

Proseminar in Comparative Politics

Winter Term 2006:

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This survey of major topics in comparative politics is intended for Ph.D. students. Its purpose is to introduce some of the major theoretical and conceptual building blocks in the sub-field. The course proceeds thematically. Each week participants discuss a subset of the pertinent scholarly literature, usually focusing on a major theoretical controversy. Key methodological issues are addressed in context.

- 1 (Jan 10) Introduction
- 2 (Jan 17) Theory, Method, and their Application in Comparative Politics
- 3 (Jan 24) States & Nations, Nationalities & Ethnicities
- 4 (Jan 31) Political Development & Modernization
- 5 (Feb 7) Violence, Rebellion, & Revolution
- 6 (Feb 14) Political Culture & Political Attitudes
- 7 (Feb 21) Institutions & Institutional Analysis
- 8 (Mar 7) Participation, Collective Action, Interests, & Interest-Intermediation
- 9 (Mar 14) Elections, Electoral Systems, & Representation
- 10 (Mar 21) Parties, Party Systems, & Representation
- 11 (March 28) Presidents & Assemblies
- 12 (Apr 4) States, Markets, & Development
- 13 (Apr 11) Political Regimes & Democratization
- 14 (Apr 18) Government, Governance, & Policy

About the Course

PS 641 is basic training for comparative politics graduate students. It is not a “fact” course and should not be taken by masters’ students who seek an introduction to the politics of a region.

- ❑ The course focuses on the task of causal (positive) explanation. We compare and contrast answers to important questions and ask what makes an explanation “good.”
- ❑ Although this course stresses positive political analysis, normative concerns do inform the questions to which we seek answers. For example, two of the major normative challenges of political systems are to improve the representation of popular interests in policy and to enhance governmental accountability and performance. This course will survey some of what we know or what has been argued regarding how the configuration of polities, societies, and economies affect the pursuit and achievement of these normative goals. Other normative aims exist as well. For example, although we usually normatively privilege democratic participation, representation, and accountability over order, in many parts of the world lack of personal security effectively debar improvement of life and expansion of choice. Again, you will observe this normative interest in the background motivation of some of the positive selections you read. We do not engage in normative debate in this class, but the imprint of these “political theory” conversations is clear.
- ❑ Careful attention to research design and theoretical and empirical method is important for ensuring that our normative predilections do not bias the answers we offer to questions, among other reasons. A number of methodological issues will arise throughout the course, although research design is not a principal focus. Appropriate research designs and theoretical and empirical methods do not vary across substantive subfields; comparative politics does not have separate methodology from the rest of social science. However, opportunities and relative efficacy of different strategies can vary across substantive applications, and we will occasionally address some of these considerations.

Requirements:

The course has two main requirements. First, active participation is essential. We expect each student to have read the assigned selections each week and to be ready to contribute to the conversation. Second, each student will prepare **three** discussion papers of about 10 pages each, explained in detail in the accompanying memo. In the calculation of grades, participation counts 25% and papers count for 75%.

Office Hours:

Inglehart: Tuesday, 4-6pm, ISR 4255

Franzese: Tuesdays 12:15-1:45, 6658 Haven Hall (and by appointment: 4256 ISR)

Shaman Drum has ordered the following books, and we have also placed them on reserve:

Henry Brady and David Collier (eds.) *Rethinking Social Inquiry* Rowman and Littlefield, 2004.

Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Adam Przeworski et. al., *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Robert Putnam. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Donald Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society*, University of California Press, 1991.

Robert Bates. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Robert Dahl. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

Sidney Tarrow. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Peter Mair, ed., *The West European Party System*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso, 1991.

Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford : Blackwell, 1983.

Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Spring, 2005.

Powell, G. Gingham, Jr. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian & Proportional Visions*. New Haven: Yale UP.

Franzese, Robert J., Jr. 2002. *Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

1. Introduction (January 10). [39pp.]

The first class introduces the enterprise of comparative politics and the intellectual history of the field.

Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton: Princeton UP, ch. 1, pp. 3-31.

Ronald Rogowski, "How Inference in the Social (but Not the Physical) Sciences Neglects Theoretical Anomaly," ch. 5, pp. 75-84, in Henry Brady and David Collier, *Rethinking Social Inquiry*. New York: Rowman Littlefield.

2. Theory, Method, and their Application in Comparative Politics (January 17). [295pp.]

Theory Building: Microfoundations and Models of Actor Choice

"Introduction," in Jon Elster, ed., *Rational Choice*. New York: NYU Press, 1986: pp 1-33.

Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro. "Methodological Pathologies," from *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory*. New Haven: Yale University Press: pp.33-46.

Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 22, 2 (April 1980): 174-197.

Empirical Evaluation:

Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, chs. 4-6, pp. 115-230.

Henry Brady and David Collier (eds.) *Rethinking Social Inquiry*, Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, Chs. 1, 3, 6, 8, 12, pp. 3-20, 53-68, 85-102, 123-39, 195-228.

Franzese, Robert J., Jr. If available: "Context Matters: The Challenge of Multi-Causality, Context-Conditionality, and Endogeneity for Empirical Research in Comparative Politics," in *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, C. Boix, S. Stokes, eds., Oxford UP (forthcoming). If not: "Quantitative Empirical Methods and Context Conditionality [Extended (original submission)]," *CP: Newsletter of the Comparative Politics Organized Section of the American Political Science Association*, 2003, 14(1): 20-24:
(<http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/QuantitativeEmpiricalMethods.ContextConditionality.pdf>)

3. States & Nations, Nationalities & Ethnicities (January 24). [440pp.]

Hendrick Spruyt. *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, chs. 1-2, pts. III-IV, pp. 9-33, 151-94.

Ertman, Thomas. 1997. *Birth of the Leviathan*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Chs. 1,7, pp. 1-34, 317-24.

Jeffrey Herbst. "War and the State in Africa," *International Security* 14 (Spring 1990), pp. 117-39.

Mancur Olson. "The Criminal Metaphor," in *Power and Prosperity*. NY: Basic Books, 2000, pp. 3-24.

Douglass North. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. NY: WW Norton, 1981, ch. 3, "A Neoclassical Theory of the State," pp. 20-32.

Charles Tilly. *Coercion, Capital, and the European States*, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990, pp. 1-5, 14-95, 187-191.

Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1991 (also a Cornell University Press Publication), Chs. 1-3,5-6, pp. 1-46, 67-112.

Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford : Blackwell, 1983, Chs. 1-6, pp. 1-87.

4. Theories of Political Development and Modernization (January 31). [449pp.]

Krishan Kumar. 1990. "Modernization & Industrialization," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, reprinted in Malcolm Waters, ed. *Modernity. Critical Concepts. Volume I: Modernization*, Routledge, London and New York, p. 72-104.

Daniel Lerner. *The Passing of Traditional Society*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. ch. 1 (pp. 19-42).

Karl W. Deutsch. 1961. "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *The American Political Science Review* 55(3): 493-514.

Samuel Huntington. *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 1968, pp. 1-92.

Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, ch. 3, pp. 142-86.

Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005: Introduction and Part I, pp. 1-145.

Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Chs. 1,3,10; pp. 3-32, 53-82, 215-42.

5. Violence, Rebellion, and Revolution (February 7) [438pp.]

James Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976, pp. 1-34.

Samuel Popkin, *The Rational Peasant*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, pp. 1-31.

James Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, pp. 28-47.

Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, chs. 1, 3, 10; pp. 1-25, 55-80, 221-38.

Theda Skocpol. *States and Social Revolutions*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979: 3-42, 161-171.

Donald Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society*, University of California Press, 1991, chs 1-3, pp. 1-123.

Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life*, pp. 1-54, 281-300.

Ashutosh Varshney, "Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Rationality," *Perspectives on Politics*, March 2003, pp. 85-99.

James Fearon and David Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review*, December 1996, pp. 715-35.

6. Political Culture and Political Attitudes (February 14). [483pp.]

David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" *Comparative Politics*, 11 (January 1979): 127-146.

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, chs. 1, (5 or 6), 13, pp. 1-44,(117-35 or 136-67), 337-74 (chs. 1, 6, 7, 15 in hardback edition).

Robert Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of 'Ideology'," *The American Political Science Review* 65(3) (Sep., 1971): 651-681.

Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Chs. 7-14, pp. 149-300.

Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, chs. 1,2,7; pp. 1-48, 147-64.

Greif, Avner. 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies." *The Journal of Political Economy* 102(5): 912-950.

Axelrod, Robert. 1997. "The Dissemination of Culture: A Model with Local Convergence and Global Polarization." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41:203-26.

Bednar, Jenna and Scott Page. 2002. "Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture?" Forthcoming, *Rationality and Society*. (Available at <http://www.umich.edu/~jbednar/papers.htm>)

7. Institutions & Institutional Analysis (February 21). [218pp.]

Kathleen Theilen and Sven Steinmo, *Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992: 1-32.

Hall, Peter and Rosemary Taylor (1996). "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44: 936-957

James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. 1966. "Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions." *Governance* 9(3): 247-64.

Riker, William. 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." *The American Political Science Review* 74(2), pp. 432-446.

- Peter C. Ordeshook. 1980. "Political Disequilibrium and Scientific Inquiry: A Comment on William Riker's 'Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions'," *The American Political Science Review* 74(2): 447-450.
- Douglas Rae. 1980. "An Altimeter for Mr. Escher's Stairway: A Comment on William H. Riker's 'Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions'." *The American Political Science Review* 74(2): 451-455.
- Ordeshook, Peter C. 1990. "The Emerging Discipline of Political Economy," in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*, 1990, pp. 9-30.
- Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1, 2 (April 1989), pp. 131-147.
- Diermeier, Daniel, Keith Krehbiel. 2003. "Institutionalism as a Methodology," *J Theoretical Politics* 15(2): 123-44.
- Douglass North. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. NY: WW Norton, 1981, ch. 4, "A Framework for Analyzing Economic Organization in History," pp. 33-44.
- Douglass North and Barry Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," *Journal of Economic History* 49(4):803-32.
- Williamson, Oliver E. 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 38 (September): 595-613.

8. Participation, Collective Action, Interest-Intermediation (March 7) [477pp.]

Participation:

Sidney Verba, Norman Nie and Jae-On Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison* (1978), chs. 1-5, 14, pp. 1-93, 286-309.

Albert Hirschman. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, chs. 1-4, pp. 1-43.

Collective Action:

Mancur Olson. *The Rise and Decline of Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, chs. 2-3, pp. 17-74.

Interest-Intermediation:

Robert Dahl, "Pluralism Revisited," *Comparative Politics*, 10: 191-203.

Gallagher, Laver, Mair, *Representative Government in Modern Europe: Institutions, Parties, and Governments*, 5th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006, ch. 14, pp. 441-65.

Bashevkin, Sylvia, "Interest Groups and Social Movements," in LeDuc, Niemi, and Norris, eds., *Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in a Global Perspective*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 1996, pp. 134-159.

Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier. "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism,'" *American Political Science Review*, 73, 4 (1979): 967-986.

Deschouwer, Kris. "The Decline of Consociationalism," in Katz, Richard, and Mair, Peter, eds. *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*. London: Sage Publications, 1994: 80-108.

Kitschelt, Herbert. "Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities," *Comparative Political Studies*, 33, 6, 2000: 845-879.

Sidney Tarrow. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, chs. Intro-2, 5-8, pp. 1-47, 81-150.

9. Elections, Electoral Systems, and Voting (Who, How Many, How) (March 14). [437pp.]

Gallagher, Laver, Mair, *Representative Government in Modern Europe: Institutions, Parties, and Governments*, 5th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006, ch. 11, pp. 340-80.

Franklin, Mark N., "Electoral Participation," in LeDuc, Niemi, and Norris, eds., *Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in a Global Perspective*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 1996, pp. 216-35.

Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 1986. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective," *The American Political Science Review* 80(1): 17-43.

Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes, "Elections and Representation," *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 30-53.

Gary Cox, "Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination." *American Political Science Review* 93,1, 1999: 145-161. [Note: too brief substitute for 'instant-classic' book: *Making Votes Count*]

Amorim Neto, Octavio and Gary W. Cox. 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(1): 149-74.

Torben Iversen, "Political Leadership and Representation in West European Democracies: A Test of Three Models of Voting," *American Journal of Political Science*, 38, 1 (1994): 45-74.

Powell, G. Bingham, and Guy Whitten. "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context," *American Journal of Political Science* 37(2): 391-414.

Raymond M. Duch, and Randy Stevenson. 2005. "Context and the Economic Vote: A Multilevel Analysis," *Political Analysis* 2005 13(4):387-409; or

Raymond M. Duch, and Randy Stevenson. 2005. "Assessing the Magnitude of the Economic Vote over Time and Across Nations," forthcoming in *Electoral Studies*.

Kedar, Orit. 2005. "When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections," *American Political Science Review* 99(2): 185-199.

Arend Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-*

1990. New York: Oxford University Press. (152pp.) [Lecture notes available.]

Boix, Carles. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 93(3): 609-624.

Benoit, Kenneth. 2004. "Models of Electoral System Change." *Electoral Studies* 23(3): 363-84.

10. Parties (Why? What do? How?) & Party Systems (March 21). [437pp.]

Peter Mair, ed., *The West European Party System*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, chs. 1 (LaPalombara & Weiner) pp. 25-30, 5 (Kirchheimer) pp. 50-60, 9 (Lipset & Rokkan) pp. 91-138, 16 (Dalton & Flanagan) 232-46, 24 (Sartori) pp. 316-49. [114pp.]

Herbert Kitschelt. 1988. "Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems," *World Politics* 40(2): 194-234.

Aldrich, John. 1995. *Why Parties?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995: 3-61.

Anthony Downs. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row. Chs. 7-8, pp. 96-141.

Schumpeter, Joseph. 1942. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. Part IV, pp. 232-302.

Riker, William. 1982. *Liberalism against Populism*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. Chs. 1,10, pp. 1-16, 233-53.

Pradeep Chhibber, and Ken Kollman. 1998. "Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States," *The American Political Science Review* 92(2): 329-342.

Laver, Michael. "Policy and the Dynamics of Political Competition," *American Political Science Review* 99(2): 263-281; "Endogenous Political Parties," with Michel Schilperoord, unpublished: http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/laver/Endogenous_parties.pdf (36pp.)

11. Executives, Legislatures, Governments, & Representation (March 28). [378pp.]

Presidents & Parliaments:

Matthew Shugart & John Carey. *Presidents and Assemblies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, chs. 1-2, pp.1-27.

Arend Lijphart, ed. 1992. *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*. Oxford: Oxford UP. Introduction, pp. 1-27.

Stepan, Alfred, and Cindy Skach. "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism," *World Politics*, 46 October 1993, pp. 1-22.

Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?" from *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 3-75.

Presidential Systems

Matthew Shugart and Scott Mainwaring. *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Chs. 1, 11; pp. 12-54, 440-60.

Parliamentary Systems

Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle. "Government Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy," in Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes, eds. *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999: 279-96.

Coalition Formation: Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, ch. 6, pp. 90-115; Gallagher, Laver, Mair, *Representative Government in Modern Europe: Institutions, Parties, and Governments*, ch. 12, pp. 381-421. Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Coalitions and Cabinet Government," *The American Political Science Review* 84(3) (Sep 1990): 873-890. Michael Laver, "Models of Government Formation," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1998, v. 1, pp. 1-25. Kaare Strøm, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*. Cambridge UP, 1990, ch. 3, pp. 56-92. [See Franzese's Lecture Notes.]

12. States, Markets, and Development (April 4). [444pp.]

Robert Bates. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981: pp. 1-135.

Chalmers Johnson, "The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept", in Meredith Woo-Cummings, ed, *The Developmental State*, Cornell University Press, 1999, pp. 32-60.

Douglass North and Robert Paul Thomas. *The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, chs. 1-3, 11-12, Epilogue, pp. 1-32, 132-58

Douglass North. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. NY: WW Norton, 1981, ch. 15, "A Theory of Institutional Change and the Economic History of the Western World," pp. 201-9.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton Root, eds. 2000. *Governing for Prosperity*. New Haven: Yale UP. Chs. 1-3, 6, 8:

Bueno de Mesquita and Root, "When Bad Economics is Good Politics," pp. 1-16;

North, Summerhill, and Weingast, "Order, Disorder, and Economic Change: Latin America versus North America," pp.17-58.

Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith, "Political Institutions, Political Survival, and Policy Success," pp. 59-84.

Zak, "Socio-Political Instability and the Problem of Development," pp. 153-71.

Barro, Robert. "Democracy and the Rule of Law," pp. 209-31.

Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti. 1997. "The Politics of Growth: A Survey." In V. Bergström (ed.), *Government and Growth*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 11-57.

Perotti, R., 1996, "Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say," *Journal of Economic Growth*, 1: 149-87.

13. Political Regimes and Democratization (April 11). [404pp. read+244pp. skimmed]

Robert Dahl. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971 chs 1, 10-11, pp. 1-16, 202-27, SKIM: Chs. 2-9, pp. 17-201 (the charts are helpful guides; notes available).

Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Negotiating (and Renegotiating) Pacts," from *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, Ch. 4, pp. 37-47.

Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, Yale UP, 1977, ch. 1, pp. 1-20

SKIM: Donald Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society*, University of California Press, 1991, chs 4-7, pp. 124-282.

Samuel Huntington. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, preface & chs. 1-2, pp. xiii-xv, 3-108.

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know About Democratization after 20 Years," *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 2, pp. 115-44.

Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, chs. 1-2, pp. 13-141.

Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Intro-Ch. 1, pp. 1-64.

14. Government, Governance, and Policy (April 18). [401pp. read+252pp. skimmed]

Powell, G. Gingham, Jr. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian & Proportional Visions*. New Haven: Yale UP. [SKIM ENTIRE: 252pp. Notes available.]

Putnam, Robert D., with Leonardi, Robert, and Nanetti, Raffaella Y., *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton UP, 1993, chs. 1,4,6 (pp. 3-16, 83-120, 163-86).

George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartism," *British Journal of Political Science* 25, 3 (July 1995), 289-325.

Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins, eds., *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chs. by Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins, "The Institutional Determinants of Policy Outcomes," pp. 21-63, and by Shugart and Haggard. "Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems," pp. 64-102.

Robert Franzese, *Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies*, chs. 1,3,5; pp. 1-61, 126-95, 256-78 [Notes available].

Robert Franzese, "Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Economic Policies and Outcomes," *Annual Reviews of Political Science* 2002: Vol. 5: 369-421.

Political Science 641 Survival Skills

Overview

This course provides an overview of some of the core concepts and works in comparative politics. The syllabus is the product of a close review of related courses at comparable universities, along with the instructors' and our colleagues' thinking about what basic training in Comparative Politics entails. The main objective is to introduce key questions, classics, and modern approaches. The focus is on "the canon" and best current practices and *not* on any particular set of facts.

Schedule

This class meets for 2 hours (not enough, but the maximum allowed); please arrive promptly so that we may utilize our time fully.

Reading

The books listed near the start of the syllabus are available at Shaman Drum. Those and all other materials are (also) on electronic (if legally permissible) and/or physical reserve at the library.

The reading load for this course is necessarily heavy. The requirements include excerpts from many works to provide an introduction to the range of approaches offered to important topics, and to permit interesting comparisons and contrasts. Even so, the reading may prove overwhelming at times. Remember that *skimming* is an important professional skill. You need to read purposively or strategically, to identify:

- The main question the author wants to answer;
- The definition of the dependent variable, or what the author wants to explain;
- The main independent variables (causes, explanatory factors) the author thinks are important;
- The theory, or logical argument, that knits independent to dependent variables in causal explanations;
- The author's research design: the main types of evidence the author uses to test his or her ideas and the way the evidence was obtained.

Also remember that this course is a "theory" course, not a "fact" course. You don't have to memorize the histories or facts presented in what you read. If you are unable to keep pace even when reading strategically, we strongly encourage your forming peer discussion groups to assist each other.

Feeling Lost?

Depending on the kind of preparation you had as an undergraduate, some of the terms, methods, and basic facts assumed in the readings may be unfamiliar. Basic textbooks can help fill in gaps, as will we.

How to Write Papers for This Course

Three papers of about ten pages each are required. A paper may focus on a general question or cluster of questions from the handout or on a question of your own devising.

The papers should be literature reviews with a "spin." That is, they present a sketch of the major theories (explanations) and the results of your own assessment, focused on a sub-question. In some weeks they may focus on research design. The "literature review" with a spin is a genre you will use extensively in the course of your life as a social scientist. Some of the best examples of this genre appear in *World Politics* and *The Annual Review of Political Science*. You may want to look at some of the review essays there as well as one or two sample past essays.

For the purposes of this course, you should first aim to distill the theory in each selection and grasp the research design, if any, and the adequacy of the evidence. To this end, you want to begin by identifying the question the author asks. The question almost always seeks to understand a variation in an outcome of social importance, such as participation or violence. Next draw out the independent variables (causes) and dependent variables (effects) and ask whether these are adequately conceptualized and operationalized. Are the concepts clear? What is the theoretical argument that links the variables? If the author tries to evaluate the

theory empirically, what does s/he do? Was the choice of design acceptable, or could you recommend a better way to test the theory? Were the measures chosen to evaluate concepts adequate?

Next you will want to consider two or a few theories for the week and contemplate which is most adequate and why, at least with respect to the question you have posed. Gut reactions may be good leads, although you will need to translate those into real reasons. Mature scholarship asks not so much whether someone is right or wrong but under what kinds of circumstances a theory is useful. Indeed, much theoretical advancement occurs when a third theory arrives to subsume previously conflicting or incompletely successful theories, explaining how both predecessors are special cases of a broader, context-conditional explanation.

In most cases, you can skim the empirical details. Papers should not be discussions of “who got the history right.” Specialized courses and cognate courses in other disciplines are the better forum for mastering “the data.” This course is about mastering the questions, arguments, and theories.

Writing quality counts. Clear, careful writing is vital professional skill. It is essential for effective communication, and it lowers the amount of time a reader has to spend to “get your message.” You should check syntax, grammar, word choice, spelling, and neatness in your papers.

Aim for a clear, concise, professional tone. Better to demonstrate that you can clarify a previously murky argument or to show that you can create new approaches when previous ones disappoint than to belittle previous attempts.

Papers are due no later than class time. The instructors will not grade late papers, because that would put those who complied with the deadline at a disadvantage. If you think you will fail to meet the deadline, then you should plan to submit a later paper. You have control over which papers you choose to write, and that flexibility should be sufficient to alleviate scheduling burdens. You should write at least one paper before February 15.

The Course and Preparation for the Field Examination

Students should find the course and its readings useful preparation for comprehensive or general examinations. The prelim exam reading list builds on the 641 syllabus, although both are in constant flux.

Keeping a Journal

During the term, some reading selections will capture your interest more than others. Questions and puzzles, and maybe even some ideas about possible theoretical advances or resolutions, will probably strike you repeatedly. You won't have time to pursue most of these at the time, but keep a journal with a list of what you liked and did not and why, of questions you found interesting, and of any new ideas that arise. Such a journal could yield surprising guidance about directions you might pursue in your own research.

Grading

The three papers count for 75% of the final grade (25-25-25), and *participation also counts 25%*. Everyone is expected to be present and to participate in discussions. If you wish to be a member of the community of scholars, you incur obligations to listen to others and to help build on their ideas. Get into the habit of arriving on time and do not skip classes. Come prepared to join the conversation, even if that “just” means having a question ready to ask (often the most important form of engagement one can have in professional contexts). No one may decline to participate on cultural, shyness, or any other grounds. Public speaking is central to the working life of every academic, and you will find speaking throughout the course and in the future easier the earlier you start speaking regularly.

We will try to return papers within a week, but administrative and other emergencies occasionally render that deadline difficult to meet. Read the comments carefully. Most people find that they do less well on the first paper than they anticipate. That doesn't preclude an A grade in the course, but it does mean you need to pay attention to the guidance the comments provide.