

PS 460.2, Wks7-8: Parties & Party Systems

I. Patterns in Party Politics (GLM ch. 7)

A. Party System:

1. DEF: character of political competition in a country, described in terms of the relative strengths & policy positions of its parties (GLM, p. 151)
2. Though each system is in some ways unique, many similarities in party systems across countries

B. Seven West European Party Sys Described: common basis in left/right divide defines the competition

1. UK

a. Description:

- (1) Major Parties: the players
- (2) Relative Strengths:
- (3) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time

b. “Responsible Party Government”

- (1) ideological decision sharply defined for voters
- (2) cabinet government with relatively unchecked power

2. Sweden

a. Description:

- (1) Major Parties: the players
- (2) Relative Strengths:
- (3) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time

b. Key differences from the UK

- (1) Soc Dems much more successful than Lab
- (2) Soc Dems not quite monop of left—small but persistent comm (left) party

- (3) Moderates quite far from monop non-soc opposition
 - (a) Liberals–center-type libs
 - (b) Center Party–agrarian
 - (c) Christian Democrats–newer
- (4) Rel. recent strength Ecology Party & New Dem (rt, protest)

3. Germany

a. Description:

- (1) Major Parties: the players
- (2) Relative Strengths:
- (3) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time

b. Key differences from the UK

- (1) relatively strong position of FDP; it more “conservative” than UK Liberals; sec. opp. to Cath. pol. rather than lib. opp. to sec. conserv.
- (2) CDU/CSU=Christian-Dem not secular conservative party
 - (a) gen. more receptive to “social justice” concerns, thus somewhat more centrist on econ. policy
 - (b) gen. more concerned w/ “moral issues” & more conserv. on social policy, esp. where major churches have stance
 - (c) CSU is the more Catholic & socially conservative of two
- (3) SPD was one of most radical in 19th C, one of most moderate now
 - (a) excluded for its extremism until ‘66, after Bad Godesberg commitment to free-mrkt & NATO
 - (b) since ‘66 increasingly de-ideologized, increasingly pro-system, & toward consensual politics
- (4) TRIANGULAR POLITICS: CDU/CSU–FDP–SPD, how do they ally on different sorts of issues?

c. Changes in the 80s & 90s

- (1) Greens–right around threshold since 80s, possible impacts on governmental coalition patterns?
- (2) 1990 Unification: 12 mill. new, presumably volatile voters,

originally mostly to CDU & FDP benefit, recently turned against them. Why?

- (3) Greens allying w/ related social movements, becoming more effectively organized to compete
- (4) *Die Republikaner*—not yet parliamentary player, but disturbing coupled w/ recently rising social strife
- (5) *Politikverdrossenheit*—disillusionment w/ politics

4. Netherlands

a. Description:

- (1) Major Parties: the players: PvdA, CDA, VVD
- (2) Relative Strength: $1/3 + 1/3 + 1/5$ + smaller, episodic players
- (3) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time

b. Triangular + small party complications

5. Italy (pre-1994)

a. Description:

- (1) Maj Parts: MSI-Lib-Rep-DC-PSDI-PSI-PCI + many smaller
- (2) Relative Strengths: DC $1/3$, PCI $1/3$
- (3) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time

b. More fractionalized & polarized than most other systems (nearest comparison was French IVth)

c. Apparent Changes

- (1) Major Parties: AN-Lega-Forza-Centro-PSI-Greens-PDS-Rifondazione, + Rete
- (2) Relative Strengths: roughly even left-right blocks
- (3) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time (so far steady alternation: RtBlck-LftBlck-RtBlck...)

6. France

a. IVth Republic: PCF ($1/4$)—PSF ($1/5$)—Rad ($1/10$)—Cath MRP ($1/4$)—Gaullists ($1/5$)—Poujadists ($1/10$) + smaller

b. Fifth Republic: PCF—PS—UDF—RPR, + smaller

- (1) Two-bloc system: what facilitated the change?
- (2) Shift in balance of strength within each bloc
- (3) *Front National, Generation Ecologie, Les Verts*

7. Spain

- a. early volatility & flux, ill-defined loose alliances
- b. early domination by Suarez' UnionDemCtr => broad Ctr-Rt & Ctr-Lft coals
- c. collapses about '82, replaced by PSOE domination w/ right in fragmented disarray
- d. Emerging system: PCE+PSOE+smaller lefts vs. PP (sec cons) + PC (people's coal, loose lib-cath-cons coal) + bunch of regional parties

C. Uniformity & Diversity

1. Maj commonality: tendency toward Lft-Rt competition, occasional exceptions dominated by center
2. Core Differences
 - a. location of liberals:
 - (1) Egalitarian (center-left): e.g., UK Liberal Democrats
 - (2) Libertarian (center-right): e.g., German FDP or Italian PLI
 - b. whether maj lft or, more rarely, rt party can govern alone
 - c. strongly structured v. loose/fragmented govt'l alliances
 - d. Degree of party discipline
3. Nature of Left-Right Competition
 - a. Left working-class parties: common historical origins of both major strands (Soc, Comm)
 - b. Right middle/upper-class parties: more variegated origins & politics
 - (1) religious v. secular conservatives
 - (2) rural/farming v. industrial/service

- (3) some rightist cultural linguistic, subcultural, regional
- c. Compare development of Welfare State across configurations of left/right competition
- d. Complications arising: New Lft & New Rt & new issues
- 4. Conflict within Left & Right
 - a. Socialist/Communist & Right/Far-Right more usually bitter enemies than allies
 - b. Systems with much electoral strength at extremes tend to produce centrist multiparty coalitions
 - c. Growing Disillusionment w/ Politics = > anti-party parties
 - (1) sources of this trend?
 - (2) effects of this trend?
- 5. Other Dimensions of Party Politics
 - a. Other cleavage lines
 - (1) religion
 - (2) cultural/ethnic/linguistic
 - (3) post-materialist/materialist
 - b. Within the broad rubric of Left-Right Competition: social & economic dimensions

II. Party Families (GLM ch. 8)

A. Definition/Grouping Characteristics

- 1. Origins
- 2. Links they form among selves, w/in & across countries
- 3. Similarity of (broad) policy stances

B. Families of the Left

- 1. Social Democrats (shrinking support or unchanged)
- 2. Communists (shrinking support in most places, recent

- Italy exceptional but perhaps not comm. any more)
3. New Left (growing in most places, social democrats usually moving to absorb eventually)
 4. Greens (growing or unchanged support in most places)
- C. Families of the Center & Right
1. Christian Democrats (shrinking or unchanged support in most places, until recently)
 2. Secular Conservatives (growing or unchanged support in most places, until recently)
 3. Liberals (growing support in most places, but some places the CDs or Sec Cons. moving to absorb)
 4. Agrarian/Rural (shrinking or unchanged support)
 5. Far Right (growing support in some places)
- D. Other
1. regionalist, nationalist (unchanged or growing support)
 2. miscellaneous, protest (growing support in most places)
- E. Patterns of Partisan Competition among Families
1. Christian-Democrat-led Right
 - a. left strong, united (AU, GE)
 - b. left strong, divided (IT)
 - c. left weak, united or divided (BE, LU, NE, SZ)
 2. Secular-Conservative-led Right
 - a. left strong, united (UK)
 - b. left strong, divided (Fin, Ice, Fra)
 3. Fragmented Right, Left strong, united (Den, Nor, Swe)

III. “Party Systems & Structures of Competition,” ch. 3 by Peter Mair in LNN, Comparing Democracies

A. Summary: “...the whole notion of a party system is centered on the assumption that a stable structure of partisan competition exists[in elections & for control of government]. Structures of competition can be seen as closed (and predictable) or open (and unpredictable), depending on the patterns of alternation in government, the degree of innovation or persistence in processes of government formation, & the range of parties gaining access to government” (p. 84).

B. Brief Intellectual History Party-Sys Classification Schemes

1. Duverger (1954): # parties, esp. 2-prty v. multi-prty sys
 - a. 2-party systems argued to foster/enhance:
 - (1) single-party government
 - (2) accountability
 - (3) alternation in government
 - (4) moderate, centripetal competition
 - b. Multiparty systems argued to...
 - (1) ...foster coalition governments
 - (2) ...prevent voters from direct voice in govt formation
 - (3) ...not ensure alternation in government
 - (4) ...sometimes favor extremist, ideological confrontations between narrowly based political parties
 - c. Although exceptions fairly common, broadly speaking, all of this seems empirically true
2. Dahl (1966): competitive strategies adopted by parties at electoral & legislative level

- a. Strictly competitive systems
 - b. Cooperative-competitive systems
 - c. Coalescent-competitive systems
 - d. Strictly coalescent systems
3. Blondel (1968): # parties & their relative size (later considers their ideological placement also)
 - a. 2-party systems
 - b. 2.5-party systems
 - c. Multiparty systems with a dominant party
 - d. Multiparty systems without a dominant party
 4. Rokkan (1968): more disagg. of multiparty-sys category
 - a. 2 + a small third-party systems (UK, Germany)
 - b. 1 large party v. coalition (Swe, Nor, maybe Ire)
 - c. 3 or more relatively even competitors (Netherlands)
 5. Sartori (1976): fractionalization & polarization, key role of “anti-system” parties
 - a. Types:
 - (1) 2-prty, ideologically polarized (S considered none such)
 - (2) 2-party, moderate ideological distance (US, UK)
 - (3) Moderate Pluralism: multiparty, mod ideol distance (Den)
 - (4) Polarized Pluralism: multiparty, ideol polarized (Italy)
 - (5) Dominant-Party systems: Japan (until recently?; Ind, Mex)
 - b. Virtues of Sartori’s scheme
 - (1) most comprehensive scope & depth of available typologies
 - (2) subsequently employed fruitfully in variety of theoretical & empirical comparative studies—proven utility
 - (3) explicitly concerned w/ patterns of competition & w/ interactions b/w parties, ^ more directly w/ party system

- (4) underlines effects of systemic characteristics on party strategy, & electoral behavior & outcomes
- c. Changes since Sartori's writings that may be somewhat problematic for the theoretical approach
 - (1) some see trend toward & thus increasing crowding of "moderate pluralism" category
 - (2) some see diminishing of polarized pluralism, since, by Sartori's definition, that requires anti-system parties on *both* sides (right & left) & most such disappearing, esp. left

C. Mair's Three Distinguishing Characteristics of Different Types of Party Competition for Government

1. Degree of Alternation in Government

- a. Wholesale alternation
 - (1) single-party v. single-party
 - (2) single-party v. coalition
 - (3) coalition v. coalition
- b. Partial Alternation
- c. Non-alternation
- d. [Think about Powell's 3 aspects of dem performance, & also about accountability; how might variation in the degree of alternation in government affect those things?]

2. Stability & Consistency of Government Alternatives

- a. Define: degree to which alternative govt formulas (i.e., combinations of parties in govt) known or predictable before-hand (i.e., stable & consistent)
- b. [Think about Powell's 3 aspects of dem performance, & also about accountability; how might variation in stability/consistency of govt alternatives affect those?]

3. Range of Parties as Potential Governmental Actors

- a. Def: ° to which access to office widely/narrowly dispersed

- b. N.b., what matters: whether each party viewed by others as potential govt participant, not whether actually *legitimate* potential participant in any abstract sense
- c. [Think about Powell's three aspects of dem performance, & also about accountability; how might variation...?]

D. Mair then combines these three to a single dimension: the *openness* or *closedness* of the party system

1. Definitions:

- a. Closed: highly predictable, little or no change over time in range governing alternatives or pattern of alternation, & with new &/or "outsider" parties finding entry difficult
- b. Open: highly unpredictable, w/ different patterns of alternation, frequent &/or large shifts in make-up of alternatives, & relatively easy access to new parties & few or no real "outsiders"

2. Closedness or Openness depends on...

- a. Parties' ideologies & govt-formation strategies (e.g., DCI)
- b. Parties' electoral strategies of parties (e.g., Fianna Fail)
- c. [electoral & govt-formation strategies not so separable]
- d. Closure $\hat{}$ depends in large part on norms of competition among parties & so requires time to establish => new dems open by definition, takes time to "close" them: a process of "structural consolidation" (e.g.: Gre, Por, Spa)

E. Party Systems & Electoral Outcomes

1. From this view, party-sys) can occur w/o) in struct of electoral support for parties & *v.v.* Mair's 4 examples:

- a. Denmark's "Earthquake" Election in 1973
 - (1) before 1973: 5 parties had 93% of vote; 1973: 5 new parties, & old 5 dropped to 65% of vote, plus new entrants include Communists & rt-wng Progress Party so polar 8too

- (2) some time before any govt able to amass majority parl support; typ. govt duration 9; & elects called more freq'ly;
 - (3) but all this somewhat true before, & on Mair's 3 dims (° & stability of alternation & range of parties allowed govt access), Denmark had been & remained quite open
- b. Italy's Electoral-System Change & Party Electoral-Support Volatility in 1994
- (1) total electoral volatility 37.2%, an Italian record & higher than almost any West European election 1885-1989
 - (2) many new parties & most old reconstituted (renamed): virtually no party 1994 parl same name or form as 1987
 - (3) polarization changed radically also as both communist PCI becomes more acceptable left-wing PDS & far-right MSI becomes a (purportedly) reformed AN
 - (4) But, by Mair's def, party-sys) occurred only if pattern & type govt alternation) accordingly. This case, seems so:
 - (5) New sys major players seem coalescing into coalitional left-right camps as opposed to old DC-dom. centrist multiparty coals: [AN-Lega-Forza]-Centro-[PSI-Greens-PDS]-Rifondazione, + Rete
- c. Canadian Electoral Watershed in 1993
- (1) tot elect vol: 42%; Conservatives only 16% of vote (lowest since 1949) & 2 seats (9 from 169 in parl before), Reform & Bloc Québécois, 2 new parties, gained many seats
 - (2) New govt, though, was Liberals, thus, pending next) of govt, alternation pattern preserved: Conservs<-> Libs
- d. Ireland: govt-alternation pattern) in 1989 & 1993
- (1) Prior to that, alternation had pattern: (Fianna Fáil) <-> (Fine Gael + Labour): FF's refusal to enter coalition was an electoral strategy aimed to keep itself the only party able to offer single-party govt & which served to keep Labour's govt options to one: allying with FG
 - (2) in 1989, FF abandoned strategy, choosing to ally with new rightish liberal party, Progressive Democrats, rather than go into opposition as it had before when it lost a majority

- (3) in 1993, they further erased any claim to credibility of old strategy by allying w/ Labour (formerly always opposing party) to form new coalition government
- (4) Clearly, party system) , but electoral volatility only 7.8% in 1989 election

2. Mair concludes that elect sys can be frozen by 3 factors:

- a. Social structure (the Lipset & Rokkan model)
- b. Institutions: elect sys & org'l efforts of estab'd parties
- c. [*new:*] structure of party competition & govt formation
 - (1) closure of party systems helps “freeze” electoral alignments
 - (2) which implies that changes in party system, as defined by Mair, can destabilize electoral alignments
 - (3) Examples:
 - (a) Italy: PCI becomes PDS, MSI becomes AN => new electoral alignments
 - (b) Ireland: FF chooses coalition with PD in 1989 & then Labour in 1993 => new electoral alignments

3. *Mair's Summary of Argument:* “the structure of competition, & the structure of competition for government in particular, may impose a major constraint on voter choice & hence may act to stabilize electoral alignments. In this sense, voters are not simply expressing preferences for individual parties [or candidates]; rather, albeit not always to same degree in different party systems, & this in itself is an important source of cross-national (and cross-institutional) variance, they are also expressing preferences for potential governments. & in much the same way that a shift in the range of parties on offer can act to undermine established preferences, so too can a shift in the range of governing options, & hence a shift in the

structure of competition, act to undermine established preferences & promote instability” (pp. 103-4).

4. Finally, Mair perceives some generally shared trends suggesting an increasing openness of party systems
 - a. Many places have seen an increasing range of acceptable governing parties in the past two decades
 - b. Many have also seen an increasing set of coalitional permutations govern in recent times
 - c. Increasing party-sys openness \leq increasing electoral instability \Rightarrow increasing uncertainty at multiple levels

IV. GLM, “Inside Political Parties,” ch. 10

A. The Standard “Basic Party Organization”

1. **Members** of parties belong in local, geographically based units called “**branches**”
2. Branches usually have some role in selecting candidates & send **delegates** to party’s **annual conference**, which is in principle the final decision-making body
3. Annual conference usually elect most or all members of the party’s **national executive** which runs the party between conferences & adjudicates internal disputes
4. Exec usually selects, & party employs, “**permanent party bureaucracy**”
5. The “**parliamentary group**” are the party’s MPs
6. [GLM omit, but add: **party’s actual & potential electoral supporters**]

B. Partial Exceptions to the Standard BPO

1. Some parties highly “**factionalized**”:

- a. i.e., divided into “tendencies” or groups under often highly personalized leadership
 - b. e.g., US’s, France’s, Italy’s, & Japan’s parties are or have been highly fractionalized
 - c. Often these factions have own organizational structure and, in the extreme, operate nearly as parties themselves
2. In fed sys (Swi, US, Can, Ger, Austral) provincial (state) branches often considerable decision-making autonomy
 3. **Communist parties** are/were usually organized on “**democratic centralism**” principles
 - a. More centralized than democratic
 - b. Same written struct, but party exec final decision-maker
 - c. Some argue that this may be partly responsible for 9 in membership & electoral support for most of these parties

C. The usual battle lines:

1. **Party activists** who place heavier emphasis on party’s adherence to ideals that prompted joining in first place
2. **Party legislators** who, as parliamentarians, often must compromise ideologically to win election, to enter govt, & to pass legislation
3. **Party’s actual & potential electoral supporters**, & perhaps members if a mass-membership party so many mems not “activists”, judge this battle.

D. **Membership**

1. **Most voters for a party, even those who regularly vote for one party, are not members**
2. **Complications** in calculating membership & compare across countries & parties

- a. Some parties do not know themselves how many mems
 - b. Even if know, some reluctant to reveal true membership
 - (1) Parties have obvious reasons to inflate their count
 - (2) Branches similar reasons to inflate report to party conf/exec
 - c. Some parties have affiliated org's whose members are automatically party mems (e.g., UK Lab & trade unions)
 - d. Rules in some political sys encourage party mem (e.g., US primaries)
3. **Comparison** of mem levels & trends (Table 10-1)
4. **Socio-demographics of party members**
- a. **Working class**
 - (1) Less represented among party members than among voters (esp. if exclude automatic membership *via* unions)
 - (2) This increasingly true as go up party hierarchy.
 - (3) This is becoming increasingly true over time also (they're becoming still less well-represented)
 - (4) All this is true even in lft parties (where white-collar public-sector workers becoming more important in many places)
 - b. **Women & minorities** under-represented also, but trends are in opposite direction.
5. What members do:
- a. Elect del's to conf & so indirectly choose party leadership
 - b. Mobilize electorate [define?], esp. at election times
 - c. Once, being party mem was like belonging to separate subculture, with own newspaper, clubs, social events, & services for mems only. Has & continues to fade [**Why?**]

E. Important Decisions within the Party

- 1. Types of party: Cadre v. Mass Parties (Duverger)
- 2. Resolution of disputes & conflict w/in party: over policy

& over spoils (e.g., *lotizzazione*). Specifically differ over:

- a. **Party Manifesto [define] & Party Program [define]**
- b. **Selection of party leadership:** often, but not always, synonymous with...
- c. **Selection of party's candidates & candidate order [this the most important thing they do]**

F. Candidate Selection

1. Except in Finl, Ger, & Nor, where its national law, how candidates selected is decided by parties themselves
2. In European countries, cand's chosen by party mems, not by ordinary party voters (as in US primary sys)
3. Two basic methods of candidate selection
 - a. Convention system **[define]** (p. 255, first paragraph):
 - (1) Party members in each constituency choose delegates to local nominating convention, which picks the candidates
 - (2) From as few as 1-2% of party members to (rarely) more than 33% participate in this selection process
 - b. National-executive system **[define]** (p. 255, 2nd para):
 - (1) In most places, national executive has right to veto local candidate-selections, but rarely exercises it
 - (2) In few (Fra, Ita, Malta, Por), executive actually chooses cand's directly, sometimes w/ local right to challenge that
 - c. In Greece, leader of party (esp. PASOK's Papandreou), chooses cand's personally; in Spa & perhaps Por, strong but lesser roles for the very central leadership also
4. **Consequences of the selection processes**
 - a. Incumbents have extremely high probability of being re-selected in all systems **[why?]**
 - b. Cand's in all sys always, except UK sometimes, have

some local ties

- c. In MMD systems, cand list is almost always “balanced”
[Define. Why?]
 - d. **Party activist, & esp. party-leadership, control of selection increases party discipline.**
5. Sets up another trade-off: “strong” parties (disciplined, responsible) v. democracy within the party

G. Parties & Money: unlike US, most dems almost all cand’s money from party [= > discipline]

1. Sources of party income

a. Internal Sources

- (1) Membership fees (about 1/4 the total)
- (2) MP’s salary (up to 10% is “requested” to be “re-donated”)
- (3) Fund-raising events
- (4) Party shops, banks, & newspapers (but many lose \$ now)

b. External Sources

- (1) Interest-group backing (in many cases there are no, or only ineffective, laws requiring party disclosure funding sources)
- (2) Public assistance (money & benefits in kind, money usually in approximate proportion to electoral strength)

2. Arguments for or against state-funding

a. For (evidence scarce, but what’s avail gen’ly supports)

- (1) Reduces reliance on interest-group funding
- (2) Evens playing field as not all supporters are equally able to support parties financially
- (3) Parties are essential to democracy & so perform a public service & so should be publicly funded

b. Against (evidence also supports)

- (1) Public fund supports *status quo* insofar as it funds existing parties only [& some in prop to previous size]

- (2) Public funding reduces party incentive to raise their own money & thus to recruit new activist members
- (3) Campaigns becoming increasingly costly, so public funding will become increasingly costly

H. Trends & future:

- 1. Duverger: trend toward *Mass Parties* & “contagion from left” (in terms of party-org. form)
- 2. Epstein: 8 mass media & campaign cost would make *Mass Parties* less ideal than parties looking for few big donors (corps, unions, etc.): “contagion from right”
- 3. Kirchheimer: w/ 8 middle class and success of welfare state, and, Epstein added, w/ 8 individualism, type of party best suited to competition would be “*catch-all*”
- 4. Sjöblom & Rantala further: 8’ly, party members a liability, not an asset, & so parties would 8’ly rely on “strategists” & TV-time, not members

I. Final thoughts:

- 1. One might join party for 3 reasons (Clark & Wilson)
 - a. Material: some tangible reward (patronage, position)
 - b. Solidarity: for social contact & sense of comradeship (party as a club of like-minded folk)
 - c. Purposive: desire to advance certain policy goals
- 2. What we think about party mems depends in large part on what we think the trends in typical saliency of these three goals & what we think the impacts are of having members predominantly of one or the other ambitions

V. “Party Sys & Elect Outcomes” Powell, ch. 5

- A. “Strong” (“weak”) party systems contribute to good

(poor) democratic performance

1. Disagreement on how to recognize such “strength”
 - a. Partly reflects differing emph on participation, stability, & order in defining “good” democratic performance
 - b. Partly reflects differing theories about what Y such perf
2. “One line of thought emphasizes the value of a de-fractionalized, two-party, ‘centrist’ party system that will aggregate citizens’ resources behind governmental majorities responsive to citizen pressures.
3. Another...emphasizes an expressive, mobilizing system of parties that will pull all major factions in the society into its representative, democratic decision-making institutions, co-opting dissent & accommodating demands that might otherwise turn to violence” (p. 74)

B. Three broad types of systems advocated

1. “Aggregative” party systems
 - a. Characteristics
 - (1) 2 or small # parties, each capable of achieving leg maj
 - (2) Centrist tendencies, not too stark alternatives
 - (3) Parties’ support cuts across social groups
 - b. [Examples; Effects; Pros & Cons]
2. “Representative” party systems
 - a. Characteristics
 - (1) More parties representing a broader range of groups
 - (2) Clearer rep by these parties of those specific grps
 - (3) Accommodating leadership, willing to compromise & coal.
 - (4) Majorities avoided
 - (5) Participatory

- b. [Examples; Effects; Pros & Cons]
- 3. “Responsible” party systems
 - a. Characteristics
 - (1) Two parties, alternation in (majority) governments
 - (2) Parties w/ closer ties to (large) social grps than “agg” sys
 - (3) Centralized, disciplined parties representing clearly distinct, somewhat ideologically distant alternatives
 - b. [Examples; Effects; Pros & Cons]
- 4. Notes:
 - a. Almost no one advocates fract sys w/ weak tie to soc grps
 - b. All agree that ° fractionalization & type of alignments with groups the keys; disagree & what’s desirable therein
 - c. All agree that extreme, anti-system parties detrimental; disagree on what to do about them or about the forces that might support them: Exclude or Coopt them
 - d. Most agree that elect volatility a sign of a weak system
 - (1) Symptom of citizen dissatisfaction
 - (2) Make stable government & policy difficult
- C. Summary of hypotheses in Table 5.1 (p. 79)
- D. Summary of Empirical Findings in Tables 5.6 & 5.7