

Comparative Governmental Systems II: Lijphart & Powell

I. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy* (1999): Chs. 1-3

A. ChI: Many, many ways to organize particulars of a democracy, but clear grouping or *clustering* along *Majoritarian vs. Consensual* nature rules & practices

1. All agree Democracy = “govt by & for people,” but which people if divergent preferences and disagreement? [Philosophically, two broad answers:]

a. The majority (\Rightarrow median rule [*Aside/Recall: Median Voter Theorem*]) or

b. As many as possible [weighted somehow accordingly]

2. *Majoritarian model*: exclusive, competitive, & adversarial;

3. *Consensus model*: inclusive, negotiation, bargaining, compromise


4. Logically internally consistent & unified principles \Rightarrow correspondingly coherent clusters of institutional arrangements, but in 2 dimensions (*horizontal & vertical*):

a. [Describe vertical dimension & its observable components]

b. [Describe horizontal dimension & its observable components]

5. Logically internally consistent & unified principles \Rightarrow corresponding clusters of institutional arrangements, but in 2 dimensions (a *horizontal* & a *vertical* dim):
- a. Executives-Parties Dimension [*Horizontal Concentrate/Diffuse Authority @ Nt'l-Govt Level*]:
- (1) Concentration of executive power in single-party (majority) cabinets v. executive power-sharing in broad multi-party (&/or minority) coalitions
 - (2) Executive-dominant v. Executive-Legislative balance
 - (3) Two-party v. multi-party systems (&, correlated, 1v. 2+ dimensional politics)
 - (4) Majoritarian & disproportional v. proportional electoral systems
 - (5) Pluralist interest-groups w/ free-for-all competition v. coordinated & corporatist interest-groups w/ compromise & concertation
- b. Federal-Unitary Dimension [*Vertical Conc./Diff. Authority Across Govt Lvls/Jurisdictions*]:
- (1) Unitary & centralized government v. federal & decentralized government
 - (2) Concentrate legislative power in unicameral v. bicameral leg. power w/ diff constituencies
 - (3) Flexible constitutions w/ simple-majority amendment v. rigid constitutions w/ extra-ordinary amendment procedures.
 - (4) Legislature final say on own legislation v. independent judicial review final
 - (5) Central banks dependent on v. independent of executive.

6. *Federalist* explanation for the empirical clustering of these characteristics:
 - a. Guarantee of federal separation of power requires clear statement of power division in a firm constitution, & separately accountable governmental power at national level to protect local authorities, & independent judge of disputes over power boundaries
 - b. \Rightarrow Explains link of 4 of 5 2nd-dim. characteristics, but not 5th & not first dimension and not why Federal-Unitary (second dim) a distinct dim from Exec-Party (first).
7. Goodin's Explanation: A logical consistency of...
 - a. *Collective Agency & Shared Responsibility*
 - b. vs. *Divided Agencies & Responsibilities*
8. Lijphart/Goodin: *Concentrated v. Diffuse Power, Authority, & Responsibility, w/ Diffusion having 2 dimensions: central-local (vertical) & executive-legislature (horizontal)* \Rightarrow
 - a. 2D conceptual map of potential democratic characteristics
 - b. Much clustering & much stability of particular polity's location on that map (pure majoritarian rare: UK, NZ through '96 close) (pure consensus also; Switz, Belg close)



9. (w.r.t.) Evaluation (both positive & normative): guard against *majoritarianist* tendency in defining & gauging democracy to over-emphasize:
- a. Opposition existence/nature—e.g., “clear, stable govt & opposition, each with one, single goal: to become government”:
 - (1) Tends assume two-parties (or at least two-blocks);
 - (2) Neglects coalition, super-majoritarian and consensus approaches to democracy
 - b. Turnover tests (alternation, govt & opp regularly reversing role) :
 - (1) Tends assume two parties/blocks;
 - (2) Neglects *partial alternation* [DEFINE].
10. So What? Do Horizontal & Vertical Concentration/Diffusion Make Difference?
- (1) Lijphart finds small if any differences on broad (macroeconomic) governing efficacy. [Larger diff's may exist in more fine-grained policies & outcomes and in nature of tradeoffs made.]
 - (2) L finds LARGE DIFF'S on democratic “quality”, favoring consensual systems.

II. Ch2: The Westminsterian (Majoritarian) Model

A. Old, storied, much-revered model of democracy from UK to colonies

B. 10 Elements of Majoritarian/Westminsterian Democracy

I. First, Horizontal, Executive-Legislature Dimension

a. Concentration of Executive Power in 1-Party, Bare-Majority Cabinets

- (1) Cabinet composed of *disciplined* members of *majority* party
- (2) Usually 1 of 2 main parties in system
- (3) Usually bare majority; in fact, more-usually just plurality & sometimes not even that
- (4) Coalition & minority government rare. (*Labour* minority govt of '70s a rare case)
- (5) \Rightarrow *Majoritarian Principle*: vast pol pow to rule as rep of & in interest of a (narrow) majority.

b. Cabinet Dominance

- (1) Parliamentary Government \Rightarrow Cabinet responsible to & dep on confidence Parl, but...
- (2) Combination of *Majority Parliamentary Support (mps)* + *Party Cohesion/Discipline (pcd)* \Rightarrow Cabinets dominate Parliament [*n.b.*, $^{\circ}$ dominant = $f(mps, pcd)$; e.g., *Labour* '70s v. *Thatcher* '80s]
- (3) So, *disciplined 2-partism* more than *parliamentarism* per se that \Rightarrow cabinet dominance.
- (4) N.b., Presidential systems decidedly more exec-leg balanced (more than consensus parl even); [Lijphart incorrect to put French Pres w/ Lat-Am ones as more pow than US pres.]

c. Two-Party System

- (1) Vote-, & esp. seat-, share dominance of two major, roughly even parties
- (2) *E.g.*, UK, *Labour+Tory* = 70-90% vote & 93+% seats
- (3) Notes/Examples:
 - (a) Lib, SD, LibDem as much as 25% vote, but max'd at only 25 (of 659) seats
 - (b) [N. Ire. + *Scot Nils* & *Plaid Cymru*, other hand, seats% > vote% [why?], but very small numbers.]
- (4) **Strong Correlation 2-Party Sys to 1-dimensional party sys. (minor excepts. in UK) [explain]**

d. Majoritarian & Disproportional Electoral System

- (1) *Single-Member Simple-Plurality (SMSP)* (DEFINE) archetypal system
- (2) Highly disproportional (*i.e.*, seat-vote ratios far from 1).
- (3) Tend produce *Manufactured Majorities* (DEFINE). *E.g.*, 100% manufactured post-'45 UK
- (4) Small-party disadvantage; Large-party advantage. *Note*: LibDem hardest hit; N. Ire, SNP, & *Plaid Cymru* actually over-represented. (EXPLAIN)
- (5) *Exceptions or Trend?*: N. Ire. local elections by PR in the period since violence outbreak in '70s, EU by PR since '99, discussion of general switch to PR continues

e. **Interest-Group Pluralism** [DEFINE]

- (1) “Free-for-all” conflict in “competitive Interest-Group market” as opposed to...
- (2) **Corporatist arrangements** [DEFINE] of concertation and coordination in system of large & powerful peak-associations in (tri-partite) bargains w/ government.
 - (a) [WHICH IS MAJORITARIAN? DISCUSS HOW/WHY.]
- (3) UK Example: General lack integration of unions or management in economic policymaking, except the (mostly failed) ‘75 Social Contract.

2. **Second, Vertical, Federal-Unitary Dimension:**

a. **Unitary & Centralized Government** [DEFINE]

- (1) Local govt at behest of center; has whatever authority center gives (& can retract).
- (2) Notably, local is financially dependent on center; centralized fisc.
- (3) E.g., UK “most cntrlzd govt any large dem state,” but are following *exceptions or trend?*
 - (a) N Ire. home rule ‘21-‘72, but, *note*, UK (central) parliament can & has remove by simple majority.
 - (b) Gradual *devolution* Scot.&Wales (& some, broader fisc decent too), through ‘97 ref’s estab local parls.

b. **Legislative-Power Concentration in Unicameral Legislature**

- (1) Concentrated unicameralism
- (2) UK deviates slightly, but strongly *asymmetrical bicameralism*: Lords (hereditary & life-peers) power to delay: 1-month budgetary; 1-year other; & rarely used.

c. Constitutional Flexibility

- (1) Unwritten (or not one, single written) constitutional document. E.g., UK:
 - (a) Magna Carta 1215, BoR 1689, Parl Acts 1911, 1949
 - (b) Common law principles, customs, conventions (& which const'l also unwritten)
- (2) Simple majority to change constitution.

(3) [WHICH IS MAJORITARIAN: WRITTEN & HARD CHANGE OR UNW. & FLEX? HOW/WHY?]

d. Absence of Judicial Review

- (1) Pure parliamentary sovereignty (of (current) majority) \Rightarrow no authority beyond parliament (i.e., current majority) to determine const. & const'l interpretation.
- (2) *Exceptions or Trends*: EU member \Rightarrow Eur Ct Justice (ECJ); E.ConventionH.R. \Rightarrow E.Ct.H.R. rev.

(3) [WHICH MAJORITARIAN: COURT WITH REVIEW OR NO OR WEAK COURT REVIEW? HOW/WHY?]

e. Central Bank Dependence

- (1) Pure parliamentary sovereignty \Rightarrow ... Same principle: nothing is above parliamentary majority
- (2) However, EU member, & econ. theory &... \Rightarrow '97 change in BoE status.

(3) [WHICH MAJORITARIAN: BANK INDEP OF, OR BANK DEP ON, GOVERNMENT? HOW/WHY?]

3. New Zealand: *More Westminsterian than Westminster*. (also Barbados)
- a. *Concentrated 1-party bare-majority cab*: '35-'93 (as system-change loomed) w/o exceptions.
 - b. *Cabinet dominance*: always maj & tight party disc through mid-'90s (as sys- Δ loomed)
 - c. *2-Party system*:
 - (1) *Labour & National Parties 95+% (of 99) seats*.
 - (2) *Almost exclusively 1-dim (soc-econ left-right) ideological space*.
 - d. *Majoritarian & Disproportional Electoral System*:
 - (1) *SMSP, but also 4 large districts that over-lap geographically reserved for Maori (12% pop); minority representation being reserved is a deviation pure-majoritarianism [right?]*.
 - (2) *Severely disproportional: '78 & '81 National Party won more seats & so govt w/o even a plurality! (Seeds of system change lie in these events.) All post-'54 manufactured majorities*.
 - e. *Interest-Group Pluralism*: until recently, no coordinated/peak-association IG's.
 - f. *Unitary & Centralized Govt*: fully ctrlzd since 1875 when the UK bequethed 6 rel'y auton provinces abolished. (Is small country: less surprising that NZ unitary than that UK is.)
 - g. *Legislative Concentration in Unicameral Parliament*: fully unicameral since 1950 when the UK-bequethed upper house abolished.

h. *Constitutional Flexibility:*

- (1) Basic Laws (Constitutional Acts of '56 & '93; Bill of Rts Act '90), conventions, customs
- (2) Some these req 3/4 maj HoReps or maj referendum, but status removable by simple maj...

i. *Absence Judicial Review:* HoR only & final judge constitutionality.

j. *Central Bank Dependence:* through '89 Reserve Bank NZ lowest *cbi*, but since: most!

k. *October 1996 Radical Shift to PR System (actually, to German MMP system):*

- (1) After '78, '81 election 'fiascos', *Labour* [why Lab?] appoints commission on electoral system.
- (2) Recommends radical shift to full PR, but later *Labour*, by then in govt, kills it in committee
- (3) Issue arises in '87 elect campaign; *Labour* promises referendum, then (wins &) reneges!
- (4) *National* uses that in '90 campaign, pledges ref, wins, & so had to fulfil.
- (5) Referendum passes...twice! '92 and '93. PR elections set for '96:
 - (a) 65 SMD, including 5 special Maori districts.
 - (b) 55 by strict Party List, allocated to make national result as proportional as possible.
 - (c) German MMP right down to 5% or 1-dist (Austrian; E.Ger.) min & nature 2-vote-per-ballot process.
- (6) Results: almost everything on 1st dim Δ , swiftly, *Majoritarian* to more *Consensus* style dem.
 - (a) 1. Proportionality $\uparrow\uparrow\uparrow$; 2. Parties $\uparrow\uparrow$, from 2 to 6; 3. No majority party;
 - (b) 4. Ethnic dimension added to party system (i.e., ethnic parties win seats; & almost religious too).
 - (c) 5. First coalition government (2 parties) of *National* & *New Zealan First* formed.
 - (d) [So, most of Lijphart's 1st dim seems electoral-system based.? Or is NZ exceptional in this regard?]
 - i) [A possible empirical-application there; see Lijphart II from syllabus for one source data if interested.]

III. Ch3: The Consensus (Proportionalism) Model

A. To extent *democracy* \Rightarrow “those affected by policy have a say in its making”, *majoritarian* can conflict w/ *democratic* principles. [HOW SO?]

1. That conflict mitigated, though, by *alternation* & *homogeneity*. [HOW SO?]
2. For *plural societies*: low homogeneity, & perhaps voter behavior & societal divisions also more rigid \Rightarrow maj not only somewhat undem but may well be dangerous.
 - a. *Example*: N. Ire. ‘21-‘72 Protestant Majority won every election, formed all governments may have contrib’d late ‘60s Catholic protests, which grew into, essentially, a civil war.
 - b. *L’s Consensus System*: consensus, not opposition; inclusion, not exclusion; max size of ruling group, not bare-min majority; limit & constrain maj power, not concentrate it.
3. N.b., consensus system may help esp. plural soc’s, but may work eff’ly anywhere

B. *Consensus Principles*: Share, disperse, & restrain rather than concentrate majority power. Switzerland, Belgium, EU.

1. First, Horizontal, Executive-Legislature Dimension:
 - a. **Executive Power Sharing in Broad Coalitions**:
 - (1) *Swiss* cabinet seats distributed 2:2:2:1 by party & 4 \pm :2 \pm :1 \pm by language, *by formula*.
 - (2) *Belg*: balanced-language cabinets (pre-‘70 informally, post-‘70 formally); all but 1 yr: coalition

b. Executive-Legislative Balance of Power:

- (1) *Swiss Fed Council* elected to fixed 4-yr terms by Parliament, but without *confidence votes*.
- (2) *Belg*: std parl sys, but somewhat less party cohesion, & mostly coal & sometimes min govts.

c. Multiparty System:

- (1) Multiple parties in parliament, & multiple potential real players in government-form game.
- (2) Multi-D(imension) societal struct (relig, lang, reg, +econ) reflected in party system:
 - (a) *Swiss*: regional/language struct somewhat cross-cut w/in relatively non-cohesive single-dim parties
 - (b) *Belg*: like Swiss, 3 dominant parties on relig&class, but each also sub-divide by language/region.

d. Proportional Representation: proportional electoral system not inhibit translation of societal cleavages into party system.

e. Interest-Group Corporatism:

- (1) Both business-led or “liberal corporatist” systems.
- (2) Encompassing & strongly cohesive peak associations, big role in policy-making

2. Second, Vertical, Federal-Unitary Dimension:

a. Federal & Decentralized Government (2nd dim):

- (1) *Swiss*: 20 cantons+6 half-cantons; 46-member upper house; large role in constitutional amendment; one of world’s most decentralized nations.
- (2) *Belgium*: Unitary & centralized state til ‘70, but gradual decent., & full formal fed in ‘93; then:
 - (a) *Unique, Byzantine Federalism*: lang-cult rep (Fr, Dtch, Grm) & geog-cult rep(Flem, Wall, Brssls)

b. **Strong Bicameralism:**

- (1) Different selection mechanism to two houses \Rightarrow different constituency structure.
- (2) Strong 2nd chamber (ideal-type: equal power).
- (3) Swiss: perfect match to ideal-type; Belg: pre-fed '70 lacked (a)-(b), now perfect match too.

c. **Constitutional Rigidity:**

- (1) Swiss & Belg both written.
- (2) *Swiss*: requires referendum, winning majority & majority in majority of cantons, to change
- (3) *Belg*: requires 2/3 majority both houses to change, plus, for law on community organization & powers, 2/3 majority both houses + majority of Dutch & of French in each house.

d. **Judicial Review:**

- (1) *Swiss: Federal Tribunal* has right of constitutional review
- (2) *Belg*: No judicial review (but international agreements as in UK) 'til '84 & '88 steps gave full review to *Court of Arbitration*. [likely very import now given the new federal system]

e. **Central Bank Independence:**

- (1) *Swiss Central Bank*: always as/more independent as/than *U.S. Fed* & *German BB* (archetypes).
- (2) *Belg*: this dimension exceptional, among more dependent CB's until Maastricht ('92-'93).

3. *European Union*, supranational institution, but not fed or even confed state (yet?), but if seen as approaching such, then considered as a state: fits consensus sys well

IV. Ch4: Criteria for selecting democracies for study & soc-econ cond's expected to influence type of democracy & democratic perform.

A. Definition(s) of Democracy

1. Dahl's *Polyarchy*
 - a. Right to Vote
 - b. Right to Run
 - c. Right of political leaders to Compete [in...]
 - d. Free and Fair Elections
 - e. Freedom of Association
 - f. Freedom of Expression
 - g. > 1 Alternative Info Sources
 - h. Institutions of Policymaking rely Votes & Other Mech's Citizen Preference Express
2. Dem by this def = a 20th-C phenom., NZ probably first: 1893 all vote, 1919 all run
3. Table 4.1 by Freedom House: free & competitive elections + civil liberties
 - a. *Borderline Cases*: India, Papua New Guinea, Columbia, Venezuela (violence & corruption)
 - b. *Possibly Lenient Interprets Def*: Switz (female suff.), Austral (Aborigines), US (Afr Amer), UK-Fr-Belg-Neth (colonies), during allied occupations Ger & Jap, Israel post-67 occupied territories

Table 4.1 The thirty-six democracies included in this study, classified by decade and first year of the period (until the middle of 1996) analyzed

Decade	First year analyzed	Democracies
1940s	1945	Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Norway, United Kingdom
	1946	Australia, Belgium, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, United States
	1947	Switzerland
	1948	Ireland, Sweden
1950s	1949	Germany, Israel
	1953	Costa Rica
1960s	1958	Colombia, France, Venezuela
	1961	Trinidad and Tobago
	1962	Jamaica
	1965	Botswana
1970s	1966	Barbados, Malta
	1972	Bahamas
	1974	Greece
	1976	Mauritius, Portugal
	1977	India, Papua New Guinea, Spain

4. Also long & stable duration of democracy (⇒Table 4.2)

B. Diversity among Democracies

1. Huntington's Three Waves: 1828-1926, 43-62, 74-(Greece in all 3 & in reverses)

2. Population, Human Dev'p. (wealth, edu, life-expect), Soc. Frag.: Table 4.3

a. Problems w/ fragmentation indices:

(1) Exclusive focus on ethnicity (or eth. & religion) may miss much.

(2) May miss important *within* group fragmentation.

(3) Fail to weigh depth of divisions (salience, polarization)

b. *Lijphart*: crude 3-fold categorical classification:

(1) subjective & rougher

(2) reflects 1990s situation, but these things very sticky

C. Broad Socio-Econ. Structure Variation

1. May partly explain both democracy type & performance [*is this problem?*]

2. Interrelations among these variables (e.g., larger & more heterogeneous):

a. Ln(pop) & soc-pluralism corr: .26

b. Plur & dev'p corr: -.24 (but largely driven by India & PNG alone)

c. Ln(pop) & dev'p corr: -.10 (but not significant)

d. Older dems more dev'd ($r = .57$), but no relation dev & (pop or plur)

Table 4.2 The twenty-five other democracies (with populations over 250,000), as of January 1996, classified by decade and year of democratization

Decade	Year of democratization	Democracies
1970s	1978	Solomon Islands
1980s	1980	Ecuador
	1981	Cyprus
	1984	Argentina
	1985	Uruguay
1990s	1988	Korea
	1990	Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Namibia, Poland
	1991	Benin, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Lithuania, Mongolia, Slovenia
	1993	Estonia, Guyana
	1994	Latvia, Malawi, Panama, Slovakia, South Africa
	1995	Mali

Source: Based on information in Freedom House Survey Team 1996 and earlier volumes of the *Freedom in the World* annual survey

Table 4.3 Population sizes (in thousands) and levels of development of thirty-six democracies, classified by extent of pluralism, c. 1995

	Population (000s) 1995	Human development index 1994		Population (000s) 1995	Human development index 1994
Plural societies			Nonplural societies		
India	929,358	0.446	Japan	125,213	0.940
Spain	39,199	0.934	United Kingdom	58,533	0.931
Canada	29,606	0.960	Venezuela	21,671	0.861
Belgium	10,146	0.932	Australia	18,054	0.931
Switzerland	7,039	0.930	Greece	10,467	0.923
Israel	5,521	0.913	Portugal	9,927	0.890
Papua New Guinea	4,302	0.525	Sweden	8,830	0.936
Trinidad	1,287	0.880	Denmark	5,220	0.927
Mauritius	1,128	0.831	Norway	4,354	0.943
Semiplural societies			New Zealand	3,601	0.937
United States	263,119	0.942	Ireland	3,586	0.929
Germany	81,869	0.924	Costa Rica	3,399	0.889
France	58,060	0.946	Jamaica	2,522	0.736
Italy	57,204	0.921	Botswana	1,450	0.673
Colombia	36,813	0.848	Malta	372	0.887
Netherlands	15,460	0.940	Bahamas	276	0.894
Austria	8,054	0.932	Iceland	268	0.942
Finland	5,110	0.940	Barbados	266	0.907
Luxembourg	410	0.899			

Source: Based on data in World Bank 1997, 16–17, and United Nations Development Programme 1997, 146–48

V. Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*: Ch1

A. Central Issue/Subject of Powell's Study:

1. De Tocqueville: "2 opinions...old as world...& perpetually met...diff forms & names in all free... 1 to limit & other to extend indefly...power of people"
2. Powell: role competitive elections is to give citizens influence over pol-mkr's.
3. Pitkin: "concern w/ elections & electoral machinery... stems from conviction... [elections] necessary to ensure *systematic responsiveness*"
4. Powell: positive study driven by normative concern -- claim of democracies to be govts in which cit's participate in policymaking: want evaluate that claim.
 - a. With many people, participation in policy-making must be indirect.
 - b. ⇒Participate by choosing policymakers in competitive elections
 - c. Elections=*instruments of democracy* to degree they confer popular influence pol-mkng
 - (1) Going try explain & gauge extent to which & how do so, differently in different systems.
5. Elections not only instrument, but seem crucial...
 - a. Compel or greatly encourage policymakers to pay attention to citizens;
 - b. Consensus that *free & competitive elects* more than any other feature signals presence of *true democracy*.

6. Disagree about whether & how elections link citizens to pol-mkrs & pol-mkng
 - a. *Normative*, reflecting different ideals relationship cit's to pm's;
 - b. *Conceptual*: diff understandings how cit preferences can aggregate;
 - c. *Theoretical/Empirical [Positive]*: altern. theories what institutions best link citizens to pm's.

B. Two Camps: Majoritarian & Proportional

1. Alternative, positive (here: not negative) conceptions of democratic ideals.
 - a. *Positive* (not negative) conceptions: e.g., Prop. > emph. limit majority power (over min.)
 - b. Majoritarian = to *control* & Prop. = to *influence* pm's, but matter of °, of *conception*.
 - c. Each has closely associated normative concept of appropriate citizen influence, & empirical model “in mind” of working electoral & legislative institutions
2. Powell: aim here to identify contrasting elements & test the ideals' expectations
3. **Majoritarian Vision: elections as instruments of citizen control... [HOW ENVISION ELECTIONS WORK? WHAT ROLE?]**

4. *Majoritarian Vision: elections as instruments of citizen control*
 - a. “Concentrated pol-mkng power, whose exercise made direct target of citizen action”
 - b. Elected officers able to make & implement policies.
 - c. Responsibility for policy obvious to everyone.
 - d. Elects: *choose b/w prospective teams (mandate) or reward/punish (retrospective) incumbents*
 - e. N.b., concentrated power necessary but not sufficient (b/c under diffuse power...):
 - (1) Diffuse power ⇒ pol-mkng results from complex bargain b/w multiple representatives;
 - (2) ⇒ Retroactive responsibility difficult to pinpoint;
 - (3) ⇒ Election only indirect relation to formation of winning policy-coalitions.
 - f. Absolute sovereignty of majority ⇒ *Majoritarian*.
 - g. **Sum:** decisiveness & effectiveness in response to popular will: either by pro- or retro-spective view of role of election [see Fig. 1.1], requires concentrated pol-mkng power that is direct object of citizen’s electoral behavior (i.e., cit’s elect gov’ts).
5. **Proportional Vision: elections as instruments of citizen influence... [HOW ENVISION ELECTIONS WORK? WHAT ROLE?]**

6. *Proportional Vision*: elections as instruments of citizen *influence*
- a. Dispersed pol-mkng power; elections indirect role: bring representative agents of all societal factions into pol-mkng arena, where they bargain on behalf of rep'd
 - b. ⇒ premium on accurate reflect of pop. prefs. in pm arena. JS Mill: “In really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not disprop’ly, but prop’ly.”
 - c. [N.b., ∃ alternative view of proportional as dim×dim majority ⇒ *plebiscitory democracy* or broadly representative arena to replicate societal D×D]
 - d. Sees elections clumsy instruments, esp. as held in majoritarian systems.
 - e. Preferences of all citizens, not just majority, should weigh [proportionally] in pol-mkng


7. *Majoritarian & Proportional* proponents have diff. weighting of concerns:
 - a. *Majoritarian*: suspicious of representatives' autonomy, less concerned re: protect minorities from 'tyranny of majority', emphasis clear & direct accountability ⇒ prefer concentrated power
 - b. *Proportional*: suspicious of majorities, esp. majorities created by clumsy elects; more worried to protect minorities; less worried re: representatives' autonomy misused, provided citizens have role in selecting, & less worried re: negotiated inaction ⇒ prefer dispersed power
8. Also ⇒ Different empirical tests of visions appropriate:
 - a. *Majoritarian vision* assumes one can identify (majority/median) citizen preferences (or at least can i.d. clearly who/what has won a majority by whatever mechanism); ***the problem for elections to address is to make policy-makers follow that directive.***
 - b. *Proportional vision* assumes citizens highly heterogeneous; not so clear who/what is majority/median-preferred; ***problem for elections to address is to ensure all groups proportional say in policy-making.***

C. Views of Elections & Citizen Relations to Policymakers

1. 2D of Vote Choice (Fig I.1): Target & Time Perspective

a. Target:

- (1) Vote for/against Govt w/ power to make policy v. Vote for representative agent, not control Govt, but bargain on behalf
- (2) Voter anticipates decisive elect, directly determines pol-mkr's v. barg & negot coal-bldng follows elect (once or continuously).
- (3) Both may be desirable to voters...:
 - (a) Issues clear-cut, cit's w/ united prefs, voters may pref former. [N.b, game of elected-reps v. voters.]
 - (b) Issues complex & voters divided, prob's arise diff to antic., each grp may prefer rep by trustworthy rep's [N.b, game between / among voters.]



b. Temporal Direction: Prospective v. Retrospective

- (1) Govt Retro ⇒ (**accountability model**) (*thron the rascals out*): Evaluate Incumbent. [simplest possible model, *the Yoda model*, of elections' role]
- (2) Govt Pro ⇒ (**mandate model**): Forecast performance of Incumbent vs. Challenger.

		Voter's Time Perspective	
		Retrospective	Prospective
Voter's Target of Choice	Collective Government	Government Accountability	Government Mandates
	Representative Agent	(Representative Trustees)	Representative Delegates

Figure 1.1. Citizen Control Through Elections: A Voter's Eye View of the Processes

- (a) Elements of Forecast: cred & desir-ability, etc. of promises
- (b) ⇒ past record relevant, even though prospective
- (3) Agent Pro ⇒ (**Representative-Delegate Model**): Choose agent believe will act as (informed) voter would
 - (a) ⇒ seek agents whose pref's mirror voter's own
 - (b) ⇒ seek agents who will be effective bargainers
- (4) AgntRetro ⇒ (**Representative-Trustee Model**): bring home bacon [U.S. Model?]
 - (a) Despite centrality... Fenno's *Homestyle*; Burke's (1774): trust agent s.t. retro oversee; T. O'Neill: 'All politics local'
 - (b) ...Powell essentially punts on this aspect/possibility

D. Intermediate Conditions for Effective Voting Each Type

1. Each has corresponding vision, information requirement, & ideal govt-sys:
2. Incumbent Evaluation: support *Ins* when going well, *Outs* when badly; some view as essence of democracy (Lippmann) ⇒ **Accountability Model**:
 - a. Minimum: periodic opportunity to change policy-makers
 - b. Esp. appeal to those desire clear citizen control yet skeptical of citizen inform & capacity to form *one, stable* opinion on complex policy-issues [Elab on *Popular Will*]
 - c. How it Works:
 - (1) Ability to reject unwanted policy-makers.
 - (2) Threat of rejection ⇒ all policy-makers (who want retain office) worry about cit reactions.
 - (3) Simplicity & Limited Information Requirements (E.g., no worries about credibility: [Pure Accountability Model = Yoda theory of democracy: “do or do not; there is no try.”])
 - d. **What it Needs to work well?**
 - (1) But *do* need **clarity of responsibility** for optimal punish/reward [DEFINE, EXPLAIN]
 - (2) *Westminster Ideal*: Single, unified party controls all policy-making & governance, citizens can vote simply for or against that party in elections (single, simple, concentrated contest).
 - (3) N.b., if policy-making divided among numerous parties (proportional-parliamentary) &/or if pol-mkng coalitions changed from issue to issue (pres-cong), not work well.
 - (4) Also: **decisive incumbent replacement** must follow voters' rejection

3. ***Electoral-Mandates Model:*** [Explain. How does it work? What does it need?]

4. ***Electoral-Mandates Model:***

a. Ideal party system: strong, cohesive parties, including opposition, offer clear effective alternative choices. Voters evaluate prospects of each team at each election.

b. How it Works/What it Needs:

(1) Possible for voters to i.d. alternative future governments @ election time;

(2) Expectation of tight link from election outcome to govt/policy formation;

(3) Winning party(ies) have full power to make policy once in office.

5. Majoritarian Visions of Elections as Instruments of Democracy:

a. Both *Accountability & Mandate* models are *Majoritarian*.

b. [N.b., also called, jointly, *Responsible Party Govt* model]

6. ***Representative Delegates Model:*** [Explain. How work? What need?]

7. *Representative Delegates Model:*

- a. Two stages: election & post-election bargaining [recap model of role elections by the representative-delegates model]
- b. Pro-/Retro- distinction less central [but could do something analogous to above distinction of *accountability* & *mandate* models]

c. How it Works/What it Needs:

- (1) Each voter group must find party reasonably near its preferences & views;
- (2) Voter groups represented proportionally *in the policy-making process* (not just in representation, but in policy-making as well);
- (3) Policy-making does not occur at the election but begins after, as representatives bargain (not as collective govt implements its promises or anticipates future sanctions);
- (4) Flexibility in post-electoral coalition formation, allowing different majorities to form on different issues.
- (5) [Note how elements 2-5 are pluses for this vision, although were minuses for majoritarian].

d. ⇒ *Authorized Representation in Policymaking Bargaining*

- 8. [N.b., Powell's claim not that *Accountability* & *Mandates* do not occur in *Proportional* systems or that *Authorized-Representative Bargaining* not occur in *Majoritarian* systems, but that these weaker/stronger in each model.]

E. Responsiveness & Representation

1. Concepts *Citizen Pref's, Political Influence, Policy Consequences* “exquisitely complex”

2. Powell's Fig I.2:

a. Powell emphasizes links A to D, recognizing that [but punting on] E links back to A

b. Parties central at B and D:

(1) Link ind'l candidates & elect contests to collective policy commitments

(2) greatly ↑ coherence of possible connections via competitive elects

(3) ctrl in both electoral & govt-formation stages all dem's [but not equally]

3. P will use votes reveal prefs:

a. Advantages: Objective, measurable, lots work to build

b. Disadvantages:


(1) Know little/nothing re: how satisfactory options on offer

(2) only weakly & rel'y how well chosen party reps that voter

(3) Know even less about voters' preferences over not-chosen parties


(4) Know little about how informed votes may be

(5) And could be strategic voting **[elaborate]**



4. Will also use Voter Left-Right Self-positioning
 - a. Advantage: allows gauge *representational congruence* [DEFINE]
 - b. Disadvantages:
 - (1) How meaningful & central is a single left-right scale?
 - (2) *Rubber Ruler* effects, across voters & across democracies [elaborate]

5. Perhaps more confidence if both approaches agree.



VI. *Constitutional Designs as [Plans to Consummate] Visions Maj/Prop Democracy (ch2)*

A. Constitutional Design:

1. Stable democracies = *rules* re: how pol-mkrs chosen & policies made.
2. These *rules* shape context & consequences democratic elections.
3. Rules embody specifics visions/theories of democracy: maj or prop.
4. Constitutions = Many-layered texts, result historic moment intense bargaining, reflect values & concerns of constitution-writers, but, for us key is:
5. Implications for concentration/dispersal political [representation &] power
 - a. Do representation rules encourage legislative majorities that can control executive?
 - b. Do rules for pol-making concentrate power this party-government's hands?
 - c. Both yes ⇒ Majoritarian Vision; Both no ⇒ Proportional Vision; Mixed otherwise.
6. Alternative Statement of Distinction (Mueller):
 - a. Elect a govt—i.e. party whose policies preferred—to legislature & executive,
 - b. *versus* Elect a representative body to vote as voters would, policy by policy.
 - c. Different electoral [& policy-making] rules required to produce each.

- B. Classify Dems by electoral & pol-mkng rules; their theoretical implications
- C. Not random sample; set $21 \pm$ developed democracies w/ the req'd data
1. Much common: ec devp; Western (exc Jap); much dem experience & stable; most pol parties around for most voters lives; stable rules, orgs, inst's; parl (exc US); & competition considerably largely summarizable by 1 L-R dimension
 2. \Rightarrow controls these factors, but also \uparrow Q's how well extend beyond (*generalizability*)
- D. Electoral Systems: *Rules of Representation* by which citizens' votes aggregated to determine winning candidates
1. Duverger's Law [...says?], rests 3 theoretical aspects [EXPLAIN EACH]:
 - a. (Strategic) Decisions parties in offering candidates for election;
 - b. (Strategic) Decisions citizens in voting for candidates;
 - c. (Mechanical) Effects of rules aggregating cit votes into parties' representative seats.
 - d. \Rightarrow limit # candidates to slightly $>$ # with realistic chance win (*M+1 rule*).

2. Notes:

a. D's Law works @ district level, further considerations needed to explain degree to which, e.g., 2/district $\Rightarrow \approx 2$ nationally [e.g.]

b. D's Law: *force* toward 2-prty as $M \downarrow$, but only *allow* > 2 as $M \uparrow$: soc struct key in latter.

c. Many possible strategic *mistakes*, esp. 1st few elections under new rules.

d. Effects help assure majority as $M \downarrow$, fits *maj* vision, but also \Rightarrow disprop., esp. to \circ rely on mechanical effect, = problem from *prop* vision, even possible that plurality vote-winner not plurality seats, = problem for both.

e. [In any system, proportionality also rests on equal apportionment, *inter alia*.]

3. Source of key effects—on prop, # parties, maj...—can be summed in the ***Effective Threshold [DEF]:***
 $T_{eff} \approx \text{Max}\{.75 / (M+1), \text{LegThresh}\}$

4. First Empirical Exploration:T2.1

Table 2.1. Election Rules and Consequences in Twenty Democracies: Fewer Parties and Greater Disproportionality

Legislative Elections Rules ¹		Effective Number of Parties ²		Vote/Seat Disproportionality ³	Number of Elections
		Votes	Seats		
Multimember districts—pure proportional representation					
Austria	(2.6)	2.7	2.6	1.5	(8)
Belgium	(4.8)	7.6	6.5	3.0	(9)
Denmark	(1.6)	5.6	5.2	1.7	(11)
Finland	(5.4)	6.2	5.3	3.2	(7)
Germany	(5.0)	2.7	2.6	1.6	(7)
*Greece	(3.3)	2.6	2.4	4.1	(3)
Italy	(2.0)	4.8	4.0	2.6	(7)
Netherlands	(.7)	5.3	4.9	1.4	(8)
*Norway	(4.0)	4.9	4.3	3.7	(2)
Sweden	(4.0)	3.7	3.5	1.9	(10)
Switzerland	(8.5)	6.5	5.7	3.1	(6)
Multimember districts—increased potential distortion					
*France	(12.0)	5.0	3.8	7.2	(1)
*Greece	(16.1)	3.0	2.2	8.7	(4)
Ireland	(17.2)	3.1	2.8	3.3	(8)
Japan	(16.4)	3.8	3.1	6.4	(8)
*Norway	(8.9)	4.0	3.3	5.0	(5)
Spain	(10.2)	3.8	2.7	8.3	(5)
Single-member districts					
Australia	(35.0)	2.6	2.4	9.6	(11)
Canada	(35.0)	3.2	2.3	12.1	(7)
*France	(35.0)	5.2	3.3	14.0	(7)
New Zealand	(35.0)	2.8	2.0	14.6	(8)
United Kingdom	(35.0)	3.0	2.2	14.4	(7)
United States	(35.0)	2.0	1.9	5.9	(6)

*Major changes: Greece in 1989–90 only; Norway 1989 ff; France 1986 (PR). Austria and Sweden used higher PR thresholds only for the very first election covered. Italy 1994 excluded. N=155.

¹“Effective Threshold” (Lijphart 1994, 25–30) in parentheses.

²“Effective Number of Parties” from Laasko and Taagepera 1979.

³Gallagher disproportionality measure (Lijphart 1994, 61).

- E. *Policymaking Rules: Majoritarian & Proportional Visions* [Likely skip over this now, & return to it later, when we return to Powell after discussing rules of representation and of policymaking in greater depth over next weeks.]
1. Elects allow citizens to choose representatives, but after elects more rules affect how those reps make policy: *decision rules*.
 2. Again, sample much common: all dem's, elect national assembly that usually = ultimate authority, many are relatively centralized parliamentary systems
 3. ***Key: Rules Structuring Executive-Legislative / Govt-Opposition Relations***
 - a. *Maj*: rules favor 1-party majority w/ full control pol-mkng, w/o check or division
 - b. *Prop*: rules favor all parties influence pol-making proportionately, govt to negotiate w/ other groups, esp. opposition groups.
 - c. N.b., Powell assumes tight party cohesion; to ° lacking ⇒ ↑ opposition/legislative infl
 - d. Strom (1984): Gauge Opposition Influence by Strength *Committee System* [LIST CONSIDERATIONS? HOW MEASURE?]

e. Strom (1984): Gauge Opposition Influence by Strength of *Committee System*

- (1) Number of standing committees
- (2) Fixed areas committee specialization (jurisdiction, expertise)
- (3) Correspondence committee with ministerial jurisdictions
- (4) Restrictions on number committee assignments *per* legislator
- (5) Proportional distribution committee chairs

f. Two parts to Committee-System Strength as gauge leg/opp influence:

- (1) Committees influential, not mere rubber stamp govt-formed policy
- (2) Committees give pol-mkng scope to actors (esp. opp) not fully tied to govt
- (3) Strom's 1st 4 on pt (1), 5th on pt (2).

g. *Table 2.2: Committee-System Strength (Leg-Opp Influence)*

Table 2.2. *Legislative Decision Rules: Concentrating Governmental Power*

Country	Formal Committee Structure ¹		Associated Features of Assembly Rules ²	
	Over Ten Standing Committees	Corresponding to Government Departments	Committee Chairs to Opposition	Government: Controls Assembly Agenda
Rules facilitate opposition influence in legislature				
Austria	Yes	Shared	Medium	No
Belgium	Yes	Shared	Medium	No
Denmark	Yes	Shared	Low	Yes
Germany	Yes	Shared	Medium	No
Netherlands	Yes	Shared	Low	Yes
Norway	Yes	Shared	Medium	No
Spain	Yes	Shared	Medium	No
Sweden	Yes	Shared	Low	No
Switzerland	Yes	Shared	High	No
Rules encourage some dispersal of influence in legislature				
Canada	Yes	No	—	(Some)
Italy	Yes	No	Low	No
Japan	Yes	No	—	(Yes)
United States	Yes	No	—	(No)
Finland	No	Shared	Low	No
Rules support domination of legislature by government				
Australia	No	No	—	(Yes)
France	No	No	High	Yes
Greece	No	No	High	Yes
Ireland	No	No	High	Yes
New Zealand	No	No	—	(Yes)
United Kingdom	No	No	High	Yes

¹From IPU 1986, except for Greece, which limited number of committees when democracy was reinstated in late 1970s; see Mattson and Strom 1995, 261 ff. and Damgaard 1995, 311.

²From Doering 1995, 225 (I-III=High; IV=Med; V-VI=Low), based on expert assessments; Doering 1995, 236; parentheses are my interpretation, based on Doering's original source (IPU 1986, table 33.4). For Canada also see the special issues of *Parliamentary Government* 43, 44 (June and August 1993).

4. *Other Institutional Features that Disperse Power (beyond Parliament)*

a. *Indep Exec (pres'ism): w/ veto & decree powers esp.*

b. *2nd Leg Chamb w/ Ind Select Base & Veto+ Pow's*

c. *Fed'ism: local author. not fully dependent on central*

d. *Judicial Review*

5. *Table 2.3: Electoral & Policymaking Institutions & Concentration/Diffusion Representation & Authority*

Table 2.3. *Two Dimensions of Constitutional Rules: The Potential to Concentrate Power*

Legislative Election Rules ¹	Legislative Committee Rules ²		
	Opposition Influence Facilitated in Committees	Mixed: Weak Committee with Shared Chairs or Vice Versa	Government Domination of Committees
Pure proportional representation	Austria Belgium Denmark Germany* Netherlands Norway Sweden Switzerland	Finland* Italy — — — — — —	Greece 1989–92 — — — — — — —
Multimember districts with increased distortion potential	Norway pre-1989 Spain	Japan	Ireland Greece France 1986
Single-member districts	— — — —	United States* Canada — —	Australia* France* New Zealand United Kingdom

*The upper houses in Australia, Germany, and the United States and the presidencies in France and the United States occasionally provide added possibilities for dispersed power in policymaking. Legislation involving increased taxes required a two-thirds majority in Finland until 1992. Committee systems were mixed in Denmark before 1973 and Sweden before 1970.

¹Classification from table 2.1

²Classification from table 2.2.

Table 2.3. Two Dimensions of Constitutional Rules:
The Potential to Concentrate Power

Legislative Election Rules ¹	Legislative Committee Rules ²		
	Opposition Influence Facilitated in Committees	Mixed: Weak Committee with Shared Chairs or Vice Versa	Government Domination of Committees
Pure proportional representation	Austria	Finland*	Greece 1989-92
	Belgium	Italy	—
	Denmark	—	—
	Germany*	—	—
	Netherlands	—	—
	Norway	—	—
	Sweden	—	—
	Switzerland	—	—
Multimember districts with increased distortion potential	Norway pre-1989 Spain	Japan	Ireland Greece France 1986
	—	United States*	Australia*
Single-member districts	—	Canada	France*
	—	—	New Zealand
	—	—	United Kingdom
	—	—	—

*The upper houses in Australia, Germany, and the United States and the presidencies in France and the United States occasionally provide added possibilities for dispersed power in policymaking. Legislation involving increased taxes required a two-thirds majority in Finland until 1992. Committee systems were mixed in Denmark before 1973 and Sweden before 1970.

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6. Table 2.3: Electoral & Policymaking Institutions & Concentration / Diffusion of Representation & Authority

- Seems most systems more-purely maj or prop than mix.
- Large change rare, esp across visions, smaller change w/in type more common
- Why constitutional designs so stable?

d. Why constitutional designs so stable?

- (1) Incumbents won under existing system, ∴ rarely incentive to change
- (2) Supportive, internally logically consistent philosophies of underlying *Major* or *Prop* vision
- (3) Unless *very* widespread & large disaffection, voters strongly disapprove short-term manipulation [elaborate?].
- (4) [1st few elects new elect rules, & presumably first few acts new pm rules, highly uncertain.]

e. Consequences:

- (1) Citizens & Pol-Makers approach elections w/ great knowledge/experience how sys works
- (2) Party & voter strategies highly dependent, and, unless can change system itself, likely vary [considerably] depending on system w/in which they are operating.

This discussion leads to the following classification of the constitutional designs of the twenty countries:

Predominately Proportional	Mixed	Predominately Majoritarian
Austria	Ireland	Australia
Belgium	Japan	Canada
Denmark	Spain	France
Finland	USA	Greece
Germany		New Zealand
Italy		United Kingdom
Netherlands		
Norway		
Sweden		
Switzerland		