

WK 12: PARLIAMENTARY GOVT FORMATION & DISSOLUTION, PT 1: UNIDEMENSIONAL MODELS

I. The Centrality of the “Politics of Coalition”

- A. 1-prty-maj govt rel'ly rare in democ, esp. in PR systems
- B. Even parl sys, even 1-prty leg maj not abrogate *pol coal*
 - 1. Single-party govt more often minority than majority
 - 2. Potential alt govts (possibly coals) bckgrnd even if maj now
 - 3. Even in single-party sys., “politics of coalition” often w/in party, amongst factions (Jap LDP, e.g.)
- C. In pres. sys, can view day-to-day pol of assembling maj behind individ pieces legis. as repeated play of coal pol
- D. Once formed, govt continually subject to parl's ability to unseat it ⇒ more politics of coalition
- E. Dem Pol-mkng virtually all about form&maintain coals

II. Two Central Q's Regarding Politics of Coalition:

- A. Govt partisan composition & cab-ministry allocation**
- B. Durability / instability of governments**

III. Executive Stability (Powell II, ch. 7)


- A. **P** had already estab'd 2 key facts re: exec performance
 - 1. Const'l factors dominate explanation of exec perf (ch.2-4)
 - a. Presidential sys => durable, but often minority, govts
 - b. Majoritarian Parl. sys. => durable, usually maj, govts
 - c. Representative Parl. sys. => unstable, occas'ly min, govts
 - 2. Presence strng extremist prtys key aspect rep. parl. sys. that ⇒ *negative* exec-perf outcomes (ch.5)

B. Govt Formation & Stability Arguments:

1. Parties' Motivations 2-fold (n.b., parties as unitary actors)
 - a. Desire to participate in & control (current) policymaking
 - (1) For both **intrinsic** (“**policy-seeking**”) reasons—parties care about what policies are made—and
 - (2) **instrumental** (“**office-seeking**”) reasons—parties & party members wish to remain in govt, which requires voter support, which presumably depends on policies
 - b. Parties also motivated by considering ramifications of current acts for future ability to participate (*i.e.*, esp. future elect ramifications)
2. What sorts of governments will form then?
 - a. Implies that govts will tend to form that contain...
 - (1) as few prtys as poss to max seats/prty for spoils & influ reasons
 - (2) as little ideol dissent as poss to make pol's as close to ideal as poss
 - (3) sufficient parl. support to pass necessary initiatives
 - b. Goals often conflict, but knowing these goals will often suffice to predict what govt-types will form & endure
3. Evidence on Government Formation: Powell's 4 Rules
 - a. **#1: When a single-party majority can form it will**
 - (1) 23/25 such cases (1965-75) follow the rule
 - (2) 2 that didn't were “oversized” govts [DEF], formed after strong pre-elect. alliance yielded surprise maj for 1 ally
 - (3) But *Oversize & Minority*[DEF] govts not so rare, partly explained...

b. #2: Coal's usu. formed of *ideologically connected* [DEF] prtys

Figure 7.1 Single-dimensional view of parties in Finland and Italy: Bases of connected coalitions, 1967–1976.^a




a. Only the relative right-to-left placing is determined, not exact positions on the continuum.

- (1) Adding connecting prty to o/w separated coal lowers avg ideol distance b/w govt prtys & thereby perhaps facilitates compromise
- (2) lessens ° to which separated parties seen (by mems & voters) as deviating from ideals in joining coalition
- (3) [parties b/w others in coal. can add legis. support w/o requiring much/any further policy-compromise]
- (4) however, adding *any* party does require further division of spoils]

- c. #3: Where “Minimum-Winning-Connected-Coalition” Govts possible, they usually form
 - d. #4: Non-maj govts & non-MWCC govts form most frequently where extremist party support high (> 15%)
4. Legislative Circumstances behind types of Minority Govt
- a. *Crisis Caretakers*:
 - (1) Intense conflict among polarized major players ⇒ passive minority govt as temporary measure
 - (2) P. calls these *caretakers*, but other give term narrower meaning
 - b. *Pre-election Minorities*:
 - (1) Often formed after elect. in sys that usu ⇒ 1-prty-maj fails to do so
 - (2) Larger of 2 holds office (assumed temporarily) while new elections prepared, which assumed to fix prob.
 - (3) If not, min. govt will typ. try to serve w/ outside supp.
 - c. *Active Minority Govt*:
 - (1) Minority party or coal. secures outside supp. from other legis. grps
 - (2) Vary in formality (tacit to written, detailed agree's) & fixity (same outside supp always to potentially diff set of supp for each law)
5. Typical Government Duration by Government Type:
- a. Expectations:
 - (1) 1-prty-maj most durable, then minimum-winning-connected
 - (2) Over-sized & unconnected govts should be less durable
 - (3) Minority govts among least durable; and among these:
 - (a) caretakers least durable,
 - (b) pre-election bit more durable,
 - (c) & externally-supported most durable
 - b. Evidence:
 - (1) SPMajG most durable, MWCC not much less, externally-supp Min can be reasonably dur., all others less, esp. crisis caretakers
 - (2) But perhaps surprisingly: oversized coals least stable of bunch

c. Fig7.2 sums P's view: strong extremist presence again key

Figure 7.2 Cabinet durability: A path model of environmental effects mediated through election outcomes and legislative coalition formation. Reduced standardized regression coefficients, 1967–1976.^a



a. The arrows and path coefficients represent the standardized regression coefficients significant at the .10 level in a set of recursive regression equations. As indicated by the direction of the arrows, the model assumes that all variables with smaller identifying numbers are causally prior to variables with larger identifying numbers. Election outcome equations are computed on 60 elections, each country weighted equally. Cabinet outcome equations are computed on 84 cabinets, each country weighted equally. Specific equations, variables, and sources are described in the Appendix.

C. Comparing Presidential & Parliamentary Governments

1. Pres sys all have durable exec's relatively indep of party sys or political & social environ, but exec often lacks legis maj (*divided govt* common to pres. sys., not unique to US)
2. Pres sys assoc. w/ *weaker* parties (less unitary), perhaps exactly b/c party can vote against exec w/o risk dissolution
3. Weak party discipline also what makes exec remaining in power w/o legislative majority feasible
4. At same time, it means presidents do not enjoy anything like degree of legislative control that PM's do
5. If anything, separated powers work to require more complex negotiations b/w exec's & legis.'s, esp. since usu. different elect. constituencies (Pres=ntnl, Legis=sub-ntnl)

IV. Lijphart, Ch.6: Concentration vs Sharing Exec Pow

A. *Core Maj vs Cons:*

1. 1-prty-maj vs multi-prty-coal;
2. more spec. ranking: 1-Prty-Maj—Multi-Prty MWC/1-Prty-Min—Multi-Prty Oversize/Minority

B. *Coalition Theories:*

1. If 1-prty maj possible, usu forms.
2. ***Minimal-Winning Coalitions*** (Riker '62): **DEF**
 - a. Base Assume: parties max pow, cab=pow, \Rightarrow as many cab seats poss
 - b. \Rightarrow Only include prtys strictly nec to install & maintain govt
3. ***Minimum-Size Coal's***: extend MWC \Rightarrow smallest poss maj.
4. ***Minimum-Parties Coal's*** (Leierson '70): Fewest prtys poss to MWC \Rightarrow \downarrow barg & negotiation costs form & maint coal
5. ***Minimal Ideological-Range Coal's*** (deSwaan '73): ease form & maintain coal's of prtys w/ similar pref's. Several versions:
 - a. Maj coal's w/ smallest L-R distance to obtain *its* majority (GLM use)
 - b. Maj coal's w/ smallest L-R distance of *possible* majorities (L uses)
6. ***Minimum Connected Coal's that Win*** (Axelrod '70):
 - a. Parties try to coalesce w/ ideol neighbors, continue until majority.
 - b. Adding connecting prty to o/w separated coal lowers avg ideol distance b/w govt prtys & thereby perhaps facilitates compromise
 - c. Additional logics to connected coal's from Powell & me above:
 - (1) lessens \circ to which separated parties seen (by mems & voters) as deviating from ideals in joining coalition
 - (2) [parties b/w others in coal. can add legis. support w/o requiring much/any further policy-compromise]
7. ***Policy-Viable Coalitions*** (Laver & Schofield '90):
 - a. If solely policy-motivated, & policy req's legis maj, then govt'l membership & majority irrel., just party pivotal-ness in leg barg \Rightarrow

- b. 'Core-Prty' Govt: core≈assuming sincere voting, cannot assemble majority w/o; e.g., in 1D, =median, so ⇒ Median-Party Govt
- c. If add reasons to be in govt, e.g., office-seeking or agenda-power, then ⇒ MWC's containing median parties

Table 6.1 Cabinet coalitions predicted by six coalition theories for a hypothetical distribution of parliamentary seats

Parties:	A (Left)	B	C	D	E (Right)	
Seats:	8	21	26	12	33	
Theories:						
Minimal winning coalition	ABC		ADE	BCD	BE	CE
Minimum size			ADE			
Bargaining proposition					BE	CE
Minimal range	ABC				BCD	CE
Minimal connected winning	ABC				BCD	CDE
Policy-viable coalition	ABC				BCD	CE

C. *Empirical Prob*: all but Axelrod=MWC; all=maj, but oversize & minority govts not at all rare [Tab 6.2]. *Expl?*

Table 6.2 Proportions of time during which five types of cabinets were in power in thirty-two parliamentary democracies, 1945–96

Type of cabinet	All cabinets (%)	All cabinets except minimal winning, one-party cabinets (%)
Minimal winning, one-party	37.1	—
Minimal winning coalition	24.7	39.3
Minority, one-party	11.4	18.1
Minority coalition	5.8	9.2
Oversized coalition	21.0	33.4
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Based on data in Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge 1998; Banks, Day, and Muller 1997; Müller and Strøm 1997; Strøm 1990; von Beyme 1985; and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*

1. **Why Minority Govt?** parties' time-perspective? Stay out for now to gain some future electoral advantage?
2. **Why Oversize Govt?**
 - a. Insurance against defection (uncertain & uncommitted allies)
 - b. Policy-based theories predict occasional oversize (not enough)
 - c. Grand coal's as unity signal re: foreign (& sometimes other) threats
3. But all still majoritarian, need real ***theory minority govt***
 - a. Lack vote investiture may preserve minority
 - b. Constructive vote no confidence (in Germany, or sim *majority against* req in France) may preserve minority (as well as foster maj)
 - c. Committee strength and other sources opposition influence
4. Likewise, need better ***theory oversize government***
 - a. Constitutional revisions may require >50% majorities
 - b. Some agenda policies may require >50% majorities
 - c. [n.b., these not truly ***oversize*** then.]
5. N.b., some similarity minority & oversize govt, esp. in somewhat optional & flexible nature of govt support.

D. Presidential Cabinets:

1. Re: keeping office, pres exec & cab always MWC 1-prty maj
2. Re: passing agenda, may be Min, MWC, or oversize (flex).

V. Building & Maintaining (Parl.) Govt (GLM ch.12)


A. 2 Cntrl Q's: Govt Comp & Cab-min Alloc; G Durability

B. The Party Composition of Governments

1. [Always recall that...] elects still paramount in that determine actual & expected legis wt of prty actors in govt-form drama
2. Politicians motivated by some combo (a) "fame & power" (*opportunistic/office-seeking*) & (b) desire influence pub pol (*politic-/outcome-seeking*), & these diff implic's in govt form
 - a. Pure office-seeking \Rightarrow min-win logic: don't share seats any further than must \Rightarrow oversized govts a puzzle
 - b. Pure pol-seeking \Rightarrow ideol/pref-compatibility \Rightarrow median-prty govt
 - c. Combination of these motivations may suggest:
 - (1) Minimum-winning-connected (Axelrod)
 - (2) Minimum-ideological-range-winning (de Swaan)

C. Min. (& oversize) govts not rare, so coal thry should expl them too; all such theories rely on prtys' pol motives

1. Minority Governments, Hypotheses:
 - a. Strom: as ability of parties to influence pol from opp \uparrow , freq min govt \uparrow
[Fig (mine): data strongly supports—Opp Influ measure used here from Laver & Hunt, not Strom, so helps his case]



- b. Luebbert: ↑ role of interest grps & org's outside parl. (esp. corporatist-type policymaking) ↓ necessity of being in govt to influ pol, so should
 ↓ minority govts: might explain Scand, but Germany, Austria, & Italy? Need multivariate analysis to consider this...
- c. Laver & Shepsle: ↑ pol divisions among opp's ⇒ ↓ ability to form alt govt, which should enable minority-govt formation—especially centrist govts can do this [we'll see this arg closer later in Laver & Shepsle]

	Majoritarian	Corporatism	Opp.Infl.	% Min. Govts		SPMa	MWC	SurpMaC	SPMi	MiC	Caretaker
AU	0	1	4.1	33.33%		1	10	1	3	3	0
BE	0	0.5	2.6	8.11%		3	21	8	2	1	2
DE	0	0.75	6.5	88.89%		0	3	0	14	10	0
FI	0	0.75	4.9	41.03%		10	7	2	13	3	4
FR	1	0.25	3.4	13.21%		1	5	38	2	5	2
GE	1	0.75	3.5	4.17%		0	14	6	1	0	3
GR	1	0	2.2	0.00%							
IC	0	0.75	4.8	10.53%		0	16	1	2	0	0
IR	0	0.25	4.1	31.58%		7	5	0	4	2	1
IT	0	0.25	7.1	37.25%		0	2	26	11	8	4
LU	0	0.25	4	0.00%		0	14	1	0	0	0
MA	1	0.25	3.3	0.00%							
NE	0	0.5	3.6	0.00%		0	7	10	0	0	0
NO	0	1	6.8	60.87%		6	3	0	10	4	0
PO	1	0	4.3	0.00%							
SP	1	0	2	0.00%							
SW	0	1	5.2	63.64%		3	5	0	12	2	0
UK	1	0	2	5.26%		18	0	0	1	0	0
Regression Output:					Regression Output:						
Constant			0.341111		Constant				-0.317961		
Std Err of Y Est			0.2285675	Correlation	Std Err of Y Est				0.1665288	Correlation	
R Squared			0.3279188	0.57264194	R Squared				0.6655412	0.8158071	
No. of Observations			18		No. of Observations				18		
Degrees of Freedom			16		Degrees of Freedom				15		
		Majoritarian					Corp	OppInfl			
X Coefficient(s)		-0.308772			X Coefficient(s)		0.2295141	0.1049517			
Std Err of Coef.		0.110511			Std Err of Coef.		0.1324662	0.0313075			
t-statistic		-2.794038			t-statistic		1.7326237	3.3522835			
Regression Output:					Regression Output:						
Constant			0.003028		Constant				-0.313933		
Std Err of Y Est			0.213252	Correlation	Std Err of Y Est				0.1723685		
R Squared			0.4149691	0.64418093	R Squared				0.6655613		
No. of Observations			18		No. of Observations				18		
Degrees of Freedom			16		Degrees of Freedom				14		
		Corp					Major	Corp	OppInfl		
X Coefficient(s)		0.4756474			X Coefficient(s)		-0.003425	0.2276072	0.1045109		
Std Err of Coef.		0.1411909			Std Err of Coef.		0.1181552	0.1520717	0.0357947		
t-statistic		3.3688249									
Regression Output:					Regression Output:						
Constant			-0.337041								
Std Err of Y Est			0.1766402	Correlation							
R Squared			0.5986052	0.77369581							
No. of Observations			18								
Degrees of Freedom			16								
		Opp Infl									
X Coefficient(s)		0.1350178									
Std Err of Coef.		0.0276406									
t-statistic		4.8847729									

2. Oversized Governments, Hypotheses:


- a. *Govts of national unity*: several observed oversized govts occur immed

postwar, only occas. after & then usu. short-lived & arise in *crises*

- b. Policy agenda in some sit's may require super-maj. (Bel. notable) ⇒ not all seeming oversized govts actually "surplus"
- c. Laver & Shepsle: extra parties may be included for signals they send [to whom?] about govt's policy stance
- d. Luebbert: dominant party(s) in coal may want surplus minor parties so no one smaller-party ally has *veto*
- e. [surplus govts maybe esp. likely when MWC bridges smaller intermed party b/c little further policy-compromise necessary to ↑ legis strength of govt. May add to Luebbert's argument in particular]
- f. [party discipline? Surpluses in Italy, e.g., may have stemmed from need of extra "insurance" support]

3. Some examples of government formation

- a. Figure 12-1: Ireland after January 1993 elect (MWC)



Coalition possibilities in Ireland, January 1993

b.

D. The Allocation of Cabinet Portfolios

1. Cabinet govt:

- a. Cab serves as cntrl decision-making committee: by time bills referred from cab. to parl. for full-parl votes, \approx done deal. In fact, most decisions do not require direct legislative assent.
- b. Vote of confidence theoretically gives parl control of cab, & ultimately it does, but only if parl willing to risk govt collapse over issue in Q \Rightarrow much latitude to cab mems, esp. w/in dept competence (more in L&S)
- c. Two Q's:
 - (1) How many seats to each party?
 - (2) Which portfolios to which parties?

2. How many seats allocated to each party?

- a. Proportional to share of legis. maj.: 90% of variation in party share of cab seats explained by party share of govt's legis. maj. (e.g., Govt has 40 seats in parl, party Y has 10 \Rightarrow party Y gets 1/4 of cab. seats).
- b. Among strngst empir rels p.s., even though not const'l req anywhere

3. Which seats to which parties?

- a. Tendency for med prty on each pol D w/ a cab dept to get that portfol
- b. Tendency for prtys most cntrly interested in pol D to get that portfolio
- c. Why? Cab Mins = agenda-setters in their pol area & have considerable latitude in policymaking: \Rightarrow
 - (1) who gets what portfol cntrl to govt pol position & likely pol outputs
 - (2) cab reshuffles more important than often realized
 - (3) ideological positions of cab mins perhaps only credible signals govt's policy stance in that policy area
 - (4) power shifts w/in parties fund'ly affects rel's b/w them

E. The Stability of Parliamentary Governments

1. What exactly counts as Δ gov not universally agreed. Issues:
 - a. Agreed that change in partisan composition of cabinet is a change in govt & that change of PM is change of govt.
 - b. Not quite all agree that every govt forming after election is change in govt even if the same make-up as before
 - c. Nor do all agree that if govt resigns & then is reformed with same PM & party make-up, that this is a new govt
 - d. Such ambiguity not so common that makes much diff. It matters some, but can proceed from here
2. Explaining Duration: Three sets of factors
 - a. Features of Government Itself
 - (1) Number of parties in the government (fractionalization)
 - (2) Ideological distance b/w parties in govt (polarization)
 - (3) Majority/Minority status of government
 - b. Features of the Political Environment
 - (1) Party System: Larger, more diverse party systems \downarrow govt duration because smaller shocks can change what coalition is an equilibrium
 - (2) Other factors? [Powell: extremist party support]
 - c. Shocks, events, & external circumstances [journalistic accounts invariably focus on these] (Warwick's work)
 - (1) Worsening economic conditions, esp. unemployment
 - (2) Unemp especially bad for ctr-right; infl esp'ly bad for socialist-led
 - d. [Note diff b/w journalism/*politics* & *political science*: pol sci not interested in specific circumstances & events that collapse specific govts, but systematic features which make govts more/less stable in general. Analogy: not interest in what particular spark caused some specific fire but what conditions make fires more likely.]

F. Evidence: from King, Alt, Burns, & Laver

Table 1. Reference Models of Coalition Duration

Model:	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4
Censoring:	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Identities:	Incl.	Incl.	Excl.	Excl.
Variables				
<i>Country attributes:</i>				
Identifiability (of alt. govts)			0.399 (0.145)	0.779 (0.085)
Opposition influence (auton. & spec. of committees)			0.104 (0.222)	
Investiture (legal-req. existence)			-0.369 (0.172)	
Volatility (elect. supp. Δ in prev. elect)			0.0002 (0.001)	
Responsiveness (prop. of entering parties that \uparrow vote share)			-0.005 (0.043)	
<i>Party structure attributes:</i>				
Fractionalization (effective # parties in parl.)			-0.0004 (0.001)	
Polarization (Powell's supp. for extremists)			-0.023 (0.010)	
<i>Coalition attributes:</i>				
Numerical status (1 = maj. ; 0 = min.)			0.535 (0.154)	0.759 (0.130)
Crisis duration (# days before govt. formed)			0.009 (0.002)	0.008 (0.002)
Opposition concentration (-) (prop. to left or right, whichever larger, in parl.)			0.136 (0.088)	
Formation attempts (# failed coal. proposals before present)			-0.085 (0.048)	
Intercept	3.385 (0.242)	3.734 (0.289)	2.653 (1.03)	0.905 (0.208)
Log-likelihood	-1187	-1025	-1017	-1030

Note: All estimates are based on 314 observations. Estimated standard errors appear under each coefficient in parentheses. Data were provided by Kaare Strom and are described in the text and i

Table 2. Unified Models of Coalition Duration

Model: Variables	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4
<i>Country attributes:</i>				
Identifiability (of altern. govts)	0.378 (0.084)			
Opposition influence (auton. espec. of comms)	-0.595 (0.134)	-0.131 (0.193)		
Investiture (existence of legal req.)	-0.633 (0.140)	-0.504 (0.171)	-0.527 (0.138)	-0.384 (0.141)
<i>Party structure attributes:</i>				
Fractionalization (eff. # parties parl.)		-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.0013 (0.0008)
Polarization (supp. for extrem.)		-0.025 (0.008)	-0.029 (0.006)	-0.016 (0.006)
<i>Coalition attributes:</i>				
Numerical status (1 = maj; 0 = min.)			0.471 (0.130)	0.526 (0.131)
Crisis duration (# days before govt installed)			0.006 (0.002)	
Formation attempts (# attempts to form)				-0.099 (0.045)
<i>Controls:</i>				
Postelection (1 = form rt. after elect; 0 if b/w elects)				0.771 (0.137)
Caretaker (1 if inter-govt caretaker; 0 = else)				-1.303 (0.260)
Intercept	3.566 (0.324)	5.305 (0.693)	5.000 (0.616)	3.845 (0.635)
Log-likelihood	-1041	-1038	-1025	-1002
Log-likelihood with country identities added	-1025 (p = 0.001)	-1024 (p = 0.01)	-1012 (p = 0.01)	-993 (p = 0.12)

Note: All estimates are based on 314 observations. Estimated standard errors appear under each coefficient in parentheses. The probabilities under the "log-likelihood with country identities added" test the statistical significance of adding the country variables to each model. The probabilities derive

Single-Dimensional Coalition-Formation Concepts

Minimal Winning Coalition (MWC): coalition whose member parties control parl majority & which contains no party unnecessary to do so; *i.e.*, coalition obtaining maj. w/o any “surplus” parties. Need not be minimum-connected winning coalition or minimum-ideological-range winning coalition.

Minimum-Connected Coalition (that wins) (MCC): coalition whose member parties are ideologically adjacent, w/o ideol’ly intervening parties outside coal, & which contains no strict subset of parties sufficient for maj. Need not be MWC, but will be MIRCW.

Minimum-Ideological-Range Coalition (that wins) (MIRC): a coalition whose mems obtain majority w/o containing any other majority within its left-to-right span. *I.e.*, coalition that spans no more ideological space, left-to-right, than necessary for maj. Need be neither MWC nor MCCW.

Single-Dimensional Coalition-Formation Concepts:

Example: Hypothetical Germany w/ parties arrayed left-to-right thus:

PDS — Greens — SPD — A — B — FDP — CDU/CSU — R

and with seats allocated thus:

1.4% — 7.0% — 44.5%—2.0%—1.0%— 6.4% — 36.62% — 1%

Minimum Winning Coalitions (MWC): (Riker)

Greens + SPD (also *MCC* & *MIRC*)

SPD + FDP (not *MCC* but *MIRC*)

SPD + CDU (neither *MCC* nor *MIRC*)

CDU/CSU + FDP + Greens (neither *MCC* nor *MIRC*)

Dummy Parties: PDS, A, B, R

Minimum Connected Coalitions that Win (MCC): (Axelrod)

Greens—SPD (also *MWC* & *MIRC*)

SPD—A—B—FDP (not *MWC* but *MIRC*)

Dummy Parties: PDS, R

Minimum Ideological Range Coalitions that Win (MIRC): (de Swaan)

Greens—SPD (also *MWC* & *MCC*)

SPD—FDP (also *MWC* but not *MCC*)

SPD—A—FDP (neither *MWC* nor *MCC*)

SPD—B—FDP (neither *MWC* nor *MCC*)

SPD—A—B—FDP (not *MWC* but *MCC*)

Dummy Parties: PDS, R

Examples from German Parls (*Bundestagen*) Elect 1994 & 1998

1994 Partisan Composition of the German Bundestag					1998 Partisan Composition of the German Bundestag				
Left to Right					Left to Right				
PARTY	L/R IDEOL.		SEATS	PERCENT	PARTY	L/R IDEOL.		SEATS	PERCENT
PDS	3.3025		30	4.5%	PDS	3.3025		36	5.4%
Greens	4.055		49	7.3%	Greens	4.055		47	7.0%
SPD	6.605		252	37.5%	SPD	6.605		298	44.5%
FDP	11.26		47	7.0%	FDP	11.26		43	6.4%
CDU/CSU	13.975		294	43.8%	CDU/CSU	13.975		245	36.6%
TOTAL			672	100.0%	TOTAL			669	100.0%
Minimum Winning Coalitions (Need 337):					Minimum Winning Coalitions (Need 335):				
<i>CDU/CSU + FDP</i>			341	50.74%	<i>SPD + Greens</i>			345	51.57%
CDU/CSU + SPD			546	81.25%	SPD + FDP			341	50.97%
CDU/CSU + Greens			343	51.04%	SPD + CDU/CSU			543	81.17%
SPD + Greens + FDP			348	51.79%	CDU/CSU+FDP+Greens			335	50.07%
n.b. PDS is a "dummy party"					n.b. PDS is a "dummy party"				
Minimum-Connected Winning (Need 337):					Minimum-Connected Winning (Need 335):				
<i>CDU/CSU + FDP</i>			341	50.74%	<i>SPD + Greens</i>			345	51.57%
SPD + Greens + FDP			348	51.79%	SPD + FDP			341	50.97%
Notes:									
Both of the minimum-connected winning coalitions are also minimum winning coalitions in this case.									
This does not have to be so. If, for example, PDS were between the greens and SPD, then:									
In 1994:	Greens + PDS + SPD + FDP would be minimum connected winning but not both MWC and MCW								
	This would leave only CDU/CSU + FDP as both MWC and MCW								
In 1998:	Greens + PDS + SPD would be minimum connected winning but not both MWC and MCW								
	This would leave only SPD + FDP as both MWC and MCW								
Minimum-Ideological-Range Winning (Need 337):					Minimum-Ideological-Range Winning (Need 335):				
Range					Range				
2.715	<i>CDU/CSU + FDP</i>		341	50.74%	2.55	<i>SPD + Greens</i>		345	51.57%
7.205	SPD + Greens + FDP		348	51.79%	4.655	SPD + FDP		341	50.97%
The following are not Minimum Ideological Range Winning Coalitions because they span one or the other coalitions above, but it may nonetheless be informative to note that these two minimum winning coalitions span greater ideological range than the above two.									
7.37	CDU/CSU + SPD		546	81.25%	7.37	SPD + CDU/CSU		543	81.17%
9.92	CDU/CSU + Greens		343	51.04%	9.92	CDU/CSU+FDP+Greens		335	50.07%
Notes:									
It is possible to construct examples where the minimum ideological-range winning coalitions are not minimum winning coalitions.									
It's also possible to construct examples where minimum ideological-range winning coalitions are not minimum connected-winning.									
The only necessary logical connection is that all minimum connected winning are also minimum ideological range winning. The opposite is not true. E.g., imagine 2 new parties, A&B, between SPD&Greens in 1998. Also imagine PDS and its 5.4% of the seats split among A&B.									
Then the following coalitions are minimum-ideological-range winning:									
SPD + Greens			SPD + B + Greens						
SPD + A + Greens			SPD + A + B + Greens						
Of these 4, only SPD + Greens is minimum winning, and only SPD + A + B + Greens is minimum connected winning, but it is still impossible to draw any minimum connected winning coalitions that is not also minimum ideological range winning.									

GOVERNMENT FORMATION and DISSOLUTION (Part II)

Laver & Shepsle, Making & Breaking Governments

I. Substantive Background (*Part I*)

A. Centrality of Government Formation & Dissolution

1. Essence of parl dem: accountability govt (*syn*: cab., exec., admin.) to legis. where it must retain majority. (Leg., in turn, to voters.)
 - a. Votes of investiture
 - b. Votes of (no) confidence
2. Nonetheless, cabinet retains wide latitude while remains in office
 - a. Agenda setting
 - b. Control over administrative departments (*syn*: cab. ministries, portfolios)
3. Govt form&diss. at apex of set of links b/w voters, reps., parties...
4. \therefore govt $\Delta \Rightarrow$ at least potential policy Δ (e.g., financial mkts respond)

B. The Role of Analytic Modeling

1. Fundamental premise: general statements about politics of building & maintaining govt possible, & such general statements can give valuable insights into political processes.
2. The advantages of deriving such general statements formally:
 - a. Allows one logically to hold a set of variables constant and manipulate certain key variables—model may thus be used as discovery tool
 - (1) Allows counterfactuals (w/in logical/modeled, not actual/empirical, world).
 - (2) Being more precise & explicit lets one check (mathematically) her intuitions & analyze further, sometimes discovering counter-intuitive features that may nonetheless prove empirically supported.
 - b. Analytical model also systematic aid to constructing empirical models: can less-ambiguously tell us what to look for & how to look for it in the data.
3. Logical abstraction (i.e. simplifying assumptions) essential to analytic models. BUT, no less essential to any other mode of theorizing. Theory *is* logical abstraction. Generally best to be as explicit as poss. about these *unavoidably* necessary assumptions.

4. Mathematical (here: set theory & geometry) Modeling [a sermon]:
 - a. Math just a language: specifically, symbolic language for expressing logic
 - (1) Anything that follows logical laws can be expressed mathematically, and
 - (2) Anything that cannot be expressed mathematically is illogical.
 - (3) *Non-mathematical logic*=oxymoron.
 - b. Like other foreign languages...
 - (1) Fluency by using & being immersion.
 - (2) No one born understanding it, & no one born without ability to learn it.
 - (3) My opinion & experience: “I suck at math” usually means...
 - c. Grad or prof. school?
 - (1) Take some calculus, linear algebra, and/or probability & statistics
 - (2) No *math escape hatches!* [OK, enough sermon]

C. Rationality & Analytic Modeling in the Social Sciences

1. Rationality and Methodological Individualism:
 - a. **Methodological Individualism:** Only human agency effects outcomes in social world that we study; therefore every social-scientific model must begin with establishing what motivates actors & how they make decisions
 - b. Steps in Rational Models
 - (1) Posit *aims* or *goals* (i.e., *utility*) (office & preferred policies) of key actors (politicians, esp. MPs) in phenom studied (govt formation & dissolution).
 - (2) Define *decision rule* by which those actors choose b/w alternative possible actions, usu. assume actors **rational** in sense that they calculate (implicitly or explicitly) costs & benefits of various actions to achieve their aims & select course of action with highest net benefit (lowest net cost).
2. Specifically, in this model of govt formation, we assume:
 - a. Politicians policy-motivated; intrinsically or instrumentally doesn't matter
 - b. **Common Knowledge:** Policy aims of all players, all rules of govt-form. game, etc. known to all players.
 - c. Politicians act given this knowledge to achieve best their aims; i.e., vote for or against govts calculated to produce their most desired cabinet possible
3. [Aside: *rationality* lends itself easily to math-model b/c “maximize net benefits” easily expressed as math problem, but *any* logically immutable decision rule can, in principle, be modeled, and any rule that cannot be so defined cannot produce logical consistency.

D. Formal Theoretic Perspective on Govt Form&Diss Problem

1. Legacy: Some Important Prior Theoretical Results

a. One Dimension

(1) Black (1958) **Median Voter Theorem (MVT)**: (DEFINE)

(a) If voters *single-peaked* pref's defined on *single dimension* (e.g., left-right), then median-voter's *ideal point* is only point majority-preferred to all others.

(2) Hotelling(1928)-Downs(1957) **Party Competition Centripetal Tendency**:

(a) Applied to 2-prty elects, MVT \Rightarrow strong incents parties converge toward median voter's ideal

b. Multiple Dimension Extensions:

(1) McKelvey's & Schofield's "**Chaos Theorems**":

(a) w/ $>1D$, if choices not structured in restrictive ways: virtually certain that policy proposals will *cycle* around policy space, w/ no proposal majority-defeating all others

i) \Rightarrow either perpetual flux or arbitrariness (Arrow's **Impossibility Theorem**).

ii) Strongly suggests inst'l restrictions on proposal- & decision-making process essential to non-arbitrary democratic decision-making: Shepsle's **Structurally Induced Equilibrium**

(b) Kadane (1972) showed that if eqbm exists in unstructured multi-D space (may not), then must be *multi-D median*, a.k.a. **Dimension-by-Dimension Median (DDM)**

2. Government Formation-and-Dissolution Game in this context

a. These prior results refer to *policies* emerging from maj-rule voting, not to *govts* forming subject to maj approval. Govt form&diss process may add *structure* that brings eqba to multi-D prob. L&S key contribution: show particular conception of govt form can do this.

b. The Institutional Structure of Government Decision-Making

(1) Policy decisions are made by the executive.

(2) Depts, & esp. their cab. mins, have agenda power & info., expertise, resource advantages that give them wide latitude in directing policy w/in their sphere

(3) Ministers appointed are govt's most credible signal of policy intent in that area

(4) *Overall policy position of govt given by partisan position of politicians' parties who are given the various cabinet portfolios.*

(a) \Rightarrow even in multi-dimensional space, the set of possible policies for government is finite.

(b) Precisely this specificity, & finiteness of set of poss. govt policies (given by

set of poss. party combo's in cab. offices), limits "chaos" potential of multi-D decision-making.

c. => Most important lesson of the volume:

- (1) Departmental Org. of Govt'l Decision-Making structures environment in which govts born, live, & die.
- (2) Eqbm cabinets \therefore differ from eqbm policies in unstructured environment.
- (3) Cabinet eqba common & usu. close to center of array of prty policy-positions.

II. Building Blocks of the Cabinet-Form.-and-Diss. Model


A. Motivations: office- and/or policy-motivated

1. Politician & voter interaction in elections brings office-seeking & policy-seeking politicians to act alike
2. \therefore L&S no stand either way; just let MPs act "as if" pol.-motivated

B. Rational Foresight & Common Knowledge

1. Politicians act (perhaps unconsciously) as if conducting (perhaps very sophisticated) C-B calculations regarding their options
2. They can look ahead to do so: attempt to foresee consequences of actions & use that to inform current C-B analysis (chess analogy)
3. Competing-players' prefs *common knowledge* (& rules of game...)
4. Important tool: "Game Tree" [see PD example]

The Prisoners' Dilemma




C. Parties treated unitary actors

1. Cabinet ministers discretion w/in their jurisdictions, but use it on behalf of, not against, their party.
2. Practical implication: govt policy in each portfolio area given by partisan identity of its minister.

D. Dimensionality: how many dimensions will we consider?

1. Theoretically infinite # may exist, but empirically great correlation in party stances across substantive dimensions.
2. => few core issues may suffice for fair party-pref descriptions
3. Take competencies of core ministries (Finance, Foreign Affairs, & maybe Internal Affairs) as defining dimensions of policy space.

E. Rationality (Cost-Benefit Analysis) in 2D: *Indifference Curves*




F. *Ministerial Discretion*: Govts implement preferred policy of party holding each cab. min. in that min.'s area. 3 sources:

1. Mins. may act in area on what whole cab. not explicitly decided
2. Mins. may influence which matters come to cab. for such decision
3. Mins. may influence content of proposals they or others put to cab.

G. *Unitary parties + ministerial-policy + indivisible ministries* ==> *limited number of possible govts (and thus policies) to consider, as given by **lattice** of perpendicular intersections of parties' ideal points [see example]. 2 key assumptions here:*

1. Party's discretion in 1 portfolio not affected by who has others [?]
2. Party's preferences on 1 D not affected by policies on other D's [?]

The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System



H. Parties incorporate *all expected* policy decisions into deciding whether to vote for particular cabinet => unforeseen matters (only) potential sources of cabinet collapse

I. The *Status Quo*:

1. Current govt remains in office until defeated by legis. majority, which can only happen when...
 - a. ...unforeseen circumstances Δ distrib. of legis. pow. that supp. govt at start,
 - b. ...some party or parties shift their ideological positions (unforeseen), or
 - c. ...some party or parties split or combine to new ideal points.
2. When govt collapses, remains in office as caretaker until new govt receives majority support.

J. Any participant in a proposed govt can *veto* that govt by refusing to accept its proposed role => *all govts require unanimous consent of parties in it & majority support of all legis. parties*

K. [The chronological (continuous) play of the government-formation game is given schematically in Figure 3.1, p. 52]




Figure 3.1. Repeat play government formation game

III. Working through the Model (*Part II*)

A. *Equilibrium Cabinet*: cabinet for which no actor with power to cause govt collapse has incentive to do so


1. Direct substantive implication of concept of eqba: eqbm cab's expected stable, non-eqbm cabinets expected unstable
2. Two types of eqba in general, & eqbm cabinets can be either sort
 - a. Attractive Equilibria [?]
 - b. Retentive Equilibria [?]
3. Core notion in determination of whether an eqbm cab exists & in characterizing it if so: *strong party*

B. Information necessary to analyze cabinet formation in model

1. About parties
 - a. Their identity (how many distinct parties)
 - b. Their legislative weight (seats for each party)
 - c. Their policy positions (ideological positions in determined policy-space)
2. About Policy Space & Departmental Structure of Government
 - a. Set of (key) relevant policy dimensions
 - b. Set of (key) cabinet ministries & their competences (i.e., issue domains)
 - c. Relation b/w the two: simple 1-for-1 relationship assumed for most of book
3. About the formation process (assumptions)
 - a. Proposals can come from anyone at any time
 - b. *Unanimous internal consent is required*
 - c. *Majority legislative consent is required*


C. Important Concepts

1. Indifference Curves for Euclidean Preferences [e.g., fig. above]
2. The *(Policy) Winset* & the *Lattice (or Govt or Cabinet) Winset*:
 - a. *Winset* of some policy x : set of all alternative pol's majority-preferred to x
 - b. *Lattice Winset* of some cab. X : set of all alt. *cab.*'s majority-preferred to X
 - (1) Only diff: *lattice winset* concerned only w/ alt. *cab.*'s, which must lie on lattice
 - (2) [Can use example lattice to show how *winsets* found; L&S's example: Fig. 4.1]



3. The *Dimension-by-Dimension Median (DDM)* in this context
 - a. DEF: a cab. is the DDM *iff* its associated policy is the median on each dimension (has 50%+ on either side of itself, including itself).
 - b. Easy way to find this: read left to right & top to bottom (or v.v.) until find lattice line that turns minority into majority. [examples below + Figure 4.1]
 - c. DDM is an eqbm govt if no alternative govt lies in its *winset*, but no guarantee DDM will have empty winset (so it may not be an eqbm)
 - (1) DDM always a potential eqbm point, so useful place to start the analysis

- (2) DDM more likely empty winset, & so be an eqbm, when # of parties & D low
- d. [Example below can have either an eqbm DDM (empty winset) or non-eqbm DDM (non-empty winset) depending on legis.-seat distrib.; L&S's Fig. 4.2 shows non-empty winset DDM—one in which cycling can occur]



4. ***Strong Parties***

- a. DEF: Party S is strong if it participates in all cab.'s maj pref'd to its ideal point (so can veto any cab. maj-pref to its ideal & so perhaps secure ideal)
- b. 2 types of “strong” party: “very strong” or “merely strong”; “strong”=either
- (1) **very strong party**: no cab. maj-pref to its ideal exists; => party's ideal=DDM
 - (2) **merely strong party**: cab.'s maj-pref to its ideal exist, but it participates in all of them, & so can veto them
- c. [Examples (from end of these notes)]:
- (1) fairly even seat dist. in ex. 1 gives an empty-winsset DDM at DD, => D is **v.s.**
 - (2) Party D may be merely strong in less even seat distributions in this example
 - (3) Party B is merely strong in L&S's Figure 4.3]

- (1) Either the DDM is an equilibrium, or
- (2) strong party can move eqbm toward its ideal, but s.p. tend to be toward median

D. “Strong” Parties Making & Breaking Governments

1. Analyzing a case vs. analyzing the process
 - a. To analyze specific case, we need to identify which, if any, party is strong
 - b. For general analysis of govt form&diss, we need to discover the conditions (e.g., distribution of legislative power, etc.) that produce them.
2. Simplest Case: 2 Dimensions, 3 Parties, any 2 parties make a majority ==> “Triangular system”
 - a. Only “middle” party can be strong, & it usually is (but doesn’t have to be)
 - b. DEF “Middle” here: connect party ideal points to make triangle, party whose ideal point is vertex between two smaller legs of triangle is “middle”
 - c. [L&S’s first example shows this]
 - d. Outside the simplest case:
 - (1) Formal analysis produces few intuitive results (the mathematical conditions for strong parties are not readily understood substantively)
 - (2) Empirical analysis is limited because universe of coalition-generating party systems is too small to produce inductive generalizations of this breadth
 - (3) => *Simulations*:
 - (a) Program computer to find eqbm cab.’s, strong parties, etc. from given info. about parties, cabinet portfolios, etc.
 - (b) Then, holding some set of parameters fixed (e.g., # parties, relative strength, & # D’s), generate large number of random “virtual parliaments” that vary some other parameter(s) (e.g., their policy positions).
 - (c) Try to find patterns in outcomes (i.e., inductive reasoning from virtual reality)
 - (d) Simulations *NOT* empirical tests b/c program assumes model true to start, but
 - i) Useful for finding substantive “bite” of formal conclusions, which may be too complicated for intuition, (always with caveat that virtual world assumes “random” & assumes model)
 - ii) Often useful for various kinds of sensitivity analysis
 - iii) [In other contexts, many statistical procedures have known properties in infinite samples (asymptotic properties), but unknown properties in limited samples => simulate large number of small samples to observe properties: called Monte Carlo Experiments]

3. L&S's Simulations

- a. Finding frequency of strong parties under alternative legis-seat dist., # of parties, & # of D (party policy-positions varied randomly) [Table 5.1]
- (1) “Dominated Decisive Structure”, Fewer Parties, Fewer Dim. all foster SP’s
 - (2) Most usually it’s dominating party that’s strong, if SP exists, but not always, even “dummy party” can be strong (though not very strong)!
 - (3) Argue that dominant position in decisive structure (i.e., size) matters b/c it makes party more likely to be merely strong or even very strong (almost true that only dominant parties can be very strong).

Table 5.1. Simulation experiments: frequency of strong and very strong parties under various dimensionalities and decisive structures.

Decisive structure	Number of dims	Frequency of	
		Strong party	Very strong party
<i>Three party</i>			
(.33, .33, .33)	2	907	327
	3	734	102
	4	536	36
<i>Four party</i>			
(.40, .20, .20, .20)	2	791	331
	3	554	131
	4	370	43
(.30, .30, .30, .10)	2	803	339
	3	578	103
	4	383	31
<i>Five party</i>			
(.40, .15, .15, .15, .15)	2	766	411
	3	516	201
	4	326	106
(.20, .20, .20, .20, .20)	2	622	201
	3	311	35
	4	150	1
<i>Six party</i>			
(.40, .12, .12, .12, .12, .12)	2	730	428
	3	477	240
	4	316	117
(.18, .18, .18, .18, .18, .10)	2	551	175
	3	236	27
	4	92	4
<i>Seven party</i>			
(.46, .09, .09, .09, .09, .09, .09)	2	740	471
	3	504	261
	4	333	133
(.14, .14, .14, .14, .14, .14, .14)	2	455	131
	3	130	9
	4	37	1




Figure 5.1. Frequency of very strong parties in “egalitarian” party systems of different sizes and dimensionalities

b. Finding frequency of strong parties as a function of party positions

- (1) Almost imposs. for prty at no median on any D to be strong, almost regardless of party’s size
- (2) Mostly, being median on 1 of 2 D’s gives party $\approx 25\%$ chance of being strong; only dominant parties in very dominated sys. have noticeably better odds
- (3) Parties at DDM usu. strong regardless of size, although size helps it be median

Table 5.2. Frequency of strong parties in random five-party, two-dimensional party systems with different decisive structures

Decisive structure	Frequency of strong party (per 1,000)	Identity of strong party				
		1	2	3	4	5
<i>Weight of party (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)</i>						
A (40, 15, 15, 15, 15)	766	559	51	58	41	54
B (40, 17, 17, 17, 9)	712	407	87	104	102	12
C (44, 24, 24, 4, 4)	671	297	131	149	49	45
D (26, 26, 26, 11, 11)	683	223	226	211	9	14
E (26, 26, 16, 16, 16)	644	188	207	71	81	97
F (20, 20, 20, 20, 20)	622	138	142	121	105	121

Table 5.3. Frequency of very strong parties in random five-party, two-dimensional party systems with different decisive structures

Decisive structure	Frequency of very strong party (per 1,000)	Identity of very strong party				
		1	2	3	4	5
<i>Weight of party (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)</i>						
A (40, 15, 15, 15, 15)	411	373	6	6	14	12
B (40, 17, 17, 17, 9)	306	241	15	23	27	0
C (44, 24, 24, 4, 4)	258	160	43	58	4	3
D (26, 26, 26, 11, 11)	284	94	95	95	0	0
E (26, 26, 16, 16, 16)	191	77	64	10	18	25
F (20, 20, 20, 20, 20)	201	38	41	40	36	46

Table 5.4. Frequency of merely strong parties in random five-party, two-dimensional party systems with different decisive structures

Decisive structure	Frequency of merely strong party (per 1,000)	Identity of merely strong party				
		1	2	3	4	5
<i>Weight of party (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)</i>						
A (40, 15, 15, 15, 15)	355	186	45	52	30	42
B (40, 17, 17, 17, 9)	406	166	72	81	75	12
C (44, 24, 24, 4, 4)	403	137	88	91	45	42
D (26, 26, 26, 11, 11)	399	129	131	116	9	14
E (26, 26, 16, 16, 16)	453	111	143	61	66	72
F (20, 20, 20, 20, 20)	421	95	101	81	69	75

put of our model, how is strength affected by a party's position in the decisive structure? And how is it affected by a party's policy position? We begin to answer these questions by building on the simulation experiments of Table 5.1 to explore the relationship between a party's position in the decisive structure and its likelihood of being strong. To do so we intensively analyze all nondictatorial decisive structures of a five-party parliament with two policy dimensions, each constituting a simple jurisdiction. We report a five-party legislature for this analysis because it is rich enough to allow a wide range of variation in strategic parameters while still remaining tractable. Unreported experiments in other types of party systems suggest similar results. Again we use our computer program, WINSET, to generate simulated parliaments. For each decisive structure a dataset consists of 1,000 cases in which five parties are assigned policy positions in a two-dimensional space, their positions on each dimension drawn independently from a uniform distribution over the [0, 1] interval.

An analysis of these simulations is presented in Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4

c. Conclusions

- (1) Size & "median-ness" key to being big player in G-form, being in small, low-D party system also helps. (L&S:) these matter b/c make party 'strong'. [Parties can be 'strong' w/o these, so such parties ∴ key test of L&S thry against alt.'s]

Table 5.5. Relative frequency of strong parties among parties occupying no median position

Decisive structure	Party				
	1	2	3	4	5
<i>Weight of party (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)</i>					
A (40, 15, 15, 15, 15)	0.0 (161)	0.0 (809)	0.0 (809)	0.0 (834)	0.0 (811)
B (40, 17, 17, 17, 9)	0.00 (242)	0.01 (707)	0.01 (698)	0.00 (671)	0.01 (1000)
C (44, 24, 24, 4, 4)	0.00 (345)	0.00 (585)	0.01 (578)	0.01 (881)	0.02 (892)
D (26, 26, 26, 11, 11)	0.00 (425)	0.00 (418)	0.00 (463)	0.01 (1000)	0.01 (1000)
E (26, 26, 16, 16, 16)	0.01 (497)	0.01 (492)	0.01 (738)	0.01 (751)	0.02 (730)
F (20, 20, 20, 20, 20)	0.02 (649)	0.01 (622)	0.01 (638)	0.02 (644)	0.01 (661)

Note: Cell entries give the proportion of trials for which a party is strong if it is at no median. In parenthesis is the number of trials (per 1,000) for which the party was in fact at no median.

- (2) Strong parties common (and very strong parties surprisingly so). They should always obtain government according to the theory.

Table 5.6. Relative frequency of strong parties among parties at n^*

Decisive structure	Party				
	1	2	3	4	5
Weight of party (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)					
A (40, 15, 15, 15, 15)	0.96 (386)	1.00 (5)	1.00 (5)	1.00 (14)	0.92 (13)
B (40, 17, 17, 17, 9)	0.97 (246)	0.94 (16)	0.85 (27)	0.93 (29)	- (0)
C (44, 24, 24, 4, 4)	0.95 (167)	0.90 (48)	0.97 (59)	1.00 (4)	1.00 (3)
D (25, 25, 26, 11, 11)	0.90 (101)	0.89 (102)	0.92 (103)	- (0)	- (0)
E (26, 26, 16, 16, 16)	0.91 (82)	0.91 (59)	0.77 (13)	0.79 (19)	1.00 (25)
F (20, 20, 20, 20, 20)	0.93 (40)	0.93 (43)	0.91 (44)	0.85 (41)	1.00 (46)

Note: Cell entries give the proportion of trials for which a party is strong if it is at n^* . In parenthesis is the number of trials (per 1,000) for which the party was in fact at n^* .

Table 5.7. Relative frequency of strong parties among parties at median on only one dimension

Decisive structure	Party				
	1	2	3	4	5
Weight of party (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)					
A (40, 15, 15, 15, 15)	0.41 (453)	0.23 (185)	0.24 (186)	0.18 (152)	0.22 (176)
B (40, 17, 17, 17, 9)	0.33 (512)	0.25 (277)	0.28 (275)	0.25 (300)	- (0)
C (44, 24, 24, 4, 4)	0.28 (488)	0.25 (367)	0.25 (353)	0.30 (115)	0.25 (105)
D (26, 26, 26, 11, 11)	0.28 (474)	0.28 (480)	0.27 (434)	- (0)	- (0)
E (26, 26, 16, 16, 16)	0.26 (421)	0.32 (439)	0.20 (249)	0.24 (230)	0.24 (245)
F (20, 20, 20, 20, 20)	0.27 (311)	0.28 (335)	0.23 (318)	0.18 (315)	0.23 (293)

Note: Cell entries give the proportion of trials for which a party is strong if it is at the median on one dimension. In parenthesis the number of trials (per 1,000) for which the party was in fact at the median on one dimension.

IV. Empirical Analysis (*Part III*)

A. Case-study Applications of the Theory

1. Necessary Info:
 - a. Number of parties & their seats in legislature
 - b. Number of dimensions & party positions on them
2. Germany 1987: Tables 6.1-6.4; Figures 6.1 & 6.2 (next pages)
3. Ireland 1992-3: Tables 6.7-6.8; Figures 6.3 & 6.4 (next pages)
4. An example may appear on test for you to analyze in various ways

B. Testable Implications of the Theory

1. Status Quo (SQ) govt at beginning of period either remains in place or is replaced by coalition in its winset
2. If SQ has an empty winset, then SQ remains in office
3. If party is very strong, then it gets all seats in the cabinet
4. If party is merely strong, then it gets at least one seat in cabinet
 - a. If party strong, & every cabinet in winset of its ideal gives some particular cabinet seat to that party, then party will get that seat
 - b. If party strong, then each cab. seat is assigned to that party or to one of its *partners* (= those parties participating in govts in winset of SP's ideal)

C. Data Required:

1. # Seats for each party across some countries over some time
2. Which party has which portfolio before & after each govt change
3. Party positions on the salient dimensions: prior issues
 - a. Which are the key portfolios?
 - b. Which are the key policy dimensions?
 - c. What is the correspondence between those two?
 - d. [Salience weighting is possible]

Table 6.1. Decisive structure after the Bundestag election of 1987

	<i>Seats</i>
<i>Individual parties</i>	
Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union (CD)	223
Social Democratic Party (SPD)	186
Free Democrats (FDP)	46
Greens (G)	42
Total	497
Majority threshold	249
<i>Winning coalitions</i>	
CD + SPD	409
CD + FDP	269
CD + G	265
SPD + FDP + G	274
CD + SPD + FDP	455
CD + SPD + G	451
CD + G + FDP	311
CD + SPD + FDP + G	497

Table 6.2. Positions of German parties on two economic policy dimensions

<i>Party</i>	<i>Mean position (standard error)</i>			
	<i>Increase taxes (1) vs. cut services (20)</i>		<i>Promote public ownership (1) vs. oppose pub. ownership (20)</i>	
Greens	5.2	(0.65)	7.1	(0.58)
SPD	6.5	(0.44)	8.1	(0.52)
CDU/CSU	13.5	(0.54)	13.6	(0.40)
FDP	15.7	(0.61)	17.4	(0.39)

Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992: 197

Note: Estimates are based on 19 expert responses.

Table 6.3. Rankings of German cabinet portfolios

<i>Portfolio</i>	<i>Mean ranking of portfolio</i>	<i>Standard error</i>
Foreign affairs	1.8	0.29
Finance	2.1	0.27
Interior	3.3	0.29
Defense	4.6	0.46
Labor and social affairs	4.7	0.38
Economics	4.9	0.42
Justice	6.3	0.35
Youth, family, women, and health	7.3	0.58
Food, agriculture, and forestry	8.8	0.29
Environment	8.8	0.84

Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992: 196

Note: Estimates are based on 19 expert responses.

Table 6.4. Positions of German parties on foreign policy dimension

<i>Party</i>	<i>Mean position (standard error): Pro (1) vs. anti (20) USSR</i>	
Greens	4.0	(0.48)
SPD	4.6	(0.35)
FDP	6.6	(0.47)
CDU/CSU	9.8	(0.68)

Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992: 197

Note: Estimates are based on 19 expert responses.




Figure 6.1. Two-dimensional German policy space: Indifference curves relating to CD-FDP cabinet




Figure 6.2. Two-dimensional German policy space: Indifference curves relating to CD ideal point

Table 6.7. Decisive structure after the 1992 Dáil election

	Seats
<i>Individual parties</i>	
Fianna Fáil (FF)	68
Fine Gael (FG)	45
Labour (Lab)	33
Progressive Democrats (PD)	10
Democratic Left (DL)	4
Others	5
Total	165
Chair	1
Majority threshold	83
<i>Winning coalitions</i>	
FF+FG	113
FF+Lab	101
FG+Lab+PD	88
FF+FG+Lab	146
FF+FG+PD	123
FF+FG+DL	117
FF+Lab+PD	111
FF+Lab+DL	105
FG+Lab+PD+DL	92
FF+FG+Lab+PD	156
FF+FG+Lab+DL	150
FF+FG+PD+DL	127
FF+Lab+PD+DL	115
FF+FG+Lab+PD+DL	160

Table 6.8. Positions of Irish parties on two key policy dimensions

Party	<i>Mean position (standard error)</i>			
	<i>Increase taxes (1) vs. cut services (20)</i>		<i>Pro (1) vs. Anti (20) British presence in N. Ireland</i>	
Fianna Fáil	12.05	(0.37)	16.27	(0.31)
Fine Gael	14.23	(0.42)	10.60	(0.59)
Labour	7.45	(0.39)	12.07	(0.54)
Prog. Dems	16.97	(0.42)	10.07	(0.61)
Dem. Left	4.77	(0.74)	8.66	(0.86)

Source: Laver, 1994.




Figure 6.3. Two-dimensional Irish policy space: Indifference curves relating to FF ideal point




Figure 6.4. Two-dimensional Irish policy space: Indifference curves relating to FF-Labour coalition

D. L&S “test” these implications against null of random portfolio allocation [*wimpy null*: L&S overstate absence of alt. theories]

1. Data

Table 7.1. Data set for empirical analysis

Country	Election
Austria	1949, 1953, 1956, 1959, 1970, 1983, 1986 ^a
Belgium	1946, 1949, 1954, 1958, 1961, 1965, 1968, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1985, 1987 ^a
Denmark	1945, 1947, 1950, 1953a, 1953b, 1957, 1960, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1988
Finland	1945, 1948, 1951, 1954, 1958, 1962, 1966, 1970, 1972, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987 ^a
Germany	1961, 1963, 1969, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1983, 1987 ^a
Iceland	1946, 1949, 1953, 1956, 1959a, 1959b, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1974, 1978, 1979, 1983, 1987 ^a
Ireland	1965, 1973, 1981, 1982a, 1982b, 1987, 1989 ^a
Italy	1953, 1958, 1963, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987 ^a
Luxembourg	1945, 1948, 1951, 1954, 1959, 1964, 1968, 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989
Netherlands	1977, 1981, 1982, 1986 ^a
Norway	1961, 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989
Sweden	1948, 1952, 1956, 1958, 1960, 1964, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988 ^a

^a Although there was another election before the end of the study period on January 1, 1992, the government that subsequently formed had not ended by the end of the study period.

Table 7.2. Length of study period

Country	Beginning	End
Austria (Not 1963-70)	7/11/49	17/12/90
Belgium (Not 1959-54)	11/3/46	7/3/92
Denmark	8/11/45	17/12/89
Finland	17/4/45	26/4/91
Germany	14/11/61	18/1/91
Iceland	4/7/47	30/4/91
Ireland (Not 1969-73, 1977-81)	1/4/65	5/2/92
Italy	17/7/53	4/7/92
Luxembourg	20/11/45	14/7/89
Netherlands	19/12/77	1/11/89
Norway	11/9/61	2/11/90
Sweden	28/10/48	3/10/91

Second, we needed data on which party held each government both at the beginning and the end of each government formation.

Third, we needed data on party positions on salient issues. In order to describe how we have proceeded on this matter, it is to identify a number of operational decisions that have had to be made. Most European cabinets comprise at least a dozen and some as many as two dozen ministerial positions. This number does not fit the capacity of our model, which can in principle handle any number of portfolios, but it does exceed our practical ability to collect and analyze data on party positions.⁶

More important than the practical problems associated with a complete analysis of the allocation of the full range of portfolios

Table 7.3. Policy jurisdictions of key cabinet portfolios

Country	1st portfolio	2nd portfolio	3rd portfolio
Austria	Finance	Interior	Foreign affairs
Belgium	Finance	Justice	—
Denmark	Finance	Foreign affairs	—
Finland	Finance	Foreign affairs	—
Germany	Finance	Foreign affairs	Interior
Iceland	Finance	Foreign affairs	—
Ireland	Finance	Foreign affairs	Agriculture
Italy	Finance	Foreign affairs	Interior
Luxembourg	Finance	Foreign affairs	—
Netherlands	Finance	Foreign affairs	Home affairs
Norway	Finance	Foreign affairs	—
Sweden	Finance	Foreign affairs	—

2. Test results:

- a. Table 8.1 assesses implication B.1 from above
- b. Table 8.2 assesses implication B.2 from above
- c. Table 8.3 assesses implication B.3 from above
- d. Table 8.4 assesses implication B.4 from above
- e. Table 8.5 assesses implication B.4a from above
- f. Table 8.6 assesses implication B.4b from above

Table 8.1. Assessment of Implication 0: $SQ_t \in (SQ_{t-1}) \cup W(SQ_{t-1})$

<i>Country (hits, misses)</i>	<i>Days implication</i>		
	<i>Could have held</i>	<i>Actually held</i>	<i>Held by chance</i>
Austria (7, 2)	6,761	5,738	3,099
Belgium (17, 9)	14,279	9,846	4,349
Denmark (18, 4)	13,392	10,685	3,624
Finland (19, 9)	10,023	5,930	3,823
Germany (12, 5)	10,552	8,889	3,736
Iceland (11, 7)	15,339	9,377	6,010
Ireland (4, 3)	5,977	4,592	1,795
Italy (30, 11)	13,741	9,835	4,985
Luxembourg (10, 4)	17,326	10,780	2,297
Netherlands (6, 1)	4,635	4,551	832
Norway (13, 4)	11,808	9,392	4,392
Sweden (15, 0)	11,471	11,471	1,079
Total (162, 59)	135,304	100,116	40,021

Table 8.2. Assessment of Implication 1: If, at time t ,
 $W(SQ_{t-1}) = \emptyset$, then $SQ_t = SQ_{t-1}$

Country (hits, misses)	Days implication		
	Could have held	Actually held	Held by chance
Austria (0, 0)	NA	NA	NA
Belgium (1, 1)	458	164	6
Denmark (1, 1)	1,083	429	42
Finland (0, 2)	1,773	0	32
Germany (0, 0)	NA	NA	NA
Iceland (0, 3)	1,911	0	86
Ireland (1, 1)	841	589	26
Italy (8, 3)	3,000	2,022	8
Luxembourg (8, 0)	7,107	7,107	444
Netherlands (0, 0)	NA	NA	NA
Norway (4, 1)	2,844	2,816	72
Sweden (11, 0)	9,440	9,440	351
Total (34, 12)	28,457	22,557	1,067

Table 8.3. Assessment of Implication 2: If $W(s^*) = \emptyset$, then $SQ_t = s^*$

Country (hits, misses)	Days implication		
	Could have held	Actually held	Held by chance
Austria (0, 0)	NA	NA	NA
Belgium (2, 10)	3,603	667	92
Denmark (2, 1)	1,835	1,181	68
Finland (0, 4)	2,062	0	47
Germany (0, 0)	NA	NA	NA
Iceland (1, 4)	4,658	1,172	233
Ireland (3, 1)	1,974	1,722	34
Italy (11, 5)	5139	3,011	13
Luxembourg (9, 6)	15,942	6,503	1,259
Netherlands (0, 0)	NA	NA	NA
Norway (6, 5)	7,316	4,384	205
Sweden (12, 7)	14,105	10,471	844
Total (46, 43)	55,634	39,111	2,795

Table 8.4. Assessment of Implication 3: If S participates in every element of $W(s^*)$, then S participates in SQ_t

Country (hits, misses)	Days implication		
	Could have held	Actually held	Held by chance
Austria (7, 3)	8,004	6,152	4,982
Belgium (15, 15)	15,319	8,638	4,916
Denmark (3, 11)	8,589	1,875	2,670
Finland (11, 7)	5,720	2,901	1,885
Germany (10, 7)	9,552	5,823	7,123
Iceland (9, 10)	16,324	8,315	6,444
Ireland (3, 1)	1,894	1,642	1,019
Italy (14, 10)	7,918	5,257	3,333
Luxembourg (14, 1)	17,822	15,966	7,225
Netherlands (0, 0)	NA	NA	NA
Norway (9, 8)	10,708	6,703	3,527
Sweden (13, 6)	14,070	11,176	4,939
Total (108, 79)	115,920	74,448	48,63

Table 8.5. Assessment of Implication 3A: If S is strong and if every element of $W(s^*)$ assigns a particular portfolio to S , then S receives that portfolio in SQ_t

Country (hits, misses)	Days implication		
	Could have held	Actually held	Held by chance
Austria (2, 0)	1,117	1,117	70
Belgium (7, 17)	14,066	7,450	2,838
Denmark (5, 16)	11,351	1,508	1,741
Finland (10, 25)	9,031	2,135	800
Germany (6, 11)	11,552	4,145	2,038
Iceland (8, 16)	15,989	5,089	3,585
Ireland (9, 3)	1,974	1,722	34
Italy (53, 24)	9,854	4,460	594
Luxembourg (23, 7)	17,735	11,235	2,568
Netherlands (0, 0)	NA	NA	NA
Norway (15, 13)	10,708	5,644	1,296
Sweden (25, 13)	14,105	10,841	651
Total (163, 145)	117,482	55,146	16,195

Table 8.6. Assessment of Implication 3B: If S is strong, then each portfolio in SQ_t is assigned to one of the parties identified in $\{s^*\}$. $\cup W(s^*)$

Country (hits, misses)	Days implication		
	Could have held	Actually held	Held by chance
Austria (10, 20)	8,468	3,706	873
Belgium (26, 34)	14,823	7,883	1,809
Denmark (12, 24)	8,689	3,607	1,158
Finland (16, 38)	7,561	2,175	707
Germany (40, 11)	10,552	8,150	834
Iceland (20, 18)	16,332	9,306	2,837
Ireland (9, 3)	1,974	1,722	34
Italy (67, 20)	9,503	7,213	132
Luxembourg (23, 7)	17,817	11,235	2,568
Netherlands (0, 0)	NA	NA	NA
Norway (16, 19)	11,907	5,644	1,008
Sweden (25, 13)	14,105	10,841	651
Total (264, 207)	121,731	71,382	12,623

3. Conclusions [Mine, not L&S's]:

- a. Not all do terribly well, & clear cross-country variation in how well they do
- b. *Random* alt. hypoth. is weak & irrelevant:
 - (1) Could use *MinWinCoal*, e.g., to narrow range prtys from which to draw rndmly
 - (2) Hard to say, \therefore , whether performance reported is “good”; how would *reasonable* alternatives have done
- c. That said, this one of only going theories that offers predictions at level of which parties will get which seats [brainstorm for any alternatives?]

E. L&S's much better test: the regression on page 189

- 1. Dependent Variable: $G_{ij} = 1$ if party i is in govt j , $G_{ij} = 0$ if not
- 2. Independent Variables:
 - a. MSP = 1 if party is a merely strong party, = 0 if it is not
 - b. VSP = 1 if party is a very strong party, = 0 if it is not
 - c. PSP = 1 if party is a partner of a strong party, = 0 if it is not
 - d. W = the party's percentage of the legislative seats
 - e. MD1 = the party's policy distance from dimension 1 median
 - f. MD2 = the party's policy distance from dimension 2 median

3. Results (next page, and...):

G=	-.970	-.151	MSP	+.630	VSP	+.248	PSP	+.041	W	-.047	MD1	-.157	MD2
s.e.	(0.34)	(0.184)		(0.182)		(0.144)		(.004)		(.031)		(0.041)	
t=	(2.85)	(0.82)		(3.46)		(1.72)		(10.5)		(1.54)		(3.84)	

Recall: We like coefficients near twice their standard error or better. That's the same as wanting t-stats around 2 or better.

Table 9.1: Variables Involved in Evaluating L&S's Making & Breaking Governments			
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Operationalization</i>	<i>Source</i>
Government	G_{ij}	1 = party i is in govt j 0 = party i is not in govt j	EJPR
“Merely” Strong Party	MSP_{ij}	1=party i merely strong at time of govt j 0=party i not merely strong in govt j	WINSET
“Very” Strong Party	VSP_{ij}	1=party i very strong at time of govt j 0=party i not very strong in govt j	WINSET
“Partner” of a Strong Party	PSP_{ij}	1 = party i is partner of merely strong party at time of govt j 0 = party i is not partner of merely strong party at time of govt j	WINSET
Weight	W_{ij}	Party i 's percentage of legislative seats at time of govt j	MR
Centrality	MD_{ijk}	Ideological distance on dimension k of party i from the median on that dimension at the time of government j	LH

Who Gets Into Government?

$$G_{ij} = -0.72 + 1.01(S_{ij}) \quad \text{where } S_{ij} = MSP_{ij} + VSP_{ij}$$

t-statistics: (2.72) (10.93)

$$G_{ij} = -0.51 + 0.68(MSP_{ij}) + 1.66(VSP_{ij}) + 0.73(PSP_{ij})$$

t-statistics: (1.90) (4.62) (11.01) (5.86)

What Makes a Party Strong?

$$MSP_{ij} = -0.77 + 0.03(W_{ij}) - 0.49(MD_{ij1}) - 0.03(MD_{ij2})$$

t-statistics: (5.23) (6.24) (8.79) (0.55)

$$VSP_{ij} = -1.77 + 0.05(W_{ij}) - 0.29(MD_{ij1}) - 0.10(MD_{ij2})$$

t-statistics: (9.67) (10.19) (6.43) (1.61)

$$PSP_{ij} = -0.86 + 0.01(W_{ij}) + 0.18(MD_{ij1}) - 0.45(MD_{ij2})$$

t-statistics: (6.96) (2.89) (6.75) (10.51)



Who Gets Into Government? Take 2

$$G_{ij} = -0.97 - .15MSP_{ij} + .63VSP_{ij} + .25PSP_{ij} + .04W_{ij} - .05MD_{ij1} - .16MD_{ij2}$$

t: (2.85) (0.82) (3.46) (1.72) (10.53) (1.54) (3.84)

V. Portfolio-Allocation Model & Cabinet Stability (*Part IV*)

- A. Eqbm cabs more durable than any non-eqbm cabs that do form
- B. Same factors (info.) needed to determine eqbm cabinets are factors that must Δ to alter what is the eqbm cabinet:
 1. [List of parties, their weights, & their policy positions]
 2. [Dimensionality of policy space & its allocation to portfolios]
- C. Only unforeseen shocks can destabilize an eqbm cab [why?].
Examples: [how do these link with I.B. above?]
 1. Party splits or fusions
 2. Defections or by-elections
 3. Emergence of new issues or fading of old
 4. Events may shift party preferences
 5. Δ parties' percept's of others (esp. ability to win standoffs)
- D. Compare Fig. 10.1 & 10.2: which cabinet more stable? Why?
What general implications might be drawn from this?



E. General Simulations

1. Take some set of fixed situations, described by...
 - a. The # parties; b. Their initial policy positions; c. Their weight in parliament
2. Computerize the following steps
 - a. Calculate initial equilibrium
 - b. Generate 1000 random perturbations of party positions
 - c. Calculate new equilibria
 - d. Draw inferences from proportion of time eqbm changes in various settings all subjected to same-variance random shocks
3. [Tables 10.2 & 10.3 show results]
4. Conclusions:
 - a. Empty winset DDMs are most stable

Table 10.2

Table 10.2. The impact of 5% shock streams on generic party systems

Party system	Cases with same strong party	Cases with same empty-winsset DDM
<i>Three party</i>		
Fig 10A.1: strong party	766	1,000
Fig 10A.2: no strong party	no s*	912
<i>Four party (Party D central)</i>		
Fig 10A.3: big party median on 1 dimension	889	1,000
Fig 10A.5: big party median on 2 dimensions	1,000	997
Fig 10A.7: big party median on no dimension	no s*	no m**
<i>Four party (Party D noncentral)</i>		
Fig 10A.4: big party median on 1 dimension	915	999
Fig 10A.6: big party median on 2 dimensions	1,000	1,000
Fig 10A.8: big party median on no dimension	no s*	no m**
<i>Five party</i>		
Fig 10A.9: SD median on 2 dimensions	1,000	998
Fig 10A.10: Center median on 1 dimension	661	1,000
Fig 10A.11: SD median on 2 dimensions	1,000	993

Table 10.3. The impact of 10% shock streams on generic party systems

Party system	Cases with same strong party	Cases with same empty-winsset DDM
<i>Three party</i>		
Fig 10A.1: strong party	615	969
Fig 10A.2: no strong party	no s*	747
<i>Four party (Party D central)</i>		
Fig 10A.3: big party median on 1 dimension	730	956
Fig 10A.5: big party median on 2 dimensions	978	885
Fig 10A.7: big party median on no dimension	no s*	no m**
<i>Four party (Party D noncentral)</i>		
Fig 10A.4: big party median on 1 dimension	734	952
Fig 10A.6: big party median on 2 dimensions	1,000	995
Fig 10A.8: big party median on no dimension	no s*	no m**
<i>Five party</i>		
Fig 10A.9: SD median on 2 dimensions	1,000	896
Fig 10A.10: Center median on 1 dimension	530	938
Fig 10A.11: SD median on 2 dimensions	986	856

- b. If empty winset DDM is an ideal point (v.s.p.), then extremely stable
- c. Least stable appears to be where dominant party is not median

F. Note on PM's ability to call elections:

1. PM can threaten coalition partners & parl. w/ calling elections when expects to gain by doing so
 - a. Certainly won't do so when expects to lose
 - b. Threat, if successful, will cause Δ in govt in PM's party's favor
2. Thus, L&S conclude, shifts in potential electoral support favoring PM's party can cause govt Δ
3. [Will Δ other parties' electoral potential have effects? Compare govt, non-govt parties, and parts of govt'l parl-maj and opp.?)

VI. Relaxing assumptions to reconsider aspects of policy space

A. Reminder:

1. Options not *whether* to make assumptions (A's). All logical arg. has some set A's. Options: which A's to make & how explicitly?
2. So, when re-considering A's, questions are:
 - a. How much do alternative A's alter conclusions?
 - b. How do conclusions drawn from one set of A's fare empirically compared to those drawn from another?
3. Agree w/ L&S that, *cet. par.*, more explicit A's (usu. from formal arg's) better than less (usu. from informal arg.'s).

B. Dimensionality—allowing for many dimensions?

1. Policy-space dimensionality likely infinite or large&indeterminate
2. Even in lattice subset, $\uparrow D \Rightarrow \downarrow \text{prob}(\text{eqba})$ in random party systems
3. Two approaches to determining policy space:
 - a. Take existing portfolios as simple & given (fixed at start of process)
 - b. Use the policy issues on which parties take a public stance
 - c. Both seem to produce D too large to reconcile w/ apparent stability of govts
4. Empirically, parties' policy positions highly correlated across D's
 - a. Esp., across related D's, but even across seemingly unrelated dims
 - b. such correlation reduces the effective dimensionality of politics
 - c. [demonstrate this in 2D, perfect correlation case: Figs. 11.1 & 11.2]
 - d. [why might parties adopt correlated policy stances like this?]




Fig 11.1. A very strong party in a system with perfectly correlated dimensions




Fig 11.2. A very strong party in a system with imperfectly correlated dimensions

- C. Differing issue salience & policy-pref dependence across D's
1. Equal salience=>circular indifference curves: pure distance pref's
 - a. Unequal salience => distance along one D 'more distasteful' than distance along others => ellipsoidal indifference curves
 - b. Still linear, orthogonal policy reaction curves => theoretical propositions still hold, but actual eqba case by case may differ
 2. Independent preferences across D's => indifference ellipses or circles that are perpendicular to axes
 - a. *Non-separable* policy pref's => non-orthogonal policy reaction-curves
 - b. => can radically change the analysis.
- D. Complex jurisdictions [define]
1. If still assume min's free reign in portfolios' areas, then allocating multiple portfolios to 1 party reduces set of possible cabs (lattice space): fewer ways to allocate control over policy areas
 2. Some new results
 - a. Party ideal points are always in set of possible cabinets: e.g., pure prime-ministerial government.
 - b. If strong (either type) under simple jurisdictions, then strong under any complex jurisdictioning [why?]
 - c. If empty-winsset DDM under simple jurisdiction remains an option under complex, then remains an eqbm [how might it disappear?]
 - d. Reminder that effective jurisdictional complexity is what matters (policy stances are correlated across issues)
- E. Implications of these three extensions
1. *Correlated preferences* between parties across dimensions reduces dimensionality & simplifies analysis, increases prob. eqba
 2. *Jurisdictional complexity* reduces the set of possible cabinets & so likewise simplifies & increases prob. eqba
 3. *Unequal salience* doesn't make that much difference, but *non-separability* makes a large difference

VII. Extensions

A. Factions & intra-party politics

1. Party leaders are potential cabinet ministers
 - a. Leadership involves a established set of policy reputations & credibility
 - b. Reputations take time to build & generally valuable enough to be maintained
 - c. => parties have set of possible issue stances to which can credibly commit in govt given by established policy reputations of their leaders
 - d. In this view, factions arise from party leads w/ (prob'ly slightly) diff. prefs
 - e. By having diverse set of leaders, party retains some ability to strategically shift its policy stance on issues by rearranging its leadership assignments
2. Three effects arise from this possibility
 - a. Effect of having more than 1 poss. party ideal point (L&S still maintain not any point possible, but those for which some leader-combo have estab. rep.)
 - b. Effect of factionalism on the stability of cabinets
 - c. Incentives for leaders to split from or fuse with parties
3. L&S work from the premises that:
 - a. A dominant party leadership controls the entire party's votes
 - b. Subordinate party leadership:
 - (1) Does not control any votes
 - (2) Cannot veto any cabinet, cannot even veto its own participation in cabinet
 - (3) BUT, once minister, can pursue own ideal, not forced to pursue dom. leaders'
 - c. Under these conditions, addition of factions adds lattice points to set of possible cabinets. Its like adding parties with zero votes & no veto power.
4. One interesting implication: Δ w/in opp. parties can alter strategic options of governing party(ies)

B. Minority & surplus-majority governments

1. One of portfolio-allocation model's most attractive features is that it predicts *minority governments* under certain conditions
2. *Surplus-majorities* also possible: parties => votes but also credible policy stances (i.e., add lattice points to possible govt sets—added points may be eqba even if party in question not nec. to maj.)

C. Endogenizing issue assignment to portfolios:

1. B/c diff. jurisdictional allocations can produce diff. eqbm cabs, parties have prefs over portfolio allocation schemes.
2. => another element in bargaining to form a government.

VIII. Some very key elements of theory & what if relaxed:

A. Extreme departmentalism:

1. But compromise within cabinet goes on all the time
2. Finance min. esp. has considerable influence on other ministries
3. Prime minister has strong influence across board
4. As departmentalism relaxed, lattice becomes *fuzzy*
 - a. => back toward govt policy as some compromise among its members' ideals on all issues rather than policy as ideal of party holding that portfolio
 - b. => back toward chaos theories


B. Party positions (or faction-leader positions) given, fixed exog. to model: if these instead strategic, may get very diff. dynamic

IX. L&S: Applying the Model to Find Equilibrium Cabinets

A. Step 0: Draw and Label the Lattice of Possible Governments

B. Step 1: Find the DDM Government


C. Steps 2+:




Example 1:

Empty winset DDM at a party's ideal point =>
 that party is very strong & govt where it gets the portfolios is *the* (1) eqbm:

The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System




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
Example 2:

Non-Empty Winset DDM, not at a party's ideal, but merely strong party exists
 => eqbm govts (>1) are that party's ideal & all govts maj-pref'd to it
 (in all of which the m.s.p. participates, by definition of "merely strong")


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
Example 3:

Empty Winset DDM, not at any party's ideal, but merely strong party exists =>


eqbm govts (>1) are that party's ideal & all govts maj-pref to it (in all of which m.s.p. participates, by def. of "merely strong"),

but only those that no farther away from m.s.p.'s ideal than empty-winsset DDM


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
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
Example 4:

Non-Empty Winset DDM & no strong party => no (0) equilibrium govts


The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System



The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System



The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System



One more possibility exists, which was not drawn: Empty Winset DDM with No Strong Party => *the* (1) equilibrium is the empty-winset DDM.