

Parties and Party Systems

I. Patterns in Party Politics (GLM ch. 7)

A. Party System:

1. DEF: character of political competition in polity, described in terms of relative strengths & policy positions of its parties (GLM, p. 151).
2. Each system somewhat unique, but many similarities across party systems

B. 7 W. European Prty Sys, Descript: common basis left/ right divide defines competition

1. UK

a. Description:

- (1) Major Parties: the players
- (2) Relative Strengths:
- (3) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time

b. “Responsible Party Government” Model:

- (1) ideological decision sharply defined for voters
- (2) cabinet government with relatively unchecked power

TABLE 7-1 ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM SINCE 1983

Party	1983		1987		1992		1997	
	% Votes	N Seats						
Conservatives	42.4	397	42.0	376	41.9	336	30.7	165
Labour	27.6	209	30.7	229	34.9	271	43.3	419
Liberals*	13.7	17	12.8	17	17.8	20	16.8	46
Social Democrats*	11.6	6	9.7	5	—	—	—	—
Scottish Nationalists	1.1	2	1.4	3	1.9	3	2.0	6
Welsh Nationalists	0.4	2	0.4	3	0.5	4	0.5	4
Irish Nationalists	0.8	2	0.8	4	0.7	4	1.1	5
Irish Unionists	1.4	15	1.2	13	1.2	13	1.4	13
Referendum party	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.6	—
Others	0.8	—	1.1	—	1.1	—	1.6	1
All	100.0	650	100.0	650	100.0	651	100.0	659

Party Composition of Government in the 1990s:

1979–97: Conservative single-party government

1997– : Labour single-party government

*The Social Democrats and the Liberals formed an electoral pact—the Alliance—in 1979 and 1983; the two parties subsequently merged under the name Liberal Democrats.

Source: The sources used for these results and all others reported in this chapter are Mackie and Rose (1991, 1997), the *Political Data Yearbook*, and, for the most recent results, various national and international websites.

- c. So, single-party, almost-always majority governments of *Labour* or *Conservative*; alternate, often at rather slow frequency (comparatively long periods of left or of right government).

2. Sweden

a. Description:

- (1) Major Parties: the players
- (2) Relative Strengths:
- (3) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time

b. Key differences from the UK

- (1) Soc Dems much more successful than Lab
- (2) Soc Dems not quite monop of left—small but persistent comm party
- (3) Moderates quite far from monopoly non-soc opposition
 - (a) Liberals—center-type libs
 - (b) Center Party—agrarian
 - (c) Christian Democrats—newer
- (4) Rel. recent strength Ecology Party & New Dem (rt, protest)

TABLE 7-2 ELECTIONS IN SWEDEN SINCE 1988

Party	1988		1991		1994		1998	
	% Votes	N Seats						
Social Democrats	43.6	156	37.7	138	45.2	161	36.6	131
Left Party/ Communists	5.9	21	4.5	16	6.2	22	12.0	43
Ecology party	5.5	20	3.4	–	5.0	18	4.5	16
Liberal party	12.2	44	9.1	33	7.2	26	4.7	17
Center party	11.4	42	8.5	31	7.7	27	5.1	18
Christian Democrats	3.0	–	7.1	26	4.1	15	11.8	42
Moderate (Conservative)	18.3	66	21.9	80	22.4	80	22.7	82
New Democracy	–	–	6.7	25	1.2	–	–	–
Others	0.1	–	1.0	–	1.0	–	2.6	–
All	100.0	349	100.0	349	100.0	349	100.0	349

Party Composition of Government in the 1990s:

1982–91: Social Democratic single-party government

1991–94: Coalition of Moderates, Liberals, Center, & Christian Democrats

1994– : Social Democratic single-party government

- (5) So, single-party Social-Democratic governments typically, relatively often minority governments, alternate with occasional center-right coalition governments (with Orwellian named parties).

3. Germany

a. Description:

- (1) Major Parties: the players
- (2) Relative Strengths:
- (3) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time

b. Key differences from the UK

- (1) Third-Party Liberals (FDP) relatively strong position.
 - (a) More “conservative” (i.e., libertarian) than UK Liberals
 - (b) Roots in secular opposition to Catholic/Christian politics rather than ctr-lft opp. to secular conservatism
- (2) CDU/CSU=Christian-Dem not secular conservative party
 - (a) gen. more receptive to *social justice* concerns⇒somewhat more centrist on econ. pol.
 - (b) gen. more concerned w/ *moral issues* & more conserv. on soc. pol., esp. where main churches have stance
 - (c) CSU is the more Catholic & socially conservative of two
- (3) SPD was one of most radical in 19th C, one of most moderate now
 - (a) excluded for its extremism pre-‘66 *Bad Godesberg* commit. to free-mrkt & NATO
 - (b) post-‘66 increasingly de-ideologized, ↑ly pro-sys, & toward consensual politics
- (4) TRIANGULAR POLITICS: CDU/CSU–FDP–SPD, how do they ally on different sorts of issues?

c. Changes in the 80s & 90s

- (1) Greens–right around threshold since 80s, breakthrough in 90s; seems now part gov’tl coalition patterns
- (2) 1990 Unification: 12M new, likely volatile voters, @ 1st mostly to CDU & FDP, since against. Why?
- (3) Greens allying w/ related social movements, becoming more effectively organized to compete
- (4) *Die Republikaner*–not yet parliamentary player, but disturbing coupled w/ recently rising social strife
- (5) *Politikverdrossenheit*–disillusionment w/ politics

TABLE 7-3 ELECTIONS IN UNITED GERMANY SINCE 1990

Party	1990		1994		1998	
	% Votes	N Seats	% Votes	N Seats	% Votes	N Seats
Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU)	43.8	319	41.5	294	35.1	245
Social Democrats (SPD)	33.5	239	36.4	252	40.9	298
Free Democrats (FDP)	11.0	79	6.9	47	6.2	44
Greens*	5.1	8	7.3	49	6.7	47
Democratic Socialists (PDS)	2.4	17	4.4	30	5.1	35
Republicans	2.1	—	1.9	—	1.8	—
German Peoples' Union (DVU)	—	—	—	—	1.2	—
Others	2.1	—	1.6	—	3.0	—
All	100.0	662	100.0	672	100.0	669
Party Composition of Government in the 1990s:						
1982–98:		Coalition of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats				
1998–		Coalition of Social Democrats and Greens				

*Includes (West German) Greens and (East German) Alliance '90/Greens in 1990.

d. Triangular pattern w/ FDP king-maker; recently seems transition to two-bloc FDP-CDU v. SDP-Greens

4. Netherlands

a. Description:

- (1) Major Parties: the players: PvdA, CDA, VVD
- (2) Relative Strength: 1/3+1/3+1/5+ smaller, episodic players
- (3) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time

b. Triangular + small party complications

TABLE 7-4 ELECTIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS SINCE 1986

Party	1986		1989		1994		1998	
	% Votes	N Seats						
Socialist party	–	–	–	–	1.3	2	3.5	5
Green Left*	3.2	3	4.1	6	3.5	5	7.3	11
Labor party (PvdA)	33.3	52	31.9	49	24.0	37	29.0	45
Democrats 66	6.1	9	7.9	12	15.5	24	9.0	14
Liberals (VVD)	17.4	27	14.6	22	19.9	31	24.7	38
Christian Democrats (CDA)	34.6	54	35.3	54	22.2	34	18.4	29
Reformed Political Union	1.0	1	1.2	2	1.3	2	1.3	2
Political Reformed party	1.7	3	1.9	3	1.7	2	1.8	3
Reformed Political Federation	0.9	1	1.0	1	1.8	3	2.0	3
Old People's Alliance	–	–	–	–	3.6	6	0.5	–
Union 55+	–	–	–	–	0.9	1	–	–
Center Democrats	0.4	–	0.9	1	2.5	3	0.6	–
Others	1.4	–	1.2	–	1.8	–	1.9	–
All	100.0	150	100.0	150	100.0	150	100.0	150

Party Composition of Government in the 1990s:

1989–94: Coalition of Christian Democrats and Labor

1994– : Coalition of Labor, Liberals and Democrats 66

*The Green Left is a merger of four different parties (the Communist party, the Pacifist Socialist party, the Radical Political party, and the Evangelical People's party), each of which last ran separate lists in 1986.

5. Italy (pre-1994)

a. Description:

- (1) Major Parties: MSI-{Lib-Rep-DC-PSDI-PSI}-PCI+many smaller
- (2) Relative Strengths: DC 1/3, PCI 1/3
- (3) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time: (continually DC-led, although famously frequently reshuffled, type but varied single-party minority, four- or five-party majority, usu. oversized)

b. More fractionalized & polarized than most other systems (nearest was FR IVth)

c. Major Changes Electoral System:

- (1) Following 1993 referendum => version of German 2-ballot system, 1994-2001
- (2) Starting Dec 2005, another change to version Greek system w/ strict party-list + provision to boost plurality seat-winner (of pre-election coalitions) to majority if necessary.

d. Major Party-System Changes:

- (1) Major Parties: AN-Lega-Forza-Centro-PSI-Greens-PDS-Rifond, + La Rete
 - (a) Much fluidity in party formation, name changes, shifting alliances, shuffles, etc., since 1994,
 - (b) But generally a right block led by Berlusconi and left block led by a few different PDS leaders such as Prodi
- (2) Relative Strengths: roughly even left-right block, but ↑ fluidity in parties and MP's party-alliance
- (3) Types govt & their general pattern over time (so far steady alternate blocks: Rt-Lft-Rt-Lft...)

TABLE 7-5 ELECTIONS IN ITALY SINCE 1987

Party	1987		1992		1994*		1996*	
	% Votes	N Seats	% Votes	N Seats	% PR Votes	N Seats	% PR Votes	N Seats
Greens	2.5	13	1.8	16	2.7	11	2.5	16
Communist party (PCI) [†]	26.6	177	—	—	—	—	—	—
Communist Refoundation	—	—	5.6	35	6.0	39	8.6	35
Democratic Party of the Left (PDS)	—	—	16.1	107	20.4	109	21.1	171
La Rete	—	—	1.9	12	1.9	6	—	—
Socialist party (PSI)/ Dini List [‡]	14.3	94	13.6	92	2.2	14	4.3	26
Social Democrats	3.0	17	2.7	16	—	—	—	—
Republicans	2.1	21	4.4	27	—	—	—	—
Liberal party	2.1	11	2.9	17	—	—	—	—
Democratic Alliance	—	—	—	—	1.2	18	—	—
Segni Pact	—	—	—	—	4.7	13	—	—
Christian Democrats (DC) [§]	34.3	234	29.7	206	—	—	—	—
Christian Democratic Center	—	—	—	—	—	29**	5.8	30
People's party/Prodi List	—	—	—	—	11.1	33	6.8	75
Forza Italia	—	—	—	—	21.0	99	20.6	123
Northern League	0.5	1	8.7	55	8.4	117	10.1	59
Social Movement (MSI)/ National Alliance	5.9	35	5.4	34	13.5	109	15.7	93
Radicals/Pannella List	2.6	13	1.2	7	3.5	6	1.9	—
Others	6.1	14	5.0	6	3.4	27	2.6	2
All	100.0	630	100.0	630	100.0	630	100.0	630

Party Composition of Government in the 1990s:

- 1991–94: Coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social Democrats and Liberals
- 1994 : Coalition of Forza Italia, National Alliance and Northern League
- 1995–96: Non-party government
- 1996– : “OliveTree Coalition,” including Democratic party of the Left, People’s Party, Greens, and Dini List (Italian Renewal)

*In 1994 and 1996, the % Votes refers only to the share of the vote in the PR districts, while the N Seats refers to the total number of seats won in both the PR and the single-member districts. Note also that the lists competing in the PR districts in 1994 and 1996 sometimes involved quite heterogeneous alliances of parties, and the overview provided in this table does not necessarily provide a wholly accurate party-by-party breakdown. For more complete details, see D’Alimonte (1998).

[†]The Communist party (PCI) split in 1991, with the majority of the party reorganizing as the social democratic Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), and with a minority maintaining a more orthodox communist position as Communist Refoundation (RC).

[‡]Although the Socialist party did not contest the 1996 election as an independent party, there was an official Socialist party list included in the list headed by Lamberto Dini.

[§]The Christian Democrats fell apart after 1992, and were succeeded by various smaller parties including the Christian Democratic Center (CCD) and the Popular party (PPI); in 1996 the PPI formed part of a list headed by Romano Prodi, which also included the former Segni Pact.

**All of the CCD seats in 1994 were won in the single-member districts.

6. France

a. IVth: *PCF (.25)–PSF (.2)–Rad (.1)–Cath MRP (.25)–Gauls (.2)–Pouj (.1) + small*

b. Fifth Republic: *PCF–PS–UDF–RPR, + smaller*

(1) Two-bloc system: what induced/facilitated the change?

(2) Shift in balance of strength within each bloc

(3) *Front National, Generation Ecologie, Les Verts*

TABLE 7-6 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN FRANCE SINCE 1988

Party	1988		1993		1997	
	% Votes*	N Seats	% Votes*	N Seats	% Votes*	N Seats
Greens	0.4	0	7.6	0	6.3	8
Communist party (PCF)	11.3	27	9.2	23	9.9	37
Socialist party (PS) [†]	37.6	280	18.5	60	25.5	246
Other left	0.4	0	3.6	10	5.3	29
Union for French Democracy (UDF)	18.5	129	19.1	213	14.7	109
Rally for the Republic (RPR)	19.2	128	20.4	247	16.8	139
Other right	2.9	12	5.0	24	4.7	8
National Front (NF)	9.6	1	12.4	0	14.9	1
Others	0.1	0	4.3	0	1.9	0
All	100.0	577	100.0	577	100.0	577
Party Composition of Government in the 1990s:						
1989–93:	Coalition of Socialist party and Left Radicals					
1993–97:	Coalition of Rally for the Republic and Union for French Democracy					
1997–	Coalition of Socialist party, Left Radicals, Communist party, Greens and other left.					

*Voting percentages refer to first-ballot results only.

[†]Includes Left Radicals

TABLE 7-7 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN FRANCE SINCE 1988

Party	1988		1995	
	1st Round % Votes	2nd Round % Votes	1st Round % Votes	2nd Round % Votes
Greens	3.8	—	3.3	—
Communist party (PCF)	6.8	—	8.6	—
Socialist party (PS)	34.1	54.0*	23.3	47.4
Rally for the Republic (RPR)	19.9	46.0*	39.5 [†]	52.6
Union for French Democracy (UDF)	16.5	—	—	—
National Front (NF)	14.4	—	15.0	—
Other left	4.5	—	5.6	—
Other right			4.7	—
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*The second ballot contestants were outgoing President François Mitterrand (PS), the eventual winner, and Jacques Chirac (RPR).

[†]The RPR (Gaullists) ran two candidates in the first ballot, Jacques Chirac and Eduard Balladur, and the figure of 39.5% refers to their combined vote. There was no UDF candidate in that first ballot. Chirac, who was the higher-polling Gaullist candidate and who came second to the eventual first-ballot leader, Lionel Jospin (PS), then went on to win the presidency in the second ballot.

7. Spain

- a. Early volatility & flux, ill-defined loose alliances
- b. Early domination by Suarez' UnionDemCtr => broad Ctr-Rt & Ctr-Lft coals
- c. collapses about '82, replaced by PSOE dom w/ right in frag'd disarray
- d. Emerging system: PCE+PSOE+smaller lefts vs. PP (sec cons) + PC (people's coal, loose lib-cath-cons coal) + several regional parties

TABLE 7-8 ELECTIONS IN SPAIN SINCE 1986

Party	1986		1989		1993		1996		2000	
	% Votes	N Seats								
United Left (IU)	4.6	7	9.1	17	9.6	18	10.5	21	5.5	8
Socialist party (PSOE)	44.3	184	39.6	176	38.7	159	37.6	141	34.1	125
Democratic & Social Center (CDS)	9.2	19	7.9	14	1.8	—	—	—	—	—
People's party (PP)	26.1	105	25.8	106	34.8	141	38.8	156	44.5	183
Convergence & Union (CiU)	5.0	18	5.0	18	5.0	17	4.6	16	4.2	15
Basque Nationalists (PNV)	1.4	6	1.2	5	1.2	5	1.3	5	1.5	7
Herri Batasuna (HB)	1.2	5	1.1	4	0.9	2	0.7	2	—	—
Others	8.2	6	10.3	10	8.0	8	6.5	9	10.2	12
All	100.0	350	100.0	350	100.0	350	100.0	350	100.0	350

Party Composition of Government since 1982:

1982–96: PSOE single-party government

1996– : PP single-party government.

C. Uniformity & Diversity

1. Maj commonality: tendency Lft-Rt competition, rel'y rare exceptions dominated by center

2. Some Core Differences:

a. Location of liberals:

(1) Egalitarian (center-left): *e.g.*, UK Liberal Democrats

(2) Libertarian (center-right): *e.g.*, German FDP or Italian PLI

b. Whether major left or, more rarely, right party can govern alone

c. Strongly structured v. loose/fragmented govt'l alliances

d. Degree of party discipline

3. Nature of Left-Right Competition

a. Left working-class parties: common historical origins both major strands (*Socialist, Communist*)

b. Right middle/upper-class parties: more variegated origins & politics

(1) Religious v. secular conservatives

(2) Rural/farming v. industrial/service

(3) Some (far) rightist cultural linguistic, subcultural, regional

c. Compare development of Welf State across config's of left/right competition [see figures to come]

d. Complications arising: New Left parties (esp. Greens) & New Right (protest & xenophobic) & new issues

4. Conflict within Left & Right

- a. Soc/Comm & Right/Far-Right more usually enemies than allies
- b. Systems w/ much electoral weight at extremes tend⇒ centrist multiparty coals
- c. Growing Disillusionment w/ Politics (*politikverdrosenheit*) ⇒ anti-party parties: sources? effects?

5. Other Dimensions of Party Politics

- a. Other cleavage lines: religion, cultural/ethnic/linguistic, materialist/post-materialist
- b. Within broad rubric of Left-Right Competition: social and economic dimensions

II. Party Families (GLM ch. 8)

A. Definition/Grouping Characteristics

1. Origins
2. Links they form among selves, w/in & across countries
3. Similarity of (broad) policy stances

B. Families of the Left

1. Social Democrats (↓ or unchanged support)
2. Comms (↓↓ support in most, except IT but decreasingly comm in fact & now not even in name)
3. New Left (↑ in most places, social democrats usually major effort to absorb...)
4. Greens (↑ or unchanged support in most places)

MEAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES, 1950–2000.

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Austria	43.3	45.0	50.0	45.4	37.2
Belgium	35.9	31.0	26.6	28.0	23.8
Denmark	40.2	39.1	33.6	31.9	36.0
Finland	25.9	26.9	25.1	25.4	24.4
France	25.9	18.6	22.1	35.0	24.4
Germany	30.3	39.4	44.2	39.4	36.9
Iceland	19.5	15.0	14.8	17.1	20.3
Ireland	10.9	14.8	12.7	8.9	14.9
Italy	18.0	19.4	14.4	16.4	25.7
Luxembourg	37.1	35.0	35.4	32.3	24.8
Malta	54.9	38.5	51.2	49.0	48.1
Netherlands	30.7	25.8	31.9	31.0	26.5
Norway	47.5	45.4	38.8	37.4	36.0
Sweden	45.6	48.4	43.7	44.5	39.8
Switzerland	26.0	26.0	25.7	21.2	21.0
UK	46.3	46.1	39.1	29.2	38.9
Mean (N = 16)	33.6	32.1	31.8	30.7	29.9
Greece				43.5	43.8
Portugal				28.7	39.4
Spain				43.5	39.4
Mean (N = 19)				31.9	31.6

Note: Since Greece, Portugal, and Spain did not become fully democratic until the mid-1970s, decade averages are reported only for the 1980s and 1990s.

Source: For this and other tables in this chapter, see Chapter 7, note 1. The calculations involved here and in the tables in Chapter 9 are drawn from an ongoing project analyzing aggregate data on voters, parties, and governments in Western Europe from 1950 to 2000. For additional analyses, see Mair (1999a, 1999b, 2000).

MEAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR COMMUNIST PARTIES, 1950–2000

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Austria	4.3	1.7	1.2	0.7	0.4
Belgium	3.4	3.7	2.9	1.4	0.2
Denmark	4.5	1.0	3.0	0.9	–
Finland	22.1	21.6	17.6	13.9	10.7
France	23.9	21.4	21.0	12.4	12.6
Germany	1.1	–	–	–	4.0
Iceland	16.4	16.3	23.7	15.3	9.6
Ireland	–	–	–	–	–
Italy	22.7	26.1	30.7	28.3	6.7
Luxembourg	11.6	14.0	8.2	5.1	2.8
Malta	–	–	–	–	–
Netherlands	4.4	3.2	3.4	1.1	–
Norway	4.3	1.8	1.0	0.9	–
Sweden	4.2	4.2	5.1	5.6	7.6
Switzerland	2.7	2.6	2.4	0.9	1.1
UK	–	–	–	–	–
Mean (N = 16)	7.9	7.3	7.5	5.4	3.5
Greece				12.1	9.5
Portugal				16.0	9.7
Spain				6.1	9.9
Mean (N = 19)				6.3	4.5

Note: Since Greece, Portugal, and Spain did not become fully democratic until the mid-1970s, decade averages are reported only for the 1980s and 1990s.

MEAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR NEW LEFT PARTIES, 1960–2000

	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Austria	–	–	–	–
Belgium	–	–	–	–
Denmark	7.7	8.3	14.4	7.7
Finland	–	–	–	–
France	–	–	–	–
Germany	–	–	–	–
Iceland	–	–	7.8	7.4
Ireland	–	1.4	3.9	3.2
Italy	2.2	3.3	4.0	–
Luxembourg	–	–	–	–
Malta	–	–	–	–
Netherlands	3.0	4.0	2.6	2.4
Norway	4.0	6.9	6.8	8.4
Sweden	–	–	–	–
Switzerland	–	0.9	2.3	0.3
UK	–	–	–	–
Mean (N = 16)	1.1	1.6	2.6	1.8
Greece	–	–	–	–
Portugal	–	–	–	–
Spain	–	–	–	–
Mean (N = 19)			2.2	1.5

Note: Since Greece, Portugal and Spain did not become fully democratic until the mid-1970s, decade averages are reported only for the 1980s and 1990s.

MEAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR GREEN PARTIES, 1980–2000

	1980s	1990s
Austria	4.1	6.6
Belgium	6.0	10.9
Denmark	0.7	2.2
Finland	2.7	7.0
France	0.9	8.4
Germany	5.1	6.4
Iceland	–	3.1
Ireland	0.4	2.1
Italy	1.3	2.7
Luxembourg	6.4	9.3
Malta	–	1.5
Netherlands	1.1	5.6
Norway	0.1	0.1
Sweden	2.9	4.3
Switzerland	5.0	6.3
UK	0.3	0.3
Mean (N = 16)	2.3	4.8
Greece	0.2	0.6
Portugal	–	0.3
Spain	–	1.0
Mean (N = 19)	2.0	4.1

C. Families of the Center & Right

1. Christian Democrats (↓ or unchanged in most places, until recently some rebound)
2. Secular Conservatives (↑ or unchanged in most places, until recently some rebound)
3. Liberals (most ↑, but some CDs/SecCons moving to absorb)
4. Agrarian/Rural (↓ or unchanged support)
5. Far Right (↑ support in several places)

MEAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES, 1950–2000

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Austria	43.8	46.9	43.2	42.2	28.7
Belgium	45.4	36.3	33.7	27.8	23.1
Denmark	–	–	3.9	2.4	2.2
Finland	–	0.6	2.9	2.8	3.4
France*	–	–	–	–	–
Germany	47.7	46.3	46.0	45.9	40.1
Iceland	–	–	–	–	0.2
Ireland†	28.1	33.4	32.8	33.9	26.3
Italy	41.3	38.6	38.5	33.6	17.8
Luxembourg	37.5	34.3	31.2	33.3	30.3
Malta	–	–	–	–	–
Netherlands	53.2	49.8	37.8	36.6	23.3
Norway	10.3	9.0	11.9	8.7	10.8
Sweden	–	1.1	1.6	2.4	7.7
Switzerland	24.2	24.4	23.2	22.2	18.8
UK	–	–	–	–	–
Mean (N = 16)	20.7	20.1	19.1	18.3	14.5
Greece	–	–	–	–	–
Portugal	–	–	–	6.9	7.3
Spain	–	–	–	2.2	–
Mean (N = 19)				15.9	12.6

Note: Since Greece, Portugal, and Spain did not become fully democratic until the mid-1970s, decade averages are reported only for the 1980s and 1990s.

*Since the mid-1970s, the Christian democrats in France, together with conservative and liberal forces, have contested elections as part of the UDF alliance; as such, their electoral support has been grouped together with that of the conservatives (see Table 8-6).

†For the purposes of this analysis, the Irish party Fine Gael is classified as Christian democratic.

MEAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR CONSERVATIVE PARTIES, 1950–2000

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Austria	–	–	–	–	–
Belgium	–	–	–	–	–
Denmark	18.4	21.3	10.5	19.5	13.3
Finland	14.2	14.2	19.6	22.9	19.5
France*	44.2	55.6	50.3	42.7	39.7
Germany	–	–	–	–	–
Iceland	41.3	39.5	36.8	38.4	38.8
Ireland	46.0	45.7	49.1	45.9	39.2
Italy	–	–	–	–	13.9
Luxembourg	–	–	–	–	–
Malta	35.9	52.7	48.3	50.9	50.5
Netherlands	–	–	–	–	–
Norway	18.7	20.2	20.9	28.1	15.7
Sweden	17.0	14.4	15.4	21.1	22.3
Switzerland	–	–	–	–	1.2
UK	47.6	42.7	41.0	42.2	36.3
Mean (N = 16)	17.7	19.1	18.2	19.5	18.2
Greece	–	–	–	41.8	44.0
Portugal	–	–	–	–	–
Spain	–	–	–	25.9	33.3
Mean (N = 19)				20.0	19.4

Note: Since Greece, Portugal, and Spain did not become fully democratic until the mid-1970s, decade averages are reported only for the 1980s and 1990s.

*Since the mid-1970s, the UDF alliance, which is treated here as a conservative party, has brought together under one umbrella Christian democrats, conservatives, and liberals.

D. Other

1. regionalist, nationalist (unchanged or ↑ support)

2. miscellaneous, protest (↑ support in most places)

MEAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR LIBERAL PARTIES, 1950–2000

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Austria*	8.4	6.2	5.6	7.4	5.0
Belgium	11.5	18.3	15.4	21.1	22.6
Denmark	8.1	9.3	8.3	5.6	4.0
Finland	7.1	9.7	5.4	0.9	1.7
France†	–	–	–	–	–
Germany	8.6	9.4	8.2	8.9	8.0
Iceland	–	–	–	–	1.8
Ireland	–	–	–	3.5	4.7
Italy	4.8	8.1	5.4	6.9	5.8
Luxembourg	12.6	13.6	21.8	17.5	20.7
Malta	–	–	–	–	–
Netherlands	9.9	12.8	19.7	25.5	34.6
Norway	9.8	9.5	5.8	3.4	4.1
Sweden	22.1	16.3	11.8	10.8	7.0
Switzerland	31.4	32.9	31.1	30.1	24.8
UK‡	5.1	9.9	14.7	23.9	17.3
Mean (N = 16)	8.7	9.8	9.6	10.3	10.1
Greece			–	–	–
Portugal				27.3	39.4
Spain				4.6	3.2
Mean (N = 19)				10.4	10.8

Note: Since Greece, Portugal, and Spain did not become fully democratic until the mid-1970s, decade averages are reported only for the 1980s and 1990s.

*The Austrian Freedom party is considered as a liberal party through to the end of the 1980s, and as an extreme-right party in the 1990s.

†Since the mid-1970s, the liberal forces in France, together with conservatives and Christian democrats, have contested elections as part of the UDF alliance; as such, their electoral support has been grouped together with that of the conservatives (see Table 8-6).

‡Includes Liberal-SDP Alliance in the 1980s.

MEAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR AGRARIAN/CENTER PARTIES, 1950–2000

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Austria	–	–	–	–	–
Belgium	–	–	–	–	–
Denmark	22.9	20.0	15.1	11.4	21.0
Finland	23.6	23.7	24.1	25.2	24.6
France	–	–	–	–	–
Germany	–	–	–	–	–
Iceland	22.6	28.2	23.0	20.0	20.2
Ireland	2.8	0.5	–	–	–
Italy	–	–	–	–	–
Luxembourg	–	–	–	–	–
Malta	–	–	–	–	–
Netherlands	–	3.5	1.3	–	–
Norway	9.5	9.9	9.8	6.6	12.3
Sweden	11.0	14.2	21.8	12.2	7.0
Switzerland	12.1	11.2	10.8	11.1	16.5
UK	–	–	–	–	–
Mean (N = 16)	6.6	6.9	6.7	5.4	6.4
Greece				–	–
Portugal				–	–
Spain				–	–
Mean (N = 19)				4.5	5.3

Note: Since Greece, Portugal, and Spain did not become fully democratic until the mid-1970s, decade averages are reported only for the 1980s and 1990s.

E. Patterns of Partisan Competition among Families

1. Christian-Democrat-led Right

- a. left strong, united (Austria, Germany)
- b. left strong, divided (Italy -'94)
- c. left weak, united or divided (Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland)


2. Secular-Conservative-led Right

- a. left strong, united (UK)
- b. left strong, divided (Finland, Iceland, France)

3. Fragmented Right, Left strong, united (Denmark, Norway, Sweden)

F. ***Size & Growth Welfare State by party system/government pattern***

CTRY	TYPICAL GOVERNING PATTERNS:
US	Alternation Rep-Dem in Presidency Dem Domination in Legis., until recently
JA	Lib Dem (LDP) Dominant until recently
GE	Alt. CDU/CSU+FDP <i>v.</i> SDP+FDP , C+F dom '82-98; CDU+FDP <i>v.</i> SDP+Gr
FR	Alternation PS & PCF -- RPR & UDF
IT	DC-led in coal w/ PSI-PRI-PSDI-PLI or subset thereof until recently Last 3 alternations: Lega-Allianza-Forza -- PDS + various left
UK	Alternation Cons -- Lab , former dominated 1979-97
CA	Alternation Cons -- Lib , recent upheaval leaves questions
AU	Pattern of SPO (Soc) & OVP (ChrDem) coal broken in 1966 by Alternation SPO -- OVP, then SPO dom 70-86, 82-86 w/ FPO (Lib) Returns to SPO--OVP coal in 1986
BE	Partial Alternation Coalitions: CVP (ChrDem), BSP (Soc), PLP (Lib) Three smaller ethnic parties players since 1974
DE	Alternation SocDem -- some subset of Cons/Agr/3 Lib Parties/CD
FI	Fluid Partial Alternation Ranging from SocDem or even Comms to Cons
GR	Alternation PASOK -- New Dem (each has occasional coal allies)
IR	Alternation Fianna Fail -- Fine Gael & Labour until 1989 now FF or FG with Lab or Lib
NE	Fluid Partial Alternation across the board until '78, since then appears Alternation b/w CDA (ChrDem)+VVD (LIB) & CDA+PvdA (SocDem)
NO	Alternation DNA (Soc) -- Cons+Lib+Agr+ChrDem, more DNA than other
PO	Since 1980, appears alternation Lib-Soc coal. and Lib-CD coal.
SP	PSOE domination 1983 to recently, 1977-83 fluid
SW	SAP (soc) dom until 1976, alternation SAP -- Lib+Agr+Cons since
SZ	Practically fixed coalition Soc-Lib-Cons-Agr
AL	Lib-Nat coal dominates through 1972, alternates with ALP (lab) since
NZ	Alternation Lib (lab) -- Nat (cons); until recently?



CTRY	Trans%GDP	GovtPartisan	#PrtyGov	GovPolar	GovType	Government Type					
						Frag'd	Altern.	Non-Dem	Rt Dom	Left-Dom	
US	7.950	6.179	1.524	1.298	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
JA	7.186	8.739	1.069	0.017	2.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	
GE	14.199	5.836	2.284	0.493	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
FR	16.667	5.552	3.701	0.898	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
IT	14.462	5.039	3.039	0.538	4.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
UK	9.397	6.311	1.000	0.000	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
CA	8.967	5.271	1.000	0.000	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
AU	16.396	4.806	1.583	0.772	4.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
BE	18.493	5.742	2.165	1.104	4.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
DE	11.872	5.443	2.061	0.428	5.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	
FI	10.204	5.049	3.721	1.217	4.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
GR	8.890	7.301	1.185	0.203	1.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	
IR	9.914	5.987	1.478	0.503	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
NE	17.308	5.547	3.429	0.942	4.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
NO	11.539	3.914	1.642	0.245	5.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	
PO	5.519	8.201	1.358	0.195	1.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	
SP	12.532	7.627	1.090	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	
SW	13.071	3.831	1.367	0.291	5.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	
SZ	10.009	5.750	3.854	1.055	4.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
AL	7.590	5.947	1.722	0.178	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
NZ		5.589	1.000	0.000	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
Regression Equation:		Transfers =	15.620	-1.08GPr	+ .937#Prty		R2	0.342	r=	0.585	
		s.e.		(.616)	(.583)						
		t-Stat		-1.753	1.607						

III. GLM, “Inside Political Parties,” (Mair) ch. 10

A. The Standard “Basic Party Organization”

1. **Party Members** belong in local, geographically based units: **branches**
2. Branches usually some role in select candidates & send **delegates** to party’s **annual conference**, in principle: final decision-making body
3. Ann conf usu elect most-all of prty’s **ntnl exec**, runs prty b/w conf’s & adjud’s internal disputes
4. Exec usu selects, & the party employs, **permanent party bureaucracy**.
5. The **parliamentary group** = party’s MPs
6. [To which, add: **party’s actual & potential electoral supporters**]

B. Partial Exceptions to the Standard BPO

1. Some parties highly **fractionalized**:
 - a. Divided into tendencies or groups, w/ often highly personalized leadership
 - b. US, FR, IT, & JA parties are or have been highly fractionalized
 - c. Often these factions have own organizational structure &, in extreme, operate nearly as parties selves
2. Esp. fed sys (SZ, US, CA, GE, AL) provincial branches often notable decision-mkng auton
3. Communist prtys are/were usu org’d instead by **democratic centralism**:
 - a. More centralized than democratic;
 - b. Same written structure, but party executive final decision-maker;
 - c. Some argue this partly responsible for ↓ in mem & elect support for most.

C. The usual battle lines:

1. **Party activists** who emphasize adherence to ideals that first prompted their joining
2. **Party legislators** who, as MPs, often must compromise ideologically to win elections, to enter government, & to pass legislation
3. **Party's actual & potential elect supporters**, & perhaps party-members if a mass-membership party so many members & not all activists, are the judges of the battle.

D. Membership

1. **Most voters for party, even those that regularly vote 1 party *not* members**
2. **Complications** in calculating membership & comparing across countries & parties:
 - a. Some parties do not know themselves how many members...
 - b. Even if know, some reluctant to reveal true membership
 - (1) Parties have obvious reasons to inflate their count;
 - (2) Branches similar reasons to inflate report to party conf/exec;
 - c. Some parties have affiliated org's whose mems automatically party mems (e.g., UK Lab & trade unions)
 - d. Rules in some political systems encourage party membership (e.g., US closed primaries) [but this may part of any systematic positive explanation varying party-membership]
3. **Comparison** of membership levels & trends (Table 10-1) [could be paper in here; what do you think might explain variation membership levels (as share of voters) across parties, across party systems (i.e., countries), and/or over time?]

TABLE 10-1 PARTY MEMBERSHIP AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE ELECTORATE

	Percentage of electorate that belongs to a political party	Trends in membership in recent decades
Austria	19	Decline from 28% in 1980
Belgium	7	Slight decline in past twenty years
Denmark	5	Decline from over 20% in the 1960s
Finland	11	Decline from 16% in 1980
France	2	Little change
Germany	3	Little change since 1960s
Greece	7	Figure has doubled since late 1970s
Iceland	17	No information
Ireland	4	Slight decline in past twenty years
Italy	4	Decline from 10% in 1980
Luxembourg	10	No information
Malta	30	Dramatic increase in early 1980s, stability since then
Netherlands	2	Now around half of the 1980 figure
Norway	7	Now around half of the 1980 figure
Portugal	5	Modest increase since 1980
Spain	3	Modest increase since 1980
Sweden	7	Slight decline in past twenty years
Switzerland	6	No information
United Kingdom	2	Now about a third of 1950s figures
Average	8	—

Source: For fifteen of the nineteen countries, data relate to 1995–98 and are from Mair and van Biezen, p. 12. For Iceland, the figure relates to 1987 (Hardarson, p. 145). For Luxembourg, the figure relates to the late 1980s (Jacobs, pp. 235–47). For Malta, data are from party web sites (www.mlp.org.mt/structur.htm, sites.waldonet.net.mt/alternattiva/frames.htm), and information supplied by the PN. For Sweden, the figure relates to 1997 (Widfeldt, 1999, p. 116).

4. **Socio-demographics of party members** [more paper possibilities in here?]

a. **Working class:**

- (1) Less rep'd among prty mems than among voters (esp. if exclude union auto-membership).
- (2) This increasingly true as ascend party hierarchy.
- (3) Becoming increasingly so over time also (i.e., becoming still less well-rep'd).
- (4) True even of left parties (wherein white-collar & public-sect workers ↑'ly import many places)

b. **Women & minorities** under-rep'd also, but trends all in opposite (↑) direction of above.

5. What members do:

a. Elect delegates to annual conference & so indirectly choose party leadership.

b. **Mobilize** electorate [define?], esp. at election times.

c. Once, being party member ≈ belong to separate subculture, w/ own news, clubs, soc events, & services for members only. Faded & Fading **[Why? Implications?]**

E. Important Decisions within the Party

1. Types of party: Cadre v. Mass Parties (Duverger); Catch-all v. Niche parties (Kirchheimer)

2. Resolution of disputes & conflict w/in party: over policy & over spoils (e.g., Italian *lotizzazione* (= division of the spoils)). Most importantly, the disputes & decisions over:

a. **Party's Manifesto [DEFINE] & Party Program [DEFINE]**

b. **Select party leadership:** often, but not always, synonymous w/...

c. **Select candidates & candidate ordering (districts)**

F. Candidate Selection

1. Except in FI, GE, & NO, where it's national law, how candidates selected is decided by parties
 - a. [Take a second to improve grammar of above sentence?]
2. Typ'ly party mems, not ordinary party voters (as in US primary; but Δing), choose candidates
 - a. Only Iceland in Europe has open primaries, e.g.
3. Two basic methods of candidate selection:
 - a. Convention system **[define]**:
 - (1) Party members of each *constituency* send delegates to local nominating convention to pick candidates.
 - (2) From as few as 1-2% of party members to (rare) >33% participate in this.
 - b. National-executive system **[define]**:
 - (1) In most places, national executive has right to veto local cand-select (but used rarely).
 - (2) In FR, IT, MA, PO, executive chooses candidates directly, some w/ local right to challenge
 - c. Party-leader system: GR: party leader (esp. PASOK's Papandreou) chooses candidate personally; SP & perhaps PO, strong (but less than GR) roles for very central leadership also.
4. **Consequences of the selection processes [More paper ideas?]**
 - a. Incumbents extremely high probability re-selected in all systems **[why?]**.
 - b. In all systems, candidates almost always, except some rare instances in UK, have some local ties.
 - c. In MMD sys, candidate list almost always *balanced* **[Define. Why? Conversely, why might not be balanced across candidates in SMD?]**.
 - d. **As ↑ party-activist & esp. party-leadership control of selection ⇒ ↑ party discipline.**
5. ⇒trade-off: strong parties (disciplined, responsible) v. democracy w/in parties.

G. Parties & Money: unlike US, in most democracies, almost all candidates' money comes from party [a key part of \Rightarrow party discipline] [*More paper ideas?*]

1. Sources of party income

a. Internal Sources

- (1) Membership fees (about 1/4 of total);
- (2) MP's salary (up to 10% is "requested" to be "re-donated");
- (3) Fund-raising events;
- (4) Party shops, banks, & newspapers (but many closed & most rest lose \$ now).

b. External Sources

- (1) Interest-group backing (in many cases no, or only ineffective, laws limit or require disclosure sources)
- (2) Individual backing (ditto re: requiring party disclosure funding sources)
- (3) Public assistance (money & in-kind (media time); money usu. proportional to (past) electoral strength)

2. Arguments for/against state-funding [Also: Elaborate possible centripetal or centrifugal force on party ideological location depending formula for pub fund]

a. For (evidence scarce, but what's relevant & available generally supports):

- (1) Reduces reliance on interest-group funding;
- (2) Evens playing field: not all supporters equally able to finance parties;
- (3) Parties essential to democracy $\Rightarrow \therefore$ perform public service & so should be publically funded.

b. Against (evidence scarce, but also supports)

- (1) Public funding supports *status quo* as funds existing parties only [& usually proportionally to previous size]
- (2) Public funds \downarrow party incentive to raise own money & so to recruit new activist members
- (3) Campaigns becoming \uparrow ly costly, so public funding will too

H. Trends & future (in terms of party-org. form):

1. Duverger: trend toward *Mass Parties* & “contagion from left” in organizational structure.
2. Epstein: ↑ mass media & campaign cost make *Mass Parties* less ideal than parties seeking few big donors (corporations, unions, etc.): “contagion from right”.
3. Kirchheimer: w/ ↑ middle class & success welfare state, &, Epstein added, w/ ↑ individualism of voters, type of party best suited to competition increasingly “*catch-all*”
4. Sjöblom & Rantala argue further: increasingly, party members=liability, not asset, & so parties increasingly rely on *strategists* & TV, not members.

I. Final thoughts:

1. One might join party for 3 reasons (Clark & Wilson)
 - a. Material: some tangible reward (patronage, position)
 - b. Solidarity: social contact & sense comradeship (party as like-minded club)
 - c. Purposive: desire to advance certain policy goals
2. What think re: party mems lrgly depends on what think trends in saliency of these goals & impacts of having mem’s predominantly w/ such ambitions

IV. “Party Systems & Electoral Outcomes” Powell II, ch. 5

A. *Strong (weak)* party systems contribute to good (poor) democratic perform

1. Disagreement on how to recognize such *strength*

- a. Partly reflects differing emph on participation, stability, & order in define *good* democratic performance
- b. Partly reflects differing theories about what \Rightarrow such performance.

2. “One line of thought emphasizes value of de-fractionalized, 2-party, ‘centrist’ party system that will aggregate citizens’ resources behind governmental majorities responsive to citizen pressures.

3. Another...emphasizes expressive, mobilizing system of parties that will pull all major factions in society into its representative, democratic decision-making institutions, co-opting dissent & accommodating demands that might otherwise turn to violence” (p. 74).

B. In Powell II’s terms, three broad types of systems advocated:

1. “Aggregative” party systems:

a. Characteristics

- (1) 2 or few prtys, @ capable get leg maj
- (2) Centrist tends, alternatives not too stark
- (3) Parties’ support cuts across social groups

b. [Examples; Effects; Pros & Cons]

2. “Representative” party systems

a. Characteristics

- (1) More parties rep’ing broader range grps
- (2) Clearer rep by the prtys those spec grps
- (3) Accommodating leadership, willing to

compromise & coalesce.

(4) Majorities avoided

(5) Participatory

b. [Examples; Effects; Pros & Cons]

3. “Responsible” party systems

a. Characteristics

(1) 2 parties, alternation in (majority) govts

(2) Parties ties to (lrg) soc grps > agg sys

(3) Ctrlzd, disciplined parties representing clearly distinct, ideolog. sharp alts

b. [Examples; Effects; Pros & Cons]

4. Notes:

- a. Almost no one advocates fractionalized system w/ weak ties to social groups
- b. All agree that degree of fractionalization & [less universally emphasized] type of alignments with groups the keys; disagree & what's desirable therein.
- c. All agree that extreme, anti-system parties detrimental; disagree on what to do about them or about forces that might support them: Exclude or Coopt
- d. Most agree that elect volatility a sign of a weak system
 - (1) Symptom of citizen dissatisfaction
 - (2) Make stable government & policy difficult

C. Summary hypotheses (Tab 5.1)

Table 5.1 Theoretical expectations about party-system attributes and political performance.

D. Summary Empirical Findings (Tab 5.6-7)

Party-system attributes	Performance Expectations		
	Participation	Government stability	Maintaining political order
Fractionalization /multiparty systems ^a	High/moderate	Conflicting predictions	Conflicting predictions
Strong party linkages to social groups	High	Conflicting predictions	Conflicting predictions
Strong support for extremist parties	Moderate	Low	Low
Volatility of support for parties	Low	Low	Low

a. The arguments for multiparty systems assume that such systems reflect strong linkages between social groups and political parties and apply only with that condition.

Table 5.6 Bases of party systems: Correlation and regression analysis of effects of social environment and constitutional setting, 1965–1976.^a

Party-system attributes 1965–1976	Social environment, mid-1960s					Constitutional arrangements	
	Small population	Economic development	Heterogeneity ^b			Presidential executive	Majoritarian electoral laws ^c
			Ethnic	Agricultural	Catholic		
Multi-party: legislative fractionalization ^d							
Correlation	.15	.24	-.17	.26	.07	-.14	-.60
Regression	-.02	.33**	.45**	.59**	.22**	-.32**	-.67**
R ² = 61%							
Strong party-group linkages							
Correlation	.35	.55	-.27	-.26	.02	-.48	-.54
Regression	.03	.37**	.08	-.27	-.13	-.22	-.52**
R ² = 66%							
Extremist-party voting support ^d							
Correlation	-.11	-.12	-.13	.51	-.16	.04	-.42
Regression	-.29**	.10	.27**	.62**	.04	-.14*	-.53**
R ² = 50%							
Volatility of party representation ^d							
Correlation	-.05	-.51	.13	.17	-.23	.27	.07
Regression	.06	-.33**	.14	.22*	-.08	.16*	.02
R ² = 32%							

Sources: Election data from Mackie and Rose, *International Electoral Almanac*; *European Journal of Political Research*; *Keesing's Archives*; country studies.

a. Regression entries are standardized regression coefficients.

b. Coding for heterogeneity variables: Ethnic is directly from table 3.4 and is a continuous measure. Agricultural minorities coded 20–49% = 3; 50–80% = 2; 5–19% = 1, from table 3.2. Catholic minorities coded similarly, using percentage Catholic from Taylor and Hudson, *World Handbook*.

c. Electoral laws coded single-member district = 3; Germany, Japan, and Ireland = 2; other = 1, from table 4.1. Presidential executive coded: presidential system = 1; other = 0.

d. Analyses of fractionalization, extremist voting support, and volatility based on 84 elections in 27 countries. Each country was weighted equally to prevent bias; 81 weighted cases. See Appendix for fractionalization measure and parties classified extremist.

e. Party-group linkage analysis based on 23 countries. See table 5.3.

* = F level over 1.7 (significant at .10).

** = F level over 3.0 (significant at .05).

Table 5.7 Party-system attributes, environmental characteristics, and political performance: correlation and regression analysis.^a

Performance Dimension	Party-system attributes ^b			Major environmental advantages ^c			
	Multi-party Fractionalization	Strong party-group linkages	Extremist-party voting	Small population	Economic development	Compulsory voting laws	Ethnic homogeneity
Voting turnout, 1958–1976							
Correlation	.30	.58	.21	.27	.26	.42	
Regression	-.35	.68**	.12	.11	.03	.43**	
R ² = 52%							
Executive durability, 1967–1976							
Correlation	-.71	-.48	-.82	.08	-.07	—	
Regression	-.13	-.19	-.70**	-.08	.02	—	
R ² = 74%							
Majority control, 1967–1976							
Correlation	-.37	-.17	-.11	-.15	-.24	—	
Regression	-.62*	.34	.14	-.10	-.19	—	
R ² = 22%							
Low rioting, 1958–1967 ^d							
Correlation	.48	-.46	-.27	.86	.25	—	.23
Regression	.36*	.00	-.35**	.72**	-.21*	—	-.06
R ² = 81%							
Low rioting, 1967–1976							
Correlation	.28	.43	-.18	.80	.29	—	.30
Regressions	.24	.15	-.27*	.67**	-.06	—	-.02
R ² = 69%							
Low deaths, 1958–1967							
Correlation	.57	.62	-.06	.65	.67	—	.67
Regression	.13	.07	-.07	.26*	.32**	—	.37**
R ² = 76%							
Low deaths, 1967–1976							
Correlation	.40	.53	-.03	.46	.72	—	.41
Regression	.29	.01	-.17	.18	.53**	—	.09
R ² = 62%							

a. Regression entries are standardized regression coefficients. For consistency, only the cases with all party variables measured are used. Including the missing countries (Ceylon, Costa Rica, Greece, Turkey, and Uruguay) does not substantially change results. Voting turnout and riots and deaths for 1967–1976 based on 23 cases; riots and deaths for 1958–1967 based on 21 cases. Executive durability and control equations based on 17 parliamentary systems (see table 4.1).

b. Sources as in table 5.6. Fractionalization and extremist voting measures are the averages from all elections in the 1965–1976 period. See Appendix for party-system averages.

c. Population size and GNP/capita are logged. Compulsory voting measure described in Chapter 6, table 6.1. Ethnicity from table 3.4.

d. Extreme outliers on riots and deaths have been truncated to the ninetieth percentile values to prevent bias. A log transformation yields similar results.

* F level over 1.7 (significant at .10).

** F level over 3.0 (significant at .05).

V. Lijphart, Chapter 5, Party Systems

- A. Two-Party v. Multiparty Systems key distinction
- B. 2-Party supposedly 2 direct & 1 indirect advantage
 - 1. Direct:
 - a. Voters clear choice b/w two alternative governments & sets policies;
 - b. Moderating influence as parties agglomerate & compete for median;
 - (1) BUT, Lijphart notes: these somewhat contradict! (N.b., a≈U.K.; b≈U.S.).
 - 2. Indirect: Necessary for stable, single-party majority govts & effect policy-making.
- C. Prior Classification Schemes: How to Count Which Parties? [elab'd in Mair below]
 - 1. Sartori: size & political relevance parties
 - a. ⇒ seat-winning parties only
 - b. ⇒ those w/ “coalition potential” or “blackmail potential” (i.e., players in govt-form game)
 - 2. Blondel: size & configuration of set of sizes ⇒ 4 possibilities
 - a. Two-party (Examples)
 - b. 2.5 party (Examples)
 - c. Multiparty w/ dominant (Examples)
 - d. Multiparty w/o dominant (Examples)
- D. (Most-emphasized) Summary Measure: **Effective Number Parties** $N=1/\sum s_i^2$

E. Complications: Closely Allied Parties & Factionalized Parties

1. Usual Rule: if calls self party, *is* party
2. *Closely Allied Parties*: “so tightly twinned that look more 1 than 2” ***E.g.? Criteria? [below] Lijphart’s Compromise?***
 - a. Compete for votes?
 - b. Cooperate in legislature? To degree that form 1 caucus?
 - c. Always Coalition *in* or *out* together?
 - d. Time: Durable such alliance? [L splits the difference for 5 pairs of parties]
3. *Factionalized Parties*: ***E.g.? Criteria? L’s Comp? [Better ideas? FP=2P]***
 - a. Such extreme lack cohesion that very unclear *unitary actor* at all appropriate
 - b. Evidence that some effects like multiple parties, but counting each faction or even each org’d faction ⇒ unrealistically extreme counts.

F. Data: Table 5.2 [& you recall relation to electoral system, at right?]




Fig. 8.2 The relationship between electoral disproportionality

Table 5.2 Average, lowest, and highest effective numbers of parliamentary parties resulting from elections in thirty-six democracies and the number of elections on which these averages are based, 1945–96

	Mean	Lowest	Highest	Number of elections
Papua New Guinea	5.98	2.69	10.83	4
Switzerland	5.24	4.71	6.70	13
Finland	5.03	4.54	5.58	15
Italy	4.91	3.76	6.97	14
Netherlands	4.65	3.49	6.42	15
Israel	4.55	3.12	5.96	14
Denmark	4.51	3.50	6.86	21
Belgium	4.32	2.45	6.51	17
India	4.11	2.51	6.53	6
Iceland	3.72	3.20	5.34	16
Japan	3.71	2.58	5.76	19
France	3.43	2.49	4.52	10
Venezuela	3.38	2.42	4.88	8
Luxembourg	3.36	2.68	4.05	11
Norway	3.35	2.67	4.23	13
Portugal	3.33	2.23	4.26	8
Sweden	3.33	2.87	4.19	16
Colombia	3.32	2.98	4.84	14
Germany	2.93	2.48	4.33	13

Table 5.2 *Continued*

	Mean	Lowest	Highest	Number of elections
Ireland	2.84	2.38	3.63	15
Spain	2.76	2.34	3.02	7
Mauritius	2.71	2.07	3.48	6
Austria	2.48	2.09	3.73	16
Costa Rica	2.41	1.96	3.21	11
United States	2.40	2.20	2.44	25
Canada	2.37	1.54	2.86	16
Australia	2.22	2.08	2.30	21
Greece	2.20	1.72	2.40	8
United Kingdom	2.11	1.99	2.27	14
Malta	1.99	1.97	2.00	6
New Zealand	1.96	1.74	2.16	17
Trinidad	1.82	1.18	2.23	7
Barbados	1.76	1.25	2.18	7
Bahamas	1.68	1.45	1.97	5
Jamaica	1.62	1.30	1.95	7
Botswana	1.35	1.17	1.71	7

Source: Based on data in Mackie and Rose 1991, Mackie and Rose 1997, Nohlen 1993, Singh 1994, Lijphart 1994, and data provided by Pradeep K. Chhibber, Michael Coppedge, Brian F. Crisp, Gary Hoskin, Mark P. Jones, J. Ray Kennedy, Hansraj Mathur, Shaheen Mozaffar, Ben Reilly, and Andrew S. Reynolds

G. Issue Dimensions of Party Systems

1. How to Measure

- a. Gauge contents of party programs, supporters preferences, and policies in govt, but each w/ care b/c problematic. **Discuss.**
- b. Differences b/w parties, not w/in, b/c looking @ issue dimensions of party systems
 - (1) Between relevant parties (as above) only.

(2) Durable (as above).

2. Seven Identifiable Dimensions Across 36 Democracies

a. Socioeconomic: most important, present in all (***characterize Lft/Rt***).

(1) *Evidence*: Size govt, inequality, unemp, infl, & educ, health, soc welf spend

(2) May have declined some since 70s, but still universal & strong

b. Religion: present in $>1/2$, often high salience, but $\downarrow\downarrow$ most places

c. Cultural-Ethnic: present & high in most *plural societies*, in some *semi-plural*

d. Urban-Rural: in few, mostly faded from prty sys (partys rename as move)

e. (Democratic) Regime Support:

(1) places where sizable communist existed, but mostly faded

(2) not usually strongly present in developed democracies (part of definition, in fact)

f. Foreign Policy: present in a few obvious places among the developed democracies

g. Materialist/Post-materialist: participatory democracy & environment; only in more developed countries & only recently

H. “Data”:Table 5.3

Table 5.3 Issue dimensions of thirty-six democratic party systems, 1945–96

	Socio-economic	Religious	Cultural ethnic	Urban-rural	Regime support	Foreign policy	Post-materialist	Number of dimensions
Finland	H	M	H	M	M	—	—	3.5
Belgium	H	H	H	—	—	—	—	3.0
Germany	H	H	M	—	—	—	M	3.0
India	H	H	M	—	M	—	—	3.0
Israel	H	H	—	—	—	H	—	3.0
Italy	H	H	—	—	M	M	—	3.0
Netherlands	H	H	—	—	—	—	H	3.0
Norway	H	H	—	M	—	—	M	3.0
Papua N.G.	H	M	H	—	—	M	—	3.0
Switzerland	H	H	M	M	—	—	—	3.0
France	H	M	—	—	M	M	—	2.5
Japan	H	M	—	—	M	M	—	2.5
Portugal	H	M	—	—	M	M	—	2.5
Colombia	H	M	—	M	M	—	—	2.5
Denmark	H	M	—	M	—	M	—	2.5
Spain	H	M	H	—	—	—	—	2.5
Sweden	H	M	—	M	—	—	M	2.5
Costa Rica	H	H	—	—	—	—	—	2.0
Luxembourg	H	H	—	—	—	—	—	2.0
Venezuela	H	H	—	—	—	—	—	2.0
Iceland	H	—	—	M	—	M	—	2.0
Malta	H	M	—	—	—	M	—	2.0
Mauritius	H	—	H	—	—	—	—	2.0
Ireland	H	—	—	—	—	M	—	1.5
Jamaica	H	—	—	—	—	M	—	1.5
United Kingdom	H	—	—	—	—	M	—	1.5
Canada	M	—	H	—	—	—	—	1.5
Trinidad	M	—	H	—	—	—	—	1.5
Australia	H	—	—	M	—	—	—	1.5
Austria	H	M	—	—	—	—	—	1.5
Botswana	H	—	M	—	—	—	—	1.5
Greece	H	—	—	—	M	—	—	1.5
Barbados	H	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.0
New Zealand	H	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.0
United States	M	—	M	—	—	—	—	1.0
Bahamas	M	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.5
Total	34.0	16.5	9.5	4.0	4.0	6.5	2.5	77.0

Note: H indicates an issue dimension of high salience and M a medium-salience dimension




Fig. 5.1 The relationship between the effective number of parliamentary parties and the number of issue dimensions in thirty-six democracies, 1945–96

I. Reasons to Expect Link # Issue Dims & # Parties

1. Practically by definition, & hard for 2 parties more than 1 dim
2. But also (societal) issue dims \Rightarrow potential bases parties

3. Data: Figure 5.1

VI. “Party Systems & Structures of Competition,” Mair, ch3 LNN

A. Summary: “...whole notion party system centers on assumption that stable structure partisan competition exists [in elects & for control of govt]. Structures of competition as **closed** (& predictable) or **open** (& unpredictable) [based on]:

1. Patterns alternation in government,
2. Degree of innovation or persistence in government-formation processes, &
3. Range of parties gaining access to government” (p. 84).

B. Brief Intellect History Party-System Classification Schemes

1. Duverger (1954): # parties, esp. 2-party v. multi-party systems

a. 2-party systems argued to foster/enhance:

- (1) Single-party government
- (2) Accountability
- (3) Alternation in government
- (4) Moderate, centripetal competition

b. Multiparty systems argued to...

- (1) ...foster coalition governments
- (2) ...prevent voters from direct voice in govt formation
- (3) ...not ensure alternation in government
- (4) ...can foster extremist, ideological confrontations narrowly based pol prtys

c. Exceptions fairly common, but, broadly speaking, all roughly empirically true

2. Dahl (1966): strategies of competition that parties adopt at electoral & legislation levels
 - a. Strictly competitive systems
 - b. Cooperative-competitive systems
 - c. Coalescent-competitive systems
 - d. Strictly coalescent systems
3. Blondel (1968): # parties & relative size (later, ideological placement too)
 - a. 2-party systems
 - b. 2.5-party systems
 - c. Multiparty systems with a dominant party
 - d. Multiparty systems without a dominant party
4. Rokkan (1968): more disaggregation of multiparty-system category
 - a. 2 + a small third-party systems (Germany, maybe UK)
 - b. 1 large party v. coalition (Swe, Nor, maybe Ire)
 - c. 3 or more relatively even competitors (Netherlands)

5. Sartori (1976) [classic, foundational]: fractionalization & polarization, + *anti-system* prty

a. Types:

- (1) 2-party, ideologically polarized (in S's consideration, none such exist[ed])
- (2) 2-party, moderate ideological distance (in S's consideration: US, UK)
- (3) Moderate Pluralism: multiparty, moderate ideological range (Den)
- (4) Polarized Pluralism: multiparty, ideologically polarized (Italy)
- (5) Dominant-Party systems: Japan (India, Mexico) (until recently?)

b. Virtues of Sartori's scheme:

- (1) Most comprehensive scope & depth of the available typologies
- (2) Proven utility in variety comparative studies, theoretical and empirical
- (3) Explicit concern competition patterns & parties' interactions, ∴ more directly w/ party system
- (4) Highlights effects of systemic characteristics on party strategy, electoral behavior, & outcomes

c. Change since Sartori's writings that maybe problematic for theoretical approach

- (1) Some see/saw trend toward & thus crowding of *moderate pluralism* category.
- (2) Some see ↓ *polarized pluralism*, since, by Sartori's def, that requires *anti-system* parties on *both* sides (rt & lft) & most such disappearing, esp. left.

C. Mair's Three Distinguishing Characteristics of *Different Types of Party Competition for Government*

1. Degree of Alternation in Government

a. Wholesale alternation

(1) single-party v. single-party

(2) single-party v. coalition

(3) coalition v. coalition

b. Partial Alternation

c. Non-alternation

d. [Consider Powell II's 3 aspects of dem perf, & also account., mandate, & rep delegation (Powell I); how might variation in degree of alternation in govt affect those? ...affect policy and/or policy patterns?]

2. Stability & Consistency of Government Alternatives (see next for examples)

a. DEF: degree to which alternative government formulas (i.e., combo of parties in govt) known or predictable beforehand (i.e., stable & consistent).

b. [Consider Powell's...; how might variation...?]

3. Range of Parties as Potential Governmental Actors

a. Def: degree to which access to office widely/narrowly dispersed

b. N.b., what matters: whether each party viewed by others as potential govt participant, not whether actually *legitimate* potential participant in abstract

c. [Consider Powell's...; how might variation...?]

CTRY	TYPICAL GOVERNING PATTERNS:
US	Alternation Rep-Dem in Presidency Dem Domination in Legis., until recently
JA	Lib Dem (LDP) Dominant until recently
GE	Alt. CDU/CSU+FDP v. SDP+FDP , C+F dom '82-98; CDU+FDP v. SDP+Green since
FR	Alternation PS & PCF -- RPR & UDF
IT	DC-led in coal w/ PSI-PRI-PSDI-PLI or subset thereof until recently Last 3 alternations: Lega-Allianza-Forza -- PDS + various left
UK	Alternation Cons -- Lab , former dominated 1979-97
CA	Alternation Cons -- Lib , recent upheaval leaves questions
AU	Pattern of SPO (Soc) & OVP (ChrDem) coalition broken in 1966 by Alternation SPO -- OVP, then SPO dom 70-86, 82-86 w/ FPO (Lib) Returns to SPO--OVP coal in 1986; more radical changes in recent years
BE	Partial Alternation Coalitions: CVP (ChrDem), BSP (Soc), PLP (Lib) Three smaller ethnic parties players since 1974
DE	Alternation SocDem -- some subset of Cons/Agr/3 Lib Parties/CD
FI	Fluid Partial Alternation Ranging from SocDem or even Comms to Cons
GR	Alternation PASOK -- New Dem (each has occasional coal allies)
IR	Alternation Fianna Fail -- Fine Gael & Labour until 1989 now FF or FG with Lab or Lib
NE	Fluid Partial Alternation across the board until '78, since then appears Alternation b/w CDA (ChrDem)+VVD (LIB) & CDA+PvdA (SocDem)
NO	Alternat. DNA (Soc) -- Cons+Lib+Agr+ChrDem, more DNA than other
PO	Since 1980, appears alternation Lib-Soc coal. and Lib-CD coal.
SP	PSOE domination 1983 to recently, 1977-83 fluid
SW	SAP (soc) dom until 1976, alternation SAP -- Lib+Agr+Cons since
SZ	Practically fixed coalition Soc-Lib-Cons-Agr
AL	Lib-Nat coal dominates through 1972, alternates with ALP (lab) since
NZ	Alternation Lib (lab) -- Nat (cons); until recently?

D. Combine to one dimension: **party system openness or closedness**

1. Definitions:

- a. **Closed: highly predictable, little or no change over time in range governing alternatives or pattern of alternation, & with new &/or “outsider” parties finding entry difficult**
- b. **Open: highly unpredictable, w/ varying alternation patterns, freq. &/or large shifts in composition alternatives, & rel’y easy access to new parties & few or no real “outsiders”**

2. **Closedness or Openness depends on [in addition to fract & polar as before]...**

- a. **Parties’ ideologies & govt-formation strategies (e.g., DCI);**
- b. **Parties’ electoral strategies (e.g., Fianna Fail);**
- c. **[n.b., suggests electoral & govt-formation strategies not so separable].**
- d. Closure ∴ depends heavily on norms competition among parties & so requires time to establish => new dems *open* by def, takes time to *close* them: a process of “structural consolidation” (e.g.: Gre, Por, Spa)

E. Party Systems & Electoral Outcomes

1. From this view, **party-system change can occur w/o change in structure of electoral support for parties & v.v. Mair’s 4 examples:**

- a. Denmark’s “Earthquake” Election in 1973 (data below)
 - (1) pre-’73: 5 parties=93% vote; ’73: 5 new prty, & old 5 ↓ to 65% vote, + new include Comm & rt-wng Progress Party so polarization ↑ too
 - (2) some time for any govt able to assemble maj parl supp; typ. govt duration ↓; & elects called more freq’ly
 - (3) but all this somewhat true before, & on Mair’s 3 dims (° & stability alt & range parties allowed govt), DEN was & remained quite open [*So this massive electoral change w/o party-competition change.*]

DENMARK'S "EARTHQUAKE" ELECTION OF 1973

	1971 % Votes	N Seats	1973 % Votes	N Seats
Social Democrats	37.3	70	25.6	46
Conservatives	16.7	31	9.2	16
Liberals	15.6	30	12.3	22
Social Liberals	14.4	27	11.2	20
Socialist People's party	9.1	17	6.0	11
Christian People's party	2.0	—	4.0	7
Justice party	1.7	—	2.9	5
Left Socialists	1.6	—	1.5	—
Communists	1.4	—	3.6	6
Progress party	—	—	15.9	28
Center democrats	—	—	7.8	14
Others	0.2	—	—	—
Total	100.0	175	100.0	175

Source: Unless otherwise stated, the sources for all tables in Chapter 9 are as those indicated in Chapter 7, note 1.

- b. Italy's 1994 Elect-System Change & Party Electoral-Support Volatility [*Elect Sys & Party Sys Change*]
- (1) Total electoral volatility 37.2%, Italian record & > than almost any West European election 1885-1989
 - (2) Many new prty & most old reconstituted (renamed): virtually no party '94 parl same name or form as '87
 - (3) Polarization Δ radically also as both PCI becomes yet-more moderate left-wing PDS & far-right MSI becomes a (purportedly) reformed AN.
 - (4) But, by Mair's def, party-sys Δ only if pattern & type govt alternation Δ . In this case, seems so:
 - (5) New sys major players seem coalesced into coalitional Left-Right camps as opposed to old DC-dom. centrist multiparty coals: [AN-Lega-Forza]-Centro-[PSI-Greens-PDS]-Rifondazione, + Rete
- c. Canadian Electoral Watershed in 1993 [*Massive Elect Support Change; May or May Not Party Sys Change*]
- (1) Total electoral volatility: 42% (!); Conservatives only 16% of vote (lowest since '49) & 2 seats (\downarrow from 169 before) (!!), Reform & Bloc Québécois, 2 new parties, gained many seats, replace Cons as 2nd & 3rd (!!!)
 - (2) New govt, though, was Liberals, thus, pending next Δ of govt, alternation pattern was so-far preserved: Progressive Conservatives \leftrightarrow Liberals [though last Lib govt a minority]
 - (3) [In fact, held until '06, by which time Conservatives recovered enough to assemble minority govt, which did again in '08, & '11 again & as a maj => so maybe around edge of Δ , but ult'ly avoided by M's def?]
- d. Ireland: government-alternation pattern change in 1989 & 1993 [w/o electoral volatility]:
- (1) Pre-'89 alternation pattern: (Fianna Fáil) \leftrightarrow (Fine Gael + Labour):
 - (2) FF's refusal to enter coals=***an electoral strategy*** aimed to keep self only prty able to offer 1-party govt & to keep Labour's govt options to 1: ally w/ FG
 - (3) in 1989, FF abandoned strategy, choosing to ally w/ new rightish liberal party, Prog Dems, rather than go into opposition as before when lost majority
 - (4) in 1993, further erased credibility claim to old strategy as ally w/ Labour (!) to form new coalition govt
 - (5) Clearly, party-system change, but electoral volatility only 7.8% in 1989 election

2. Mair concludes that elect system can be frozen (& thawed) by 3 factors (changes therein):

- a. Social structure (the Lipset & Rokkan model)
- b. Institutions: electoral system & organization efforts of established parties (Duverger's Law, etc.)
- c. [new:] Structure/Strategies of party competition & government formation
 - (1) Closure of party systems helps "freeze" electoral alignments,
 - (2) which implies change of party system, by Mair definition, can destabilize electoral alignments.
 - (3) Examples:
 - (a) Italy: PCI becomes PDS, MSI becomes AN => new electoral alignments;
 - (b) Ireland: FF chooses coal w/ PD '89 & then Lab in '93 => new elect aligns.

3. Summary:

- a. 'structure of competition, compete for govt esp., may impose major constraint on voter choice & hence act to stabilize electoral alignments.
- b. Thus, voters not simply expressing pref's for individual prty [or cand]; rather, albeit not always to same ° in diff prty sys, & this itself is important cross-national (& cross-institutional) variation to explain, but also expressing pref's for potential govts.
- c. & so, much like how shift in range prtys on offer can undermine estab'd pref's, so too can shift in range governing options, & hence in struct compet, undermine estab'd pref's & promote instab" (pp. 103-4).

4. Finally, Mair perceives some generally shared trends suggesting ↑ openness of party systems

- a. Many places ↑ range of acceptable governing parties in past 2 decades (e.g. Austria, Italy)
- b. Many also ↑ set of coalitional permutations govern in recent times (e.g., AU, Ger, Ire)
- c. ↑ prty-sys openness ⇔ ↑ elect instab ⇒ ↑ uncertainty at multiple levels
 - (1) [Not so sure of trend; may have been transition to closure on new patterns]