PARLIAMENTARY GOVT FORMATION & DISSOLUTION, PT 1: NON- AND UNI-DIMENSIONAL MODELS

I. The Centrality of the “Politics of Coalition”

A. Single-party-majority government relatively rare in democracy, esp. in PR sys

B. Even in parl sys, even those w/ 1-prty leg maj, politics of coalition not abrogated

   1. In comparative history, single-party govts more often minority than majority;
   2. Potential alternative govts (possibly coals) background even if (1-prty) maj now;
   3. Even in dominant-prty sys, politics coalition often w/in prty, among factions (Jap LDP)

C. In pres., day-to-day pol assemble maj for ind pieces leg = repeated play coal pol

D. Once formed, govt continually subject parl’s ability unseat it ⇒ more pol of coal

E. Democratic Policymaking virtually all about forming & maintaining coalitions

II. Two Central Questions Regarding Politics of Coalition:

A. Types Govt that Form [define, as used here]: number of parties, majority status, & party composition, and cabinet-ministry allocation

B. Durability / instability of governments
III. Executive Stability (Powell II, ch. 7)

A. P.II had already established 2 key facts re: executive performance [DEF, as used here]

1. Constitutional factors dominate explanation of executive performance (chs. 2-4):
   a. Presidential systems ⇒ durable, but often minority, governments
   b. Majoritarian Parliamentary systems ⇒ durable, usually majority, governments
   c. Representative Parliamentary systems ⇒ unstable, occasionally minority, governments

2. Strong extremist parties, where present, are the key aspect of Rep. Parl. sys. that ⇒ its negative executive-performance outcomes [this all in ch.5]

B. Govt Formation & Stability Arguments:

1. Parties’ Motivations 2-fold (n.b., prior assumption: prtys=unitary actors [define; discuss])
   a. Desire to participate in & control (current) policymaking (i.e., prtys seek gov’tl office b/c:)
      (1) For both instrumental (policy-seeking, partisan) reasons–parties care what policies made–and
      (2) intrinsic (office-seeking, opportunistic) reasons–parties & party members wish to remain in govt
      (power & perks & ego), which requires voter support, which presumably depends on policies
   b. Parties also motivated by considering ramifications of current actions, including enter or stay out of govt, for future ability to participate (i.e., esp. future electoral ramifications)

2. What sorts of govts [in terms of characteristics from II. above] will form then?
   a. Implies that govts will tend to form that contain...
3. What sorts of governments will form then?
   a. Implies that govts will tend to form that contain...
      (1) As few parties as possible to max cab seats/party for both spoils & influence reasons;
      (2) As little ideological dissent as possible to make policies as close to gov prtys’ ideal as possible;
      (3) Sufficient parliamentary support to pass necessary initiatives [& stay in office].
         (a) Note: As Powell delineates them, last two motivations relate to policy-seeking motivation;
         (b) but, if some gov't members care these things, then others purely office-seeking care too.

b. Goals often conflict, but knowing them often suffice to predict what gov't-types form & endure

4. Evidence on Government Formation: Powell’s 4 Rules
   a. #1: When a single-party majority can form it will
      (1) 23/25 such cases (1965-75) follow the rule
      (2) 2 that not were oversized govts [DEF], formed after strong pre-elect. alliance => surprise maj for 1 ally
      (3) But Oversize & Minority [DEF] govts not so rare, partly explained by...
   b. #2: Coalitions usually formed of ideologically connected [DEF] prtys. [Pics next] [Why?]
      (1) Add connecting prty to o/w sep’d coal ↓ avg ideol distance b/w govt prtys & so may aid compromise
      (2) lessens ° to which separated parties seen (by mems & voters) as deviating from ideals in join coalition
      (3) [parties b/w others in coal. can add leg. support w/o requiring much/any further policy-compromise]
      (4) however, adding any party does require further division of spoils]
   c. #3: Where “Minimum-Winning-Connected-Coalition” Govts possible, they usually form
      (1) [DEF] Minimum-Winning Coalition (concept due to W. Riker)
   d. #4: Min & non-MWCC govts form most often where extremist prty support high (>15%)
Figure 7.1 Single-dimensional view of parties in Finland and Italy: Bases of connected coalitions, 1967–1976.

Finland

Far left  Center  Far right

Communist League

Socialist

Agrarian  Swedish  Liberal  Christian  Conservative  Rural

Connected coalition of 1972–1975

Connected oversize coalition of 1975–1976

Italy

Far left  Center  Far right

Communist

Socialist  Social Democrat  Republican  Christian Democrat  Liberal  Neofascist

Connected coalition of 1973–1974 (very oversize)

a. Only the relative right-to-left placing is determined, not exact positions on the continuum.
5. Legislative Circumstances behind types of Minority Govt
   a. Crisis Caretakers:
      (1) Intense conflict among polarized major players ⇒ passive minority govt as temporary measure
      (2) P. calls these crisis caretakers, but note that others reserve caretaker govt for narrower meaning
   b. Pre-election Minorities:
      (1) Often formed after elect. in sys that usu⇒1-prty-maj fails to do so
      (2) Larger of 2 holds office (typ. assumed temporarily) while new elects prep’d, which assumed will fix.
      (3) If not, minority govt will typically try to serve w/ outside support.
   c. Active Minority Govt:
      (1) Minority party or coalition secures some outside support from other legislative groups
      (2) Vary in formality (tacit to written, detailed agreements) & fixity (same outside support always to potentially different set of support for each law [which, notice, sim. to pres. sys.])

6. Typical Government Duration by Government Type:
   a. Expectations:
      (1) 1-prty-maj most durable, then minimum-winning-connected
      (2) Over-sized & unconnected govts should be less durable
      (3) Minority govts among least durable; and among these:
         (a) caretakers least durable,
         (b) pre-election bit more durable,
         (c) & externally-supported most durable
b. Evidence:

(1) **SP MajG most** durable, MWCC not much less, externally-supp Min can be reasonably dur., all others less, esp. crisis caretakers

(2) But perhaps surprisingly: oversized coals least stable of bunch

c. Figure 7.2 sums P’s findings & conclusions: strong extremist presence again key
C. Comparing Presidential & Parliamentary Governments (Powell II)

1. Presidential systems all have durable executives relatively independent of party system or political & social environment, but executive often lacks legislative maj (dividea govt common to pres. sys., not unique to US)

2. Presidential systems associated w/ weaker parties (less unitary, disciplined; again, not just in U.S.), perhaps partly b/c party can vote against exec w/o risk dissolution

3. Weak party discipline also part of what makes executive remaining in power w/o a legislative majority workably functional

4. At same time, it means presidents do not enjoy anything like degree of legislative, governmental control that PM’s do

5. If anything, separated powers work to require more complex negotiations b/w exec’s & legis.’s, esp. since the two branches usually have different electoral constituencies (Pres=ntnl, Legis=sub-ntnl)
IV. Lijphart, Ch.6: Concentration vs Sharing Executive Power

A. Core of Majoritarian vs Consensus:
   1. 1-prty-maj vs multi-prty-coalition; or, more more detailed ranking on conc/diff exec power: 1-Prty-Maj—Multi-Prty MWC/1-Prty-Min—Multi-Prty Oversize/Minority

B. Coalition Theories:
   1. If 1-prty maj possible, usu forms.
      a. Base Assumption: parties max power [& perks], cab=pow [&p], ⇒ as many cab seats poss
      b. ⇒Only include prtys strictly nec to install & maintain govt [no surplus parties]
   3. Minimum-Size Coalitions: extend MWC⇒smallest poss majority
   4. Minimum-Parties Coalitions (Leierson ‘70): Fewest parties possible to MWC ⇒ ↓ bargaining & negotiation costs form & maintain coalition
   5. Minimal Ideological-Range Coalitions (deSwaan ‘73): ease form & maintain coal’s of prtys w/ similar pref’s. Several versions:
      a. Maj coal’s w/ smallest L-R distance to obtain its majority (GLM use: ordinal version)
      b. Maj coal’s w/ smallest L-R distance of possible majorities (L uses: cardinal version)
      c. Could also vary whether MWC logic also applied: i.e., if all parties nec. or surplus allowed.
6. **Minimum Connected Coalitions that Win** (Axelrod ‘70):

   a. A’s arg: Parties add partners to assemble majority, starting w/ closest ideological neighbors b/c easiest search & negotiate, continue until majority.

   b. Another Arg: Adding connecting prty to o/w separated coal lowers avg ideol distance b/w govt prty & thereby perhaps facilitates compromise.

   c. Additional logics to connected coal’s from Powell & me above:
      
      (1) Lessens ° to which separated parties seen (by mems & voters) as deviate from ideals in join coalition.

      (2) [parties b/w others in coal. can add leg. support w/o requiring much/any further policy-compromise].

   d. Could apply ordinal or cardinal version here also.

7. **Policy-Viable Coalitions** (Laver & Schofield ‘90):

   a. If solely policy-motivated, & policy requires legis majority, then govt’l membership & majority irrelevant, just party pivotal-ness in legislative bargaining ⇒

      (1) ‘Core-Prty’ Govt: core≈assuming sincere voting, cannot assemble majority w/o; e.g., in 1D, =median, so ⇒ Median-Party Govt.

      (2) If add other reasons parties want be in govt, e.g., office-seeking or agenda-power, then ⇒ MWC’s containing median parties.

8. Note what need to know to apply these theories:

   a. MWC, Min Seats, Min Parties = zero-dimensional, just leg seats dist across parties.

   b. Rest need also parties’ L-R on one-dimension (some only ordinally).

9. Apply these Theories in Table 6.1:
### Table 6.1 Cabinet coalitions predicted by six coalition theories for a hypothetical distribution of parliamentary seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties:</th>
<th>A (Left)</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E (Right)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seats:</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>33</td>
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<td>Theories:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal winning coalition</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>ADE</td>
<td>BCD</td>
<td>BE</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum size</td>
<td></td>
<td>ADE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bargaining proposition</td>
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<td></td>
<td>BE</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal range</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>BCD</td>
<td></td>
<td>CE</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Minimal connected winning</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>BCD</td>
<td></td>
<td>CDE</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy-viable coalition</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>BCD</td>
<td></td>
<td>CE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Count Seats; determine majority “magic number”: 100 here, so 51.
2. That suffices for MWC, MinSize (Min Seats), BargProp. (Min Prtys): Find all possible subsets >50 seats.
3. Array Parties & assemble coalitions for rest.
C. **Empirical Prob**: most (all but Axelrod, 1 version of MinRange, & Core-Party) = MWC; all but Core-Party Govt = maj, but oversize & minority govts not at all rare [Tab 6.2]. *Explanations? Why Minority Govt? Why Oversize Govt?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of cabinet</th>
<th>All cabinets (%)</th>
<th>All cabinets except minimal winning, one-party cabinets (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimal winning, one-party</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Minimal winning coalition</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>39.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minority, one-party</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minority coalition</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversized coalition</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Based on data in Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge 1998; Banks, Day, and Muller 1997; Müller and Strøm 1997; Strøm 1990; von Beyme 1985; and Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*
1. **Why Minority Govt?** Parties time-perspective: Stay out for now to gain some future electoral advantage? [More ideas below, & to come in GLM.]

2. **Why Oversize Government?**
   a. Insurance against defection (uncertain & uncommitted allies) [explain];
   b. Policy-based theories predict occasional oversize (not enough) [when? explain];
   c. Grand coalitions as unity signal re: foreign (& sometimes other) threats.

3. But these still basically majoritarian, need a real *theory minority government*
   a. Lack of a vote investiture may preserve minority;
   b. Constructive vote no confidence (in Germany, or sim majority against req in France) may preserve minority (as well as foster maj)
   c. Committee strength and other sources opposition influence may reduce (increase) relative policy-seeking appeal (dissatisfaction) of being in (out) of govt

4. Likewise, need better *theory oversize government*
   a. Constitutional revisions may require >50% majorities; Some agendas may require >50% maj
   b. [n.b., these not truly oversize then.]

5. N.b., some similarity min & surp govt, esp. in optional & flexible nature govt support.

D. Presidential Cabinets: [L offers just two notes]

1. Re: keeping office, pres& cab always MWC 1-prty maj; Re: passing agenda, may best seen as Min, MWC, or oversize (flex), depending on pres’s position in leg chamber(s).
V. Building & Maintaining (Parl.) Govt (GLM ch.12)

A. GLM’s version of the 2 Central Questions:

1. Govt Composition & Cabinet-ministry Allocation;
2. Govt Durability

B. The Party Composition of Governments

1. [Always recall that...] elects still paramount in that determine actual & expected legis wt of prty actors in govt-formation drama.

2. Politicians motivated by some combo (a) “fame & power” (opportunistic/office-seeking) & (b) desire influence pub pol (policy/outcome-seeking), & these diff implic’s in govt form
   a. Pure office-seeking ⇒ min-win logic: don’t share seats further than must ⇒ oversized govt a puzzle
   b. Pure policy-seeking ⇒ parties’ ideological/preference-compatibility ⇒ core- (median-) party govt
   c. Combination of these motivations may suggest:
      (1) Minimum-winning-connected (Axelrod)
      (2) Minimum-ideological-range-winning (de Swaan)
      (3) [Etc., as just reviewed from Lijphart, & mostly in Powell II as well]
C. Minority (\& oversize) governments not rare, so coalition theory should explain them too; all such theories rely on parties’ policy motives

1. **Minority Governments, Hypotheses:**

a. Strom, **Opposition Influence:** as ability parties influence pol from opp ↑, freq min govt ↑ [Fig (mine): data strongly supports—Opp Influ measure used here is Laver & Hunt, not Strom, btw]

\[ \text{%MinorityGovernment} = -0.337 + 0.135(\text{OppositionInfluence}) \]
\[ \text{correlation} = 0.774 \ ; \ Number \ of \ Observations = 18 \]

b. Luebbert, **Extra-Parliamentary Influence:** ↑ role int.grps \& orgs outside parl (esp. corporatist-type policymaking) ↓ necessity of being in govt to influ pol, so should ↑ minority govts: might explain Scand, but Germany, Austria, \& Italy? Need multivariate analysis to consider this...

c. Laver \& Shepsle, **Divided Opposition:** ↑ pol divisions among opp ⇒ ↓ ability to form alt govt, which should enable min-govt form—esp. centrist govts [we’ll see this arg closer later...]
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Majoritarian</th>
<th>Corporatism</th>
<th>Opp Infl</th>
<th>% Min Gains</th>
<th>SPMa</th>
<th>MWC</th>
<th>SurpMaC</th>
<th>SPMi</th>
<th>MiC</th>
<th>Caretaker</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

Regression Output:

| Constant | 0.341111 | Std Err of Y Est | 0.2288675 | Correlation | 0.57264194 | R Squared | 0.3279186 | 0.1655288 | 0.0158071 |
| Degrees of Freedom | 18 | 16 | 15 |

| X Coefficient(s) | -0.308722 | Std Err of Coef. | 0.110511 | t-statistic | -2.794038 |
| Degrees of Freedom | 16 |

Regression Output:

| Constant | 0.003028 | Std Err of Y Est | 0.213252 | Correlation | 0.64418093 | R Squared | 0.4149681 | 0.1723685 | 0.6555613 |
| Degrees of Freedom | 18 | 16 | 14 |

| X Coefficient(s) | 0.4756474 | Std Err of Coef. | 0.1411909 | t-statistic | 3.3688249 |
| Degrees of Freedom | 16 |

Regression Output:

| Constant | -0.337041 | Std Err of Y Est | 0.1768402 | Correlation | 0.5986052 | R Squared | 0.7369561 |
| Degrees of Freedom | 16 |

| X Coefficient(s) | 0.1350178 | Std Err of Coef. | 0.0276406 | t-statistic | 4.8847729 |
2. **Oversized Governments, Hypotheses:**

   a. *Govts of national unity*: several observed oversized govts occur immed postwar, only occas. after & then usu. short-lived & arise in some context of “crisis”

   b. *Policy agenda may require super-majority* in some situations (Belg. notable) ⇒ not all seeming oversized govts actually “surplus”

   c. L & S, *parties in govt, holding ministries, sends signals re: govt policy*: extra parties may be included for signals they send [to whom?] about govt’s policy stance [we’ll see this up close later]

   d. Luebbert, *dominant-party interest in oversize coalitions*: dominant party(s) in coal may want surplus minor parties so no one smaller-party ally has veto [some Italian govts may exemplify]

   e. *Insurance for Weak Party Discipline*: Surpluses in Italy, e.g., may have addressed need of extra “insurance” support

   f. *Intermediate Parties Low Cost Surplus Support*: surplus govts maybe esp. likely when MWC bridges smaller intermed party b/c little further policy-compromise necessary to ↑ legis strength of govt. May add to Luebbert’s & our insurance arguments in particular.

3. [Some **more examples of government formation**, using the coalition theories already outlined in the Lijphart section of these notes.]
a. Figure 12-1: Ireland after January 1993 elect (MWC)

Promote raising taxes to increase public services

Party policy on taxation

Promote cutting public services to cut taxes

Seats

DL  4
Lab  33
FF  68
FG  45
PD  10

Possible winning coalitions: threshold 83 seats (seat totals in parentheses)

Minimal winning
Lab-FF (101)
Lab-FG-PD (88)
FF-FG (113)

Minimal connected winning
Lab-FF (101)
FF-FG (113)

Actual government
Lab-FF (101)

Coalition possibilities in Ireland, January 1993
b. Figure 12-2: Sweden after Oct. 1991 elect (minority coal)
c. Figure 12-3: Italy after July 1987 elect (surplus majority)
D. The Allocation of Cabinet Portfolios

1. Cabinet govt:
   a. Cab serves as cntrl decision-making committee: by time bills referred from cab. to parl. for full-parl votes, ≈ done deal. In fact, many decisions do not require direct legislative assent.
   b. Vote confidence theoretically gives parl control cab, & ultimately it does, but only if parl willing risk govt collapse over issue ⇒ much latitude to cab mems, esp. w/in dept competence (L&S)
   c. Two Questions:
      (1) How many seats to each party?
      (2) Which portfolios to which parties? [This Central in L&S Model to Come]

2. How many seats allocated to each party?
   a. Proportional to parties’ shares of govts’ legis. maj. (Gamson’s Law): 90% of variation in party share of cab seats explained by party share of govts’s legis. maj. (e.g., Govt has 40 seats in parl, party Y has 10 ⇒ party Y gets 1/4 of cab. seats).
   b. Among strongest relationships in pol sci, even though not constitutional requirement anywhere
   c. Notably, deviations not consistently favor proposer (formateur, PM or lrgst prty).
   d. See Figures next (from Yoshi Ono’s UMich dissertation)
(a) Prime ministerial parties

(b) Junior coalition parties
3. **Which seats to which parties?**

a. **Centrism:** Tendency median party each policy Dim w/ a cabinet ministry to get that portfolio

b. **Salience:** Tendency for parties most centrally interested in a policy Dim to get assoc’d portfolio

c. Why? Cab Mins=agenda-setters in their pol area & have considerable latitude in pol-mkng: ⇒
   (1) Who gets what portfolio central to govt pol position & likely pol outputs [L&S]
   (2) Cabinet *reshuffles* more important than often realized
   (3) Ideological positions of cab mins perhaps only credible signals govt’s policy stance in that policy area
   (4) Power shifts w/in parties can fundamentally affect relations b/w them

**E. The Stability of Parliamentary Governments**

1. What exactly counts as Change, Start, End of Govt not universally agreed. Issues:
   a. Agreed that $\Delta$ partisan composition cab is $\Delta$ in govt & that $\Delta$ PM is $\Delta$ of govt.
   b. Not quite all agree that every govt forming after election is $\Delta$ in govt even if same as before
   c. Nor do all agree that govt resigns & then reformed w/ same PM & prty make-up = new govt
   d. Such ambig cases not so common that makes much diff. It matters some, but can proceed...
2. Explaining Duration: Three sets of factors

a. Features of Government Itself
   
   (1) Number of parties in the government (fractionalization)
   
   (2) Ideological distance b/w parties in govt (polarization)
   
   (3) Majority/Minority status of government

b. Features of the Political Environment
   
   (1) Party System Frac. & Polar.: Larger, more diverse party systems ↓ govt duration because smaller shocks can change what coalition is an equilibrium
   
   (2) Other factors? [Powell: extremist party support – i.e., party systems with fatter-tailed distributions of seats or votes, i.e., systems with support-weight less concentrated at center.]

c. Shocks, events, & external circumstances [journalistic accounts invariably focus on these] (see also Warwick’s pioneering work on the question, e.g.)
   
   (1) Worsening economic conditions, esp. unemployment
   
   (a) Unemp especially bad for ctr-right? Infl esp’ly bad for socialist-led? Or v.v.?
   
   (2) Scandals & the like [but hard devise systematic theory of these].

d. [Note difference b/w journalism & history versus social, e.g., political, science:

   (1) Pol sci less interested specific circumstances & events that collapse specific govts, but systematic features which make govts more/less stable in general.
   
   (2) Analogy: not interest in what particular spark caused some specific fire (arson investigator) but what conditions make fires more likely (actuary?).]

F. Evidence: from King, Alt, Burns, & Laver
Table 1. Reference Models of Coalition Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model:</th>
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<th>1.4</th>
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<td>(elect. supp. Δ in prev. elect.)</td>
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<td>(prop. to left or right, whichever larger, in parl.)</td>
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Note: All estimates are based on 314 observations. Estimated standard errors appear under each coefficient in parentheses. Data were provided by Kaare Strom and are described in the text and i
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<td>(eff. # parties parl.)</td>
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<td>(# attempts to form)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
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<td>(1 if inter-govt caretaker; 0 = else)</td>
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<td>(0.616)</td>
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<td>-1025</td>
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<td>Log-likelihood with country identities added</td>
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<td>-1024</td>
<td>-1012</td>
<td>-993</td>
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<td>(p = 0.01)</td>
<td>(p = 0.01)</td>
<td>(p = 0.12)</td>
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*Note: All estimates are based on 314 observations. Estimated standard errors appear under each coefficient in parentheses. The probabilities under the "log-likelihood with country identities added" test the statistical significance of adding the country variables to each model. The probabilities derive...*
MORE EXAMPLES: Non- and Uni-Dimensional Coalition-Formation Concepts

Minimal Winning Coalition (MWC): coalition whose member parties control parliamentary majority & which contains no party unnecessary to do so; *i.e.*, coalition obtaining majority w/o any *surplus* parties. Need not be minimum-connected winning coalition or minimum-ideological-range winning coalition.

Minimum-Connected Coalition (that wins) (MCC) (ordinal): coal whose members ideologically adjacent, w/o ideol’y intervening parties outside coal, & which contains no subset of parties sufficient for maj. Need not be MWC, but will be MIRC.

Minimum-Ideological-Range Coalition (that wins) (MIRC): a coalition whose mems obtain majority w/o containing any other majority within its left-to-right span. *I.e.*, coalition that spans no more ideological space, left-to-right, than necessary for maj. Need be neither MWC nor MCC.

**Single-Dimensional Coalition-Formation Concepts:**

**Example:** Hypothetical Germany w/ parties & seat-shares arrayed left-to-right thus:

PDS — Greens — SPD — A — B — FDP — CDU/CSU — R

1.4% — 7.0% — 44.5%—2.0%—1.0%— 6.4% — 36.62% — 1%

**Minimum Winning Coalitions (MWC):** (Riker)

- Greens + SPD (also *MCC* & *MIRC*)
- SPD + FDP (not *MCC* but *MIRC*)
- SPD + CDU (neither *MCC* nor *MIRC*)
- CDU/CSU + FDP + Greens (neither *MCC* nor *MIRC*)

Dummy Parties: PDS, A, B, R

**Minimum Connected Coalitions that Win (MCC):** (Axelrod)

- Greens—SPD (also *MWC* & *MIRC*)
- SPD—A—B—FDP (not *MWC* but *MIRC*)

Dummy Parties: PDS, R

**Minimum Ideological Range Coalitions that Win (MIRC):** (de Swaan)

- Greens—SPD (also *MWC* & *MCC*)
- SPD—FDP (also *MWC* but not *MCC*)
- SPD—A—FDP (neither *MWC* nor *MCC*)
- SPD—B—FDP (neither *MWC* nor *MCC*)
- SPD—A—B—FDP (not *MWC* but *MCC*)

Dummy Parties: PDS, R
Examples from German Parls (Bundestagen) Elect 1994 & 1998

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<th>PARTY</th>
<th>LR/IDEOL.</th>
<th>SEATS</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>3.3025</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>4.055</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>6.605</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>11.26</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>13.975</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>669</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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<th>PARTY</th>
<th>LR/IDEOL.</th>
<th>SEATS</th>
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<td>SPD</td>
<td>3.3025</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>669</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minimum Winning Coalitions (Need 337):

- CDU/CSU + FDP: 341 seats, 50.74%
- SPD + Greens: 341 seats, 50.74%
- SPD + CDU/CSU: 341 seats, 50.74%

Minimum-Connected Winning (Need 337):

- CDU/CSU + FDP: 341 seats, 51.79%
- SPD + Greens: 341 seats, 51.79%

Minimum Ideological Range Winning (Need 337):

- SPD + Greens: 341 seats, 51.79%
- SPD + FDP: 341 seats, 51.79%

Notes:
- Both of the minimum-connected winning coalitions are also minimum winning coalitions in this case.
- In 1994: Greens + PDS + SPD + FDP would be minimum connected winning but not both MWC and MCW.
- In 1998: Greens + FDP + SPD would be minimum connected winning but not both MWC and MCW.

Minimum Ideological Range Winning (Need 337):

- SPD + Greens: 341 seats, 51.79%
- SPD + CDU/CSU: 341 seats, 51.79%
- SPD + FDP: 341 seats, 51.79%

Notes:
- It is possible to construct examples where the minimum ideological range winning coalitions are not minimum winning coalitions.

The following are not Minimum Ideological Range Winning Coalitions because they span one or the other coalitions above, but it may nonetheless be informative to note that these two minimum winning coalitions span greater ideological range than the above two:

- SPD + Greens: 341 seats, 51.79%
- SPD + CDU/CSU: 341 seats, 51.79%
- SPD + FDP: 341 seats, 51.79%

The only necessary logical connection is that all minimum connected winning are also minimum ideological range winning. The opposite is not true. E.g., imagine 2 new parties, A&B, between SPD&Greens in 1998. Also imagine FDS and its 5.4% of the seats split among A&B.

Then the following coalitions are minimum ideological range winning:

- SPD + Greens
- SPD + B + Greens
- SPD + A + Greens
- SPD + A + B + Greens

Of these 4, only SPD + Greens is minimum winning, and only SPD + A + B + Greens is minimum connected winning, but it is still impossible to draw any minimum connected winning coalitions that is not also minimum ideological range winning.
Some Tools we Need for L&S: What’s a “game tree”?

The Prisoners' Dilemma

- Confess (10 years, 10 years)
- Stay Silent (free, 15 years)
- Confess (15 years, free)
- Stay Silent (5 years, 5 years)

- Prisoner One
- Prisoner Two
How do we model actors’ preferences & decisions?

Indifference Curves for (Simple) Euclidean Preferences

- Foreign Policy
- Economic Policy