

# Comparative Politics of Developed Democracies

## INTRODUCTION (Part 1)

- I. Start by **define subject matter**: What is a “Developed Democracy”?
  - A. **LNN**: “Although elections & democracy not synonymous concepts, existence of free, competitive elections invariably considered one of the critical features that define a nation as ‘democratic’ (Inkeles 1991; Beetham 1994)” (p. 4)
  - B. **Powell II**:
    1. “working political democracies[:] Citizens...able to organize & vote in competitive elections[, and] the national political leaders are held accountable to their citizens through electoral means” (p. 1).

2. “‘democracy’ [... :] political systems where representative leaders chosen through competitive elections. Competitive electoral context, w/ several political parties organizing the alternatives that face voters, is identifying property of contemporary democratic process. ...competitive elections...most citizens eligible to participate”
3. Case-selection criteria (p. 3):
  - a. Legitimacy of government rests on claim to represent desires of its citizens [Monte Python: “Arthur, King of the Britons.” “Well I didn’t vote for you.” “King, eh? How’d you get that, eh?” “Supreme executive power derives from a mandate from the masses...”] [See next...]
  - b. Organized relationship that regulates this bargain of legitimacy is the competitive political election. Leaders elected at regular intervals, & voters choose among alternative candidates. In practice 2+ parties with a chance of winning is minimal
  - c. Most adults can participate in the electoral process, both as voters & as candidates for important political office
  - d. Citizens’ votes are secret & not coerced
  - e. Citizens & leaders enjoy basic freedoms of speech, press, assembly, & organization
4. “Although definitionally possible to have a democratic context in which power did not change hands (because of continuing support of the incumbents by a majority of citizens [*e.g.*, Japan, Switzerland, Italy, Sweden for long periods]), such power changes seem a clear indication of importance of competitive elections” (p. 6).

## Who Made You King?

A scene from the comedy feature film "Monty Python and the Quest for the Holy Grail"

SCENE 3: JUST BECAUSE SOME WATERY TART...

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Characters:

Peasants: As in 1 and 2, for the first bit.

Arthur: King of the Britons.

Dennis: ...the political thinker...

Woman: ...and the woman who's working in the fields with him at the time.

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[Plays the usual fanfare music we all know and love...]

Arthur: Old woman!

Dennis: Man!

Arthur: Man, sorry... What knight lives in that castle over there?

Dennis: I'm 37!

Arthur: What?

Dennis: I'm 37, I'm not old!

Arthur: Well I can't just call you "Man"...

Dennis: You could say "Dennis"...

Arthur: I didn't know you were called Dennis.

Dennis: Well you didn't bother to find out, did you?

Arthur: I did say sorry about the old woman, but from behind you

looked...

Dennis: (interrupting) What I object to is your automatically treatin' me like an inferior!

Arthur: Well I AM king...

Dennis: Oh, King, eh? Oh, very nice... And how'd you get that, eh? By exploiting the workers! By hanging on to outdated imperialist dogma which perpetuates the economic and social differences in our society! If there's ever gonna be any progress in our society...

Woman: Denny, there's some lovely filth down here!

[Noticing Arthur] Oh! How d'you do?

Arthur: How do you do, good lady. I am Arthur, King of the Britons. Whose castle is that?

Woman: King of the who?

Arthur: The Britons.

Woman: Who are the Britons?

Arthur: Well we all are... We are all Britons... And I am your king.

Woman: I didn't know we had a king... I thought we were an autonomous collective.

Dennis: You're foolin' yourself. We're livin' in a dictatorship! A self-perpetuating autocracy in which the working classes...

Woman: (interrupting) Oh there you go, bringing class into it again...

Dennis: That's what it's all about! If only people would...

Arthur: Please, please, good people, I am in haste. Who lives in that castle?

Woman: No one lives there.

Arthur: Then who is your lord?

Woman: We don't have a lord.

Arthur: What?

Dennis: I told you. We're an anarcho-syndicalist commune. We take it in turns to sort of act as a sort of executive officer for the week.

Arthur: Yes.

Dennis: But all the decisions of that officer have to be ratified at a special bi-weekly meeting...

Arthur: Yes I see.

Dennis: ...by a simple majority in the case of purely internal affairs...

Arthur: Be quiet!

Dennis: But by a two-thirds majority in the case of more major...

Arthur: Be quiet! I order you to be quiet!

Woman: Order, eh? Who does he think he is?

Arthur: I am your king!

Woman: Well I didn't vote for you!

Arthur: You don't vote for kings.

Woman: Well how'd you become king then?

[Angelic music plays...]

Arthur: The Lady of the Lake, her arm clad in the purest shimmering samite held aloft Excalibur from the bosom of the water, signifying by divine providence that I, Arthur, was to carry Excalibur. THAT is why I am your king!

**Dennis: (interrupting) Listen, strange women lyin' about in ponds distributin' swords is no basis for a system of government! Supreme executive power derives from a mandate from the masses, not from some farcical aquatic**

**ceremony!**

Arthur: Be quiet!

Dennis: Oh but you can't expect to wield supreme executive power just because some watery tart threw a sword at you!

Arthur: SHUT UP!

Dennis: Oh but if I went 'round sayin' I was Emperor, just because some moistened bink lobbed a scimitar at me, they'd put me away!

Arthur: SHUT UP! WILL YOU SHUT UP! [Grabs Dennis]

Dennis: Ah! Now we see the violence inherent in the system!

Arthur: SHUT UP!

Dennis: Oh, come and see the violence inherent in the system! Help! Help! I'm being repressed!

Arthur: (muttering) Bloody peasant!

Dennis: Oh, what a giveaway! Did you hear that? Did you hear that, eh? That's what I'm on about! Did you see him repressin' me? You saw it, didn't you?

(END OF SCENE)

[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Xd\\_zkMEgkI&feature=related](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Xd_zkMEgkI&feature=related)

### C. Lane & Ersson:

1. “[Western] Democracies[:]. . . legitimate operation of democratic political institutions within state structures that involve big government” (p. 10).
2. “A liberal democratic political order is combined with a welfare state & a mixed economy. The public sector plays a major role in the economy of the Western countries, allocating & redistributing resources by means of various institutions at different levels of government” (p. 10)
3. “open competition between political parties for the allegiance of the voter in free elections recruiting a legislative assembly that shares the exercise of power with government institutions in a national setting” (p. 10).

### D. Powell:

1. *Democracies: governments* in which the people participate in *policymaking* (pp. 3-4)
  - a. With many people, democracy nec’y *indirect*: choose policymakers in competitive elections
  - b. *Elections* are instruments of democracy to degree give people influence over pol-makers
  - c. Elections not only, but universally seen as crucial instrument, compel or encourage p-m’s to pay attention to citizens.
2. Two Views (each normative & positive): *Majoritarian v. Proportional* Visions


## E. Lijphart:

1. *Democracy*: government for and by the people (Daniel Webster, 1830) (pp. 1-3).  
But, what if the people disagree & have divergent preferences?
  - a. The *majority* of people.
  - b. As many people as possible, [*proportionally*].
2. Many ways to organize democracy, but cluster around *Majoritarian v. Consensus*. In that distinction, two dimensions discernable:
  - a. *Executive-Legislative Dimension* [horizontal concentration/diffusion, within national govt]
  - b. *Federal-Unitary Dimension* [vertical concentration/diffusion, across levels of govt]

## F. Why do we choose to study *developed democracies* together and distinctly from ‘developing democracies’ and ‘non-democracies’?

1. Theories assume relatively “liberal democracy” & “free-market capitalism” no longer part of but rather the general boundaries within which citizens and leaders (actors of our models) conduct day-to-day politics
2. Empirics: something distinct *re* these countries & related about dem&dev

## The Relationship Between the Degree of Democracy and of Economic Development



G. [Hypothesize...] [How recognize a positive theory?]

## II. Notable Trends, Events, & Topics (Brief Socio-Politico-Economic Historiographies from Introductory Chapters...)

### A. Lane & Ersson: “A Changing Scenario”

#### 1. “1950-65: End of Ideology, & Apathy” (pp. 1-2)

##### a. Attributed causes of perceived decline in conflict

- (1) Seen disappearing/reduced ideological conflict, ↑ harmony of views
- (2) Seen very effective welfare society succeeding in providing security & thus reduced divisive consequences of socio-economic cleavages

##### b. The west was certainly thriving in this period

- (1) strong economic growth
- (2) stable law & order
- (3) legitimacy of established political institutions not questioned
  - (a) either evolutionary result of long process toward peaceful & prosperous democratic society
  - (b) or result of recent (re-)establishment of same, hard-won by war

#### 2. “1965-80: Rejection of Political Authority” (pp. 2-6)

##### a. ↑ citizen activism in 60s turned scholars toward participation

- (1) demands (regional) institutional autonomy in UK, Belgium, Spain
- (2) demands for increased decentralization in Sweden, France, Germany

##### b. Affluence:

- (1) Seen rising affluence as increasingly diminishing intensity of socio-economic cleavages relative ‘new’ post-materialist (Inglehart) issues.
- (2) Others noted that affluence itself can exacerbate economic cleavages through the perception of relative deprivation (Stouffer, Gurr).

##### c. Economic Hardship (Rising Inflation, then OPEC I (1973-4) & OPEC II (1979-80) & the responses thereto) & Increasing Dissatisfaction with Government

- (1) Corporatism: tri-partite bargaining over (particularly) macroeconomic management b/w organizations of labor, business, & government (Berger, Lehmbruch, Schmitter)
- (2) New/re-emerging parties & movements (Greens, radical left & right) & protest parties

##### d. Perceived Upshot (*caveat* not to exagg. change or continuity):

- (1) changing voter alignments & behavior
- (2) changing party systems, patterns of support, & behavior
- (3) previous consensuses now questioned
  - (a) legitimacy of govt—though legit. always rel’y strong in dev’d dem’s
  - (b) efficiency of the Welfare State
  - (c) social disorder becomes less an extreme rarity if still not exactly common



3. “1980-90: Crisis of the Welfare State & Communism”
  - a. Slower growth, higher unemploy., more variant if not higher infl
    - (1) certainty & optimism of Keynesian macroecon. management gone
    - (2) New Ideas: monetarism, supply-side economics, the “Rational-Expectations revolution” all (to varying degrees) reject policy effectiveness of macroeconomic management
  - b. immigration & refugees—new issue for many of these homogenous societies: consider Ireland, Italy, France, Germany
  - c. Continued (for a time) growth of govt, but economic slowdown produces huge deficit & debt issues in many countries—perceived *Crises of the Welfare State*
4. “1990s: Integration, Unemployment, & Immigration”
  - a. The European Community (<http://europa.eu>)
    - (1) ECSC—France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Nether., Luxem. (1950)
    - (2) EC: Treaty of Rome 1957 (same 6); EFTA 1960—Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, UK
  - b. Grows over time:
    - (1) membership additions:
      - (a) UK, Ireland, & Denmark (1973) ==> 9
      - (b) Greece (1981) ==> 10
      - (c) Portugal & Spain (1986) ==> 12
      - (d) Austria, Finland & Sweden (1995) ==> 15
      - (e) (2004) Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia ==> 25
      - (f) Bulgaria & Romania ==> 27
    - (2) scope:
      - (a) ECSC weak, loose, protectionist agreement on coal & steel quotas, stds, etc.; a very tentative first step, designed join France & Germany post-WWII
      - (b) Treaty of Rome: more general trade-agreement, supposed internal free trade & common external trade policy, Common Agricultural Program
      - (c) EurCurrUnion & the snake (exchange-rate convention) 1973
      - (d) VAT harmonization 1977
      - (e) E.C.U. & the ERM: 1979
      - (f) The Delors Programme 1985
      - (g) Maastricht 1993
      - (h) Euro 1999 (11, then 12 countries), Circulation Currency 2002, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia (==> 16 Euro countries)
      - (i) Nice: signed 2001, in force 2003
      - (j) Constitution 2004: ratification falters
  - c. High unemployment remains, slow growth, fiscal crisis; democracy is stronger than ever, but its form—especially its national locus—is more open to question

## B. LeDuc, Niemi, & Norris:

1. Three Waves of Democratization: late 19<sup>th</sup> to early 20<sup>th</sup> C; post-WWII, & 1990s
2. Recent Democratizations
  - a. “Triple transformation” in E. Eur.–party systems, constitutional struct’s, & econ systems
  - b. Collapse of last authoritarian regimes in West Europe: Greece, Portugal, & Spain
  - c. End of Apartheid in South Africa
  - d. growth and/or re-establishment of democracy in Latin America & Southeast Asia
3. N.b. these waves are not unidirectional ==> democracy is not secure or “established” once initially instituted
4. Major Changes in Established Democracies also
  - a. party systems—traditional patterns conflict changing (Mair, ch. 3)
  - b. attitudes & voting behavior of citizens (Dalton, ch. 13)
  - c. rise of cynicism & “legitimacy crises”
  - d. even changes in foundations of representative institutions in some (N.Z., Italy, Japan)
  - e. Again, though, should not exaggerate these changes:
    - (1) Generally changes w/in systemic confines rel’y liberal, rel’y free-market democratic capitalism
    - (2) And not all new & re-emerging democracies are not “established” yet
5. N.b. These last changes (B.4.) plus the experience of Eastern

Europe draws our attention to the electoral system as a manipulable or even engineer-able variable

## C. Powell II:

1. Electoral participation is relatively consistent within nations over time, but US is exceptional in having seen considerable decline between late 60s to 80s
2. Important incidents of breakdown of democratic order, even into violence:
  - a. Northern Ireland (U.K.)—violence flares in late 60s
    - (1) Catholic minority in mostly Protestant Ulster region of mostly Catholic island
    - (2) Catholic minority demands greater political equal & economic advance; draws our attention to reinforcing cleavages
  - b. U.S.—race riots in late 60s through 70s—again draws attention to disruptive potential of reinforcing cleavages
  - c. Various other occasionally violent problem areas
    - (1) Ireland—I.R.A. actions supporting Irish intervention
    - (2) Germany—far-left Bader-Meinhof in late 60s, far right against immigrants in the 90s
    - (3) Canada—periodic separatist turmoil; some native Canadian standoffs
    - (4) France—student riots in late 60s (eventually commingled with other issues, esp. Algeria, brings down regime), massive strikes common
    - (5) Spain—separatist struggles: Basque & Catalan
    - (6) Belgium—Fleming & Walloon—language, religion, & class

### III. **POWELL II (Chapters 1 & 2)** [Recall: Powell II, for us, is 1982]

#### A. Working Political Democracies

1. Definition (I.B.1, +selection criteria, I.B.3)
2. Some Work “Well”
  - a. Participate *via* elections
  - b. Stable governments
  - c. Discontent expressed through democratic competition & not violent conflict
3. Some Work “Less Well”
  - a. Involvement characterized by turmoil not elected parties
  - b. Government is unstable, unresponsive, or both
  - c. Violence widespread--at worst “the life expectancy of democracy itself is a matter of constant calculation.”
4. Why?
  - a. Social & economic environment?
  - b. Political institutions & organizations?
  - c. Beliefs & strategies of leaders/citizens?
  - d. System of political parties?

B. Social Structure  $\implies$  Institutions & Parties  $\implies$  Democratic Functioning

C. Role of Parties for Powell:

1. The link between social, economic, & constitutional setting & political performance
  - a. Examining citizen partisanship, party strategies, & election outcomes (party factors) helps us understand relationship between economic development & voter participation or between electoral laws & government stability
  - b. Not all effects of environmental conditions work through party system but many do
2. Independent Effects: The configurations of memory, organizations, & perception that accompany the party system have their own direct effects once sys established.




D. Three focal Dimensions of Political Performance: Citizen Participation; Govt Stability & Efficacy; Social Order & Peace

1. Citizen Electoral Participation: (Voter Turnout = # voting/eligible population)
  - a. Not only form of participation, but essential in forcing policy-makers to respond
  - b. Symbolic--especially with increased secularization, legitimacy has come to rest on claim to respond to citizen's preferences
  - c. STOP HERE: What is the empirical puzzle?

The Comparative-Historical Data are shown here 3 ways...

Why do people vote?

1. Generate some hypotheses
2. Tell *irrational-to-vote* story
3. Generate more hypotheses




## 2. Government Stability & “Effectiveness”

### a. Definitions:

- (1) Stability: (Government Duration)--Some issues & challenges in defining, but possible
- (2) Effectiveness: Definition? (Powell’s measure: % of legislative support for executive [?])

### b. Note difference definitions (theoretical, abstract) and operationalization & measurement (empirical, concrete)






- (1) Some data on duration
- (2) Generate some hypotheses
- (3) Some data on effectiveness?--or generate some alternative ideas on how to measure it



### 3. Socio-Political Order:

- a. [DEF:] Absence of turmoil & violence & maintenance of basic forms of democratic regime
- b. Important to distinguish observing order from attributing “blame” or “credit” for it (& Powell’s interest & claims lie in former only); breakdown of order may reflect:
  - (1) regime policy failures
  - (2) bargaining intransigence by either party to another
  - (3) efforts by either party to dispute to undermine democracy itself
- c. Democracies unique in providing citizens (a) resources, & (b) freedom to use, (c) expand it by organizing & mobilizing other citizens, & (d) allowing use to express discontent
- d. Democracy=a gamble that discontent can be channeled through legitimate (electoral & other) channels--an outbreak of serious, collective violence is a sign it is not working (whose fault is another question)
- e. Measures: Riots, Deaths from Political Violence, Suspension/Replacement of Regime
  - (1) Some Data
  - (2) Generate some hypotheses

### Political Attacks and Acts of Repression per Million in 21 Developed Democracies, 1950-82





## E. An Interesting Question is Relation b/w the Three Dimensions of Performance

1. Mutually-reinforcing Hypothesis is common, but also quite possible not:
2. Participation  $\Rightarrow$  (In)stability, & (In)effectiveness
3. Stability  $\Rightarrow$  Effectiveness & Order or  $\Rightarrow$  Corruption & Disorder
4. Powell finds
  - a. Participation...
    - (1) ...  $\Rightarrow$  Order (low violence, turmoil, & no regime  $\Delta$ )
    - (2) ...  $\Rightarrow$  Low government durability,
  - b. otherwise the three generally unrelated


## IV. Organization of Course & *The Cycle of Democratic Policymaking*

### A. Syllabus:




1. Introduction; Cycle (Schematic Overview Democratic Politics); Intellectual History
2. Socio-Politico-Economic Structure & Politics
  - a. Socioeconomic development and democratic politics
  - b. Socioeconomic cleavage-structure and democratic politics
    - (1) Participation, Government Stability & Efficacy, Sociopolitical Order & Peace
3. Comparative Governmental Systems
  - a. Description of Alternative Democratic Arrangements
  - b. Alternative Visions of Democratic Government & Its Core Challenges
    - (1) Majoritarian vs. Proportional Visions
    - (2) *Us Citizens vs. Them Politicians* (Accountability) & *Us Citizens vs. Them Citizens* (Representation)
4. Electoral Systems
  - a. Proportional vs. Majoritarian and district-magnitude
  - b. Candidate Centered vs. Party Centered

5. Parties & Party Systems
  - a. Fractionalization and Polarization
  - b. Party Internal Structure and Party Discipline
6. Participation and Representation
  - a. Voting
  - b. Extra-electoral Participation & Interest Groups
7. CGS: Political-Authority Allocation; Accountability, Mandates, & Representation
  - a. The Competing Visions
  - b. The Central Conflicts
  - c. And the terms of the trade-offs
8. (Parliamentary) Governmental Formation & Dissolution
  - a. Unidimensional Models
  - b. Multidimensional Models
9. Policies & Outcomes
  - a. Do the Varieties of Democracy Matter?
  - b. How Do the Varieties of Democracy Matter? Recent Research


## B. *The Cycle of Democratic Policymaking*



# C. More Data, or “How Does It All Matter?”, or “So What?”




**Figure I.4: Public Transfer Payments by Country-Year**




Bars separate annual data for each country, 1948-97 (as available).

**Figure I.5: Public Transfer Payments by Country**




Dot marks postwar mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum.

**Figure I.6: Public Transfer Payments by Year**




Dot marks 21-country mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum.

**Figure I.7: Public Debt by Country-Year**




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**Figure I.8: Public Debt by Country**




Dot marks postwar mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum.

**Figure I.9: Public Debt by Year**




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**Figure I.10: Public Employment by Country-Year**




Bars separate annual data for each country, 1948-97 (as available).

**Figure I.11: Public Employment by Country**



Dot marks postwar mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum.


**Figure I.12: Public Employment by Year**



Dot marks 21-country mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation




Figure I.13: Unemployment by Country-Year




Bars separate annual data for each country, 1948-97 (as available).

Figure I.14: Unemployment by Country




Dot marks postwar mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum.

Figure I.15: Unemployment by Year




Dot marks 21-country mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum.

**Figure I.16: Inflation by Country-Year**




Bars separate annual data for each country, 1948-97 (as available).

**Figure I.17: Inflation by Country**




Dot marks postwar mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum.

**Figure I.18: Inflation by Year**




Dot marks 21-country mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum.

**Figure I.19: Real Per-Capita Growth by Country-Year**




Bars separate annual data for each country, 1948-97 (as available).

**Figure I.20: Real Per-Capita Growth by Country**




Dot marks postwar mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum.

**Figure I.21: Real Per-Capita Growth by Year**



Dot marks 21-country mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum.

# V. Joint Determination of Social, Political, & Economic Outcomes





# The Cycle of Political Economy

Examples of the Elements at Each Stage:

(A) Interests:

- Sectoral Structure of Economy
- Income Distribution
- Age Distribution
- Trade Openness

Elections:

- Electoral Law
- Voter Participation

Government Formation:

- Fractionalization
- Polarization

(B) Representation:

- Partisanship

Policy:


- Fiscal Policy
- Monetary Policy
- Institutional Adjustment

Government Termination:

- Replacement Risk

(C) Outcomes:

- Unemployment
- Inflation
- Growth
- Sectoral Shift
- Debt
- Institutional Change



[Following two sections are from lectures I've given in other undergraduate political-science classes, aiming to help students understand and learn how to build, and then evaluate, positive social-scientific theory. We will probably not cover them in class, but you may find them useful to have.]

## VI. Standards for Theory (Olson, *The Rise & Decline of Nations*)

- A. No *Ad Hocery*  $\Rightarrow$  must insist that any explanation fits some data or observations beyond that/those from which it derived
  - 1. Case-by-case identification of some unique characteristic of nation or nation-time is insufficient explanation because...
    - a. ...cannot be tested against broad enough array of evidence or experience to evaluate theory;
    - b. ...almost always possible to construct an 'irrefutable explanation' if completely free to draw from any of an infinite number of unique characteristics of any given country-time.
  - 2. Sum: "unless the differences invoked also apply to other cases, we are making inferences from a sample of one" (p. 11)
- B. High Power/Parsimony Ratio: the goal of any theory is to explain as much as possible with as little as possible.
  - 1. Given some amount of explanatory power, more parsimony preferred.
  - 2. Given some amount of parsimony, more explanatory power preferred.
  - 3. Given that optimal on both dimensions: largely matter of taste, or of how theory to be used, how much explanatory power willing cede for greater parsimony or v.v.

- C. Consilience: theory explains quite diverse facts (e.g., Darwin's *Evolution*).
- D. Theory must explain some cases beyond that/those from which derived.
- E. Theory must specify what sorts of observations would decrease confidence and what sorts of observations would increase confidence that it is correct.
  - 1.  $\exists$  no expectation that any one theory should explain everything.
    - a. In fact, highly doubtful any one or even any combination of theories could.
    - b. Not necessary claim that theory stresses the *only*, the *most important*, or even a particularly *important* aspect of systematic relations. Just that systematic.
  - 2.  $\Rightarrow$  there is no such thing as a critical case.
  - 3.  $\Rightarrow$  all predictive statements include *ceteris paribus* (all-else =) proviso.
  - 4. I.e., our predictive statements are ***probabilistic***: we state conditions that make some outcome more or less likely to occur, *ceteris paribus*.



## VII. *A Positive Epistemology: Building & Empirically Evaluating Positive Theory*

### A. Viewing the Social World Positively

1. *Systematic & Stochastic Features*: We think of world as characterized by more-or-less systematic features & more or less random (or *stochastic*) features.
  - a. We must think there is something systematic, else:
    - (1) Why lament bad policies? If simply random, nothing to be done about them. Unless something systematic about whatever *causes* policies, we would have no blame to lay. *E.g.*, Why hate or love congress as 'always the same' if policies strictly random? Must be something systematic.
    - (2) Politics not entirely random (see figures below).
      - (a) If right govt succeeds left, do you think taxes, pub-spend, inf, UE, ineq, will rise or fall, *ceteris paribus*?
      - (b) Comparing dev'd ctry with under-dev'd, which faces greater threat of violent soc unrest (*cet. par.*)?
      - (c) Comparing dev'd ctry with under-dev'd, which more likely have dem gov't or greater civ lib's (*cet. par.*)?
  - b. No Proper Nouns: One trick to beginning to see systematic aspects of social reality is to rid exposition of your arguments of proper nouns.
    - (1) Not *Jesse Helms [Tip O'Neil] caters to religious rt & tobacco industry [AFL-CIO & Bostonians]*, but...*Senators (representatives) respond to interests of constituencies that elect them.*
    - (2) Former may seem to explain, but note it no help to say what would happen when Helms [O'Neil] died/replaced. Latter helps...

- (3) ...and incidentally opens new lines for inquiry: why does one constituency win over its opponents? Shear numbers? How does Helms ever get his way if other Senators do not have similar constituencies? If he doesn't get his way, how re-elected?
- c. Another trick is to posit some claim, some prediction. Then ask why you think it so—what moving parts make it happen that way. Then...so, if more/less of this moving part, we will have more/less of such-and-such outcome. Thus, also may help think in degrees not in binary.
2. Systematic Features of Social World amount to a *set of (probabilistic) relationships between variables*:
- a. That is, we think of some feature(s) X that make Y more or less *likely* to occur or *tend* to  $\uparrow$  or  $\downarrow$  amount of Y that occurs.
- (1) Examples of hypothesized such relationships
- (a) Comparative Examples:
- i) Huntington: Rapid socio-econ change produces political instability, coups, riots, & rebellions in under-dev'd ctrys  $\Rightarrow$  Probability of Social Strife = an increasing function of rate of change in society & economy + other stuff
  - ii) Right-of-center govts run lower deficits than left-of-center govts do  $\Rightarrow$  Budget Deficit = f(partisanship,  $\epsilon$ )
- (b) American Examples:
- i) Divided government responds slowly if at all to shocks  $\Rightarrow$  Policy Response-Rate = f(Divided government,  $\cdot$ )
  - ii) Voters “rally around the flag”, supporting president when s/he's involved in international events  $\Rightarrow$  Presidential Approval Rating = some function of how involved is president in international events + noise & other stuff

- (c) International-Relations Examples:
  - i) Ken Waltz: number of great powers affects likelihood or amount of systemic war  $\Rightarrow$  Amount of War = some function of number of great powers + some other stuff (stochastic &/or other factors not considered at moment)
  - ii) Paul Huth: number of nuclear weapons and latent threat of nuclear use by defender will not increase probability of extended deterrence success when potential attacker is not a nuclear power  $\Rightarrow$  Likelihood Extended Deterrence Success  $\neq$  function nuclear power of defender if potential attacker also nuclear

b. Some Important Notes:

- (1) Statements are Probabilistic: speak of likelihoods of events, tendencies, fertile ground for Y to happen being created, *etc.*
  - (a) *E.g.*, not generally interested in the particular event that triggered some riot, interested in environmental features which make riots more or less likely (systematic)
  - (b) *E.g.*, not generally interested in whether some aspect of Kennedy's personality determined his choices during Cuban missile crisis (specific, deterministic), though may be interested in particular characteristics of pres's personalities may make them more/less likely enact certain sorts policies (general, probabilistic)
- (2) Statements about Relationships: theories not so much about predicting *per se*, though that certainly part of their product, but rather about how some X (set of X's) *relates* to Y (or doesn't): "X goes up" tends to make "Y go up/down..."
- (3) Positive Theories are Simplifications:
  - (a) **No** implicit claim that the X's highlighted = everything (or even necessarily most or even very important thing) relevant to phenomenon, Y, being predicted. In other words, an implicit *ceteris paribus* (other things equal) statement accompanies any positive-theoretical statement.
  - (b) **No** intention of explaining everything about Y. World partly random--unless you believe it *all* systematic--we not aiming to explain all of Y, but rather to grasp some systematic feature(s) of the social world.
  - (c) **Not** looking for photographic completeness & detail; in fact, would not be particularly useful as *theory* if were. Theory summarizes.

## B. Conceptualization and Hypothesizing

### 1. Construct a Schematic for your argument

a.  $Y = f(X_1, X_2, X_3, \dots, X_k, \epsilon)$  where  $X_1$  to  $X_k$  represent the systematic part and  $\epsilon$  the random part and any parts we are leaving out omitting.

(1) Then you want to reason / use logic / construct formal model to derive theoretically expected relationship b/w X's & Y.

(2) E.g., Y is probability of deterrence success. X is relative military might of defender. Arg: Y positively related to X.

b. Arrow Diagrams:  $X \rightarrow Z \rightarrow Y$

c. Tables and Games:

Actor 1 ↓ \ Actor 2 →	$X_2=0$	$X_2=1$
$X_1=0$	$(0,0) \Rightarrow ?$	$(0,1) \Rightarrow ?$
$X_1=1$	$(1,0) \Rightarrow ?$	$(1,1) \Rightarrow ?$

### 2. Identify counter-hypotheses

a. Easiest & most frequently relevant: you predict Y positively related to X  $\implies$  counter hypothesis negatively or not related.

b. More powerful, usually, to identify specific theoretical counter-predictions: you predict military spending responds to economic conditions in country, presidential partisanship, and past military spending; Waltz predicts it responds to objective threat faced by nation at systemic level; Walt predicts depends on perceived threat. What would expect see differently if each were right?

## C. Operationalization and Measurement

1. Operationalization: Theories usually constructed at fairly abstract level.
  - a. You will next need to relate your abstract theoretical concepts (e.g. Walt's "perceived threat") to empirically observable counterparts.
  - b. You must be every bit as careful and theoretically minded here as in previous step. When it comes time to evaluate evidence, your "findings" will only inform you about your theory to degree measures match the theoretical abstractions.
2. Measurement: data collection stage. May involve primary sources, secondary sources, or pre-processed data-bases like CoW, NES, PWT, OECD, IMF, etc.
  - a. Everything that exists in the observable world can be measured and measurement implies quantitative measurement:
    - (1) At bare minimum on a present / not-present basis, or possibly an informal index or ranking; either way...
    - (2) Inability to measure perfectly does *not* imply cannot be measured and it would be a horrendous mistake to think that by not explicitly ~~talking about~~ discussing such measurement you have not in fact taken it because:
  - b. You cannot make any positive statements about the world without having made, explicitly or implicitly some measurement. (Given that logical truth, I find little persuasive arguments saying that we ought to leave it implicit.)
3. ~~This stage should not be slighted~~ Researchers should not slight this stage because:

“Operationalization and measurement must be theoretically informed for empirical evaluation to be theoretically informing.”

#### D. Empirical Evaluation


1. Broad intuition of most empirical evaluation is to examine whether the comparative-historical (only database we have) evidence aligns more with your theoretical expectations than was likely just by chance or by some alternative.
2. The two-by-two table:



	Y=0	Y=1
X=0	# of (0,0) cases	# of (0,1) cases
X=1	# of (1,0) cases	# of (1,1) cases

3. Regression analysis (see figures to come, and (much) more on this later)

E. Reconsidering Theory in Light of Evidence: Once the “data have spoken,” you go back return to the beginning and reconsider.


# The Relationship Between the Degree of Democracy and of Economic Development









### Aggregate Economic Performance of Developed Democracies in the Postwar Period



### Aggregate Economic Performance of Developed Democracies in the Postwar Period




# The "Catch-Up" Hypothesis




Correlation = 0.90 # pts = 21  
 $y = 0.178 + -0.0176x$   
 (0.0019)


# The "Small Government" Hypothesis



Correlation = .27 # pts = 21  
 $y = 0.0391 + -0.0354x$   
 (0.0292)



R-square = 0.00304 # pts = 21  
 $y = 0.0309 + -0.000264x$



0=Neutral; 1=Part. on For. Soil; 2=Part. on Dom. Soil; 3=Conquered by Axis; 4 Conquered by Allies, Restructured

R-square = 0.151 # pts = 21  
 $y = 0.0253 + 0.00235x$

- F. We'll discuss further how to interpret empirical-estimation results like these, and (much) more sophisticated versions of these, as we get to them in the course of the semester.
- G. Of course... (three fundamental challenges to a positive social-science, & some of the strategies employed to address them)
1. More than one thing matters... (*multicausality* and *controls*);
  2. How things matter may depend on other things... (*context conditionality* and *interactions & nonlinearity*);
  3. Correlation does not imply causality... (ubiquitous *endogeneity* and *causal identification* strategies):
    - a. The *poor man's exogeneity* (time)...
    - b. System specification...
    - c. Instrumentation...
    - d. Discontinuity...
    - e. Matching...
    - f. Experimentation...

## VIII. Intellectual History of Comparative Politics as a Field of Inquiry (another introduction, built from Lane & Ersson, intro-ch. 1)

- A. **Theoretical Framework:** “We organize our [study]...in terms of cleavages, political institutions, & public policies” (p. 11)
- B. “Traditional” (to *ca.* 1950s) Study of Politics: 5 Characteristics
  1. *Configurative [Historical] Description:* just describe from A to Z everything political that exists or happens in some country
  2. *Parochialism:* Western (& predominantly US) slant on what issues for consideration
  3. *Formal Legalism:* Descriptive focus on the constitutional & legal details of a country
  4. *Absence of Empiricism, Methodology, & Theory:* description & legalism w/ little or no attempt to relate configurational aspects & outcomes systematically
  5. *Non-Comparative:* despite the name, field tended to focus on one system (country) at a time (relates to previous problem)

## C. Continuing Methodological Divides & Disputes

1. Case Study *vs.* Comparative Method
2. Political Sociology evolving into Political Institutionalism
3. Newer Disputes
  - a. Formal (*i.e.* mathematical) *v.* Qualitative (linguistic) theoretical derivation of arguments
  - b. Quantitative (*i.e.* statistical) *v.* Qualitative empirical evaluation
  - c. Positive theory (positivism) *v.* “Interpretation & ‘Understanding’ (interpretivism)” as the goal
4. “Either/Or” divisions somewhat arbitrary in that all involve some degree of other; further, several quite highly related; still, some unease remains around these divides

## IX. Intellectual History $\Rightarrow$ Intro some important, classical arguments re:

- A. Connection SES and Democratic/Sociopolitical Stability
- B. Ways conceptualize socioeconomic (*cleavage*) structure [Lipset’s CC *v.* Reinf]
- C. Ways conceptualize social structure & party system [Sartori’s Frac & Polar]
- D. Ways conceptualize “quality of democracy” [Dahl’s *Polyarchy*]



## E. Gabriel Almond & the Parsonian Revolution (mid 1950s)

1. Influence of Sociology
  - a. Gabriel Almond “Comparative Political Systems” (1956)
  - b. Talcott Parsons [*Toward a General Theory of Action* (with Shils, 1951), *The Social System* (1951), & *Economy & Society* (with Smelser, 1956)] brought Weber’s new systematic approach to the study of social behavior (“Sociology”) to the forefront of political science (and social science more generally)
2. Intro’s Central Q: What fosters (stable) (democratic) political development
3. Theory/Argument: Almond argued Anglo-American political systems stable b/c high degree consensus on political means & ends & b/c political roles of individuals & institutions clearly differentiated & delineated. (As a theoretical conjecture, interesting; empirically, he neither defined nor measured either independent or dependent variables. Still, huge advance over what preceded.)

Socio-Pol Struct ( <i>Culture</i> ) → Political Role Structure ↓	Homogenous	Fragmented
<b>Highly Differentiated</b>	Anglo-American	Continental European
<b>Low Differentiation</b>	Totalitarian	Pre-Industrial (Traditional)

F. **Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (1959): “conditions necessary for democracy in societies & organizations’ (p. 9)” (p. 19)**

1. “Democracy ‘implies
  - a. political formula or body of beliefs specifying which institutions—parties, free press, etc.—legitimate (all accept as proper);
  - b. one set of political leaders in office; and
  - c. one or more sets of recognized leaders attempting to gain office’ (p. 45) [within those democratic institutions & rules]”
2. Seeks to explain which systems exhibit these characteristics stably & why?; i.e. stability of democracy not govt stability in democracy
3. Democracy requires govt. & opp.; thus democracy cannot exist without cleavages; question which cleavages are “too much”/too irascible, and which factors may serve to mitigate conflict arising out of cleavages

4. Factors facilitating stability:

- a. Economic Development: produces greater income, economic security, & widespread education—all considered conducive in that they contribute to a moderating of the terms of the ‘class struggle’ permitting the less well-off to take a long-term [and optimistic] view
- b. Class Structure: large middle class good
- c. 2-Party System: claims two-party competition fosters integrative rather than divisive politics
- d. Cross-Cutting [as Opposed Reinforcing] Cleavages:** claims territorial rather than proportional representation help in this regard
- e. Federal, not Unitary, System: (claims concentration of power frequently a threat to democracy; others note Weimar)
- f. Historical development of conflict resolution (problematic?)

Cleavage Structure → Class “Stratification” [DEF] ↓	Cross-Cutting	Reinforcing
Highly Stratified	Intermediate	Least Stable
Low Stratification	Most Stable	Intermediate

## G. Stein Rokkan: Cleavage Struct & Democratization (1967, '70, '83)

1. Four fundamental developmental processes in democratic transformations of Western Democracies (note the historicism)
  - a. Protestant Reformation—divided Catholic/Protestant
  - b. National Revolution—breaking local & regional affiliations (Germany & Italy mid to late 19<sup>th</sup> century)
  - c. Industrial Revolution—replacing diffuse agrarian & religious loyalties w/ class
  - d. Communist Revolution—international fault lines

CLEAVAGE TYPOLOGY	National/Center	Local/Periphery
Interests/Economy	worker v. employer/owner	primary v. secondary econ.
Ideology/Culture	church v. state	subject v. dominant culture

2. [We'll see this one up-close next week...]

# H. Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy* (1971): Conditions for & Degree of Democracy (“polyarchy”)

The Two Dimensions of Political Systems

Contestation ↓	Participation →	High	Low
High		<i>Polyarchies</i> : Italy, Finland	<i>Competitive Oligarchies</i> : Switz., Ire.
Low		<i>Inclusive Hegemonies</i> : Hungary, Poland (pre-Dem.)	<i>Closed Hegemonies</i> : Portugal, Spain (pre-Dem.)

1. Conditions for Democracy: Dahl offered a long list...
  - a. Peaceful evolution of democracy (transferring legitimacy from old to new regime)
  - b. Decentralized economy (avoiding concentration of economic power)
  - c. Economic development
  - d. Economic equality
  - e. Social homogeneity
  - f. Elite pro-democratic beliefs (best when authority structures same in most institutions of society)
  - g. Popular beliefs in democratic efficacy & in sincere intentions of adversaries
  - h. Passive or supportive international conditions
  
2. More-lasting, notable contribution in *polyarchy*, contestation × participation as conceptualization of the quality of democracy.

# I. Merkl, Almond & Verba: “Political Culture”

1. Peter Merkl, *Modern Comparative Politics* (1970)
  - a. Common State of Democracy is Change, Instability, & Disequilibrium
  - b. Culture (beliefs, attitudes) explain this best since these things change observably (*social-science survey-research exploding*): problems critics often allege(d) with cultural arguments: Descriptive at best; Tautological at worst
2. G. Almond & Sid Verba, *The Civic Culture* (1965): key to democracy is how citizens relate (sub & ob-jectively) to political system
  - a. People have attitudes toward:
 

(1) political system	(3) output activities govt (pol’s & prog’s)
(2) input activities of cit’s (e.g., voting)	(4) themselves as political participants
  - b. These configure into three archetypes of society

Involvement in Pol. Sys. → Knowledge of Pol&PolSys ↓	High	Low
High	Participant Society	Subject Society
Low	[Not Considered]	Parochial Society

c. ⇒ Peoples attitudes, (a), defined public orientation toward political system, (b), which produced politics of identifiable patterns

- J. Gordon Smith, *Politics & Society in Western Europe* (1984) [Approach presaged by Jean Blondel (1969) *An Introduction to Comparative Government*; Also well-exemplified by Powell (1984) *Contemporary Democracies*): linking social to political cohesion; intro text helps begin shift emphasis institutions...
1. Social Cohesion not directly or Necessarily linked to Political Cohesion
  2. Governing Institutions structure Actors' Incentives from Voters to Leaders
  3. **⇒ Sociological Structure Works through Political Institutions to Determine Democratic Functioning**
  4. Critique came at point when structuralism & culturalism were losing steam

## K. Arend Lijphart: *Consociationalism (Consensus), Inst'lism, & Democ*

1. Social heterogeneity creates impetus to instability, but impetus modified or redirected by institutions  $\Rightarrow$  two original foci
  - a. **capacity** of pol institutions & pol leaders to respond to stimuli from society
  - b. institutional means of dividing power to diffuse disruptive conflict:
    - (1) Minority representation
    - (2) Division of power: geographic, demographic, or functional
2. Then on elite behavior:

Social Structure $\rightarrow$	Homogenous	Plural (Heterogenous)
Elite Behavior $\downarrow$		
<b>Coalescent</b>	<i>Depoliticized Democracy: Switzerland</i>	<i>Consociational Democracy: Austria</i>
<b>Adversarial</b>	<i>Centripetal Democracy: United States</i>	<i>Centrifugal Democracy: Italy</i>

3. Only bottom-right unstable  $\Rightarrow$  Heterogeneity only a necessary condition for instability, absent consociation it becomes sufficient.
4. Later work would more-likely try to endogenize elite strategy to contextual factors. [what's positive-scientific advantage of this?]



5. ***Democracies* (1984): stress again structure of decision-making process mediating b/w social cleavages & instability =>**

6. Two ideal-types of democracy:

a. *The Westminster Model*

- (1) 1 party, bare-majority govts
- (2) fused legis&exec pow, & cab dom
- (3) asymmetric bicameralism
- (4) Two-party System
- (5) One-dimensional party-system
- (6) plurality electoral system
- (7) unitary & cntrlzed territorial govt
- (8) unwritten const & parl sovereignty

b. *The Consensus Model*

- (1) Executive power-sharing
- (2) Sep. powers, formal & informal
- (3) Balanced Bicam & minority rep
- (4) Multi-party system
- (5) Multi-dimensional party system
- (6) Proportional representation
- (7) Territorial & non-terr. fed, decent
- (8) Written const & minority vetoes

7. [Predecessors to textbook that evolved into *Patterns of Democracy* (1999)]

L. Suzanne Berger, Gerhard Lehmruch, Phillippe Schmitter: *Corporatism & Interest Intermediation* (1970s & 1980s)

1. B/w interests created by social structure & policies implemented by govts lie organizations that aggregate, mobilize, & press for policies: Parties + Other actors... (esp. economic actors: unions, employers, banks, etc.)
2. Corporatist Policymaking [DEFINE] credited with successful macroecon. management & thereby facilitation of democratic stability
3. Recent innovations have begun to shift the focus toward the role of firms as employers & allocators of capital

**M. Giovanni Sartori: *Parties & Party Systems* (1976): fractionalization and polarization [DEFINITIONS]**

1. Parties do not simply reflect underlying cleavage structure of society ⇒ independent role of party systems for stability

Party-System Polarization → Party-Sys Fractionalization ↓	Low	High
Low	<i>Bipartism</i> : United States	<i>Centripetal Competition</i> : U. K.
High	<i>Segmented Multipartism</i> : Ireland	<i>Polarized Multipartism</i> : Italy

2. Also emphasizes key role of anti-system parties

## N. Comparative Party Research

1. Schumpeter (1942): defined party role
  - a. interest articulation, aggregation, policy-making, & system legitimation
  - b. parties offer voters choice b/w ideologies represented in election manifestos & implemented by govts in office: voters evaluate
2. V.O. Key (1966): do parties set agenda for voters or do voters choose parties?
3. Pateman, Rose, Lawson (*When Parties Fail?*) => parties increasingly failed these roles (?): studied “why stability ended” (?)
4. Strategies of Parties (Rokkan, Otto Kirchheimer): Mobilize a **niche** or manufacture a **catch-all** coalition ==>
  - a. probability of success for party strategy depends on social structure, institutional rules, & *strategies of other parties*
  - b. Strength: highlights strategic behavior of political actors
  - c. Weakness: tends to explain change by actor mistakes & stability by actor wisdom
5. Comparative Party Research, New directions: why parties at all? “Post-materialist” values stress independence & critical of system=>crisis for parties

## O. Other Important Milestone Origins of Modern Institutionalism

### 1. Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (1971)

#### a. Duverger's Law & Beyond

#### b. Relations between voting rules and...

- (1) Voters' incentives & actions
- (2) Policymakers' incentives & actions

### 2. Lawrence Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government* (1976)

#### a. Argues that simple, standard argument that multiparty parliaments $\Rightarrow$ coalition govts; coalition govts unstable; so multiparty systems unstable: false; theories of coalition formation

#### b. “Minimal Winning Coalitions” (DEFINE) William Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (1962)

#### c. Implications

- (1) MWC's are stable: Single-party majority or Multiparty
- (2) Emphasis on.....willingness to enter coalition and.....informational uncertainty in coalition bargaining...
- (3)  $\Rightarrow$  Re-emphasis on fractionalization & polarization

#### d. Extensions:

- (1) Minority governments' workings: Kaare Strom & George Tsebelis
- (2) Parliamentary behavior: Party discipline; “Constituency”

3. *Dodd & Coalitions in Parliamentary Government* (1976)
  - a. Introduces notion of Minimal-winning coalitions—MWCs are stable
    - (1) Single-party governments are usually MWCs, so they're usually stable
    - (2) Multi-party governments are stable too if they're MWCs
  - b. Formation of MWC's is a function of **parties' willingness to enter coalitions & informational uncertainty in bargaining with potential coalition members**
  - c. Minority governments: how they work & the conditions under which they work well (Strom, Tsebelis)
  - d. Parliamentary behavior: **party discipline** a key factor related to electoral system & government structure
4. Modern Successors:
  - a. Gary Cox, *Making Votes Count* (1997)
  - b. Michael Laver & Ken Shepsle, *Making & Breaking Governments* (1995)

## P. Political Outputs & Outcomes:

1. Traditionally little focus on what governments actually did (!)
  - a. All about societal inputs & how political institutions produced governments from them (corporatism exceptional here), but
  - b. Little or nothing about what policies were produced, *i.e.*, “So What?”
2. **Increasing focus also on policies & outcomes produced by structure & institutions ⇒**
  - a. **Focus on Actors’ Opportunities, Objectives, & Constraints**
  - b. **Focus also on outcomes that concretely affect citizens’ lives in democracy**
  - c. **Empirical Analysis: attempt to link differences in policies & outcomes across time & countries to structure & institutions**
3. The Keynesian Welfare State & Successor Policies become a central focus for modern comparative study
  - a. E.g.: Countries faced similar economic conditions & responded differently, Why?
    - (1) Partisan differences?
    - (2) Socio-economic-structure differences?
    - (3) Institutional differences?
  - b. Q: originally, “Does Politics Matter?” A: yes; so new Q: “How Does Politics Matter?”

Q. G. Bingham Powell: *Contemporary Democracies* (1982)

1. One of the first systematic analyses of structure & institutions ⇒ Participation & Stability & Order
2. Fertile ground by then: rich in theory & assumption, empirical vacuum

R. Lijphart's, *Patterns of Democracy* (1999) and Powell's, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy* (2000) [We'll return to these, but for now...]

1. Note emphasis on understanding inputs to, and terms of certain kinds of trade between, representation and accountability; i.e.,
2. What shapes effective representation of divided societal interests in policy?
3. What shapes effective accountability of elected leaders to society that elected them?