Wks 13b: Comparative Governmental Systems, Part III – Authority Allocation

Lijphart, Ch. 7 (Exec-Leg Balance), (10,12: Fed/Unit, Judic Rvw,) 14 (2D Map of Dem)

I. Taking Stock of Where We Are:

A. Preface

1. Definition of Subject: Developed Democracy
   a. (Liberal) Democracy ⇔ (Capitalist) Econ Development
   b. Effective Democratic Governance: Partic, Stab, Order

2. Intellectual History: Evolution Study Comp Dem Pol
   a. Traditional: Parochial, Legalistic, Configurative Descript
   b. Pol Sociology: Almond & the Parsonian Revolution
      (1) conditions necessary for democracy & dem stability
(2) cleavage structure
   (a) cross-cutting v. reinforcing
   (b) fractionalization & polarization

(3) Political Culture

  c. Pol Institutions:
   (1) Process soc struct, interests (& “cult”) into pol’s & out’s
   (2) Corporatism & Interest Intermediation
   (3) Comparative Parties & Party Systems
   (4) Electoral Systems & Coalition Formation

3. Cycle of Democratic Politics

![Figure I.22: The Cycle of Political Economy](image-url)

- Example Elements at Each Stage:
  - (A) Interests: Sectoral Structure, Income Distribution, Age Distribution, Trade Openness
  - Elections: Electoral Law, Voter Participation
  - Government Formation: Fractionalization, Polarization
  - (B) Representation: Partisanship
  - Policy: Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy, Institutional Adjustment
  - Government Termination: Replacement Risk
  - (C) Outcomes: Unemployment, Inflation, Growth, Sectoral Shift, Debt, Institutional Change

- Non-Governmental Actors
- Exogenous Factors
- Government Termination

Result of Outcomes at T-1

Result of Outcomes at T0

On to T+1

Action at Time T0

(B) Partisan Representation in Government

(C) Political and Economic Outcomes
B. Socio-Economic Development/Structure &...
   1. Democratization & Democratic Stability/Functioning
   2. Party System & (Citizen) Political Behavior

C. Comparative Governmental Systems
   1. Theoretical & Empirical Variation in Political Systems
   2. Alternative Visions Democracy & Pol Sys that Support

D. Electoral Systems & ...
   1. Party Systems & (Partisan) Policymaker Behavior
   2. (Citizen) Political Behavior

E. Party Systems &...
   1. (Partisan) Policymaker Behavior
   2. (Citizen) Political Behavior
F. Political Participation:
   1. Voting: who, how many, how
   2. Interest Groups Extra-electoral Participation

G. Given partisan, elected representatives, operating in strategic environment set by socio-econ struct, electoral & party systems...

H. What governments form from that set of reps elected under those conditions (& related issues):
   1. Non- & Unidimensional Coalition-Formation Models
   2. L&S Multidimensional Coalition-Formation Models
   3. Theories of minority & oversize governments, of portfolio-allocation, and of government durability
I. **Next Question** = how policy-making authority allocates among/across those reps:

The Distribution of Governmental Authority

II. Lijphart, Ch. 7: Executive-Legislative Balance

A. Presidential vs. Parliamentary Government

1. Three Crucial Differences

   a. *Parl*: HoG (PM) resp to/dep on legislative confidence; *Pres*: HoG (Pres) elected for const’ly prescribed period & not under normal circumstances resp/dep to/on legislature

   b. *Pres*: HoG pop’ly elect (usu directly); *Parl*: HoG leg. select

   c. *Parl*: collective exec’s; *Pres*: one-person, non-coll. exec.

      (1) *PM* power can vary pre-eminence to virtual equal cab mins’

      (2) *Pres* cab mins=his/her appoints: advisory, subord role
2. ⇒ Fig 7.1 Executive Classification

a. 35 of 36 purely pres or parl by this definition (although Fra & Isr shift)

b. Switz the exception; exec not dep on legis

c. U.S. pres elect by HoR possibility => shift cat. III

d. Columbia was category V hybrid for a time.

e. II, IV, VI somewhat log’ly contradictory => not surprising no e.g.’s
   a. Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal
   b. Lijphart: Austria, Ice, Ire, & post-‘82 Port presidents weak
   c. France:
      (1) Pres=HoG, but until ‘86 not tested whether effective pow
           rested on position as head of majority parl party (disciplined).
           Since tested: does seem so (see J.Huber’s work, e.g.)
      (2) Pres power seems largely confined to foreign & security pol.
   d. Finland:
      (1) Const’ly similar but weaker than French pres (& ind. elect -‘91)
      (2) Esp. Kekkonen ‘56-‘81 period, strong, esp. foreign/security pol.
      (3) Since ‘91 reform: abolished pres rt to dissolve parl, but also
           made direct elect. => Ambig effect on Strength
e. Short-Lived Israeli System: Pres...
   (1) Directly elected
   (2) Fixed period, *except if Pres & Parl dissolve each other*
   (3) Predominates over cabinet.
   (4) Some arg (e.g., US ‘87 Committee on Const’l Reform) this help overcome or prevent deadlock; Others that ⇒ *incessant elections.*

4. Other Important (but not as universal) Pres-Parl Diff’s
   a. Sep vs. Fused Exec/Legis entail (non-) mem in both? Varies.
   b. Pres & Cabs not right dissolve legis; PMs & Cabs do, but ° to which that right unmitigated (UK) or limited (Germ) varies.
   c. (Non-)Separation HoS from HoG: many exceptions.
B. Degrees of Executive Dominance

1. Legis-Exec Balance not fully determined by Pres-Parl.

2. Presidential Power Sources
   a. Const’l Powers: Reactive (Veto) & Proactive (Decree) [rel’ly stable formally, but effectively varies w/ strategic situation]
   b. Strength & cohesion pres’ party in legis [rel’ly unstable & varies lot w/ strat. sit., esp. w/ divided v. unified & size]
   c. Direct election (& usu. only they have 1 national dist) [rel’ly stable but varies some w/ margin electoral victory].

3. Measuring Degrees of Exec Dominance [Tab 7.1, nxt page]
   a. Lijphart: parl sys well measured by cab dur [BIG PROB’s]
   b. Tweaked for pres & some other peculiarities [more prob’s]
   c. Recall: Do not confuse cab (in)stability w/ policy (in)stability, government (in)efficacy, or regime (in)stability:
(1) Cab pol-mkng position can move more in stable-govt sys
(2) Avg. Tenure of Cab Mins can & often is longer in less durable
govt sys; even more stability of which parties are in govt.
(3) Regime instab seems corr w/ govt inefficacy not govt instability
d. Some issues re: what counts empirically as govt change...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.1</th>
<th>Average cabinet duration according to two criteria (in years), the mean of these two measures, and the index of executive dominance in thirty-six democracies, 1945–96</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average cabinet life I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>16.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3.85</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.94</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>4.74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These values of the index of executive dominance (for the five presidential systems, Switzerland, and five former British colonies) differ from the values of the mean of measures I and II

Source: Based on data in Woldendorp, Kemn, and Budge 1998; Banks, Day, and Muller 1997; Müller and Strøm 1997; Strøm 1990; von Beyme 1985; Keesing’s Contemporary Archives; and data provided by Octavio Amorim Neto
4. Govt Types and Govt Durability [Table 7.2]

a. Reasons to expect pos rel. MW & 1-Prty Govt exec dom
   (1) Same cluster of variables & concepts underlie exec-dom & MW+1-Prty
   (2) Minority cabs by nature more at mercy of parl
   (3) indep of indiv MP behav varies directly w/ cab’s maj

b. [CIRCULARITY PROBLEMS]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of cabinet</th>
<th>Measure I</th>
<th>Measure II</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cabinets</td>
<td>cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>duration (years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal winning, one-party</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minimal winning coalition</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>3.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority, one-party</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority coalition</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversized coalition</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All cabinets</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>3.09</td>
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</table>

Source: Based on data in Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge 1998; Banks, Day, and Muller 1997; Müller and Strøm 1997; Strøm 1990; von Beyme 1985; and Keesing’s Contemporary Archives
5. 1-Party-Maj Govt & Exec Dom [Fig 7.2] [circ probs]

Fig. 7.2 The relationship between type of cabinet and executive dominance in thirty-six democracies, 1945–96

A. Strong Clustering 10-Variables Along 2-Dimensions

1. Executive-Parties Dimension (*Horizontal Concent/Diffuse*)
   a. Effective Number Parliamentary Parties
   b. *Percentage Minimal Winning 1-Party Cabs (core element)*
   c. Executive Dominance (of legislature)
   d. Electoral Disproportionality
   e. Interest-Group Pluralism (as opposed to Corporatism)

2. Federal-Unitary Dimension (*Vertical Concent/Diffuse*)
   a. *Federalism & Decent (core element)* (ch. 10) (DEF)
   b. Symmetric & Incongruent Bicameralism (ch. 11) (DEF)
   c. Constitutional Rigidity (ch. 12...)
   d. Judicial Review (...ch. 12) (DEF)
   e. Central Bank Independence (ch. 13) (DEF)
B. Tables 14.1 & 14.2 show clustering

C. Figures 14.1 & 14.2 show positioning & movement

D. Explanations for patterns/clustering:
   1. Pol heritage & soc pluralism explain much of 1\textsuperscript{st} D
   2. Pop size & soc pluralism explain much of 2\textsuperscript{nd} D
   3. ⇒ perhaps representational dem & federal/decent functional substitutes/complements in redress soc het?

E. Sets stage for last part of book: So What?
   1. Economic & Conflict Management
   2. Quality of Democracy
**Table 14.1** Correlation matrix of the ten variables distinguishing majoritarian from consensus democracy in thirty-six democracies, 1945–96

Variable 1: Effective number of parliamentary parties  
Variable 2: Minimal winning one-party cabinets  
Variable 3: Executive dominance  
Variable 4: Electoral disproportionality  
Variable 5: Interest group pluralism  
Variable 6: Federalism-decentralization  
Variable 7: Bicameralism  
Variable 8: Constitutional rigidity  
Variable 9: Judicial review  
Variable 10: Central bank independence

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<td>[1]</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>[2]</td>
<td>-0.87**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>[3]</td>
<td>-0.71**</td>
<td>0.68**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>[4]</td>
<td>-0.50**</td>
<td>0.57**</td>
<td>0.33*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>[5]</td>
<td>-0.55**</td>
<td>0.68**</td>
<td>0.38*</td>
<td>0.56**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>[6]</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>[7]</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.64**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>[8]</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.54**</td>
<td>0.35*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>[9]</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.48**</td>
<td>0.41**</td>
<td>0.39**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>[10]</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.57**</td>
<td>0.34*</td>
<td>0.42**</td>
<td>0.39**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed test)  
**Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed test)
**Table 14.2** Varimax orthogonal rotated factor matrix of the ten variables distinguishing majoritarian from consensus democracy in thirty-six democracies, 1945–96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor I</th>
<th>Factor II</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective number of parliamentary parties</td>
<td>−0.90</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal winning one-party cabinets</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive dominance</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral disproportionality</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest group pluralism</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism-decentralization</td>
<td>−0.28</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicameralism</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional rigidity</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial review</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central bank independence</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* The factor analysis is a principal components analysis with eigenvalues over 1.0 extracted.
Fig. 14.1  The two-dimensional conceptual map of democracy
Not much interesting in movement; relative stability