Comparative Governmental Systems (Part I)

I. Overview of Material to Date

A. Introduction

1. DEF of subject matter: “Developed Democracy”

2. Intellectual History of Comparative Politics, w/ some key topics & terms:
   a. Fractionalization & Polarization (of socioeconomic structure, of party system, of governments...)
   b. Cross-cutting vs. Reinforcing Socioeconomic Cleavage Structure


B. Soc-Ec Development & Structure and Democratic Politics

1. Basic Notion & Definition of Social Cleavage & Cleavage-Structure

2. Typologies of Social Cleavages:
   a. By membership bases: Ascriptive vs. Acquired
   b. By conflict issues (in a proposed order from most-Ascriptive to most-Acquired): Ethnic/Linguistic; Religious/Values; Regional/Geographic; Class/Economic

3. Characteristics SE Cleavages & Cleavage-Structures Potentially Important to Dem. Perform.:
   a. Salience of the Divide (latent—manifest); also important as a weighting on different divides.
   b. Ascriptive v Acquired bases (property of individual cleavage)
   c. Divisibility (Bargainability, Compromisability) (property of individual cleavage)
d. Ranked v. Unranked Cleavages (property of individual cleavages)

e. Relative Power of Groups Involved (property of individual cleaves or of Cleavage Structure)

f. Fractionalization & Polarization (property of individual cleavages or of Cleavage Structure)

g. Cross-Cutting v. Reinforcing (property of Cleavage Structure)

C. Modernization & Democratic Performance [Mostly uncovered to date; key hypotheses:]

1. Simple, Monotonic Propositions relating: Modernization to ↑ Participation, Govt Stability & Efficacy, & Social Order & Peace

   a. (Education &) The “Modern Person” Argument (e.g., Lipset)

   b. (Education &/or Affluence and) The Value-Harmonization Argument

   c. Affluence Arguments, 2 Versions: Resources, Maslovian Hierarchy Needs

   d. ↑ Density of Interactions (↑ Interdependence of Individuals in Society) Requires Democracy Argument

2. Impact of Modernization Depends... (Complicated Propositions)

   a. Ratio of Economic Development to Social Mobilization Argument (Huntington 1968)

   b. Economic Development at Time of Democratization Argument (Rokkan)

   c. Pace of Development Argument (Huntington 1968)
D. Social-Cleavage Patterns & Party System:

1. Basic notion:
   a. Party system—i.e., #, sizes, & ideological positioning of parties—reflects underlying social-structure
   b. Social grps delineated by (salience-weighted) pattern socioeconomic cleavage-lines ⇒ potential parties.

2. But relation heavily moderated by:
   a. Institutions b/w social structure & party system (esp., electoral institutions).
   b. Party & other elite strategies, & history (loosely, inertia).

E. L&R’s Cleavage-Struct. Formation & Freezing Hypoth

1. 2 stages, Nation-Building & Industrial Revolution, each brings 2 fundamental conflicts, forming the cleavage structure. Nature of resolution forms party system.
   a. Nation Building I: Center v. Periphery
   b. Nation-Building II: Church v. State
   c. Industrial Revolution I: Urban v. Rural
   d. Industrial Revolution II: Labor v. Employers

2. Argument: cleavage structure frozen into party system (& vote behavior) by mid-20th C:
   a. Underlying conflicts persist & groups developed collective ID
   b. Universal suffrage largely completed
   c. Political rules made by & so favor existing, established parties
   d. Established party strategies aim to isolate supporters from outside appeals
   e. Soc-Group/Party-Alignment advantageous parties & voters [How?]
F. Perceived \( \uparrow \) electoral volatility post-70s \( \Rightarrow \) explain thaw

1. 2 big \( \Delta \)s in link SES to voting behavior:
   a. \( \Delta \)ing Patterns Individual Voting Behavior:
      (1) \( \downarrow \) Structural Vote.
      (2) Traditional cleavages (esp. class/income & religion) transformed & weakened as predictor of individuals’ vote-choices
   b. Changing bases ideological conflict:
      (1) De- vs. Re-alignment,
      (2) \( \uparrow \) post-materialism

2. These \( \Rightarrow \) general \( \uparrow \) issue voting:
   a. Less socially pre-determined & structured (vote-choices & so party) competition
   b. New calculus elect’l choice: Individualistic, Varying issue positions & weights

3. Why were these divisions so potent?
   a. Represented & (re-)produced deep ideological divisions
   b. Social groups enable parties to institutionalize basis for support
   c. Other Key Soc Div’s: Region, Urban/Rural & Center/Periphert, Race/Ethnicity/Language
   d. Relative \( \downarrow \) in types of Structural Voting: Class \( > \) (Religion \( < > \) Regional) \( > \) Ethno-Ling.

4. Decline sociologically determined vote
   a. Simple Class-Voting \( \downarrow \): Define. Explanations.
   c. Other Key Soc Div’s: Region, Urban/Rural & Center/Periphert, Race/Ethnicity/Language
   d. Relative \( \downarrow \) in types of Structural Voting: Class \( > \) (Religion \( < > \) Regional) \( > \) Ethno-Ling.

5. General explanations (hypoth’s) \( \downarrow \) SES vote
   a. For each of below, worth asking whether & how well may explain relative \( \downarrow \) types of structural voring &/or cross-country differences in levels or trends structural voting (specific types or general)
   b. Underlying conflicts increasingly resolved
   c. Prtys (tried) broaden appeals cross trdtn’l lines
   d. Structural & institutional change \( \Rightarrow \) \( \downarrow \) relevance relatively fixed social characteristics for individuals in define selves & interests
   e. \( \uparrow \% \) pop characterized by social fluidity & ind. mobility across struct’l divides.
   f. Social cleavages still very relevant to those deeply enmeshed in them, but that’s fewer & fewer.
   g. Parties have contributed to & reinforced all this
II. *Comparative Governmental Systems I: Executives & Legislatures* (Courts, Admin., & Local Govt)

A. Overview (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, chs. 2,3,4,6):

1. To compare dem’s, asking how diff ways of constructing inst’s of dem might affect key soc, pol, & econ outcomes, must first have some grasp range of diff institutional systems possible.

2. Branches of govt: executive, legislature, judiciary, administration (bureaucracy); plus, some mechanisms for subdividing jurisdiction: local governance
   a. [Democratically, could also divide as Powell does in *Elections as Instruments: Institutions of Representation, and Institutions of Governance & Policymaking.*]
   b. [Or as Lijphart does in *Patterns of Democracy: Institutions & Structures of Horizontal & Vertical Concentration vs. Diffusion of Authority.*]

B. Executive (ch. 2)

1. DEFINE:
   a. classically, implements policy set by legislation;
   b. in practice, more than that:
      (1) consolidated leadership of government, of country: CEO
      (2) often agenda setter, designer, enforcer of law
      (3) figurehead: personal embodiment of state

2. Key distinctive features of democratic executives (outside US):
   a. Separation of Executive Powers
      (1) Executive-legislative separation non-existent in Parliamentary democracies (which are most, btw: >2/3)
      (2) Head of State (HoS) & Chief Exec. (CEO) strongly separated (this sep. not exist in US): (historical evolution)
   b. Indirect Election: Executives not usually directly elected, usually indirectly elected *from legislature*
3. Head of State:

a. Types of Head of State (where differ from CEO, usually longer term than CEO):

(1) Constitutional Monarchies:
   (a) CA, AL, NZ (UK Queen rep. by Gov.-Gen.), JA (Emp.), BE, DE, LU (GrDuke), NE, NO, SP, SW, UK

(2) Republics (President HoS):
   (a) Direct Election: US*, AU, FI, FR, IC, IR, PO
   (b) Election by Legislature: GE, GR, IT, MA, SZ

b. Roles:

(1) Symbolic: personal embodiment of nation
(2) Procedural: preside @ big state events (open parl, ratify laws, etc.)
(3) Diplomatic: greeting visiting dignitaries, attending funerals, etc.

c. Variation in Effective Powers:

(1) Effective influence varies, but France (“Semi-Presidential” since 1958) a major exception (rest of W. Eur. Dem’s, w/ poss exception Switz, Fin, & stretching, 1 or 2 others, more strictly Parliamentary Democracies)
(2) Formal Powers: appoint PM, chair cabinet meetings, dismiss PM, dissolve parliament
(3) Seems formidable, but w/ parliamentary majority required to pass legislature & to back a PM...
   (a) Only power dissolve parliament much effective when Pres&Parl differ (French cohabitation: ‘86-88, ‘93-5, ‘97-),
   (b) & blunt weapon, plus only likely useful & used when expect could win election [ELABORATE the Strategic Logic].
(4) All directly elected presidents have at least that potency as (usu.) only leader elected by whole nation, often some other, usu. minor, powers beyond that

(a) **Fin**: pres ctrl role in for. policy, can lever dom.-policy influence therefrom [ELABORATE the Strategic Logic]

(b) Even **Ire**, where Pres can’t even leave ctry or speak on any policy issue w/o govt OK: still has 2 powers
   i) Can refer bills passed by parliament to Supreme Court for judicial review (see below).
   ii) Can refuse petition to dissolve legislature (more later; n.b., weighs against too-frequent election-calling)

(5) Indirectly elected presidents &,** a fortiori**, monarchs lack this advantage. These generally the even less powerful presidents, but still not wholly powerless; many have some dissolution-refusal and such powers also, plus:

(a) **Italy**: can refuse dissolution, +bully pulpit: aloofness (graduated) from day-to-day politics can be advantage.

(b) Monarchs: some have intervened or spoken too strongly, and many presidents exist today as result, but even there still powerful symbol, which can also matter:
   i) Belgium (King Baudouin (ca. 1951-93): “the only Belgian” (Albert II, 1993-)): illustrates this value in divided country
   ii) Spain (**modernising monarch**): illustrates potentially constructive role in emerging democracies
   iii) Elsewhere (SW & NE notably): royalty self-consciously avoids pomp

d. Explaining varying efficacy of Heads of State (to generalize):

(1) Formal powers in constitution,

(2) **Plus** polical-strategic & social situation (e.g., France, Finland, but also, e.g., Italy, Belgium, Spain)

(3) Direct election helps
4. Head of Government: **Prime Minister (PM)**/Chancellor (“political boss” or C.E.O.)

   a. PM’s usually far more powerful than US presidents, esp. in single-party gov, but in coal.’s too. Why?

      (1) Usu. PM obtains position by strong bargaining power in legislature;

      (2) Usu. PM is head of a key, often largest, party as well as head of govt.

   b. **Aspects/Sources of PM Power;** again, formal description part of it, but key is pol-strategic position:

      (1) PM=legislature’s choice to head gov’t; the typically tight **party discipline** also key;

      (2) Given modest role of HoS, PM=nation’s central political figure: “Thatcher’s England”, e.g.

      (3) Cabinet & party leader: *first among equals*—hires & fires cabinet ministers ⇒ **gatekeeper** to power (controls careers), so demands & gets strong party loyalty. [SEE NEXT SLIDE]

      (4) At apex all political info., & usu. govt’s **agenda-setter:** which proposals discussed, what order. [SEE NEXT]

   c. **Replacing PMs:** PMs ≠ dictators: replaceable at any time, by 3 distinct mech’s [DISCUSS Strat Logic]:

      (1) **Electoral Loss:**

         (a) If party loses enough seats in election that PM no longer maintain parliamentary majority to retain office;

         (b) If loses parl supp b/w elects, or if former supporters thinks may have, opponents (new & old) can force early elect.

      (2) **Legislative-Majority Loss w/o Election:** current supporters can abandon if get better offer or begin to doubt or dislike current deal: PM (& cabinet, see below) serves at will of parliamentary majority.

      (3) **Loss of Own-Party Leadership:** own party could also lose faith and decide to replace PM as party leader; does not technically, *per se*, remove PM title, but party could always abandon govt and replace it.

   d. Conclusions on PM:

      (1) ⇒ relatively small number of MPs shifting support could topple PM (& cab govt) w/o voters immediate & direct say, but, ultimately, all return to voter for approval, so estimates of voter support continually key;

      (2) powerful but replaceable;

      (3) formal powers detailed, but key is political position.
Median-Voter Theorem:

Indifference Curves for (Simple) Euclidean Preferences

Note: Salaries in thousands of dollars.

Figure 6.1. Voter Preferences for Political Scientist Salaries

M-S Chaos & Agenda-Setting Power:

Gate-keeping Power:

Figure 5.22 An Example of Structure-Induced Equilibrium with Five Voters and Two Issues

Figure 6.4. Agenda Manipulation and Faculty Salaries
5. **Cabinet (Govt):** Cab = Board of Directors; set of ministers that comprise govt & head depts.
   
a. Department Head (Minister):
      
      (1) **portfolio responsibility:** responsible for dept affairs to cab as whole, which resp to parl, which resp to voters

b. Government Member (Minister):
   
   (1) **collective responsibility:** may debate issues in cab, but once decided, they’re unanimous & all sink or swim together (n.b., this also distinguishes cab in parl. from in pres. dem.)
   
   (2) **collective responsibility** often taken to ⇒ secrecy of cab discussion, but veterans know how to leak strategically (personally, collectively) & veterans how to read tea leaves
   
   (3) ministers w/o **portfolio:** rare, have only this second role.

c. **Ministerial Autonomy:** GLM (esp. L) argue ministerial system exhibits strong division of labor:
   
   (1) complexity modern pol-mkng ⇒ only dept has expertise & resources create, amend, etc., policy in its area ⇒
   
   (2) minister generates policy in his/her area for cabinet discussion ⇒ choice structured on departmental lines (n.b., this claim key to L&S model of government formation, later)

6. Making and Breaking Governments (our first look) (schematic diagrams are 2 slides down)

   a. **Fundamental Principle of Parliamentary Democracy:** Exec (PM & Cab) responsible to Leg (Parl), which responsible to Voters.

   b. Govt cannot form, survive, or act w/o parliamentary majority-support. Key tools:
      
      (1) **Vote of Investiture:** DEF; even if not explicitly required, govt must survive votes *ab initio.*
      
      (2) **Vote of (No) Confidence:** DEF
         
         (a) In almost all, govt must resign if lose [SZ: govts not face: that one reason some say SZ not strictly Parl Dem]
         
         (b) Opposition may propose *vote of no confidence* at any time [DISCUSS Strategic Logic: Why/when would they?]
         
         (c) Govt may convert no-conf into confidence vote, or call a confidence vote at any time [STRAT. LOGIC: Why?]
         
         (d) Votes on budgets often formally, & if not, informally, votes of confidence.
c. (some major) Consequences:

(1) Govt’s do not have fixed terms: Gov’t (Cab) Duration, & Endogeneous Election-Timing [DISCUSS]
(2) Major source of parliamentary power over government: Govt serves at Parl maj’s preference/tolerance.

d. Caretaker Governments: DEFINE

(1) Can last indefinitely, sometimes actually do (months in Belgium & Netherlands not uncommon).
(2) By convention, usu. not initiate new legis agendas or implement new policies.

e. HoS, Formateurs, & Informateurs: the logistics of the process (see Figure from GLM, next slide)

(1) Formateur: DEFINE; Informateur: DEFINE
(2) HoS role usu. to name Formateur or Informateur, sometimes choice prescribed mechanically (such as…?)
(3) Formateur names (proposes) PM & cabinet & portfolio allocation, for parliamentary vote
   (a) Formateur only names; parliamentary (party) leaders bargain & make the decision.
   (b) Ministries are career goals of parliamentarians–key prize & power, so much sought.
   (c) Because, once installed, policy control only re-arranged by reforming government (Laver’s ministerial autonomy again), portfolio allocation central to debate & bargain over new government.

f. Party Leaders (PM) Choosing Cabinet Members; char’s sought/rewarded, punished (DISCUSS WHY?):

(1) Party loyalty (awarding cab mins key tool create/keep party disc.)
(2) Represent diverse party strands
(3) PM’s internal-prty supp’s &/or opp’s
(4) Seniority
(5) Ability
(6) Typ’ly must be MP’s, but not always, & some even prohibit being both at same time

g. Civil Service: politicized v. depoliticized (DEF & DISC)

h. Minority Govts: DEF; DISC: how maintain power? 1 key: maj coal may vary policy-to-policy, which less possible w/in majority-govt model, more like the standard in presidential systems.

i. Defeat in Conf Vote: often not played to end-game, govt resigns, but sometimes to force public play
Making & Breaking Parliamentary Governments (Detailed):

```
Government resigns

Is an election held?
  Yes
  New legislature
  No
  Is head of state active?
    Yes
    Head of state reviews options
    No
    Is an election due?
      Yes
      Freestyle bargaining between allies
      No
      Informateur develops options
      Appoints informateur
      Yes
      Formateur available?
      No
      Appoints formateur
      Can formateur form cabinet?
        Yes
        Is investiture vote required?
          Yes
          Does formateur win vote?
            Yes
            Government remains in office
            No
            Head of state appoints government
          No
          Is there a vote of no confidence?
            Yes
            Does government win vote?
              Yes
              Government remains in office
              No
              Head of state appoints government
            No
```
Making & Breaking Parliamentary Governments (Simple, Stylized Version):

**FIGURE 2.1 Dynamics of parliamentary democracy**

*Source: Adapted from Laver et al. (2010)*
C. Legislatures (Parliaments): (GLM ch. 3)

1. Legislatures in Presidential & Parliamentary Systems:
   a. Presidential systems (US + many Latin-American systems, E. Eur. hybrids, & few other dev’ing-dem’s):
      (1) Legislature usu. power to create & enact legislation, including, critically, budgets.
      (2) Presidents usu. power to ratify or veto legislation, to implement & monitor/enforce it.
   b. In parliamentary systems:
      (1) Government (= PM & Cabinet) is the decisive power: creates, implements, monitors/enforces;
      (2) Legislature (parl): merely enacts/ratifies, but:
         (a) Parliament can usu. dismiss govt at any time ⇒ “Government responsible to Parliament”.
         (b) Government needs parliamentary majority support (at least implicit, passive) come to & stay in power.
      (3) Key to govt dominance of parl in practicality: party cohesion & discipline

   a. Most systems bicameral, w/ lower directly elected & upper, usu. less pow, selected somehow else-wise
   b. Bicameralism and Upper Houses
      (1) Methods of Selecting Upper Houses
         (a) Heredity, (Lifetime) Appoint: UK House Lords, LU Council State; CA Senate; these usu. have least power.
         (b) Direct Election, by approx. same system as lower: most of IT, SP, & BE Senates; among most powerful. Indeed, IT & SP selection & powers mirror lower chambers’ (⇒ point of such bicameralism not obvious...)
         (c) Direct Election, by diff system (e.g., diff constituency structure, diff terms) than lower (often geographic basis rep):
            i) examples: US, AL, JA, SZ
            ii) notable, but usu. lesser, pows; diff intrsts/org than lower ⇒ these most interesting
(d) Indirect Election or Appointment by Local Govt:
   i) Selected differently than lower House, have appreciable powers, but usu. lesser ⇒ these also typ. ly interesting
   ii) E.g.: GE, NE, AU, plus IR and FR (although these complicated mix).

(2) Typ. Powers of Upper Houses: (Italy exceptional: same as lower) [WHEN HAVE INTERESTING ROLE?]
   (a) Delay implementation of legislation enacted by lower (usu. const’ly ltd; cannot overturn);
   (b) Obstruct certain types of legislation (veto, or indef delay): usu. on const’l grounds, sometimes more;
      i) E.g., GE Bundesrat Veto
      ii) Stronger still in a few places: can initiate & approve legis: US, IT, others
   (c) Often controlled by diff block (b/c diff. select meth, terms) than lower ⇒ a certain check on current govt

(c) Unicameral:
   (1) DE, FI, GR, IC, MA, NO, PO, SW, NZ (& Nebraska), but even these often have some mechanism that...
   (2) ...partly simulates bicam: NO lower house divides self, FI & PO has 1 large perm. comm., acts some like U.H.

3. **Lower House Roles:** Making & Breaking Governments; Legislating; Government Oversight

   [CAN YOU DESCRIBE TYPICAL PARLIAMENTARY LOWER-HOUSE ROLES IN EACH OF THESE?]
4. Lower House Roles: Making & Breaking Governments; Legislating; Government Oversight

a. Appointing and Dismissing Governments

(1) Parliamentary System: legislatures usu. have primary power to remove govt & usu. also power to call elections
   (a) Exceptions: SZ neither power; many say ∴ not parliamentary; NO fixed 4-yr ele. cycle (& others among new systems); GE & SP (& others among new systems) constructive vote no confidence
   (b) Stronger than legislature in pres system in this one way: important implications (e.g., for party discipline)

(2) ⇒ Govt responsiveness to legislature; govt requires legislative majority
   (a) (If) Proportional Representation (then) ⇒ typically multiparty parl, & govt ∴ often relies on parl coalition
   (b) ⇒ shifts in power, expectations, etc. can induce sudden change in govt, without direct electoral input

(3) Conversely, though, govt usu. power to dissolve parl. & call new elections
   (a) ⇒ Election timing = strategic variable (n.b. max inter-elect period always const’ly fixed) [DISCUSS]
   (b) ⇒ Govt & Parl “gun to each other’s head,” but party discipline ⇒ govt usu. leads the dance

(4) Partisan Balance Power reflected in 1 national arena (but not much of determinate action happens there usu.)

b. Legislating (i.e., policymaking, governing):

(1) Party discipline + Gov’t’l legislative majority ⇒ Govt can usu. pass its program
(2) + Govt controls civil service ⇒ plans, implements, monitors, enforces legislation.
(3) Little committee development or resources in most parliaments ⇒ little parl ability to design legis, although some trend of ↑ resources & stronger committee systems.

(4) Representation:
   (a) Unlike systems where reps legislate effectively, & where party discipline weaker, MP’s see selves less as legislators, less as rep’s specific, individual electoral district, more as of representative of particular (e.g., partisan) interests
   (b) Provisions for private-member bills usu. exist, & can intro & pass if govt not oppose, but usu. not esp. important bills

(5) Still, enough variation that not all parliaments simply rubber stamp:
   (a) Majoritarian (Westministerian) systems:
      i) Single-party govt typ., strong party disc. typical ⇒ little role for backbenchers
      ii) However, PM & Cab must keep party supp, so even here must keep some eye to maintaining party unity
      iii) Opposition sees role more as vocal critic; offering shadow (alternative) government
   (b) Proportional & Consensual systems:
i) Multiparty govt norm; more explicit, overt give & take among governing parties
ii) SZ, by convention, explicitly consensus; others have varyingly operative consensual norms.

(6) Role of Opposition:

(a) Obstruct (& Vocal Watchdog; Ready Alternative) as much as can in “majoritarian democracies”:
   i) Filibuster or equivalent: e.g., in GR.
   ii) Speeches against govt plans: embarrass govt, offer alternative.

(b) Stronger role w/ more bargaining w/ government in “consensual democracies”:
   i) Govt negotiation with opposition plays stronger role in “consensual democracies”
   ii) More dev’d committee systems, although role more in details than policy per se; bills often to committee for negotiation & compromise before to floor (as opposed to how always happens in majoritarian: straight govt to parl floor)
   iii) Some parl’s can even set own agenda & timetable (as opp. to govt setting them) & sometimes amend bills

(7) Examples of parliamentary roles:

(a) Scandinavian parliaments perhaps closest to congressional model (Strøm):
   i) Relatively strong committees w/ stable membership, often govt commissions to form policy;
   ii) Parl seats arranged by geography rather than party ⇒ more cross-party bargaining, esp. re: regional issues
   iii) FI (repealed ‘92): almost all bills required 2/3 majority ⇒ more compromise.
   iv) DE: minority govt ⇒ ↑ role of opp: illustrates how strength of parl. is function of govt’s strategic position in parl.

(b) IT at one far extreme (among parliamentary systems):
   i) Party leaders set policy agenda; much policy even designed in party committees (instead of govt)
   ii) Secret ballot inside leg. (til ‘88) ⇒ harder enforce party disc ⇒ more govt-opp & govt-backbench negot’n & compromise
   iii) Parl comm’s very strong: explicit lawmaking powers to scrutinize all legis & even finalize & approve some w/o go to floor!
   iv) But even so: parl’s direct domain mostly restricted to leggine [DEFINE] and partitocrazia [DEFINE].

c. Govtl Oversight: watchdog role (Q of degree replaced by media in this); methods differ across systems:

(1) Question Time [DEFINE]:
   (a) frequency, and required-response, & timing varies; degree govt retains control of process varies
   (b) cat & mouse game of words w/ opp. trying to embarrass govt, govt trying not to give too much away while not lying
   (c) Pattern: ↑↑ # Q’s⇒more effective oversight? or still no bite, or devalued by use?

(2) Interpolation: like Q time, except response debated in parl if sufficient # ask

(3) Oversight comm’s: exist, but not near as dev’d as presidential systems [Why?]
5. **Party Discipline** (e.g., in one study: 99.8% party-line votes in Norway):

   a. The Centrality of Party Discipline to Governmental Dominance:

      (1) MP virtually must vote party line + Govt must have parliamentary majority \( \Rightarrow \text{Govt passes its agenda} \)

      (2) \( \Rightarrow \) “legislature” acts as a group of parties, not some larger # individual MPs from those parties.

   b. Sources of (Variation in) Party Discipline (discussed above, & more later, for now):

      (1) Party leaders have *unpleasant punishments & positive reinforcements* for backbenchers [*SUCH AS...? See Next...*]

   c. Party Discipline key to democratic responsibility in parliamentary systems: Govt resp. to Parl. resp. to Voters; clear links at each step \( \Rightarrow \) clear whom to blame/credit (easy for voters)

   (1) **[WHAT IMPLICATIONS DO YOU SUPPOSE TIGHTER OR WEAKER PARTY DISCIPLINE MAY HAVE?]**

      (a) “personal v. party vote”?

      (b) “geographic (district) v. partisan (ideology, interest) vote”?

      (c) “pork-barrel politics”?

      (d) “polarization”?

      (e) “gridlock”?

      (f) “incumbency advantage”?

      (g) “value of party label”: to voters? to MP’s, backbench & leaders?
6. **Party Discipline** (e.g., in one study: 99.8% party-line votes in Norway):
   
a. The Centrality of Party Discipline to Governmental Dominance:
   
   (1) MP virtually must vote party line + Govt must have parliamentary majority ⇒ Govt passes its agenda
   
   (2) “legislature” acts as a group of parties, not some larger # individual MPs from those parties.
   
b. Sources of (Variation in) Party Discipline (discussed above, & more later, for now):
   
   (1) Party leaders have unpleasant punishments for backbenchers *e.g.?*
   
   (a) Party label needed for election, can be denied [how? What are processes by which ‘denied party label’?]
   
   (b) Ambitious MP’s must note leaders are gatekeepers to power positions (ministries etc).
   
   (2) Positive reinforcements:
   
   (a) Sense of i.d., loyalty to common purpose: e.g., shared party ideology.
   
   (b) Opt-out provisions often exist for individual MP’s on key issues *when more, when less?*, but, n.b., usu. not to extent that have any effect on vote passage [in PO, e.g.: MP steps aside, replaced by other party mem to take vote].
   
   (c) Decision w/in party on its govt’l program may be fairly democratic.
   
   (d) Some negotiation (degree hard to ascertain with certainty) occurs before bill proposed to floor.
   
   (3) Some evidence backbenchers ↑ ly assertive (i.e., party discipline ↓) *why?*
   
   c. Party Discipline key to democratic responsibility in parliamentary systems: Govt resp. to Parl. resp. to Voters; clear links at each step ⇒ clear whom to blame/credit (easy for voters)
   
   (1) Voters vote for Parties (smaller “personal vote”) *explain; discuss*
   
   (2) MP’s think of selves as representing block of interests behind party (rather than specific electoral district)
   
   (3) 1 + 2 ⇒ less distributive and more national politics [a hypothesis: ?]
   
   (4) 1 + 2 ⇒ less incumbency advantage [a hypothesis: ?]
   
   (5) 1 + 2 ⇒ party label, w/ discipline to ensure its full meaningfulness, valuable to MPs, backbenchers & leaders (so maintain it), & voters (so demand it) [can you explain? A hypothesis: ?]
7. Summary Assessment:

a. Role of Parliaments ↑ or ↓?

(1) Arguments for ↓:

(a) ↑ technical sophistication & complexity of legislation & policymaking; parl lacks resources, organization; so...
(b) ↑ # grps in compromise (follows from above) ⇒ ↓ govt willingness to allow parliamentary role (to amend, e.g.)
(c) ↑ scrutiny-role replacement by media
(d) ↑ casework workloads ⇒ ↓ time for significant legislating? (But see next...)

(2) Arguments for ↑:

(a) ↑ casework workloads ⇒ ↑ citizen appreciation of parliamentary role?
(b) ↑ professionalization of MPs
(c) ↑ resources of common (even furthest backbench) MP

(3) GLM say seems parliaments on rise despite all the critics.

b. Variation in parliamentary power: function of rules, but also of strategic position of govt in legislature.

c. Centrality of PARTY DISCIPLINE

[If Time, we will cover GLM ch. 4, 6.]

D. Courts and Constitutions: Gallagher, Laver, Mair ch. 4

1. Background:

b. As ↑ edu. & ↓ single-issue politics, ↑ # issues taken not to legis (seen as slow, ineffective) but to courts [DISC]
c. Courts once ignored in discussing most democracies’ politics, but now judicial review central almost everywhere

2. Common Law and Civil Law traditions

a. Civil Law (Roman system): Most of Europe (plus Lat. Am., Louisiana, & parts of Can.)
   (1) Laws of parl are the law—every legal decision begins from legal code, not from precedent
   (2) Two strands/sources: Code Napoléon (BE, LU, NE, IT, SP, PO), German Civil Code (GE, NO, SW, DE, FI, IC)
   (3) Judges apply, they do not make, the law; see selves & are seen as more civil servants
   (4) Parl is supreme; indeed, judges often search travaux préparatoires to aid interpretation.
b. Common Law (British system): UK, most of US, most of CA, AL, NZ, IR, MA
   (1) Less emph. on “laws” of parl, more on “The Law” of accumulated precedent: previous judgements (& constitution) are the law, until explicitly overwritten (by hard process specifically described)
   (2) Judges interpret, but here only the final law as written (not travaux préparatoires) is usually base for it.
   (3) => greater judicial-legislature conflict potential under Common Law

c. Much evidence of convergence; degree to which Civil Law converging toward common partly function of declining specificity (rising vagueness) with which laws written.

3. Judge Appointment Procedures: in virtually all places, top judges appointed by govt &, to varying degree, removable by parl majority
   a. can & do appoint by partisan persuasion, but also can be difficult to keep in line because:
      (1) strength of removal provisions varies +
      (2) legal tradition/strong norm of judicial independence +
      (3) strong public opinion against partisan-eering of judges =>

   b. Results:
      (1) No UK judge removes since 19th C
      (2) Publics gen’ly strong belief in indep.(n.b., sim in US toward Sup Ct. but Gore v. Bush)
      (3) Accusations of partisan bias abound [DISC why in appointment sys; & elected judges]
      (4) Esp. IT case cited for partisan judges–much more overt there => IT (&US?) most highly politicized judges

4. Judicial Review: DEFINE
   a. Extent of Judicial Review Varies: non-existent; in reg. cts; in “supreme” cts; both (US, PO, etc.)
   b. European Court of Justice (ECJ) has judicial review over any mem’s domestic laws for accord w/ EU constitution
   c. No Explicit Judicial Review
      (1) UK: no written constitution => vague => issue of unconstitutionality doesn’t arise, or different guise; ultra vires [DEFINE] exists, but nothing stops parliament from simply writing such law
         (a) constitution from: statute law (written laws accepted as big ones)...
         (b) ...common law (customs of basic government forms and processes)
         (c) ...convention (elite accepts some set of implicit prohibitions)
         (d) ...works of (scholarly) authority
      (2) NE: courts expressly forbidden judicial review (undermines parliamentary supremacy)
   d. Limited judicial review
      (1) SZ: court can strike down canton but not federal law
      (2) BE: only those laws concerning balance of powers b/w levels of govt reviewable
      (3) Traditionally weak in Scandinavia:
(a) only NO long history w/ review, not much significant;
(b) SW strong constitutional provisions for review, but not much used (seen to undermine parl. supr.)
(c) FI: pres. may refuse to ratify legis. as unconst., but parl. uses legal advisors to pre-vet

e. Explicit, extensive judicial review: 75 of 160 constitutions in world; many use separate constitutional courts
   (1) Types of Review:
      (a) Concrete v. Abstract review [DEFINE]
      (b) A Priori v. A Posteriori review [DEFINE]

f. Strong Const'l Cts: US, CA, FR, GE, IT, AU, SP, PO (JA weak; AL, NZ mid-to-weak)
   (1) All appointed by government, usually to longer terms than govt and hard to remove
   (2) All are highly political appointments, and likely becoming more so
   (3) Recall: in many sys, some of pres. power stems from being able to call for such review.
   (4) French Constitutional Council illustrates many further points about strong const'l cts:
      (a) Courts are inherently weak political actors:
          i) often decisions only declaratory;
          ii) enforcement always lacking;
      (b) So courts rely for their efficacy on
          i) moral (and intellectual) authority
          ii) public support
          iii) political-elite willingness to follow its decisions.
      (c) Most adopt several strategies to accommodate this weakness:
          i) if they can, delay addressing politically contentious issues until attention fades
          ii) sometimes disting. b/w unconst'l and null&void
          iii) relatively few laws actually revoked (e.g., French C.C. about 5%)—this partly b/c govt’s pre-vet bills)
          iv) conditional constitutionality: if bill means X, then constitutional, taking most constitutional view of what law means, which may dampen lawmakers’ intent without outright revoking it.

III. We skip GLM ch. 5 on the EU because too big and other courses here spend whole semester on EU
IV. Administration (Bureaucracy) and Local Government: Gallagher, Laver, Mair ch. 6

A. Administration

1. Background:
   a. “Bureaucrats” do most day-to-day implement of most of what is vital to Jane & Joe Cit
   b. Ideal of depoliticized bureaucracy: administration merely a technical prob, not political...

2. Two Key Factors in Political Relation between Civil Service and Policymakers/Politicians
   a. Civil Service “Culture”: Generalist (e.g., UK, IR, IT, SP, PO) v. Technocratic (e.g., FR, GE) Civil Service
      (1) assessed on general administrative & managerial skills (human skills, liberal arts) v. specialist, technical training (economist, lawyer, engineer)
      (2) occurs through and matters because training & recruitment, socialization differ
      (3) Why some technocratic others generalist? one influential argument: naval v. land-army based territorial domination implies different needs for domestic organization
   b. Politicization of Senior Civil Service (mostly via appointment, promotion processes)
      (1) Spoils system [DEFINE] most dev’d in US, but general to all dems, perhaps growing
      (2) Anglo-world (except US) at one end: staunchly non-partisan bureaucracy the norm
      (3) Continental Europe b/w: Francophone world–ministerial cabinets: teams of trusted upper civil servants brought with the minister, far less formalized elsewhere in Europe

3. Self-Interested Bureaucracy:
   a. budget and size maximization (Niskanen; Wildavsky)
   b. “bureau-shaping”: making job more congenial in various ways, implies inter alia status quo bias (Dunleavy)

4. Other key question in comparative public administration: relative autonomy of bureaucracy
   a. Yes, Minister! [great show, catch an episode]: view that bureaucrats know what’s really happening, pol’s not, so b’s great latitude to make effective policy what they want (or at least not to move if don’t want)
   b. Ministerial (political) power: opposite view that ultimate responsibility with pol., pol. has complete authority and real power over b’s “quality of life” => all real power w/ pol., b’s just at margin
   c. Obviously, matter of degree, and it varies [hypoths] [Principal-Agent Situations]
B. Local Governments: Federal v. Unitary States; Systems of Local Government

1. **Federalism**: (const’l) entrenchment of some level local/regional govt in national policymaking
   a. Examples (in rough order of degree): SZ, US, now BE, (\{order uncertain\} AL, CA, GE), AU, (now UK?, w.r.t. to N.Ire., Scott, & Wales)
   b. Most bicameral legislatures in which upper house rep’s regions & signif pows, e.g. veto
   c. Federal local govt’s gen’ly more powerful than unitary...GLM do not stress enough: even if explicit powers at any moment might be less, b/c federal localities have constitution, courts, & Upper-House protection
   d. [DISC] Explain varying “degree of fed”, i.e., varying power regions v. center in fed sys?
      (1) Constitutional provisions:
         (a) residual powers to whom,
         (b) power of the purse,
         (c) constitutionally ensconced protectors like courts, upper houses, etc.
      (2) Strategic sit at national level, & among set of local levels--complicated interplay here
      (3) Social structure, history, and jurisdictional map overlay:
         (a) SZ cantons date to 13\textsuperscript{th} C, language homog./religious nearly by canton not nation, strong ID, etc.
         (b) ...to...US history, some ID...to...
         (c) Germany: fed more-recent political construct (some historical root, but match poor)

2. [DISC] Ctrl- v. dectrl-izing pressures? What logical issues involved in power alloc across levels?

3. Local Government:
   a. federal or unitary, all: at least one level local govt (commune, municipality), most have one intermed level (province, region); in unitary, though, local only has whatever power center chooses to give
   b. degree of local accountability--election v. appointment; budgetary control--varies
   c. relation across levels not usu. strictly hierarchical; more separate responsibilities/powers: in federal, constitutionally defined, in unitary, by legislation, so more easily changed
   d. typical local powers:
      (1) nearly all: land use & environ control, services to property (fire, garbage, utilities)
      (2) some: police but varies widely, usu. several law-enforcement divisions at mult. levels
      (3) often: some combo of local pub trans, roads, schools, health&hum serves, pub housing
   e. Sev. unitary ctrys **special regions w/ more fed-like prescribed pows**: e.g., UK, SP, IT, DE
   f. Key to local autonomy is budgetary control, esp. on revenue side:
      (1) sources: local prop, bus, & inc taxes; local service charges; transfers from other levels
      (2) most argue: greater reliance on first two and less on last => more effectively auton