Merideth Naomi
is now 15 months old
No new pictures posted. Yet.
- Fritz. (Aug. 6th, 1998)
Fritz's Lexicon
Artificial Intelligence Terms
Agent
-
[Russell & Norvig 1995]
(page 7) define an agent as someone or something that perceives and acts.
Agent, Strong Notion of
-
(To be added.)
Agent, Weak Notion of
-
(To be added.)
Hard Artificial Intelligence
-
(To be added.)
Knowledge Level, The
-
(To be added.)
Soft Artificial Intelligence
-
(To be added.)
Symbol Hypothesis, The
-
(To be added.)
Computer Terms
NP Complete
-
(To be added.)
General Terms
Philosophical Terms
Intentional
-
[Martin 1994]
1. Sometimes 'intentional' means 'on purpose', or
'having to do with intentions' (i.e., plans or desires about actions).
2. Intentionality is the idea that mental events have objects which
they "point to" or are "about"; thus, if you think that Venus is a planet
your thought has intentionality or aboutness: it is about Venus.
Brentano held that intentionality was the distinguishing feature of the
mental. Intentionality is problematic because the items we think about do
not seem to be identical to things in the external world. Thus if think
that Santa Claus lives at the north pole, your thought is about Santa - it
has Santa as its intntional object - even though (bad news) there is no
Santa. Likewise it seems that there is a difference between thinking
about the Morning Star and thinking about about the Evening Star - you
might think something about one that you didn't think about the other - even
though the Morning Star is identical with the Evening Star (they are just
different names for Venus). So there are seem to be two intentional objects
even though there is only one planet.
3. A sentence is said to provide intentional (or oblique) context
if co-reffering terms cannot be substituted within it salva veritate, that
is, if it is referentially opaque.
Sources
[Martin 1994]
The Philospher's Dictionary - 2nd Edition by Robert M. Martin
Broadview Press, 1994
[Russell & Norvig 1995]
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach by Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig
Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1995