is a great deal of confusion between these two very different arguments. Bonham (1984, p. 207) notes that the perception by the “liberal” critics of the Wilhelmine bureaucracy of “an independent administration appears to be contradicted by their contention that it was also
dominated by a landed aristocratic social elite.” This conflation is even present in most current writings on the Wilhelmine state, including Wehler (1973, 1985). A further dilemma is that the so-called “Kehrites” (cf. Puhle 1978; Eley 1986) are often considered Marxist, because of their emphasis on class control of the state. Yet their assumption that the Junkers controlled the state is deeply at odds with the class correspondence thesis. Puhle (1978) is thus correct in doubting the unity of the category “Kehrite,” insofar as Wehler, Kocka, and even Kehr view the Imperial state as promoting industry.

Both East German historians and some representatives of the “Bielefeld school” have suggested that industrial, especially monopoly, rather than agrarian interests were served by state policy, even if Junkers held office. Most recent GDR writing stresses a Junker-capitalist entente as opposed to pure capitalist domination (e.g., Klein 1976; Baudis and Nussbaum 1978). As Eley (1985, p. 131) points out, Kocka and Wehler tend to assert a discrepancy between “the state as a system of political domination … and its role in the economy (its modern interventionist character).” But it is precisely the “modernity” of the latter—the problem of discerning which classes and factions were favored by the state’s interventions in the economy, which is in question here. To the extent that Eley’s characterization of Kocka and Wehler is correct, my interpretation is not at odds with theirs. Wehler’s writings are particularly enigmatic in this regard, however, even when he endorses the polysemic term “organized capitalism.” I would tend to agree with Lothar Gall’s (1978, p. 558, note 15) assessment of Wehler as viewing the interventionist state as “patriarchal [and] social-conservative, and not as an instrument of new and offensive economic dynamics.”

27. Marx ([1891] 1970a) wrote little on the Bismarckian state, except to call it “nothing but a police-guarded military despotism, embellished with parliamentary forms, alloyed with a feudal admixture, already influenced by the bourgeoisie and bureaucratically carpentered.” (p. 27). Yet as Perry Anderson (1979) has pointed out, this is more an “agglutination of epithets” (p. 277) than a clear conceptualization.

28. German “Bonapartism” was in the interests of business: “The bourgeoisie buys gradual social emancipation at the price of the immediate renunciation of political power” (Engels [1875] 1969b, p. 167). On numerous occasions Engels provided what is now a familiar explanation for this indirect form of rule: “Our German bourgeoisie is stupid and cowardly; it even failed to understand how to take hold of and keep the political rule which the working class won for it in 1848 … the German bourgeoisie has never had the ability to lead and represent the nation as a ruling class ([1889] 1962, pp. 383-384); “The mass of the bourgeoisie … does not want to rule” (Engels [1870] 1969a, p. 160). Yet at times, Engels indicates that the state might not even be indirectly capitalistic: “in the new German Empire … capitalists and workers are balanced against each other and equally for the benefit of the impoverished Prussian cabbage junkers” ([1884] 1970b, p. 329); “In Germany the state is still to a certain extent a power hovering independently over society, which for that reason represents the collective interests of society and not those of a single class” ([1872-1873] 1969c, p. 348).

29. For a generous exegesis of Poulantzas’ work, see Jessop (1985); see also Van den Berg (1988, Chap. 5) and Léger (1979).

30. Given Poulantzas’ definition of the feudal and capitalist forms of state, this classification presumably refers to the relative strength of the executive branch, and to the fact that three of the major political bodies—the Prussian Herrenhaus (House of Lords) and Haus der Abgeordneten (House of Representatives), and the German Bundesrat (Federal Council)—were not elected by universal suffrage. These aspects of the German state might prohibit it from achieving an effect that for Poulantzas (1978, p. 189) is characteristic of the capitalistic state: “maintaining the political disorganization of the dominated classes, by presenting itself as the unity of the people-nation, composed of political-persons/private individuals.”

31. A complication is introduced by the fact that, in Poulantzas’ (1978) view, the Imperial German state was not fully capitalist in structural terms (pp. 161, 167). This seems to represent
a confusion in his theory rather than a complexity of the German state. For it is unclear how a state structure could lag so far behind a social formation dominated by the capitalist mode of production—unless, of course, institutional structures have no effects. Poulantzas provides specific examples of "premature" transitions to capitalist state forms—the English revolution (pp. 169 ff.) and the Absolutist state—but nowhere does he theorize "lagging" states.

32. On these concepts see Wolfe (1980) and Wright (1985, pp. 11, 109-114).

33. Although this mode was capitalist in economic terms, "this wage labour ... was itself regulated by a feudal Gesindeordnung ... and imposed a ruthless manorial discipline on agricultural laborers and domestic servants" (Anderson 1974, p. 274).

34. It is crucial to note that agrarian interests in Imperial Germany were not strictly noncapitalist. Even if agrarian laborers were still subjected to "precapitalist" forms of coercion on the estate (Rittergut), they were increasingly employed as normal wage workers with no feudal dues. See the various writings of Max Weber on the East-Elbian rural workers, especially the results of his main study for the Verein für Sozialpolitik, in its Schriften (1892) and Weber (1894) 1979). See also Moeller (1986), Perkins (1981), Schissler (1978) and Tribe (1983).

35. Few welfare state studies have argued explicitly that agrarian interests—as opposed to precapitalist values, which we will discuss below—affected the content of welfare policy, although it is easy to construct such arguments. In fact, very little effort has been made until recently to understand the relations between business interests and welfare programs in the German Empire.

36. The near-total absence of poor relief from German social history until recently is all the more perplexing when one considers its centrality in English social history. The relations between the welfare state and poor relief are addressed in Sachse and Tennstedt (1980, 1983), Tennstedt (1975, 1976, 1981a, 1981b, 1981c, 1983a, 1983b), Leibfried and Tennstedt (1985) and Leibfried et al. (1985).

37. Over 92 million marks were spent on direct relief costs (Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt 1887, p. 50*); in the same year 59 million marks were spent on goods, services, and transfers in social insurance (Andic and Veverka 1963, p. 247).

38. The 1912 poor relief estimate is perhaps exaggerated, since there were no national poor relief surveys after 1892. The order of magnitude of change is greater than what we might expect from a city like Berlin, whose relief spending during the same period (1885-1912) rose by only about 300 percent (Meinerich 1919, p. 50); in Essen, spending rose by 419 percent (Hagenberg 1914, p. 154); in Bremen only 251 percent (Funk 1913, p. 111).

39. The Freedom of Movement Laws of 1842, 1855 and 1860 in Prussia and of 1834 in Saxony (see Köllmann 1966; Deutscher Landwirtschaftsrat 1881, p. 257), and the Prussian Poor Laws of 1842 and 1855. As explained below, not all states immediately took over the Relief Residency Law, and all had specific regulations governing its implementation.

40. Evidence for the use of traditional public assistance to relieve unemployed able-bodied workers is given in Steinmetz (1987). While social policy contributed to the creation of a nationwide labor market, I do not want to claim that Imperial policies were necessary conditions for economic development (cf. Tipton 1981), but merely that the state thereby removed one barrier to migration.

41. Only if the person became impoverished before obtaining a new "relief residence" (Unterstützungswohnsitz) for reasons other than temporary inability to work was the town allowed to expel him (Gesetz über die Freizügigkeit, § 5).

42. The Relief Residency Law was complemented by a number of implementing statutes (Ausführungsgesetze) of the various federal states. See Bätzner (1873), Gugel (1910) and Wohlers (1876). It was taken over by Württemburg and Baden after their entry into the newly-founded German Empire, but was not adopted by Alsace-Lorraine until 1910 and Bavaria until 1916. Until 1910, laws dating from the French Revolution (1793 and 1796) regulated poor relief in Alsace-Lorraine, where it remained voluntary: cf. Denkschrift über die Lage des Armenwesens der Stadt Kolmar (1898, pp. 4-5); Böhmert (1888, p. 105); Goltz (1896); and Sachse and Tennstedt (1980, ...
p. 204). See also Reichsgesetzblatt (1913, p. 495); and Zentrales Staatsarchiv I. Potsdam (hereafter ZStA I). Rep. 15.01, Nr. 1266. Bavaria retained the older system (Heimatrecht) whereby the place of birth was also the relief residency throughout a person's life, although by 1896 legislation had converged with the national norm to the extent that a new relief residency could be gained within the state of Bavaria by residing in a town for four uninterrupt ed (and nonimpoverished) years (Baron 1983, p. 20).

43. In the two eastern agrarian provinces of East Prussia and Gumbinnen alone, almost 19,000 marks were paid in 1884 by Local and Regional Relief Boards for people who had emigrated to the west and became impoverished there; in 1890 the total was nearly 26,500 marks. 165,557 marks were paid out in reimbursements to western Relief Boards over the total 7-year period (1884-1890) by these two eastern provinces. If these figures are representative for other agrarian regions losing population, several million marks may have been paid by rural Relief Boards to Boards in areas receiving their rural workers during the first two decades of the Relief Residence Law, ZStA I, Rep. 15.01, Nr. 1274 (pp. 97 ff.). Report of January 21, 1892 on “Costs of relief paid by eastern Relief Boards for persons impoverished in West.”

44. It is impossible to establish whether the Poor Law actually increased peoples' willingness to emigrate, or whether freedom of movement regulations, combined with economic and social pressures, provide an adequate account. It is interesting that, while a steep rise in overseas emigration characterized the years immediately following 1870, “internal” migration did not become dominant until the first half of the 1890s, when the shortage of industrial jobs abated (Deutscher Landwirtschaftsrat 1883, p. 485; Bade 1983; Langewiesche 1977).

45. Interestingly, the same Junker class strongly opposed restrictions on the immigration of Polish laborers into Germany, arguing in free-trade terms (Bade 1983, pp. 136 ff.). Like other agrarian doctrinal contradictions, this one was explicable in terms of economic interest: the Junkers were strongly dependent on Polish labor.


47. Many Southern German officials—from the Reichspartei, Center, Conservative and National Liberal parties—preferred the old “Heimatswohnsitz” or “Heimatgesetze” (home town relief residence system), in which the Heimat (usually the birthplace) remained the Relief Residence throughout one's life. Cf. the typical argumentation by Varnbüler in Reichstag Stenographische Berichte, 4th Legislature, 4th session (1881, p. 1292); and Reichstag, Verhandlungen, Aktenstücke, 4th Legislature, 4th session Nr. 124 (1881, pp. 713-714); also Rembold in Stenographische Berichte, 9th Legislature, 2nd session (1894, p. 977).

48. The Landwirtschaftlicher Centralverein demanded, above all, lowering the age from 24 to 20; cf. Reichstag, Verhandlungen, Akenstücke, 4th Legislature, 3rd session, Nr. 183 (1880, pp. 944-45). Conservatives called for changes throughout the 1880s and 1890s: see Reichstag, Verhandlungen, Stenographische Berichte, 7th Legislature, 1st session (1887, p. 61); 7th Legislature, 4th session (1889, p. 1995); and 8th Legislature, 2nd session (1891, p. 3363). On the Kreisvertretungen, cf. Reichstag, Verhandlungen, Aktenstücke, 6th Legislature period, 2nd session, Nr. 223 (1886, pp. 1045-1046). At its 1876 and 1881 meetings, the Deutscher Landwirtschaftsrat called for a lowering of the age at which a new “relief residency” could be obtained, and argued that the Regional Poor Law boards should bear the costs of persons with no “relief residency.” The problem was discussed again at the 20th plenary session of the Deutscher Landwirtschaftsrat in 1892: cf. ZStA 1, Rep. 15.01, Nr. 1285 (p. 4); and Nr. 1288 (pp. 24 ff.); also Deutscher Landwirtschaftsrat (1880, pp. 441-463); Vol. 5 (1881, pp. 36, 239-287).

49. Given the impossibility of realizing this goal, however, Bismarck supported shortening the length of time necessary for gaining a new Relief Residence to one year. ZStA 1, Rep. 15.01, Nr. 1271 (pp. 38 ff.), Bismarck's Votum of March 28, 1877 on reforms in the Poor Law.

50. See ZStA 1, Rep. 15.01, Nr. 1272 (pp. 130 ff.) for Bismarck's comments on reform of poor relief.
51. A bill from the Imperial Chancellery that would have made it easier for migrants to gain a new residence was rejected by the Prussian Minister of the Interior, who opposed placing new burdens on the cities, and was defeated in the Bundesrat: ZStA 1, Rep. 15.01, Nr. 1272 (pp. 38 ff.). The government responded to attempts to reintroduce the matter in the Reichstag during the 1880s with the claim that the social insurance legislation would remove much of the burden of the Poor Law; cf. the statements by the State Secretary of the Interior von Boetticher in the budget debates of 1887 and 1889: Reichstag, Verhandlungen, Stenographische Berichte, 7th Legislature, 1st session (1887, p. 61); 7th Legislature, 4th session (1889, p. 1995).

52. In 1886, an East-Prussian county (Kreisvertretung) petitioned to have the Relief Residence system introduced in Alsace-Lorraine (Reichstag, Verhandlungen, Aktenstücke, 6th Legislature, 1st session [1885/86], Nr. 223 [pp. 1045-1046]).

53. ZStA 1, Rep. 15.01, Nr. 1275, pp. 192, 292 ff. List of demands sent to the Kaiser by the Prussian Diet following the debate on the crisis of rural labor.

54. It stipulated that the costs of aid for the first 16 weeks of illness were to be paid by the Relief Board of the town in which the pauper had worked. In addition, §361 of the Criminal Code was altered such that a negligent parent who failed to care for dependents could be jailed or fined up to 150 marks. Cf. Blätter f.d. Armenwesen (1894, p. 65); Reichs-Gesetzblatt, Nr. 9 (1894, pp. 259-277); Reichstag, Verhandlungen, Stenographische Berichte, 8th Legislature, 2nd session (1893, pp. 1677-1743); 9th Legislature, 1st session (1894, pp. 977-997, 1101-1102); and Reichstag, Verhandlungen, Aktenstücke, 8th Legislature, 2nd session, Nr. 130 (1893 pp. 751-754); 9th Legislature, 1st session, Nr. 117 (1894 pp. 727-744) and Nr. 142 (1894, pp. 807-808).

55. ZStA 1, Rep. 15.01, Nr. 1275 (pp. 257 ff.). Miquel had been the strongest Junker ally among the higher Prussian and Reich officials in opposing trade treaty revisions during the early 1890s, seeking "consistently either to prevent a reduction of the agricultural tariff or to undermine the treaties altogether" (Bonham 1985, p. 178). He was also the leader of resistance to the Mittelland canal at the turn of the century, another measure strongly opposed by the Junkers (Bonham 1985, p. 189, note 51, p. 206, note 211).

56. See Reichs-Gesetzblatt Nr. 35 (1908, pp. 377-396); and Deutscher Verein für Armenpflege und Wohltätigkeit (1906, Vol. 76).

57. The distinction in this literature between poor relief and the welfare state is often fairly vague. According to Marshall (1970, p. 44), "the British Poor Law had the functions, but not the spirit, of a welfare service"; yet elsewhere he writes that the emphasis on the "contractual character of social insurance ... led people to exaggerate the distinction between social insurance and social assistance" (1970, p. 48).

58. But decommodified policies may be more patriarchal: as feminist critics of the American welfare state have pointed out, in-kind relief characterizes the more "feminized" sector of welfare (food stamps, AFDC, and so forth). Such decommodified relief clearly does not decrease the dependence of women welfare clients (Fraser 1987). Fraser argues further that means-tested programs "familialize" their clients and treat claimants as unpaid family workers, while social insurance programs "individualize" claimants and treat them as wage-workers (Fraser 1987); see also Nelson (1984); and Gordon (1987). For a preliminary assessment of the relations between gender and welfare policy in Germany, see Steinmetz (1989) and the literature reviewed there.

59. This account is different from Foucault's, of course, since he refuses to understand the emergence of the modern subject in class terms. (He also rejects an emphasis on the state as the central locus of political power.) Clearly, the technologies of self-discipline, once established, can undergird nonbourgeois regimes (e.g., state-socialist ones). What the analyses of Foucault (and Elias) reveal, however, is the extent to which these new technologies of subject-creation emerged concurrently with capitalism.

60. Seen from this angle, the modern welfare state recalls Althusser's (1971, p. 181) notion of Ideological State Apparatus: "The subjects 'work,' they 'work by themselves' in the vast majority
of cases ... by ideology.” Nancy Fraser (1987) underscores this association, characterizing the American welfare state as a “Juridico-Administrative-Therapeutic Apparatus.”

61. As recent critiques of traditional Marxism have recognized, working-class formation is not strictly derivable from class structure: cf. Przeworski (1977); Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Bourdieu (1985, p. 726) writes: “While the probability of assembling a set of agents ... rises when they are closer in social space ... alliance between those who are closest is never necessary ... and alliance between those most distant from each other is never impossible.”

62. The logic of the state’s role in “classification struggles” is clearly illustrated in Jürgen Kocka’s analyses of the effects of the 1911 German social insurance legislation in solidifying distinctions between white-collar and manual workers (e.g., Kocka 1980, 1981); see also Boltanski’s (1984) treatment of the impact on the solidification of the social category “cadres” by the Vichy administration’s granting of legal status to the cadres in the 1941 charte du travail.

63. Given the formal similarities between this argument and Poulantzas’ (1978) claims about the “disorganizing effects” of the capitalist form of state and parliamentary democracy (pp. 134, 189, 190-194, 277, 287), it is perhaps necessary to underscore that I am not claiming that all social policies necessarily splinter subordinate classes, nor that all bourgeoisies attempt to shape welfare policy along these lines. Note also that the creation of male and female “streams” in the welfare state—the division of men and women, rather than within a theoretically-unified working class—may follow a similar logic.

64. These “bourgeois” criteria could change in other periods. The “bourgeois subject” may be well-suited to certain postcapitalist societies or ill-suited to contemporary, late capitalism; unified working classes are more stabilizing at certain moments than divided ones; elites often prefer de commodified policies from a political standpoint of social reproduction.

65. There is a vast nineteenth-century literature on the Elberfeld system, beginning with the overview by Berthold (1881) and the excellent study by Böhmert (1888); see also Schlaudraff (1932), Köllmann et al. (1953), and Sachse and Tennesedt (1980). Finally, the Schriften of the Deutscher Verein für Armenpflege und Wohltätigkeit often deal with the Elberfeld system, especially volumes 18, 49, and 63.

66. It had few programs specifically for jobless workers, such as unemployment insurance.

67. “Ongoing” relief referred to cases in which a specific termination of the relief period was not foreseen or established from the beginning. It was generally distributed in monthly portions. See Die Ergebnisse der am 1.12.1900 erfolgten statistischen Erhebung über die im Gebiete der Stadt Hamburg in offener Armenpflege unterstützten Personen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Wohnungsverhältnisse, p. 5.

68. Stadtsarchiv Berlin (Stadt A Berlin), Rep. 03, N. 54, p. 208, report by Seeger, April 10, 1880.


70. An average of 13 percent of the population in the cities with greater than 50,000 inhabitants was eligible to vote in the years 1900-1910. The maximum was 20 percent, the minimum 1 percent. These calculations are from a variety of sources, listed in Steinmetz (1987, Appendix 2).

71. Before the turn of the century, the majority of Liberal councilors in many cities were bankers, industrialists or businessmen of some kind. In Mühlhausen, for example, Liberals held a majority of town council seats before 1900, in 1886 almost half of the councilors were members of the “bourgeoisie” by this broad definition (calculated from the Mühlhausen Verwaltungsbericht, 1887/1888, pp. 200-201). Participation in local government by the traditional urban elite began declining at the end of the century, perhaps due to increased demands on their time, as Helmut Croon (1960, p. 38) has suggested in his studies of the cities of Rheinland and Westfalia. In Krefeld, in 1890, for example, 10 of the 20 councilors elected in the top two classes were silk manufacturers and dealers; in 1918, they were represented by only one official (Jaeger 1967, p. 87). But the restrictive municipal franchise and the tradition of middle-class Honoratioren self-government meant that these economic elites were succeeded not by workers but by a “new middle-class”.

73. On the English Poor Law see Fraser (1976, 1981); Hay (1981); Rose (1972, 1981); and Williams (1981).

74. Under the New Poor Law of 1834 a pauper could theoretically receive relief only if shut off in a poorhouse (Polanyi [1944] [1957]). It was assumed that only those who were genuinely needy would be willing to undergo the humiliations of the workhouse. There is an enormous literature arguing that out-relief continued after the passage of the 1834 Poor Law, and that the workhouse system was only incompletely implemented. Williams (1981) insists, however, that out-relief was in fact curtailed after 1834. The crucial point is not whether the workhouse system was in fact implemented, but that the “Elberfeld” ideology of individualized out-relief did not take root in England.

75. “Infrastructural” power is Mann’s (1986a) term for “the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (p. 113). In The Sources of Social Power, Mann (1986b, pp. 7-10) uses slightly different terms, distinguishing “intensive” versus “extensive” and “authoritative” versus “diffused” types of power.

76. Note that in this literature, “corporate” and “corporatist” carry the atavistic connotations of the ancien régime, rather than referring to the modern political forms familiar from the “neocorporatism” literature. Compare Pauly (1981) with Schmitter (1979) and Panitch (1986).

77. Conservative interpretations coming from administrative-science circles, however, do tend to depict the early German welfare state in more favorable terms: as “modern”, flexible, and even pathbreaking. Cf. Zöllner (1982); Köhler and Zacher (1983); and Zacher (1979). These writings are extremely useful even if they are hesitant to speculate about the causes of social policies or the meaning of specific policy forms.

78. Although compulsion looked traditional (and obrigkeitstaatlich) to some German Liberals and to British observers, it was actually the more “traditional” Catholic countries that continued to adhere to the voluntary principle (Ritter 1986, p. 6). Not surprisingly, the German government viewed the conviction that “only the greatest measure of freedom for the individual can develop the best and most efficient resources of the nation” as traditional rather than modern (Ritter 1986, p. 7-8).

79. Space constraints preclude a narrative account of the enactment of the major national social policy laws during the Kaisersreich, or even a list. The best accounts, aside from the massive oeuvre of Florian Tennefeldt, include Born (1957), Hentschel (1983), Ritter (1986), Rothfels (1927, 1970), Vogel (1951), and Zöllner (1982).

80. According to Stegmann (1970, p. 103), the agrarians called for an end to social policy to put a halt to “Landflucht.” See also Richthofen (1901, pp. 43, 52).

81. There is ample documentation of the swing in heavy industry's attitude towards social policy after the late 1880s: see Deutsche Industrie-Zeitung (organ of the Centralverband Deutscher Industrieller); Der Arbeitergeber (organ of the Hauptstelle Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände); and Deutsche Arbeitgeberzeitung (of the Verein Deutscher Arbeitgeber-Verbände).

82. This is shown in the minutes of the Handelstag's annual meetings and its bleibender Ausschuß or permanent commission. See Deutscher Handelstag (1881, Anlage I, p. 2), 10th meeting of permanent commission, discussion of the accident insurance bill. See also various issues of its Deutsche Wirtschafts-Zeitung, e.g., 1906, pp. 870 ff. and 919 ff. (“Die Belastung der Betriebe durch die Arbeiterversicherung”); and 1907, p. 163, praising the recommencement of social policy under Wilhelm II (“Die deutsche Sozialpolitik im Jahre 1906”). After 1909 most of the Chambers of Commerce urged their members to join the liberal Hansa-Bund (Fricke et al., 1984, Vol. 2, p. 142).

83. The ties between the National Liberal Party and industry are most readily documented; the Freisinnige Vereinigung was close to financial and commercial interests. Some of the closest ties between Liberalism and industry are demonstrated at the local level, where liberals (especially
the National Liberals) reigned until 1914 (Sheehan 1971, 1983). Many heavy industrialists were closer to the Reichs- und freikonservative Partei (Imperial Conservative Party), whose social policy views paralleled those of the CDI. A helpful visual overview of the complicated splits among German Liberal parties from 1871 to 1914 can be found in Elm (1969); see also Sheehan (1978); and Fricke et al. (1983-86).

84. Although the National Liberal party leader Ernst Basserman called for new reforms and increased social spending between 1898 and 1909, his position in the party was increasingly tenuous; cf. Basserman (1919); Düding (1972, p. 175); Eschenburg (1929); and Heckart (1974).

85. The Freisinnige leader Theodor Barth called for tactical alliances with the Social Democrats and cultivated relations with the right wing of the SPD beginning in 1890 (Wegner 1968, p. 112; Elm 1969, pp. 40, 117). The notion of “social Liberalism” was propagated by the Freisinnige Vereinigung, and its Berlin section started calling itself the “Social Liberal” Association.

86. Heavy industry’s vehement opposition to unemployment insurance was repeatedly expressed by the CDI: cf. Bueck (1905), Vol. 3, pp. 414-481, 559. The influential newspaper Der Arbeitgeber (until 1910 the Mitteilungen der Hauptstelle deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände) came out repeatedly against unemployment insurance (e.g., 1908 Nr. 27; 1909 Nrs. 14 (esp. p. 163); 1910 Nr. 15; 1911 Nrs. 19, 20; 1912 Nrs. 12, 15, 19; 1913 Nrs. 21-24 (esp. Nr. 22, pp. 274-277); see also Deutsche Industrie-Zeitung (1911, Nr. 22, pp. 393-395). Some Chambers of Commerce opposed it as well: see Handelskammer für den Kreis Heidelberg 1909. Only scattered groups of German industry appear to have supported unemployment insurance: cf. Archives Nationales (Paris), Fonds Max Lazard, 6 AS 75, envelope “International-Bibliographie.”

87. The major missing dimensions here are universal coverage and a macro-economic regulation of demand through social policy. I have explained the “class” reasons for nonuniversal coverage above; full-scale demand management had to await the development of Keynesianism (see Weir and Skocpol 1985).

88. Some sickness insurance benefits were given in kind: free medical treatment was general, and hospital treatment could be substituted for sick pay (Zöllner 1982, p. 29).

89. Jill Quadagno (1988) has employed the idea of the “insurance metaphor” in a paper on U.S. social security policies.

90. However, differences between unskilled and skilled workers were administratively eroded by the 1883 sickness insurance law (Ritter 1986, p. 72).

91. Indeed, German industrialists repeatedly criticized the bureaucracy before and during World War I for unresponsiveness to their “objective advice” (Feldman 1981, p. 168).

92. The issue of military motives and class correspondence is slightly more complex than is suggested here, since the state could sometimes be led by military considerations to engage in social policies against industrial interests. This is illustrated by the 1905 miners’ strike and the Prussian government’s response to the mine employer’s plans to import strikebreakers from abroad. The government’s response actually met certain of the striking miners’ key demands, culminating in a revision of the Prussian mining code. The state’s liberalism and flexibility in this case probably reflected the strategic military importance of mine production (Born 1957, pp. 184-185).

93. This was illustrated by the dismissal of the Prussian minister Miquel when he transgressed a political-cultural boundary within the administration: supporting the Junkers once too often against the Kaiser and Chancellor (and industry). Indeed, Bismarck’s dismissal has also been traced to a comparable sin: see Draper (1977, p. 425).

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