Socio-Economic Structure (SES) & Democratic Politics

Introduction:

Politics = means by which conflicts (of opinion, interests, views) are reconciled (not necessarily resolved) in deciding & implementing policies and governing.

Democratic polities aim to manage this process through election of representatives, as orderly, efficiently, & peacefully as possible.

Analysis of socioeconomic development & socioeconomic *cleavage* structures is our inroad into understanding the fundamental, enduring, & potentially prominent schisms in society across which such conflict arises.

I. Introduction

A. Our analysis of SE cleavage-structure & politics has 4 goals

1. Definition of concepts
2. Survey of some empirical facts, two parts
   a. variation & similarity broad, cross-sectional features within & across countries
   b. change & continuity over time
3. Cover some arguments relating SE cleavage-structure to outcomes:
   a. Democratic Performance: participation, stability, violence
   b. Party Systems: number & ideological (platform, policy) location
4. Cover some arguments relating SE development to outcomes:
   a. Democracy & democratization
   b. Democratic Perform: participation, stability, violence

II. **Definition** & Typologies of cleavages & cleavage structure

III. Definition & Typologies of socioeconomic cleavages

A. L&E: **"a *division* on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups, or org's [b/w] whom *conflict may* arise"** (p. 53) [*emph. added*]

B. Rae & Taylor: "'Cleavages are the criteria which divide members of a community or subcommunity into groups...'" (p. 53). *A first Typology*:

1. Ascriptive/trait: race, caste, ethnicity, language
2. Attitudinal/opinion: ideology, preference, class, relig
3. Behavioral/act: "elicited through voting & org'l membership"

C. [I'd say R&T's first two are sufficient; let's call them:]

1. **Ascriptive (Inherent) Cleavages**
2. **Functional, Preference, Value (Acquired) Cleavages**]

a. [Could now discuss how ascriptive vs. functional might matter for outcomes.]

D. Some of the characteristics by which socioeconomic cleavages differ:

1. criteria that determine group mem'ship: objectivity v. subjectivity;
2. exclusivity of the groups so divided (disjointness);
3. nature of disagreement: policy differences v. belief & value differences;
4. ***salience* [DEFINE]**, which subsumes what sometimes labeled *latent vs. manifest*; [could now discuss idea of *salience-weighting*].

E. Finding abstract typology by membership criteria difficult, scholars tried more concrete enumeration to see if could further understanding connection of socieconomic structure to politics, esp. social & political order. (Daalder's list):

1. *class/sectoral (economic) interests*: worker/employer; traded/non-traded; private/public
2. *religion*: Cath/Prot; Christian/Non-C; relig/secular; fundamentalist/moderate
3. *geographical*: urban/rural, center/periphery
4. *nationality or nationalism*: ethnic, nationalist, & regionalist separatism

F. Multifarious cleavages, basically infinite in principle, so Q of which cleavages matter is best seen as entirely a practical one of *explanatory power v. parsimony*. L&E's set [paraphrased] reasonable:

1. **Religious/Values**
2. **Ethnic/Linguistic**
3. **Class/Economic**
4. **Regional/Geographic**

   a. [Could now discuss extent to which these four bases SE cleavage ascriptive vs. functional]

G. Some other definitions:

1. Powell II: "A set of attitudes that divides nation's citizens into major political grps."

   a. "Sometimes... 'purely' political: reflect opinions about [particular] policies [or policy areas] & are developed, sustained, & organized by political leaders committed to such policies..."

   b. "more frequently alignment large grps based on deep social, economic, & cultural divisions in fabric of society...[e.g.]occupation, religion, language, race, custom, geography..." (42)

   c. He focuses on two:

      (1) ethnic (cultural) divisions

      (2) economic divisions

   d. ⇒ one often-raised question: relative relative weight of these two, economy v. culture, in shaping interests and identity:

      (1) [Pink Floyd, e.g., take one side: "With/Without/& who'll deny/it's what the fighting's all about" from 'Us & Them' off 'Dark Side of the Moon']

      (2) No need be either-or: Both ethnic/cultural & econ always matter though relative weight may vary.

      (3) [Any hypotheses as to why & how the relative might vary? (Explaining cross-time, cross-country relative salience of cultural v. economic divides might make a good paper topic...)]

2. GLM: "implies much more than mere division, more even than outright conflict, b/w 2 [or more] sets of people...

a. *fundamental* cleavage...3 specific connotations: [GLM are reviewing Lipset&Rokkan here]

(1) "involves a *social division* that separates people who can be distinguished from one another in terms of key social characteristics such as occupation, status, religion, or ethnicity...Cannot be defined at the political level alone" (210)

(2) "groups involved in the division must be *conscious of their collective identity*...& willing act on this basis"

(3) "must be expressed in organizational terms ... usually achieved as a result of the activities of a trade union, a church, a political party, or some other organization that gives formal institutional expression to the interests of those on one side of the division" (p. 211)

b. following Lipset & Rokkan, GLM focus on four (more on Lipset & Rokkan later):

(1) Center-Periphery

(2) Church-State

(3) Rural-Urban

(4) Class Structure

H. SUMMARY of DEFINITIONS & TYPES:

1. Definitions of Cleavages

a. **L&E:** "a division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups, or organizations [between] whom conflict may arise" (p. 53)

b. **Powell II:** "a set of attitudes which divides the nation's citizens into major political grps"

(1) "Sometimes purely political: they reflect opinions about policies or & are developed, sustained, & organized by political leaders committed to such policies..."

(2) "more frequently, alignment of large groups...based on deep social, economic, & cultural divisions in fabric of society[:] occupation, religion, language, race, custom, geography" (p.42)

c. **GLM:** "[cleavage] ⇒ much more than mere division, more even than outright conflict, between 2 sets of people." Cleavages **3 properties**:

(1) Social divisions on the basis of **identifiable characteristics** (e.g., occupation, status, religion, ethnicity); cannot be defined at political level alone (e.g., *not* parties)

(2) Groups must possess **group consciousness** & willing to act on that basis

(3) Cleavage must be **expressed in organizational terms** (e.g., unions, action groups, etc.) [We stress this less as a *criteria* qualifying a division to count in socioeconomic cleavage structure...]

2. **Typologies of Cleavages:**

a. We distinguish **2 Broad Cleavage-Types**:

(1) **Ascriptive Cleavages**: bases for division are *inherent* characteristics of individuals involved, there's no element of choosing to belong to some group: e.g., race, caste, ethnicity, language

(2) **Acquired** (Functional, Preference, or Value) **Cleavages**: these are adopted views or, at least to some degree, chosen affiliations: e.g., class, preferences, ideology, & possibly religion

b. We identify **4 Common Cleavage-Bases**:

(1) **Religious/Values**: Christian/Non-Christian, Catholic/Protestant, Fundamentalist/Moderate, Religious/Secular

(2) **Ethnic/Linguistic**: Race, Language, Cultures

(3) **Class/Economic**: social class, income & wealth, worker/employer, manual/skilled labor, traded/non-traded sector, private/public sector

(4) **Regional/Geographic**: Urban/Suburban/Rural, Center/Periphery, *Regionalism*

c. Socioeconomic cleavages may differ along other characteristics as well: ***salience***, of course; may also be more or less evaluatively *ranked*; can conceive of *polarization* &/or *fractionalization* of particular cleavage lines; etc.

IV. Powell's (II) Arguments & Findings on Socio-Econ (SE) Cleavages & Cleavage-Structure and Democratic Performance

A. Ethnic-/Linguistic-/Religious-ly divided societies

1. **Preliminary Analytical Problems/Issues**:

a. Which of the many, many divides in society matter?

b. Whether E/L/R divides cause conflict or economic differences coinciding therewith do?

2. **Argument:** E/L/R divisions are less ***divisible*** ('compromisable' or 'bargainable') [DEFINE; EXPLAIN] &, so, greater prevalence & saliency of E/L/R divisions worsens democratic perform

3. (Expected) **Implications** (i.e., hypotheses): regarding...

a. **Participation**: could go either way,

b. **Government stability**: should decline as E/L/R divisions rise

c. **Social order**: should decline as E/L/R divisions rise

4. **Findings:** (in broad sample of democracies)

a. Some weak indication that **participation** decreases with E/L/R fractionalization

b. Stronger evidence that **govt stability** & *effectiveness* declines with E/L/R fractionalization

c. Complicated relationship with upheaval & violence:

(1) Greater E/L/R fract produces no greater **tendency to riot**, but, given some degree of social upheaval, it appears more likely to become **violent** the greater is E/L/R fractionalization

Table 2.1 National voting turnout and government change in response to election outcomes, 1958–1976.

Country	Elections included	Average turnout (Percentage of Citizens of eligible age)[a]	Elections at which gov't had changed in response to an election in the preceding decade
Switzerland	1963, 67, 71, 75	53%	None
United States	1960, 64, 68, 72, 76	59	All
India	1962, 67, 71, 77	60	None
Jamaica	1962, 67, 72	61	All
Turkey	1965, 69, 73	62	All
France	1962, 67, 68, 73, 78	70	Some
Canada	1962, 63, 65, 68, 72, 74	71	Some
Chile	1964, 70	71	All
Japan	1960, 63, 67, 69, 72, 76	71	None
Uruguay	1958, 62, 66, 71	71	Some
Ceylon (Sri Lanka)	1960, 60, 65, 70	72	All
Costa Rica	1962, 66, 70, 78	73	All
United Kingdom	1964, 66, 70, 74, 74	74	All
Ireland	1961, 65, 69, 73, 77	75	Some
Philippines	1957, 61, 65	77	All
Venezuela	1958, 63, 68, 73	80	Some
Israel	1961, 65, 69, 73, 77	81	Some/Complex
New Zealand	1960, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75	81	All
Norway	1961, 65, 69, 73, 77	82	Some
Finland	1962, 66, 70, 72, 75	84	Some/Complex
West Germany	1961, 65, 69, 72, 76	84	All
Greece	1963, 64, 74, 78	85	Some
Australia	1961, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75	86	Some
Sweden	1960, 64, 68, 70, 73, 76	86	Some/Complex
Denmark	1960, 64, 66, 68, 71, 73, 75, 77	87	Some
Belgium	1961, 65, 68, 71, 74, 77	88	Some
Austria	1962, 66, 70, 71, 75	89	All
Netherlands	1959, 63, 67, (71, 72, 77)	90	Some/Complex
Italy	1963, 68, 72, 76	94	Some/Complex

5. First, the **Data:** Recall that Powell II (in broader sample countries) emphasize political participation, government stability & efficacy, and social order & peace.

Table 2.2 Stability and effectiveness of government, 1967–1976.

Country	Stability: Average durability of governments or presidents	Effectiveness: Did government have a legislative majority 75% of decade?
Italy	7 months	No
Finland	16	Yes
Turkey	16	No
Belgium	20	Yes
Denmark	22	No
Netherlands	22	Yes
Ceylon (Sri Lanka)	23	Yes
Norway	24	No
Uruguay	25[a]	Yes
Australia	27	Yes
India	28	Yes
United Kingdom	29	Yes
Austria	30	Yes
Canada	30	Yes
U.S.A.	30[b]	No
Chile	36[c]	No
Costa Rica	36	No
France	36	No
Germany	36	Yes
Ireland	36	Yes
Jamaica	36	Yes
Japan	36	Yes
New Zealand	36	Yes
Philippines	36	Yes
Sweden	36	No
Venezuela	36	No
Switzerland	36	Yes

Table 2.3 Indications of the failure of political order: 1958–1967, 1967–1976.[a]

Conflict	1958–1967[c]		1967–1976[c]	
Regime suspended or replaced	France, Greece, Turkey		Ceylon, Chile, India, Philippines, Turkey, Uruguay, Jamaica	
Deaths from political violence: Average over 10 per year while democratic	India	320.3	Philippines	332.7
	Philippines	37.5	India	328.4
	Ceylon	31.5	Ceylon	302.8
	U.S.A.	29.0	U.K. (Northern Ireland)	160.0
	Turkey	11.9	Chile	87.3
	France	10.1	U.S.A.	20.7
			Uruguay	18.2
			Turkey	18.1
			Jamaica	17.9
Riots: Average over 2.5 per year while democratic	U.S.A.	62.8	India	56.8
	India	33.0	U.S.A.	42.7
	Italy	9.3	U.K.	11.7
	Japan	7.0	Italy	7.4
	U.K.	6.5	Venezuela	4.5
	Ceylon	3.8	Turkey	4.4
	West Germany	3.1	France	3.3
	Belgium	3.0	Japan	2.9
	Turkey	3.0	Uruguay	2.7
	Greece	2.7		
Less severe conflict[b]	Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Uruguay		Australia, Austria, Canada, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, West Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland	

Sources: Data for the first decade from Taylor and Hudson, *World Handbook*. Data for the second decade compiled by the author. One-year overlap in decades designed for source comparability. See Appendix for complete 1967–1976 data and a comparison with a recently published alternative source.

a. Greece is excluded as nondemocratic in most of the second decade; Jamaica and Venezuela are added in the second decade. Israel is excluded because of data incomparability; especially after 1967 the distinction between internal and external violence is extremely blurred.

b. If the deaths and riots are divided by population size to obtain a per capita measure, Austria, Canada, Chile, and Uruguay are in the topmost group in the first decade, Chile and Jamaica in the second. No countries are added to the high-death group in the first decade, but Ireland and Venezuela are added in the second.

c. The numbers in these columns represent the total number of riots or deaths suffered while the country remained a democracy, divided by the years democratic in the decade.

Table 2.4 Factor analysis of relationships between measures of democratic performance.

Performance Measures	Loadings on rotated factors[a]		
	Factor 1: political order	Factor 2: government stability	Factor 3: government control
Voting turnout 1960–1977	+.53	−.50	−.07
Executive durability 1967–1976	+.09	+.73	−.05
Executive control of legislature, 1967–1976	+.01	−.04	+.58
Rioting 1967–1976[b]	−.82	−.21	+.30
Deaths by violence 1967–1976[b]	−.69	+.02	−.12

B. Relations between the Three Dimensions of Performance

1. Regarding the Mutually-Reinforcing Hypothesis, Powell finds:

   a. Partic. relates social order (low violence, turmoil, & no regime Δ), also low govt durability

   b. Govt stability small negative relation riot; govt majority positive rel'n, o/w gen'ly 0 rel'n.

C. Obviously want to control population size and (next 2 pages) consider socioeconomic development in exploring effect of socioeconomic structure on participation, govt stability & efficacy, and especially social order & peace...

1. Table 3.1, DepVars by population size.

Table 3.1 Population size and democratic performance.

Country	1965 population (millions)	Median voting turnout	Median executive durability	Median riots/year		Median deaths/year by political violence	
				1958–1967	1967–1976	1958–1967	1967–1976
Costa Rica	1.4						
Jamaica	1.8						
Israel	2.6						
New Zealand	2.6						
Uruguay	2.7	81%	31 months	.1	.2	.1	0
Ireland	2.9						
Norway	3.7						
Finland	4.6						
Denmark	4.8						
Switzerland	5.9						
Austria	7.3						
Sweden	7.7						
Greece	8.6						
Chile	8.6						
Venezuela	8.7	86%	30 months	1.8	.3	.1	.1
Belgium	9.5						
Ceylon	11.2						
Australia	11.3						
Netherlands	12.3						
Canada	19.6						
Turkey	31.1						
Philippines	32.3						
France	48.9						
Italy	51.6						
United Kingdom	54.6	71%	30 months	4.8	3.9	6.4	13.5
West Germany	59.0						
Japan	98.0						
U.S.	194.6						
India	486.7						

2. Some data on economic development and "modernization", which probably also important to control.

Table 3.2 Economic development in democratic regimes.

Country	1965 GNP per capita	1972 GNP per capita	Average year's real GNP growth, 1965–1972	Literate adults	Agricultural employees[a]	Export concentration[a]
U.S.	$4810	$5590	2.0%	99%	8%	.08
Sweden	3441	4480	2.5	100	18	.09
Canada	3327	4440	3.2	99	12	.08
Switzerland	3139	3940	2.9	100	15	.11
Denmark	2853	3670	3.7	100	23	.10
Australia	2694	2980	3.1	98	(13)	.14
New Zealand	2664	2560	1.8	99	18	.22
France	2589	3620	4.8	99	25	.06
West Germany	2558	3390	4.1	99	8	.10
Norway	2543	3340	3.8	100	24	.08
Belgium	2427	3210	4.6	99	7	—
U.K.	2446	2600	2.0	99	5	.09
Finland	2354	2810	4.9	100	38	.16
Netherlands	2091	2840	4.3	99	13	.06
Israel	1940	2480	7.1	90	13	.20
Austria	1732	2410	5.0	98	18	.07
Italy	1485	1960	4.3	92	24	.07
Ireland	1319	1510	3.7	96	42	.11
Venezuela	1187	1260	1.1	80	(38)	—
Japan	1159	2320	9.7	98	21	.09
Greece	927	1460	—	82	48	.21
Uruguay	771	760	.4	90	23	—
Chile	760	800	2.2	84	34	.46
Jamaica	669	800	3.9	85	52	.29
Costa Rica	556	630	4.1	84	58	.27
Turkey	379	370	4.3	46	58	.17
Philippines	215	220	2.4	72	67	.15
Ceylon (Sri Lanka)	193	188	2.0	75	46	.46
India	136	110	1.4	28	68	.17

3. Table 3.3 gives DepVars by 'modernization' level

Table 3.3 Modernization and political performance.

Country	Modernization level (1965)	Median turnout	Median executive durability	Median yearly riots/million		Median yearly deaths/million	
				1958–1967	1967–1976	1958–1967	1967–1976
India Ceylon Philippines Turkey Costa Rica Jamaica	Predominantly traditional	67%	32 months	.07	.11	.66	4.5
Chile Uruguay Greece Japan Venezuela Ireland	Mixed traditional and modern	71%	36 months	.23	.15	.04	1.3
Italy Austria Finland Norway France Denmark	Modern with traditional sector	86%	23 months	.07	.01	.03	0
Netherlands U.K. Belgium West Germany New Zealand Australia Switzerland Canada Sweden U.S.	Predominantly modern	83%	30 months	.06	.03	.01	0

4. Finally, Table 3.4 shows ethno-linguistic fragmentation & outcomes...

Table 3.4 Ethnic division and political performance.

Country	Ethnic fractional-ization index[a]	Median voting turnout	Median executive durability	Median yearly riots/million		Median yearly deaths/million	
				1958–1967	1967–1976	1958–1967	1967–1976
Japan	.02						
West Germany	.03						
Ireland	.04						
Italy	.04						
Jamaica	.04						
Norway	.04						
Denmark	.05	84%	36 months	.04	.03	.01	.02
Costa Rica	.07						
Sweden	.08						
Greece	.10						
Netherlands	.10						
Venezuela	.11						
Austria	.13						
Chile	.14						
Finland	.16						
Uruguay	.20						
Turkey	.25						
France	.26	77%	30 months	.10	.09	.04	.25
Australia	.32						
United Kingdom	.37						
New Zealand	.37						
Ceylon (Sri Lanka)	.47						
Switzerland	.50						
U.S.	.50						
Belgium	.55						
Philippines	.74	71%	30 months	.12	.05	.15	.10
Canada	.75						
India	.89						

a. From Taylor and Hudson, *World Handbook*. The index measures the probability that two randomly drawn citizens will be of different ethnic or linguistic groups.

D. **Economically Divided Societies**

1. **Classical Arguments**: (date back to Aristotle)
   a. Economic **inequality** produces political instability
   b. Large **middle class** key to defusing this potential
2. **Powell II's Arguments**:
   a. "little doubt that occupational divisions & the inequalities that usually accompany them ... convenient basis for constructing political organizations" (p.47).
   b. Likewise, little question that natural basis for potentially disruptive conflict.
   c. What's less clear is mechanism by which economic inequality ⇒ polical instability
      (1) How/why are such inequalities so frequently tolerated in traditional societies & become issues in modernizing & modern ones?
      (2) Several scholars have suggested that more usually seems abrogation of traditional peasant "rights" which triggers revolutions, not awareness of severe inequality *per se*
      (3) [*concepts*: relative deprivation, perceived v. objective inequality, justice]
3. **Powell II's Hypotheses**: Economic inequality reduces participation, government stability, & social order.
4. **Powell II's Findings**: Weak evidence of any (simple, i.e. unmoderated, linear or even monotonic) relationship between inequality & democratic functioning. [See Table 3.5 next]

Table 3.5 Income inequality and political performance.

Country	Income share to top 20%	Median voting turnout	Median executive durability	Median yearly riots/million		Median yearly deaths/million	
				1958–1967	1967–1976	1958–1967	1967–1976
Australia	39%						
Canada	40						
U.S.	40						
Norway	41						
New Zealand	42						
Sweden	44	78%	30 months	.07	.01	.00	.00
United Kingdom	44						
Japan	46						
Denmark	48						
Italy	48						
Uruguay	48						
Finland	49						
Netherlands	49						
Greece	50	84%	23 months	.08	.03	.05	.04
Ceylon	52						
India	52						
West Germany	53						
France	54						
Philippines	56						
Chile	57						
Costa Rica	60						
Turkey	61	72%	36 months	.06	.13	.30	4.53
Jamaica	62						
Venezuela	65						

Sources: Hollis Chenery et al., *Redistribution with Growth* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 8–9; Felix Paukert, "Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development," *International Labour Review,* 108 (Aug.–Sept. 1973):97–128.

Interesting patterns:







[Might be several interesting possible papers in these]

Table 3.6 Environmental advantages and political order: correlation and regression analysis.[a]

Measure of political order[b]	Environmental advantages in democracies			
	Small population	Economic development (GNP/capita)	Ethnic homogeneity	Income equality
Low rioting, 1958–1967				
Simple correlation	+.83	+.17	+.27	−.08
Regression	+.90**	+.38**	−.30	−.35
Low rioting, 1967–1976				
Simple correlation	+.76	+.15	+.33	−.00
Regression	+.79**	+.09	−.09	+.03
Low deaths, 1958–1967				
Simple correlation	+.55	+.65	+.75	+.25
Regression	+.29*	+.40**	+.46**	+.02
Low deaths, 1967–1976				
Simple correlation	+.35	+.70	+.52	+.25
Regression	+.23*	+.71**	+.08	−.12

a. Correlation coefficients are Pearson r. Regression coefficients are standardized regression coefficients in simultaneous regression equation, with all four independent variables. Because population size is in the regression equation, the violence variables use absolute, not per capita, measures. Simple correlations with per capita riots and deaths because of political violence, with GNP/capita (log), ethnic homogeneity, and equality are as follows: +.11, +.14, −.03; +.27, −.11, +.46; +.71, +.51, +.54; +.72, +.19, +.51. Population size and GNP/capita variables are logged. Twenty-six cases are used in 1958–1967; 27 in 1967–1976.

b. To prevent extreme outliers from biasing the coefficients, the extreme values on riots and deaths are truncated back to the ninetieth-percentile values, a procedure followed throughout the book. A log transformation of the dependent variable yields similar

E. Powell Summary:

1. **Arguments:** Small population, high dev'p, homogeneity (ethnic, etc.), & low inequality reduce riots & deaths
2. **Findings:** Yes to pop. & devp., some evidence for ethnic homogeneity, weak evidence for economic inequality.
3. P II's findings refer entire sample dems *ca.* 1980. Findings for dev'd dems differ some. [See below]

F. [EXPLAIN how read multiple-regression table like this.]

G. **Further Considerations/Discussion regarding why some divided societies function dem'ly, peacefully, & stably, but others not?**

1. History?
   a. ...of oppression & repression & of internal & external war: US, UK/N.Ire.; Israel; former Yugo.; Franco-Germ, Franco-Span, Germ-Danish, Ital-Austrian, Ital-French border regions
   b. ...of homogeneity or heterogeneity: Compare reactions to massive immigration in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, U.K., & France; Italy v. Canada
2. Structure or Nature of Cleavages? [discussion to come; see below]
   a. **Reinforcing v. cross-cutting cleavages?**
      (1) US v. Switzerland; Finland v. Spain
   b. **Relative size (power) of the factions?**
      (1) Too small to be a "threat" v. So large it "must be accommodated" v. power-transitions (Organski) / racial-threat (V.O. Key) hypothesis: 15-40% range most severe problems?
   c. **Divisibility of issues? Ascriptive v. functional? Fractionalization? Polarization?**
3. Institutional structure? [more on this later in course]
   a. *Regional autonomy* (Switzerland, Canada, US, Germany, Australia, Italy, Spain: federalism or special relationships with peripheral groups)
   b. *Parliamentary representation* of minorities (Neth., Bel.: highly prop. sys.)
   c. *Functional representation* (Austria: *proportz*, Netherlands: *pillarization*)
   d. *Checks & balances* (US); *constitutionally ensconced liberties* (all dev'd dem's)

H. Powell summarizes chapt nicely—read last 3 paragraphs carefully

V. Characteristics of Socio-Econ Cleavages & Cleavage Structure that May Affect Democratic Performance: *[List & Discuss]*

VI. Characteristics of Socio-Econ Cleavages & Cleavage Structure that May Affect Democratic Performance: Summary

A. Reinforcing (coinciding) Cleavages & Cross-cutting Cleavages

1. Definitions:

   a. *Reinforcing*: 2 cleavages are reinforcing to degree they divide society into same 2 groups

   b. *Cross-cutting*: 2 cleavages cross-cut to degree their divisions of society do not coincide

2. N.b. this a property of cleavage structure, of relations between cleavages (dividing lines), of the set rather than any one specific cleavage line.

For a modern treatment (emphasizing issues of conceptualization, operationalization, and measurement, see Joel S. Selway, "The Measurement of Cross-cutting Cleavages and Other Multidimensional Cleavage Structures" (2011) *Political Analysis* 19(1): 48-65.

B. **Salience**: importance dividing line & its associated conflicts to those involved. (Some refer to dormant cleavages as *latent* & active cleavages as *manifest*.)

1. **Argument 1 (salience-weighting)**: the more salient are particular cleavages, the more they weigh in determining the effective pattern of cleavage lines & the relative weight of specific cleavage lines in defining the effective socioeconomic structure.

2. **Argument 2**: cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more salient the issues involved. [why/explain]

C. **Divisibility**: degree to which issues over which groups divided by cleavage easily *bargainable* or *compromisable* as opposed to categorical (0-1).

1. **Argument**: cleavages more likely less detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more divisible the issues involved. [why/explain]

D. **Ascriptive v. Acquired**: degree to which membership in the groups divided is by inherent, immutable vs. acquired, changeable individual characteristic.

1. **Argument**: cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more ascriptive are the bases for membership in the grps so divided. [?]

E. **Ranked vs. Unranked:**

1. **Argument:** cleavages (un)ranked in socioeconomic standing tend induce more-intense conflicts between groups. [why/explain]

F. **Relative Size/Power** of groups divided by the cleavage

1. **Argument 1**: cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more closely is power distributed among the groups.
2. **Argument 2**: cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more unevenly is power distributed among the groups.
3. **Argument 3**: cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order as the power of ascendant groups approaches that of dominant groups.

G. *Note*: the above generally characteristics of particular socioeconomic cleavages;

the below generally characteristics of the socioeconomic cleavage-structure.

H. **Fractionalization & Polarization**:

1. Fractionalization refers to number of cleavages operating (manifest); polarization refers to "distance" separating the parties' preferred policies & outcomes
2. Could also refer to the number of groups and the distances between them along a particular socioeconomic cleavage line.
3. **Argument 1**: more fractionalized and/or polarized SE cleavages are more likely to be more detrimental to democratic stability & social order
4. **Argument 2**: SE cleavages are more likely to be more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more fractionalized & polarized they are

I. **Cross-Cutting vs. Reinforcing**:

1. Cleavage structures (a set of cleavages) are **cross-cutting** to the degree that each divides the nation differently into different groups & **reinforcing** to the degree that each divides the nation into the same groups.
2. **Argument**: cleavages are more (less) likely to be more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more they reinforce (cross-cut) each other.

VII. **Patterns of Cleavages & the Number of Political Parties**

A. Pattern of Cleavages & the Number of Parties

1. The SE cleavage-structure of a polity is described in various dimensions

   a. *fractionalization* of society (# of sub-groups, *possibly overlapping*)

   b. *polarization* of society ("distance" between groups)

   c. degree to which cleavages *reinforce or cross-cut*

   d. *relative salience* of the various cleavages ⇒ a salience-weighting.

2. These factors combine to suggest number of political parties that may evolve to represent various issues

   a. They tell us number of relevant *disjoint* subgroups

   b. If political parties evolve to represent groups of people with distinct interests, that should at least suggest the number of parties that a polity will evolve

3. Social-structural data that would enable operationalize the abstract concepts above & process them into the number of disjoint subgroups has not been attempted* & would be no simple task (though have a student...) However, subjectively, my impression is that relationship not as strong, directly, as might expect:

   a. US–many disjoint subgroups, effectively 2 parties; UK–rel'ly homog, 2 groups

   b. Italy–relatively homog, many parties; Denmark–relatively homog, many parties

   c. [Any guesses why this might be? What suggest about relationship SE struct & party sys?]

* But we're getting there; see:

Joel S. Selway, "The Measurement of Cross-cutting Cleavages and Other Multidimensional Cleavage Structures" (2011) *Political Analysis* 19(1): 48-65.

B. **Argument**: Cleavage structure suggests # & types of social groups that parties could evolve to represent; *i.e.*, soc. struct. gives basis for political org. suggesting that societal fractionalization & polarization may be mirrored by party-system fractionalization & polarization.

C. **Evidence**:

1. To measure adequately effective number of relevant social groupings daunting empirical task: only beginning attempts so far (see above).
2. However, my subjective impression is correlation b/w # social groups & # parties weak at best: US: many groups, 2 parties; Switzerland: many groups, many parties; Italy: relatively homogenous, many parties; UK: relatively homogenous, 2 parties.
3. Why? Probably b/c b/w soc. struct. & party sys. intervenes extremely powerful inst'l variables, esp. electoral law & inst's

D. ***Some Key Concepts*:** *cleavage; cleavage structure; salience/intensity; latent v. manifest; cross-cutting v. reinforcing; fractionalization & polarization; modernization & social-mobilization; post-materialism.*

VIII. Modernization [DEFINE] & Democratic Performance:

IX. Modernization & Democratic Performance

A. **Key features of development:**

1. Growth & spread of affluence
2. Economic- & social-struct'l change
3. Urbanization
4. Spread & advance education, literacy, & mass media
5. Greater social & occupat'l mobility

B. **Classical Hypotheses:** Dems w/ modernized social structures & developed economies expected to have higher participation, more stable & effective governments, & less political violence than countries with more traditional social structures & underdeveloped economies & democracies. Why?

1. Simple, monotonic arguments:
   a. *(Education &) The Modern Person* hypotheses (Lerner, Inkeles: rational/scientific life views)
   b. *(Edu&) The Value-harmonization hypoth*
   c. *(Affluence &) The Economic-security hypoth* (Maslow's hierarchy of needs)
   d. *(Affluence &) The Government-resources hypothesis:* affluence allows greater fulfillment of social demands, partly *via* increase of government resources
   e. *Increasing-interdependence hypothesis*
2. Non-monotonic, Conditional (i.e., complicated) arguments
   a. *Ratio Economic Dev'p to Soc-Pol Mobilization* (Huntington)
   b. *Level of Ec dev'p at intro political competition*
   c. *Pace-of-development hypothesis* (Huntington)

C. Powell II: Impact of dev'p on political performance? [HYPOTHESES?]

1. **Participation**

a. **Argument:** modernization raises participation

(1) greater info., edu., & psychological involvement of modern person

(2) more extensive & specialized grp structures, more effective org's (esp. parties & related org's)

b. **Finding:** Modernization ⇒ Greater Participation, but within developed world No or Negative relation

c. Why?

2. **Government Stability/Effectiveness:**

a. **Hypothesis:** Seems logical that modernize ⇒ ⇑govt stab & effect

b. **Finding:** Modernization ⇒ no apparent relation to govt stab. & effect.

c. Why?

3. **Social Order & Violence:**

a. **Hypothesis:** Again, seems logical that modernization ⇒ greater social order & less violence

b. **Findings:** Relationship b/w development & "social upheaval" (riots) seems different than that b/w development & political violence

(1) Soc disorder most in early stages of modernization, less at undeveloped & developed stages; i.e., curvilinear w/ early modernization appearing worst

(2) Violence, contrarily, strictly declines (increases) in modernization (underdevelopment); i.e., linear

c. Why?

X. Some data and simple evidence on Socioeconomic Structure & Development and Democratic Performance

A. Societal Fragmentation Indices (EXPLAIN)



B. Bivariate relations [imagine try draw regression lines through the scatterplots], then multivariate analyses [work on interpreting multivariate regression]

C. Participation






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
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
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
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
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Number of obs = 21 R-squared = 0.8833

vpart	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
lpop	-3.336463	1.212639	-2.751	0.019	-6.005463	-.6674632
lrgdpc	1.848647	6.740736	0.274	0.789	-12.98761	16.68491
ethind	.0623695	7.192933	0.009	0.993	-15.76917	15.89391
relind	12.3443	7.94188	1.554	0.148	-5.13566	29.82426
gini	-111.8817	44.40408	-2.520	0.028	-209.6144	-14.14894
edsec	-.2808857	.1271328	-2.209	0.049	-.5607032	-.0010682
age65o	1.203603	.7275164	1.654	0.126	-.3976493	2.804856
US	-17.27092	6.455974	-2.675	0.022	-31.48042	-3.061414
SZ	-46.59973	6.659673	-6.997	0.000	-61.25757	-31.94189
_cons	144.9013	57.75213	2.509	0.029	17.78975	272.0129

D. Government Stability




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
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
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
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
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lpop	-1.208241	1.905755	-0.634	0.538	-5.360524	2.944042
lrgdpc	-21.06676	11.06763	-1.903	0.081	-45.18106	3.047533
ethind	24.58645	10.87294	2.261	0.043	.8963491	48.27655
relind	28.05811	12.91752	2.172	0.051	-.0867556	56.20297
gini	-48.43518	70.82302	-0.684	0.507	-202.7453	105.8749
edsec	.220791	.2004675	1.101	0.292	-.2159903	.6575722
age65o	1.553841	1.179984	1.317	0.212	-1.017124	4.124805
US	18.08332	10.5959	1.707	0.114	-5.003161	41.1698
_cons	192.649	94.03041	2.049	0.063	-12.2256	397.5237

E. Social Order & Violence






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
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
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
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Number of obs = 16 R-squared = 0.6063

lattopp	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
lpop	.6046398	.3707692	1.631	0.142	-.2503556	1.459635
lrgdpc	-3.45209	1.985412	-1.739	0.120	-8.030458	1.126277
ethind	1.977078	1.950378	1.014	0.340	-2.520503	6.474659
relind	1.822315	2.361272	0.772	0.462	-3.622789	7.267419
gini	3.157216	13.30192	0.237	0.818	-27.51707	33.8315
edsec	.0401198	.033673	1.191	0.268	-.0375303	.1177698
age65o	.7656431	.2847183	2.689	0.028	.1090814	1.422205
_cons	9.059294	16.14223	0.561	0.590	-28.16475	46.28334

XI. Interpreting Regression-Analysis Results

A. Output refers to equation, where name in top-left, here "lattopp", is **dependent variable** & rest of names in first column are **independent variables**, "lpop", "lrgdpc" etc.

B. Second column contains **estimated coefficients** on those independent variables. Last such coefficient, on "_cons", is coefficient on a constant (one), otherwise known as intercept. Coefficients tell you how much dependent variable tends to move for each 1-unit increase in independent variable. ***Sign***, therefore, tells you direction of the relationship & ***size*** tells you magnitude (keeping in mind substantive scales of independent & dependent variables).

C. So, above estimated equation is:

$$\text{lattopp} = 9.06 + .605(lpop) - 3.45(lrgdpc) + 1.98(ethind) + 1.82(relind) + 3.16(gini) + .040(edsec) + .766(age65o)$$

D. All data are for the 1980s:

1. *lattopp*=avg # of "political attacks & oppressions"
2. *lpop*=natural log of size of population
3. *lrgdpc*=natural log of real GDP per capita
4. *ethind*=ethnic fractionalization index: probability that 2 persons chosen at random will be of diff ethnic grps
5. *relind*=religious fractionalization index: probability 2 persons chosen at random will be of diff relig grs
6. *gini*=GINI index of income inequality
7. *edsec*=percentage of population in relative age grp that attained at least secondary edu (high school)
8. *age65o*=percentage of population over 65 years old

E. Third column is **standard error**. It tells you precision of the estimated relationship: with how great certainty do increases in independent variable lead to movements in the dependent variable? You can read these as loosely something like the +/- number that comes with every survey. E.g., "When percent of population high-school educated or better goes up by 1, natural log of political attacks & oppressions go up by about .04 [coefficient on *edsec*] give or take .034 [std error on edsec coeff]."

F. Next column contains **t-statistics**. Std errors should at very least be smaller than coefficient for us to lend any credence to coefficient estimate. We'd prefer them to be no larger than half as large as coefficient. T-statistic is just coefficient divided by standard error. So, loosely, larger t-statistics imply more precise relationships (tighter relationships, not necessarily larger ones). We like t-stats approaching or exceeding about 2 (very crude advice, please don't ever tell a statistician this).

G. Next column is probability, under certain assumptions, of having estimated a coefficient this far or farther from zero if the true relationship actually were zero. We look to these to see if we can say with any statistical certainty that a relationship (positive or negative) exists. We like these "**p-levels**" (a.k.a. *significance levels, alpha levels*) approaching or smaller than 0.10 (again, this very rough statement would make a statistician cringe).

H. Last two columns are "95% **confidence interval**". Again, exceedingly crudely but good enough for now, we can say, under certain assumptions, we are 95% confident that the true relationship b/w these bounds.

I. This is ***multiple regression***. It's just like the scatter-plots for two variables above, only now looking for relation between a ***set*** of possible independent variable***s*** & the dependent variable. Thus, each coefficient is "the effect of X on Y, holding all else constant" or "the effect of X on Y after having 'netted out' all relationships between the other x's & Y".

1. Coefficients (and standard errors, t-stats, and p-levels) defined above all related to how (and the certainty with which) *each variable, controlling for all the others,* relates to the dependent variable.
2. R^2 term ("**R-squared**" at top-right of table) indicates share of total variation of dependent variable that can be "explained" (i.e., linearly accounted) by, that is systematic in, *(all of)* the independent variables.

J. Questions? We will see this again, so:

1. Do not panic if you did not get all of this right now. We will see it again (& again) & I will explain it again.
2. However, do not hope that it will just go away if you ignore it. We *will* see it again (& again).

XII. Further Q's (topics?) regarding ***Dev & Saliency of Diff Cleavages***:

1. Does development increase saliency functional relative to ascriptive cleavages?
2. Does rise of **post-industrial society & post-materialism** decrease saliency of economic cleavages?
3. Did the rise of welfare state & more recent "plateau-ing" or receding of welfare state increase or decrease the saliency of economic cleavages? [Or is causality in other direction? Some change in saliency economic cleavages explains stagnation/decline of the welfare-state efforts?
4. More broadly, are *new* cleavages replacing *old* ones?
5. [More on some of this next times...]

XIII. Summary of What We Have So Far on Socio-Econ Development & Cleavage-Structure and Politics:

A. Basic Notion & Definition of Social Cleavage & Cleavage-Structure

B. Typologies of Social Cleavages:

1. *Ascriptive v. Acquired Cleavages*
2. *Religious/Values, Ethnic/Linguistic, Class/Economic, Regional/Geographic*

C. Characteristics of Social Cleavages & Cleavage-Structures Potentially Important to Key Elements Democratic Performance

1. *Salience of the Divide ("latent" — "manifest")*
2. *Ascriptive v. Acquired Cleavages*
3. *Divisibility ("Bargainability" or "Compromisability")*
4. *Ranked v. Unranked Cleavages*
5. *Relative Size/Power of the Groups Involved*
6. *Fractionalization & Polarization (of Cleavages &/or of Cleavage Structure)*
7. *Cross-Cutting v. Reinforcing (Cleavage Structure)*

D. Modernization & Democratic Perf; Key Hypotheses

1. *Modernization ↑ Participation, Govt Stab, & Soc Order*

   a. Education & the "Modern Person" Arg.

   b. Value-Harmonization Arg.

   c. Increasing Density of Interactions (Increasing Interdependence of Individuals in Society) Arg.

2. *Impact of Modernization Depends (is complicated)*

   a. Ratio of Econ Dev't to Social Mobilization Arg.

   b. Economic Dev'p at Time of Democratization Arg.

   c. Pace of Development Arg.

E. Why do some democracies function well & others not?

1. Answer in material so far stresses nature & severity of underlying potential conflicts as expressed in social-structure. This omits other important parts of answer, some of which we will emphasize later. For now, note:

2. *History:* of oppress & repress & of homogeneity or heterogeneity

3. *Institutional Structure:* Checks&Balances, Regional Autonomy, Minority Represent. in Parliament; Functional Rep. of Minorities, Guaranteed Rights in Constitutions

F. Social-Cleavage Patterns & the Party System:

1. Basic notion that party system, *i.e.*, number, sizes, & ideological positioning of parties, reflects somehow underlying social-structure.

   a. May be particularly useful to conceive set of societal groups–their sizes, structure, & positions–as set of potential parties.

   b. But relation from potential to actual parties moderated by:

2. *Institutions operating b/w social structure & party system (most centrally, electoral institutions).*

3. *Party & other elite strategies, & history (loosely, inertia)*