

Proseminar in Comparative Politics
Fall Term 2007: Tu 2-4, 2325 Mason Hall
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This survey of major topics in comparative politics is intended for Ph.D. students. Its purpose is to introduce some of the major theoretical and conceptual building blocks in the sub-field. The course proceeds thematically. Each week participants discuss a subset of the pertinent scholarly literature, usually focusing on a major theoretical controversy. Key methodological issues are addressed in context.

- 1 *(Sep 4)* Introduction
- 2 *(Sep 11)* States & Nations, Nationalities & Ethnicities
- 3 *(Sep 18)* Political Development & Modernization
- 4 *(Sep 25)* Violence, Rebellion, & Revolution
- 5 *(Oct 2)* Political Culture & Political Attitudes
- 6 *(Oct 9)* Institutions & Institutional Analysis
- 7 *(Oct 16)* Participation, Cleavage Structure, Interests & Interest-Intermediation
- 8 *(Oct 30)* Elections, Electoral Systems, & Voting
- 9 *(Nov 6)* Parties & Party Systems
- 10 *(Nov 13)* Legislatures, Executives, & Governments
- 11 *(Nov 20)* States, Markets, & Development
- 12 *(Nov 27)* Regimes & Regime Transformation, Democratization & Development
- 13 *(Dec 4)* Governance & Policy
- 14 *(Dec 11)* Theoretical & Empirical Methodology

About the Course

PS 641 is basic training for comparative politics graduate students. It is not a “fact” course and should not be taken by masters’ students who seek an introduction to the politics of a region.

- ❑ The course focuses on the task of causal (positive) explanation. We compare and contrast answers to important questions and ask what makes an explanation “good.”
- ❑ Although this course stresses positive political analysis, normative concerns do inform the questions to which we seek answers. For example, two of the major normative challenges of political systems are to improve the representation of popular interests in policy and to enhance governmental accountability and performance. This course will survey some of what we know or what has been argued regarding how the configuration of polities, societies, and economies affect the pursuit and achievement of these normative goals. Other normative aims exist as well. For example, although we usually normatively privilege democratic participation, representation, and accountability over order, in many parts of the world lack of personal security effectively debars improvement of life and expansion of choice. Again, you will observe this normative interest in the background motivation of some of the positive selections you read. We do not engage in normative debate in this class, but the imprint of these “political theory” conversations is clear.
- ❑ Careful attention to research design and theoretical and empirical method is important for ensuring that our normative predilections do not bias the answers we offer to questions, among other reasons. A number of methodological issues will arise throughout the course, although research design is not a principal focus. Appropriate research designs and theoretical and empirical methods do not vary across substantive subfields; comparative politics does not have separate methodology from the rest of social science. However, opportunities and relative efficacy of different strategies can vary across substantive applications, and we will occasionally address some of these considerations.

Requirements:

The course has two main requirements. First, active participation is essential. We expect each student to have read the assigned selections each week and to be ready to contribute to the conversation. Second, each student will prepare **three** discussion papers of about 10 pages each, explained in detail following the reading list. In the calculation of grades, participation counts 25% and papers count for 75%.

Office Hours:

Varshney: TuWe, 11am-12pm, 7735 Haven

Franzese: Tu 11:45-1:45, 6658 Haven Hall (and by appointment: 4246 ISR)

Shaman Drum has ordered the following books, and we have also placed them on reserve:

- Bates, Robert. 1981. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*. U California P.
- Boix, Carles, and Susan Stokes, eds. 2007. *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford UP.
- Brady, Henry, and David Collier, eds. 2004. *Rethinking Social Inquiry*. Rowman and Littlefield.
- Franklin, Mark N. 2004. *Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies*. Cambridge UP.
- Franzese, Robert J., Jr. 2002. *Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies*. Cambridge UP.
- Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*. Cambridge UP.
- King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton UP.
- Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian & Proportional Visions*. Yale UP.
- Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Russell Sage.
- Varshney, Ashutosh. 2003. *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. Yale UP.

1. Introduction (Sep 4). [75pp.]

The Enterprise of Comparative Politics and its Intellectual History: Introduction.

Rogowski, R. 1993. "Comparative Politics," in Finifter, A., ed. *Political Science the State of the Discipline II*, American Political Science Association, pp. 431-50.

Laitin, D. 2002. "Comparative Politics: The State of the Subdiscipline," in Milner, H., Katznelson, I., eds. *Political Science: The State of the Discipline, Centennial Edition*, pp. 630-59.

Boix, C., S. Stokes. 2007. "Introduction," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pp. 1-25.

2. States & Nations, Nationalities & Ethnicities (Sep 11). [442pp.]

Hendrick Spruyt. 2007. "War, Trade, and State Formation," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pp. 211-36.

Hendrick Spruyt. 2002. "The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the Modern State," *Annual Review of Political Science* 5:127-49.

Ertman, Thomas. 1997. *Birth of the Leviathan*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Chs. 1,7, pp. 1-34, 317-24.

Jeffrey Herbst. "War and the State in Africa," *International Security* 14 (Spring 1990), pp. 117-39.

Mancur Olson. "The Criminal Metaphor," in *Power and Prosperity*. NY: Basic Books, 2000, pp. 3-24.

Douglass North. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. NY: WW Norton, 1981, ch. 3, "A Neoclassical Theory of the State," pp. 20-32.

Charles Tilly. *Coercion, Capital, and the European States*, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990, pp. 1-5, 14-95, 187-191.

Levi, Margaret. 2002. "The State of the Study of the State," in Milner & Katznelson, eds., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline, Centennial Edition*, pp. 33-55.

Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1991 (also a Cornell University Press Publication), Chs. 1-3,5-6, pp. 1-46, 67-112.

Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford : Blackwell, 1983, Chs. 1-6, pp. 1-87.

3. Political Development & Modernization (Sep 18). [380pp.]

Krishan Kumar. 1990. "Modernization & Industrialization," in Malcolm Waters, ed. *Modernity. Critical Concepts. Volume I: Modernization*, Routledge, London and New York, p. 72-104.

Daniel Lerner. *The Passing of Traditional Society*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. ch. 1 (pp. 19-42).

Karl W. Deutsch. 1961. "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *The American Political Science Review* 55(3): 493-514.

Samuel Huntington. *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 1968, pp. 1-92.

Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, ch. 3, pp. 142-86.

Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005: Introduction, Chs. 1-2, pp. 1-76.

Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Chs. 1,3,10; pp. 3-32, 53-82, 215-42.

4. Violence, Rebellion, & Revolution (Sep 25) [454pp.]

James Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976, pp. 1-34.

Samuel Popkin, *The Rational Peasant*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, pp. 1-31.

James Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, pp. 28-47.

Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, chs. 1, 3, 10; pp. 1-25, 55-80, 221-38.

Theda Skocpol. *States and Social Revolutions*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979: 3-42, 161-171.

Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life*, pp. 1-54, 281-300.

Ashutosh Varshney. 2007. "Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict," in C. Boix and S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Ch. 19, pp. 274-95.

Ashutosh Varshney, "Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Rationality," *Perspectives on Politics*, March 2003, pp. 85-99.

James Fearon and David Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review*, December 1996, pp. 715-35.

James Fearon and David Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," *International Organization* 54(4):845-77.

Steven Wilkinson. 2004. *Votes and Violence*. Cambridge UP. Chs. 1, 7-8, pp. 1-18, 204-42.

Kanchan Chandra. 2006. "What is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 9:397-424.

5. Political Culture and Political Attitudes (Oct 2). [408pp.]

David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" *Comparative Politics*, 11 (January 1979): 127-146.

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, chs. 1, 6, 13, pp. 1-44, 136-67, 337-74 (chs. 1, 7, 15 in hardback edition).

Robert Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of 'Ideology'," *The American Political Science Review* 65(3) (Sep., 1971): 651-681.

Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Chs. 4-8, pp. 94-148. [SKIM Rest.]

Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, chs. 1,2,7; pp. 1-48, 147-64.

Greif, Avner. 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies." *The Journal of Political Economy* 102(5): 912-950.

Laitin, David. 1995. "The Civic Culture at 30," *American Political Science Review* 89(1):168-73.

Laitin, David. 2000. "What is a Language Community?" *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1):142-55.

Laitin, David. 1988. "Political Culture and Political Preferences," *American Political Science Review* 82(2): 589-93.

Axelrod, Robert. 1997. "The Dissemination of Culture: A Model with Local Convergence and Global Polarization." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41:203-26.

Bednar, Jenna and Scott Page. 2007. "Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture? The Emergence of Cultural Behavior within Multiple Games" *Rationality and Society* 19(1):65-97.

6. Institutions & Institutional Analysis (Oct 9). [401pp.+86pp skimmed]

James G. March & Johan P. Olsen. 2007. "Elaborating the New Institutionalism," in R.A.W. Rhodes, S.A. Binder, & B.E. Rockman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ch. 1, pp. 3-21.

READ ONE, SKIM OTHER:

Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol. 2002. "Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science," in Milner & Katznelson, eds., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline, Centennial Edition*, pp. 693-721 (29pp).

Kathleen Thelen. 1999. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 369-404 (36pp).

READ ONE, SKIM OTHER:

Weingast, B. 2002. "Rational-Choice Institutionalism," in Milner & Katznelson, eds., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline, Centennial Edition*, pp. 660-92.

Shepsle, K. 2007. "Rational-Choice Institutionalism," in R.A.W. Rhodes, S.A. Binder, & B.E. Rockman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ch. 2, pp. 23-38.

Hall, Peter and Rosemary Taylor (1996). "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44: 936-957 (22pp).

- Riker, William. 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." *The American Political Science Review* 74(2), pp. 432-446 (15pp).
- Ordeshook, Peter C. 1990. "The Emerging Discipline of Political Economy," in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*, 1990, pp. 9-30 (22pp).
- Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1, 2 (April 1989), pp. 131-147 (17pp).
- Diermeier, Daniel, Keith Krehbiel. 2003. "Institutionalism as a Methodology," *J Theoretical Politics* 15(2): 123-44 (22pp).
- Helmke, G., S. Levitsky. 2004. "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda," *Perspectives on Politics* 2(4):725-40 (26pp).

READ FIRST, SKIM SECOND:

- Douglass North. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. NY: WW Norton, 1981, ch. 4, "A Framework for Analyzing Economic Organization in History," pp. 33-44 (12pp).
- Douglass North and Barry Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," *Journal of Economic History* 49(4):803-32 (30pp).
- Weingast, Barry R. 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," *The American Political Science Review* 91(2):245-63 (19pp).
- Williamson, Oliver E. 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 38 (September): 595-613 (19pp).
- Mancur Olson. *The Rise and Decline of Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, chs. 2-3, pp. 17-74 (58pp).
- Elinor Ostrom. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. Cambridge UP. Chs. 1,2,6, pp. 1-57, 182-216 (92pp).

7. Participation, Cleavage-Structure, Interests & Interest-Intermediation (Oct 23) [420pp.]

- Sidney Verba, Norman Nie and Jae-On Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison* (1978), chs. 1-5, 14, pp. 1-93, 286-309.
- Albert Hirschman. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, chs. 1-4, pp. 1-43.
- Robert Dahl, "Pluralism Revisited," *Comparative Politics*, 10: 191-203.
- Gallagher, Laver, Mair, *Representative Government in Modern Europe: Institutions, Parties, and Governments*, 5th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006, ch. 14 ("Politics Outside of Parliament", pp. 441-65.
- Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, 2006, "Citizen-Politician Linkages. An Introduction," and "A Research Agenda for the Study of Citizen-Politician Linkages and Democratic Accountability," in Kitschelt & Wilkinson, eds., *Patrons, Clients, or Policies?* Cambridge UP, pp. 1-50, 322-41.

Posner, Daniel. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, Cambridge UP. Chs. 1,5-6, pp. 1-20,130-78.

Selway, Joel. 2007. "Cross-cutting Cleavages: Theory and Measurement of Social Structure," unpublished (42pp).

S. Whitefield. 2002. "Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 5:181-200.

Tarrow, Sidney and Charles Tilly. "Contentious Politics and Social Movements," in C. Boix and S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Ch. 19, pp. 435-60.

8. Elections, Electoral Systems, & Voting (Oct 30). [349pp.+186pp. skimmed, some w/ lecture notes]

SKIM w/ DETAILED LECTURE NOTES AVAILABLE:

Gallagher, M., Laver, M., Mair, P. *Representative Government in Modern Europe: Institutions, Parties, and Governments*, 5th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006, ch. 11, "Elections, Electoral Institutions, and Referendums," pp. 340-80.

Arend Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. Oxford UP. Chs. 1-3,5, pp. 1-77, 95-117 (100pp.) [Lecture notes available.]

READ ONE, SKIM OTHER:

Taagepara, R. 2007. "Electoral Systems," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford UP. Ch. 28, pp. 678-702.

Shaun Bowler. 2007. "Electoral Systems," in R.A.W. Rhodes, S.A. Binder, & B.E. Rockman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ch. 29, 577-94.

Franklin, Mark. 2004. *Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945*. Cambridge UP. Chs. 1-2,5,7-8, pp. 1-58, 119-50, 171-224.

Clark, W.R., Golder, M. 2006. "Rehabilitating Duverger's Law: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws," *Comparative Political Studies* 39(6): 679-708.

Gary Cox, "Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination." *American Political Science Review* 93,1, 1999: 145-161. [Note: too brief substitute for 'instant-classic' book: *Making Votes Count*]

READ ONE, SKIM OTHER:

Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes, "Elections and Representation," *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999, pp. 30-53.

Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 2004. "Political Representation in Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 7:273-96.

Powell, G. Bingham, and Guy Whitten. "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context," *American Journal of Political Science* 37(2): 391-414.

Raymond M. Duch. 2007. "Comparative Studies of the Economy and the Vote," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford UP. Ch. 33, pp. 805-44.

Kedar, Orit. 2005. "When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections," *American Political Science Review* 99(2): 185-199.

Shugart, M., Wattenberg, M. 2005. "Conclusion: Are Mixed-Member Systems the Best of Both Worlds?" in Shugart & Wattenberg, eds., *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford UP, ch. 25, pp. 571-96.

Boix, Carles. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 93(3): 609-624.

Benoit, Kenneth. 2004. "Models of Electoral System Change." *Electoral Studies* 23(3): 363-84.

9. Parties & Party Systems (Nov 6). [461pp.]

Peter Mair, ed., *The West European Party System*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, chs. 1 (LaPalombara & Weiner) pp. 25-30, 5 (Kirchheimer) pp. 50-60, 9 (Lipset & Rokkan) pp. 91-138, 24 (Sartori) pp. 316-49. [114pp.]

Boix, Carles. "The Emergence of Parties and Party Systems," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Ch. 21, pp. 499-521.

Kitschelt, Herbert. "Party Systems," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Ch. 22, pp. 522-54.

Aldrich, John. 1995. *Why Parties?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995: 3-61.

John Aldrich. 2007. "Political Parties In and Out of Legislatures," in R.A.W. Rhodes, S.A. Binder, & B.E. Rockman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ch. 28, 555-76.

Anthony Downs. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row. Chs. 7-8, pp. 96-141.

Riker, William. 1982. *Liberalism against Populism*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. Chs. 1,10, pp. 1-16, 233-53.

Pradeep Chhibber, and Ken Kollman. 1998. "Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States," *The American Political Science Review* 92(2): 329-342.

Laver, Michael. "Policy and the Dynamics of Political Competition," *American Political Science Review* 99(2): 263-281.

Stokes, Susan. 1999. "Political Parties and Democracy," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:243-67.

Frances Hagopian. 2007. "Parties and Voters in Emerging Democracies: Structures, Strategies, and Stability," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pp. 582-603.

Stathis Kalyvas. 1999. "The Decay and Breakdown of Communist One-Party Systems," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:323-43.

10. Legislatures, Executives, & Governments (Nov 13). [383pp.+308 skimmed, some w/ lecture notes]

READ ONE, SKIM OTHER: (22pp)

Gary Cox. 2006. "The Organization of Democratic Legislatures," in B. Weingast & D. Wittman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy* 141-61.

John Carey. 2007. "Legislative Organization," in R.A.W. Rhodes, S.A. Binder, & B.E. Rockman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ch. 22, 431-54.

READ ONE, SKIM OTHER: (24pp)

Gerald Gamm & John Huber. 2002. "Legislatures as Political Institutions: Beyond the Contemporary Congress," in Milner, H., Katznelson, I., eds. *Political Science: The State of the Discipline, Centennial Edition*, pp. 313-41.

Michael Laver. 2006. "Legislatures and Parliaments in Comparative Context," in B. Weingast & D. Wittman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy* 121-40.

David Samuels. 2007. "Separation of Powers," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pp. 703-26. (24pp)

READ ONE, SKIM OTHER: (27pp)

Matthew Shugart & John Carey. *Presidents and Assemblies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, chs. 1-2, pp.1-27.

Arend Lijphart, ed. 1992. *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*. Oxford: Oxford UP. Introduction, pp. 1-27.

READ TWO OF THESE THREE, SKIM THIRD: (90ppr, 68pps)

Matthew Shugart and Scott Mainwaring. *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Chs. 1, 11; pp. 12-54, 440-60.

Stepan, Alfred, Cindy Skach. "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism," *World Politics*, 46 October 1993, pp. 1-22.

Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?" from *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 3-75.

SKIM EACH OF THESE, and REVIEW the DETAILED LECTURE NOTES AVAILABLE: (66pps)

Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, ch. 6, pp. 90-115

Gallagher, Laver, Mair, *Representative Government in Modern Europe: Institutions, Parties, and Governments*, ch. 12, pp. 381-421.

Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Coalitions and Cabinet Government," *The American Political Science Review* 84(3) (Sep 1990): 873-890. (18pp)

Kaare Strøm, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*. Cambridge UP, 1990, ch. 3, pp. 56-92. (37pp)

READ ONE, SKIM OTHER: (20pp)

Kaare Strøm & Benjamin Nyblade. 2007. "Coalition Theory and Government Formation," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pp. 782-803.

Daniel Diermeier. 2006. "Coalition Government," in B. Weingast & D. Wittman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy* 162-79.

Michael Laver. 2003. "Government Termination," in *Annual Review of Political Science* 6:23-40. (18pp)

READ ONE, SKIM OTHER: (17pp, 29pp)

Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle. "Government Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy," in Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes, eds. *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999: 279-96.

José María Maravall. 2007. "Accountability and the Survival of Governments," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford UP. Ch. 37, pp. 910-38.

Mathew Soberg Shugart. 2007. "Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations," in R.A.W. Rhodes, S.A. Binder, & B.E. Rockman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ch. 18, 344-65. (22pp)

READ FIRST, SKIM NEXT TWO: (30ppr, 34pps)

Pablo Beramendi. 2007. "Federalism," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pp. 752-781.

Brian Galligan. 2007. "Comparative Federalism," in R.A.W. Rhodes, S.A. Binder, & B.E. Rockman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ch. 14, pp. 261-80.

Jonathan Rodden. 2006. "Federalism," in B. Weingast & D. Wittman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy* 357-70.

READ ONE, SKIM OTHER: (24pp)

Jenna Bednar. 2007. *The Robust Federation*. Cambridge UP. Appendix B: "Background: Federalism's Promise." (24pp).

Erik Wibbels. 2006. "Madison in Baghdad? Decentralization and Federalism in Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9:165-88.

11. States, Markets, & Development (Nov 20). [401pp.]

Robert Bates. 1981. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*. U Cal P, Pp. 1-135. (Lecture notes available).

Robert Bates. 2006. "The Role of the State in Development," in B. Weingast & D. Wittman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy* 708-22

Chalmers Johnson, "The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept", in Meredith Woo-Cummings, ed, *The Developmental State*, Cornell University Press, 1999, pp. 32-60.

Atul Kohli. 2002. "State, Society, and Development," in Milner, H., Katznelson, I., eds. *Political Science: The State of the Discipline, Centennial Edition*, pp. 84-117.

Douglass North and Robert Paul Thomas. *The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, chs. 1-3, Epilogue, pp. 1-32, 157-8

Douglass North. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. NY: WW Norton, 1981, ch. 15, "A Theory of Institutional Change and the Economic History of the Western World," pp. 201-9.

B. Bueno de Mesquita, H. Root, eds. 2000. *Governing for Prosperity*. Yale UP. Chs. 3, 8:
Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith, "Political Institutions, Political Survival, and Policy Success," pp. 59-84.

Barro, Robert. "Democracy and the Rule of Law," pp. 209-31

Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti. 1997. "The Politics of Growth: A Survey." In V. Bergström (ed.), *Government and Growth*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 11-57.

JA Robinson. 2006. "Economic Development and Democracy," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9:503-27.

Philip Keefer. 2007. "Beyond Elections: Politics, Development, and the Poor Performance of Poor Democracies," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pp. 886-909.

12. Regimes & Regime Transformation, Democratization & Development (Nov 27). [469pp. +22 skim]

Robert Dahl. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971 chs 1-2, 10-11, pp. 1-32, 202-27.

B. Bueno de Mesquita, J.D. Morrow, R.M. Siverson, A. Smith. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. MIT Press. Chs. 1-3, pp. 3-106.

Samuel Huntington. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, chs. 1-2, pp. 3-108.

Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, chs. 1,2, pp. 13-59, 78-137.

Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Intro-Ch. 1, pp. 1-64.

Barbara Geddes. 2007. "What Causes Democratization?" in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pp. 317-39.

READ ONE, SKIM OTHER:

Timothy Frye. 2007. "Economic Transformation and Comparative Politics," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pp. 939-?.

D.L. Yang. 2006. "Economic Transformation and Its Political Discontents in China," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9:143-64.

13. Governance & Policy (Dec 4). [547pp. + 438 skimmed]

Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian & Proportional Visions*. New Haven: Yale UP, pp. 3-114, 233-54 (134pp); **SKIM REST**: (118pp.) [Lecture notes available.]

Putnam, Robert D., with Leonardi, Robert, and Nanetti, Raffaella Y., *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton UP, 1993, chs. 1,4,6 (pp. 3-16, 83-120, 163-86) (76pp).

George Tsebelis. 2002. *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Russell Sage. Intro-ch. 2 7, 9 (pp. 1-66, 161-86, 207-21 (107pp), **SKIM REST**: 67-160, 187-206,222-289 (181pp).

Robert Franzese. 2002. *Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies*. Cambridge UP. Chs. 1,3,5; pp. 1-61, 126-95 (129pp); **SKIM REST**: 62-125, 196-278 (149pp). [Lecture notes available].

Recommended Starts on Further Reading in Comparative Governance & Policy Implications:

Robert Franzese. 2002. "Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Economic Policies and Outcomes," *Annual Reviews of Political Science* 5:369-421.

Peter Hall & David Soskice, eds. 2001. "Introduction" to *Varieties of Capitalism*, pp. 1-70.

James Alt. 2002. "Comparative Political Economy: Credibility, Accountability, and Institutions," in H. Milner & I. Katznelson, eds., *Political Science: State of the Discipline, Centennial Edition*, 147-71.

Barbara Geddes. 2002. "The Great Transformation in the Study of Politics in the Developing World," in H. Milner & I. Katznelson, eds., *Political Science: State of the Discipline, Centennial Edition*, 342-70.

S. Haber. 2006. "Authoritarian Government," in B. Weingast & D. Wittman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, Oxford University Press, pp. 693-707.

- R. Wintrobe. 2006. "Dictatorship: Analytic Approaches," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Oxford University Press, pp. 363-395.
- Torben Iversen & David Soskice. 2006. "New Macroeconomics and Political Science," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9:425-53.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini. 2003. *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. MIT Press.

14. Theoretical & Empirical Methodology (Dec 11). [395pp.+198 skimmed]

Theory Building: Microfoundations and Models of Actor Choice

- David Austin-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1998. "Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Positive Political Science," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1:259-87.
- Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro. "Methodological Pathologies," in *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory*. New Haven: Yale University Press: pp.33-46.
- Bryan Jones. 1999. "Bounded Rationality," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:297-321.

READ ONE, SKIM OTHER:

- Elinor Ostrom. 2007. "Collective Action Theory," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pp. 186-208.
- Elinor Ostrom. 1998. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action," *The American Political Science Review* 92(1):1-22.
- Paul Pierson. 2000. "Path Dependence, Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review* 94(2):251-67.
- Scott Page. 2006. "Path Dependence," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1(1):87-115.

Empirical Evaluation:

- Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton UP, ch. 1, pp. 3-31, **SKIM REST**: 32-230.
- Henry Brady and David Collier (eds.) *Rethinking Social Inquiry*, Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, Parts I, V, pp. 3-50, 195-271.
- Chris Achen. 2002. "Toward a New Political Methodology: Microfoundations and ART," *Annual Review of Political Science* 5:423-50.
- Peter Hall. 2003. "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research" in J. Mahoney & D. Rueschemeyer, eds., *Comparative Historical Analysis: New Approaches and Methods*, Cambridge UP, pp: 373-406.
- Robert J. Franzese, Jr. 2007. "Multicausality, Context-Conditionality, and Endogeneity," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pp. 27-72.
- John Gerring. 2007. "The Case Study: What it is and What it Does," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pp. 90-122.

Elisabeth Jean Wood. 2007. "Field Research," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pp. 123-46.

Adam Przeworski. 2007. "Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?" in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pp. 147-71.

Robert H. Bates. 2007. "From Case Studies to Social Science: A Strategy for Political Research," in C. Boix & S. Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pp. 172-85.

Andrew Bennet & Colin Elman. 2006. "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case-Study Research," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9:455-76.

Further Considerations for starts on deeper explorations:

Arthur Lupia & Jamie Druckman. "Preference Formation," *Annual Review of Political Science* 3:1-24).

Charles Cameron & Rebecca Morton. 2002. "Formal Theory Meets Data," in H. Milner & I. Katznelson, eds., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline, Centennial Edition*, pp. 784-804.

Donald Green & Alan Gerber. 2002. "Reclaiming the Experimental Tradition in Political Science," in H. Milner & I. Katznelson, eds., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline, Centennial Edition*, pp. 805-32.

Scott Page & Ken Kollman. 2008. "Agent-Based Models," in *Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, J. Box-Steffensmeier, H. Brady, & D. Collier, eds., Oxford UP, pp. XX-XX. (Basic equivalent at: <http://www.cscs.umich.edu/~spage/Handcompecon.pdf>) (25pp.)

Brady & Collier: Rest.

Political Analysis. Special Issue "Causal Complexity and **Qualitative Methods**," Vol. 14(3).

J. Box-Steffensmeier, H. Brady, D. Collier, eds. 2008. *Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*.

A Guide to Political Science 641

Overview

This course provides an overview of some of the core concepts and works in comparative politics. The syllabus is the product of a close review of related courses at comparable universities, along with the instructors' and our colleagues' thinking about what basic training in Comparative Politics entails. The main objective is to introduce key questions, classics, and modern approaches. The focus is on "the canon" and best current practices and *not* on any particular set of facts.

Schedule

This class meets for 2 hours (not enough, but the maximum allowed); please arrive promptly so that we may utilize our time fully.

Reading

The books listed near the start of the syllabus are available at Shaman Drum and campus bookstores. Those and all other materials are also (if legal) on electronic and/or physical reserve at the library.

The reading load for this course is necessarily heavy. The requirements include excerpts from many works to provide an introduction to the range of approaches offered to important topics, and to permit interesting comparisons and contrasts. Even so, the reading may prove overwhelming at times. Remember that *skimming* is an important professional skill. You need to read purposively or strategically, to identify:

- The main question the author wants to answer;
- The definition of the dependent variable, or what the author wants to explain;
- The main independent variables (causes, explanatory factors) the author thinks are important;
- The theory, or logical argument, that knits independent to dependent variables in causal explanations;
- The author's research design: the main types of evidence the author uses to test his or her ideas and the way the evidence was obtained.

Also remember that this course is a "theory" course, not a "fact" course. You don't have to memorize the histories or facts presented in what you read. If you are unable to keep pace even when reading strategically, we strongly encourage your forming peer discussion groups to assist each other.

Feeling Lost?

Depending on the kind of preparation you had as an undergraduate, some of the terms, methods, and basic facts assumed in the readings may be unfamiliar. Basic textbooks can help fill in gaps, as will we.

How to Write Papers for This Course

Three papers of about ten pages each are required. A paper may focus on a general question or cluster of questions from the handout or on a question of your own devising.

The papers should be focused literature reviews with a "spin." That is, they present a sketch of *some* of the major theories (explanations) and the results of your own assessment, focused on a particular part of that week's readings. In some weeks, they may focus on research design. The "spin" component is crucial; it gives your own input to the literature, suggesting new direction, new syntheses, new questions from or for the reviewed work. Such "literature review with a spin" is a genre in which you will travel extensively as a social scientist; introductions to articles and books, in setting questions and summarizing approaches and answers to be offered, often have this flavor. Some of the best examples of this genre as stand-alone works appear in *The Annual Review of Political Science* and the *Oxford Handbooks* series. You may want to consider some of the review essays there as well as one or two sample past essays as examples.

In your papers, you should first aim to distill the theory in each selection and grasp the research design, if any, and the adequacy of the evidence. To this end, you want to begin by identifying the question the author asks. The question usually seeks to understand a variation in an outcome of social importance, such as participation or violence. Next draw out the independent variables (causes) and dependent variables (effects) and ask whether these are adequately conceptualized and operationalized. Are the concepts clear? What is the theoretical argument that links the variables? If the author tries to evaluate the theory empirically, what does s/he do? Was the choice of design acceptable, or could you recommend a better way to test the theory? Were the measures chosen to evaluate concepts adequate?

Next you will want to consider two or a few theories for the week and contemplate which is most adequate and why, at least with respect to the question you have posed. Gut reactions may be good leads, although you will need to translate those into real reasons. Mature scholarship asks not so much whether someone is right or wrong but under what

kinds of circumstances a theory is useful. Indeed, much theoretical advancement occurs when a third theory arrives to subsume previously conflicting or incompletely successful theories, explaining how both predecessors are special cases of a broader, context-conditional explanation. In any event, here is likely where you will explicitly expound your *spin*, your suggestion for advancing the literature, although the critiques and assessments with which you preceded this explicit elaboration of your new contribution should, in most instances, presage where you intend to go with your *spin*.

In most cases, you can skim the empirical details. Papers should not be discussions of “who got the history right.” Specialized courses and cognate courses in other disciplines are the better forum for mastering “the data.” This course is about mastering the questions, arguments, and theories.

Writing quality counts. Clear, careful writing is a vital professional skill. It is essential for effective communication, and it lowers the amount of time a reader has to spend to “get your message.” You should check syntax, grammar, word choice, spelling, and neatness in your papers. Aim for a clear, concise, professional tone. Better to demonstrate that you can clarify a previously murky argument or to show that you can create new approaches when previous ones disappoint than to belittle previous attempts. Split infinitives, dangling prepositions, pronouns without antecedents, unnecessarily wordy constructions (like “so as to” or “in order to,” for each of which “to” will usually suffice” and several other grammatical foibles that have become common even in quality newspapers and journals lead to weak and ineffective prose and should be avoided. Passive voice, too, in most instances is avoidable and should be eschewed. (The present document is, thus, a poor example for your prose!) Passive voice is weak and ineffectual compared to active voice, but, even more damning for theoretical exposition, passive voice relatively obscures the subject of the sentence, which does the action. Passive voice is, therefore, very useful and widely used in politics, but, for the same reason, political scientists should avoid it! Theories must clearly indicate who or what produces outcomes; active voice will help you, almost force you, to confront that squarely.

Papers are due no later than the Monday morning before class because the instructors will make every effort to read, grade, and comment on them for class. If you think you will fail to meet the deadline, then you should plan to submit a later paper. You have control over which papers you choose to write, and that flexibility should be sufficient to alleviate scheduling burdens.

The Course and Preparation for the Field Examination

Students should find the course and its readings useful preparation for comprehensive or general examinations. The prelim exam reading list builds on the 641 syllabus, although both are in constant flux.

Keeping a Journal

During the term, some reading selections will capture your interest more than others. Questions and puzzles, and maybe even some ideas about possible theoretical advances or resolutions, will probably strike you repeatedly. You won't have time to pursue most of these at the time, but keep a journal with a list of what you liked and did not and why, of questions you found interesting, and of any new ideas that arise. Such a journal could yield surprising guidance about directions you might pursue in your own research.

Grading

The three papers count for 75% of the final grade (25-25-25), and *participation also counts 25%*. Everyone is expected to be present and to participate in discussions. If you wish to be a member of the community of scholars, you incur obligations to listen to others and to help build on their ideas. Get into the habit of arriving on time and do not skip classes. Come prepared to join the conversation, even if that “just” means having a question ready to ask (often the most important form of engagement one can have in professional contexts). No one may decline to participate on cultural, shyness, or any other grounds. Public speaking is central to the working life of every academic, and you will find speaking throughout the course and in the future easier the earlier you start speaking regularly.

We will try to return papers within a week, but administrative and other emergencies occasionally render that deadline difficult to meet. Read the comments carefully. Most people find that they do less well on the first paper than they anticipate. That doesn't preclude an A grade in the course, but it does mean you need to pay attention to the guidance the comments provide.