

PS341: Comparative Politics of Developed Democracies
STUDY GUIDE

I. INTRODUCTION

A. **Definition of subject matter:** What is a “Developed Democracy”?

1. **Democracy:** political systems where representative leaders chosen through competitive elections, with more than one alternative competing in elections, in which most citizens are eligible to participate, and by which the national political leaders are held accountable to these citizens.
2. **Developed Democracy:** political system in which relatively liberal democracy and relatively free-market capitalism are no longer the subject of political contestation but rather the bounds within which political competition occurs.
 - a. *Important Substantively/Theoretically because* it implies that the actors in our models (voters, candidates, parties, etc.) do not consider overthrow of democracy &/or capitalism itself among the set of actions they might take nor even among the set of possible results of any action they might take, and we do not know particularly well whether and how our theoretical propositions about how democracies work might travel into contexts where these were real options or possibilities.
 - b. *Empirically, currently, that corresponds* to least ambiguously to the countries of North America, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Increasingly, it may include also some countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and South Asia.

B. Broad characterizations of the different ways to organize democratic systems

1. **Powell:**

- a. *Elections* are instruments of democracy that give people influence over pol-makers
- b. Two Views (each normative & positive): **Majoritarian v. Proportional Visions**

2. **Lijphart:**

- a. *Democracy:* govt for & by the people, but, what if the people disagree & have divergent preferences?
 - (1) The *majority* of people.
 - (2) As many people as possible, *proportionally*.
- b. The ways to organize democracy cluster around **Majoritarian v. Consensus Democracy**, two dimensions of which discernable:
 - (1) *Executive-Legislative Dimension:* Horizontal concentration-diffusion authority at national level.
 - (2) *Federal-Unitary Dimension:* Vertical concentration-diffusion authority across gov'tal levels.

C. **The Cycle of Democratic Policymaking:** *Structure of interests* processed through *competitive electoral contests* conducted under varying *electoral systems* produces *partisan representative bodies* from which *governments form* (and occasionally dissolve) to *make policy*, which, along with exogenous factors and the actions of extra-governmental actors *affects political and economic outcomes*, which may in part reshape the structure of interests within which the next partisan electoral contest occurs. At any point in the cycle, the relevant actors' choices may be motivated by looking forward in the cycle as much as by how they got to that stage of the cycle.

D. **Intellectual History** [Highlighting only *key concepts* that recur later; names/titles unimportant.]

1. Lipset, *Political Man* (1959): “conditions necessary for democracy in societies & organizations” (p. 9) ...[several; most notable for us:] **Cross-Cutting, rather than Reinforcing, Cleavages**
2. Stein Rokkan: *Cleavage Structure & Democratization Process* (1967, '70, '83): Four fundamental developmental processes in democratic transformations of Western Democracies
 - a. Protestant Reformation—divided Catholic/Protestant
 - b. National Revolution—breaking local & regional affiliations
 - c. Industrial Revolution—replacing diffuse agrarian & religious loyalties w/ class
 - d. Communist Revolution—international fault lines
3. Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy* (1971): The Degree of Democracy (“polyarchy”) = Contestation & Participation
4. Gordon Smith, Arend Lijphart, & Others: Social structure works through political institutions to determine democratic functioning (politics, policies, & outcomes). That is, political institutions mediate, modify, shape, or condition (synonyms) the effects of social structure, and, vice versa, social structure

determine the effects of political institutions.

a. Structure of decision-making process mediates b/w social cleavages & instability

5. Giovanni Sartori: *Parties & Party Systems* (1976): **fractionalization & polarization**

Party-System Polarization → Party-Sys Fractionalization ↓	Low	High
Low	<i>Bipartism</i> : United States	<i>Centripetal Competition</i> : U. K.
High	<i>Segmented Multipartism</i> : Ireland	<i>Polarized Multipartism</i> : Italy

a. Also emphasizes key role of anti-system parties

6. Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (1971): **Duverger’s Law**

7. William Riker, *Theory of Political Coalitions* (1962): **“Minimal Winning Coalitions”**

E. Interpreting Regression-Analysis Results:

1. **Dependent Variables: Y**, the left-hand side, the thing being explained

2. **Independent Variables: X**, the right-hand side, the stuff doing the explaining

3. **Coefficients:**

a. signs reveal directions of relationships

b. magnitudes (along with the scales of the dependent and independent variables) determines the amount of the ‘effect of X on Y’.

4. **Standard-errors:** the “give or take” number revealing the certainty, precision, or tightness of the relationship between X and Y

5. **T-statistics:** the ratio of the coefficient to its standard error; at absolute minimum, the coefficient (in absolute value) should be larger than the standard error to reflect any reasonable certainty at all; for “significance”, these should be around 2 or, better yet, more (in absolute value)

6. **P-levels (alpha-levels, significance levels):** the probability (under assumptions we do not detail here) of estimating so large a coefficient as one did if the true coefficient were actually zero.

7. **R²:** the share of the variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by the *entire set* of independent variables. Like a standard error/t-stat/p-level, it tells us about the tightness of the relationship between Y and X, but standard errors (etc.) each refer to the tightness of the relationship between Y and that one X (controlling for the others) whereas R² relates the tightness of the relation between Y and the entire set of Xs, literally the share of Y, the dependent variable, the left-hand side explained by independent variables, X, the right-hand-side.

8. **Know how to do each of the following sorts of things with regression analysis:**

a. Given the results of some empirical estimation such as:

$$\text{polviolence} = 9.06 + .605(\text{lpop}) - 3.45(\text{lrgdpc}) + 1.98(\text{ethind}) + 1.82(\text{relind}) + 3.16(\text{gini})$$

$$(1.3) \quad (.250) \quad (1.15) \quad (0.35) \quad (3.55) \quad (2.98) \quad R^2=.78$$

be able to interpret the coefficients (sign & magnitude), the standard errors (in parentheses 2nd row), and R².

b. Given an equation to be estimated, be able to explain using our theories what sign we expect for coefficients:

$$\text{VoteParticRate} = b_0 + b_1 * \text{DistrictMagnitude} + b_2 * \text{PublicRegistration} + b_3 * \text{FineNotVoting} + \epsilon$$

what signs do our theories indicate we should expect for b₁, b₂, b₃? Explain.

II. Socio-Economic Structure (SES) & Democratic Politics

A. Introduction

1. Definition of concepts

2. Arguments relating Socio-Economic Cleavage-Structure to outcomes

a. Democratic Perform: participation, stability, violence

b. Party Systems

3. Arguments relating Socio-Economic Development to outcomes:

a. Democracy & democratization

b. Democratic Perform: participation, stability, violence

B. Definitions & Typologies of Cleavages & Cleavage Structures

1. Definitions:
 - a. **Socio-Economic Cleavage:** a societal *division* on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups, or org's [b/w] whom *conflict may* arise
 - b. **Socio-Economic Cleavage-Structure:** aspects of the set of such divides, including their number and relative intensity (salience), the relative sizes or powers of the groups so divided, and the pattern of those dividing lines (cross-cutting v. reinforcing).
2. Typologies...
 - a. ...of Cleavage Bases:
 - (1) **Ascriptive/Trait Cleavages:** bases for division = inherent characteristics of individuals; there's little or no element of choosing to belong to some group: e.g., race, caste, ethnicity, language
 - (2) **Functional/Preference/Value Cleavages:** adopted views or, at least to some degree, chosen affiliations: e.g., class, preferences, ideology, & possibly religion
 - b. ...of Cleavage Contents:
 - (1) **Religious:** Christian/Non-C, Catholic/Protestant, Fundamentalist/Moderate, Religious/Secular
 - (2) **Ethnic/Linguistic:** Race, Language, Cultures
 - (3) **Class/Economic:** social class, income & wealth, worker/employer, manual/skilled labor, traded/non-traded sector, private/public sector
 - (4) **Regional/Geographic:** Urb/Sub/Rural, Cntr/Periph, *Regionalism*

C. Characteristics of S-E Cleavages & Cleavage Structure that May Affect Socio-Political Stability

1. **Cross-Cutting v. Reinforcing:** Cleavage structures (a set of cleavages) are **cross-cutting** to the degree that each divides the nation differently into different groups & **reinforcing** to the degree that each divides the nation into the same groups
 - a. **Argument:** cleavages are more (less) likely to be more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more they reinforce (cross-cut) each other.
2. **Salience:** importance of dividing line & its associated conflicts to those involved. (Some refer to dormant cleavages as "latent" & active cleavages as "manifest".)
 - a. **Argument:** cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more salient the issues involved.
3. **Divisibility (bargainability, compromisability):** degree to which issues over which groups divided by cleavage easily *bargainable* or *compromisable* as opposed to categorical (0-1).
 - a. **Argument:** cleavages more likely less detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more divisible the issues involved.
4. **Ascriptive v. Functional Nature of Salient Divides:**
 - a. **Argument:** Membership of more ascriptive cleavages being inherently less fluid and of more functional ones being inherently more fluid, greater salience of societal conflicts occurring along more ascriptive lines implies more entrenched combatants & so greater potential for social disorder.
5. **Relative Power** of groups divided by the cleavage
 - a. **Argument 1a:** [predominance breeds peace] cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more closely is power distributed among the groups.
 - b. **Argument 1b:** [the opposite] balance secures peace; imbalance breeds resentment
 - c. **Argument 2:** [the threat-perception or power-transition view] cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order as the power of ascendant groups approaches that of dominant groups. That is, (a) at very small non-majority sizes, they pose no perceived threat to the majority; (b) at very near parity, conflictual turmoil is too costly to both parties, so it is avoided; at moderately large minority-group sizes, the potential for conflict to erupt is greatest.
6. **Fractionalization & Polarization:** Fractionalization refers to number of cleavages operating (manifest); polarization refers to "distance" separating the parties' preferred policies & outcomes
 - a. **Argument:** cleavages are more likely to be more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more fractionalized & polarized the cleavage structure

D. Patterns of Cleavages & the Number of Political Parties

1. Pattern of Cleavages & the Number of Parties
 - a. SE cleavage struct. of polity described in various dimensions...
 - (1) fractionalization of society (# of sub-groups, *possibly overlapping*)
 - (2) polarization of society (“distance” between groups)
 - (3) degree to which cleavages reinforce or cross-cut
 - (4) relative salience of the various cleavages
 - b. ...combine to suggest number of political parties that may evolve to represent various issues
2. **Argument:** Cleavage structure suggests # & types of social groups that parties could evolve to represent; *i.e.*, soc. struct. gives basis for political org. suggesting that societal fractionalization & polarization may be mirrored by party-system fract. & polar.
3. **Rough Evidence:** Societal cleavage-structures not so well reflected in party systems, likely because the relationship between social structure of interests and party systems is heavily moderated by crucial political institutions, most notably electoral systems.

E. Modernization & Democratic Performance

1. **Key features of development:** Growth & spread of affluence; Economic- & social-structural change; Urbanization; Education, literacy, & spread of mass media; Greater social & occupational mobility
2. **Classical Hypotheses:** Democracies with modernized social structures & developed economies expected to have higher participation, more stable & effective govts, & less political violence than countries with more traditional social structures & underdeveloped economies & democracies. Why? [Logic and/or Evidence seems stronger for those in bold]
 - a. Simple, monotonic arguments:
 - (1) **Education & Modern Person hypotheses: spread of edu. & modernization fosters rational, scientific life views that favor problem-solving rather than “fate” view of societal matters**
 - (2) *Value-harmonization hypothesis:* spread of education & modernization increasingly brings a harmonization of peoples’ values & goals
 - (3) **Affluence hypothesis: (Maslow’s hierarchy of needs) More developed (economically) societies have resolved lower-order issues like self-survival etc. and turn to higher-order issues like participatory self-realization**
 - (4) **Govt-resources hypothesis: development allows greater fulfillment of social demands, partly via increase of govt resources it affords**
 - (5) **Increasing-interdependence hypothesis: the idea that the dense networks of impersonal, anonymous interpersonal exchanges necessary in developed economies necessitates non-arbitrary, rule-based policymaking and contract enforcement; things at which democracy has strong advantages over the various non-democratic, autocratic forms of government.**
 - b. Non-monotonic, Conditional, or Complicated arguments
 - (1) **Ratio econ dev’p to soc-pol mobilization (Huntington): socio-political stability obtains where the degree of economic and political development remain parallel. If the former gets ahead, demand for democratic input outpaces the institutionalization of means for such input (the government remaining too autocratic); if the latter gets ahead, the (democratic) demand for governmental services outpaces the economic means to provide them.**
 - (2) *Level of Econ dev’p at intro of political competition:* stable democracy requires that economic development precede political democratization. [evidence mixed]
 - (3) *Pace-of-development hypothesis:* rapid econ development is destabilizing because of the rapid societal disruption it entails [relatively untested]

III. Cleavage-Structure Formation, *Freezing*, and *Thawing*

- A. Lipset & Rokkans Diachronic Model of Cleavage Formation & Its Freezing Into the Party System:
 1. 2 stages, **Process of Nation-Building & Industrial Revolution**, each bringing 2 fundamental conflicts, form underlying cleavage structure. Nature of resolution forms party system.
 - a. **Nation Building I: Center v. Periphery**
 - b. **Nation-Building II: Church v. State**

- c. **Industrial Revolution I: Urban v. Rural**
- d. **Industrial Revolution II: Labor v. Employers**
- 2. **Argument:** Pattern of how these conflicts arose in each ctry & how had been or were being resolved at time mass democ. arrived frozen. I.e., **cleavage structure *frozen* into party system by mid-20th Century and expected to persist because:**
 - a. **Underlying conflicts persist** & groups involved have developed **collective identities**
 - b. Major new political entities typ'ly can arise only w/ large ↑ in suffrage & **universal suffrage mostly completed** by then.
 - c. **Political rules made by & so favor established parties**
 - d. **Established parties follow electoral strategies to isolate their supporters from outside appeals**
 - e. **Alignment between underlying social-structural groups and parties advantageous to parties & voters [Be able to explain how.]**
 - (1) Groups so divided provided social & political reference & source of info for members (voters)
 - (2) They provide org'l structure, people, & political ally for parties
- 3. Why were these divisions so potent?
 - a. Represented & (re-)produced deep ideological divisions
 - (1) Class: conflict over nature of politics & economics, over very org. of society
 - (2) Religion: basic value-systems (right & wrong) in conflict
 - b. Social groups enabled parties to institutionalize a basis for support
 - (1) Labor unions & firms provided organizational & people support
 - (2) Ditto for churches
- B. Perceived ↑ **electoral volatility** in 1970s led some to seek **explanations for unfreezing (*thawing*):**
 - 1. **Social-Structural Changes in Developed Democracies**
 - a. **Sectoral-Structure:** industry ↓, agriculture ↓↓, service-sector ↑↑
 - b. **Erosion of Class Boundaries**
 - (1) general education & more wide-spread higher education
 - (2) changing work modes: relative ↓ manual labor; more-fluid occup. Δ
 - (3) increasingly widespread affluence (though relative disparities widened too)
 - 2. **Changes in Patterns of Individual Voting Behavior:** Decline of **Structural Voting**
 - a. Decline class voting & religious voting but still recognizably diff.
 - b. **Arg's:** suggested reasons for class-voting decline listed above, to which add these for religious-voting decline:
 - (1) secularization & decreasing coherence of views among relig. & secular alike
 - (2) increased individuality & political sophistication
 - 3. Changes in Issues on which basis those Individuals Vote: *Dealignment v. Realignment*
- C. Closer Examination of ***The General Decline in Sociologically Determined (Structural) Vote:***
 - 1. Simple Class-Voting Decline
 - a. **Define class voting:**
 - b. **Explanations for specifically this cleavage decline:**
 - (1) Class division better defined by degree of job autonomy & authority
 - (2) Rise of the middle class "salariat" & affluent blue-collar worker
 - (3) Educational divide: skilled v. unskilled labor, human-capital rich v. poor
 - (4) Broad sectoral: public v. private; traded v. non; service v. industry v. agr
 - (5) Life-style differences: industrial v. yuppie
 - 2. Religious Voting "Decline"
 - a. **Define religious voting, two types:**
 - (1) Denominational voting
 - (2) Religious v. secular
 - b. **Explanations for specifically this cleavage decline:**
 - (1) Secularization

- (a) Decreasing church memberships & attendance
- (b) Ethical individuality—e.g. US Catholic Church
- (2) Church/state, secular/relig conflict largely resolved
- c. NOTE:
 - (1) other structural voting, esp. religious/secular, seems to have persisted to much greater degree than has class voting
 - (2) Dalton's broader claim of falling structural voting rests more solidly therefore on fact that divisions of relevance to declining prop. of pop.

3. Other Key Social Divisions

- a. Region
 - (1) Occasional, dramatic flare-ups
 - (2) Still, some general fall in region's predictive power
- b. Urban/Rural & Center/Periphery
 - (1) Differences diminishing due to transport & communications revolutions
 - (2) But still-present agricultural-industry-service divide
- c. Race/Ethnicity
 - (1) Prominent exception to general declining relevance of socioecon structure to one's vote-choice
 - (2) Many societies still homogeneous or nearly so, less relevant there obviously

D. General explanations (hypotheses) for decline of SES as predictor of vote choice

- 1. Degree to which underlying conflicts have increasingly been resolved [Note: this would also explain persistence of race-ethnicity & relative decline of other cleavages]
- 2. Parties broadened, or sought to, appeals across cleavage lines
- 3. Dalton: structural & institutional changes that have produced declining relevance relatively fixed social characteristics for contemporary electoral politics
 - a. These social cleavages still very relevant to those deeply enmeshed in them, but that's fewer & fewer
 - b. Increasing proportion of population characterized by **social fluidity & individual mobility across structured divides**. [Notice how this may explain relative ↓ class & less ↓ in religion & no ↓ in race/ethnicity.]
- 4. Parties contributed to & reinforced all this:
 - a. By seeking to accommodate these changes in structure & institutions within existing party struct. they have eroded their core estab'd images/reputations
 - b. But they do not wish to commit yet to any strong stand on the new issues.

E. New Bases of Political Cleavages: Post-Materialism

F. Impact of all this change:

- 1. **Decline in long-term structural/partisan predispositions** ==>
 - a. ↑ short-term factors like issues & image?
 - b. ↑ performance-based voting, like econ voting?
 - c. ↑ "candidate-cntrd" politics [DEF, *n.b.* US always more so? Why?]
 - d. ↑ in "issue-voting" [DEF]

IV. Comparative Governmental Systems I Executives & Legislatures (Courts, Administration, & Local Govt) [Should be little need to study this mostly descriptive material, so I will only highlight any important concepts or logics that arose]

V. Comparative Govt Systems I:

A. Overview:

- 1. To compare dem's, asking how diff ways of constructing inst's of dem might affect key soc, pol, & econ outcomes, must first have some grasp range of diff inst'l sys poss.
- 2. Branches of govt: exec, legis, judic, admin (bureauc); plus, some mech's for subdividing jurisdiction: local governance

B. Executive

- 1. Separation of Powers

- a. Executive-Legislative separation: strong in Presidential systems; weak-to-nonexistent in Parl
- b. Head of State (HoS) & Chief Executive (CEO) separation: strong in Parl; non-exist in Pres
2. Explaining varying efficacy of Heads of State (to generalize):
 - a. Formal powers in constitution,
 - b. *Plus* pol.-strategic & social situation (e.g., Fra, Fin, but also, e.g., Ita, Bel, Spa)
 - c. Direct election helps
3. Prime Minister (PM)/Chancellor (“political boss” or C.E.O.)
 - a. Usu. far more pow than pres, esp. in 1-prty gov, but in coals too. *Why?*
 - b. **Aspects/Sources of PM Power**; again, formal description part of it, but key is political position:
 - (1) PM=leg’s choice to head govt: tight **party discipline** also key
 - (2) Given modest role of HoS, PM=nation’s ctrl pol fig: *Thatcher’s England*, e.g.
 - (3) Cab & party leader: *first among equals*–hires & fires cab mins => **gatekeeper** to power (controls careers), so demands & gets strong party loyalty
 - (4) at apex of political info, & usu. govt’s **agenda-setter**: which proposals discussed, in what order
 - c. **Replacing PM’s**: PMs≠dictators, can be replaced at any time in one of three ways *Electoral Loss*, *Legislative-Majority Loss w/o Election*, or *Loss of Own-Party Leadership*
4. Cabinet (Govt): Cab=Board of Directors; set of ministers that comprise govt & head depts.
 - a. *portfolio* responsibility
 - b. collective responsibility
 - c. *Ministerial Autonomy*
- C. **Fundamental Principle of Parliamentary Democracy**: Exec. (PM & Cab) responsible to Legis. (Parl)
 1. *Vote of Investiture*
 2. *Vote of (No) Confidence*
 3. Constructive Vote of No Confidence.
 4. Govt’s do not have fixed terms / **Endogenous (as opposed to Exogenous) Election Timing**
 5. Caretaker Governments
 6. Formateurs, & Informateurs
 7. Minority Governments
- D. Legislatures (Parliaments)
 1. Legislatures in Presidential & Parliamentary Systems:
 - a. Pres sys (US+many Lat.Am. & few other dev’ing-country dem’s):
 - (1) Legislature usu. pow to create & enact legislation, including, critically, budgets
 - (2) Presidents usu. pow to ratify or veto leg., to implement & monitor/enforce it
 - b. In parliamentary systems:
 - (1) **Govt** (PM & Cab) *the* decisive power: creates, implements, monitors/enforces,
 - (2) Legislature (parl): merely enacts/ratifies, *but* parl can usu. dismiss govt at any time => “Govt responsible to Parliament”
 - (3) Key to govt dominance of parl in practicality: **party cohesion & discipline**
 - (4) **Some legislative power retained, however, if minority govt &/or strong committee system**
 2. Bicameralism & Upper Houses
 - a. Typ Powers of Upper Houses, if have any: (Italy exceptional: same as lower)
 - (1) Delay implement leg enacted by lower (usu. const’ly lmted; cannot overturn)
 - (2) Obstruct certain types of leg (veto, or indef delay): usu. on const’l grounds, sometimes more
 - b. More important if controlled by diff block than lower, and this more likely if different selection method, terms, and/or constituency structure => stronger check on rest of govt if so.
 3. *Lower House Roles*:
 - a. Making & Breaking Govts (primary role);
 - b. Legislating (small role unless minority govt &/or strong committees);
 - c. Govt Oversight (loyal opposition/public critic role)
- E. **Party Discipline** (e.g., a study: 99.8% party-line votes in Nor):

1. The Centrality of Party Discipline to Govt'l Dominance:
 - a. MP virt'ly must vote party line+Gov must have parl maj⇒*Gov passes its agenda*
 - b. ⇒ "legislature" acts as grp of parties, not some large # individs
2. Sources of Party Disc (discussed above, & more later, for now):
 - a. Party ldrs have *unpleasant punishments* for backbenchers [*e.g.?*]
 - (1) party label needed for election, can be denied
 - (2) leaders gatekeepers to powerful positions (ministries *etc*)
 - b. Positive reinforcements:
 - (1) Sense of i.d., loyalty to common purpose: e.g., share party ideology
 - (2) Opt-out provisions often exist for individ MP's on key issues
 - (3) Decision w/in party on its govt'l program may be fairly democratic
 - (4) Some negotiation (degree hard to ascertain with certainty) occurs *before* bill proposed to floor
 - (5) Some evidence backbenchers ↑'ly assertive (i.e., party discipline ↓)
 - c. P.D. key to dem responsibility in parl sys: Govt resp. to Parl. resp. to Voters, w/ clear links on whom to blame/credit (easy for voters)
 - (1) ⇒ Voters vote for Parties (smaller "personal vote")
 - (2) ⇒ MP's think of selves as rep'ing block of interests behind party
 - (3) 1+2 ⇒ less distributive & more national politics
 - (4) 1+2 ⇒ less incumbent advantage
 - (5) 1+2 ⇒ party label, w/ disc. to ensure its full meaningfulness, valuable to MPs, backbenchers & leaders (so maintain it), & voters (so demand it)

VI. Comparative Govt'l Systems II: *Lijphart & Powell*

A. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy* (1999): Chs. 1-3

1. **Ch1:** Many ways to org dem, but clear cluster along *Majoritarian v. Consensual* nature rules & practices
 - a. *Majoritarian model*: exclusive, competitive, & adversarial
 - b. *Consensus model*: inclusive, negotiation, compromise, barg.
 - c. Logically internally consistent & unified principles⇒clusters of inst'l arrange. corresponding thereto, but along 2 dims:
 - (1) Executives-Parties Dimension:
 - (a) Concentration exec. power in 1-party cabs v. exec. power-sharing in broad multi-party coal's
 - (b) Exec-dominant in exec-leg. v. exec-leg. balance
 - (c) Two-party v. multi-party systems (& , correlated, 1 v. 2+ dim. pol.)
 - (d) Majoritarian & disproportional v. proportional electoral systems
 - (e) Pluralist interest-groups w/ free-for-all competition v. coordinated & corporatist interest-groups w/ compromise & concertation
 - (2) Federal-Unitary Dimension:
 - (a) Unitary & centralized govt v. federal & decentralized govt
 - (b) Concentrate leg pow in uni- v. bicam legis power w/ diff constituencies
 - (c) Flexible constitutions w/ simple-majority amendment v. rigid constits w/ extra-ordinary amendment procedures.
 - (d) Legis final say on own legislation v. independent judicial review final
 - (e) Central banks dependent v. independent on/of executive.
2. Ch2: The Westminsterian (Majoritarian) Model: UK & New Zealand (pre-1996)
3. Ch3: The Consensus (Proportionalism) Model: Switzerland & Belgium

B. Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*: Ch1

1. Elects=*instruments of democracy* to ° pop influence pol-mkng; Disagree about how best link cits to pol
 - a. *Normative*, reflecting different ideals relationship cit's to pm's
 - b. *Conceptual*: diff understandings how cit pref's can aggregate
 - c. *Theor./Emp.*: altern. theories what instit's best link cits to pols
2. Two Camps: **Majoritarian & Proportional**
 - a. *Majoritarian*: elections as instruments of cit control

- (1) “Concentrated pm pow, whose exercise made trgt cit act”
- (2) Elected officers able to make & implement policies
- (3) Responsibility for policy obvious to everyone
- (4) Elects: *choose b/w prospective teams or reward/punish incumb’s*
- (5) N.b., concentrated power nec but not suff:
 - (a) Diffuse power ⇒ pm results from complex bargain b/w sev. reps
 - (b) ⇒Retroactive responsibility difficult to pinpoint
 - (c) ⇒ Elect only indirect relation to formation winning policy goals.
- (6) Sum: decisiveness & effectiveness in resp. to pop. will: either pro- or retro- view of elect role req’s concentrated pm power which is object of cit electoral behavior (i.e., one elects govts).
- (7) Absolute sovereignty of majority ⇒ *Majoritarian*
- b. *Prop*: elections as instruments of cit influence
 - (1) Dispersed pm power; elects indirect role: bring representative agents of all societal factions into pm arena, where bargain
 - (2) ⇒ premium on accurate reflect of pop. prefs. in pm arena. JS Mill: “In really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not disprop’ly, but prop’ly.”
 - (3) Elections clumsy instruments, esp. as held in maj. sys.
 - (4) Pref’s of all cit’s, not just maj, should weigh (proportionately) in pm
- c. *Maj & Prop* Proponents diff weighting of concerns
 - (1) *Maj*: suspicious of rep auton., less concerned re: minorities, emph. clear & direct accountability ⇒prefer concentrated pow
 - (2) *Prop*: suspicious of majorities, esp. created by clumsy elects, less worried re: rep auton, provided cit’s role in select, & less worried re: negotiated inaction⇒prefer dispersed power
3. Views of Elections & Cit Relations to Policymakers
 - a. 2D Vote Choice (Fig I.1): Target & Time Perspective
 - b. Target:
 - (1) Vote for/against Govt w/ power to make policy v. Vote for rep agent, not control Govt, but barg on behalf
 - (2) Voter anticipates decisive elect, directly determines pm’s v. barg & negot coal-bldng (discrete or contin.) follows elect.
 - (3) Both may be desirable to voters (not @ same time):
 - (a) Issues clear-cut, cit’s w/ united prefs, voters may pref former. [N.b, in game of elected v. voters.]
 - (b) Issues complex & voters divided, prob’s arise diff to antic., each grp may prefer rep by trustworthy rep’s [N.b, game b/w voters with different preferences.]
 - c. Temporal Direction: Prospective v. Retrospective
 - (1) Govt Retro⇒ (*throw rascals out*) Evaluate Incumbents.
 - (2) Govt Pro⇒ (*mandates*) Forecast perform Incumb & Chall.
 - (a) Elements of Forecast: credibility, desirability, etc. promises
 - (b) ⇒past record relevant, even though prospective
 - (3) Agent Pro⇒(*Representative Delegate*)Choose agent believe will act as (informed) voter would
 - (a) ⇒ seek agents whose pref’s mirror voter’s own
 - (b) ⇒ seek effective bargaining agents
 - (4) Agent Retro⇒(*Representative Trustee*): bring home bacon
4. Intermediate Cond’s for Effective Voting Each Type
 - a. Government Retrospective = ***Accountability Model*** (throw bums out); How it Works/What it Needs:
 - (1) Ability to reject unwanted pm’s.
 - (2) Threat of rejection ⇒ all pm’s worry about cit reaction.
 - (3) Simplicity & Limited Information Requirements (E.g., no worries about credibility: “do or do not, there is no try.”)
 - (4) But do need ***clarity of responsibility***

- (5) Also: **decisive incumbent replacement**: must follow voters' rejection
 - b. Government Prospective = **Electoral-Mandates Model**:
 - (1) Ideal party sys: strong, cohesive parties, including opp, offer effective choice. Voters eval prospects of each @ each elect.
 - (2) How it Works/What it Needs
 - (a) Possible voters to i.d. alternative future govts @ election time
 - (b) Expectation of tight link from elect outcome to govt/policy form
 - (c) Winning party(ies) have full power to make policy
 - c. Both *Accountability & Mandate* models are *Majoritarian*: [n.b., also called, jointly, *Responsible Party Govt* model]
 - d. **Representative Delegates Model**:
 - (1) Two stages: election & post-election bargaining
 - (2) Pro-/Retro- distinct less cntrl [but could do same as above]
 - (3) How it Works/What it Needs
 - (a) Each voter group must find party near enough its prefs & views
 - (b) Voter groups represented proportionally in the pm bargaining
 - (c) pm begins as reps bargain (not as collective govt implements its promises or anticipates future sanctions).
 - (d) Flexibility in post-electoral coalition formation, allowing different majorities to form on different issues.
 - (4) *Authorized Representation in Policymaking Bargaining*
- C. *Const'l Designs as Visions Maj/Prop Dem* (ch2)
1. Key is Implications for concentration/dispersal political representation & power
 - a. Do rep rules encourage leg majorities that can control exec?
 - b. Do rules for pol-making concentrate power in this party govt's hands?
 - c. Both yes ⇒ Maj; Both no ⇒ Prop Vision; Mixed otherwise.
 2. Thus, classify constitutions by their electoral & policymaking rules & the theoretical implications thereof
 3. *Rules of Representation* by which cit's votes aggregated to determine winning cand's
 - a. *Primary Key is Electoral System* and, in particular, district magnitude (see below)
 - b. Also important is division of representational roles by different chambers/branches with different constituency structures
 4. *Policymaking Rules: Majoritarian & Proportional Visions*
 - a. *Primary Key: Executive-Legislative / Govt-Opp Relations*
 - (1) *Maj*: rules favor 1 parl maj full cntrl pm, w/o check or division
 - (2) *Prop*: rules favor all parties influence pm prop'ly, govt to negotiate w/ other grps, esp. opp. grps.
 - (3) N.b., assumes tight cohesion, ° lack ⇒ ↑ opp/leg infl
 - (4) Strom (1984): Gauge by Strength of *Committee System*
 - (a) Number of standing committees
 - (b) Fixed areas of committee specialization (jurisdiction, expertise)
 - (c) Correspondence comm & ministerial jurisdictions
 - (d) Restrictions # comm assignments *per* legislator
 - (e) Proportional distribution committee chairs
 - (5) Two parts to Comm Sys Strength as gauge leg/opp influence:
 - (a) Comm's influential, not mere rubber stamp govt-formed policy
 - (b) Comm's ⇒ pm scope to actors (esp. opp) not fully tied to govt
 - (c) Strom's 1st four on part (1), 5th on part (2).
 - (6) *Table 2.2: Committee-System Strength (Leg-Opp Influence)*
 - b. **Other Inst'l Features Disperse Power (beyond Parl)**
 - (1) Indep Execs (presidentialism): veto & decree pow's esp.
 - (2) 2nd Legis Chamb w/ Indep Selection Base & Veto+ Pows

- (3) Federalism: local-level authority not fully dep on central
- (4) Judicial Review
- c. Electoral & Policymaking Institutions & Concentration/Diffusion Representation & Authority
 - (1) Seems most systems more-purely maj or prop than mix.
 - (2) Large Δ rare, esp cross types, smaller Δ w/in more common
 - (3) Why const'l designs so stable?
 - (a) Incumbents won under existing sys, \therefore rarely incentive to Δ
 - (b) Supportive, internally logically consistent phil of *Maj* or *Prop*
 - (c) Unless *very* widespread & large disaffect, voters strongly disapprove short-term manipulation
 - (d) [1st few elects new elect rules, & presumably first few acts new pm rules, highly uncertain.]
 - (4) Consequences:
 - (a) Cits & Pols approach elects w/ great know/exp how sys works
 - (b) Unless can Δ sys itself, party & voter strategies highly dependent & likely quite variant on system w/in which operating.

VII. ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

- A. Importance of Elections: Practically & Symbolically
- B. General Matters of Importance Regarding Elections
 - 1. Suffrage Expansion
 - 2. Suffrage Restrictions
 - 3. Turnout--Gen'ly higher outside US, \downarrow since 70's
 - 4. Timing of Elections: **Endogenous v. Exogenous** (Implications)
- C. Other Elections: EU & Pres & Local
- D. Other Voting--Referenda
 - 1. "voter fatigue?"
 - 2. democracy by referendum? [Chaos Theorems]
 - 3. Issues over which referenda tend to called
- E. Types of Electoral Systems
 - 1. **DEF electoral systems:** "the mechanisms that turn votes cast by people on election day into seats to be occupied by deputies in the parliament. The electoral system is what converts the choices of voters into a legislature." GLM (p. 274)
 - 2. **Where do electoral systems come from?**
 - a. "Determined by political elite of the day, some of whose motivations may be partisan" GLM (p. 274)
 - b. "designs reflect...constitution-makers' values, their expectations regarding the consequences of various arrangements, their often laboriously negotiated compromises" Powell (p. 66)
 - c. Cultural/Historical Legacy: **See Powell II Table 4.3 (p. 67)**
 - d. Generally **not** frequently manip'd for electoral advantage, despite obvious opportunities. **If such a potent political engineering tool, why not?**
 - (1) Why would those in power change system that put them there?
 - (2) Parties uncertainty about future electoral position
 - (3) Difficult to change (constitutions usually require super-majorities)
 - (4) Relatively obvious opportunism, may trigger negative voter-reaction
 - (5) Sometimes imposed from abroad (e.g. Germ., Jap., It., Aust.)
 - 3. **Key distinctions between types of electoral systems**
 - a. **Primary Simple Distinction: Proportional Representation (PR) vs. Plurality/Majority (P/M)**
 - b. **Other key features [define each]**
 - (1) DISTRICT MAGNITUDE**
 - (2) Degree of candidate vs. party voting (preference voting)
 - (3) Number of tiers

- (4) Electoral formula (within the PR-P/M divisions)
 - (5) Legal Thresholds
 - (6) Constituency pattern (e.g., Malapportionment, Gerrymanders)
 - 4. **Plurality/Majority Systems**
 - a. **Single-Member Plurality (SMP)**
 - b. **Majority Systems**
 - (1) STV: *alternative or single-transferable vote (majority version)*
 - (2) **Multiple-Round Majority Balloting**
 - 5. **Proportional Representation (PR) Systems**
 - a. **The key feature of PR is the Multi-member district**
 - b. **Key types of PR: List & STV**
 - c. **List Systems' Formulas**
 - (1) **Two Basic Types**
 - (a) **Largest Remainders (Quotas) Methods** (Hare, Droop)
 - (b) **Highest Averages (Divisor) Methods** (d'Hondt, Sainte-Lague, & Mod. SL, Imperiali--Defunct Italian system)
 - (2) **Tiers**
 - (3) **Legal Thresholds**
 - (4) **Preferential vs. Non-Preferential List**
 - d. **Single-Transferable-Vote (PR version)**
- F. **Assessing the Impacts of Electoral Systems**
- 1. **The Simple Standard Story**
 - a. Pluralist/Majoritarian => Disproportionality, but largest two parties take all or nearly all of the seats & thus the system produces stable majority govts
 - b. PR ==> Proportionality, but parties proliferate & thus system produces coalition govts, fractionalized & polarized legislatures, & thus unstable govts
 - 2. **GLM's Assessment on 6 possible effects of elect systems**
 - a. **Proportionality—strongest relation, PR => more; in fact, tight relation with District Magnitude**
 - b. **Number of parties in legislature & in elections**
 - (1) Effective (size-weighted) vs. raw number of parties
 - (2) **relation b/w # parties & ethnic het. increases & tightens w/ dist. mag. (EXPLAIN & ELAB)**
 - (3) **direct, mechanical effects vs. psychological, strategic effects**
 - (a) **Two strategic/psych effects: one at voter level (strategic voting) and one at candidate/party level (strategic entry): (EXPLAIN & ELAB)**
 - (b) **[Be able to explain why relationship between district magnitude and the number of parliamentary parties is tighter than that between district magnitude and the number of electoral parties.]**
 - (4) **PR more *necessary* than *sufficient* condition for party sys fract: disprop acts as governor, dampens soc struct reflection in prty sys**
 - c. **Coalition or Single-Party Govt: next in causal chain from DM=>Prop=># Parties=>Govt Type; some slippage at each stage of sequence, so this relation weaker**
 - d. **Constituency (District) Representation (Service): arguments each way on whether single-member-district or multi-member-district offers better district service**
 - e. **Backgrounds of Parliamentarians [e.g., more female representatives in list PR systems than in single-member-district systems; why?]**
 - f. **Gerrymandering possibilities & incentives: which systems have more such possibilities & incentives, which less, & why.**
 - g. Differences in broad econ perform little, simple relation to elect sys, but spec economic *policies* vary significantly by elect sys, especially insofar as they produce different types of govts
- G. Lijphart, *Electoral Systems* (ch. 8) (points not in GLM, or not fully)

1. Elect Sys most ctrl & direct diff Maj & Cons philosophies
 2. *7 Key Aspects Elect Sys => 2 Key Outcomes*
 - a. Aspects: EForm, DMag, LegThresh, AssySize, Pres, Malapp, Apparent: first three esp. key. (1st 3 + malapp. covered in GLM)
 - b. Outcomes: Proportionality & Number Parties
 3. *Semi-Proportional Systems*
 - a. Lmtd & Single-Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) (Japan)
 - b. Cumulative Vote (Not currently in use @ national level)
 - c. Parallel Plurality-PR System (German System)
 4. *Assembly Size*: can be consequential for disprop
 5. *Presidentialism*
 - a. Powerful pop-elect pres, esp. if simultaneously or nearly so elect w/ legis, own force toward 2-partism [Why?]
 - b. Esp. if pres by plurality rather than maj-runoff [Why?]
 6. *Apparentement* [DEF]
 7. **[DEF] Manufactured & Earned Majorities, Natural Minority**
- H. Elaboration, Clarification, & Further Topics (Lijphart II)
1. **Effective Thresholds (T_{eff})**: roughly set by dist. mag. (or exactly legal threshold if that higher)
 - a. Three Problems in determining T_{eff}
 - (1) \exists lower threshold (lowest vote share that could produce a seat) & upper threshold (lowest vote share that assures a seat)
 - (2) Both thresholds also depend on formula & # parties competing
 - (3) # prtys, DM, etc. & $\therefore T_{eff}$ can vary dist-to-district w/in system
 - b. Roughly= $\text{Max}(\text{LegalThresh}, .75/(\text{DM}+1))$, except in SMP where Lijphart sets it 35% by assumption
 2. [interesting fact/Q: US has had 100% congressional maj, only 8.7% manu.; UK has had 92% maj, all manu. What explains?]
 3. Why is relationship w/ # parties not stronger still, esp. w/ # electoral parties? [both exist, but former stronger]
 - a. Bi-directional causality [Ne => +Disprop, Disprop => -Ne]
 - b. Psychological: parties never forced to leave electoral arena; can keep losing
 - c. Multiple other factors involved here (e.g., geog. concentration of support)
 - d. Can be statistical artifact: systems performing oddly (too many or too few parties relative to designers' aims) will tend to be changed...
 4. *Refining Question*: Why eNpp so much more responsive to electoral system than eNep?
 - a. Takes Time for Expectational Effects to Manifest;
 - (1) Politicians presumably know expected effects of electoral systems, voters have to work them out.
 - (2) Historicity: 2 (effect.) prty sys won't become 3 over-night, etc.
 - b. Uncertainty over elect support for various potential new parties, or over who will lose by new rules, & whose support now vulnerable
 - (1) => risk-aversion => less changing of rules
 - (2) => "winner's curse" => excessive net party entry as rules change
 5. **Basic conclusions:**
 - a. **Some support for expected effects on most dimensions**
 - b. **T_{eff} is key factor (n.b. it subsumes PR/PM distinction, which alone strong)**
 - c. **Disproportionality is dependent variable most completely explained by electoral system, then sort of "slippages" away as go down chain: DMag=>Prop=>#Parties=>GovtType**

VIII. Parties & Party Systems

- A. Patterns in Party Politics & Party Families (GLM chs. 7-8): [Mostly descriptive, so highlight here only key concepts, etc.]
 1. Party System: DEF: character of political competition in ctry, described in terms of relative strengths

- & policy positions of its parties (GLM, p. 151)
- 2. “Responsible Party Govt” Model ≈ Accountability Model
 - a. ideological decision sharply defined for voters
 - b. cabinet govt with relatively unchecked power
- 3. Two types of Liberal Parties: Egalitarian (Center-Left) Liberals & Libertarian (Center-Right) Libs
- 4. Christian Democrats v. Secular Conservatives
- 5. “Triangular Politics”
- 6. *Politikverdrossenheit*—disillusionment w/ politics
- B. GLM, “Inside Political Parties,” (Mair) ch. 10
 - 1. The usual battle lines:
 - a. Party activists who emph adherence to ideals that 1st prompted joining
 - b. Party legislators who, as MPs, often must compromise ideologically to win elect, to enter govt, & to pass legislation
 - c. Party’s actual & potential elect supporters, & perhaps mems if mass-mem prty so many mems not activist, judge battle.
 - 2. Membership
 - a. Most voters for prty, even those reg’ly vote 1 prty *not* mems
 - b. Socio-demographics of party members
 - (1) Working class
 - (a) Less rep among prty mems than voters (esp. if exclude union auto mem)
 - (b) This increasingly true as ascend party hierarchy.
 - (c) becoming increasingly true over time also (becoming still less well-rep’d)
 - (d) true even lft prtys (where white-collar pub-sect wrkrs ↑’ly import many places)
 - (2) Women & minorities under-rep’d also, but trends in opp (1) direct.
 - c. What members do:
 - (1) Elect del’s to conf & so indirectly choose party leadership
 - (2) Mobilize electorate [define?], esp. at election times
 - (3) Once, being prty mem≈belong to sep subcult, w/ own news, clubs, soc events, & services for mems only. Faded & Fading [Why? Implic’s?]
 - 3. Important Decisions within the Party
 - a. Resolution of disputes & conflict w/in party: over policy & over spoils
 - (1) **Party Manifesto [define] & Party Program [define]**
 - (2) **Select party leadership**: often, but not always, synonymous w/...
 - (3) **Select cand & cand order [most important thing prtys do]**
 - b. **Candidate Selection**: key is degree central leadership control over selection process; consequences:
 - (1) Incumbts extremely high probability re-selected in all sys [**why?**]
 - (2) Cands in all sys always, except UK sometimes, have some local ties
 - (3) In MMD sys, cand list almost always *balanced* [**Define. Why?**]
 - (4) **Prty activist & esp. leadership control selection ⇒ ↑ prty disc.**
 - (5) ⇒trade-off: strong prtys (disciplined, responsible) v. democracy w/in prtys
 - 4. **Parties & Money: unlike US, most dems almost all cands’ money from party** [⇒ discipline]
 - a. **Sources of party income [& implications?]**
 - (1) Internal Sources: Membership fees (about 1/4 of total); “re-donated” MP’s salary; Fund-raising events; Party shops, banks, & newspapers (but many lose \$ now)
 - (2) External Sources: Interest-group backing (often limited disclosure or other restrictions); Individual backing (ditto re: disclosure & limits); Public assistance (\$ & in-kind (media time), \$ usu. in rough prop to elect strength)
 - b. **Arguments for or against state-funding; NOTE: Key whether funding allocated in proportion to past vote share or matching-funds; explain different implications.**
- C. “Party Sys & Elect Outcomes” Powell II, ch. 5 *Strong (weak)* prty sys contrib to good (poor) democratic

perform; Three broad types of systems advocated

1. "Aggregative" party systems [Examples?]
 - a. 2 or small # parties, each capable of achieving leg maj
 - b. Centrist tendencies, not too stark alternatives
 - c. Parties' support cuts across social groups
 2. "Representative" party systems [Examples?]
 - a. More parties representing a broader range of groups
 - b. Clearer rep by these parties of those specific grps
 - c. Accommodating leadership, willing to compromise & coal.
 - d. Majorities avoided
 - e. Participatory
 3. "Responsible" party systems [Examples?]
 - a. Two parties, alternation in (majority) govts
 - b. Parties w/ closer ties to (large) social grps than "agg" sys
 - c. Centralized, disciplined parties representing clearly distinct, ideolog. sharp alts
- D. Lijphart, Chapter 5, Party Systems [mostly repeat information; only new info highlighted here]
1. Issue Dimensions of Party Systems: Seven Identifiable Dimensions Across 36 Democracies
 - a. Socioeconomic: most important, present in all (*characterize Lft/Rt*).
 - b. Religion: present in $>1/2$, often high salience, but $\downarrow\downarrow$ most places
 - c. Cultural-Ethnic: present & high in most *plural societies*, some *semi-plural*
 - d. Urban-Rural: in few, mostly faded from prty sys (partys rename as move)
 - e. (Democratic) Regime Support: places where sizable comm existed, but mostly faded; not usu present in developed dems
 - f. Foreign Policy: present in a few obvious places among dev'd democracies
 - g. Materialist/Post-materialist: participatory democracy & environment; only in more dev'd countries & only recently
 2. Always few key dimensions (usually 2, rarely just 1 or more than 3)
 3. Reasons to Expect Link # Issue Dems & # Partys
 - a. Practically by definition, & hard for 2 parties more than 1 dim
 - b. But also (societal) issue dims \Rightarrow potential bases partys
- E. "Party Systems & Structures of Competition," Mair, ch3 LNN
1. Sartori ('76): fractionalization & polarization, *anti-sys* parties: Review
 - a. 2-prty, ideologically polarized (S considered none such)
 - b. 2-party, moderate ideological distance (US, UK)
 - c. Moderate Pluralism: multiparty, mod ideol distance (Den)
 - d. Polarized Pluralism: multiparty, ideol polarized (Italy)
 - e. Dominant-Party systems: Japan (until recently?; Ind, Mex)
 2. Mair's Three Distinguishing Characteristics of *Different Types of Party Competition for Govt*
 - a. **Degree of Alternation in Govt**
 - (1) Wholesale alternation: single-party v. single-party; single-party v. coalition; coalition v. coalition
 - (2) Partial Alternation
 - (3) Non-alternation
 - b. **Stability & Consistency of Govt Alternatives**: DEF: degree to which alternative govt formulas (i.e., combo of parties in govt) known or predictable before-hand (i.e., stable & consistent)
 - c. **Range of Parties as Potential Governmental Actors**
 - (1) Def: $^{\circ}$ to which access to office widely/narrowly dispersed
 - (2) N.b., what matters: whether each party viewed by others as potential govt participant, not whether actually *legitimate* potential participant in abstract
 3. Combine to one dimension: **prty sys openness or closedness**
 - a. Definitions:

- (1) **Closed:** highly predictable, little or no change over time in range governing alternatives or pattern of alternation, & with new & /or “outsider” parties finding entry difficult
- (2) **Open:** highly unpredictable, w/ varying alternation patterns, freq. & /or large shifts in composition alternatives, & relatively easy access to new parties & few or no real “outsiders”

b. Closedness or Openness depends on electoral & governmental institutions but also...

(1) **Parties’ ideologies & govt-formation strategies** (e.g., Italian DC exclusion of PC)

(2) **Parties’ electoral strategies of parties** (e.g., Fianna Fail v. FG+Lab)

(3) Closure ∴ depends heavily on norms of competition among parties & so requires time to establish => new dems open by definition, takes time to “close” them: a process of “structural consolidation” (e.g.: Gre, Por, Spa)

c. From this view, **party-sys Δ can occur w/o Δ in struct of electoral support for parties & v.v.**

IX. Voting: Partisanship & Partisan Representation

A. Party Identification (Party I.D.)

1. **DEF:** Long-term, affective, psych. i.d. w/ pref’d pol prty; Cumulative tally [*Bayesian updating/learning*]

2. **Acquiring partisan identification (“Prty ID”)**

a. Acquired largely by an **early age**–primary school => **parents & family environ play cntrl role**

b. **Accum’d exper. party supp.** itself reinf. prty ID

c. Prty ID ↑ w/ age, & esp. w/ contin. elect supp prty

d. => **unstable prty sys tend to weaken party ID**

3. **Partisanship more stable than vote pref’s in Europe as in US, but less so, Why?**

a. **Type of voting:** candidate or party

b. **Freq. of voting:** more frequent voting facilitates distinguishing between partisan loyalty & vote

4. **Impact of partisanship**

a. => **cues** for eval events, policies, prop’s, cand

(1) More broadly relevant than class or relig for this

(2) Reliance on partisanship in this way could be thought of as “satisficing”: a mental short-cut

b. **Party ID also mobilizes:** ↑s propensity to vote & to perform other political activities [*Why?*]

c. Prty ID **more easily countered in more prom. elects** (e.g., pres elects v. off-year) [*Why?*]

d. Partisanship offers clear & low-cost info. voting **cue: n.b., can only serve so if prty label provides info. on likely policies–fail to maintain partisan rep eventually weaken prty ID among supporters**

B. Partisan Dealignment [Fig 9.3]

1. Partisan align, like (social) struct voting, ↓

a. Some contend many *non-partisans* = **closet-partisans**; consistently voting for one party, even so, # of partisans definitely declining

b. Consequences:

(1) Decreased turnout might be linked to this

(2) “Split-ticket” voting increasing (Fig 9.4)

(3) More delay voting decisions (closer to elect day)

(4) Number of “floating” voters increasing

2. **Explanations:**

a. Crises & events: Vietnam, Watergate, scandals; but, if universal, such explan’s weakened

b. Many traditionally prty functions now by other orgs & grps, incl. even cand. select somewhat

c. Mass media Δs, personalizes campaigns

d. Leading prtys’ inability to address mod issues: *Keynesian Welfare State* crises, new issues, etc.

e. Δ charact’s contemp voter (Dalton: Cognitive Mobilization & Apartisans)

C. “Cognitive Mobilization” & Apartisans: two types of independents & two types of partisans

1. **Define** “cognitive mobilization”

2. **Four types** cit’s according to ° cognitive mobilization & partisan identification [Figure 9.5]

- a. *Apoliticals* (trend 0: ‘52=16%, ‘80=19%, ‘92=16%)
- b. *Ritual Partisans* (↓↓↓: ‘52=42%, ‘80=28%, ‘92=20%)
- c. *Cognitive Partisans* (↑: ‘52=32%, ‘80=35%, ‘92=41%)
- d. *Apartisans* (↑↑: ‘52=10%, ‘80=18%, ‘92=24%)

3. **Implications of rising Apartisans**

- a. ↓ consistent voting patterns
- b. ↑ issue-voting
- c. ↑ demand for responsiveness to public opinion
- d. Press for expansion of citizen-input opportunities
- e. [Plus the above & below under “consequences”...]

4. **Soc-Econ trends that ⇒ this voting-behavior trend:** parties’ actions can bolster or resist trend

- a. Young, educated, post-materialists
- b. Information revolution [...]

D. **Consequences of these trends** [discussion]

- 1. Decreased turnout might be linked to this
- 2. “Split-ticket” voting increasing
- 3. More delayed voting decisions
- 4. Number of “floating” voters increasing
- 5. Electoral volatility
- 6. Electoral unpredictability
- 7. Increased divided govt / fractionalization
- 8. Rise in independent candidates & “flash parties”
- 9. Factors further in funnel ↑ import rel to early [...]
- 10. Less consistent voting patterns
- 11. More issue-voting
- 12. ↑ demand for responsiveness to public opinion
- 13. ↑ demand for expansion cit-input opportunities
- 14. All these may produce increasing responsiveness of elected officials to public opinion [or not...]

E. **Issue & Image Voting** (Dalton, ch. 10)

- 1. **Struct & part vote ↓ ⇒ relative ↑ issue & image vote**
- 2. Issue voting long seen **key to sophisticated, rational voting. Logical req’s** for issue voting:
 - a. Citizens are interested in issue
 - b. Citizens hold an opinion on issue
 - c. Citizens know cand or parties’ stands on issue
 - d. On most issues, most cit’s do not meet req’s ⇒ early conclusion: voters incapable issue voting, but **Overlapping issue publics (DEFINE):** Most voters meet all 3 req’s on 1 issue min.

3. **Classification of issue types** [discussion]

	Content of Issue		
Time Frame	<i>Position Issues</i>	<i>Performance Issues</i>	<i>Cand/Prty Attributes</i>
<i>Retrospective</i>	Policy appraisal	Performance eval	Attribute voting
<i>Prospective</i>	Policy mandate	Anticipatory judge	

- 4. Left/right attitudes as a “super-issue”
- 5. **Image as issue:** pertains to voter eval of how cand’s will behave in certain circumstances
 - a. Interesting that, actually, the more-educated are more likely to eval. on personal characteristics
 - b. More moderate but growing impact outside US
 - c. Coming @ end *causal funnel*, ⇒ analytical prob’s
 - (1) Somewhat predetermined by earlier factors
 - (2) Hard disting. image eval. from vote choice itself

6. Opinions on ... issues ... influence vote choice
 - a. ... **Old Politics** (econ, moral, *etc.*) ... strongly ...
 - b. ... **New Politics** (environ, womens' rights, *etc.*)... only modestly ...
 - c. ... **Foreign-policy** ... **typically** only weakly ...
 - (1) **Exc. crises**, attracts primary attention of rel. few
 - (2) Party diff's on foreign policy also tend lesser
7. Ec. vote: pers/soc, ret-/pro-spective [*see Norpoth*]
8. SUMMARY: Each issue usu small agg. impact *b/c* not all salient to all voters, but together issues key to agg. outcome & ind. or small # of issues usu. key to individual voters
9. Dalton refers to all of this trend toward personal, issue-centered politics as **citizen politics**:
 - a. ↓ lng-term determ vote: struct & partisan attach
 - b. ↑ shrt-term determ vote: issues & image
 - c. Among voting pop that ↑'ly *cognitively mobilized*
- F. Political Representation (ch. 11): how well do elected reps correspond to their *constit's*? General Patterns
 1. Elites tend to be more extreme than supporters (**EXPLAIN & ELABORATE SEVERAL REASONS WHY/HOW THIS COULD BE SO IN DEMOCRACIES**)
 2. Strong constit.-rep./party-voter agreement on economic & social policy, less on foreign policy
 3. Clarity of party issue positions tends to ↑ voter-party correspondence
 4. Fractionalized party systems tend to ↑ voter-party correspondence
- X. **Voting: Who, How Many, & How?** Electoral Participation (Franklin, ch. 8 of LN & N)
 - A. Three approaches to explaining voter participation
 1. *Individual-Resources (SES) Approach*:
 2. *Political-Mobilization Approach*
 3. *Instrumental-Motivation (Cost-Benefit) Approach*
 - B. Cross-ctry variation VP much greater than b/w individuals w/ diff. characteristics; This suggests two things:
 1. much of explanation for variation VP must come from differences in political system not from differences in demographics or average individual characteristics (e.g., education level)
 2. follows, moreover, that if one aims to ↑ (or ↓) VP, changes in political institutions, environments, & rules are way, esp. since most individual-level characteristics less manipulable
 - C. Comparing approaches w/ these considerations in mind:
 1. Individual-resources approach
 - a. arg: people w/ time, \$, & intellectual where-w/-all to participate
 - b. evidence:
 - (1) w/in ctry, broadly true, though perhaps not so strong as you'd think
 - (2) cross-ctry: not much variation on avg levels \$, edu, etc., so don't explain much
 2. Political-mobilization approach:
 - a. arg: grps, orgs, & media can be very effective in exhorting, inculcating participatory ethic, etc.
 - b. evidence:
 - (1) no doubt that group efforts effective (esp. driving people to polls, register, etc.), media effect more debatable
 - (2) even less cross-ctry var mobilization efforts than in ind char's
 3. Instrumental-motivation approach:
 - a. arg: people vote based on perceived C & B (largely perceived policy-influencing efficacy) of voting
 - b. subsumes both other approaches & also allows election *contest* itself to be factor driving turnout
 - c. Specific hypotheses derives from this approach
 - (1) ↑ policy relevance elect & voter's role in it ⇒ ↑ voter turnout [*salience*]
 - (a) is (executive) policymaking power clearly, unmitigatedly at stake? [*federalism, division of power, etc. reduce turnout*]
 - (b) is election expected to be close? (particularly in my district?)
 - (c) is outcome likely to affect public policy?
 - (d) are perceived differences between perceived alternatives large?

- (2) electoral system that ↓ proportion of wasted votes ↑ turnout
- (3) anything that ↑ vote difficulty (costly in time, \$, opp costs), ↓ VP
 - (a) compulsory voting
 - (b) registration laws
 - (c) weekend/workday polling
 - (d) advance and/or postal voting
 - (e) number of days polls are open
- (4) *voter fatigue*: ↑#distinct elects⇒↓VP [correlates highly w/ no on 1a]
- d. Evidence [review regression analysis]:
 - (1) The individual-level results are given in Table 8.3
 - (2) Country-level results given in Table 8.4
- D. Economic Voting (Helmut Norpoth, “The Economy,” in LNN) [More questions than answers here]
 - 1. Form of the Vote Function (describing relation from economic outcomes to vote shares incumbents)
 - a. Common or Conflicting Interests? (Valence v. Positional Issues; Partisan Reward & Punishment?)
 - b. Symmetric or Asymmetric Reward & Punishment?
 - c. Personal or Sociotropic Concerns?
 - d. Retro- or Prospective Evaluation?
 - 2. Vote fnctn, whatever form, varies across ctry-time. Why?
 - a. Clarity of responsibility (Powell & Whitten)
 - b. Alternatives for Discontent–2-prty sys clearest [US or UK?]
 - 3. Uninformed voters?
 - a. Perfectly rational to be uninformed (**Rational Ignorance**)
 - b. (Partisan) ideological filters? Reputation
 - c. If electorate *right-on-average (unbiased)*≈irrelevant that uninformed.
- XI. Extra-electoral Participation & Interest Groups (Bashevkin, “I-G’s & Social Movements,” in LNN)
 - A. Definitions
 - 1. Interest Groups (IG’s): *Truman (1951)*: ‘IG’ refers to any group that, on basis of 1 or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes... (pp. 135-6)
 - 2. Social Movements (SM’s): Bashevkin: Like IG’s except “more pro-change, more challenging, *vis-à-vis* institutional status quo”; Less formal than interest grps, more heterogeneity of views typically within SM’s than IG’s (largely because former are typically broader)
 - B. Interest Group Functions:
 - 1. Social roles of IG’s
 - a. [shared attitudes] afford participants frames of reference for interp. & eval. events & behave
 - b. Like prtys, function as soc. networks as well as pol. org’s
 - 2. Electoral roles of IG’s:
 - a. Evaluate competing candidates
 - b. Help fund candidates
 - c. Mobilize voters
 - 3. Policymaking roles of IG’s
 - a. Influence or pressure govt decision-makers, but not seek office (distinguishes them from parties)
 - b. Provide information to policymakers
 - (1) Where voters/citizens stand on issues
 - (2) Information (possibly biased) about issue itself
 - C. Substantive Q’s regarding interest groups & movements
 - 1. Why some grps more diff. to org than others?
 - a. Mem’s Hetero/homo-geneity: SE homog & unity views
 - b. Size of the groups (Olson) [**Logic of Collective Action**]
 - c. Coercion/suasion & Selective benefits (Olson)
 - 2. What explains difference in *means* employed by different groups with shared interests?

- a. institutional & ideological settings
- b. History? “diffusion of innovation”
- c. Intensity of views?
- d. Power config. of alternative & orthogonal views?
3. What explains gen. ↑ # & importance of I.G.’s?
 - a. Decline of parties
 - b. Education & affluence => greater resources & abilities => lower relative cost to mobilize groups
 - c. Advances in communications & transportation tech=> increased efficiency in organizing
4. What explains variation across space & time in activities of I.G.’s?
 - a. Traditionally I.G.’s in US politics lobbied elected politicians in national & state capitals, ↑’ly they...
 - (1) Work in coalitions to lobby bureaucrats
 - (2) Present their arguments in court
 - (3) Go directly to pub *via* media interviews & ads
 - (4) Try to influence elections as well as traditional attempt to influence policy at legislative stage
 - b. What might explain these changing activities?
 - (1) Increasing professionalization of interest groups
 - (2) Societal changes? [Such as...]
 - (3) Voting-behavior changes?
5. What explains differing success of various grps of interests in achieving their ends?
 - a. Brdth & flexblty grp’s *tactical repertory*
 - b. History, *e.g.*, novelty of SM’s or IG’s aims or tactics?
 - c. Institutional differences in political process?
 - d. Emphasis on (relative) internal group characteristics, especially organizational resources.
 - (1) S-E status, media access or control, education, & skill of group leaders
 - (2) Internal organizational cohesion
 - (3) Strategic social position (in political issue-space rel. to other I.G.’s)
 - (4) *Group Resources*: financial & human resources positively related to policy influence
 - (5) *Group Cohesion*: organizational control, unity, & discipline positively related to influence
 - (6) *Leadership Expertise*: policy & administrative knowledge always helps
 - (7) *Grp Representativeness*: favorable strategic position & /or grp standing in policy domain

D. Theoretical “Models” of Group Activity

1. *Power-Elite Model*: Small elite, sometimes covert, controls govt, limiting opp’s for “average” citizens’ political participation
2. *Pluralist Model*: “Vectors of pol. inputs” image: multiple (vector) forces push govt; resultant (vector) of those forces=>policy
 - a. Multiple points of access for diverse interests => group participation in public policymaking is virtually assured
 - b. Basic Argument/Assumption Pluralist Model: open, fair competition naturally favors groups w/ highest net “score” on these factors
3. *State- & Institution-Centric*: emphasize state preferences, capacity, & autonomy
4. *Corporatist Model*: system of interest rep in which constituent units org’d into limited # of larger, more-encompassing institutions for direct interaction with & involvement in policymaking process

XII. The Distribution of Governmental Authority & Govt Formation

A. Lijphart, Ch. 7: Executive-Legislative Balance

1. Presidential v. Parliamentary Govt
 - a. Three Crucial Differences
 - (1) *Parl*: HoG (PM) resp to/dept on legislative confidence; *Pres*: HoG (Pres) elected for const’yly prescribed period & not under normal circumstances resp/dep to/on legis.
 - (2) *Pres*: HoG pop’yly elect (usu directly); *Parl*: HoG leg. select
 - (3) *Parl*: collective exec’s; *Pres*: one-person, non-coll. exec.
 - (a) *PM* power can vary: pre-eminence to virtual equal cab mins’

- (b) *Pres cab mins*=his/her appoints: advisory, subord role
 - b. Semi-Presidential Systems: pop elect pres & parl PM
 - (1) Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, but Austria, Ice, Ire, & , post-'82 Port presidents relatively weak
 - (2) France, Finland, Short-Lived Israeli System only systems with powerful Pres & Parl among developed democracies (others in developing world)
 - c. Other Important (but not as universal) Pres-Parl Diff's
 - (1) Sep v. Fuse Exec/Legis entail (non-) mem in both? Varies.
 - (2) Pres/Cabs not right dissolve legis; PMs & Cabs do., but degree to which right unmitigated (UK) or lmtd (Germ) varies.
 - (3) (Non-)Separation HoS from HoG: many exceptions.
2. Degrees of Executive Dominance
- a. Legis-Exec Balance not fully determined by Pres-Parl.
 - b. Presidential Power Sources
 - (1) Varying Formal Const'l Powers: Reactive (Veto) & Proactive (Decree)
 - (2) Varying Strength & cohesion pres' party in legis
 - (3) Direct or indirect election (& usu. only they have 1 national dist)
 - c. 1-Party-Maj Govt enhances Exec Dom
- B. Lijphart, ch. 14: 2D Conceptual Map Democracy
1. Strong Clustering 10-Variables Along 2-Dimensions
- a. Executive-Parties Dimension
 - (1) Effective Number Parliamentary Parties
 - (2) ***Percentage Minimal Winning 1-Party Cabs (core element)***
 - (3) Executive Dominance (of legislature)
 - (4) Electoral Disproportionality
 - (5) Interest-Group Pluralism (as opposed to Corporatism)
 - b. Federal-Unitary Dimension
 - (1) ***Federalism & Decent (core element)*** (ch. 10) (DEF)
 - (2) Symmetric & Incongruent Bicameralism (ch. 11) (DEF)
 - (3) Consitutional Rigidity (ch. 12...)
 - (4) Judicial Review (...ch. 12) (DEF)
 - (5) Central Bank Independence (ch. 13) (DEF)
2. Explanations for patterns/clustering:
- a. Pol heritage & soc pluralism explain much of 1st D
 - b. Pop size & soc pluralism explain much of 2nd D
 - c. ⇒ perhaps representational dem & federal/decentralization functional substitutes/complements in managing social heterogeneity
- C. Powell, *Accountability: Conditions for Citizen Control* (Ch3)
1. **Clarity of Responsibility**: Single, unified, identifiable set of policymakers ⇒ policymaking authority concentrated ntl leg & exec + unified & disciplined (*strong*) governing party
2. *Govt Type* in increasing order of *CoR*:
- a. Minority Govt:
 - b. Minority Govt w/ Fixed & Known Outside Support
 - c. Post-Election Negotiated Majority Multiparty Govt
 - d. Pre-Election Confirmed Majority Multiparty Govt
 - e. Majority Single-Party Govt:
3. Evidence: "Economic Voting" stronger in latter government types; Corr w/ "Expert Ratings" Opposition Influence
4. Additional Issues & Modifying Considerations
- a. Diff to assess pres relative to parl sys on *CoR*: definitely less than 5, could be as low as 1
 - b. *Legislative & Executive Separations of Powers* allows separate accountability, but also blurs

responsibility & complicates voters' assessment task; likewise *Federalism & Decentralization*; on balance, likely reduce *CoR*.

- c. Party Cohesion also critical to *CoR*: discipline increases *CoR*, lack of unity weakens it.
- d. Effective Bicameral Opposition (real power & distinct basis) weakens *CoR*
- e. Committee Influence (Real Power plus Proportional or Inclusive Chair Allocation) weakens *CoR*
- f. Socio-Economic Conditions: stuff *beyond policymakers control* [e.g., globalization] weakens *CoR*

D. *Conditions Mandates: Identifiability & Majority* (Ch4)

1. Criteria: Voter needs to be able...
 - a. ...to anticipate govt that will form as response to votes
 - b. ...to expect govt's cohesive, with durable efficacy to fulfill
 - c. ⇒ *Identifiability & Efficacy (Responsivity & Responsibility)* ⇒ need:
2. ***Identifiability***: Key=*nature electoral & partisan competition for govt*; in decreasing order:
 - a. Strong 2-prty comp govt maj ⇒ most identifiable, but (n.b., almost exclusively manufactured)
 - b. Formal Pre-election Coalitions
 - c. Highly predictable or regularized coalition patterns
 - d. No pre-determ'd or strongly expected post-elect govts
3. ***Identifiability PLUS*** strong majority necessary for effective Mandate operation

E. *Vision Dispersed Pow: Auth'd Representation* (Ch5)

1. Two Key Stages:
 - a. *Proportionality in Selection to Representative Arena*
 - b. *Proportionality in Input from Representatives to Pol-mkng*
 - c. #2 never fully, ranges from opposition≈0 influence beyond seek sway pub-opinion to considerable oversight & veto powers, effective supra-maj req's, etc.
2. *Proportionality in Selection to Representative Arena*: straightforward; know all about this from electoral systems material
3. *Proportionality in Input from Representatives to Pol-mkng*
 - a. Powell's Approach: Weigh 3 sets voters to obtain total % effectively represented in policymaking
 - (1) Supporters of Govt Parties: 100% effective representation
 - (2) Supporters of Gov-Supp Parties: 75% effective representation
 - (3) Supporters Opp Parties: 10%-50% effective representation, depending on institutional-structural conditions that ↑↓ opposition influence
 - b. Institutional-structural conditions ↑↓ opp influence
 - (1) Majority Status Govt (Govt Type, roughly as above)
 - (2) Committee Strength (as above)

XIII. **Parliamentary Govt Formation & Dissolution, Pt 1: Unidimensional Models**

A. **Two Central Q's Regarding Politics of Coalition:**

1. **Govt partisan composition & cab-ministry allocation**
2. **Durability / instability of govts**

B. Powell II, ch. 7:

1. Executive Stability
 - a. Const'l factors dominate explanation of exec perf (ch.2-4)
 - (1) Presidential sys ⇒ durable, but often minority, govts
 - (2) Majoritarian Parl. sys. ⇒ durable, usually maj, govts
 - (3) Representative Parl. sys. ⇒ unstable, occas'ly min, govts
 - b. Presence strng extremist prtys key aspect rep. parl. sys. that ⇒ *negative exec-perf outcomes* (ch.5)
 - c. Typical Govt Duration by Govt Type:
 - (1) 1-prty-maj most durable, then minimum-winning-connected
 - (2) Over-sized & unconnected govts should be less durable
 - (3) Minority govts among least durable, but, & among these, externally-supported minority govts relatively durable
2. Evidence from King, Alt, Burns, Laver: internal characteristics government; characteristics of political

system; external conditions/shocks/events

3. Comparing Presidential & Parliamentary Govts

- a. Pres sys all have durable exec's relatively indep of party sys or political & social environ, but exec often lacks legis maj (*divided govt* common to pres. sys., not unique to US)
- b. Pres sys assoc. w/ *weaker* parties (less unitary), perhaps exactly b/c party can vote against exec w/o risk dissolution
- c. Weak party discipline also what makes exec remaining in power w/o legislative majority feasible
- d. At same time, it means pres do not enjoy anything like degree of legislative control that PM's do
- e. If anything, separated powers work to require more complex negotiations b/w exec's & legis.'s, esp. since usu. different elect. constituencies (Pres=ntnl, Legis=sub-ntnl)

C. Govt Formation Arguments:

1. Parties' Motivations 2-fold (n.b., parties as unitary actors)

a. Desire to participate in & control (current) policymaking

(1) For both **intrinsic ("policy-seeking")** reasons—parties care about what policies are made—and

(2) **instrumental ("office-seeking")** reasons—parties & party members wish to remain in govt, which requires voter support, which presumably depends on policies

b. Parties also motivated by considering ramifications of current acts for future ability to participate (*i.e.*, esp. future elect ramifications)

2. What sorts of govts will form then?

a. Implies that govts will tend to form that contain...

(1) as few prtys as poss to max seats/prty for spoils & influence reasons

(2) as little ideol dissent as poss to make pol's as close to ideal as poss

(3) sufficient parl. support to pass necessary initiatives

b. Goals often conflict, but knowing them helps predict what govt-types will form & endure

D. Lijphart, Ch.6

1. **(0- and 1-Dimensional) Coalition Theories:**

a. If 1-prty maj possible, usu forms.

b. **Minimal-Winning Coalitions** (Riker '62): **DEF**

(1) Base Assume: parties max pow, cab=pow, ⇒ as many cab seats poss

(2) ⇒ Only include prtys strictly nec to install & maintain govt

c. **Minimum-Size Coal's:** extend MWC logic: divy spoils to fewest MP's poss ⇒ set of parties with smallest possible majority % of parliament

d. **Minimum-Parties Coal's** (Leierson '70): extend MWC logic: Fewest prtys possible to MWC ⇒ ↓ barg & negotiation costs form & maintain coalition

e. **Minimal Ideological-Range Coal's** (deSwaan '73): ease form & maintain coal's of prtys w/ similar pref's. Two versions:

(1) **ordinal version:** Maj coal's w/ smallest L-R distance to obtain *its* majority

(a) Note: *compare within* coalition itself: does narrower range majority exist within its range? If so, not Min IR Coal.

(2) **cardinal version:** Maj coal's w/ smallest L-R distance of *possible* majorities (L uses)

(a) Note: *compare across* Min IR Coals of ordinal sort & pick the narrowest range one.

(3) Note for both versions: need not be connected; need not be minimal-winning, so can be multiple Min IR coals within a single L-R min-IR span.

f. **Minimum Connected Coal's that Win** (Axelrod '70):

(1) Parties try to coalesce w/ ideol neighbors, continue until majority.

(2) Adding connecting prty to o/w separated coal lowers avg ideol distance b/w govt prtys & thereby perhaps facilitates compromise

(3) Additional logics to connected coal's from Powell & me:

(a) lessens ° to which separated parties seen (by mems & voters) as deviating from ideals in joining coalition

- (b) [parties b/w others in coal. can add legis. support w/o requiring much/any further policy-compromise]
- (4) Notes: need not be Minimal Winning; will be Minimal Ideological-Range
- g. **Policy-Viable Coalitions** (Laver & Schofield '90):
 - (1) If solely policy-motivated, & policy req's legis maj, then govt'l membership & majority irrel., just party pivotal-ness in leg barg ⇒ **Median-Party Govt**
 - (2) If add reasons to be in govt, e.g., office-seeking or agenda-power, then ⇒ **MWC's containing median parties**
- 2. **Empirical Prob:** all but connected & min-range = MWC, all but policy-viable=majority, but oversized & minority govts not at all rare. Some important possible explanations below.
- 3. Presidential Cabinets:
 - a. Re: keeping office, pres exec & cab always MWC 1-prty maj
 - b. Re: passing agenda, may be Min, MWC, or oversized (flex).
- E. Building & Maintaining (Parl.) Govt (GLM ch.12)
 1. **2 Cntrl Q's: Govt Comp & Cab-min Alloc; G Durability**
 2. Politicians motivated by some combo (a) "fame & power" (**opportunistic/office-seeking**) & (b) desire influence pub pol (**politic-/outcome-seeking**), & these diff implic's in govt form
 - a. Pure office-seeking ⇒ MWC logic: don't share any further than must ⇒ oversized govts a puzzle
 - b. Pure pol-seeking ⇒ ideol/pref-compatibility ⇒ median-prty govt
 - c. Combination of these motivations may suggest the theories above
 3. Minority Govts, Hypotheses:
 - a. Strom: as ability of parties to influence pol from opp ↑, freq min govt ↑; evidence supports.
 - b. Luebbert: ↑ role of interest grps & org's outside parl. (esp. corporatist-type policymaking) ↓ necessity of being in govt to influ pol, so should ↑ minority govts; evidence supports.
 - c. Laver & Shepsle: ↑ pol divisions among opp's ⇒ ↓ ability to form alt govt, which should enable minority-govt formation—especially centrist govts can do this; evidence supports.
 - d. Parties' time-perspective: stay out for now to gain some future electoral advantage? No evidence yet.
 - e. Lack vote investiture may preserve minority
 - f. Constructive vote no confidence (in Germany, or sim *majority against* req in France) may preserve minority (as well as foster maj)
 4. Oversized Govts, Hypotheses:
 - a. *Govts of national unity*: several observed oversized govts occur immed postwar, only occas. after & then usu. short-lived & arise in *crises*; Grand coal's as unity signal esp. re: foreign threats
 - b. Policy agenda in some sit's may require super-maj. (Belg. notable) ⇒ not all seeming oversized govts actually "surplus"
 - c. Extra parties may be included for signals they send about govt's policy stance
 - d. Dominant party(s) in coal may want surplus minor parties so no one smaller-party ally has *veto*
 - e. [surplus govts maybe esp. likely when MWC bridges smaller intermed party b/c little further policy-compromise necessary to ↑ legis strength of govt.]
 - f. [party discipline may => need of extra "insurance" support]
 - g. Insurance against defection (uncertain & uncommitted allies)
 - h. Policy-based theories predict occasional oversized (not enough)
 5. Note: some similarity minority & oversized govt in somewhat optional & flexible nature of govt support.
 6. The Allocation of Cabinet Portfolios (simple theories); Two Q's:
 - a. How many seats to each party? Proportional to each party's share of legis. maj.
 - b. Which portfolios to which parties?
 - (1) Tendency for med prty on each pol D w/ a cab dept to get that portfol
 - (2) Tendency for prtys most cntrly interested in pol D to get that portfolio
 7. The Stability of Parliamentary Govts
 - a. Explaining Duration: Three sets of factors

- (1) Features of Govt Itself
 - (a) Number of parties in the govt (fractionalization)
 - (b) Ideological distance b/w parties in govt (polarization)
 - (c) Majority/Minority status of govt
- (2) Features of the Political Environment
 - (a) Party System: Larger, more diverse party systems ↓ govt duration because smaller shocks can change what coalition is an equilibrium
 - (b) Other factors? [Powell: extremist party support]
- (3) Shocks, events, & external circumstances [journalistic accounts invariably focus on these]
 - (a) Worsening economic conditions, esp. unemployment
 - (b) Unemp especially bad for ctr-right; infl esp'ly bad for socialist-led
 - (c) Scandals, etc.

F. NOTE: YOU WILL BE EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO APPLY THESE THEORIES OF COALITION FORMATION, SO WORK THROUGH THE EXAMPLES IN THE NOTES, TEXTS, &/OR CREATE SOME FOR YOURSELF (on a left-right policy line, label 6 or 7 parties, allocate 100 parl seats across them, then identify the MWC's, the Min Connected, the...)

G. Laver & Shepsle's Multidimensional Model of Govt Formation & Dissolution

1. Background

- a. Rationality (=cost-benefit & forward looking) & Methodological Individualism (only individ's act)
- b. Steps in Rational Models
 - (1) Posit *aims* or *goals* (i.e., *utility*) (office & preferred policies) of key actors (politicians, esp. MPs) in phenom studied (govt formation & dissolution).
 - (2) Define *decision rule* by which those actors choose b/w alternative possible actions
- c. Specifically, in this model of govt formation, we assume:
 - (1) Politicians purely policy-motivated; intrinsically or instrumentally doesn't matter
 - (2) *Common Knowledge*: Policy aims of all players, all rules of govt-form. game, known to all.
- d. Legacy: Some Important Prior Theoretical Results (know roughly what these say)
 - (1) One Dimension
 - (a) Black's (1958) **Median Voter Theorem (MVT)**
 - (b) Hotelling's (1928)/Downs' (1957) **Party Competition Centripetal Tendency** implication of MVT in 2-prty elections: strong incents parties converge toward median voter's ideal
 - (2) Multiple Dimension Extensions:
 - (a) McKelvey's & Schofield's "**Chaos Theorems**" / Arrow's **Impossibility Theorem**
 - (b) Strongly suggests inst'l restrictions on proposal- & decision-making process essential to non-arbitrary democracy: Shepsle's **Structurally Induced Equilibrium**
 - (c) Kadane (1972) showed that if eqbm exists in unstructured multi-D space (likely will not), then must be *multi-D median*, a.k.a. **Dimension-by-Dimension Median (DDM)**

2. Govt Formation-and-Dissolution Game in this context

- a. These prior results refer to *policies* emerging from maj-rule voting, not to *govts* forming subject to maj approval. Govt form & diss process adds just such *structure* that brings eqba to multi-D prob.
- b. The Institutional Structure of Govt Decision-Making
 - (1) *Executive Policymaking*: Policy decisions are made by the executive.
 - (2) *Strong Ministerial Autonomy*: Depts, & esp. their cab. mins, have agenda power & info., expertise, resource advantages that give them wide latitude in directing policy w/in their sphere
 - (3) => *Overall policy position of govt given by partisan position of politicians' parties who are given the various cabinet portfolios.*
 - (a) => even in multi-dimensional space, the set of possible policies for govt is finite.
 - (b) Precisely this specificity, & finiteness of set of poss. govt policies (given by set of poss. party combo's in cab. offices), limits "chaos" potential of multi-D decision-making.

3. Building Blocks of the Cabinet-Form.-and-Diss. Model

- a. Motivations: MPs act "as if" solely **policy-motivated**

- b. Rational foresight & everything **common knowledge**
 - c. **Parties=unitary actors**
 - d. Dimensionality: Theoretically infinite # may exist, but empirically great correlation in party stances across substantive dimensions... [we worked with only 2 dimensions]
 - e. Rationality (Cost-Benefit Analysis) in 2D => **Indifference Curves**
 - f. **Ministerial Discretion**: Govts implement preferred policy of party holding each cab. min. in that min.'s area. Three sources of this ministerial autonomy:
 - (1) Mins. may act freely in their area on whatever whole cab. not explicitly decided
 - (2) Mins. may influence which matters come to cab. for such decision
 - (3) Mins. may influence content of proposals they or others put to cab.
 - g. *Unitary parties + ministerial-policy + indivisible ministries* ==> *limited number of possible govts (and thus policies)* to consider, as given by **lattice** of perpendicular intersections of parties' ideal points [see example]. 2 key assumptions here:
 - (1) Party's discretion in 1 portfolio not affected by who has others [?]
 - (2) Party's preferences on 1 D not affected by policies on other D's [?]
 - h. Parties incorporate *all expected* policy decisions into deciding whether to vote for particular cabinet => unforeseen matters (only) potential sources of cabinet collapse
 - i. The *Status Quo*:
 - (1) Current govt remains in office until defeated by legis. majority, which can only happen when...
 - (a) ...unforeseen circumstances Δ distrib. of legis. pow. that supp. govt at start,
 - (b) ...some party or parties shift their ideological positions (unforeseen), or
 - (c) ...some party or parties split or combine to new ideal points.
 - (2) When govt collapses, remains in office as caretaker until new govt receives majority support.
 - j. Any participant in a proposed govt can *veto* that govt by refusing to accept its proposed role; this plus majority parl-supp requirement => ***equilibrium govts require unanimous internal consent of parties in it & majority external support of all legis. parties***
4. **Working through the Model**—NOTE: YOU WILL BE EXPECTED TO APPLY THIS MODEL, SO WORK THROUGH SOME EXAMPLES IN THE NOTES, THE TEXT, &/OR CREATE SOME YOURSELF (on some graph paper, draw 4 or 5 dots, label them as parties and assign a number of parl seats to each; then go through the steps). YOU WILL HAVE THE FLOWCHART FROM YOUR NOTES USED FOR DETERMINING EQUILIBRIA IN THE MODEL.
- a. *Equilibrium Cabinet*: cabinet for which no actor with power to cause govt collapse has incentive to do so; in this model, ***equilibrium govts require unanimous internal consent of parties in it & majority external support of all legis. parties***
 - b. Information necessary to analyze cabinet formation in model
 - (1) About parties
 - (a) Their identity (how many distinct parties)
 - (b) Their legislative weight (seats for each party)
 - (c) Their policy positions (ideological positions in determined policy-space)
 - (2) About Policy Space & Departmental Structure of Govt
 - (a) Set of (key) relevant policy dimensions
 - (b) Set of (key) cabinet ministries & their competences (i.e., issue domains)
 - (c) Relation b/w the two: simple 1-for-1 relationship assumed for most of book
 - (3) About the formation process (assumptions)
 - (a) Proposals can come from anyone at any time
 - (b) *Unanimous internal consent is required*
 - (c) *Majority legislative consent is required*
5. Important Concepts/Tools/Starting Points
- a. **Indifference Curves** for Euclidean Preferences [those circles]
 - b. The *(Policy) Winset* & the *Lattice (or Govt or Cabinet) Winset*:
 - (1) *(Policy) Winset* of some policy x : set of all alternative pol's majority-preferred to x

- (2) **Lattice Winset** of some cab. X : set of all alt. *cab.*'s majority-preferred to X
- c. The **Dimension-by-Dimension Median (DDM) Government**
- (1) DEF: a cab. is the DDM *iff* its associated policy is the median on each dimension (has 50%+ on either side of itself, including itself).
 - (2) Easy way to find this: read left to right & top to bottom (or v.v.) until find lattice line that turns minority into majority. [examples below + Figure 4.1]
 - (3) DDM is *an* eqbm govt if no alternative govt lies in its *winsset*, but no guarantee DDM will have empty *winsset* (so it may not be an eqbm)
 - (a) DDM always a potential eqbm point, so useful place to start the analysis
 - (b) DDM more likely empty *winsset*, & so be *an* eqbm, when # of parties & D low
- d. **Strong Parties**
- (1) DEF: Party S is strong if it participates in all cab.'s maj pref'd to its ideal point (so can veto any cab. maj-pref to its ideal & so perhaps secure ideal)
 - (2) 2 types of "strong" party: "very strong" or "merely strong"; "strong"=either
 - (a) **very strong party**: no cab. maj-pref to its ideal exists;
 - i) \Rightarrow party's ideal=empty-winsset DDM
 - ii) = *the* equilibrium. Very strong party gets everything.
 - (b) **merely strong party**: cab.'s maj-pref to its ideal exist, but it participates in all of them, & so can veto them.
 - i) Equilibria will be the strong party's ideal point, and all governments majority preferred to it that are no farther away from the party's ideal than empty-winsset DDM if one exists.
 - (3) **Highlander Theorem**: At most 1 strong party can exist
 - (4) Whether & who's strong will depend on weights & positions of parties
 - (a) Δ s entirely external to strong party itself can Δ identity or existence of s.p.
 - (b) "Striking discontinuities"
 - i) small Δ n weights or positions can have large effect on who's strong & thus on cab.
 - ii) conversely, large Δ in these same could have no effect on who's strong
 - iii) depends on how close eqbm is to some alternative govt in lattice that could be an eqbm if things were just somewhat different [refer back to diagrams]; notice that this implies governments more stable in less dense lattices (fewer parties, lower dimensions)
 - (5) Notice the strong centripetal tendencies:
 - (a) Either the DDM is an equilibrium, or
 - (b) strong party can move eqbm toward its ideal, but s.p. tend to be toward median
 - (6) Special Case: 2 Dimensions, 3 Parties, any 2 parties make a majority \Rightarrow "Triangular system"
 - (a) Only "middle" party can be strong, & it usually is (but doesn't have to be)
 - (b) DEF "Middle" here: connect party ideal points to make triangle, party whose ideal point is vertex between two smaller legs of triangle is "middle"
 - (7) Size & "median-ness" key to being strong & therefore "big player" in G-form game, being in small, low-D party system also helps.
6. Testable Implications of the Theory
- a. Status Quo (SQ) govt at beginning of period either remains or is replaced by govt in its *winsset*
 - b. If SQ has an empty *winsset*, then SQ remains in office
 - c. If party is very strong, then it gets all seats in the cabinet
 - d. If party is merely strong, then it gets at least one seat in cabinet
 - e. If party strong, & every cabinet in *winsset* of its ideal gives some particular cabinet seat to that party, then party will get that seat
 - f. If party strong, then each cab. seat is assigned to that party or to one of its *partners* (= those parties participating in govts in *winsset* of SP's ideal)

XIV. Outcomes:

A. Gallagher, Laver, & Mair, chpt. 13: The central question: does politics matter?

1. Diff. to determine whether partic. govt made diff. in partic. instance b/c counter-factual: would

something diff. have happened if diff. govt in office?

2. Approaches
 - a. Detailed ‘case study’ of major policy interventions. Logic: pick dramatic policy initiative, if world changes some way, then initiative caused it
 - b. Compare elect promises w/ govt programs at investiture
 - c. Compare elect promises & /or govt programs w/ policy actions
 - d. Spec’ly gov spend or other directly observable govt action
 - e. Broad outcomes like gov size, econ outcomes (UE, INF, ineq.)
3. Case Studies: privatization in France & UK
4. Party manifestos & govt policy-programs [2nd ed.]. General conclusions:
 - a. When parties’ elect manifestos diverge much, progs reflect this
 - b. Conversely, where parties’ manifestos show little pol debate, lack of debate reflected in their respective programs
 - c. Where govt alt partial [DEF], response in govt prog’s also partial
 - d. Prog’s tend closer to ‘perm fixtures’ of govt than partners
5. Party manifestos & actual govt policy
 - a. Methodological issues
 - (1) What’s a pledge & what’s just a platitude or aspiration?
 - (2) Disting. pledges would have power to fulfill if elect from not
 - (3) Fulfillment is going to be a matter of degree
 - b. Findings:
 - (1) Parties overwhelmingly do what they promise:
 - (a) **70-90% fulfillment rates** found
 - (b) Even at lower end, it’s 70% complete fulfillment, **only about 1% do-the-opposite**, remaining percentages try and fail or limited fulfillment
 - (2) Clarity of promise (esp. those regarding ↑ benefits etc.) increases its odds of being fulfilled
 - (3) Promises to repeal ideologically unacceptable acts of previous govt almost always fulfilled
 - (4) Evidence from multiparty coalition govts lacking: some rough evidence that generally, across countries & time, policies react to vote-weighted policy-programs of parties
 - c. Criticisms:
 - (1) Many focus only on ‘doable’ promises
 - (2) Lots of promises are straightforward & uncontroversial
 - (3) Parties may choose to promise only what easily kept so it can carry their fulfillment to electorate
6. Party govt & public policy: Left/Right & Size of Govt, Bdgt Categories/Priorities, & Environment
 - a. Broad association b/w L/R govt partisanship & govt size / policy emphases as expected; NOT L/R associate with deficits & debts as might expect (right more deficit/debt-prone)

B. LIJPHART ch15: *Macroeconomic Management & Violence Control*

1. “So what?” Does maj v. cons dem matter? How? Conventional Wisdom:
 - a. Based on PR v. Plur/Maj, extended to maj v. consensus: Tradeoff b/w the “quality” & the “effectiveness” of democratic govt
 - (1) PR/Cons ⇒ more accurate rep, esp. Minority rep & protect
 - (2) Plur/Maj ⇒ 1-prty maj more decisive & effective govt
 - b. Hypotheses:
 - (1) Conv Wis: concentrated political power in 1, unified, maj prty ⇒ unified, decisive ldrshp, coherent & effective pol-mkng
 - (2) Counter-arguments:
 - (a) Fast decisions not nec. = wise (or effective) decisions
 - (b) Alternation may undermine coherence of 1 govt’s policies
 - i) Perhaps esp. in ec pol, policy consistency may be paramount
 - ii) Pol by broad cons/conciliation more effective & eff’ly implem
 - (3) Maintaining civil peace in divided society esp. may require broad conciliation/consensus &

broad inclusion grps

c. Evidence

- (1) Mixed on macroeconomic management; more important, ∴, negative conclusion: majoritarian clearly not significantly better in govt efficacy.
- (2) Unequivocal re: violence control: representational dem signif advantage maintain civ order

C. LIJPHART ch16: *Quality of Democracy*

1. Consensus democracy (1st dim: exec-prtys; i.e., the horizontal diffusion authority at national level) makes big diff w/ almost all measures of democratic quality & “kindler & gentler” policy directions.
2. Fed-unitary (2nd, vertical) dimension associated only w/ social expend (-) & incarceration rate (+), but the latter turns out fully due to US outlier.

D. LIJPHART ch17: *Conclusions*

1. (Lijphart’s) Two main conclusions:
 - a. Variety dem instits well reflected on 2D’s Maj-Cons
 - b. Cons maybe slight edge performance, strong edge quality democracy
2. *Implication*: adopt consensus if possible
 - a. Good News:
 - (1) no tradeoff at all, consensus dominates
 - (2) not diff to construct consensus constitution; know how
 - b. Bad News:
 - (1) Coherence in 2D’s suggest strong inst’l equilibria & so resistance to change.
 - (2) Cultural resistance to change too.
 - c. Tempered bad news: institutions & culture do evolve, jointly, if slowly

E. *Powell, Testing Visions: Responsiveness in Gov Select & pol-making*

1. *Responsiveness* [DEF] Policymaker selection & effective pol-making follow directly cit votes
 - a. Each vision carries own ideal for responsiveness
 - (1) *Maj*: tight, mech connection from cit votes to single-party maj w/ clear responsibility & mandate, & unchecked power impl
 - (2) *Prop*: multiparty elect compet ⇒ accurate reflect cit pref in *pm*
 - b. ⇒ *Figure 6.1*: continuous or discontinuous mapping vote-shares into “govt” & effective pm-share
2. ***Responsiveness in Majoritarian Systems***
 - a. 45 elections in 5 maj sys: Austral, Can, Fra, Greece, NewZeal
 - b. *Figure 6.2*: Near-perfect fit seat-maj to govt maj accords w/ ideal; however,
 - (1) Exceptions rare, but highly problematic from maj view
 - (2) Almost *no* actual vote majorities (mostly manufactured majorities) ⇒ full retreat to *plurality*
 - (3) ***Failures***: 15-20% of time, & once or more per system, leg- & gov-maj went to plurality *loser!*
 - c. *Figure 6.3*: Govt much, but not all policymaking power ⇒ story similar for effective policymaking
 - d. ⇒ *Avg plurality prty: 45% of vote, 55% of seats, 74% of government, and 72% policymaking*
3. ***Responsiveness in Proportional Systems***
 - a. 74elects in 9 prop sys: Austria,Bel,Den,Fin,Germ,Ita,Neth,Nor,Swe, ~~Switz~~ (can’t apply to Switz)
 - b. *Figure 6.4*: Near-perfect vote-seat fit accords w/ ideal; however,
 - (1) While vote-govt fit follows much more the proportional ideal than maj sys do, heavy majority-ideal visible here also. (Not mysterious: parliamentary decision-making is majoritarian)
 - (2) *Practicality*: Maj vision retreats to *plurality*; Prop vision cedes some maj in pol-mkng
 - (3) Govt fit to ideal not great, some tendency 2nd party under-rep, but
 - c. *Figure 6.5*: Vote-to-effective pol-making fit much closer to ideal. Govt-only look is much more misleading in this vision of lmted govt.
4. ⇒ The Systems/Visions on Their Own Terms:
 - a. Maj sys more or less achieve a *plurality* (not maj) ideal, but w/ some *large* failures (losers winning)
 - b. Prop sys more or less achieve prop ideal, but some majoritarian bias & frequent, *smaller* errors
5. ⇒ ***A Common Metric for Evaluating the Systems***: *actual(pol-mkng|vote) - ideal(pol-mkng|vote)*
 - a. ⇒ Each does well in own terms (*maj=plur*), terrible in other’s

- b. Trade-Offs or Design Flaws?
 - (1) $\uparrow\downarrow$ approximation to maj/prop ideal does \Rightarrow roughly compensating $\uparrow\downarrow$ prop/maj: tradeoff, but...
 - (2) ...Two types Failures occur in Majoritarian systems:
 - (a) No seat-majority may obtain, which may \Rightarrow minority govt, which \Rightarrow \downarrow *mand & account*; in this case, though, also compensating \uparrow prop
 - (b) Seat maj may go to a vote minority \Rightarrow \downarrow *mand & account*, but also \downarrow prop (auth'd rep)! Utter Failure by any ideal.
 - (3) \Rightarrow *Figure 6.6*: Some design flaw in Maj, none in Prop.
 - (4) \Rightarrow *Fig 6.7*: Comparing both sys:
 - (a) Most elects in 2 sys on 1 maj v. prop cost-ben trade-off line
 - (b) Plur fit their ideal, & bunched in range of prop costs
 - (c) Prop fit their ideal, but more spread in the Plur costs of doing so
 - (d) Only Plur sys produce unmitigated failures
- 6. Govt change between elections
 - a. Cost from maj/plur view: very rare therein
 - b. Common in prop, but there tend to fit view: \uparrow diversity govt b/w elects & \uparrow avg effect pm-vote match
- F. Powell, chs. 7-9: Citizen Preferences & Party Positions
 - 1. Vote-Policy Connection Insufficient; Powell attempts preference-policy using pub-opinion, self-placement \Rightarrow ***Representational Congruence***:
 - a. Uses a Median Voter Criterion: match govt or pol-mkng position to median voter's
 - b. Alternative Visions of Processes that Create Representational Congruence
 - (1) Maj: 1 electoral stage; either party nearest median wins or centripetal pressure means both near
 - (2) Prop: elect stage, then govt form & pol-mkng bargaining stages \Rightarrow rep cong
 - c. Measure median voter pref: by self-placement on public-opinion surveys
 - d. Measure Govt Position:
 - (1) If 1-party majority govt=position of that party (expert-placement scale)
 - (2) If multi-party govt=weighted average (by % seats) of party positions
 - e. Measure Pol-mkng Position by wtd influence scale as before:
 - (1) $1 * \text{govt parties (seats)}$
 - (2) $.75 * \text{non-govt support parties (seats)}$
 - (3) $.5 \text{ to } .1$ weighting of opposition parties (seats) depending on opp infl.
 - 2. Powell, ch. 8: Maj=Decisive Elects, Govts, & Med Cit
 - a. How Maj Vision Supposed to Work:
 - (1) Competition b/w 1 incumb & 1 major challenger
 - (2) Voters eval past perform (account) & future promises (mand)
 - (3) Voter-chosen pref'd cand implements & performs in office
 - (4) Voters can evict at next elect if underperform/outpromised
 - b. \Rightarrow Vision consummation in *Representative Congruence* terms rests on victory of party near median.
 - (1) How Achieve?
 - (a) 2-Party Hotelling/Downs Competition \Rightarrow Convergence (note could evolve rather than parties know & go to median immed'y; for this sample, enough stable time pub opin & prty sys to expect H/D convergence even by evolution.)
 - (b) Alternatively, only one prty near median & it wins.
 - (2) Potential Problems (i.e., how can it fail?):
 - (a) Neither converges (convergence failure).
 - (b) Prty farther from median wins election (voter failure).
 - (c) Vote winner close to median, but not win govt (election failure).
 - c. Results:
 - (1) Convergence not so great in maj: only 1/3 cases < 1.5 pts from median (sample avg); $1.5 \approx 50\%$ farther from med than clearly non-maj elects (≈ 1 pt)
 - (2) In about $\frac{1}{2}$ cases, both or winner within 1.5 pts of median; not noticeably superior to non-

- majoritarian. Other $\frac{1}{2}$, both or winner far (avg \approx 2 pts of \approx 5 possible) from cit med.
- (3) Key to this polarization of majoritarian systems results seems to be i.d. & unchecked govt:
 - (a) \uparrow Identifiability \Rightarrow \uparrow distance govt from median voter
 - (b) Add “unchecked govt” (Mandate) \Rightarrow $\uparrow\uparrow$ distance
 - (c) High id-able \approx 1.6 pts $>$ 0.8 pts \approx low id-able (\approx 2x).
- d. Conclusions:
- (1) The prob (from *rep cong* perspect) w/ maj vision/systems is that voters rarely create maj for 1 party w/o *artificial* aids (e.g., disproportional elections), which aids undermine *rep cong*
 - (2) Three Ways Disprop Elect Sys \Rightarrow Majorities
 - (a) Voter & party mutual anticipation of *viable* parties \Rightarrow Cox’s M+1 rule (strategic vote/entry)
 - (b) Explicitly *via* pre-election coalitions (*strategic pre-electoral coalitions*)
 - (c) Vote-seat disproportionality (*mechanical*).
 - i) Vote-seat disprop main source lack *rep cong*: creating shift from voted med to legis med.
 - ii) Mostly reflects *party coordination-failure*: $>$ 1 party competing in same ideological space (i.e., 3rd party entry into or near occupied space; e.g., Can Reform, US Nader/Greens, UK Lib/Dem) allows less-supported opposition (the party farther from med) to win plur/maj
 - (3) Why Majoritarian Vision So Often Fail (of *Rep Cong* criterion)?
 - (a) Small *errors* magnified by maj winner-take-all knife-edge.
 - (b) Asking too much for simple yay/nay of A/B vote to connect voters well to policymakers in complex (multi-D) world.
 - (c) Further, 3 ways to produce identifiability given (assume) simple normal, continuous, & symmetric pub-opinion distrib:
 - i) 2-party electoral dominance \Rightarrow natural or earned majority
 - ii) 2-party govtal (w/o elect) dom \Rightarrow manufactured majority
 - iii) Pre-electoral coalition [\Rightarrow same as other 2 w/ coal’s the competitors]
 - iv) Maj Vision Assumes first but second far more comm (only US close to first)
3. Chapt. 9: Prop=Rep Med Cit by Multistage Process
- a. How Prop Vision Supposed to Work:
 - (1) Multiple, diverse parties proportionally (to voter-pref distrib) rep’d in parl \Rightarrow govt formation.
 - (2) Govt more rep’d in policy than legis \Rightarrow some $^{\circ}$ opposition influence (ideally, prop’ly) via minority gov, committee sys, *etc*)
 - b. Three Elements to Accurate Reflect Voter Opin in Policy:
 - (1) Multiple parties avail to voter (so latter can pick close former)
 - (2) Voters choose closer (rational & not much cause strategic vote)
 - (3) Accurate reflection voter choice in effective governance (in legis, govt, & , most important, effective policymaker).
 - c. Results:
 - (1) Voted med & leg med close (w/in .6 pts); diffs seem from prty-spacing *lumpiness*
 - (2) Govts gen’ly several prtys, spanning rel wide ideol range
 - (3) Coal maj govts usually include median party; sometimes straddling cit med so avg near it, but sometimes ctr-lft or ctr-rt so avg not so near, but still w/in .8 of it on avg.
 - (4) Minority govts typically farther from median
 - (5) Problems:
 - (a) Pre-electoral coals \Rightarrow more maj-like outcomes, including \downarrow *rep cong*
 - (b) Minority govts \Rightarrow low govt *rep cong*, but these more common in maj systems & opposition influence often higher in prop systems...
 - (6) Complications: Govt Change Remote from Election
 - (a) Three theoretical possibilities for effects of govt change remote from elect:
 - i) Govts far from cit med tend to fall & replace by closer \Rightarrow \uparrow *rep cong*
 - ii) Antic./expect electorate Δ \Rightarrow \uparrow govt dist pre-elect cit med, closer current/next, \uparrow *rep cong*
 - iii) Govt shift unrelated cit prefs, & elite manip takes farther from cit med: \downarrow *rep cong*

- (b) Evidence: if anything, intra-elect $\Delta \Rightarrow \uparrow$ rep cong
- d. General Conclusions:
 - (1) *Majoritarian Vision works “only fitfully”*: *Exact high rep cong cost for majority generation [n.b., on which its account. & mand. advantages rest] & oppositions lack influence to alter*
 - (2) *Proportional Vision works fairly well*: *Post-election bargaining typically \Rightarrow near-median govts, Govt change b/w elects only \uparrow that, & even where not opposition influence brings effective policymaking closer to median [but at cost of \downarrow efficacy account. & mand. mechanisms]*
- 4. Ch10: Conclusion–Elections as Instruments Democracy
 - a. Gen’ly negative relation b/w achieve alt ideals (Fig 10.1)
 - b. Const’l designs gen’ly performing as expected.
 - c. None give effective representation to $<50\%$ (i.e., all are democracies)
 - d. Some substantial maj failings, & some doing better than avg tradeoff on both, but, generally, ctrys doing worse on maj do better on prop & v.v. Dual failures possible (e.g., post-sov Russia & Poland?) but seem not occur at all commonly.
- 5. **Powell’s View of Tradeoff: (a) decisiveness & accountability (mandate problematic b/c loser too-often wins) vs. (b) accurate effective representation.**
 - a. *If game of democratic politics largely of cit’s v. pol-makers, perhaps advantage maj*
 - b. *If game of democratic politics largely of conflict intrst among cit’s, definitely advantage prop.*
- G. Franzese, ch. 2: “Political Participation, Income Distrib, & Public Transfers in Dev’d Dems”
 - 1. Start with std Meltzer-Richard-type argument:
 - a. Median person poorer than average, therefore (\therefore) median desires positive net transfers
 - b. Tax/Transfer $\Rightarrow \downarrow$ incentives to work & invest, \therefore median desires larger net transfers until this cost outweighs greater redistrib. $\therefore \uparrow$ diff b/w median & mean \Rightarrow larger transfers before this occurs.
 - 2. However, not everyone votes, &, in particular, relatively wealthy vote more than relatively poor.
 - a. \therefore , greater positive effect of \uparrow income skew on trans. as voter-participation \uparrow
 - b. Conversely, positive impact on transfers of \uparrow voter partic. larger the greater underlying income skew
- H. Franzese, ch. 3: “Positive Political Econ of Public Debt: Empirical Exam OECD Postwar”
 - 1. Much of expansion in public debt since mid-seventies due to econ. conditions; specifically:
 - a. \uparrow UE & \downarrow growth $\Rightarrow \downarrow$ rev’s & \uparrow expend’s, given current taxation & expend. system
 - b. That initial impact amplified by ensuing rise real interest rates \Rightarrow explosive public-debt path in many ctrys. (N.b., the real-interest spike was party policy-induced as slammed monetary brakes 1980 \pm)
 - 2. Key political factor is *govt* fractionalization (# parties in govt) and, less so, polarization (govt)
 - a. Where govts fractionalized, fiscal-policy adjustments to address rising debt were delayed as parties in govt, may have agreed on need for adjust, naturally disagreed over whose constituents would pay the costs of adjustment
 - b. Where govts more unified (fewer parties, not divided govt), adjust. plans easier to implement: governing party more easily placed adjust costs on opponents
 - c. Where poor econ conditions hit environments with fractionalized govts, debt path yet more explosive
 - 3. Several other political, structural, & institutional factors had some, but more minor, effects