

Comparative Politics of Developed Democracies

INTRODUCTION (Part 1)


- I. Start with **definition of subject matter**: What is a “Developed Democracy”?
 - A. **LNN**: “Although elections & democracy are not synonymous concepts, the existence of free, competitive elections is invariably considered one of the critical features that define a nation as ‘democratic’ (Inkeles 1991; Beetham 1994)” (p. 4)
 - B. **Powell II**:
 1. “working political democracies[:] Citizens...able to organize & vote in competitive elections[, and] the national political leaders are held accountable to their citizens through electoral means” (p. 1).
 2. “‘democracy’ [...] political systems where representative leaders chosen through competitive elections. The competitive electoral context, with several political parties organizing the alternatives that face voters, is the identifying property of contemporary democratic process. ...competitive elections...most citizens eligible to participate” (3)
 3. Case-selection criteria (p. 3):
 - a. legitimacy of govt rests on claim to represent desires of its citizens [Monte Python: “Arthur, King of the Britons.” “Well I didn’t vote for you.” “King, eh? How’d you get that, eh?...” “Supreme exec. pow. derives from a mandate from the masses...”]
 - b. organized relationship that regulates this bargain of legitimacy is the competitive political election. Leaders elected at regular intervals, & voters choose among alternative candidates. In practice 2+ parties with a chance of winning is minimal
 - c. Most adults can participate in the electoral process, both as voters & as candidates for important political office
 - d. Citizens’ votes are secret & not coerced
 - e. Citizens & leaders enjoy basic freedoms of speech, press, assembly, & organization
 4. “Although definitionally possible to have a democratic context in which power did not change hands (because of continuing support of the incumbents by a majority of citizens [*e.g.*, Japan, Switzerland, Italy, Sweden for long periods]), such power changes seem a clear indication of importance of competitive elections” (p. 6).
 - C. **Lane & Ersson**:
 1. “West European Democracies[:] ...legitimate operation of democratic political institutions within state structures that involve big govt” (p. 10).
 2. “A liberal democratic political order is combined with a welfare state & a mixed economy. The public sector plays a major role in the economy of the West European countries, allocating & redistributing resources by means of various institutions at different levels of govt” (p. 10)
 3. “open competition between political parties for the allegiance of the voter in free elections recruiting a legislative assembly that shares the exercise of power with govt institutions in a national setting” (p. 10).
 - D. **Powell**:
 1. *Democracies*: govts in which the people participate in *policymaking* (pp. 3-4)
 - a. w/ many people, dem. *indirect*: choose policymakers in competitive elections
 - b. *Elections* are instruments of dem. to degree give people influence over pol-makers
 - c. Elections not only, but universally seen as crucial instrument, compel or encourage p-m’s to pay attention to citizens.
 2. Two Views (each normative & positive): *Majoritarian v. Proportional* Visions
 - E. **Lijphart**:
 1. *Democracy*: govt for & by the people (Daniel Webster, 1830) (pp. 1-3). But, what if the people disagree & have divergent preferences?
 - a. The *majority* of people.
 - b. As many people as possible, [*proportionally*].
 2. Many ways to organize democracy, but cluster around *Majoritarian v. Consensus*. In that distinction, two dimensions discernable:

a. *Executive-Legislative Dimension*

b. *Federal-Unitary Dimension*

F. Why do we choose to study developed democracies together & distinctly from ‘developing democracies’ & ‘non-democracies’?

1. Theories assume relatively “liberal democracy” & “free-market capitalism” no longer part of but rather the general boundaries within which citizens & leaders (actors of our models) conduct day-to-day politics
2. Empirics: something distinct *re* these countries & related about dem & dev



[We didn't cover the following material this year. I have scaled the font down to 10 for such omitted materials.]

II. Notable Trends, Events, & Topics to Consider

A. Lane & Ersson: “A Changing Scenario”

1. “1950-65: End of Ideology, & Apathy” (pp. 1-2)
 - a. Attributed causes of perceived decline in conflict
 - (1) Some saw disappearing/reduced ideological conflict, ↑ harmony of views
 - (2) Some saw very effective welfare society succeeding in providing security & thus reduced divisive consequences of socio-economic cleavages
 - b. The west was certainly thriving in this period
 - (1) strong economic growth
 - (2) stable law & order
 - (3) legitimacy of established political institutions not questioned
 - (a) either evolutionary result of long process toward peaceful & prosperous democratic society
 - (b) or result of recent (re-)establishment of same, hard-won by war
2. “1965-80: Rejection of Political Authority” (pp. 2-6)
 - a. Increased citizen activism in 60s turned scholars toward participation
 - (1) demands for institutional autonomy in UK, Belgium, Spain
 - (2) demands for increased decentralization in Sweden, France, Germany
 - b. Affluence:
 - (1) Some saw rising affluence as increasingly diminishing the intensity of socio-economic cleavages relative to “new” post-materialist (Inglehart) issues.
 - (2) Others noted that affluence itself can exacerbate economic cleavages through the perception of relative deprivation

- (Stouffer, Gurr).
- c. Economic Hardship (Rising Inflation, then OPEC I (1973-4) & OPEC II (1979-80) & the responses thereto) & Increasing Dissatisfaction with Govt
 - (1) Corporatism: tri-partite bargaining over (particularly) macroeconomic management b/w organizations of labor, business, & govt (Berger, Lehmbruch, Schmitter)
 - (2) New/re-emerging parties & movements (Greens, radical left & right) & protest parties
 - d. Perceived Upshot (*caveat* not to exaggerate change or continuity):
 - (1) changing voter alignments & behavior
 - (2) changing party systems, patterns of support, & behavior
 - (3) everything is now questioned
 - (a) legitimacy of govt—though this is always relatively strong in developed democracies
 - (b) efficiency of the Welfare State
 - (c) social disorder becomes less unheard of if still not exactly common
3. “1980-90: Crisis of the Welfare State & Communism”
 - a. Slower growth, higher unemployment, more variant if not always higher inflation
 - (1) certainty & optimism characterizing Keynesian macroecon. management gone
 - (2) New Ideas: monetarism, supply-side economics, the “Rational-Expectations revolution” all (to varying degrees) reject policy effectiveness of macro mngmnt
 - b. immigration & refugees—new issue for many of these homogenous societies: consider Ireland, Italy, France, Germany
 - c. Continued (for a time) growth of govt, but economic slowdown produces huge deficit & debt issues in many countries—Crises of the Welfare State
 4. “1990s: Integration, Unemployment, & Immigration”
 - a. The European Community (<http://europa.eu.int/>, click on “Welcome”)
 - (1) ECSC—France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg (1950)
 - (2) EC: Treaty of Rome 1957; EFTA 1960—Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, UK
 - (3) Grows over time:
 - (a) membership additions:
 - i) UK, Ireland, & Denmark (1973) ==> 9
 - ii) Greece (1981) ==> 10
 - iii) Portugal & Spain (1986) ==> 12
 - iv) Austria, Finland & Sweden (1995) ==> 15
 - (b) scope:
 - i) ECSC weak, loose, protectionist agreement on coal & steel quotas, stds, etc. tentative first step
 - ii) Treaty of Rome: more general trade-agreement, supposed internal free trade & common external trade policy, Common Agricultural Program
 - iii) EurCurrUnion & the snake (exchange-rate convention) 1973
 - iv) VAT harmonization 1977
 - v) E.C.U. & the ERM: 1979
 - vi) The Delors Programme 1985
 - vii) Maastricht 1993
 - b. High unemployment remains, slow growth, fiscal crisis; democracy is stronger than ever, but its form—especially its national locus—is more open to question

B. LeDuc, Niemi, & Norris:

1. Three Waves of Democratization: late 19th to early 20th C; following WWII, & 1990s
2. Recent Democratizations
 - a. “Triple transformation” in Eastern Europe—party systems, constitutional structures, & economic systems
 - b. Collapse of last authoritarian regimes in West Europe: Greece, Portugal, & Spain
 - c. End of Apartheid in South Africa
 - d. growth and/or re-establishment of democracy in Latin America & Southeast Asia
3. N.b. these waves are not unidirectional ==> democracy is not secure or “established” once initially instituted
4. Major Changes in Established Democracies also
 - a. party systems—traditional patterns of conflict changing (Mair, ch. 3)
 - b. attitudes & voting behavior of citizens (Dalton, ch. 13)
 - c. rise of cynicism & “legitimacy crises”
 - d. even changes in the foundations of representative institutions in some cases (New Zealand, Italy, Japan)
 - e. Again, though, should not exaggerate these changes
 - (1) Generally changes w/in systemic confines of relatively liberal, relatively free-market democratic capitalism
 - (2) And new & re-emerging democracies are not near “established” yet
5. N.b. These last changes (B.4.) plus the experience of Eastern Europe draws our attention to the electoral system as a

manipulable or even engineer-able variable

C. **Powell II:**

1. Electoral participation is relatively consistent within nations over time, but the US is exceptional in having seen considerable decline between late 60s to 80s
2. Important incidents of breakdown of democratic order, even into violence:
 - a. Northern Ireland (U.K.)—violence flares up in late 60s
 - (1) Catholic minority in mostly Protestant Ulster region of mostly Catholic island
 - (2) Catholic minority demands greater political equality & economic advance; draws our attention to reinforcing cleavages
 - b. U.S.—race riots in late 60s through 70s—again draws our attention to disruptive potential of reinforcing cleavages (IV.D.2.c-e; Vietnam)
 - c. Various other occasionally violent problem areas (almost all (have) had their problems)
 - (1) Ireland—I.R.A. actions supporting Irish intervention in Ireland
 - (2) Germany—far-left Bader-Meinhof in late 60s, far right against immigrants in the 90s
 - (3) Canada—periodic separatist turmoil
 - (4) France—student riots in late 60s (eventually commingled with other issues, esp. Algeria, bringing down the regime), massive strikes especially of late
 - (5) Spain—separatist struggles: Basque & Catalan
 - (6) Belgium—Fleming & Walloon—language, religion, & class

III. **POWELL II (Chapters 1 & 2)**

A. Working Political Democracies

1. Definition (I.B.1, +selection criteria, I.B.3)
2. Some Work “Well”
 - a. Participate *via* elections
 - b. Stable govts
 - c. Discontent expressed through Democratic competition not violent conflict
3. Some Work “Less Well”
 - a. Involvement characterized by turmoil not elected parties
 - b. Govt is unstable, unresponsive, or both
 - c. Violence widespread—at worst “the life expectancy of democracy itself is a matter of constant calculation.”
4. Why?
 - a. Social & economic environment?
 - b. Political institutions & organizations?
 - c. Beliefs & strategies of leaders/citizens?
 - d. System of political parties?


B. Social Structure ==> Institutions & Parties ==> Democratic Functioning

C. Role of Parties

1. The link between social, economic, & constitutional setting & political performance
 - a. Examining citizen partisanship, party strategies, & election outcomes (party factors) helps us understand relationship between economic development & voter participation or between electoral laws & govt stability
 - b. Not all effects of environmental conditions work through party system but many do
2. Independent Effects: The configurations of memory, organizations, & perception the system represents have direct effects once established

D. Three focal Dimensions of Political Performance



1. Citizen Electoral Participation: (Voter Turnout = # voting/eligible population)
 - a. Not only form of participation, but essential in forcing policy-makers to respond
 - b. Symbolic--especially with increased secularization, legitimacy has come to rest on claim to respond to citizen's preferences
 - c. STOP HERE: What is the empirical puzzle?



- (1) Some Data
- (2) Why do people vote?
 - (a) Generate some hypotheses
 - (b) Tell the irrational to vote story
 - (c) Generate more hypotheses
2. Govt Stability & "Effectiveness"
 - a. Definitions:
 - (1) Stability: (Govt Duration)--Some issues/problems in defining
 - (2) Effectiveness: Def? (% of legislative support for executive)
 - b. STOP HERE: Note diff b/w defs (theoretical, abstract) & operationalization (empirical, concrete)


- (1) Some data on duration
- (2) Generate some hypotheses
- (3) Some data on effectiveness?--or generate some alternative ideas on how to measure it


c. Aside on party discipline



3. Political Order--Absence of turmoil & violence & maintenance of basic forms of democratic regime
 - a. Distinguish observing order from attributing "blame" or "credit" for it; order breakdown may reflect:
 - (1) regime policy failures

- (2) bargaining intransigence by either party to another
- (3) efforts by either party to dispute to undermine democracy itself
- b. Democracies unique in providing citizens (a) resources, & (b) freedom to use, (c) expand it by organizing & mobilizing other citizens, & (d) allowing use to express discontent
- c. Democracy=a gamble that discontent can be channeled through legitimate (electoral & other) channels--an outbreak of serious, collective violence is a sign it is not working (whose fault is another question)
- d. Measures: Riots, Deaths from Political Violence, Suspension/Replacement of Regime
 - (1) Some Data
 - (2) Generate some hypotheses





E. Relations between the Three Dimensions of Performance

1. Mutually reinforcing Hypothesis
2. Participation ==> (In)stability, & (In)effectiveness
3. Stability ==> Effectiveness & Order or ==> Corruption & Disorder
4. Powell finds
 - a. Participation...
 - (1) ... ==> Order (low violence, turmoil, & no regime Δ)
 - (2) ... ==> Low govt durability,
 - b. otherwise the three generally unrelated

IV. Organization of the Course Material & *The Cycle of Democratic Policymaking*


A. Syllabus:

1. Introduction; Cycle (Schematic Overview Democratic Politics); Intellectual History
2. Socio-Politico-Economic Structure & Politics
3. Comparative Govt'l Systems
 - a. Description of Alternative Democratic Arrangements
 - b. Alternative Visions
4. Electoral Systems
5. Parties & Party Systems
6. Participation & Representation
 - a. Voting
 - b. Extra-electoral Participation & Interest Groups

7. CGS: Political-Authority Allocation; Accountability, Mandates, & Representation
8. (Parliamentary) Govt Formation & Dissolution
 - a. Unidimensional Models
 - b. Multidimensional Models
9. Policies & Outcomes
 - a. Do the Varieties of Democracy Matter?
 - b. How Do the Varieties of Democracy Matter? Recent Research


B. The Cycle of Democratic Policymaking

Figure 1.22: The Cycle of Political Economy




C. More Data, or "How Does It All Matter?," or "So What?"

Figure 1.1: Total Public Fiscal Activity by Country-Year




Bars: separate annual data for each country, 1948-97 (as available)

Figure 1.2: Total Public Fiscal Activity by Country




Up marks postwar mean, box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean, lines extend to maximum and minimum

Figure 1.3: Total Public Fiscal Activity by Year




Up marks 21-country mean, box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean, lines extend to maximum and minimum

Figure 1.4: Public Transfer Payments by Country-Year




Each separate annual data for each country, 1948-97 (as available)

Figure 1.5: Public Transfer Payments by Country




Dot marks postwar mean, box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean, lines extend to minimum and maximum

Figure 1.6: Public Transfer Payments by Year




Dot marks 21-country mean, box extends plus to minus one standard deviation

Figure 1.7: Public Debt by Country-Year




Bar = separate annual data for each country, 1948-93 (as available).

Figure 1.8: Public Debt by Country




Dot mark: postwar mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; line: extend to maximum and minimum.

Figure 1.9: Public Debt by Year




Dot mark: 21-country mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; line: extend to maximum and minimum.

Figure I.10 Public Employment by Country-Year




Bars separate annual data for each country, 1948-97 (as available)

Figure I.11: Public Employment by Country




Dot marks postwar mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum

Figure I.12: Public Employment by Year




Dot marks 21-country mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum

Figure I.13 Unemployment by Country-Year




Bars separate annual data for each country, 1940-97 (as available).

Figure I.14: Unemployment by Country




Dot marks postwar mean, box extends plus to minus one standard.
Whisker from mean lines extend to maximum and minimum.

Figure I.15: Unemployment by Year




Dot marks 21-country mean, box extends plus to minus one standard.

Figure L.16: Inflation by Country-Year




Bars separate annual data for each country, 1949-97 (as available)

Figure L.17: Inflation by Country




Dot marks postwar mean; box extends plus/minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum

Figure L.18: Inflation by Year




Dot marks 21-country mean; box extends plus/minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum

Figure I.19: Real Per-Capita Growth by Country-Year




Bars separate annual data for each country, 1948-97 (as available)

Figure I.20: Real Per-Capita Growth by Country



Dot marks postwar mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum

Figure I.21: Real Per-Capita Growth by Year



Dot marks 21-country mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum

- V. Intellectual History of Comparative Politics as a Field of Inquiry (built from Lane & Ersson, intro-ch. 1)
- A. **Theoretical Framework:** “We organize our[study]...in terms cleavages, pol institutions, & pub pols” (p 11)
- B. “Traditional” (to *ca.* 1950s) Study of Politics: 5 Characteristics
1. *Configurative Description*: just describe from A to Z everything political that exists/happens some ctry
 2. *Parochialism*: Western (& predominantly US) slant on identification of issues to be considered
 3. *Formal Legalism*: Excessive focus on the constitutional & legal details of a country
 4. *Absence of Empiricism, Methodology, & Theory*: description & legalism w/ no attempt to relate aspects & outcomes systematically
 5. *Non-Comparative*: despite the name, the field tended to focus on one country at a time (relates to previous problem)
- C. Continuing Methodological Problems & Debates
1. Case Study *vs.* Comparative Method
 2. Political Sociology evolving into Political Institutionalism
 3. Newer Debates
 - a. Formal (*i.e.* mathematical) *v.* Qualitative (linguistic) theoretical derivation of arguments
 - b. Quantitative (*i.e.* statistical) *v.* Qualitative empirical evaluation
 - c. Positive theory (positivism) *v.* Interpretation & “Understanding” (interpretivism) as the goal
 4. “Either/Or” divisions somewhat arbitrary in that all involve some degree of other; further, several quite highly related; still, some controversy remains around these divides
- D. Gabriel Almond & the Parsonian Revolution (mid 1950s)
1. Influence of Sociology
 - a. Gabriel Almond “Comparative Political Systems” (1956)
 - b. Talcott Parsons [*Toward a General Theory of Action* (with Shils, 1951), *The Social System* (1951), & *Economy & Society* (with Smelser, 1956)] brought Weber’s new systematic approach to the study of social behavior (“Sociology”) to the forefront of political science (and social science more generally)
 2. Intro’s Central Q: What fosters (stable) (democratic) political development
 3. Theory/Argument: Almond argued Anglo-American political systems stable b/c high degree consensus on political means & ends & b/c political roles of individuals & institutions clearly differentiated & delineated. (As a theoretical conjecture, interesting; empirically, he neither defined nor measured either independent or dependent variables. Still, huge advance over what preceded.)

Socio-Pol Struct (<i>Culture</i>) → Political Role Structure ↓	Homogenous	Fragmented
Highly Differentiated	Anglo-American	Continental European
Low Differentiation	Totalitarian	Pre-Industrial (Traditional)

- E. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (1959): “‘conditions necessary for democracy in societies & organizations’ (p. 9)” (p. 19)
1. “Democracy ‘implies
 - a. political formula or body of beliefs specifying which institutions—parties, free press, etc—legitimate (all accept as proper);
 - b. one set of political leaders in office; and
 - c. one or more sets of recognized leaders attempting to gain office’ (p. 45)”
 2. Seeks to explain which systems exhibit these characteristics stably & why?; *i.e.* stability of democracy not govt stability in democracy
 3. Democracy requires govt. & opp.; thus democracy cannot exist without cleavages; question which cleavages are “too much”/too irascible, & which factors may serve to mitigate conflict arising out of cleavages
 4. Factors facilitating stability

- a. Economic Development: produces greater income, economic security, & widespread education—all considered conducive in that they form the terms of the ‘class struggle’ permitting the less well-off to take a long-term [and optimistic] view
- b. Class Structure: large middle class good
- c. 2-Party System: claims two-party competition fosters integrative rather than divisive politics
- d. **Cross-Cutting Cleavages**: claims territorial rather than proportional rep help in this regard
- e. Federal, not Unitary, System: (claims concentration of power frequently a threat to democracy; others note Weimar)
- f. Historical development of conflict resolution (problematic?)

Cleavage Structure → Class Stratification ↓	Cross-Cutting	Reinforcing
Highly Stratified	Intermediate	Least Stable
Low Stratification	Most Stable	Intermediate

F. Stein Rokkan: Cleavage Struct & Democratization Process (1967, ‘70, ‘83)

1. Four fundamental developmental processes in democratic transformations of Western Democracies (note the historicism)
 - a. Protestant Reformation—divided Catholic/Protestant
 - b. National Revolution—breaking local & regional affiliations (Germany & Italy mid to late 19th century)
 - c. Industrial Revolution—replacing diffuse agrarian & religious loyalties w/ class
 - d. Communist Revolution—international fault lines

CLEAVAGE TYPOLOGY	National/Center	Local/Periphery
Interests/Economy	worker v. employer/owner	primary v. secondary econ.
Ideology/Culture	church v. state	subject v. dominant culture

G. Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy* (1971): The Conditions for & the Degree of Democracy (“polyarchy”)

The Two Dimensions of Political Systems

Contestation ↓ Participation →	High	Low
High	<i>Polyarchies</i> : Italy, Finland	<i>Competitive Oligarchies</i> : Switz., Ire.
Low	<i>Inclusive Hegemonies</i> : Hungary, Poland (pre-Dem.)	<i>Closed Hegemonies</i> : Portugal, Spain (pre-Dem.)

1. Conditions for Democracy: A Long List
 - a. Peaceful evolution of democracy (transferring legitimacy from old to new regime)
 - b. Decentralized economy (avoiding concentration of economic power)
 - c. Economic development
 - d. Economic equality
 - e. Social homogeneity
 - f. Elite pro-democratic beliefs (best when authority structures same in most institutions of society)
 - g. Popular beliefs in democratic efficacy & in sincere intentions of adversaries
 - h. Passive or supportive international conditions

H. Merkl, Almond & Verba: “Political Culture”

1. Peter Merkl, *Modern Comparative Politics* (1970)
 - a. Common State of Democracy is Change, Instability, & Disequilibrium
 - b. Culture (beliefs, attitudes) explain this best since they change observably (survey research): problems with cultural arguments:

- (1) Descriptive at best
- (2) Tautological at worst
- 2. G. Almond & Sid Verba, *The Civic Culture* (1965): key to democracy is how citizens relate (sub & objectively) to political system
 - a. People have attitudes toward:
 - (1) political system
 - (2) input activities of citizens (e.g., voting)
 - (3) output activities of govt (policies & programs)
 - (4) themselves as political participants
 - b. These configure into three archetypes of society

Involvement in Pol. Sys. → Knowledge of Pol & PolSys ↓	High	Low
High	Participant Society	Subject Society
Low	[Not Considered]	Parochial Society

- c. => Peoples attitudes, (a), defined public orientation toward political system, (b), which produced politics of identifiable patterns
- I. Gordon Smith, *Politics & Society in Western Europe* (1984): linking social to political cohesion
 - 1. Social Cohesion not directly or Necessarily linked to Political Cohesion
 - 2. Governing Institutions structure Actors' Incentives from Voters to Leaders
 - 3. ==> **Sociological Structure Works through Political Institutions to Determine Democratic Functioning**
 - 4. Critique came at point when structuralism & culturalism were losing steam
- J. Arend Lijphart: *Consociationalism* (Consensus), Institutionalism, & Democ
 - 1. Social heterogeneity creates impetus to instability, but impetus modified or redirected by institutions
 - 2. ==> two original foci
 - a. **capacity** of pol institutions & pol leaders to respond to stimuli from society
 - b. institutional means of dividing power to diffuse disruptive conflict:
 - (1) Minority representation
 - (2) Division of power: geographic, demographic, or functional
 - 3. Then on elite behavior:

Social Structure → Elite Behavior ↓	Homogenous	Plural (Heterogenous)
Coalescent	<i>Depoliticized Democracy:</i> Switzerland	<i>Consociational Democracy:</i> Austria
Adversarial	<i>Centripetal Democracy:</i> United States	<i>Centrifugal Democracy:</i> Italy

- 4. Only bottom-right unstable ==> Heterogeneity only a necessary condition for instability, absent consociation it becomes sufficient
- 5. **Democracies (1984): stress again structure of decision-making process mediating b/w social cleavages & instability =>**
- 6. Two ideal-types of democracy:
 - a. *The Westminster Model*
 - (1) 1 party, bare-majority govts
 - (2) fused legis & exec pow, & cabinet
 - (3) asymmetric bicameralism
 - (4) Two-party System
 - (5) One-dimensional party-system
 - (6) plurality electoral system
 - (7) unitary & cntrlzd territorial govt
 - (8) unwritten const & parl sovereignty

b. *The Consensus Model*

- (1) Executive power-sharing
- (2) Sep. powers, formal & informal
- (3) Balanced Bicam & minority rep
- (4) Multi-party system

- (5) Multi-dimensional party system
- (6) Proportional representation
- (7) Territorial & non-terr. fed, decent
- (8) Written const & minority vetoes

K. Suzanne Berger, Gerhard Lehmbruch, Phillippe Schmitter: *Corporatism & Interest Intermediation* (1970s & 1980s)

1. B/w interests created by social structure & policies implemented by govts lie organizations that aggregate, mobilize, & press for policies: Parties + Other actors... (esp. economic actors: unions, employers, banks, etc.)
2. Corporatist Policymaking [DEFINE] credited with successful macroecon. management & thereby facilitation of democratic stability
3. Recent innovations have begun to shift the focus toward the role of firms as employers & allocators of capital

L. Giovanni Sartori: *Parties & Party Systems* (1976): **fractionalization & polarization**

1. Parties do not simply reflect underlying cleavage structure of society ==> independent role of party systems for stability

Party-System Polarization → Party-Sys Fractionalization ↓	Low	High
Low	<i>Bipartism</i> : United States	<i>Centripetal Competition</i> : U. K.
High	<i>Segmented Multipartism</i> : Ireland	<i>Polarized Multipartism</i> : Italy

2. Also emphasizes key role of anti-system parties

M. Comparative Party Research

1. Schumpeter (1942): defined party role
 - a. interest articulation, aggregation, policy-making, & system legitimation
 - b. parties offer voters choice b/w ideologies represented in election manifestos & implemented by govts in office: voters evaluate
2. V.O. Key (1966): do parties set agenda for voters or do voters choose parties?
3. Pateman, Rose, Lawson (*When Parties Fail?*) => parties increasingly failed these roles (?): studied “why stability ended” (?)
4. Strategies of Parties (Rokkan, Otto Kirchheimer): Mobilize a **niche** or manufacture a **catch-all** coal==>
 - a. probability of success for party strategy depends on social structure, institutional rules, & *strategies of other parties*
 - b. Strength: highlights strategic behavior of political actors
 - c. Weakness: tends to explain change by actor mistakes & stability by actor wisdom
5. Comparative Party Research, New directions: why parties at all? “Post-materialist” values stress independence & critical of system==>crisis for parties

N. Origins of Modern Institutionalism

1. Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (1971)

a. Duverger’s Law & Beyond

- b. Relations between voting rules and...
 - (1) Voters’ incentives & actions
 - (2) Policymakers’ incentives & actions

2. Lawrence Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Govt* (1976)

- a. Argues that multiparty parliaments==>coalition govts; coalition govts unstable; so multiparty systems unstable = false
- b. “Minimal Winning Coalitions” (DEFINE) William Riker, *Theory of Political Coalitions* (1962)

- c. Implications
 - (1) MWC's are stable: Single-party majority or Multiparty
 - (2) Emphasis on.....willingness to enter coalition and.....informational uncertainty in coalition bargaining...
 - (3) ==> Re-emphasis on fractionalization & polarization
- d. Extensions:
 - (1) Minority govts' workings: Kaare Strom & George Tsebelis
 - (2) Parliamentary behavior: Party discipline; "Constituency"
- 3. Dodd & *Coalitions in Parliamentary Govt* (1976)
 - a. Introduces notion of Minimal-winning coalitions–MWCs are stable
 - (1) Single-party govts are usually MWCs, so they're usually stable
 - (2) Multi-party govts are stable too if they're MWCs
 - b. Formation of MWCs is a function of **parties' willingness to enter coalitions & informational uncertainty in bargaining with potential coalition members**
 - c. Minority govts: how they work & conditions under which they work well (Strom, Tsebelis)
 - d. Parliamentary behavior: **party discipline** a key factor related to electoral system & govt structure
- 4. Modern Successors:
 - a. Gary Cox, *Making Votes Count* (1997)
 - b. Michael Laver & Ken Shepsle, *Making & Breaking Govts* (1995)
- O. Political Outputs & Outcomes:
 - 1. Traditionally little focus on what govts actually did (!)
 - a. All about societal inputs & how political institutions produced govts from them (corporatism exceptional here), but
 - b. Little or nothing about what policies were produced, *i.e.*, "So What?"
 - 2. **Increasing focus on policies & outcomes produced by structure & institutions ==>**
 - a. **Focus on Actors' Opportunities, Objectives, & Constraints**
 - b. **Focus also on outcomes that concretely affect citizens' lives in democracy**
 - c. **Empirical Analysis: attempt to link differences in policies & outcomes across time & countries to structure & institutions**
 - 3. The Keynesian Welfare State & Successor Policies become a central focus for modern comparative study
 - a. E.g.: Countries faced similar economic conditions & responded differently, Why?
 - (1) Partisan differences?
 - (2) Socio-economic-structure differences?
 - (3) Institutional differences?
 - b. Ques. originally "Does Politics Matter?" Ans.: yes; so new question: "How Does Politics Matter?"
- P. G. Bingham Powell: *Contemporary Democracies* (1982)
 - 1. One of the first systematic analyses of structure & institutions ==> Participation & Stability & Order
 - 2. Fertile ground by then: rich in theory & assumption, empirical vacuum
- Q. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy* (1999) [We'll return to this]
- R. Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy* (2000) [We'll return to this]

Socio-Economic Structure (SES) & Democratic Politics

Introduction: Politics=means by which conflicts (of opinion, interests, views) reconciled (not necessarily resolved) so policies may be decided & implemented. Liberal-democratic countries aim to manage this in as orderly, efficient, & peaceful manner as possible while remaining democratic. Analysis of socio-economic development & socio-economic *cleavage* structures, then, is our inroad into understanding fundamental, enduring, & potentially prominent schisms in society across which such conflict arises.

VI. Introduction

- A. Our analysis of SE cleavage-structure & politics has 4 goals
 - 1. Definition of concepts
 - 2. Introduction of empirical facts, two parts

- a. variation & similarity broad, cross-sectional features w/in & cross ctry
 - b. change & continuity over time
- 3. Arguments relating SE cleavage-structure to outcomes
 - a. Democratic Perform: participation, stability, violence
 - b. Party Systems
- 4. Arguments relating SE development to outcomes:
 - a. Democracy & democratization
 - b. Democratic Perform: participation, stability, violence
- VII. Definition & Typology of cleavages & cleavage structure
 - A. L & E: “a *division* on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups, or org’s [b/w] whom *conflict may arise*” (p. 53) [*emph. added*]
 - B. Rae & Taylor: “‘Cleavages are the criteria which divide members of a community or subcommunity into groups...’” (p. 53). *Typology*:
 - 1. Ascriptive/trait: race, caste, ethnicity, language
 - 2. Attitudinal/opinion: ideology, preference, class, relig
 - 3. Behavioral/act: “elicited through voting & org’l membership”
 - C. [I’d say R & T’s first two are sufficient; let’s call them:]
 - 1. **Ascriptive Cleavages**
 - 2. **Preference/Value Cleavages**
 - D. Some of the characteristics by which cleavages differ:
 - 1. criteria that determine group mem’ship: objectivity v. subjectivity
 - 2. exclusivity of the groups so divided
 - 3. nature of disagreement: policy differences v. belief & value diff’s
 - 4. salience
 - 5. latent v. manifest
 - E. Abstract typology by membership criteria is difficult, but more concrete enumeration may suffice (Daalder):
 - 1. *class or sectoral (economic) interests*: worker/employer; traded/non-traded; private/public
 - 2. *religion*: Cath/Prot; Christian/Non-C; relig/secular; fundamentalist/moderate
 - 3. *geographical*: urban/rural, center/periphery
 - 4. *nationality or nationalism*: ethnic, nationalist, & regionalist separatism
 - F. Multifarious cleavages, basically infinite in principle, so Q of which cleavages matter best seen as entirely a practical one of *explanatory power v. parsimony*. L & E’s set [paraphrased] reasonable:
 - 1. **Religious**
 - 2. **Ethnic/Linguistic**
 - 3. **Class/Economic**
 - 4. **Regional/Geographic**
 - G. Some other definitions:
 - 1. Powell II: “A set of attitudes that divides the nation’s citizens into major political groups.”
 - a. “Sometimes... ‘purely’ political: they reflect opinions about [particular] policies [or policy areas] & are developed, sustained, & organized by political leaders committed to such policies...”
 - b. “more frequently alignment of large groups based on deep social, economic, & cultural divisions in the fabric of society...[e.g.] occupation, religion, language, race, custom, & geography...” (42)
 - c. He focuses on two:
 - (1) ethnic (cultural) divisions
 - (2) economic divisions
 - d. one often-raised Q is relative weight of these two
 - (1) [Pink Floyd quote: “With/Without/ & who’ll deny/it’s what the fighting’s all about” from ‘Us & Them’ off ‘Dark Side of the Moon’]
 - (2) but avoid any false dichotomy
 - (3) [Both ethnic/cultural & econ always matter though relative weight may vary—any hypotheses as

- to why & how the relative might vary?]
2. GLM: “implies much more than mere division, more even than outright conflict, b/w 2 sets of people...
 - a. *fundamental* cleavage...3 specific connotations: [GLM are reviewing Lipset & Rokkan here]
 - (1) “involves a *social division* that separates people who can be distinguished from one another in terms of key social characteristics such as occupation, status, religion, or ethnicity...Cannot be defined at the political level alone” (210)
 - (2) “the groups involved in the division must be *conscious of their collective identity*... & be willing to act on this basis”
 - (3) “must be expressed in organizational terms ... usually achieved as a result of the activities of a trade union, a church, a political party, or some other organization that gives formal institutional expression to the interests of those on one side of the division” (p. 211)
 - b. following Lipset & Rokkan, focus is on four (more on this later):
 - (1) Center-Periphery
 - (2) Church-State
 - (3) Rural-Urban
 - (4) Class Structure

H. SUMMARY of DEFINITIONS & TYPES:

1. Definitions of Cleavages

- a. **L & E:** “a division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups, or organizations [between] whom conflict may arise” (p. 53)
- b. **Powell II:** “a set of attitudes which divides the nation’s citizens into major political groups”
 - (1) “Sometimes purely political: they reflect opinions about policies or & are developed, sustained, & organized by political leaders committed to such policies...”
 - (2) “more frequently [they are the] alignment of large groups...based on deep social, economic, & cultural divisions in the fabric of society[:] occupation, religion, language, race, custom, geography” (p.42)
- c. **GLM:** “[cleavage] ⇒ much more than mere division, more even than outright conflict, between 2 sets of people.” Cleavages **3 properties:**
 - (1) Social divisions on the basis of **identifiable characteristics** (e.g., occupation, status, religion, ethnicity); cannot be defined at political level alone (e.g., *not* parties)
 - (2) Grps must possess **grp consciousness** & willing to act on that basis
 - (3) Cleavage must be **expressed in organizational terms** (e.g., unions, action groups, etc.) [We stress this less as a *criteria*...]

2. Typologies of Cleavages:

- a. We distinguish **2 Broad Cleavage-Types:**
 - (1) **Ascriptive or “Trait” Cleavages:** bases for division are inherent characteristics of individuals involved, there’s no element of choosing to belong to some group: e.g., race, caste, ethnicity, language
 - (2) **Functional, Preference, or Value Cleavages:** these are adopted views or, at least to some degree, chosen affiliations: e.g., class, preferences, ideology, & possibly religion
- b. We identify **4 Common Cleavage-Bases:**
 - (1) **Religious:** Christian/Non-Christian, Catholic/Protestant, Fundamentalist/Moderate, Religious/Secular
 - (2) **Ethnic/Linguistic:** Race, Language, Cultures
 - (3) **Class/Economic:** social class, income & wealth, worker/employer, manual/skilled labor, traded/non-traded sector, private/public sector
 - (4) **Regional/Geographic:** Urb/Sub/Rural, Cntr/Periph, *Regionalism*

VIII. Powell’s (II) Arguments & Findings on Socio-Econ Cleavages & Cleavage-Structure & Democratic Perform

A. Ethnic-/Linguistic-/Religious-ly divided societies

1. Preliminary Analytical Problems/Issues:

- a. Which divides matter?
- b. Whether E/L/R divides cause the conflict or economic differences coinciding therewith do?
2. **Argument:** E/L/R divisions are less divisible (“compromisable” or “bargainable”) &, thus, greater prevalence & saliency of E/L/R divisions worsens democratic performance
3. **Implications:**
 - a. **participation** could go either way,
 - b. **govt stability** should decline as E/L/R divisions rise
 - c. **social order** should decline as E/L/R divisions rise
4. **Findings:** (in broad sample of democracies)
 - a. Some weak indication that **participation** decreases with E/L/R fractionalization
 - b. Stronger evidence that **govt stability** & “effectiveness” declines with E/L/R fractionalization
 - c. complicated relationship with upheaval & violence
 - (1) no greater tendency to riot apparent
 - (2) however, given social upheaval, appears more likely to become violent & deadly—latter frequently occurring as govts attempt to restore order
 - (3) I.e., Greater E/L/R fractionalization produces no greater **tendency to riot**, but, given some degree of social upheaval, it appears more likely to become **violent** the greater is E/L/R fractionalization

B. Economically Divided Societies

1. **Classical Arguments:** (date back to Aristotle)
 - a. Economic **inequality** produces political instability
 - b. Large **middle class** key to defusing this potential
2. **Powell II’s Arguments:**
 - a. “little doubt that occupational divisions & the inequalities that usually accompany them...convenient basis for construct. political org’s” (p.47)
 - b. still less Q, I’d say, that natural basis for potentially disruptive conflict
 - c. What’s less clear is mech. by which econ. inequality ⇒ pol. instability
 - (1) how are such inequalities so frequently tolerated in traditional societies & become issues in modernizing & modern ones?
 - (2) n.b. it’s usu. abrogation of traditional peasant “rights” which triggers revolutions, doesn’t appear to be the awareness of inequality *per se*
 - (3) [concepts: relative deprivation, perceived v. objective inequality, justice]
3. **Powell II’s Hypotheses:** Economic inequality reduces participation, govt stability, & social order
4. **Powell II’s Findings:** Weak evidence of any relationship between inequality & democratic functioning

C. Powell Summary:

1. Arguments: Small population, high development, homogeneity (ethnic, etc.), & low inequality reduce riots & deaths
2. Findings: Yes to pop. & dev., some evidence for ethnic homog., weak evidence for economic inequality. [Why do you suppose?]

D. Powell’s findings refer to entire sample of democracies (*ca.* 1980). We study developed democracies; findings in that sample differ somewhat. [See scatterplots & regressions below.]

E. Further Considerations/Disc.: why some divided soc’s function dem’ly, peacefully, & stably, but others not?

1. History?
 - a. History of oppression & repression & of internal & external war: US, UK/N.Ire.; Israel; former Yugo.; Franco-German, Franco-Spanish, German-Danish, Italian-Austrian, Italian-French border regions
 - b. History of homogeneity or heterogeneity: Compare reactions of massive immigration in Germany v. Switzerland; Italy v. Canada
2. Structure or Nature of Cleavages [see below]?

- a. Reinforcing v. cross-cutting cleavages?
 - (1) US v. Switzerland
 - (2) Finland v. Spain
- b. Relative size of the factions?
 - (1) Too small to be a “threat”
 - (2) So large it “must be dealt with”
 - (3) Hypothesis: 15-40% range most severe problems?
- c. Divisibility of issues? Ascriptive v. functional?
- d. Fractionalization? Polarization?
- 3. Institutional structure? [more on this later]
 - a. *Regional autonomy* (Switzerland, Canada, US, Germany, Australia, Italy, Spain: federalism or special relationships with peripheral groups)
 - b. *Parliamentary representation* of minorities (Neth., Bel.: highly prop. sys.)
 - c. *Functional representation* (Austria: *proportz*, Netherlands: *pillarization*)
 - d. *Checks & balances* (US); *constitutionally ensconced liberties* (all dev’d dem’s)
- F. Powell summarizes chapt nicely—read last 3 paragraphs carefully

IX. Characteristics of Socio-Econ Cleavages & Cleavage Structure that May Affect Democratic Performance

- A. Reinforcing (coinciding) Cleavages & Cross-cutting Cleavages
 - 1. Definitions:
 - a. *Reinforcing*: two cleavages are reinforcing to the degree that they divide society into the same two groups of people
 - b. *Cross-cutting*: two cleavages are cross-cutting to the degree that their divisions of society do not coincide
 - 2. N.b. this a property of cleavage structure, of relations between cleavages (dividing lines), not of one specific cleavage line.
 - 3. [Examples & So What?]
- B. **Cross-Cutting v. Reinforcing**: Cleavage structures (a set of cleavages) are **cross-cutting** to the degree that each divides the nation differently into different groups & **reinforcing** to the degree that each divides the nation into the same groups
 - 1. **Argument**: cleavages are more (less) likely to be more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more they reinforce (cross-cut) each other.
- C. **Salience**: importance of dividing line & its associated conflicts to those involved. (Some refer to dormant cleavages as “latent” & active cleavages as “manifest”).
 - 1. **Argument**: cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more salient the issues involved.
- D. **Divisibility**: degree to which issues over which groups divided by cleavage easily *bargainable* or *compromisable* as opposed to categorical (0-1).
 - 1. **Argument**: cleavages more likely less detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more divisible the issues involved.
- E. **Relative Power** of groups divided by the cleavage
 - 1. **Argument 1**: cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more closely is power distributed among the groups.
 - 2. **Argument 2**: cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order as the power of ascendant groups approaches that of dominant groups.
- F. **Fractionalization & Polarization**: Fractionalization refers to number of cleavages operating (manifest); polarization refers to “distance” separating the parties’ preferred policies & outcomes
 - 1. **Argument**: cleavages are more likely to be more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more fractionalized & polarized the cleavage structure

X. Patterns of Cleavages & the Number of Political Parties

A. Pattern of Cleavages & the Number of Parties

1. SE cleavage struct. of polity described in various dimensions
 - a. fractionalization of society (# of sub-groups, *possibly overlapping*)
 - b. polarization of society (“distance” between groups)
 - c. degree to which cleavages reinforce or cross-cut
 - d. relative salience of the various cleavages
2. These factors combine to suggest number of political parties that may evolve to represent various issues
 - a. they tell us number of relevant *disjoint* subgroups
 - b. if political parties evolve to represent groups of people with distinct interests, that should at least suggest number of parties that evolve
3. Social-structural data that would enable operationalize the abstract concepts above & process them into the number of disjoint subgroups has not been attempted & would be no simple task (though I think it might be feasible). However, subjectively, my impression is that relationship not as strong as might expect:
 - a. US—many disjoint subgroups, effectively 2 parties
 - b. Italy—relatively homogenous, many parties
 - c. Denmark—relatively homogenous, many parties
 - d. [Any guesses why this might be?]

B. **Argument:** Cleavage structure suggests # & types of social groups that parties could evolve to represent; *i.e.*, soc. struct. gives basis for political org. suggesting that societal fractionalization & polarization may be mirrored by party-system fract. & polar.

C. **Evidence:**

1. To measure adequately effective number of relevant social groupings daunting empirical task: only crude attempts so far.
2. However, my subjective impression is correlation b/w # social groups & # parties weak at best: US: many groups, 2 parties; Switzerland: many groups, many parties; Italy: relatively homogenous, many parties; UK: relatively homogenous, 2 parties.
3. Why? Probably b/c b/w soc. struct. & party sys. intervenes extremely powerful inst’l variables, esp. electoral law & inst’s

D. **Some Key Concepts:** *cleavage; cleavage structure; salience/intensity; latent v. manifest; cross-cutting v. reinforcing; fractionalization & polarization; modernization & social-mobilization; post-materialism*

XI. Modernization & Democratic Performance

A. **Key features of development:**


1. Growth & spread of affluence
2. Economic- & social-structural change
3. Urbanization
4. Education, literacy, & spread of mass media
5. Greater social & occupational mobility




B. **Classical Hypotheses:** Democracies with modernized social structures & developed economies expected to have higher participation, more stable & effective govts, & less political violence than countries with more traditional social structures & underdeveloped economies & democracies. Why?


1. Simple, monotonic arguments:
 - a. *Education & Modern Person* hypotheses (Lerner, Inkeles: rational/scientific life views)
 - b. *Value-harmonization hypothesis*
 - c. *Affluence hypothesis*: (Maslow’s hierarchy of needs)
 - d. *Govt-resources hypothesis*: affluence allows greater fulfillment of social demands, partly *via* increase of govt resources
 - e. *Increasing-interdependence hypothesis*
2. Non-monotonic, Conditional (complicated) arguments
 - a. *Ratio econ dev’p to soc-pol mobilization* (Huntington)

- b. *Level of Econ dev'p at intro of political competition*
 - c. *Pace-of-development hypothesis*
- C. Powell II: Impact on political perf? [generate hypoth's]
 - 1. **Participation**
 - a. **Argument:** modernization raises participation
 - (1) greater info., edu., & psychological involvement of modern person
 - (2) more extensive & specialized grp structures, more effective organizations (esp. parties & related org's)
 - b. **Finding:** Modernization=> Lesser Participation
 - c. Why?
 - 2. **Govt Stability/Effectiveness:**
 - a. **Hypothesis:** Seems logical that modernize \Rightarrow \uparrow govt stab & effect
 - b. **Finding:** Modernization \Rightarrow no apparent relation to govt stab. & effect.
 - c. Why?
 - 3. **Social Order & Violence:**
 - a. **Hypothesis:** Again, seems logical that modernization \Rightarrow greater social order & less violence
 - b. **Findings:** Relationship b/w development & "social upheaval" (riots) seems different than that b/w development & political violence
 - (1) Soc disorder most in early stages of modernization, less at undeveloped & developed stages; i.e., curvilinear w/ early modernization appearing worst
 - (2) Violence, contrarily, strictly declines (increases) in modernization (underdevelopment); i.e., linear
 - c. Why?
- XII. Some data & simple evidence on S-E Development & Cleavage-Structure & Democratic Performance

A. Participation







Number of obs = 21


R-squared = 0.8833




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
---
vpart | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
---
lpop | -3.336463 1.212639 -2.751 0.019 -6.005463 -.6674632
lrgdpc | 1.848647 6.740736 0.274 0.789 -12.98761 16.68491
ethind | .0623695 7.192933 0.009 0.993 -15.76917 15.89391
relind | 12.3443 7.94188 1.554 0.148 -5.13566 29.82426
gini | -111.8817 44.40408 -2.520 0.028 -209.6144 -14.14894
edsec | -.2808857 .1271328 -2.209 0.049 -.5607032 -.0010682
age65o | 1.203603 .7275164 1.654 0.126 -.3976493 2.804856
US | -17.27092 6.455974 -2.675 0.022 -31.48042 -3.061414
SZ | -46.59973 6.659673 -6.997 0.000 -61.25757 -31.94189
_cons | 144.9013 57.75213 2.509 0.029 17.78975 272.0129
-----
---

```

B. Govt Stability










Number of obs = 21 R-squared = 0.6162

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
lpop	-1.208241	1.905755	-0.634	0.538	-5.360524 2.944042
lrgdpc	-21.06676	11.06763	-1.903	0.081	-45.18106 3.047533
ethind	24.58645	10.87294	2.261	0.043	.8963491 48.27655
relind	28.05811	12.91752	2.172	0.051	-.0867556 56.20297
gini	-48.43518	70.82302	-0.684	0.507	-202.7453 105.8749
edsec	.220791	.2004675	1.101	0.292	-.2159903 .6575722
age65o	1.553841	1.179984	1.317	0.212	-1.017124 4.124805
US	18.08332	10.5959	1.707	0.114	-5.003161 41.1698
_cons	192.649	94.03041	2.049	0.063	-12.2256 397.5237

C. Social Order & Violence




```

-----
lattopp | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
lpop | .6046398 .3707692 1.631 0.142 -.2503556 1.459635
lrgdpc | -3.45209 1.985412 -1.739 0.120 -8.030458 1.126277
ethind | 1.977078 1.950378 1.014 0.340 -2.520503 6.474659
relind | 1.822315 2.361272 0.772 0.462 -3.622789 7.267419
gini | 3.157216 13.30192 0.237 0.818 -27.51707 33.8315
edsec | .0401198 .033673 1.191 0.268 -.0375303 .1177698
age65o | .7656431 .2847183 2.689 0.028 .1090814 1.422205
_cons | 9.059294 16.14223 0.561 0.590 -28.16475 46.28334
-----

```

XIII. Interpreting Regression-Analysis Results

- A. Output refers to equation, where name in top-left, here “lattopp”, is dependent variable & rest of names in first column are independent variables, “lpop”, “lrgdpc” etc.
- B. Second column contains estimated coefficients on those independent variables. Last such coefficient, on “_cons”, is coefficient on a constant (one), otherwise known as intercept. Coefficients tell you how much dependent variable tends to move for each 1-unit increase in independent variable. **Sign**, therefore, tells you direction of the relationship & **size** tells you magnitude (keeping in mind substantive scales of independent & dependent variables). So, above estimated equation is:

$$\text{lattopp} = 9.06 + .605(\text{lpop}) - 3.45(\text{lrgdpc}) + 1.98(\text{ethind}) + 1.82(\text{relind}) + 3.16(\text{gini}) + .040(\text{edsec}) + .766(\text{age65o})$$
- C. All data are for the 1980s:
 1. *lattopp*=avg # of “political attacks & oppressions”
 2. *lpop*=natural log of size of population
 3. *lrgdpc*=natural log of real GDP per capita
 4. *ethind*=ethnic fractionalization index: probability that 2 persons chosen at random will be of diff ethnic grps
 5. *relind*=religious fractionalization index: probability 2 persons chosen at random will be of diff relig grs
 6. *gini*=GINI index of income inequality
 7. *edsec*=percentage of population in relative age grp that attained at least secondary edu (high school)
 8. *age65o*=percentage of population over 65 years old
- D. Third column is standard error. It tells you precision of the estimated relationship: with how great certainty do increases in independent variable lead to movements in the dependent variable? You can read these as loosely something like the +/- number that comes with every survey. E.g., “When percent of population high-school educated or better goes up by 1, natural log of political attacks & oppressions go up by about .04 [coefficient on *edsec*] give or take .034 [std error on *edsec* coeff].”
- E. Next column contains t-statistics. Std errors should at very least be smaller than coefficient for us to lend any credence to coefficient estimate. We’d prefer them to be no larger than half as large as coefficient. T-statistic is just coefficient divided by standard error. So, loosely, larger t-statistics imply more precise relationships (tighter relationships, not necessarily larger ones). We like t-stats approaching or exceeding about 2 (very crude advice, please don’t ever tell a statistician this).
- F. Next column is probability, under certain assumptions, of having estimated a coefficient this far or farther from zero if the true relationship actually were zero. We look to these to see if we can say with any statistical certainty that a relationship (positive or negative) exists. We like these “p-levels” approaching or smaller than 0.10 (again, this very rough statement would make a statistician cringe).
- G. Last two columns are “95% confidence interval”. Again, exceedingly crudely but good enough for now, we can say, under certain assumptions, we are 95% confident that the true relationship b/w these bounds.
- H. This is *multiple regression*. It’s just like the scatter-plots for two variables above, only now looking for

relation between a *set* of possible independent variables & the dependent variable. Thus, each coefficient is “the effect of X on Y, holding all else constant” or “the effect of X on Y after having ‘netted out’ all relationships between the other x’s & Y”.

1. Coefficients (and standard errors, t-stats, & p-levels) defined above all related to how (and the certainty with which) *each variable, controlling for all the others*, relates to the dependent variable.
2. R^2 term (“R-squared” at top-right of table) indicates share of total variation of dependent variable that can be explained by, that is systematic in, (*all of*) the independent variables.

I. Questions? We will see this again, so:

1. Do not panic if you did not get all of this right now. We will see it again (& again) & I will explain it again.
2. However, do not hope that it will just go away if you ignore it. We *will* see it again (& again).

XIV. Further Q’s regarding ***Dev & Saliency of Diff Cleavages***:

1. Does development increase the saliency of functional cleavages relative to ascriptive ones?
2. Does rise of **post-industrial society & post-materialism** decrease saliency of economic cleavages?
3. Did the rise of the welfare state & the more recent plateau-ing or receding of the welfare state increase or decrease the saliency of economic cleavages?
4. More broadly, are *new* cleavages replacing *old* ones?

XV. **Summary of What We Have So Far on Socio-Econ Development & Cleavage-Structure & Politics:**

A. Basic Notion & Definition of Social Cleavage & Cleavage-Structure

B. Typologies of Social Cleavages:

1. *Ascriptive v. Functional Cleavages*
2. *Religious, Ethnic/Linguistic, Class/Economic, Regional/Geographic*

C. Characteristics of Social Cleavages & Cleavage-Structures Potentially Important to Key Elements of Democratic Performance

1. *Saliency of the Divide (“latent” — “manifest”)*
2. *Divisibility (“Bargainability” or “Compromisability”)*
3. *Relative Power of the Groups Involved*
4. *Fractionalization & Polarization (of Cleavage Structure)*
5. *Cross-Cutting v. Reinforcing (Cleavage Structure)*

D. Modernization & Democratic Perf; Key Hypotheses

1. *Modernization ↑ Participation, Govt Stab, & Soc Order*
 - a. Education & the “Modern Person” Arg.
 - b. Value-Harmonization Arg.
 - c. Increasing Density of Interactions (Increasing Interdependence of Individuals in Society) Arg.
2. *Impact of Modernization Depends (is complicated)*
 - a. Ratio of Econ Dev’t to Social Mobilization Arg.
 - b. Economic Dev’p at Time of Democratization Arg.
 - c. Pace of Development Arg.

E. Why do some democracies function well & others not? Answer in this material emphasizes nature & severity of underlying potential conflicts as expressed in social-structure & the way they are expressed. This omits other important parts of answer, some of which we will emphasize later. For now, note:

1. *History*: of oppress & repress & of homogeneity or heterogeneity
2. *Institutional Structure*: Checks & Balances, Regional Autonomy, Minority Representation in Parliament; Functional Representation of Minorities, Guaranteed Rights in Constitutions

F. Social-Cleavage Patterns & the Party System: basic notion that party system, *i.e.*, number, sizes, & ideological positioning of parties, reflects somehow underlying social-structure. But relation moderated by:

1. *Institutions operating b/w soc struct & party sys (most centrally, electoral inst’s).*
2. *Party & other elite strategies, & history (loosely, inertia)*

**Lipset & Rokkan's Diachronic Model of
Cleavage-Structure Formation & Freezing**

- XVI. 2 stages, **Process of Nation-Building & Industrial Revolution**, each bringing 2 fundamental conflicts, form underlying cleavage structure. Nature of resolution forms party system.
- A. **Nation Building I: Center v. Periphery**
1. Those seeking to standardize laws & consolidate power in nation-state (ctr) v. those striving to maintain local powers & privileges (periph)
 2. The struggle can end in:
 - a. secession (Ireland from UK),
 - b. periph. absorption & its gradual fade as distinct (France: Bretton, Occitan),
 - c. local autonomy (some Spanish & Italian regions),
 - d. or retention of diffuse, persistent tension (e.g., Germany, except Bavaria which is more local-autonomy resolution)
 3. Only last 2 likely to result in cleavage's reflection in party system
- B. **Nation-Building II: Church v. State**
1. Conflict b/w (Cath) Church's claim of rights & privileges, esp. its supremacy in certain moral areas, v. state consolidators; central issue often education
 2. Resolution depends centrally on nation's history & role in Protestant Ref. & later secularist movements:
 - a. Where Protestant movements allied with state & won, party system does not usually reflect Church-State cleavage (e.g., UK, Scandinavia)
 - b. Where Catholicism continued to dominate, Church-State cleavage tended to persist (e.g., Latin Europe)
 - c. Where secularists most momentum (e.g., France), party system often evolved anti-clerical elements
- C. **Industrial Revolution I: Urban v. Rural**
1. Conflict b/w traditionally dominant rural interests & new commercial & industrial classes
 2. Have almost universally faded (largely b/c urban int's won), but...
 - a. ...in some places agrarian parties emerged, & some persist if lead strategists allowed party flexibility from early aims & purposes, (e.g., Sweden, Finland)
 - b. ...split has seen rebirth in reverse as urban decline began, (e.g., US, UK)
 - c. ...some rebirth also in conflicts over agr. protection (e.g., esp. Eur & Jap)
- D. **Industrial Revolution II: Labor v. Employers**
1. ↑ concentration of production, & accompanying ↑ organization of labor & employers as grps, ⇒ almost-inherently-organized conflict
 2. Resolution occurred by two patterns:
 - a. Where workers rose & *bourgeoisie* adopted an accommodative strategy, Socialist parties arose as the representatives of labor (e.g., UK, Sweden)
 - b. Where workers rose & *bourgeoisie* adopted stonewalling & /or repressive strategy, Communist parties arose as rep's of labor (e.g., Fra, Ita, Ger, Spa)
- XVII. **Argument:** Pattern of how these conflicts arose in each ctry & how had been or were being resolved at time mass democ. arrived frozen. I.e., **cleavage structure frozen into party system by mid-20th Century because:**
- A. **Underlying conflicts persist** & groups involved have developed **collective identities**
 - B. Major new political entities typ'ly can arise only w/ large ↑ in suffrage & **universal suffrage mostly completed** by then.
 - C. **Political rules made by & so favor established parties**
 - D. **Established parties follow electoral strategies to isolate their supporters from outside appeals**
- XVIII. Perceived ↑ **electoral volatility** in 1970s led some to seek **explanations for unfreezing (thawing):**
- A. **Social-Structural Changes in Developed Democracies**
1. **Sectoral-Structure:** industry ↓, agriculture ↓↓, service-sector ↑↑
 2. **Erosion of Class Boundaries**

- a. general education & more wide-spread higher education
- b. changing work modes: relative ↓ manual labor; more-fluid occup. Δ
- c. increasingly widespread affluence (though relative disparities widened too)

B. Changes in Patterns of Individual Voting Behavior: Decline of Structural Voting

- 1. Decline class voting & religious voting but still recognizably diff.
- 2. **Arg's:** suggested reasons for former listed above, to which add:
 - a. secularization & decreasing coherence of views among relig. & secular alike
 - b. increased individuality & political sophistication

C. Changes in Issues on which basis those Individuals Vote: *Dealignment v. Realignment*

- 1. **Realignment:** new parties & changing support among existing
 - a. Some see a “New Politics” movement
 - (1) new, highly educated, young middle class
 - (2) distinctive new values & issues: environment, feminism, etc.
 - (3) new-left: greens, new comm.; new-right: anti-govt, xenophobic, protest
 - b. GLM suggest this may be exaggerated
 - (1) most of these new parties are still marginal electorally
 - (2) parliamentary and/or electoral necessity implies increasing association of the “new” lefts & rights with “old” ones
 - c. Conclusion: *Realignment* very limited, some new dim's in still-recognizable left-right divide. Great electoral stability remains across left-right blocks of parties/issues; instability w/in blocks.
- 2. **Dealignment:** non-partisan allegiances & no allegiances. Supposed evidence: (a) ↓ party ID, (b) ↑ new parties & party-sys fractionalization, & (c) ↑ elect volatility. All of which questionable.

Dalton, ch. 13 in LNN, & ch.8 in Cit. Pol., 2nd ed.

XIX. Broad Theme:

- A. 2 prominent changes in link from SES to voting behavior
 - 1. Traditional cleavages (esp. class & religion) transformed & weakened as predictors of individuals' electoral choices
 - 2. Changing bases of ideological conflict: rise of “post-materialism”
- B. These producing general rise in “issue-based” voting
 - 1. Less based on socially pre-determined & structured competition
 - 2. A new calculus of electoral decisions
 - a. Individualistic
 - b. Varying issue positions & weights thereupon

XX. The post-war era through late 1960s to 1970s

- A. Party competition & voting patterns structured around social divisions within a polity
 - 1. Review Lipset & Rokkan's “Diachronic” Model & Social-Cleavage/Party-System “Freezing” Hypothesis
 - 2. **Expected to persist because...**
 - a. Such cleavage structures long-lasting: underlying conflicts persist & grps developed collective ID
 - b. Universal suffrage largely completed: new parties tend to form (only) when new grps enter electorate
 - c. Political rules made by & so favor estab'd parties
 - d. Estab'd party strategies: often try to isolate supporters from outside appeals
 - e. **NEW: Alignment w/ underlying social-structural groups advantageous to parties & voters**
[How? See below.]
 - 3. Why were these divisions so potent?
 - a. Represented & (re-)produced deep ideological divisions
 - (1) Class: conflict over nature of politics & economics, over very org. of society
 - (2) Religion: basic value-systems (right & wrong) in conflict
 - b. Social groups enabled parties to institutionalize a basis for support
 - (1) Labor unions & firms provided organizational & people support
 - (2) Ditto for churches

B. What does(reputation for) alignment of parties with social-structural groups do for voters & parties?

1. The groups so divided provided a social & political reference & source of info for their members (voters)
2. They provide org'l structure, people, & political ally for parties

XXI. General ↓ in sociologically determined vote

- A. Figs. pp. 172, 183-4 [n.b., usu. said post-'68 or so, but seems pretty uniform since the war to me]




FIGURE 8.1
THE OVERALL LEVEL
OF CLASS VOTING, 1990

SOURCE: 1990-91 World Values Survey.
NOTE: Values in parentheses are Gamma's & correlations. Respondents without a party preference are excluded from the calculation of correlations.

Republican	34	42	53
Total	100	100	100
Great Britain, 1992			
Labour	51	24	18
Liberal Democrats	14	21	20
Conservatives	34	55	62
Total	100	100	100
Germany, 1994			
PDS	3	5	4
Alliance 90/Greens	3	12	6
SPD	51	38	17
FDP	2	7	10
CDU/CSU	42	38	58
Total	101	100	101
France, 1988			
PC	12	7	10
Socialists	51	47	30
Other Left	3	2	0
Greens	10	6	4
UDF	13	15	20
RPR	12	19	30
National Front	4	1	7
Total	101	99	101

SOURCES: United States: 1992 American National Election Study; Great Britain, 1992: British Election Study; Germany, 1994: German Election Study; France, 1988: French Election Study.




FIGURE 8.2
TRENDS IN CLASS VOTING

SOURCES: *United States, 1948-52*, American National Election Studies; *Great Britain, 1959*, Civic Culture Study; 1964-72, British Election Studies; *Germany 1953-94*, German Election Studies; *France, 1955*, Maréchal 1997; 2001; 2008, Converse and Duquenois study; 1962, IFOP survey; 1967, Converse and Prewé study; 1968, Inglehart study; 1973-88, *Barometer* studies.

NOTE: American data are based on congressional elections, except for 1948. German data for 1950 and 1954 are from unified Germany. The values plotted are the Alford Class Voting Index, that is, the percentage of the working class voting for Leftist parties minus the percentage of the middle-class-voting for Leftist parties.

TABLE 8.2
RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION AND PARTY SUPPORT
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	No relig.		Jewish		Protestant		Other Church of England	
	Non-relig.	Relig.	Protestant	Catholic	Protestant	Catholic	Protestant	Catholic
<i>United States, 1992</i>								
Democrat	66	72	62	62	62	60	45	45
Republican	34	28	38	38	38	40	55	55
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Great Britain, 1992</i>								
Labour	39	52	34	39	28	28	28	28
Liberal Democrats	20	15	20	12	18	18	18	18
Conservatives	41	34	46	49	55	55	55	55
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Germany, 1994</i>								
PDs	14	1	8	1	1	1	1	1
Alliance 90/Greens	10	10	8	10	10	10	10	10
SPD	38	38	47	32	32	32	32	32
CDU/CSU	5	5	4	8	8	8	8	8
Total	38	38	41	51	51	51	51	51
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>France, 1988</i>								
PC	18	18	5	5	5	5	5	5
Socialists	55	55	41	41	41	41	41	41
Other Left	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2
Centre	10	10	6	6	6	6	6	6
UDF	5	5	12	12	12	12	12	12
RPR	5	5	25	25	25	25	25	25
National Front	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCES: *United States, 1992*, American National Election Study; *Great Britain, 1992*, British Election Study; *Germany, September 1994*, *Politbarometer* Study; *France, Eurobarometer 39*, (Fall 1988).




FIGURE 8-3
THE OVERALL LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS VOTING, 1990

SOURCE: 1990-91 World Values Survey.

NOTE: Values in parentheses are *Cramer's V* correlations. Respondents without a party preference are excluded from the calculation of correlations.

TABLE 8-3
CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND PARTY SUPPORT
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	Never	Occasionally	Weekly
<i>United States, 1992</i>			
Democrat	66	60	55
Republican	34	40	46
Total	100	100	101
<i>Great Britain, 1992</i>			
Labour	39	29	33
Liberal Democrats	17	18	21
Conservatives	44	53	47
Total	100	100	101
<i>Germany, 1994</i>			
FD5	7	1	1
Alliance 90/Greens	11	6	2
SPD	43	44	19
FDP	6	6	4
CDU/CSU	34	43	74
Total	101	99	100
<i>France, 1988</i>			
PC	15	4	3
Socialists	52	43	25
Other Left	3	2	2
Greens	10	6	1
UDF	7	17	10
RPR	9	25	17
National Front	3	3	1
Total	101	100	99

SOURCES: *United States*, 1992 American National Election Study; *Great Britain*, 1992 British Election Study; *Germany*, September 1994, *Politbarometer* Study; *France*, *Eurobarometer* (Fall 1988).




FIGURE 8.4
TRENDS IN DENOMINATIONAL VOTING

SOURCE: *United States*, 1952-92, American National Election Studies; *Great Britain*, 1964-92, British Election Studies; *Germany*, 1953-92, German Election Studies.

NOTE: Comparisons for the United States and Germany are between Protestants and Catholics. "GB-2" is a comparison of the Labour Party vote of Anglicans and Catholics. "GB-1" is a comparison of the Conservative Party vote of Anglicans and non-Anglicans.




FIGURE 8.5
TRENDS IN RELIGIOUS VOTING

SOURCE: *United States*, 1952-92, American National Election Studies; *Great Britain*, 1964-92, British Election Studies; *Germany*, 1953-92, German Election Studies; *France*, 1957, Converse and PricewaterhouseCoopers study; 1973-88, Eurobarometer studies.

NOTE: The values plotted are the differences between Leftist voting preferences of those who never attend church from those who attend weekly.




FIGURE 8.6
THE OVERALL LEVEL
OF VALUES VOTING, 1990

SOURCE: 1990-91 World Values Survey.
NOTE: Values in parentheses are Gamma's V correlations. Respondents without a party preference are excluded from the calculation of correlations.

TABLE 8.4
VALUE PRIORITIES AND PARTY SUPPORT
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	Postmaterial		Material
<i>United States</i>			
Democrat	57	59	52
Republican	33	42	48
Total	100	101	100
<i>Great Britain</i>			
Labour	70	56	47
Liberal Democrats	9	8	3
Conservatives	22	37	50
Total	101	101	100
<i>Germany</i>			
Alliance 90/Greens	14	4	1
SPD	52	38	33
FDP	11	8	10
CDU/CSU	21	46	52
Other party	2	4	3
Total	100	100	99
<i>France</i>			
PC	16	6	5
Socialists	46	42	35
Other Left	3	1	0
Greens	21	17	12
UDF	15	20	30
RPR	6	8	16
National Front	3	6	3
Total	100	100	101

SOURCE: 1990-91 World Values Survey.
NOTE: Value priorities are measured with the twelve-item index (see chapter 7).




FIGURE 8-7
TRENDS IN NEW POLITICS VOTING

SOURCES: 1990-91 World Values Survey, 1973 European Communities Study, and 1973 Political Action Survey.

NOTE: The values plotted are the Percentage Difference Index (PDI) correlating postmaterial value priorities with Leftist party preference.

B. Simple Class-Voting Decline

1. **Define class voting:**
2. Blue/White collar divide appears to be decreasingly relevant as a predictor of party vote
3. **Explanations for specifically this cleavage decline:**
 - a. Class division better defined by degree of job autonomy & authority
 - b. Rise of the middle class “salariat” & affluent blue-collar worker
 - c. Educational divide: skilled v. unskilled labor, human-capital rich v. poor
 - d. Broad sectoral: public v. private; traded v. non; service v. industry v. agr
 - e. Life-style differences: industrial v. yuppie
4. Even so, general decline in ability of such socio-economic status indicators to predict vote choices

C. Religious Voting “Decline”

1. **Define religious voting, two types:**
 - a. Denominational voting
 - b. Religious v. secular
2. **Explanations for specifically this cleavage decline:**
 - a. Secularization
 - (1) Decreasing church memberships & attendance
 - (2) Ethical individuality—e.g. US Catholic Church
 - b. Church/state, secular/relig conflict largely resolved
3. N.b.,
 - a. other structural voting, esp. religious/secular, seems to have persisted to much greater degree than has class voting

- b. Dalton's broader claim of falling structural voting rests more solidly therefore on fact that divisions of relevance to declining prop. of pop.

D. Other Key Social Divisions

1. Region
 - a. Occasional, dramatic flare-ups
 - b. Still, some general fall in region's predictive power
2. Urban/Rural & Center/Periphery
 - a. Differences diminishing due to transport & communications revolutions
 - b. But still-present agricultural-industry-service divide
3. Race/Ethnicity
 - a. Prominent exception to general declining relevance of socioeconomic structure to one's vote-choice
 - b. Many societies still homogeneous or nearly so, less relevant there obviously

XXII. General explanations (hypotheses) for decline of SES as predictor of vote choice

A. Underlying conflicts have increasingly been resolved

1. Nieuwbeerta (1995) finds that strength of class voting declines in the size of the welfare state
2. [Note: this would also explain persistence of race-ethnicity & relative decline of other cleavages]
3. Dalton dismisses this, though, noting:
 - a. Periodic recessions bring economic issues back to front [doesn't this weaken his other claims?]
 - b. Persisting poverty, homelessness [yes, but do these segments of population vote? It varies.]
 - c. Crime [not quite clear how this fits with any of above cleavages *per se*]
 - d. Large differences remain on abortion, homosexual rights, & other "moral issues" [yes, but it's exactly in this that religious/secular divide persists]
4. [As is clear from my comments here, I think case for "relative resolution of underlying conflicts" arg. could be made more strongly. **Notice that deg. to which underlying conflicts "resolved" might explain relative decline of some types of struct voting & relative persistence or rise of others**]

B. Parties broadened, or sought to, appeals across cleavage lines

1. Some evidence of platform convergence on broad socio-economic issues [e.g., industrial nationalization], but recently evidence indicates a reversal of that trend: increasingly polarized politics. Perhaps, the polarization is diminishing again? (Pragmatic left winning in US, UK, France, Germany?) Remains to be seen.
2. Dalton notes that voters, party leaders, & "political experts" still perceive large & /or clear partisan differences which would imply...
 - a. ...that it's not that voters don't perceive or are unclear about partisan differences, nor that parties no longer express such differences, but rather...
 - b. ...that socio-economic status of voter serves less as determinant of how voter will interpret & react to different signals parties send & voters receive.

C. Dalton's preferred explanation emphasizes structural & institutional changes that have produced ↓ relevance relatively fixed social characteristics for contemporary electoral politics

1. These social cleavages still very relevant to those deeply enmeshed in them, but that's fewer & fewer.
2. Increasing proportion of population characterized by:
 - a. "Fragmentation of life spaces" [Huh? Define]
 - b. ↓ partic., membership, or involve "stable & bounded social structures" [?]
 - c. Lifestyles becoming increasingly individualized & diverse [?]
3. **[How about social fluidity & individual mobility across structured divides? Notice how this explains relative ↓ class & less ↓ in religion & no ↓ in race/ethnicity.]**
4. D acknowledges that parties contributed to & reinforced all this:
 - a. By seeking to accommodate these changes in structure & institutions within existing party struct. they have eroded their core estab'd images/reputations
 - b. But they do not wish to commit yet to any strong stand on the new issues.

XXIII. New Bases of Political Cleavages, *i.e.* Post-Materialism

A. Define/Examples of “Post-Materialism”:

B. How did/do they arise?

1. ↑ new issues benefitted from ↓ old ones: the “open space” arg.
2. *Vice versa*, new issues cut across old divides, weakening their ability to divide: the “emergence of cross-cutting issues” arg.
3. Meanwhile, cit’s ev’where ↑ly demanded ↑ opp’s to part. more act’ly in p-mkng: gen’l “further democratization of soc. & pol.” arg
4. Finally, notice that new issues appeal exactly to those groups increasingly outside traditional struct’d & inst’lized cleavages: young, new middle class, educated, non-religious, [others?]
5. [Other hypoths? esp. regarding environmentalism, are non-material problems increasing? affluence? education? cross-derivatives, i.e. implications of Maslow’s hierarchy?]
6. Before we proclaim “all new” divides, new cleavage patterns, though, we need to keep in mind:
 - a. Not all of these issues are so terribly new, even if perhaps their current prominence might be unprecedented.
 - b. Compared to the structured ideologies underlying class & religious cleavages, materialist vs. post-materialist framework (still) diffuse & imprecise: what beside their novelty links these concerns?

XXIV. So what is the impact of all this change?

A. Decline in long-term partisan predispositions ==>

1. ↑ short-term factors like issues & image?
2. ↑ performance-based voting, like econ voting?
3. ↑ “candidate-cntrd” politics [DEF, *n.b.* US always more so? Why?]
4. ↑ in “issue-voting”?

B. Issue-voting:

1. **Define Issue-Voting:**
2. Harder to study systematically because:
 - a. Issues vary across elections & across individuals
 - b. Multiplicity of issues at all times
3. Issues underlying old cleavages still here; new issues added thereto

C. Takes some time for, & it’s an uncertain process by which a new basis, for partisan competition can arise.

1. Grps must org to represent & mobilize interested.
2. Parties must establish positions, reputations, & images on those interests (in uncertain environ).

D. New Politics is orthogonal to old politics divides: Left v. Right, Religious v. Secular (or Cath. v. Prot. etc.)

1. The new divide is, maybe, sustainable society & libertarian values v. conservative social values & structured life choices.
2. **[Is this another dimension? or more like new manifestation or replacement of relig v. secular?]**

Comparative Govt'l Systems (Part I)

XXV. Overview of Material to Date

A. Introduction

1. DEF subject matter: “Developed Democracy”
2. Intellectual History of Comparative Politics
3. Well-functg Dem: Part, Gov Stab & Eff, Soc Stab & Order
4. Cycle-of-Democratic-Politics Schematic

B. Soc-Ec Development & Structure & Democ. Politics

1. Basic Notion & Def Social Cleavage & Cleavage-Structure
2. Typologies of Social Cleavages:
 - a. By membership bases: Ascriptive v. Functional/Preference
 - b. By dimension of conflict: Religious; Ethnic/Linguistic; Class/Economic; Regional/Geographic
3. Characteristics of SE Cleavages & Cleavage-Structures Potentially Important to Democratic Performance
 - a. Salience of the Divide (“latent” — “manifest”)

- b. Ascriptive v. functional bases of most salient cleavages
 - c. Divisibility (“Bargainability” or “Compromisability”)
 - d. Relative Power of the Groups Involved
 - e. Fractionalization & Polarization (of Cleavage Structure)
 - f. Cross-Cutting v. Reinforcing (Cleavage Structure)
- C. Modernization & Democratic Perf; Key Hypotheses
 - 1. Modernization ↑ Participation, Govt Stab, & Soc Order
 - a. Education & the “Modern Person” Arg.
 - b. Value-Harmonization Arg.
 - c. ↑ Density of Interactions (↑ Interdep. of Ind’s in Society) Arg.
 - 2. Impact of Modernization Depends (is complicated)
 - a. Ratio of Econ Dev’t to Social Mobilization Arg.
 - b. Economic Dev’p at Time of Democratization Arg.
 - c. Pace of Development Arg.
- D. Social-Cleavage Patterns & Party System:
 - 1. basic notion that party system, *i.e.*, #, sizes, & ideological positioning of parties, reflects underlying social-structure.
 - 2. But relation heavily moderated by:
 - a. Institutions b/w soc struct & party system (esp., elect. inst’s).
 - b. Party & other elite strategies, & history (loosely, inertia)
- E. L & R’s Cleavage-Struct. Formation & *Freezing* Hypoth
 - 1. 2 stages, Nation-Build & Indust. Rev., each brings 2 fundamental conflicts, form cleavage structure. Nature of resolve forms party sys.
 - a. Nation Building I: Center v. Periphery
 - b. Nation-Building II: Church v. State
 - c. Industrial Revolution I: Urban v. Rural
 - d. Industrial Revolution II: Labor v. Employers
 - 2. *Arg*: cleavage struct *frozen* in party sys by mid-20th C:
 - a. Underlying conflicts persist & grps developed collective ID
 - b. Universal suffrage largely completed
 - c. Political rules made by & so favor estab’d parties
 - d. Estab party strategies to isolate supporters from outside appeals
 - e. Soc-Grp/Party Alignment advantages parties & voters [*How?*]
- F. Perceived ↑ electoral volatility post-70s ⇒ explain *thaw*
 - 1. 2 big changes in link from SES to voting behavior
 - a. Changing Patterns Ind. Voting Behave: ↓ Struct Vote. Traditional cleaves (esp. class & rel) transformed & weakened as predicts of inds’ vote choices
 - b. Changing bases ideol conflict: De- v. Re-alignment, ↑ *post-materialism*
 - 2. These producing general rise in “issue-based” voting
 - a. Less socially pre-determined & structured competition
 - b. New calculus electoral choice: Individualistic, Varying issue positions & wts
 - 3. Why were these divisions so potent?
 - a. Represented & (re-)produced deep ideological divisions
 - b. Social grps enable parties to inst’l-ize basis for support
 - 4. Decline in sociologically determined vote
 - a. Simple Class-Voting Decline: Define. Explanations.
 - b. Religious Voting “Decline”: Define. Explanations.
 - c. Other Key Soc Div’s: Region, Urb/Rur & Ctr/Periph, Race/Eth
 - d. Relative ↓ Struct Vote: Class>(Relig<Region)>Eth/Ling
 - 5. General explanations (hypothes) for decline of SES vote

- a. Underlying conflicts increasingly resolved (explain rel ↓?)
- b. Parties (tried to) broaden appeals across lines (explain rel ↓?)
- c. Structural & institutional changes produced ↓ relevance relatively fixed social characteristics for contemporary electoral politics
- d. Social cleavages still very relevant to those deeply enmeshed in them, but that's fewer & fewer.
- e. Increasing proportion characterized by social fluidity & individual mobility across struct divides. (could explain relative decline)
- f. Parties have contributed to & reinforced all this

XXVI. *Comparative Govt Systems I: Executives & Legislatures (Courts, Administration, & Local Govt)*

A. Overview (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, chs. 2,3,4,6):

1. To compare dem's, asking how diff ways of constructing inst's of dem might affect key soc, pol, & econ outcomes, must first have some grasp range of diff inst'l sys poss.
2. Branches of govt: exec, legis, judic, admin (bureauc); plus, some mech's for subdividing jurisdiction: local governance

B. Executive (ch. 2)

1. DEFINE:

- a. classically, implements policy set by legislation;
- b. in practice, more than that:
 - (1) consolidated leadership of govt, of country: CEO
 - (2) often agenda setter, designer, enforcer of law
 - (3) figurehead: personal embodiment of state

2. Key distinctive features of democratic exec's (beyond US)

- a. Separation of Powers
 - (1) Executive-legislative separation non-existent in most democracies
 - (2) Head of State (HoS) & Chief Executive (CEO) strongly separated (separation non-existent in US): (historical evolution)
- b. Indirect Elect.: Execs not usu. directly elected, usually indirectly from legis

3. Head of State

- a. Types of Head of State (where differ, usu. longer term than CEO):
 - (1) Const'l Monarchies: CA, AL, NZ (Queen rep. by Gov.-Gen.), JA (Emp.), BE, DE, LU (GrDuke), NE, NO, SP, SW, UK
 - (2) Republics (Pres. HoS):
 - (a) Direct Election: US, AU, FI, FR, IC, IR, PO
 - (b) Election by Legislature: GE, GR, IT, MA, SZ
- b. Roles:
 - (1) Symbolic: personal embodiment of nation
 - (2) Procedural: preside@big state events (open parl, ratify laws, etc.)
 - (3) Diplomatic: greeting visiting dignitaries, attending funerals, etc.
- c. Variation in Effective Powers:
 - (1) Effective influence varies, but **France** ("Semi-Presidential" since 1958) a major exception (=> rest, w/ poss. exception Switz., Fin., & 1 or 2 others, more strictly **Parliamentary Democracies**)
 - (a) Formal Powers: appoint PM, chair cab mtgs, dismiss PM, dissolve parl
 - (b) Seems formidable, but w/ parl maj req'd to pass legis & to back a PM...
 - i) only last much effective when Pres & Parl differ (**cohabitation**: '86-88, '93-5, '97-)
 - ii) & blunt weapon, plus only likely useful when expect could win in elect.
 - (2) All directly elected pres have at least that potency as (usu.) only leader elected by whole nation, often some other, usu. minor, powers beyond that
 - (a) **Fin**: pres ctrl role in for. policy, can lever dom.-policy influence therefrom
 - (b) Even **Ire**, where P can't leave or speak any policy issue w/o govt. OK: 2 powers
 - i) refer bills passed by parl to Supreme Ct for judicial review (see below)

- ii) refuse petition to dissolve legis. (more later; n.b. weighs against too-freq ele.-calling)
- (3) Indirectly elected pres & , *a fortiori*, monarchs lack that adv., but still not wholly powerless; many have some dissolution-refusal & such powers also, plus:
 - (a) **Italy**: can refuse diss., +bully pulpit: aloofness from day-to-day pol can be adv.
 - (b) Monarchs: some have intervened or spoken too strongly, & many presidents exist today as result, but even there still powerful symbol, which can also matter
 - i) Belg (King Baudouin, *the only Belgian*): illustrates value in divided ctry
 - ii) Sp (*modernising monarch*): illustrates potential value in emerging dems
 - iii) Elsewhere (SW & NE notably): royalty self-consciously avoids pomp
- d. Explaining varying efficacy of Heads of State (to generalize):
 - (1) Formal powers in constitution,
 - (2) *Plus* pol.-strategic & social situation (e.g., Fra, Fin, but also, e.g., Ita, Bel, Spa)
 - (3) Direct election helps
- 4. **Prime Minister (PM)/Chancellor** (“political boss” or C.E.O.)
 - a. Usu. far more pow than US pres, esp. in 1-prty gov, but in coals too. *Why?*
 - (1) Usu. PM obtains position by strong barg power in legislature
 - (2) Usu. head of a key, often largest, party as well as head of govt
 - b. **Aspects/Sources of PM Power**; again, formal description part of it, but key is political position:
 - (1) PM=leg’s choice to head govt: tight **party discipline** also key
 - (2) Given modest role of HoS, PM=nation’s ctrl pol fig: *Thatcher’s England*, e.g.
 - (3) Cab & party leader: *first among equals*—hires & fires cab mins => **gatekeeper** to power (controls careers), so demands & gets strong party loyalty
 - (4) at apex of political info, & usu. govt’s **agenda-setter**: which proposals discussed, in what order
 - c. **Replacing PM’s**: PMs≠dictators, can be replaced at any time
 - (1) *Electoral Loss*:
 - (a) If party loses enough seats that PM no longer maintain parl maj to retain office
 - (b) If loses parl supp b/w mandated elections, or if former supporters thinks may have, opponents (new & old) can force early election...
 - (2) *Legislative-Majority Loss w/o Election*: current supporters can abandon if get better offer or begin to doubt or dislike current deal: PM (& cab, see below) serves at will of parl majority
 - (3) *Loss of Own-Party Leadership*: own party could also lose faith & decide to replace PM as party leader; does not *per se* remove PM title, but party could always abandon govt & replace it.
 - d. Conclusions on PM:
 - (1) => relatively small # MPs shifting support could topple PM (& cab govt) w/o voters immediate & direct say, but, ultimately, all return to voter for approval, so estimates of voter support continually key
 - (2) powerful but replaceable
 - (3) formal powers detailed, but key is political position
- 5. **Cabinet (Govt)**: Cab=Board of Directors; set of ministers that comprise govt & head depts.
 - a. Department Head:
 - (1) **portfolio responsibility**: responsible for affairs of dept to cab as a whole, which is responsible to parl, which is responsible to voters
 - b. Govt Member
 - (1) **collective responsibility**: may debate issues in cab, but once decided, they’re unanimous & all sink or swim together (n.b., this distinguishes cab in parl. from in pres. dem.)
 - (2) *coll. resp.* often taken to => secrecy of cab discussion, but veterans know how to leak strategically (personally, collectively) & veterans how to read tea leaves
 - (3) *ministers w/o portfolio*: rare, have only this second role
 - c. *Ministerial Autonomy*: GLM argue ministerial sys exhibits strong division labor
 - (1) complexity of modern policymaking means only dept has expertise & resources to create, to

amend, etc. policy in its area =>

- (2) minister generates policy in his/her area for cab disc. => choice structured on departmental lines (n.b., this claim key to L & S model of govt form., later)

6. Making & Breaking Govts (first look)

- a. **Fundamental Principle of Parliamentary Democracy:** Exec. (PM & Cab) responsible to Legis. (Parl)
- b. Govt cannot form, survive, or act w/o parl-maj supp. Key tools:
 - (1) *Vote of Investiture*: DEF; even if not explicitly req'd, must survive votes *ab initio*
 - (2) *Vote of (No) Confidence*: DEF
 - (a) in almost all, govt must resign if lose [SZ: govts not face: not strictly Parl Dem]
 - (b) opp. may propose vote of no confidence at any time [Why?]
 - (c) govt may convert no-conf into conf vote or call conf vote at any time [Why?]
 - (d) budgets often formally, & , if not, informally, votes of confidence
- c. (some major) Consequences:
 - (1) Govt's do not have fixed terms
 - (2) major source of parliamentary power over govt
- d. Caretaker Govts: DEFINE
 - (1) can last indef., sometimes act'ly long (months in Bel & Neth not uncommon)
 - (2) by convention, usu. not initiate new legis agendas or implement new policies
- e. HoS, Formateurs, & Informateurs: the logistics of the process
 - (1) Formateur: DEFINE; Informateur: DEFINE
 - (2) HoS role usu. to name Form or Inform, sometimes mech'ly prescribed choice
 - (3) Form. names (proposes) PM & cab & portfol. alloc., for parl vote
 - (a) Form. only names; parl (party) leaders bargain & make the decision
 - (b) Ministries are career goals of parliamentarians—key prize & pow, so much sought
 - (c) b/c, once installed, policy control only re-arranged by reforming govt (*ministerial autonomy* again), portfolio allocation central to debate & bargain over new govt
- f. Party Leaders (PM) Choosing Cabinet Members; characteristics sought/rewarded, punished (WHY?):
 - (1) party loyalty (key tool in maintaining party discipline)
 - (2) representation of party strands (WHY?)
 - (3) PM internal-party supporters and/or opponents (WHY?)
 - (4) seniority (WHY?)
 - (5) ability (WHY?)
 - (6) typ. must be MP's, but not always, & some even prohib. both at same time
- g. Civil Service: politicized v. depoliticized (DEF & DISC)
- h. **Minority Govts**: DEF; how maintain pow? one key: maj. coal. may vary from policy to policy; something less possible within majority-govt model
- i. Defeat in Conf Vote: often not played to end-game, govt resigns before, but sometimes is to force public play

7. Summary Conclusion: 2 paragraphs on p. 38 (4th ed.)

C. Legislatures (Parliaments): (GLM ch. 3)

1. Legislatures in Presidential & Parliamentary Systems:

- a. Pres sys (US+many Lat.Am. & few other dev'ing-country dem's):
 - (1) Legislature usu. pow to create & enact legislation, including, critically, budgets
 - (2) Presidents usu. pow to ratify or veto leg., to implement & monitor/enforce it
- b. In parliamentary systems:
 - (1) **Govt** (PM & Cab) the decisive power: creates, implements, monitors/enforces,
 - (2) Legislature (parl): merely enacts/ratifies, *but* parl can usu. dismiss govt at any time => "Govt responsible to Parliament"

- (3) Key to govt dominance of parl in practicality: **party cohesion & discipline**
2. Parliamentary Chambers: Unicameral v. Bicameral
 - a. *Char's*: Most bicam., w/ lower direct elect & upper, usu. less pow, otherwise
 - b. Bicameralism & Upper Houses
 - (1) Methods of Selecting Upper Houses
 - (a) Heredity, (Lifetime) Appoint: UK House Lords, LU Council State; CA Senate; these usu. have least power
 - (b) Direct Election, approx. same system as lower: most of IT, SP, & BE Senates; among most powerful. Indeed, IT & SP selection & powers mirror lower chambers' => point of such bicameralism obscure
 - (c) Direct Election, diff. sys (dist's, terms) than lower (usu. geographic basis rep):
 - i) examples: US, AL, JA, SZ
 - ii) notable, but usu. lesser, pows; diff intrsts/org than lower => these most interesting
 - (d) Indirect Election or Appointment by Local Govt:
 - i) selected differently than lower House, have appreciable powers, but usu. lesser => these also typ. more interesting
 - ii) E.g.: GE, NE, AU, plus IR & FR (although these complicated mix)
 - (2) Typ Powers of Upper Houses: (Italy exceptional: same as lower)
 - (a) Delay implement leg enacted by lower (usu. const'ly lmted; cannot overturn)
 - (b) Obstruct certain types of leg (veto, or indef delay): usu. on const'l grounds, sometimes more
 - i) E.g., GE *Bundesrat* Veto
 - ii) Stronger still in some: can initiate & approve legis: US, IT, others
 - (c) Often controlled by diff block (b/c diff. select meth, terms) than lower => check on govt
 - c. Unicameral: DE, FI, GR, IC, MA, NO, PO, SW, NZ (& Nebraska), but even these often have some mechanism that partly simulates bicameralism: Norway lower house divides itself, FI & PO has one large permanent committee, acts somewhat like U.H.
3. *Lower House Roles*: Make & Break Govts; Legislating; Govt Oversight
 - a. Appointing & Dismissing Govts
 - (1) Parl sys: legis usu. power to remove govt & usu. to call elections
 - (a) Exceptions:
 - i) SZ neither power; many say ∴ not parliamentary;
 - ii) NO fixed 4-yr ele. cycle;
 - iii) GE & SP constructive vote no confidence
 - (b) Stronger than legis. in pres. sys. in this way: important implications
 - (2) => Govt responsiveness to legis; govt requires legis majority
 - (a) Prop Rep=>multiparty parl, & govt ∴ often relies on parl coalition
 - (b) => shifts in power, expectations can induce sudden change in govt, *without direct electoral input*
 - (3) Govt usu. converse power to dissolve parl. & call new elections
 - (a) => Elect timing=strategic var. (n.b. max inter-elect period always const'ly fix)
 - (b) => Govt & Parl *gun to each other's head*, but party disc. => govt usu. leads
 - (4) Partisan Balance Pow reflected in 1 ntnl arena (*but* not much action there usu.)
 - b. Legislating
 - (1) Party disc + Govt'l legis. maj => Govt can usu. pass its program
 - (2) + Govt controls civ serv => plans, implements, monitors, enforces legis.
 - (3) Little committee development or resources in most => little parl ability to design legis, although trend of ↑ resources & stronger committee systems
 - (4) Representation:
 - (a) Unlike sys where reps legislate effectively, & where party discipline weaker, MP's see selves less as legislators, less as rep's elect dist, more as of (partisan) interests

- (b) Provisions for *private-member bills* usu. exist, & can intro & pass if govt not oppose
- (5) Still, enough variation that not all parl simply rubber stamp:
 - (a) *Majoritarian (Westminsterian) systems*:
 - i) single-party govt typ., strong party disc. => little role for *backbenchers*
 - ii) however, PM & Cab must keep party supp, so even here must keep some eye to maintaining party unity
 - iii) opp sees role more as vocal critic; offering *shadow (alternative) govt*
 - (b) *Proportional & Consensual systems*:
 - i) multiparty govt norm; more explicit give & take among gov'ing parties
 - ii) SZ, by convention, explicitly consensus; others varyingly operative consensual norms
- (6) Role of Opposition:
 - (a) Obstruct as much as can in majoritarian:
 - i) Filibuster or equivalent: GR
 - ii) Speeches against govt plans: embarrass govt, offer alternative
 - (b) Stronger role w/ more bargaining w/ govt in consensual:
 - i) govt negotiation with opposition plays stronger role
 - ii) more dev'd committee sys, although role more in details than policy per se; bills often to committee for negotiation & compromise before to floor (as opp. to majoritarian)
 - iii) some can even set own agenda & timetable & sometimes amend bills
- (7) Examples of parliamentary roles:
 - (a) Scand. parl's closest to congressional model:
 - i) rel. strong committees w/ stable membership, often govt commissions to form policy
 - ii) parl arranged by geog rather than party=>more cross-party barg, esp. regional issues
 - iii) FI (repealed '92): almost all bills req'd 2/3 maj=>more compromise
 - iv) *DE: minority govt. illustrates strength of parl. function of govt's strategic position in parl*
 - (b) IT at one far extreme:
 - i) party ldrs set policy agenda; much policy even designed in party comm
 - ii) secret ballot in legis. through '88 => harder to enforce party discipline => more govt.-opp. & govt.-backbench negotiation & compromise
 - iii) parl. comm's very strong: explicit lawmaking powers to scrutinize all legis. & even finalize & approve some without going to floor!
 - iv) but even so: *leggine* [DEFINE] & *partitocrazia* [DEFINE]
- c. Govtl Oversight: watchdog role, background question of degree replaced by media in this role; methods differ across systems:
 - (1) *Question Time* [DEFINE]:
 - (a) frequency & required response time varies
 - (b) cat & mouse game of words with opp. trying to embarrass govt, govt trying not to give too much away while not lying
 - (c) Pattern: ↑↑# Q's=>more effective oversight? or still no bite, or devalued by use?
 - (2) Interpolation: like Q time, except response debated in parl if sufficient # ask
 - (3) Oversight comm's: exist, but not near as dev'd as pres sys [*Why?*]
- 4. **Party Discipline** (e.g., a study: 99.8% party-line votes in Nor):
 - a. The Centrality of Party Discipline to Govtal Dominance:
 - (1) MP virt'ly must vote party line+Gov must have parl maj=>*Gov passes its agenda*
 - (2) => "legislature" acts as grp of parties, not some large # individs
 - b. Sources of Party Disc (discussed above, & more later, for now):
 - (1) Party ldrs have *unpleasant punishments* for backbenchers [*e.g.?*]
 - (a) party label needed for election, can be denied
 - (b) ambitious MP's must note leaders gatekeepers to pow positions (ministries *etc*)

- (2) Positive reinforcements:
 - (a) Sense of i.d., loyalty to common purpose: e.g., share party ideology
 - (b) Opt-out provisions often exist for individ MP's on key issues [*when more, when less?*], but, n.b., usu. not to any effect on vote pass [in PO, MP steps aside, replaced by other party mem to take vote]
 - (c) Decision w/in party on its govt'l program may be fairly democratic
 - (d) Some negotiation (degree hard to ascertain with certainty) occurs *before* bill proposed to floor
- (3) Some evidence backbenchers ↑'ly assertive (i.e., party discipline ↓)
- c. P.D. key to dem responsibility in parl sys: Govt resp. to Parl. resp. to Voters, w/ clear links on whom to blame/credit (easy for voters)
 - (1) => Voters vote for Parties (smaller "personal vote")
 - (2) => MP's think of selves as rep'ing block of interests behind party
 - (3) 1+2 => less distributive & more national politics
 - (4) 1+2 => less incumbent advantage
 - (5) 1+2 => party label, w/ disc. to ensure its full meaningfulness, valuable to MPs, backbenchers & leaders (so maintain it), & voters (so demand it)
- 5. Summary Assessment:
 - a. Role of Parliaments ↑ or ↓?
 - (1) Arguments for ↓:
 - (a) ↑ tech sophist. & complexity legis. & policymaking; parl lacks resources, org.
 - (b) ↑ # grps in compromise (*follows from above*) => ↓ gov willing to allow parl. amend
 - (c) ↑ scrutiny role replacement by media
 - (d) ↑ casework workloads => ↑ casework workloads => ↓ time for signif leg?, but...
 - (2) Arguments for ↑
 - (a) ↑ casework workloads => ↑ citizen appreciation of parl role?
 - (b) ↑ professional MP
 - (c) ↑ resources of common MP
 - (3) GLM say seems parliaments on rise despite all the critics
 - b. *Variation in parl pow: function of rules, but also of strategic position of govt in legis.*
 - c. Centrality of PARTY DISCIPLINE

[If Time, we will cover GLM ch. 4,6.]

D. Courts & Constitutions: Gallagher, Laver, Mair ch. 4

- 1. Background:
 - a. Constitution ("Basic Laws") = Rules of the Game; Courts & Judges = Referees
 - b. As ↑ edu. & ↑ single-issue politics, ↑ # issues taken not to legis (seen as slow, ineffective) but to courts [DISC]
 - c. Cts once ignored in discussing most dems' politics, but now judicial review ctrl everywhere
- 2. Common Law & Civil Law traditions
 - a. Civil Law (Roman system): Most of Europe (plus Lat.Am., Louisiana, & parts of Can.)
 - (1) Laws of parl are the law—every legal decision begins from legal code, not from precedent
 - (2) Two strands/sources: Code Napoléon (BE,LU,NE,IT,SP,PO), German Civil Code (GE,NO,SW,DE,FI,IC)
 - (3) Judges apply, they do not make, the law; see selves & are seen as more civil servants
 - (4) Parl is supreme; indeed, judges often search *travaux préparatoires* to aid interpretation.
 - b. Common Law (British system): UK, most of US, most of CA, AL, NZ, IR, MA)
 - (1) Less emph. on "laws" of parl, more on "The Law" of accumulated precedent: previous judgements (& constitution) are *the* law, until explicitly overwritten (by hard process specifically described)
 - (2) Judges interpret, but here only the final law as written (not *travaux préparatoires*) is usually base

for it.

- (3) ==> greater judicial-legislature conflict potential under Common Law
- c. Much evidence of convergence; degree to which Civil Law converging toward common partly function of declining specificity (rising vagueness) with which laws written.
- 3. Judge Appointment Procedures: in virtually all places, top judges appointed by govt & , to varying degree, removable by parl majority
 - a. can & do appoint by partisan persuasion, but also can be difficult to keep in line because:
 - (1) strength of removal provisions varies +
 - (2) legal tradition/strong norm of judicial independence +
 - (3) strong public opinion against partisan-eering of judges ==>
 - b. Results:
 - (1) No UK judge removes since 19th C
 - (2) Publics gen'y strong belief in indep.(n.b., sim in US toward Sup Ct. but Gore v. Bush)
 - (3) Accusations of partisan bias abound [DISC why in appointment sys; & elected judges]
 - (4) Esp. IT case cited for partisan judges—much more overt there ==> IT (& US?) most highly politicized judges
- 4. Judicial Review: DEFINE
 - a. *Extent of Judicial Review Varies*: non-existent; in reg. cts; in “supreme” cts; both (US, PO, etc.)
 - b. European Court of Justice (ECJ) has judicial review over any mem's domestic laws for accord w/ EU constitution
 - c. No Explicit Judicial Review
 - (1) UK: no written constitution ==> vague ==> issue of unconstitutionality doesn't arise, or different guise; *ultra vires* [DEFINE] exists, but nothing stops parliament from simply writing such law
 - (a) constitution from: statute law (written laws accepted as big ones)...
 - (b) ...common law (customs of basic govt forms & processes)
 - (c) ...convention (elite accepts some set of implicit prohibitions)
 - (d) ...works of (scholarly) authority
 - (2) NE: courts expressly forbidden judicial review (undermines parliamentary supremacy)
 - d. Limited judicial review
 - (1) SZ: court can strike down *canton* but not federal law
 - (2) BE: only those laws concerning balance of powers b/w levels of govt reviewable
 - (3) Traditionally weak in Scandinavia:
 - (a) only NO long history w/ review, not much significant;
 - (b) SW strong constitutional provisions for review, but not much used (seen to undermine parl. supr.)
 - (c) FI: pres. may refuse to ratify legis. as unconst., but parl. uses legal advisors to pre-vet
 - e. Explicit, extensive judicial review: 75 of 160 constitutions in world; many use separate constitutional courts
 - (1) Types of Review:
 - (a) *Concrete v. Abstract* review [DEFINE]
 - (b) *A Priori v. A Posteriori* review [DEFINE]
 - f. Strong Const'l Cts: US, CA, FR, GE, IT, AU, SP, PO (JA weak; AL, NZ mid-to-weak)
 - (1) All appointed by govt, usually to longer terms than govt & hard to remove
 - (2) All are highly political appointments, & likely becoming more so
 - (3) Recall: in many sys, some of pres. power stems from being able to call for such review.
 - (4) French Constitutional Council illustrates many further points about strong const'l cts:
 - (a) Courts are inherently weak political actors:
 - i) often decisions only declaratory;
 - ii) enforcement always lacking;
 - (b) So courts rely for their efficacy on

- i) moral (and intellectual) authority
 - ii) public support
 - iii) political-elite willingness to follow its decisions.
- (c) Most adopt several strategies to accommodate this weakness:
 - i) if they can, delay addressing politically contentious issues until attention fades
 - ii) sometimes disting. b/w *unconst'l* & *null & void*
 - iii) relatively few laws actually revoked (e.g., French C.C. about 5%)—this partly b/c govt's pre-vet bills)
 - iv) conditional constitutionality: if bill means X, then constitutional, taking most constitutional view of what law means, which may dampen lawmakers' intent without outright revoking it.
- E. We skip GLM ch. 5 on the EU because too big & other courses here spend whole semester on EU
- F. Administration (Bureaucracy) & Local Govt: Gallagher, Laver, Mair ch. 6
 - 1. Administration
 - a. Background:
 - (1) "Bureaucrats" do most day-to-day implement of most of what is vital to Jane & Joe Cit
 - (2) Ideal of *depoliticized bureaucracy*: administration merely a technical prob, not political...
 - b. Two Key Factors in *Political* Relation between Civil Service & Policymakers/Politicians
 - (1) Civil Service "Culture": Generalist (e.g., UK, IR, IT, SP, PO) v. Technocratic (e.g., FR, GE) Civil Service
 - (a) assessed on general administrative & managerial skills (human skills, liberal arts) v. specialist, technical training (economist, lawyer, engineer)
 - (b) occurs through & matters because training & recruitment, socialization differ
 - (c) Why some technocratic others generalist? one influential argument: naval v. land-army based territorial domination implies different needs for domestic organization
 - (2) Politicization of Senior Civil Service (mostly via appointment, promotion processes)
 - (a) *Spoils system* [DEFINE] most dev'd in US, but general to all dems, perhaps growing
 - (b) Anglo-world (except US) at one end: staunchly non-partisan bureaucracy the norm
 - (c) Continental Europe b/w: Francophone world—ministerial *cabinets*: teams of trusted upper civil servants brought with the minister, far less formalized elsewhere in Europe
 - c. Self-Interested Bureaucracy:
 - (1) budget & size maximization (Niskanen; Wildavsky)
 - (2) "bureau-shaping": making job more congenial in various ways, implies inter alia status quo bias (Dunleavy)
 - d. Other key question in comparative public administration: relative autonomy of bureaucracy
 - (1) *Yes, Minister!* [great show, catch an episode]: view that bureaucrats know what's really happening, pol's not, so b's great latitude to make *effective* policy what they want (or at least not to move if don't want)
 - (2) Ministerial (political) power: opposite view that ultimate responsibility with pol., pol. has complete authority & real power over b's "quality of life" ==> all real power w/ pol., b's just at margin
 - (3) Obviously, matter of degree, & it varies [hypothesis] [Principal-Agent Situations]
 - 2. Local Govts: *Federal v. Unitary States*; Systems of Local Govt
 - a. **Federalism**: (const'l) entrenchment of some level local/regional govt in national policymaking
 - (1) Examples (in rough order of degree): SZ, US, now BE, ({order uncertain} AL, CA, GE), AU, (now UK?)
 - (2) Most bicameral legislatures in which upper house rep's regions & signif pows, e.g. veto
 - (3) Fed local govts gen'ly more powerful than unitary...GLM do not stress enough: even if explicit powers at any moment might be less, b/c federal localities have constitution, courts, & Upper-House protection

- (4) [DISC] Explain varying “degree of fed”, i.e., varying power regions v. center in fed sys?
 - (a) Constitutional provisions:
 - i) residual powers to whom,
 - ii) power of the purse,
 - iii) constitutionally ensconced protectors like courts, upper houses, etc.
 - (b) Strategic sit at national level, & among set of local levels—complicated interplay here
 - (c) Social structure, history, & jurisdictional map overlay:
 - i) SZ cantons date to 13th C, language homog./religious nearly by canton not nation, strong ID, etc.
 - ii) ...to...US history, some ID...to...
 - iii) Germany: fed more-recent political construct (some historical root, but match poor)
- b. [DISC] Ctrl- v. dectrl-izing pressures? What logical issues involved in power alloc across levels?
- c. Local Govt:
 - (1) federal or unitary, all: at least one level local govt (commune, municipality), most have one intermed level (province, region); in unitary, though, local only has whatever power center chooses to give
 - (2) degree of local accountability—election v. appointment; budgetary control—varies
 - (3) relation across levels not usu. strictly hierarchical; more separate responsibilities/powers: in federal, constitutionally defined, in unitary, by legislation, so more easily changed
 - (4) typical local powers:
 - (a) nearly all: land use & environ control, services to property (fire, garbage, utilities)
 - (b) some: police but varies widely, usu. several law-enforcement divisions at mult. levels
 - (c) often: some combo of local pub trans, roads, schools, health & hum serves, pub housing
 - (5) Sev. unitary ctrys *special regions* w/ more fed-like prescribed pows: e.g., UK, SP, IT, DE
 - (6) Key to local autonomy is budgetary control, esp. on revenue side:
 - (a) sources: local prop, bus, & inc taxes; local service charges; transfers from other levels
 - (b) most argue: greater reliance on first two & less on last => more effectively auton

Comparative Govtal Systems II: Lijphart & Powell

XXVII. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy* (1999): Chs. 1-3

- A. **Ch1:** Many ways to org dem, but clear patterns & regular's along *Majoritarian v. Consensual* nature rules & practices
 - 1. All agree Dem=“govt by & for people,” but which people if divergent prefs & disagreement?
 - a. The majority (=> median rule) or
 - b. As many as possible (weighted accordingly)
 - 2. *Majoritarian model*: exclusive, competitive, & adversarial
 - 3. *Consensus model*: inclusive, negotiation, compromise, barg.
 - 4. Logically internally consistent & unified principles=>clusters of inst'l arrange. corresponding thereto, but along 2 dims:
 - a. Executives-Parties Dimension:
 - (1) Concentration of exec. Power in single-party cabinets v. exec. power-sharing in broad multi-party coal's
 - (2) Exec-dominant in exec-leg. v. exec-leg. balance
 - (3) Two-party v. multi-party systems (& , correlated, 1 v. 2+ dim. pol.)
 - (4) Majoritarian & disproportional v. proportional electoral systems
 - (5) Pluralist interest-groups w/ free-for-all competition v. coordinated & corporatist interest-groups w/ compromise & concertation
 - b. Federal-Unitary Dimension:
 - (1) Unitary & centralized govt v. federal & decentralized govt
 - (2) Concentrate leg pow in uni- v. bicam legis power w/ diff constituencies
 - (3) Flexible constitutions w/ simple-majority amendment v. rigid constits w/ extra-ordinary

amendment procedures.

(4) Legis final say on own legislation v. independent judicial review final

(5) Central banks dependent v. independent on/of executive.

5. Federalist explan, for empirical clustering of characteristics:
 - a. Guarantee of fed sep. pow. requires clear statement pow div. in firm const., & separately accountable force at national lvl to protect local, & indep. judge of disputes over power boundaries
 - b. ⇒ Explains link of 4 of 5 2nd-dim. characteristics, but not 5th & not why Federal-Unitary a distinct dimension from Exec-Party.
6. Goodin Explanation:
 - a. *Collective Agency & Shared Responsibility*
 - b. vs. *Divided Agencies & Responsibilities*
7. Lijphart/Goodin: *Concentrated v. Diffuse Power, Authority, & Responsibility, w/ Diffusion having 2 dims: ctrl-local & exec-leg.* ⇒
 - a. 2D conceptual map of potential democratic characteristics
 - b. Much clustering & much stability of location on that map (pure maj. rare: UK, NZ through '96) [prob. pure consens. too]
8. Evaluation: guard against *majoritarianist* tendency to over-emph.
 - a. Opposition existence/nature
 - b. One, single goal "to become govt"
 - c. Turnover tests
9. So What? Effect of such Differences?
 - (1) Small differences on (economic) broad governing efficacy. [Lrg diff's in more fine-grained policies & outcomes & in nature of tradeoffs made.]
 - (2) Large diff's on democratic quality, favoring consensual systems.

XXVIII. Ch2: The Westminsterian (Majoritarian) Model

A. Old, storied, much-revered model dem. from UK to colonies

B. 10 Elements of Majoritarian/Westminster Democracy

1. **Concentration of Exec Pow in 1-Party, Bare-Maj. Cabinets**
 - a. Cab composed of *disciplined* members of *majority* party
 - b. Usu 1 of 2 main parties in system
 - c. Usu bare majority; in fact, more-usually just plurality & times not even
 - d. Coalition & minority govt rare. (*Labour* '70s examples)
 - e. ⇒ *Majoritarian Principle*: vast pol pow to rule as rep of & in interest of a narrow majority.
2. **Cabinet Dominance**
 - a. Parl Govt ⇒ Cab resp to & dep on confidence of Parl, but...
 - b. Combo *Maj Parl Supp & Party Cohesion/Discipline* ⇒ Cabs dom Parl [*n.b.*, ° dom = $f(mps, pcd)$; e.g., *Labour* '70s v. *Thatcher* '80s]
 - c. So, *disciplined 2-partism* more than *parliamentarism* that ⇒ cab dom.
 - d. N.b., Pres sys decidedly more balanced (more than consensus parl); Lijphart incorrect to put French Pres w/ Lat Am as more pow US pres.
3. **Two-Party System**
 - a. Vote-, & esp. seat-, share dominance of two major, roughly even parties
 - b. E.g., UK, *Labour+Tory* = 70-90% vote & 93+% seats
 - c. Notes/Examples:
 - (1) Lib, SD, LibDem as much as 25%, but only 25 (of 659) seats
 - (2) N. Ire.+ *Scot Ntls & Plaid Cymru*, seats% > vote%, but very small numbers.
 - d. *Strong Correlate 2-Party Sys*: 1-dim party sys. (minor excepts. in UK)
4. **Majoritarian & Disproportional Electoral System**
 - a. *Single-Member Simple-Plurality (SMSP)* (DEFINE) archetypal system
 - b. Highly disproportional (*i.e.*, seat-vote ratios far from 1).

- c. *Manufactured Majorities* (DEF). E.g., 100% manufactured post-‘45 UK
- d. Small-party disadv.; Large-party adv. *Note*: LibDem hardest hit; N. Ire, SNP, & *Plaid Cymru* over-rep. (EXPLAIN)
- e. *Exceptions or Trend?*: N. Ire. locals by PR post-violence outbreak in ‘70s, EU by PR since ‘99, discussion of general switch continues
- 5. **Interest-Group Pluralism**
 - a. “Free-for-all” conflict in “competitive IG market” as opposed to...
 - b. Corporatist arrangements of concertation & coordination in system of large & powerful peak-associations in (tri-partite) barg’s w/ govt.
 - c. UK Example: General lack integration of unions or management in ec policymaking, except the (mostly failed) ‘75 Social Contract.
- 6. **Unitary & Centralized Govt** (n.b., 2nd dim)
 - a. Local govt at behest of ctr; has what author ctr gives (& can retract).
 - b. Notably, local financially dependent on center; centralized fisc.
 - c. E.g., UK “most cntrlzd govt any large dem state,” but *excepts or trend?*
 - (1) N Ire. home rule ‘21-‘72, but, *note*, ntl parl can & did remove by simple maj
 - (2) Gradual *devolution* to Scotland & Wales (& some, broader fisc decent too), culminates in ‘97 ref’s that estab local parl.
- 7. **Legislative-Power Concentration in Unicameral Legislature**
 - a. Concentrated unicameralism
 - b. UK deviates slightly, but strongly *asymmetrical bicam*: Lords (hereditary & life-peers) power to delay: 1mo bdgtry; 1yr other; & rarely used.
- 8. **Constitutional Flexibility**
 - a. Unwritten (or not one, single written) constitutional document. E.g., UK: Magna Carta 1215, BoR 1689, Parl Acts 1911, 1949, common law principles, customs, conventions (& which const’l also unwritten)
 - b. Simple majority to change constitution.
- 9. **Absence of Judicial Review**
 - a. Pure parl sovereignty (of (current) majority) ⇒ no authority beyond parl to determine const. & const’l intepretation.
 - b. *Excepts or Trends*: EU mem⇒ECJ & EConventionHR ⇒ EcourtHR rev.
- 10. **Central Bank Dependence**
 - a. Pure parl sovereignty ⇒ ... Same principle: nothing over parl maj
 - b. However, EU mem, & econ thry & ... ⇒ ‘97 change in BoE status.
- 11. *New Zealand: More Westminsterian than Westminster* (& Barbados)
 - a. *Conc. 1-party bare-maj cab*: ‘35-‘93 (as sys Δ loomed) w/o excepts.
 - b. *Cab dom*: always maj & tight party disc through mid-‘90s (as sys Δ...)
 - c. *2-Party sys*:
 - (1) *Labour & National Parties* 95+% (of 99) seats.
 - (2) Almost exclusively 1-dim (soc-econ left-right) ideol. space.
 - d. *Maj & Disprop Elect Sys*:
 - (1) SMSP, but also 4 lrg dists over-lap geog’ly reserved for Maori (12% pop); minority rep. being reserved a deviation.
 - (2) Severely disprop: ‘78 & ‘81 *National* won w/o even a plurality! (Seeds of sys Δ lie in these events.). All post ‘54 *manufactured majorities*.
 - e. *Interest-Group Pluralism*: until very recently, no coord/peak-assoc IG
 - f. *Unitary & Centralized Govt*: fully ctrlzd since 1875 when UK bequeathed 6 rel’ly auton provinces abolished. (Is small ctry: less surprising.)
 - g. *Legis Concentration in Unicameral Parl*: fully uni-C since 1950 when UK bequeathed upper house abolished.

- h. *Constitutional Flexibility*:
 - (1) Basic Laws (Const Acts '56 & '93; BoR Act '90), conventions, customs,
 - (2) Some require 3/4 maj of HoReps or maj referendum, but that status removable by simple majority, so...
- i. *Absence Judicial Review*: HoR only & final judge constitutionality.
- j. *Central Bank Dependence*: to '89 Res Bnk NZ lowest *cbi*, but since: most!
- k. **October 1996 Radical Shift to PR System (act'ly, German MMP sys)**:
 - (1) After '78, '81 fiascos, Labour appoints commission on elect sys.
 - (2) Rec's rad. shift to full PR, but Lab, being in govt, killed it in committee
 - (3) Issue arises in '87 elect campaign; Lab promises referendum, then reneges!
 - (4) National uses that in '90 campaign, pledges ref, wins, & so had to fulfil.
 - (5) Ref passes...twice! '92 & '93. PR elects set for '96:
 - (a) 65 SMD, including 5 special Maori districts.
 - (b) 55 by strict Party List, allocated to make ntl result proportional as poss.
 - (c) German MMP right down to 5% or 1-dist (Austrian; E.Ger.) minimum & nature of 2-vote-per-ballot process.
 - (6) Results: almost everything on 1st dim Δ, swiftly, *Maj* to more *Cons* style
 - (a) Proportionality ↑↑↑
 - (b) Parties ↑↑, from 2 to 6
 - (c) No majority party
 - (d) Ethnic dimension added to party system (& almost religious too).
 - (e) 2-party coalition govt of *National* & *NZ First* formed.
 - (f) [So, most of Lijphart's 1st dim seems electoral-system based.]

XXIX. Ch3: The Consensus (Proportionalism) Model

- A. To extent *democracy*⇒those affected by policy have say in its making, *majoritarian* can conflict w/ *democratic* principles.
 - 1. Conflict mitigated by *alternation & homogeneity*.
 - 2. *Plural Societies* lack homog. & perhaps voter behavior & societal divisions more rigid ⇒ maj not only somewhat undemocratic but also quite often/possibly dangerous.
 - a. *Example*: N. Ire. '21-'72 Prot Maj won all elects, formed all govts ⇒ (perhaps) late '60s Cath protests, which grew into, essent'y, civ war
 - b. *Consensus sys*: cons. not opposition, inclusion not excl., max size ruling maj not bare-min, limit & constrain maj power not concentrate it.
 - 3. N.b., cons sys. may esp. help here, but may work eff'ly anywhere
- B. *Consensus Principles*: Share, disperse, & restrain rather than concentrate majority power. Switzerland, Belgium, EU
 - 1. **Executive Power Sharing in Broad Coalitions**:
 - a. *Swiss* 2:2:2:1 party & 4±:2±:1± language formulae.
 - b. *Belg*: balanced-lang cabs (pre-'70 informal, post=form);all but 1yr coal
 - 2. **Executive-Legislative Balance of Power**:
 - a. *Swiss Fed Council* elected to fixed 4-yr terms by Parl, but ~*confidence votes*
 - b. *Belg*: std parl sys, but somewhat less party cohesion, & mostly coal & sometimes minority govts.
 - 3. **Multiparty System**:
 - a. Multiple parties in parl & potential real players in govt-form game.
 - b. Multi-D societal struct (relig, lang, reg, +econ) reflected in party sys:
 - (1) *Swiss*: regional/language struct w/in relative noncohesive single-D parties
 - (2) *Belg*: like Swiss, 3 dom parties on relig & class, but sub-divide lang & reg.
 - 4. **Proportional Representation**: prop elect sys not inhibit trans. societal cleavages into party system.
 - 5. **Interest-Group Corporatism**:
 - a. Both business-led or "liberal corporatist"

- b. Encompassing & strongly cohesive peak assoc's, big role in pol-make
- 6. **Federal & Decentralized Govt** (2nd dim):
 - a. *Swiss*: 20 cantons + 6 half-cantons; 46 member upper house; role in const. amend; one of world's most decentralized states.
 - b. *Belg*: unitary & centralized state through '70, but gradual decent., & full formal fed in '93. *Unique, Byzantine Federalism*: both lang-cult rep (French, Dutch, Germ) & geog-cult (Flem, Wall, Bruss)
- 7. **Strong Bicameralism**:
 - a. Different selection mechanism to two houses \Rightarrow diff constit struct
 - b. Strong 2nd chamber (ideal-type: equal power).
 - c. *Swiss*: perfect match to ideal-type; *Belg*: pre-fed lacked *a*, now perfect.
- 8. **Constitutional Rigidity**:
 - a. *Swiss* & *Belg* both written.
 - b. *Swiss*: req's ref, majority & majority in majority of cantons, to Δ
 - c. *Belg*: req's 2/3 maj both house to Δ plus, for law on community org & powers, 2/3 maj both houses + maj of Dutch & French in each house.
- 9. **Judicial Review**:
 - a. *Swiss*: *Federal Tribunal* has right of const'l review
 - b. *Belg*: No judicial review (but int'l agree like UK) 'til '84 & '88 steps gave full rev to *Court of Arbitration*. [likely v.import. now|new fed sys.]
- 10. **Central Bank Independence**:
 - a. *Swiss Central Bank*: always as/more indep as/than *Fed* & *BB*.
 - b. *Belg*: exception, among more dep CB's until Maastricht ('92-'93)
- 11. *European Union*, supranat'l inst. but not fed or even confed state (yet?), but if seen as (approaching) such, fits cons sys well
- XXX. Ch4: Criteria for selecting dem's for study & Soc-Econ cond's expected to influence type of dem & dem perform.
- A. Definition(s) of Democracy
 - 1. Dahl's *Polyarchy*
 - a. Right to Vote
 - b. Right to Run
 - c. Right of political leaders to Compete
 - d. Free & Fair Elections
 - e. Freedom of Association
 - f. Freedom of Expression
 - g. Alternative Sources of Information
 - h. Institutions of Policymaking Depend on Votes & Other Pref Express
 - 2. 20th C phenom., NZ prob first 1893 all vote, 1919 all run
 - 3. Table 4.1 by Freedom House: free & compet. elects + civ libs
 - a. *Borderlines*: Ind., Papua New Guinea, Columb., Venez. (viol & corrupt)
 - b. *Possibly Lenient Interps*: Switz (fem), Austral (Abor.), US (AfrAm), UK-Fr-Bel-Neth (colonies), allied occup. Ger & Jap, Isr post-67 occup.
 - 4. Also long & stable duration of democracy (\Rightarrow Table 4.2)
- B. Diversity among Democracies
 - 1. Huntington's Three Waves: 1828-1926, 43-62, 74-(Greece in all three & in reverses)
 - 2. Pop., Hum. Dev. (wealth, edu, life-expect), Soc Frag: Table 4.3
 - a. Problems w/ frag indices:
 - (1) Exclusive focus on eth (or eth & relig) may miss much.
 - (2) May miss important *within* group fragmentation.
 - (3) Fails to weigh depth of division (salience)
 - b. *Lijphart*: crude 3-fold categorical classification:

(1) subjective & rougher

(2) reflects 1990s situation, but these things very sticky

C. Broad Socio-Econ Struct Variation

1. May partly explain both democracy type & performance [*prob?*]
2. Interrelations among these var's (e.g., lrg & more het):
 - a. Ln(pop) & pluralism corr: .26
 - b. Plur & dev'p corr: -.24 (but lrgly India & PNG driven)
 - c. Ln(pop) & dev'p corr: -.10 (but not significant)
 - d. Older dems more dev'd ($r=.57$), but no relation dev & (pop or plur)

XXXI. Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*: Ch1

A. Central Issue/Subject of Powell's Study:

1. De Tocqueville (p. 3): "2 opinions...old as world... & perpetually met...diff forms & names in all free... 1 to limit & oth to extend indef'ly...pow of people"
2. Pow: role competitive elects in give cit's influ. over pm's.
3. Pitkin: "concern w/ elects & elect machinery... from conviction...nec. to ensure *systematic responsiveness*"
4. Pow: driven by normative concern: claim of democ's to be govts in which cit's participate in policymaking.
 - a. With many people, must be indirect.
 - b. \Rightarrow Participate by choosing policymakers in compet. elects
 - c. Elects=*instruments of democracy* to \circ pop influence pol-mkng
5. Elects not only instrument, but seem crucial...
 - a. Compel or greatly encourage policymakers to pay attent. cit's
 - b. Consensus that *free & compet elects* more than any other feature signals presence of *true democracy*
6. Disagree about whether & how link cit's to pol
 - a. *Normative*, reflecting different ideals relationship cit's to pm's
 - b. *Conceptual*: diff understandings how cit pref's can aggregate
 - c. *Theor./Emp.*: altern. theories what instit's best link cit's to pols

B. Two Camps: **Majoritarian & Proportional**

1. Altern., positive conceptions of democratic ideals.
 - a. *Positive* (not neg.) conceptions: e.g., Prop. $>$ limit maj. pow.
 - b. Maj. to *control* & Prop. to *influence* pm's, but $>^{\circ}$, of *conception*
 - c. Each has closely assoc norm concept of approp cit inflence, & empirical model of wrkng electoral & legislative institutions
2. Powell: i.d. contrasting elements & test expectations
3. *Majoritarian*: elections as instruments of cit control
 - a. "Concentrated pm pow, whose exercise made trgt cit act"
 - b. Elected officers able to make & implement policies
 - c. Responsibility for policy obvious to everyone
 - d. Elects: *choose b/w prospective teams* or *reward/punish incumb's*
 - e. N.b., concentrated power nec but not suff:
 - (1) Diffuse power \Rightarrow pm results from complex bargain b/w sev. reps
 - (2) \Rightarrow Retroactive responsibility difficult to pinpoint
 - (3) \Rightarrow Elect only indirect relation to formation winning policy coals.
 - f. Sum: decisiveness & effectiveness in resp. to pop. will: either pro- or retro- view of elect role req's concentrated pm power which is object of cit electoral behavior (i.e., one elects govts).
 - g. Absolute sovereignty of majority \Rightarrow *Majoritarian*
4. *Prop*: elections as instruments of cit influence
 - a. Dispersed pm power; elects indirect role: bring representative agents of all societal factions into pm arena, where bargain

- b. ⇒ premium on accurate reflect of pop. prefs. in pm arena. JS Mill: “In really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not disprop’ly, but prop’ly.”
- c. [N.b., alt. view of prop./maj. as dimxdim maj⇒*plebiscitory dem* or broadly representative arena to replicate societal Dx D]
- d. Elections clumsy instruments, esp. as held in maj. sys.
- e. Pref’s of all cit’s, not just maj, should weigh in pm
- 5. *Maj & Prop* Proponents diff weighting of concerns
 - a. *Maj*: suspicious of rep auton., less concerned re: minorities, emph. clear & direct accountability ⇒ prefer concentrated pow
 - b. *Prop*: suspicious of majorities, esp. created by clumsy elects, less worried re: rep auton, provided cit’s role in select, & less worried re: negotiated inaction⇒prefer dispersed power
- 6. ⇒Diff empirical tests of visions appropriate:
 - a. Maj assumes can i.d. cit. pref., or at least who wins maj, prob of elects is to make pm’s follow that directive.
 - b. Prop assumes cit’s highly het., problem of elects is to ensure all grps proportional say in pm.
- C. Views of Elections & Cit Relations to Policymakers
 - 1. 2D Vote Choice (Fig I.1): Target & Time Perspective
 - 2. Target:
 - a. Vote for/against Govt w/ power to make policy v. Vote for rep agent, not control Govt, but barg on behalf
 - b. Voter anticipates decisive elect, directly determines pm’s v. barg & negot coal-bldng (discrete or contin.) follows elect.
 - c. Both may be desirable to voters (not @ same time):
 - (1) Issues clear-cut, cit’s w/ united prefs, voters may pref former. [N.b, in game of elected v. voters.]
 - (2) Issues complex & voters divided, prob’s arise diff to antic., each grp may prefer rep by trustworthy rep’s [N.b, game b/w voters.]
 - 3. Temporal Direction: Prospective v. Retrospective
 - a. Govt Retro⇒ (*throw rascals out*) Evaluate Incumbents.
 - b. Govt Pro⇒ (*mandates*) Forecast perform Incumb & Chall.
 - (1) Elements of Forecast: credibility, desirability, etc. promises
 - (2) ⇒past record relevant, even though prospective
 - c. Agent Pro⇒(*Representative Delegate*)Choose agent believe will act as (informed) voter would
 - (1) ⇒ seek agents whose pref’s mirror voter’s own
 - (2) ⇒ seek effective bargaining agents
 - d. Agent Retro⇒(*Representative Trustee*): bring home bacon
 - (1) Despite centrality: Fenno’s *Homestyle*, Burke (1774): trust agent s.t. retro oversight, Tip O’Neill: “All politics is local.” ...
 - (2) ...Powell essentially punts on this aspect/possibility
- D. Intermediate Cond’s for Effective Voting Each Type
 - 1. Each has correspond vision, info req, & ideal gov types
 - 2. Incumb Eval: support *Ins* when going well, *Outs* when badly essence dem (Lippmann)⇒**Accountability Model**:
 - a. minimum: periodic opp to change pms
 - b. appeal to those desire clear cit cntrl yet skept of cit inform & capacity to form *one, stable* opin on complex policy issues
 - c. How it Works/What it Needs:
 - (1) Ability to reject unwanted pm’s.
 - (2) Threat of rejection ⇒ all pm’s worry about cit reaction.
 - (3) Simplicity & Limited Information Requirements (E.g., no worries about credibility: “do or do not, there is no try.”)

(4) But do need **clarity of responsibility**

(a) *Westminster Ideal*: Single, unified party controls all pm, cits can vote simply for or against that party in elects.

(b) N.b., if pm divided among numerous parties (prop parl) or if pm coalitions changed from issue to issue (pres-cong), not work well.

(5) Also: **decisive incumbent replacement**: must follow v's reject

3. **Electoral-Mandates Model**:

a. Ideal party sys: strong, cohesive parties, including opp, offer effective choice. Voters eval prospects of each @ each elect.

b. How it Works/What it Needs

(1) Possible voters to i.d. alternative future govts @ election time

(2) Expectation of tight link from elect outcome to govt/policy form

(3) Winning party(ies) have full power to make policy

4. Both *Accountability & Mandate* models are *Majoritarian*: [n.b., also called, jointly, *Responsible Party Govt* model]

5. **Representative Delegates Model**:

a. Two stages: election & post-election bargaining

b. Pro-/Retro- distinct less cntrl [but could do same as above]

c. How it Works/What it Needs

(1) Each voter group must find party near enough its prefs & views

(2) Voter groups represented proportionally in the pm bargaining

(3) pm begins as reps bargain (not as collective govt implements its promises or anticipates future sanctions).

(4) Flexibility in post-electoral coalition formation, allowing different majorities to form on different issues.

d. *Authorized Representation in Policymaking Bargaining*

6. [N.b., not that *Account & Mandates* not occur in *Prop* or that *Auth Rep in Barg* not occur in *Maj*, but that these weaker/stronger in each model.]

E. Responsiveness & Representation

1. Concepts of *Citizen Preferences, Political Influence, & Policy Consequences* “exquisitely complex”

2. Powell's Fig I.2:

a. P emph's links A to D, recognizing that E links back to A

b. Parties central at B & D:

(1) link individual candidates & collective policy commitments

(2) greatly ↑ coherence of possible connections via compet elects

(3) critical in elect & govt-form stages of all dem's [but not equally]

3. Using votes to reveal preferences:

a. Advantage: Objective, measurable, large body work to build

b. Disadvantages:

(1) Know little-to-nothing re: how satisfactory options presented

(2) Know only weakly & rel'y about how well chosen party rep's

(3) Know even less about prefs over not-chosen parties

(4) Know little about how informed votes are

(5) And could be strategic voting

4. Using Voter Left-Right Self-positioning

a. Advantage: allows gauge *representational congruence*

b. Disadvantages:

(1) How meaningful & cntrl single left-right scale?

(2) *Rubber Ruler* effects, across voters & across dem's

5. Perhaps more confidence if both approaches agree.

XXXII. *Const'l Designs as Visions Maj/Prop Dem* (ch2)

A. Const Design:

1. Stable dems=*rules* re: how pm's chosen & policies made
2. These *rules* shape context & conseq. democratic elects
3. Embody spec visions/thrys of dem: maj or prop
4. Many-layered text, result historic moment intense barg, reflect val's & concerns const-writers, but, for us key is:
5. Implications for conc/disp political [rep &] power
 - a. Do rep rules encourage leg majorities that can control exec?
 - b. Do rules for pol-making conc pow this party govt's hands?
 - c. Both yes \Rightarrow Maj; Both no \Rightarrow Prop Vision; Mixed otherwise.
6. Alternative Statement of Distinction (Mueller):
 - a. Elect a govt, i.e. party whose policies preferred to leg & exec.
 - b. Elect truly rep body to vote as they would pol by pol.
 - c. Diff electoral rule req'd to produce each.

B. Class by elect & pm rules & their thrtcl implications

C. Not rndm sample; set 21 \pm dev'd dems w/ nec. data

1. Much common: ec devp, Western (exc Jap), much dem experience & stable, most pol parties around for most voters lives, stable rules & orgs, parliamentary (exc US), & competition considerably summarizable by 1 L-R dim
2. \Rightarrow controls these, but also \uparrow Q's how well extend beyond

D. Electoral Systems: *Rules of Representation* by which cit's votes aggregated to determine winning cand's

1. Duverger's Law, rests 3 theoretical aspects [EXPLAIN]
 - a. (Strategic) Decisions parties in offering candidates for election
 - b. (Strategic) Decisions citizens in voting for candidates
 - c. (Mechanical) Effects rules aggregate votes into represent seats
 - d. \Rightarrow limit # cands to slightly $>$ # realistic chance (*M+1 rule*)
2. Notes:
 - a. D's Law works @ district level, further considerations nec. to explain degree to which, e.g., 2/district $\Rightarrow \approx 2$ nationally [e.g.]
 - b. D's Law: *force* toward 2-prty as $M \downarrow$, but only *allow* >2 as $M \uparrow$: soc struct key in manifestation of latter.
 - c. Many poss. strategic *mistakes*, esp. 1st few elects new rules
 - d. Effects help assure majority, fits *maj* vision, but also disp, esp. to $^\circ$ rely on mechanical, disconcert *prop* vision, even poss that plur vote-winner not plur seat, disconcert both.
 - e. In any sys, proportionality also rests eq. apportionment
3. Source key effects—prop, # parties, maj—can sum in **Effective Threshold**: $T_{eff} \approx \text{Max}\{.75/(M+1), \text{LegThresh}\}$
4. Empirical Exploration: Table 2.1 [basically: works]

E. *Policymaking Rules: Majoritarian & Proportional Visions*

1. Elects allow cits choose reps, but after elects more rules affect how reps make policy: *decision rules*.
2. Again, sample much common: all dem's, elect ntl ass'y usu. ultimate authority, many relatively cntrlzd parl sys
3. **Key: Executive-Legislative / Govt-Opp Relations**
 - a. *Maj*: rules favor 1 parl maj full cntrl pm, w/o check or division
 - b. *Prop*: rules favor all parties influence pm prop'ly, govt to negotiate w/ other grps, esp. opp. grps.
 - c. N.b., Powell assumes tight cohesion, $^\circ$ lack $\Rightarrow \uparrow$ opp/leg infl
 - d. Strom (1984): Gauge by Strength of *Committee System*
 - (1) Number of standing committees
 - (2) Fixed areas of committee specialization (jurisdiction, expertise)

- (3) Correspondence comm & ministerial jurisdictions
- (4) Restrictions # comm assignments *per* legislator
- (5) Proportional distribution committee chairs
- e. Two parts to Comm Sys Strength as gauge leg/opp influence:
 - (1) Comm's influential, not mere rubber stamp govt-formed policy
 - (2) Comm's \Rightarrow pm scope to actors (esp. opp) not fully tied to govt
 - (3) Strom's 1st four on part (1), 5th on part (2).
- f. *Table 2.2: Committee-System Strength (Leg-Opp Influence)*
- 4. ***Other Inst'l Features Disperse Power (beyond Parl)***
 - a. Indep Execs (presidentialism): veto & decree pow's esp.
 - b. 2nd Legis Chamb w/ Indep Selection Base & Veto+ Pows
 - c. Federalism: local-level authority not fully dep on central
 - d. Judicial Review
- 5. ***Table 2.3: Electoral & Policymaking Institutions & Concentration/Diffusion Representation & Authority***
 - a. Seems most systems more-purely maj or prop than mix.
 - b. Large Δ rare, esp cross types, smaller Δ w/in more common
 - c. Why const'l designs so stable?
 - (1) Incumbents won under existing sys, \therefore rarely incentive to Δ
 - (2) Supportive, internally logically consistent phil of *Maj* or *Prop*
 - (3) Unless *very* widespread & large disaffection, voters strongly disapprove short-term manipulation [elaborate?].
 - (4) [1st few elects new elect rules, & presumably first few acts new pm rules, highly uncertain.]
 - d. Consequences:
 - (1) Cits & Pols approach elects w/ great know/exp how sys works
 - (2) Unless can Δ sys itself, party & voter strategies highly dependent & likely quite variant on system w/in which operating.

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (GLM ch. 11, Lijphart ch. 8)

(+ L & E, pp. 226-40; Powell II, ch. 4; Blais & Massicotte in LNN; Lijphart II)

XXXIII. Importance of Elections

A. Practically

- 1. Produce parliaments--legislative & executive policy-makers
- 2. Determine who becomes part of political elite
- 3. Bearing on the formation of govts
 - a. Direct, especially in presidential systems
 - b. Indirect, partic. in systems characterized by coalition govts
- 4. Focal point for activity for: Parties; Citizens (often only activity)--input mechanism; Interest groups

B. Symbolically

- 1. Legitimization of the political system
- 2. Citizen means of partic., express opinion, evaluate
- 3. Give cit's feel of exercising choices (even if ind'ly little wt)

XXXIV. General Background Matters Regarding Elections


A. Suffrage Expansion

- 1. Universal male typ. by WWI; female typ. by WWII except:
 - a. BE, FR, GR, IT: universal female just after WWII
 - b. PO, SP, Switz.: uni. female in 1970's (1991 in 1 Swiss canton)
 - c. **HYPOTHESES on late & early to full female suffrage? [fig.]**
- 2. Voting age generally reduced 21 to 18 postwar...[WHY?]

B. Suffrage Restrictions

- 1. Generally citizens only (but UK/IR)

2. Prisoners & mentally ill usually excluded
3. Otherwise—gen’ly 18+ & gen’ly who can vote can run
4. Registration: in most places govt’s responsibility, in some places individual’s (**Implications?**)



Predicting the Year of Full Female Suffrage Extension

R Squared				R Squared			
No. of Observations				No. of Observations			
0.3443283				0.4887309			
21				21			
				CONSTANT Switzerland			
MSUF				MSUF			
SCATH				SCATH			
SECEDU				SECEDU			
Coefficients				Coefficients			
1738				1388			
0.10				0.22			
0.37				0.00			
0.04				0.38			
Std. Errs				Std. Errs			
123				20.95			
0.08				0.21			
0.14				0.13			
0.57				0.54			
t-Stats				t-Stats			
14.13				6.62			
1.25				1.05			
2.65				0.02			
0.07				0.70			
p-Levels				p-Levels			
0.00				0.00			
0.02				0.05			
0.01				0.98			
0.94				0.50			

C. Turnout: Gen'ly higher non-US, ↓ since 70s (**Implic's?**)

D. Election Timing: **Endogenous v. Exogenous**

- Gen'ly incumbent govt can call elects when wants, subjct to:
 - Must be an election within X years (usually 4 or 5)
 - Often must call an election if fails a vote-of-confidence
- Exceptions
 - Presidents, where directly elected, are usually fixed term
 - FR: Parliament elections at President's discretion
 - US: Legislature fixed terms & elections fixed timing
 - NO & SZ: Fixed four-year election interval
 - SW: El. ev. 3 yrs; gov may call, but still in 3rd yr (clock not restart)

3. **Implications?**

E. Other Elections

- All countries also at least some local elections; offices so-elected vary greatly in practical importance
- EU Parl every 5 yrs, nationally determined elect systems
- Directly elected **Presidents**, (importance in *'s): Austria (½*), Finland (*), Iceland (½*), Ireland (½*), Port (*), France (1 ½*), US (***)--others have appointed (usu. by legislature) presidents--more "figure-headish" typically but can have some importance (e.g., Italy, maybe ½*)

F. Other Voting--Referenda

- Most frequently used in Switzerland (nearly ½ world's referenda in Switz.; recently California rivals)
 - => **"voter fatigue?"**
 - => democracy by referendum? [**ASIDE: Condorcet paradox & "chaos theorems"**]
- Others employing it:
 - Italy: Approx. 1/year--key ones on Divorce, Abortion, Elect Law
 - France: President may call one
 - Most other places, at discretion of parliament & very rare
- Issues over which referenda tend to called**
 - Issues that cut across party lines
 - Constitutional Issues
 - Constitutional amendments require referenda in Den., Ire., & Switz.; optional in France & Italy
 - Major & fundamental changes in nations "place in the world"
 - (1) NATO or EC membership
 - (2) Neutrality/Allegiance
 - Moral/Ethical questions--esp. divorce & abortion in Catholic ctrys
 - Why do you suppose there's a rising use of referenda?**

XXXV. Types of Electoral Systems

A. **Definition of electoral systems:** "mechanisms that turn votes cast by people on election day into seats ... occupied by deputies in parl...elect. sys. is what converts voters choices into legislature." GLM (p. 274)

B. **Where do electoral systems come from?**

- "Determined by the political elite of the day, some of whose motivations may be partisan" GLM (p. 274)
- "Their designs reflect constitution-makers' values, expects regarding consequences various arrangements, their often laboriously negotiated compromises" Powell II (p. 66)

3. Cultural/Historical Legacy: **See Powell Table 4.3 (p. 67)**
4. Generally **not** frequently tinkered with for electoral advantage, despite obvious opportunities
 - a. France & Greece (especially the latter) exceptional on this
 - b. Germany's famous 5% threshold
 - c. Recent Italian & New Zealand changes
 - d. French IVth to Vth transition
5. **[If such a potent political engineering tool, why do you suppose it is so rarely manipulated?]**
 - a. Why would those in power change system that put them there?
 - b. Parties uncertainty about future electoral position
 - c. Difficult to Δ (constitutional Δ s usually require super-majorities)
 - d. Relatively obvious opportunism when employed, may trigger negative voter-reaction
 - e. Sometimes imposed from abroad (e.g. Ger., Jap., Ita., Aust.)

Table 4.3 Culture and Constitutional Arrangements

Cultural influence	Presidentialism type	Countries sharing type	Explanations or mixed
American or Anglo-Saxon countries	Presidential executive and nonpartisan legislature	USA, Philippines	West Germany, Japan
British or British-dominated or otherwise	Parliamentary and/or judicially review	UK, Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, Jamaica, New Zealand	Ireland
Continental Western Europe and Scandinavia	Parliamentary and proportional electoral legislature	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden	France, Switzerland
Latin America	Presidential executive and representative legislatures	Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Venezuela	(Pre-1967) Uruguay
Other	Parliamentary and/or proportional legislature	Greece, Turkey	

C. Key distinctions between types of electoral systems

1. **Primary Distinction: Proportional Representation (PR) vs. Plurality/Majority (P/M) systems**
 - a. Former stresses representation & concept of proportionality
 - b. Latter stresses decisiveness & “accountability model”
2. **Other key features [define each]**
 - a. District magnitude
 - b. Degree of candidate vs. party voting (preference voting)
 - c. Number of tiers
 - d. Electoral formula (within the PR-P/M divisions)
 - e. (Legal) Thresholds
 - f. Constituency (District) pattern (*(mal)apportionment*)

XXXVI. Plurality/Majority Systems

- A. Historically, plurality common system (through 19th C)
- B. **Single-Member Plurality (SMP)** a.k.a. “first past the post,” “winner take all” (UK, US, CA, NZ-pre-1993)
 1. **Argued Merits**
 - a. Simplicity--for voters, parties, & all involved
 - b. Produces majorities, & therefore decisiveness & accountability
 - c. Since one rep./MP per district, fosters MP-constit. bond
 2. **Criticisms**
 - a. Unrepresentative/Winner may be disliked by a majority
 - b. Encourages “**strategic voting**”
 - c. Anti-small party, & ∴, possibly, anti-minority (pol & soc min’s)
 3. [Aside: plurality need not be conducted in single-member districts; multiple member, winner take-all possible, tends to be even more disproportional & even more likely to produce elected majorities; *e.g.*, US Presidential Electoral College, India used to have multiple-member districts]

C. Majority Systems:

1. **STV: *Alternative or Single-Transferable (maj ver) vote***
 - a. In Australia (some in France); was used in Illinois; was used more widely in US at one time
 - b. Voters rank candidates; candidate with majority wins; if no majority, drop lowest contender & transfer his/her votes to those voters’ second choices; continue until someone has a majority
 - c. Therefore, a Majority system
2. **Multiple-Round Majority Balloting:** *e.g.*, French (Vth) system(s), many US local elections (“run-off”)
 - a. French Vth Parliament: Simple vote; if no majority, eliminate candidate(s) < 12.5% of vote; vote again--plurality candidate then wins (often-called *plurality-plurality* system, but usu. => majority)
 - b. French Vth President: Simple vote; if no majority, drop all but top 2; second election will produce a majority winner (a *plurality-majority*, or “run-off” system)
 - c. [Describe French party systems of IVth & Vth; What do you suppose impact of Vth’s electoral process & introduction of a strong President has been on party systems & party behavior?]
3. **Argued Merits & Demerits of Majority Systems**
 - a. Largely the same as SMP, but:
 - b. Slightly more choice usually preserved because more parties usually persevere (why?)
 - c. Less simple (and “run-off” versions requires two trips to polls)

XXXVII. Proportional Representation (PR) Systems

- A. **The key feature of PR is the Multi-member district**
 1. Cannot divide one seat proportionally, so PR requires multiple seats per district
 2. In fact, **proportionality of result [define]** tends to increase w/ number of seats per district (magnitude)
- B. **Key types of PR:** “List” sys; STV sys (*e.g.*, Ire & Malta)
- C. **List Systems**
 1. Each party lists a number of candidates (usually equal to the number of seats available in district)
 2. **List systems vary by**

- a. Formula
 - b. Number of tiers
 - c. Degree of preference voting
 - d. Legal Thresholds
 - e. District magnitudes
3. **Formulas: 2 Base Types (Blais & Massicotte Tab 2.1-2)**
- a. **Largest Remainders (Quotas) Methods** (Hare, Droop)
 - b. **Highest Averages (Divisor) Methods** (d'Hondt, Sainte-Lague & Mod. SL, Imperiali=old IT system)
 - c. **Basics:**
 - (1) Highest Averages: divide votes for each party by series of divisors, allocating seats 1-by-1; then dividing party's vote by next divisor, each stage awarding seat to party w/ most votes so-divided
 - (2) Largest Remainders: divide total votes in district by number of seats (Hare) or # seats +1 (Droop). That's a quota (Q). Each Q votes for party buys 1 seat. When no party can *buy* further seats, remaining allocated to parties with "largest remainders," one for each until done

d. Relative Proportionality (roughly)

- (1) Imperiali > Sainte Lague & Hare > Droop > Mod S t e Lague > d'Hon dt
- (2) B u t , district magnitude is a considerably more important determinant



4. Tiers:

- a. Esp. in small-mid DM (e.g., 6 = S P a v g) , much disprop. can remain
- (1) Option 1: Lrg M (FI, P O, LU > 1 2 a v g , NE & IS: 1 dist=



whole ctry)

(2) Option 2: *Higher tiers* to redress proportionality deficiencies

b. **Fixed vs. Variable 2nd-Tier allocation**

(1) Fixed: DE (20%), IC (20%), (25%), NO (5%), SW (11%), GE (50%)

Fixed # Second-Tier Seats reserved for allocation to move district-level results closer to national-lvl prop...

(e.g. Vote Shares: Red=30%; White=40%; Blue=20%; Green=10%)

District-level Results in Seats: Red=25%; White=42%; Blue=19%; Green=5%)

=> Allocate set-aside seats to try to make 2nd row match the first

=> Larger 2nd-Tier proportion seats set-aside produces more proportionality

(2) Variable: Austria, Belgium, Greece

Variable # Second-Tier Seats: All votes for all parties that were not used in winning seats at district level are pooled at regional or national level & another round of PR allocation undertaken (not necessarily by the same formula)

5. **(Legal) Thresholds:**

a. **Primary features designed to limit proportionality & in particular limit small parties. Why?**

(1) Self-interest on the part of larger parties

(2) Concern unmitigated prop. => proliferation of small parties => difficulty forming stable govts

(3) Aim to exclude extremists (e.g., Germany's 5% rule)

b. Examples:

(1) Germany's famous 5% rule

(2) Sweden 4%; Aust. 4% or 1 seat; Neth. .62% (=almost meaningless)

(3) Greece--PASOK manipulate it relentlessly: "loaded/reinforced" PR--as high as 17%, removed for 1989-90 (3 ele's), 3% by New Democracy in 1990 => Very good example elect.-law manip.

6. **Preferential vs. Non-Pref. List: Who decides which of parties' listed candidates gets seat(s) party won?**

a. Non-Pref. or "straight" list: Relatively rare--FR ('86), GE, IT ('94+, for PR seats), PO, SP; Party orders its candidates & their allotted seats go in order

b. Preferential List--Many variations

(1) IT (until 1994): Voters give up to 3-4 preferences, voters' prefs. decide who gets seats--can choose party's default ordering though. System received much blame in IT for "clientelistic" politics & corruption ("vote-buying") that prevailed.

(2) FI--Voters obliged to choose one candidate

(3) SZ & LU--As many preference votes as seats, can cross party lines in pref. ordering (*panachage*)

(4) DE--Party discretion as to how to list

(5) In some cases, party default very hard to override though nominal pref. option exists--BE, AU (pref. intro. '71, restrictive, altered '92 purportedly to more effective choice), NE (parties usu. demand any "preferenced-in" candidate cede his/her seat to party order), NO, SW

D. **Single-Transferable-Vote (PR version)**

1. **Very Rare** (rel. new): Ire., Malta, & N. Ire. (since 1972)

2. **Aims proportionality, not assume prefs org'd by prty**

3. **Mechanics:**

a. Voters rank cand's listed (∴ relatively small DM's required)

b. Droop Quota calculated

(1) Anyone over quota elected & remaining votes allotted to 2nd pref's (e.g. 100 1st pref's, quota = 75 => elected, 25 votes transferred to 2nd pref's in proportion to 2nd pref's of these 100 voters)

(2) Continue until no one > quota, then eliminate cand. w/ fewest votes, transfer his/her votes, & ...

(3) Continue until number of seats in that district are allocated.

4. **Merits (argued)**

a. More information on voter preferences revealed

b. Not constrained by party lines

c. Votes can't harm favored candidate => no incentive strategic vote

- d. Allows voter input at polls on which tendencies within party to expand/contract (via ranking)
- 5. **Demerits (argued)**
 - a. May weaken **party discipline** [Aside: effects of party cohesion?]
 - b. May spur vague candidate positioning--as much incentive not to be disliked as to be liked almost
 - c. Disproportionality b/c small district mag. (too complicated to have large lists of candidates to rank)
 - d. GLM's read of Evidence:
 - (1) The Ireland case seems to support a & b, but Malta does not
 - (2) IR & MA not much different than others in practice on c
 - (3) ==> GLM are advocates of STV-PR

XXXVIII. Assessing the Impacts of Electoral Systems

A. The Simple Standard Story

- 1. Plurality/Majority=> Disprop., but largest 2 parties take all/near-all seats & so => stable majority govts.
- 2. PR=> Prop., but parties proliferate=> coalition govt, fractionalized & polarized legis., & unstable govts
- 3. Obviously, not quite so simple, but broad outline roughly correct (*i.e.*, strongly supported by evidence)

B. Many other questions, however

- 1. Which affords better **"constituency"** [n.b., not unambig. term] representation?
- 2. Which offers better **access to pol. & soc. minorities?**
- 3. **Redistricting/gerrymandering** opp's & incentives?
- 4. [*etc.*--see Powell, Blais, & Massicotte; **OTHERS?**]

C. G, L, & M's Assess 6 possible effects elect. sys.

- 1. **Proportionality: absolutely no doubt PR => more; in fact, tight relation w/ Dist. Mag. (see graphs)**
- 2. **Number of parties (in legislature; parliament usually)**
 - a. Effective (size-weighted) vs. raw number of parties
Taagepera & Laakso ($n^* = \text{Effective \# parties}$, $P_i = \text{party } i\text{'s share seats/votes}$): $n^* = [\sum_i (1/P_i)^2]^{-1}$
 - b. # parties in legis. or # contesting elects? Either: **PR => ↑ party.**
 - c. (**direct, mechanical effects**) Non-PR => big mathematical bonus to large parties => fewer parties, esp. fewer effect. parties, in legis.
 - d. (**indirect, psychological, strategic effects**) Non-PR => strategic voting & strategic party/candidate entry
 - e. **Q:** So, which relation stronger, DM to Parl Prtys or Elect prtys?
 - f. **Some counter-evidence**
 - (1) Several countries: Bel, Den, Ger, Nor had multiparty before PR
 - (2) Number of parties in Austria reduced after 1919 switched to PR
 - (3) Malta nearly pure 2-party but a PR system
 - (4) ==> **PR not always cause prolif. parties, more nec. than suff. cond.**
 - (5) **GLM: "PR systems will give parliamentary expression to a multiparty system if other factors, such as the number of political or social cleavages, cause voters to create one in the first place, but PR does not by itself bring a multiparty system into being"**
 - g. Still: Most fract'd parl's: Bel, Den, Fin, Ita, Net, & Swi all PR
- 3. **Coalition or Single-Party Govt?**
 - a. Again no doubt **simple story broadly correct:** Single-party-majority govts in 10% of PR, 60% P/M
 - b. Again, many **exceptions**
 - (1) Minority govts have occurred in UK & elsewhere in P/M systems
 - (2) Single-party govts have occurred in Ger & elsewhere in PR systems
 - (3) four key parties in France (usually compete as 2-party coalitions)
 - c. **Tradeoff: Clarity responsibility vs. accuracy electoral message**
- 4. **Constituency (i.e., district/locality) Representation**
 - a. Could argue: 1 rep per district facilitates constituent service
 - b. Could counter: multiple rep's/district helps ensure at least 1 of your political persuasion to approach
 - c. **What little evidence exists shows no discernible relationship**

5. **Backgrounds of Parliamentarians:** [E.g., what features of various elect sys do you suppose might affect probability of female & /or minority cand's being elected? Evidence: PR raises female representation in parliament. **Why?**]
6. **Gerrymandering possibilities & incentives:** Obv. gerrymandering much more effective in P/M...
7. **GLM state differences in econ perform little relation to differences in elect sys. This somewhat misleading.**
 - a. **Economic policy** varies a lot by electoral system, esp. insofar as produce different types of govts
 - b. **Some evidence that some econ perf varies by elect sys too**

Blais, A. & L. Massicotte, "Electoral Systems," in LeDuc, Niemi, & Norris, Comparing Democracies (1996).

XXXIX. Describing Various Types Elect Sys: Plur, Maj, PR; Magnitude; Tiers; Thresholds; Cand Select

XL. (Positive) Political Consequences

A. *Psychological* (Strategic, Behavioral) & *Mechanical*

1. Psychological (Strategic, Behavioral) Effects:

- a. P/M/PR & the number of parties
- b. Electoral System & ideology / cohesion
- c. Electoral System & strategic voting
- d. Obvious impact in plurality elections: Gunther (1989) found supporters of small parties less likely to vote for them in districts of smaller mag—make sense? what's logic here?

2. Mechanical (Mathematical) Effects

- a. Vote-seat proportionality
- b. Duverger's Law & number parties (raw v. effective number)
- c. Lijphart finds: Plurality ==> about 2.0 effective parties, Majority ==> about 2.8, PR ==> about 3.6
- d. Threshold effects too
- e. **Ordeshook & Shvetsova** find: relation b/w # parties & ethnic het. increases & tightens w/ dist. mag.
- f. presence/absence of parl. majority: Lijphart II: Plur => maj 93% of cases, Majority => 50%, PR => 20-30% depending on threshold

XLI. Normative Debate—informed by Postive Theory, Evidence, & Debates

Some Data: Raw Correlations of Various Socioeconomic Conditions & Political Outcomes

	lpop	lrgdpc	ethind	relind	gini	edsec	lmag	vpart	prop	enpp	dgov80	psupg80	npgov80	attopp
lpop	1.0000													
lrgdpc	0.2121	1.0000												
ethind	0.2919	0.4089	1.0000											
relind	0.3915	0.5090	0.4680	1.0000										
gini	0.0742	-0.3997	-0.0288	-0.2382	1.0000									
edsec	0.0173	0.5804	0.1929	0.0905	-0.2585	1.0000								
lmag	-0.1310	-0.0565	-0.4859	-0.0592	0.0261	-0.1147	1.0000							
vpart	-0.3360	-0.1393	-0.4735	-0.1867	-0.1405	-0.0934	0.3422	1.0000						
prop	-0.1885	0.1740	-0.0715	-0.1855	-0.2574	0.0654	0.4178	0.0582	1.0000					
enpp	-0.2744	0.0873	-0.3626	-0.0874	-0.0724	-0.0256	0.6698	0.0398	0.4062	1.0000				
dgov80	0.2125	0.1954	0.5897	0.5222	-0.0760	0.1199	-0.2862	-0.5699	-0.3684	-0.1180	1.0000			
psupg80	-0.1414	-0.1086	0.2782	0.1825	-0.0981	-0.2837	0.0666	-0.2439	0.2347	-0.1192	0.2400	1.0000		
npgov80	-0.2504	0.1249	-0.0328	-0.2107	0.0856	-0.0468	0.3536	-0.0776	0.8342	0.3345	-0.3579	0.3393	1.0000	
attopp	0.2792	0.0093	0.1424	0.1441	0.2152	-0.0428	-0.2643	-0.1296	-0.2204	-0.2986	0.4303	0.0928	-0.2025	1.0000

lpop: natural log of population
lrgdpc: natural log of real GDP per capita
ethind: ethnic fragmentation index
relind: religious fragmentation index
gini: GINI index of income inequality
edsec: index primary &

secondary sch. enroll.
lmag: natural log electoral district mag.
vpart: voter participation rate
prop: proportionality of legislative seat distribution to vote distribution
enpp: effective number of parliamentary parties
dgov80: average duration of

govts (in months) in the 1980s
psupg80: average percent of seats in parliament supporting the govt in the 1980s
npgov80: average number of parties in govt in 1980s
lattopp: natural log of the number of political attacks & oppressions in 1980s

Determinants of the Proportionality of Electoral Outcomes

Number of obs = 21

R-squared = 0.6983

prop	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
lmag	2.568204	.7283494	3.526	0.004	.994701 4.141707
lpop	-1.886149	.9376368	-2.012	0.065	-3.91179 .1394918
lrgdpc	2.941667	4.083722	0.720	0.484	-5.880679 11.76401
ethind	-5.946238	6.171297	-0.964	0.353	-19.27851 7.386038
edsec	-.0141931	.0961284	-0.148	0.885	-.2218658 .1934797
US	13.95252	5.210637	2.678	0.019	2.69562 25.20941
SZ	4.030246	5.213686	0.773	0.453	-7.233238 15.29373
_cons	80.45612	31.88155	2.524	0.025	11.58023 149.332

Number of obs = 23

R-squared = 0.6303

prop	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
lmag	2.394217	.681835	3.511	0.003	.9556706 3.832763
lpop	-.9292101	.5964194	-1.558	0.138	-2.187545 .3291249
ethind	-7.55057	5.362998	-1.408	0.177	-18.86551 3.764366
US	12.91222	4.860203	2.657	0.017	2.658084 23.16635
SZ	6.514613	4.677849	1.393	0.182	-3.354785 16.38401
_cons	96.9738	5.687898	17.049	0.000	84.97338 108.9742

Determinants of the Effective Number of Parties in Parliament

Number of obs = 21

R-squared = 0.2939

enpp	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
lmag	.4464824	.3087327	1.446	0.172	-.220494 1.113459
lpop	-.1250728	.3974454	-0.315	0.758	-.9837014 .7335557
lrgdpc	.925385	1.731008	0.535	0.602	-2.81423 4.665
ethind	.5329234	2.615889	0.204	0.842	-5.118361 6.184208
edsec	.0055997	.0407469	0.137	0.893	-.0824286 .093628
US	-1.144733	2.208684	-0.518	0.613	-5.916305 3.62684
SZ	1.341764	2.209977	0.607	0.554	-3.432601 6.116129
_cons	-4.88439	13.51395	-0.361	0.724	-34.0795 24.31072

Number of obs = 21

R-squared = 0.2581

enpp	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
lmag	.5087292	.285378	1.783	0.095	-.0995395 1.116998
lpop	-.2890912	.324563	-0.891	0.387	-.9808809 .4026984
lrgdpc	1.046867	1.603379	0.653	0.524	-2.370654 4.464388
ethind	1.081365	2.262387	0.478	0.640	-3.740798 5.903528
edsec	-.0026652	.0366468	-0.073	0.943	-.0807759 .0754456
_cons	-3.897634	12.48691	-0.312	0.759	-30.51286 22.71759

Number of obs = 21

R-squared = 0.2460

enpp	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
lmag	.4435446	.2316949	1.914	0.073	-.0452888 .9323781
lpop	-.2552405	.2989749	-0.854	0.405	-.8860225 .3755414
lrgdpc	1.237125	1.12866	1.096	0.288	-1.144139 3.61839
_cons	-5.798764	10.07684	-0.575	0.573	-27.05904 15.46151

Number of obs = 21

R-squared = 0.1745

enpp	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
lmag	.4554715	.2272422	2.004	0.059	-.0201518 .9310948
_cons	2.907758	.5454194	5.331	0.000	1.766182 4.049333

Determinants of the Number of Parties in Govt

Number of obs = 21

R-squared = 0.7386

npgov80	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
lpop	-.0857474	.1697331	-0.505	0.623	-.455564 .2840692
lrgdpc	.126545	.7444957	0.170	0.868	-1.495572 1.748662
ethind	.0155078	1.114686	0.014	0.989	-2.413185 2.4442
edsec	-.0084333	.0173481	-0.486	0.636	-.0462315 .0293649
lmag	.0064405	.1415198	0.046	0.964	-.3019047 .3147857
enpp	.5247365	.1179966	4.447	0.001	.267644 .781829
US	.1011615	.9493274	0.107	0.917	-1.967245 2.169568
SZ	.7775238	.9534556	0.815	0.431	-1.299877 2.854925
_cons	.5166641	5.778226	0.089	0.930	-12.07301 13.10634

Number of obs = 21

R-squared = 0.6960

npgov80	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
enpp	.5604526	.0849834	6.595	0.000	.3825802 .738325
_cons	.0025308	.3487783	0.007	0.994	-.7274705 .7325321

Determinants of Voter Participation

Number of obs = 21

R-squared = 0.8380

vpart	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
lpop	-4.246587	1.577331	-2.692	0.021	-7.71827 -.7749051
lrgdpc	13.62715	6.147855	2.217	0.049	.0958134 27.15849
ethind	.3665997	9.440726	0.039	0.970	-20.4123 21.1455
edsec	-.3292375	.141427	-2.328	0.040	-.6405162 -.0179588
lmag	2.831868	1.509369	1.876	0.087	-.4902306 6.153967
prop	-.4603597	.4176456	-1.102	0.294	-1.379591 .4588722
enpp	.0927027	.9852923	0.094	0.927	-2.075911 2.261316
US	-10.9058	9.83255	-1.109	0.291	-32.54709 10.7355
SZ	-41.28559	7.886355	-5.235	0.000	-58.64333 -23.92784
_cons	64.44762	58.44081	1.103	0.294	-64.17974 193.075

Number of obs = 21

R-squared = 0.8379

vpart	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
lpop	-4.235734	1.446679	-2.928	0.012	-7.361094 -1.110374
lrgdpc	13.77331	5.398993	2.551	0.024	2.109492 25.43712
edsec	-.3283281	.1299159	-2.527	0.025	-.6089943 -.0476618
lmag	2.838158	1.356566	2.092	0.057	-.0925245 5.76884
prop	-.4568824	.3620822	-1.262	0.229	-1.239114 .3253487
US	-11.0263	8.544266	-1.290	0.219	-29.48507 7.432461
SZ	-41.02204	6.447957	-6.362	0.000	-54.95201 -27.09208
_cons	63.03857	52.37633	1.204	0.250	-50.11361 176.1907

Determinants of Govt Durability

Number of obs = 21

R-squared = 0.7844

dgov80	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
lpop	-.3782034	2.813301	-0.134	0.896	-6.865687 6.10928
lrgdpc	-4.091615	9.845209	-0.416	0.689	-26.79471 18.61148
ethind	15.2347	12.93021	1.178	0.273	-14.58243 45.05183
edsec	.1928452	.2382477	0.809	0.442	-.356555 .7422454
lmag	1.058475	2.369944	0.447	0.667	-4.406626 6.523576
prop	.0176297	.5973344	0.030	0.977	-1.359826 1.395085
vpart	.0248729	.4148886	0.060	0.954	-.9318619 .9816077
enpp	-.605193	2.177049	-0.278	0.788	-5.625478 4.415092
psupg80	.2608685	.2983566	0.874	0.407	-.4271431 .94888
npgov80	-4.543667	3.260021	-1.394	0.201	-12.06129 2.973955
US	19.76192	14.06015	1.406	0.197	-12.66086 52.18469
SZ	24.22542	19.60525	1.236	0.252	-20.98437 69.4352
_cons	36.34008	90.46144	0.402	0.698	-172.2644 244.9445

Number of obs = 23

R-squared = 0.5847

dgov80	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ethind	9.006614	10.86274	0.829	0.419	-13.91175 31.92498
psupg80	.6395543	.2689653	2.378	0.029	.0720871 1.207021
npgov80	-4.939279	1.973245	-2.503	0.023	-9.102461 -.7760958
US	22.63304	11.39794	1.986	0.063	-1.414514 46.68059
SZ	11.60115	11.95508	0.970	0.345	-13.62187 36.82416
_cons	-.8834984	14.97185	-0.059	0.954	-32.47134 30.70434

Number of obs = 23

R-squared = 0.5680

dgov80	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
psupg80	.7023434	.2558337	2.745	0.013	.1648566 1.23983
npgov80	-5.21179	1.928714	-2.702	0.015	-9.263868 -1.159712
US	26.66925	10.21622	2.610	0.018	5.205769 48.13274
SZ	13.71925	11.57712	1.185	0.251	-10.60337 38.04186
_cons	-1.972604	14.78407	-0.133	0.895	-33.03278 29.08757

Determinants of Political Attacks & Oppressions

Number of obs = 16

R-squared = 0.6223

lattopp	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
lpop	1.421063	.5419046	2.622	0.039	.09507 2.747056
lrgdpc	.3458066	1.710578	0.202	0.846	-3.839827 4.53144
ethind	-3.110833	2.794551	-1.113	0.308	-9.948853 3.727188
relind	-2.244102	2.512261	-0.893	0.406	-8.391384 3.90318
gini	9.470207	15.16302	0.625	0.555	-27.63238 46.57279
edsec	.0360057	.0400388	0.899	0.403	-.0619657 .133977
lmag	-.3206208	.2987685	-1.073	0.324	-1.051681 .4104394
US	-3.668315	1.954821	-1.877	0.110	-8.451588 1.114959
SZ	3.554796	2.143322	1.659	0.148	-1.689725 8.799317
_cons	-22.13167	16.97318	-1.304	0.240	-63.66356 19.40021

Number of obs = 16

R-squared = 0.5978

lattopp	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
lpop	1.515946	.4647737	3.262	0.011	.4441763 2.587716
ethind	-2.959762	2.430442	-1.218	0.258	-8.564372 2.644847
relind	-2.342026	2.101011	-1.115	0.297	-7.186966 2.502914
edsec	.0315434	.0312592	1.009	0.342	-.0405405 .1036272

```

lmag | -.3256798 .2626285 -1.240 0.250 -.9313023 .2799428
US | -3.735173 1.734805 -2.153 0.063 -7.73564 .2652943
SZ | 3.346048 1.882843 1.777 0.113 -.9957944 7.687891
_cons | -15.94199 5.526296 -2.885 0.020 -28.68565 -3.198325

```


XLII. Lijphart, *Electoral Systems* (ch. 8)

A. *Elect Sys* most ctrl & direct diff *Maj* & *Cons* philo's.

1. *Maj*=SMD, plurality or *majority* ; *Cons*=prop rep
2. Δ cross type rare, & each ctry tends be attached to own

B. 7 Key Aspects *Elect Sys* Produce 2 Key Outcomes

1. *Aspects*: **EForm**, **DMag**, **LegThresh**, AssySize, Pres, Malapp, Apparent: first three esp. key.
2. *Outcomes*: Proportionality & Number Parties



C. Electoral Formulae: Figure 8.1

1. **Plurality**: Simple [impl's?]; $DM=1 \Rightarrow$ disp, few prtys, maj
 - a. Common: Legis in 12 of 36 Dems (+ sev pres) [**Examples**]
2. **Majority**: *Maj-Runoff* & *Alt Vote* \Rightarrow disp, few prtys, & maj
 - a. Simple (not quite as simple as plurality); $DM=1$
 - b. Not very common [**Examples**]
3. **Proportional Representation**
 - a. More complex (not nec. by a lot) than Plur/Maj.
 - b. $DM>1 \Rightarrow$ prop, allows more parties & tends not produce maj.
 - c. Three Main Types:
 - (1) **List Systems**: [...see GLM...] Very common: Leg in 18/36 Dems
 - (2) **Mixed Systems**; e.g., **Mixed-Member Proportionality (MMP)** (Germany)
 - (a) Each cit 2 votes (cand/district & party/national).

(b) List PR seats (usu. $\frac{1}{2} \pm$ total) *compensatory*, & usu. national dist.

(c) Supposedly allows tighter dist-constit/rep tie & proportionality.

(d) Rare, but recently pop: 4/36, incl 2 key recent changes (NZ, It)

(3) **Single Transferable Vote (STV)** [...see GLM...]

4. **Semi-Proportional Systems**

a. *Lmt'd & Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV); Cumulative Vote*

(1) Cits vote cand's, not ranking, #votes fewer #seats.

(2) ↑ Prop as seat-vote gap increases.

(3) Very Rare (unique): Japan through '46-'95

b. *Parallel Plurality-PR System*

(1) Like MMP, 2-ballots etc., but non-compensatory ⇒ less prop

(2) Very Rare (unique): Japan through '95-

D. ***District Magnitude [DEF]***

1. Plurality/Majority not req. SMD, but usually SMD

a. MMD Maj possible but never used; MMD Plur not so rare [e.g.?]; MM provisions to assure some minority rep not so rare [e.g.?]

b. Disprop ↑ w/ DM in Plur/Maj.

2. DMag the key factor in prop & other effects PR

a. Prop ↑ w/ DM Tight relation.

b. *Upper Tiers* common, very lrg M's, dom proportionality effect

E. ***(Legal) Thresholds***

1. Purpose: to limit extreme fragmentation of very high M

2. Typically, bite seems to start @ around 4-5%.

3. b/c ***effective threshold*** depends heavily on M (& # cand's), roughly according to $T_{eff} \approx .75/(M+1)$, s.t. legal thresh min.

4. **[ELABORATE ON EFFECTIVE THRESHOLD]**

F. ***Assembly Size***

1. Size < ³rt-rule [def], esp <100, consequential for disprop

2. [Also, ↑ Assy Size may ↑ poss disprop in dists to cancel]

G. ***Presidentialism***

1. Powerful pop-elect pres, esp. if simultaneously or nearly so elect w/ legis, ⇒ own force toward 2-partism
[Why?]

2. Esp. if pres by plurality rather than maj-runoff **[Why?]**

H. ***Malapportionment [DEF]***

1. Hard to avoid in plur/maj w/ pre-exist geog divisions as district, easy in PR (just vary magnitude w/ pop).

2. Typically result in rural over-representation [Examples]

a. US: Senate, Elect Coll, even house through '60s reapportion.

b. ***[Other examples? Expected effects?]***

3. Rural over-rep not nec. translates partisan disprop.

I. ***Apparentement [DEF]***

1. Poss. to link lists in list-PR (Switz, Isr, & Neth '77+)

2. Some rules linking possible by nature: AV, STV, Runoff

J. ***Gauging Disproportionality:***

1. Gallagher Index: $[\frac{1}{2} \sum (v_i - s_i)^2]^{-.5}$ (i.e., $\frac{1}{2}$ sum sqrd dev's)

2. Complicating Issues:

a. Systems with multiple votes:

(1) MMP: use party's vote. (Arg: better rep partisan prefs.)

(2) AV/STV: use 1st-pref votes (rather than final tally)

(a) more available

- (b) better rep pref distribution
- (3) Runoff: use decisive, i.e. usu. 2nd-rnd, vote
 - (a) arg better rep final pref's
 - (b) [n.b., contradicts logic from AV/STV, likely understates disprop]

Table 8.1 Average disproportionality in legislative and in presidential elections, the numbers of elections on which these averages are based, and the geometric means of the two disproportionalitys in ex. presidential systems, 1948-98

	Legislative disproportionality (%)	Legislative elections (N)	Presidential disproportionality (%)	Presidential elections (N)	Geometric mean (%)
Israel	11.03	7	29.31	7	19.08
Zimbabwe	2.03	11	18.06	10	14.52
South Africa	4.13	11	43.11	11	20.05
Venezuela	3.26	8	33.19	4	14.01
United States	4.00	35	25.29	12	14.97
France	11.13	8	10.03	6	10.94

Notes: (1) All elections in which the prime minister was directly elected.
 (2) Not included in table 1998-2002: disprop=0, where lack of proportional parties.

Sources: Disprop in table 2.00-2002 from Table 1 in *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America* (1999) and data provided by Manuel Cusack, from *Table 1* in *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America* (1999) and data provided by Manuel Cusack, from *Table 1* in *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America* (1999).

K. Pres Elects in Pres Sys & Disprop (Table 8.1)

1. Pres, almost by def, SMD \Rightarrow highly disprop (e.g., in 2-cand, disprop=losing cand vote share).
2. Lijphart uses geometric mean pres & leg disp for pres. sys.

L. Emp Eval: Table 8.2. [Explain rel. low US leg disprop:

1. Wk prty+open prim's \Rightarrow \downarrow 3rd prty; run as dissident w/in prty
2. Very large # districts.]

Table 8.2 Average electoral disproportionality and typical electoral systems (used in legislative elections) in unity-gov democracies 1945-88

	Depreciation (%)	High and System		Depreciation (%)	Electoral System
Netherlands	1.10	PR	Spain	8.15	PR
Denmark	1.83	PR	Australia	9.28	Majority
Sweden	1.90	PR	Papua New Guinea	10.00	Plural
Israel	1.27	PR	Singapore	10.13	Plural
Malta	2.38	PR-STV	Colombia	10.52	PR*
Austria	2.43	PR	New Zealand	11.11	Plural
Germany	2.52	PR	India	11.30	Plural
Switzerland	2.55	PR	Canada	11.75	Majority
Norway	2.60	PR	Barbados	11.74	Plural
Belgium	1.24	PR	Czech Rep.	13.60	PR*
Italy	2.25	PR	Malaysia	13.00	Plural
Luxembourg	3.25	PR	Venezuela	14.41	PR*
Ireland	2.49	PR-STV	United States	14.90	Plural
Portugal	1.10	PR	Bahamas	15.17	Plural
France	4.25	PR	Barbados	15.77	Plural
Norway	4.27	PR	Nicaragua	16.13	Plural
Japan	8.03	SNPV	Kenya	17.77	Plural
Kenya	8.10	PR	Malawi	21.00	Majority

THE END OF THE LINE

^aMANIT = number of electrons in valence band; n₀ = carrier concentration at equilibrium; N_D = donor density.[illegible]

M. Elect Sys & Prty Sys: Duverger's Law; Mech & Psych...

1. Rae: Three things all elect sys do
 - a. Yield disproportional results.
 - b. Reduce effective # parliamentary rel to electoral parties
 - c. Can manufacture seat-majority for non-electoral-majority
2. All 3 effects \uparrow strength w/ T_{eff} & essentially *via* disprop.
3. Disprop systematic, not random: favors larger parties [*with essentially one exception...what?*].
4. **[DEF] Manufactured & Earned Maj, Natural Min**

N. Empirical Evaluation: Table 8.3 & Figure 8.2

Table 8.3 Manufactured and natural resources, 1945-96, and natural resources as a share of GDP of electoral systems, 1945-96

	Manufactured resources (%)	Electoral disproportionality (%)	Natural resources (%)	Total (%)	Electoral disproportionality (%)
Unanimity and majority systems					
Disproportional systems	23.7	20.0	15.3	100.0	100.0
Proportional systems	4.4	13.8	12.1	100.0	5.4
Proportional representation					
122 countries	12.4	5.3	12.3	100.0	30.1
All legislative elections in 39 countries	15.8	4.3	12.1	100.0	32.5

Source: Data on data in Mackenzie and Rose (1991) Mackenzie and Rose (1997); Nunnally and Nunnally (1991) and data provided by Graham K. Clarke, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands, and Graham K. Clarke, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands, and Graham K. Clarke, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands.




Fig. 8.2 The relationship between electoral disproportionality and the effective number of parliamentary parties in thirty-six democracies, 1945-96

XLIII. Elaboration, Clarification, & Further Topics:

- A. **Effective Thresholds:** roughly set by dist. mag. (or exactly legal threshold if that higher)
 - 1. Three Problems in determining T_{eff}
 - a. \exists lower threshold (lowest vote share that could produce a seat) & upper threshold (lowest vote share that assures a seat)
 - b. Both thresholds also depend on formula & # parties competing
 - c. # prtys, DM, etc. & $\therefore T_{\text{eff}}$ can vary dist-to-district w/in system
 - 2. Roughly equal to the larger of
 - a. Legal Threshold or
 - b. Approx.: $T_{\text{eff}} \approx .75/(DM+1)$
 - c. Except in SMP where Lijphart assumes it 35% by assumption
- B. [interesting fact/Q: US has had 100% congressional maj, only 8.7% manufactured; UK has had 92% maj, all manu. What produces the difference do you suppose?]
- C. Why is relationship w/ # parties not stronger still, esp. w/ # electoral parties? [relation exists]
 - 1. Bi-directional causality [$N_e \Rightarrow +\text{Disprop}$, $\text{Disprop} \Rightarrow -N_e$]
 - 2. Psychological: parties never *forced* to leave electoral arena; can keep losing as long as want
 - 3. Multiple other factors involved here (e.g., geographic concentration of support)
 - 4. Can be statistical artifact: systems performing oddly (too many or too few parties relative to designers' aims) will tend to be changed... E.g., US plurality = 1 case of elect sys; Greece's less than proportional PR = many cases.
- D. Refining question: Why eNpp so much more responsive to electoral system than eNep? Why eNep appears basically unaffected in fact in this longitudinal analysis?
 - 1. Takes Time for Expectational Effects to Manifest;
 - a. Politicians presumably know expected effects of electoral systems, voters have to work them out.
 - b. Historicity: 2 (effect.) prty sys won't become 3 over-night, etc.
 - c. Uncertainty over elect support for various potential new parties, or over who will lose by new rules, & whose support now vulnerable
 - (1) \Rightarrow risk-aversion \Rightarrow less changing of rules
 - (2) \Rightarrow "winner's curse" \Rightarrow excessive net party entry as rules change
 - d. Spurious/Endogeneity: when do electoral rules change? Isn't it likely that the same conditions which trigger electoral law change are likely to be producing party system changes?
 - e. Periods of time compared usu. long \Rightarrow questionable whether reliably controlled cases—too much else also changing. On other hand, this "else" ought to avg out across some # such comparisons.
 - 2. Lijphart II partly addresses last: compare last election under old w/ 2nd or 3rd under new rather than all elections under old w/ new. Drawback: single election less reliable indicator of functioning of electoral system than avg over several.

XLIV. Basic conclusion:

- A. Some support for expected effects on most dimensions
 - 1. T_{eff} is key factor (n.b. it subsumes the PR/PM distinction, which is itself a very strong predictor)
 - 2. Disproportionality is dependent variable most completely explained by electoral system

XLV. Impact of 4 ancillary properties of elect sys

- A. Ballot structure: categorical (w/in-party voting only) v. ordinal (potential cross-party voting)
- B. Malapportionment: differing numbers of voters per representative across districts
- C. Presidential govt & elections
- D. Interparty electoral links:
- E. **See Lijphart II & Class Lecture Notes from Previous Years**

- XLVI. Grand Summary of Findings: tables 6.2 & 6.3, though perhaps understate strength of conclusion in favor of the elect formula & AS links eNpp. Remains broad conclusion that T_{eff} the main factor & Disprop. the most completely determined

Parties & Party Systems, Part I

XLVII. *Review of Electoral Systems Material*

- A. Importance of Elections: Practically & Symbolically
- B. General Matters of Importance Regarding Elections
 - 1. Suffrage Expansion
 - 2. Suffrage Restrictions
 - 3. Turnout--Gen'yly higher outside US, ↓ since 70's
 - 4. Timing of Elections: **Endogenous v. Exogenous** (Implications)
- C. Other Elections: EU & Pres & Local
- D. Other Voting--Referenda
 - 1. "voter fatigue?"
 - 2. democracy by referendum? [Chaos Theorems]
 - 3. Issues over which referenda tend to be called
- E. Types of Electoral Systems
 - 1. **DEF electoral systems:** "the mechanisms that turn votes cast by people on election day into seats to be occupied by deputies in the parliament. The electoral system is what converts the choices of voters into a legislature." GLM (p. 274)
 - 2. **Where do electoral systems come from?**
 - a. "Determined by the political elite of the day, some of whose motivations may be partisan" GLM (p. 274)
 - b. "designs reflect...constitution-makers' values, their expectations regarding the consequences of various arrangements, their often laboriously negotiated compromises" Powell (p. 66)
 - c. Cultural/Historical Legacy: **See Powell II Table 4.3 (p. 67)**
 - d. Generally **not** frequently manip'd for electoral advantage, despite obvious opportunities. **If such a potent political engineering tool, why not?**
 - (1) Why would those in power change system that put them there?
 - (2) Parties uncertainty about future electoral position
 - (3) Difficult to change (constitutions usually require super-majorities)
 - (4) Relatively obvious opportunism, may trigger negative voter-reaction
 - (5) Sometimes imposed from abroad (e.g. Germ., Jap., It., Aust.)
 - 3. **Key distinctions between types of electoral systems**
 - a. **Primary Distinction: Proportional Representation (PR) vs. Plurality/Majority (P/M) systems**
 - b. **Other key features [define each]**
 - (1) District magnitude
 - (2) Degree of candidate vs. party voting (preference voting)
 - (3) Number of tiers
 - (4) Electoral formula (within the PR-P/M divisions)
 - (5) Legal Thresholds
 - (6) Constituency pattern (e.g., Malapportionment, Gerrymanders)
 - 4. **Plurality/Majority Systems**
 - a. **Single-Member Plurality (SMP)**
 - b. **Majority Systems**
 - (1) **STV: alternative or single-transferable vote (majority version)**
 - (2) **Multiple-Round Majority Balloting**
 - 5. **Proportional Representation (PR) Systems**
 - a. **The key feature of PR is the Multi-member district**
 - b. **Key types of PR: List & STV**
 - c. **List Systems' Formulas**
 - (1) **Two Basic Types**
 - (a) **Largest Remainders (Quotas) Methods** (Hare, Droop)
 - (b) **Highest Averages (Divisor) Methods** (d'Hondt, Sainte-Lague, & Mod. SL, Imperiali--

Defunct Italian system)

(2) **Tiers**

(3) **Legal Thresholds**

(4) **Preferential vs. Non-Preferential List**

d. **Single-Transferable-Vote (PR version)**

F. Assessing the Impacts of Electoral Systems

1. The Simple Standard Story

- a. Pluralist/Majoritarian => Disproportionality, but largest two parties take all or nearly all of the seats & thus the system produces stable majority govts
- b. PR ==> Proportionality, but parties proliferate & thus system produces coalition govts, fractionalized & polarized legislatures, & thus unstable govts

2. GLM's Assessment on 6 possible effects of elect systems

- a. **Proportionality--absolutely no doubt PR ==> more; in fact, tight relation with District Magnitude (see pictures)**
- b. **Number of parties in legislature & in elections**
 - (1) Effective (size-weighted) vs. raw number of parties
 - (2) **direct, mechanical effects**
 - (3) **psychological, strategic effects (2: candd/prtys & voters)**
 - (4) **PR more *necessary* than *sufficient* condition for party sys fract: disprop acts as governor, dampens soc struct reflect in prty sys**
- c. **Coalition or Single-Party Govt?**
- d. **Constituency Representation**
- e. **Backgrounds of Parliamentarians**
- f. **Gerrymandering possibilities & incentives**
- g. Differences in broad econ perform little, simple relation to elect sys, but spec economic *policies* vary significantly by elect sys, especially insofar as they produce different types of govts

G. Psychological (Strategic, Behavioral) v. Mechanical Effects (From Blais & Massicotte, in LNN)

1. Psychological (Strategic, Behavioral) Effects:

- a. P/M/PR & the number of parties
- b. Electoral System & ideology / cohesion
- c. Electoral System & strategic voting
- d. Obvious impact in plurality elections: Gunther (1989) found supporters of small parties less likely to vote for them in districts of smaller mag (*explain*)

2. Mechanical (Mathematical) Effects

- a. Vote-seat proportionality
- b. Duverger's Law & number parties (raw v. effective number)
- c. Lijphart II: Pl => 2.0+/- effective parties, Maj => 2.8+/-, PR => 3.6+/-
- d. Legal Threshold effects too
- e. Ordeshook & Shvetsova: relation b/w # parties & ethnic het. increases & tightens w/ dist. mag. (**EXPLAIN & ELABORATE**)
- f. presence/absence of parl. maj: Lijphart II: Pl => maj 93% cases, Maj => 50%, PR => 20-30% depending on threshold

H. Sample Empirical (Regression) Results

lpop: natural log of population

lrgdpc: natural log of real GDP per capita

ethind: ethnic fragmentation index

relind: religious fragmentation index

gini: GINI index of income inequality

edsec: index primary & secondary sch. enroll.

lmag: natural log electoral district mag.

vpart: voter participation rate

prop: proportionality of legislative seat distribution to vote distribution

enpp: effective # parliamentary parties

dgov80: average duration of govts (in months) in the 1980s

psupg80: average % seats in parliament supporting

the govt in the 1980s

npgov80: average # parties in govt in 1980s

lattopp: natural log of the number of political attacks
& oppressions in 1980s

Determinants of the Proportionality of Electoral Outcomes

Number of obs = 21 R-squared = 0.6983

prop	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
lmag	2.568204	.7283494	3.526	0.004	.994701 4.141707
lpop	-1.886149	.9376368	-2.012	0.065	-3.91179 .1394918
lrgdpc	2.941667	4.083722	0.720	0.484	-5.880679 11.76401
ethind	-5.946238	6.171297	-0.964	0.353	-19.27851 7.386038
edsec	-.0141931	.0961284	-0.148	0.885	-.2218658 .1934797
US	13.95252	5.210637	2.678	0.019	2.69562 25.20941
SZ	4.030246	5.213686	0.773	0.453	-7.233238 15.29373
_cons	80.45612	31.88155	2.524	0.025	11.58023 149.332

Number of obs = 23 R-squared = 0.6303

prop	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
lmag	2.394217	.681835	3.511	0.003	.9556706 3.832763
lpop	-.9292101	.5964194	-1.558	0.138	-2.187545 .3291249
ethind	-7.55057	5.362998	-1.408	0.177	-18.86551 3.764366
US	12.91222	4.860203	2.657	0.017	2.658084 23.16635
SZ	6.514613	4.677849	1.393	0.182	-3.354785 16.38401
_cons	96.9738	5.687898	17.049	0.000	84.97338 108.9742

Determinants of the Effective Number of Parties in Parliament

Number of obs = 21 R-squared = 0.2939

enpp	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
lmag	.4464824	.3087327	1.446	0.172	-.220494 1.113459
lpop	-.1250728	.3974454	-0.315	0.758	-.9837014 .7335557
lrgdpc	.925385	1.731008	0.535	0.602	-2.81423 4.665
ethind	.5329234	2.615889	0.204	0.842	-5.118361 6.184208
edsec	.0055997	.0407469	0.137	0.893	-.0824286 .093628
US	-1.144733	2.208684	-0.518	0.613	-5.916305 3.62684
SZ	1.341764	2.209977	0.607	0.554	-3.432601 6.116129
_cons	-4.88439	13.51395	-0.361	0.724	-34.0795 24.31072

Number of obs = 21 R-squared = 0.2581

enpp	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
lmag	.5087292	.285378	1.783	0.095	-.0995395 1.116998
lpop	-.2890912	.324563	-0.891	0.387	-.9808809 .4026984
lrgdpc	1.046867	1.603379	0.653	0.524	-2.370654 4.464388
ethind	1.081365	2.262387	0.478	0.640	-3.740798 5.903528
edsec	-.0026652	.0366468	-0.073	0.943	-.0807759 .0754456
_cons	-3.897634	12.48691	-0.312	0.759	-30.51286 22.71759

Number of obs = 21 R-squared = 0.2460

enpp	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
lmag	.4435446	.2316949	1.914	0.073	-.0452888 .9323781

```
lpop | -.2552405 .2989749 -0.854 0.405 -.8860225 .3755414
lrgdpc | 1.237125 1.12866 1.096 0.288 -1.144139 3.61839
_cons | -5.798764 10.07684 -0.575 0.573 -27.05904 15.46151
```

Number of obs = 21 R-squared = 0.1745

```
enpp | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
lmag | .4554715 .2272422 2.004 0.059 -.0201518 .9310948
_cons | 2.907758 .5454194 5.331 0.000 1.766182 4.049333
```

Determinants of the Number of Parties in Govt

Number of obs = 21 R-squared = 0.7386

```
npgov80 | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
lpop | -.0857474 .1697331 -0.505 0.623 -.455564 .2840692
lrgdpc | .126545 .7444957 0.170 0.868 -1.495572 1.748662
ethind | .0155078 1.114686 0.014 0.989 -2.413185 2.4442
edsec | -.0084333 .0173481 -0.486 0.636 -.0462315 .0293649
lmag | .0064405 .1415198 0.046 0.964 -.3019047 .3147857
enpp | .5247365 .1179966 4.447 0.001 .267644 .781829
US | .1011615 .9493274 0.107 0.917 -1.967245 2.169568
SZ | .7775238 .9534556 0.815 0.431 -1.299877 2.854925
_cons | .5166641 5.778226 0.089 0.930 -12.07301 13.10634
```

Number of obs = 21 R-squared = 0.6960

```
npgov80 | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
enpp | .5604526 .0849834 6.595 0.000 .3825802 .738325
_cons | .0025308 .3487783 0.007 0.994 -.7274705 .7325321
```

Determinants of Voter Participation

Number of obs = 21 R-squared = 0.8380

```
vpart | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
lpop | -4.246587 1.577331 -2.692 0.021 -7.71827 -.7749051
lrgdpc | 13.62715 6.147855 2.217 0.049 .0958134 27.15849
ethind | .3665997 9.440726 0.039 0.970 -20.4123 21.1455
edsec | -.3292375 .141427 -2.328 0.040 -.6405162 -.0179588
lmag | 2.831868 1.509369 1.876 0.087 -.4902306 6.153967
prop | -.4603597 .4176456 -1.102 0.294 -1.379591 .4588722
enpp | .0927027 .9852923 0.094 0.927 -2.075911 2.261316
US | -10.9058 9.83255 -1.109 0.291 -32.54709 10.7355
SZ | -41.28559 7.886355 -5.235 0.000 -58.64333 -23.92784
_cons | 64.44762 58.44081 1.103 0.294 -64.17974 193.075
```

Number of obs = 21 R-squared = 0.8379

```
vpart | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
lpop | -4.235734 1.446679 -2.928 0.012 -7.361094 -1.110374
lrgdpc | 13.77331 5.398993 2.551 0.024 2.109492 25.43712
edsec | -.3283281 .1299159 -2.527 0.025 -.6089943 -.0476618
lmag | 2.838158 1.356566 2.092 0.057 -.0925245 5.76884
prop | -.4568824 .3620822 -1.262 0.229 -1.239114 .3253487
US | -11.0263 8.544266 -1.290 0.219 -29.48507 7.432461
```

SZ | -41.02204 6.447957 -6.362 0.000 -54.95201 -27.09208
_cons | 63.03857 52.37633 1.204 0.250 -50.11361 176.1907

Determinants of Govt Durability

Number of obs = 21 R-squared = 0.7844

dgov80	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
lpop	-.3782034	2.813301	-0.134	0.896	-6.865687 6.10928
lrgdpc	-4.091615	9.845209	-0.416	0.689	-26.79471 18.61148
ethind	15.2347	12.93021	1.178	0.273	-14.58243 45.05183
edsec	.1928452	.2382477	0.809	0.442	-.356555 .7422454
lmag	1.058475	2.369944	0.447	0.667	-4.406626 6.523576
prop	.0176297	.5973344	0.030	0.977	-1.359826 1.395085
vpart	.0248729	.4148886	0.060	0.954	-.9318619 .9816077
enpp	-.605193	2.177049	-0.278	0.788	-5.625478 4.415092
psupg80	.2608685	.2983566	0.874	0.407	-.4271431 .94888
npgov80	-4.543667	3.260021	-1.394	0.201	-12.06129 2.973955
US	19.76192	14.06015	1.406	0.197	-12.66086 52.18469
SZ	24.22542	19.60525	1.236	0.252	-20.98437 69.4352
_cons	36.34008	90.46144	0.402	0.698	-172.2644 244.9445

Number of obs = 23 R-squared = 0.5847

dgov80	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ethind	9.006614	10.86274	0.829	0.419	-13.91175 31.92498
psupg80	.6395543	.2689653	2.378	0.029	.0720871 1.207021
npgov80	-4.939279	1.973245	-2.503	0.023	-9.102461 -.7760958
US	22.63304	11.39794	1.986	0.063	-1.414514 46.68059
SZ	11.60115	11.95508	0.970	0.345	-13.62187 36.82416
_cons	-.8834984	14.97185	-0.059	0.954	-32.47134 30.70434

Number of obs = 23 R-squared = 0.5680

dgov80	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
psupg80	.7023434	.2558337	2.745	0.013	.1648566 1.23983
npgov80	-5.21179	1.928714	-2.702	0.015	-9.263868 -1.159712
US	26.66925	10.21622	2.610	0.018	5.205769 48.13274
SZ	13.71925	11.57712	1.185	0.251	-10.60337 38.04186
_cons	-1.972604	14.78407	-0.133	0.895	-33.03278 29.08757

Determinants of Political Attacks & Oppressions

Number of obs = 16 R-squared = 0.6223

lattopp	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
lpop	1.421063	.5419046	2.622	0.039	.09507 2.747056
lrgdpc	.3458066	1.710578	0.202	0.846	-3.839827 4.53144
ethind	-3.110833	2.794551	-1.113	0.308	-9.948853 3.727188
relind	-2.244102	2.512261	-0.893	0.406	-8.391384 3.90318
gini	9.470207	15.16302	0.625	0.555	-27.63238 46.57279
edsec	.0360057	.0400388	0.899	0.403	-.0619657 .133977
lmag	-.3206208	.2987685	-1.073	0.324	-1.051681 .4104394
US	-3.668315	1.954821	-1.877	0.110	-8.451588 1.114959
SZ	3.554796	2.143322	1.659	0.148	-1.689725 8.799317
_cons	-22.13167	16.97318	-1.304	0.240	-63.66356 19.40021

Number of obs = 16 R-squared = 0.5978

	lattopp	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
--	---------	-------	-----------	---	------	----------------------

lpop		1.515946	.4647737	3.262	0.011	.4441763	2.587716
ethind		-2.959762	2.430442	-1.218	0.258	-8.564372	2.644847
relind		-2.342026	2.101011	-1.115	0.297	-7.186966	2.502914
edsec		.0315434	.0312592	1.009	0.342	-.0405405	.1036272
limg		-.3256798	.2626285	-1.240	0.250	-.9313023	.2799428
US		-3.735173	1.734805	-2.153	0.063	-7.73564	.2652943
SZ		3.346048	1.882843	1.777	0.113	-.9957944	7.687891
_cons		-15.94199	5.526296	-2.885	0.020	-28.68565	-3.198325

I. Lijphart, *Electoral Systems* (ch. 8) (points not in GLM, or not fully)

1. Elect Sys most ctrl & direct diff Maj & Cons philosophies
2. *7 Key Aspects Elect Sys* => *2 Key Outcomes*
 - a. Aspects: EForm, DMag, LegThresh, AssySize, Pres, Malapp, Apparent: first three esp. key. (1st 3 + malapp. covered in GLM)
 - b. Outcomes: Proportionality & Number Parties
3. *Semi-Proportional Systems*
 - a. Lmtd & Single-Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) (Japan)
 - b. Cumulative Vote (Not currently in use @ national level)
 - c. Parallel Plurality-PR System (German System)
4. *Assembly Size*: when less than cube-root rule [*def*], esp<100, consequential for disprop
5. *Presidentialism*
 - a. Powerful pop-elect pres, esp. if simultaneously or nearly so elect w/ legis, own force toward 2-partism [Why?]
 - b. Esp. if pres by plurality rather than maj-runoff [Why?]
6. *Apparentement* [DEF]
7. Gauging Disproportionality:
 - a. Gallagher Index: $[\frac{1}{2}\sum_i(v_i-s_i)^2]^{-.5}$ (i.e., sq. rt. of $\frac{1}{2}$ sum sqrd dev's)
 - b. Complicating Issues:
 - (1) Multiple-vote systems (e.g., MMP, AV/STV); run-offs; presidential sys.
 - (2) What counts as a party?
8. Rae: Three things all elect sys do
 - a. Yield disproportional results (favoring larger parties).
 - b. Reduce effective # parliamentary rel to electoral parties
 - c. Can manufacture seat-majority for non-electoral-majority
 - d. All 3 effects ↑ strength w/ T_{eff} & essentially via disprop.
9. [DEF] Manufactured & Earned Maj, Natural Min

J. Elaboration, Clarification, & Further Topics (Lijphart II)

1. **Effective Thresholds (T_{eff})**: roughly set by dist. mag. (or exactly legal threshold if that higher)
 - a. Three Problems in determining T_{eff}
 - (1) \exists lower threshold (lowest vote share that could produce a seat) & upper threshold (lowest vote share that assures a seat)
 - (2) Both thresholds also depend on formula & # parties competing
 - (3) # prtys, DM, etc. & $\therefore T_{eff}$ can vary dist-to-district w/in system
 - b. Roughly equal $\text{Max}(\text{Legal Threshold}, .75/(\text{DM}+1))$, except in SMP where Lijphart assumes it 35% by assumption
2. [interesting fact/Q: US has had 100% congressional maj, only 8.7% manu.; UK has had 92% maj, all manu. What explains?]
3. Why is relationship w/ # parties not stronger still, esp. w/ # electoral parties? [relation exists]
 - a. Bi-directional causality [$N_e \Rightarrow +\text{Disprop}$, $\text{Disprop} \Rightarrow -N_e$]
 - b. Psychological: parties never forced to leave electoral arena; can keep losing

- c. Multiple other factors involved here (e.g., geog. concentration of support)
- d. Can be statistical artifact: systems performing oddly (too many or too few parties relative to designers' aims) will tend to be changed...
- 4. *Refining Question*: Why eNpp so much more responsive to electoral system than eNep?
 - a. Takes Time for Expectational Effects to Manifest;
 - (1) Politicians presumably know expected effects of electoral systems, voters have to work them out.
 - (2) Historicity: 2 (effect.) prty sys won't become 3 over-night, etc.
 - b. Uncertainty over elect support for various potential new parties, or over who will lose by new rules, & whose support now vulnerable
 - (1) => risk-aversion => less changing of rules
 - (2) => "winner's curse" => excessive net party entry as rules change
 - c. Spuriousness/Endogeneity: when do electoral rules change? Isn't it likely that the same conditions which trigger electoral law change are likely to be producing party system changes?
- 5. Basic conclusions:
 - a. Some support for expected effects on most dimensions
 - b. T_{eff} is key factor (n.b. it subsumes PR/PM distinction, which alone strong)
 - c. Disproportionality is dependent variable most completely explained by electoral system, then sort of "slippages" away as go down chain.

XLVIII. **Parties & Party Systems, Part I**

A. Patterns in Party Politics (GLM ch. 7)

1. Party System:
 - a. DEF: character of political competition in ctry, described in terms of relative strengths & policy positions of its parties (GLM, p. 151)
 - b. Each sys somewhat unique, but many sim's across party sys
2. Seven West European Party Sys Described: common basis in left/right divide defines the competition
 - a. UK
 - (1) Description:
 - (a) Major Parties: the players
 - (b) Relative Strengths:
 - (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time
 - (2) "Responsible Party Govt"
 - (a) ideological decision sharply defined for voters
 - (b) cabinet govt with relatively unchecked power
 - b. Sweden
 - (1) Description:
 - (a) Major Parties: the players
 - (b) Relative Strengths:
 - (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time
 - (2) Key differences from the UK
 - (a) Soc Dems much more successful than Lab
 - (b) Soc Dems not quite monop of left—small but persistent comm party
 - (c) Moderates quite far from monopoly non-soc opposition
 - i) Liberals—center-type libs
 - ii) Center Party—agrarian
 - iii) Christian Democrats—newer
 - (d) Rel. recent strength Ecology Party & New Dem (rt, protest)
 - c. Germany
 - (1) Description:
 - (a) Major Parties: the players
 - (b) Relative Strengths:

- (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time
- (2) Key differences from the UK
 - (a) relatively strong position of FDP; it more “conservative” than UK Liberals; sec. opp. to Cath. pol. rather than lib. opp. to sec. conserv.
 - (b) CDU/CSU=Christian-Dem not secular conservative party
 - i) gen. more receptive to *social justice* concerns⇒somewhat more centrist on econ. pol.
 - ii) gen. more concerned w/ *moral issues* & more conserv. on soc. pol., esp. where main churches have stance
 - iii) CSU is the more Catholic & socially conservative of two
 - (c) SPD was one of most radical in 19th C, one of most moderate now
 - i) excluded for its extremism pre-‘66 *Bad Godesberg* commit. to free-mrkt & NATO
 - ii) post-‘66 increasingly de-ideologized, ↑’ly pro-sys, & toward consensual politics
 - (d) TRIANGULAR POLITICS: CDU/CSU–FDP–SPD, how do they ally on different sorts of issues?
- (3) Changes in the 80s & 90s
 - (a) Greens–right around threshold since 80s; beginning to affect govtal coalition patterns?
 - (b) 1990 Unification: 12 mill. new, presumably volatile voters, originally mostly to CDU & FDP benefit, recently turned against them. Why?
 - (c) Greens allying w/ related social movements, becoming more effectively organized to compete
 - (d) *Die Republikaner*–not yet parliamentary player, but disturbing coupled w/ recently rising social strife
 - (e) *Politikverdrossenheit*–disillusionment w/ politics
- d. Netherlands
 - (1) Description:
 - (a) Major Parties: the players: PvdA, CDA, VVD
 - (b) Relative Strength: 1/3+1/3+1/5+ smaller, episodic players
 - (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time
 - (2) Triangular + small party complications
- e. Italy (pre-1994)
 - (1) Description:
 - (a) Maj Parts: MSI-Lib-Rep-DC-PSDI-PSI-PCI+many smaller
 - (b) Relative Strengths: DC 1/3, PCI 1/3
 - (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time
 - (2) More fractionalized & polarized than most other sys (nearest was FR IVth)
 - (3) Apparent Changes
 - (a) Major Parties: AN-Lega-Forza-Centro-PSI-Greens-PDS-Rifond, + Rete
 - (b) Relative Strengths: roughly even left-right blocks
 - (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time (so far steady alternation: RtBlck-LftBlck-RtBlck...)
- f. France
 - (1) IVth: PCF (.25)–PSF (.2)–Rad (.1)–Cath MRP (.25)–Gauls (.2)–Pouj (.1) + small
 - (2) Fifth Republic: PCF–PS–UDF–RPR, + smaller
 - (a) Two-bloc system: what facilitated the change?
 - (b) Shift in balance of strength within each bloc
 - (c) *Front National*, *Generation Ecologie*, *Les Verts*
- g. Spain
 - (1) early volatility & flux, ill-defined loose alliances
 - (2) early dom by Suarez’ UnionDemCtr => broad Ctr-Rt & Ctr-Lft coals
 - (3) collapses about ‘82, replaced by PSOE dom w/ right in frag’d disarray

- (4) Emerging system: PCE+PSOE+smaller lefts vs. PP (sec cons) + PC (people's coal, loose lib-cath-cons coal) + bunch of regional parties

3. Uniformity & Diversity

- a. Maj commonality: tendency toward Lft-Rt competition, occasional exceptions dominated by center
- b. Core Differences
 - (1) location of liberals:
 - (a) Egalitarian (center-left): *e.g.*, UK Liberal Democrats
 - (b) Libertarian (center-right): *e.g.*, German FDP or Italian PLI
 - (2) whether maj lft or, more rarely, rt party can govern alone
 - (3) strongly structured v. loose/fragmented govt'l alliances
 - (4) Degree of party discipline
- c. Nature of Left-Right Competition
 - (1) Lft wrkng-class prtys: common hist origins both maj strands (*Soc, Comm*)
 - (2) Right middle/upper-class parties: more variegated origins & politics
 - (a) religious v. secular conservatives
 - (b) rural/farming v. industrial/service
 - (c) some rightist cultural linguistic, subcultural, regional
 - (3) Compare development of Welf State across config's of left/right compet
 - (4) Complications arising: New Lft & New Rt & new issues
- d. Conflict within Left & Right
 - (1) Soc/Comm & Right/Far-Right more usually bitter enemies than allies
 - (2) Systems w/ much elect strength at extremes tend⇒ centrist multiparty coals
 - (3) Growing Disillusionment w/ Politics⇒anti-party parties
 - (a) sources of this trend?
 - (b) effects of this trend?
- e. Other Dimensions of Party Politics
 - (1) Other cleavage lines: religion, cultural/ethnic/linguistic, mat/post-mat
 - (2) Within broad rubric of Left-Right Competition: soc & econ dim's

B. Party Families (GLM ch. 8)

- 1. Definition/Grouping Characteristics
 - a. Origins
 - b. Links they form among selves, w/in & across countries
 - c. Similarity of (broad) policy stances
- 2. Families of the Left
 - a. Social Democrats (↓ support or unchanged)
 - b. Comms (↓↓ in most, recent IT except but not so comm any more)
 - c. New Left (↑ in most places, soc dems usu moving to absorb...)
 - d. Greens (↑ or unchanged support in most places)
- 3. Families of the Center & Right
 - a. Christian Dems (↓ or unchanged in most places, until recently)
 - b. Secular Conservatives (↑ or unchanged in most places, until recent)
 - c. Libs (most ↑, but some CDs/SecCons moving to absorb) (*Explain?*)
 - d. Agrarian/Rural (↓ or unchanged support)
 - e. Far Right (↑ support in some places)
- 4. Other
 - a. regionalist, nationalist (unchanged or ↑ support)
 - b. miscellaneous, protest (↑ support in most places)
- 5. Patterns of Partisan Competition among Families
 - a. Christian-Democrat-led Right
 - (1) left strong, united (AU, GE)

- (2) left strong, divided (IT)
- (3) left weak, united or divided (BE, LU, NE, SZ)
- b. Secular-Conservative-led Right
 - (1) left strong, united (UK)
 - (2) left strong, divided (Fin, Ice, Fra)
- c. Fragmented Right, Left strong, united (Den, Nor, Swe)

Parties & Party Systems

XLIX. Parties & Party Systems I: Description

A. Patterns in Party Politics (GLM ch. 7)

1. Party System:

- a. DEF: character of political competition in ctry, described in terms of relative strengths & policy positions of its parties (GLM, p. 151)
- b. Each sys somewhat unique, but many sim's across party sys
- 2. Seven West European Party Sys Described: common basis in left/right divide defines the competition

a. UK

(1) Description:

- (a) Major Parties: the players
- (b) Relative Strengths:
- (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time
- (2) "Responsible Party Govt" (Accountability & Mandate Model)
- (a) ideological decision sharply defined for voters
- (b) cabinet govt with relatively unchecked power

TABLE 7.1 THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVIDE IN THE SEVEN WEST EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEMS

Party	1987		1987		1992		1997	
	% Votes	# Seats	% Votes	# Seats	% Votes	# Seats	% Votes	# Seats
Conservative	32.3	208	30.7	208	34.3	208	30.7	208
Labour	27.0	171	30.7	208	34.3	208	30.7	208
Liberal	12.3	17	12.8	17	10.3	17	18.3	17
Scottish Nationalist	11.3	8	11.7	8	11.3	8	11.3	8
Scottish Labour	1.1	0	1.1	0	1.1	0	1.1	0
Welsh Labour	1.1	0	1.1	0	1.1	0	1.1	0
Welsh Liberal	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.1	0
Welsh Labour	1.1	0	1.1	0	1.1	0	1.1	0
Welsh Liberal	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.1	0
Welsh Labour	1.1	0	1.1	0	1.1	0	1.1	0
Welsh Liberal	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.1	0
All	100.0	400	100.0	400	100.0	400	100.0	400

Party System Description of Government in 1997

1997-2001 Conservative single-party government

1997-2001 Labour single-party government

The Social Democratic Party (SDP) was a minor party in the 1980s, but it merged with the Liberal Party in 1988 to form the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrats were a significant force in the 1997 and 2001 elections, but they were defeated by the Labour Party in both. The Liberal Democrats were a significant force in the 1997 and 2001 elections, but they were defeated by the Labour Party in both.

b. Sweden

(1) Description:

- (a) Major Parties: the players
- (b) Relative Strengths:
- (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time
- (2) Key differences from the UK

- (a) Soc Dems much more successful than Lab
- (b) Soc Dems not quite monop of left—small but persistent comm party
- (c) Moderates quite far from monopoly non-soc opposition
 - i) Liberals—center-type libs
 - ii) Center Party—agrarian
 - iii) Christian Democrats—newer
- (d) Rel. recent strength Ecology Party & New Dem (rt, protest)

TABLE 7.2: ELECTIONS IN GERMANY SINCE 1949

Party	1949		1953		1957		1961	
	% Votes	% Seats	% Votes	% Seats	% Votes	% Seats	% Votes	% Seats
Social Democratic	41.8	44.8	47.7	50.8	43.0	45.1	39.0	41.1
Free Party	2.8	3.1	4.0	4.3	3.5	3.7	1.0	1.1
Christian Democrats	33.3	35.0	34.1	36.1	37.1	39.1	45.0	47.1
Liberal Party	12.0	12.4	11.7	12.3	12.2	12.6	14.0	14.5
Center Party	11.1	11.6	8.5	9.1	7.1	7.7	3.1	3.3
Christian Communists	0.0	0.0	7.1	7.6	4.1	4.3	1.0	1.1
Miscellaneous	1.0	1.1	11.1	11.8	13.0	13.7	22.2	23.1
Other	—	—	9.7	10.3	1.4	1.5	—	—
Others	10.1	—	11.1	—	11.1	—	2.8	—
All	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Party Composition of Government in 1949

1949–1953: Social Democratic–Christian–Liberal Government

1953–1957: Coalition of Moderates, Liberals, Center, & Christian Democrats

1957–1961: Social Democratic–Liberal Party Government

c. Germany

(1) Description:

- (a) Major Parties: the players
- (b) Relative Strengths:
- (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time

(2) Key differences from the UK

- (a) relatively strong position of FDP; it more “conservative” than UK Liberals; sec. opp. to Cath. pol. rather than lib. opp. to sec. conserv.
- (b) CDU/CSU=Christian-Dem not secular conservative party
 - i) gen’ly more receptive to *social justice* concerns⇒somewhat more centrist on econ.
 - ii) gen’ly more emph. *moral issues* & more conserv soc pol, esp. if churches take stance
 - iii) CSU is the more Catholic & socially conservative of two
- (c) SPD was one of most radical in 19th C, one of most moderate now
 - i) excluded for its extremism pre-‘66 *Bad Godesberg* commit. to free-mrkt & NATO
 - ii) post-‘66 increasingly de-ideologized, ↑’ly pro-sys, & toward consensual politics
- (d) TRIANGULAR POLITICS: CDU/CSU–FDP–SPD, how do they ally on different sorts of issues?

(3) Changes in the 80s & 90s

- (a) Greens—near threshold since 80s; beginning to affect govt’l coalition patterns.

- (b) 1990 Unification: 12 mill. new, presumably volatile voters, originally mostly to CDU & FDP benefit, recently turned against them. Why?
- (c) Greens allying related soc moves, becoming more effectively org'd to compete
- (d) *Die Republikaner*—not yet parl. player, but disturbing coupled w/ rising soc strife
- (e) *Politikverdrossenheit*—disillusionment w/ politics

TABLE 7-3 ELECTIONS IN UNITED GERMANY SINCE 1990

Party	1990		1994		1998	
	% Votes	N Seats	% Votes	N Seats	% Votes	N Seats
Christian Democrats (CDU)	43.8	317	41.7	291	35.1	244
Social Democrats (SPD)	33.3	239	36.4	258	44.4	298
Free Democrats (FDP)	11.4	79	6.4	41	6.2	40
Greens	5.1	31	1.3	8	6.7	42
Democratic Socialists (DSS)	2.4	14	3.0	20	6.1	38
Republicans	1.1	—	1.2	—	1.4	—
German Laborers Union (GLU)	—	—	—	—	1.2	—
Others	2.1	—	1.0	—	3.4	—
Total	100.1	682	100.0	622	100.1	682
Party Composition of Government in the 1990s						
1990-98	Coalition of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats					
1998+	Coalition of Social Democrats and Greens					

*INCLUDES TWO GERMAN GROUPS: DAU (BASE: GERMAN) ALLIANCE (GERMAN) IN 1990

d. Netherlands

(1) Description:

- (a) Major Parties: the players: PvdA, CDA, VVD
- (b) Relative Strength: 1/3+1/3+1/5+ smaller, episodic players
- (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time

(2) Triangular + small party complications

Party	1998		2002		2006		2010	
	% Votes	N Seats	% Votes	N Seats	% Votes	N Seats	% Votes	N Seats
Christian Democrats (CDA)	17	11	11	8	11	8	11	8
Labour Party (PvdA)	33	21	21	14	21	14	21	14
Free Democrats (FDP)	11	7	11	7	11	7	11	7
Green Party (GroenLinks)	6.2	4	6.2	4	6.2	4	6.2	4
Liberal Party (VVD)	21	14	21	14	21	14	21	14
Left Party (D66)	1.1	—	1.1	—	1.1	—	1.1	—
Right Party (Lijst Delt	1.1	—	1.1	—	1.1	—	1.1	—
Others	2.1	—	2.1	—	2.1	—	2.1	—
Total	100.1	682	100.0	622	100.1	682	100.1	682

e. Italy (pre-1994)

(1) Description:

(a) Maj Prt: MSI-Lib-Rep-DC-PSDI-PSI-PCI+ #smaller

(b) Rel Str: DC 1/3, PCI 1/3

(c) Types govt & time pattern

(2) More fractionalized & polarized than most other sys (nearest was FR IVth)

(3) Apparent Changes

(a) Major Parties: AN-Lega-Forza-Centro-PSI-Greens-PDS-Rifond, + Rete

(b) Relative Strengths: roughly even left-right blocks

(c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time (so far steady alternation: RtBlck-LftBlck-RtBlck...)

f. France


(1) 4th: PCF (.25)–PSF (.2)–Rad (.1)–Cath MRP (.25)–Gauls (.2)–Pouj (.1) + small

(2) 5th Republic: PCF–PS–UDF–RPR, + smaller

(a) Two-bloc system: what facilitated the change?

(b) Shift in balance of strength within each bloc

(c) *Front National, Generation Ecologie, Les Verts*



g. Spain

(1) early volatility & flux, ill-defined loose alliances

(2) early dom by Suarez' UnionDemCtr => broad Ctr-Rt & Ctr-Lft coals

(3) collapses about '82, replaced by PSOE dom w/ right in frag'd disarray

(4) Emerging system: PCE+PSOE+smaller lefts vs. PP (sec cons) + PC (people's coal, loose lib-cath-cons coal) + bunch of regional parties

TABLE 7-3 ELECTIONS IN SPAIN SINCE 1980

Party	1980		1982		1983		1989		2000	
	% Votes	N Seats	% Votes	N Seats	% Votes	N Seats	% Votes	N Seats	% Votes	N Seats
LIBERAL DEMOCRAT	11.8	7	8.1	17	9.8	18	10.5	21	5.2	—
Socialist Party (PSOE)	44.6	144	55.6	176	38.7	129	47.9	141	43.1	145
Conservative R-Socialist (CDS)	5.2	13	7.8	14	4.1	—	—	—	—	—
Basque Party (BPP)	26.1	178	26.8	175	34.3	141	33.8	151	24.2	100
Communist Party of Spain (CPS)	3.0	15	5.0	18	5.7	17	4.1	11	4.2	15
Basque Nationalist Party (PNV)	11.1	31	1.2	5	11.2	5	11.8	35	11.3	7
Home Bloc Party (HB)	11.5	31	1.1	4	11.2	5	11.7	35	—	—
Others	3.3	5	10.5	16	3.0	8	3.5	11	10.0	12
All	100.0	304	100.0	300	100.0	200	100.0	200	100.0	200
PARTY GOVERNMENT OR GOVERNMENT-SHARE (1980-1992)										
1980-1982	PSOE single-party government									
1982-1983	PSOE single-party government									


3. Uniformity & Diversity

- Maj commonality*: tend to Lft-Rt competition, occas. excepts dom'd by cntr
- Important Differences*:
 - location of liberals:
 - Egalitarian (center-left): *e.g.*, UK Liberal Democrats
 - Libertarian (center-right): *e.g.*, German FDP or Italian PLI
 - whether maj lft or, more rarely, rt party can govern alone
 - strongly structured v. loose/fragmented govt'l alliances
 - Degree of party discipline
- Nature of Left-Right Competition:
 - Lft wrkng-class prtys: common hist origins both maj strands (*Soc, Comm*)
 - Right middle/upper-class parties: more variegated origins & politics
 - religious v. secular conservatives
 - rural/farming v. industrial/service
 - some rightist cultural linguistic, subcultural, regional
 - Complications arising: New Lft & New Rt & new issues
- Conflict within Left & Right
 - Soc/Comm & Right/Far-Right more usually bitter enemies than allies
 - Systems w/ much elect strength at extremes tend⇒ centrist multiparty coals
 - Growing Disillusionment w/ Politics⇒anti-party parties
 - sources of this trend?
 - effects of this trend?
- Other Dimensions of Party Politics
 - Other cleavage lines: religion, cultural/ethnic/linguistic, mat/post-mat
 - Within broad rubric of Left-Right Competition: soc & econ dim's

B. *Size & Growth Welfare State by prty sys/govt pattern*

CTRY	TYPICAL GOVERNING PATTERNS:
US	Alternation Rep-Dem in Presidency Dem Domination in Legis., until recently
JA	Lib Dem (LDP) Dominant until recently
GE	Alt. CDU/CSU+FDP v. SDP+FDP , C+F dom '82-98; CDU+FDP v. SDP+Gr
FR	Alternation PS & PCF -- RPR & UDF
IT	DC-led in coal w/ PSI-PRI-PSDI-PLI or subset thereof until recently Last 3 alternations: Lega-Allianza-Forza -- PDS + various left
UK	Alternation Cons -- Lab , former dominated 1979-97
CA	Alternation Cons -- Lib , recent upheaval leaves questions
AU	Pattern of SPO (Soc) & OVP (ChrDem) coal broken in 1966 by Alternation SPO -- OVP, then SPO dom 70-86, 82-86 w/ FPO (Lib) Returns to SPO--OVP coal in 1986
BE	Partial Alternation Coalitions: CVP (ChrDem), BSP (Soc), PLP (Lib) Three smaller ethnic parties players since 1974
DE	Alternation SocDem -- some subset of Cons/Agr/3 Lib Parties/CD
FI	Fluid Partial Alternation Ranging from SocDem or even Comms to Cons
GR	Alternation PASOK -- New Dem (each has occasional coal allies)
IR	Alternation Fianna Fail -- Fine Gael & Labour until 1989 now FF or FG with Lab or Lib
NE	Fluid Partial Alternation across the board until '78, since then appears Alternation b/w CDA (ChrDem)+VVD (LIB) & CDA+PvdA (SocDem)
NO	Alternation DNA (Soc) -- Cons+Lib+Agr+ChrDem, more DNA than other
PO	Since 1980, appears alternation Lib-Soc coal. & Lib-CD coal.
SP	PSOE domination 1983 to recently, 1977-83 fluid
SW	SAP (soc) dom until 1976, alternation SAP -- Lib+Agr+Cons since
SZ	Practically fixed coalition Soc-Lib-Cons-Agr
AL	Lib-Nat coal dominates through 1972, alternates with ALP (lab) since
NZ	Alternation Lib (lab) -- Nat (cons); until recently?


CTRY	Trans/GDP	Govt/Partisan	Priv/Gov	Gov/Star	Gov/Type	Flight	Altan	Non-Dem	Rt Dom	Left-Dem
US	7.950	6.179	1.524	1.298	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
JA	7.186	8.799	1.069	0.017	2.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000
GE	14.199	5.836	2.284	0.493	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
FR	16.667	5.562	3.701	0.898	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
IT	14.462	5.039	3.039	0.538	4.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
UK	9.397	6.311	1.000	0.000	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
CA	8.967	5.271	1.000	0.000	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
AU	16.396	4.806	1.583	0.772	4.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
BE	18.493	5.742	2.165	1.104	4.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
DE	11.872	5.443	2.061	0.428	5.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
FI	10.204	6.049	3.721	1.217	4.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
GR	8.896	7.301	1.185	0.203	1.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000
IR	9.914	6.987	1.478	0.503	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
NE	17.308	5.547	3.429	0.942	4.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
NO	11.539	5.914	1.642	0.245	5.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
PO	5.519	8.201	1.358	0.195	1.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000
SP	12.532	7.627	1.090	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000
SW	13.071	3.831	1.367	0.291	6.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
SZ	10.009	6.250	3.854	1.055	4.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
AL	7.590	5.947	1.722	0.178	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
NZ		5.589	1.000	0.000	3.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Regression Equation										
Transfers =			15.620	1.086 Part	937 #2.00	R2 = 0.342				
S.E.				1.6161	1.6891	r = 0.585				
t-Stat				1.753	1.607					



C. Party Families (GLM ch. 8)

1. Definition/Grouping Characteristics

- Origins
- Links they form among selves, w/in & across countries
- Similarity of (broad) policy stances



2. Families of the Left


- Social Democrats (↓ support or unchanged)
- Comms (↓↓ in most, recent IT except but not so comm any more)
- New Left (↑ in most places, soc dems usu moving to absorb...)
- Greens (↑ or unchanged support in most places)

3. Families of the Center & Right
 - a. Christian Dems (↓ or unchanged in most places, until recently)
 - b. Secular Conservatives (↑ or unchanged in most places, until recent)
 - c. Libs (most ↑, but some CDs/SecCons moving to absorb) (*Explain?*)
 - d. Agrarian/Rural (↓ or unchanged support)
 - e. Far Right (↑ support in some places)

MEAN LEFT/RIGHT SUPPORT FOR W/PRIN/SEC/CDR PARTIES 1960-2000					1960s					1980s				
	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	1960	1970	1980	1990
Christian Dems	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3
Secular Conservatives	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3
Libs	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3
Agrarian/Rural	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3
Far Right	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3

MEAN LEFT/RIGHT SUPPORT FOR W/PRIN/SEC/CDR PARTIES 1960-2000					1960s					1980s				
	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	1960	1970	1980	1990
Christian Dems	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3
Secular Conservatives	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3
Libs	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3
Agrarian/Rural	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3
Far Right	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3

4. Other
 - a. regionalist, nationalist (unchanged or ↑ support)
 - b. miscellaneous, protest (↑ support in most places)



5. Patterns of Partisan Competition among Families

- a. Christian-Democrat-led Right
 - (1) left strong, united (AU, GE)
 - (2) left strong, divided (IT)
 - (3) left weak, united or divided (BE, LU, NE, SZ)
- b. Secular-Conservative-led Right
 - (1) left strong, united (UK)
 - (2) left strong, divided (Fin, Ice, Fra)
- c. Fragmented Right, Left strong, united (Den, Nor, Swe)

L. Parties & Party Systems II: Analyses

A. GLM, "Inside Political Parties," (Mair) ch. 10

1. The Standard "Basic Party Organization"
 - a. **Prty Mems** belong in local, geog'y based units: *branches*
 - b. Branches usu some role in select cand's & send *delegates* to prty's *ann conference*, in principle: final decision-mkng body
 - c. Ann conf usu elect most or all mems of party's *ntnl exec* which runs party b/w conf's & adjudicates internal disputes
 - d. Exec usu selects, & party employs, *permanent prty bureauc.*
 - e. The **parliamentary group** = party's MPs
 - f. [To which, add: *prty's actual & potential elect supporters*]
2. Partial Exceptions to the Standard BPO
 - a. Some parties highly **factionalized**:
 - (1) divided into tendencies or grps w/ often highly personalized leadership
 - (2) US, FR, IT, & JA parties are or have been highly fractionalized
 - (3) Often these factions have own organizational structure &, in the extreme, operate nearly as parties themselves
 - b. Esp. in fed sys (SZ, US, CA, GE, AL) provincial (state) branches often considerable decision-making

- autonomy
- c. Comm prtys are/were usu org'd by **democratic centralism**
 - (1) More centralized than democratic
 - (2) Same written struct, but party exec final decision-maker
 - (3) Some argue this partly responsible for ↓ in mem & elect support for most
3. The usual battle lines:
- a. **Party activists** who emph adherence to ideals that 1st prompted joining
 - b. **Party legislators** who, as MPs, often must compromise ideologically to win elect, to enter govt, & to pass legislation
 - c. **Party's actual & potential elect supporters**, & perhaps mems if mass-mem prty so many mems not activist, judge battle.
4. **Membership**
- a. **Most voters for prty, even those reg'ly vote 1 prty not mems**
 - b. **Complications** in calc mem & compare cross ctrys & prtys
 - (1) Some parties do not know themselves how many mems
 - (2) Even if know, some reluctant to reveal true membership
 - (a) Parties have obvious reasons to inflate their count
 - (b) Branches similar reasons to inflate report to party conf/exec
 - (3) Some parties have affiliated org's whose members are automatically party mems (e.g., UK Lab & trade unions)
 - (4) Rules in some pol sys encourage party mem (e.g., US primaries)
 - c. **Comparison** of mem levels & trends (Table 10-1)

TABLE 10-1 PARTY MEMBERSHIP AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE ELECTORATE

	Percentage of electorate that belongs to a political party	Trends in membership in recent decades
Austria	19	Decline from 28% in 1980
Belgium	7	Slight decline in past twenty years
Denmark	5	Decline from over 20% in the 1960s
Finland	11	Decline from 15% in 1980
France	2	Little change
Germany	3	Little change since 1960s
Greece	7	Figure has doubled since late 1970s
Iceland	17	No information
Ireland	4	Slight decline in past twenty years
Italy	4	Decline from 10% in 1980
Luxembourg	10	No information
Malta	30	Dramatic increase in early 1980s, stability since then
Netherlands	2	Now around half of the 1980 figure
Norway	7	Now around half of the 1980 figure
Portugal	5	Modest increase since 1980
Spain	3	Modest increase since 1980
Sweden	7	Slight decline in past twenty years
Switzerland	5	No information
United Kingdom	2	Now about a third of 1950s figures
Average	8	—

Source: For fifteen of the nineteen countries, data relate to 1985–88 and are from Mal and van Biezen, p. 12. For Iceland, the figure relates to 1987 (Hartmann, p. 1145). For Luxembourg, the figure relates to the late 1980s (Jaspers, pp. 235–17). For Malta, data are from party web sites (www.mip.org.mt/structure.htm) and alternative sources (http://www.walden.net/alternative/comp.htm), and information supplied by the PN. For Sweden, the figure relates to 1987 (Walden, 1989, p. 116).

- d. **Socio-demographics of party members**
 - (1) **Working class**

- (a) Less rep among prty mems than voters (esp. if exclude union auto mem)
 - (b) This increasingly true as ascend party hierarchy.
 - (c) becoming increasingly true over time also (becoming still less well-rep'd)
 - (d) true even lft prtys (where white-collar pub-sect wrkrs ↑'ly import many places)
- (2) **Women & minorities** under-rep'd also, but trends in opp (↑) direct.
- e. What members do:
 - (1) Elect del's to conf & so indirectly choose party leadership
 - (2) Mobilize electorate [define?], esp. at election times
 - (3) Once, being prty mem≈belong to sep subcult, w/ own news, clubs, soc events, & services for mems only. Faded & Fading [**Why? Implic's?**]
- 5. Important Decisions within the Party
 - a. Types of party: Cadre v. Mass Parties (Duverger)
 - b. Resolution of disputes & conflict w/in party: over policy & over spoils (e.g., *lotizzazione*). Specifically differ over:
 - (1) **Party Manifesto [define] & Party Program [define]**
 - (2) **Select party leadership**: often, but not always, synonymous w/...
 - (3) **Select cand & cand order [most important thing prtys do]**
- 6. **Candidate Selection**
 - a. Except FI, GE, & NO, where ntl law, how cand selected decided by prtys
 - b. In Eur, prty mems choose cand, not ordinary prty voters (e.g., US primary)
 - c. Two basic methods of candidate selection
 - (1) Convention system [**define**] (p. 255, first paragraph):
 - (a) Party mems @ *constituency* send delegates to local nom. convent. to pick cand
 - (b) From as few as 1-2% prty mems to (rare) >33% participate in this
 - (2) National-executive system [**define**] (p. 255, 2nd para):
 - (a) In most places, ntl exec right to veto local cand-select, but used rarely
 - (b) In FR, IT, MA, PO, exec chooses cand directly, some w/ local rt to challenge
 - (3) GR: prty leader (esp. PASOK's Papandreou) chooses cand person'ly; SP & perhaps PO, strong but lesser roles for very cntrl leadership also
 - d. **Consequences of the selection processes**
 - (1) Incumbents extremely high probability re-selected in all sys [**why?**]
 - (2) Cand in all sys always, except UK sometimes, have some local ties
 - (3) In MMD sys, cand list almost always *balanced* [**Define. Why?**]
 - (4) **Prty activist & esp. leadership control selection** ⇒ ↑ **prty disc.**
 - e. ⇒trade-off: strong prtys (disciplined, responsible) v. democracy w/in prtys
- 7. **Parties & Money: unlike US, most dems almost all cand's money from party** [⇒ discipline]
 - a. **Sources of party income**
 - (1) Internal Sources
 - (a) Membership fees (about 1/4 of total)
 - (b) MP's salary (up to 10% is "requested" to be "re-donated")
 - (c) Fund-raising events
 - (d) Party shops, banks, & newspapers (but many lose \$ now)
 - (2) External Sources
 - (a) Interest-group backing (in many cases there are no, or only ineffective, laws to limit or requiring party disclosure funding sources)
 - (b) Individual backing (ditto re: requiring party disclosure funding sources)
 - (c) Pub assistance (\$ & in-kind (media time), \$ usu. in rough prop to elect strength)
 - b. **Arguments for or against state-funding**
 - (1) For (evidence scarce, but what's avail gen'ly supports)
 - (a) Reduces reliance on interest-group funding

- (b) Evens playing field: not all supporters equally able to finance parties
 - (c) Parties essential to dem=perform pub serv & so should be pub funded
- (2) Against (evidence scarce, but also supports)
 - (a) Pub fund supports *status quo* as funds existing prtys only [& usu. % to prev size]
 - (b) Pub fund ↓ prty incentive to raise own money & so to recruit new activist mems
 - (c) Campaigns becoming ↑ ly costly, so public funding will too
- 8. Trends & future (in terms of party-org. form):
 - a. Duverger: trend toward *Mass Parties* & “contagion from left” in org. struct.
 - b. Epstein: ↑ mass media & campaign cost make *Mass Parties* less ideal than parties seeking few big donors (corps, unions, etc.): “contagion from right”
 - c. Kirchheimer: w/ ↑ middle class & success welfare state, & , Epstein added, w/ ↑ individualism, type of party best suited to competition ↑ ly “*catch-all*”
 - d. Sjöblom & Rantala further: ↑ ly, party mems=liability, not asset, & so parties ↑ ly rely on *strategists* & TV, not mems
- 9. Final thoughts:
 - a. One might join party for 3 reasons (Clark & Wilson)
 - (1) Material: some tangible reward (patronage, position)
 - (2) Solidarity: social contact & sense comradeship (party as like-minded club)
 - (3) Purposive: desire to advance certain policy goals
 - b. What think re: party mems lrgly depends on what think trends in saliency of these goals & impacts of having mem’s predominantly w/ such ambitions

B. “Party Sys & Elect Outcomes” Powell II, ch. 5

- 1. *Strong (weak)* prty sys contrib to good (poor) democratic perform
 - a. Disagreement on how to recognize such *strength*
 - (1) Partly reflects differing emph on participation, stability, & order in defining “good” democratic performance
 - (2) Partly reflects differing theories about what ⇒ such perform
 - b. “One line of thought emphasizes value of a de-fractionalized, two-party, ‘centrist’ party system that will aggregate citizens’ resources behind govtal majorities responsive to citizen pressures.
 - c. Another...emphasizes expressive, mobilizing system of parties that will pull all major factions in society into its representative, democ decision-making institutions, co-opting dissent & accommodating demands that might otherwise turn to violence” (p. 74)
- 2. Three broad types of systems advocated
 - a. “Aggregative” party systems
 - (1) Characteristics
 - (a) 2 or small # parties, each capable of achieving leg maj
 - (b) Centrist tendencies, not too stark alternatives
 - (c) Parties’ support cuts across social groups
 - (2) [Examples; Effects; Pros & Cons]
 - b. “Representative” party systems
 - (1) Characteristics
 - (a) More parties representing a broader range of groups
 - (b) Clearer rep by these parties of those specific grps
 - (c) Accommodating leadership, willing to compromise & coal.
 - (d) Majorities avoided
 - (e) Participatory
 - (2) [Examples; Effects; Pros & Cons]
 - c. “Responsible” party systems
 - (1) Characteristics
 - (a) Two parties, alternation in (majority) govts

- (b) Parties w/ closer ties to (large) social grps than “agg” sys
- (c) Centralized, disciplined parties representing clearly distinct, ideolog. sharp alts
- (2) [Examples; Effects; Pros & Cons]
- d. Notes:
 - (1) Almost no one advocates fract sys w/ weak tie to soc grps
 - (2) All agree that ° fractionalization & type of alignments with groups the keys; disagree & what’s desirable therein
 - (3) All agree that extreme, anti-sys parties detrimental; disagree on what to do about them or about forces that might support them: Exclude or Coopt
 - (4) Most agree that elect volatility a sign of a weak system
 - (a) Symptom of citizen dissatisfaction
 - (b) Make stable govt & policy difficult
- 3. Summary of hypotheses (Tab 5.1)
- 4. Summary of Empirical Findings (Tab 5.6-7)

film. ² This is indicated in *Leopoldstadt* and *Outsourced* (see *Outsourced* and *Leopoldstadt* below).

[illegible][illegible]

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Approved: 501 INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE

4. Extreme outlier: 50,000 and 1,000,000 (mean = 1,000,000 for the entire population)

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C. Lijphart, Chapter 5, Party Systems

1. Two-Party v. Multiparty Systems key distinction

2. 2-Party supposedly 2 direct & 1 indirect advantage
 - a. Direct:
 - (1) Voters clear choice b/w two alternative govts & sets policies
 - (2) Moderating influence as parties agglomerate & compete for median
 - (3) BUT, these somewhat contradict! (N.b., a≈UK; b≈US)
 - b. Indirect: Nec for stable, single-party maj govts & effect pol-mkng
3. Prior Classification Schemes: How to Count Which Parties?
 - a. Sartori: size & political relevance parties
 - (1) ⇒ seat winners only
 - (2) ⇒ those w/ “coalition potential” or “blackmail potential” (i.e., players)
 - b. Blondel: size & configuration of set of sizes ⇒ 4 possibilities
 - (1) Two-party (Examples)
 - (2) 2.5 party (Examples)
 - (3) Multiparty w/ dominant (Examples)
 - (4) Multiparty w/o dominant (Examples)
4. Summary Measure: **Effective Number Parties** $N=1/\sum s_i^2$
5. Complications: Closely Allied Parties & Factionalized Parties
 - a. Usual Rule: if calls self party, is party
 - b. *Closely Allied Parties*: “so tightly twinned that look more 1 than 2” **E.g.? Criteria? [below]**
Lijphart’s Compromise?
 - (1) Compete for votes?
 - (2) Cooperate in legislature? To degree that form 1 caucus?
 - (3) Always Coalition *in* or *out* together?
 - (4) Time: Durable such alliance? [L splits the diff for 5 pairs prtys]
 - c. *Factionalized Parties*: **E.g.? Criteria? L’s Comp? [Better ideas? FP=2P]**
 - (1) Such extreme lack cohesion that very unclear *unitary actor* at all appropriate
 - (2) Evidence that some effects like multiple parties, but counting each faction or even each org’d faction ⇒ unrealistically extreme counts.

6. Data: Table 5.2

	Seats	Votes	Effective Number of Parties
Belgium	21	21.4	1.7
Denmark	13	13.0	1.0
France	35	35.0	1.0
Germany	51	51.0	1.0
Greece	34	34.0	1.0
Italy	54	54.0	1.0
Japan	29	29.0	1.0
Netherlands	15	15.0	1.0
Portugal	10	10.0	1.0
Spain	54	54.0	1.0
Sweden	19	19.0	1.0
Switzerland	19	19.0	1.0
United Kingdom	53	53.0	1.0
United States	53	53.0	1.0
West Germany	51	51.0	1.0
Yugoslavia	10	10.0	1.0

	Seats	Votes	Effective Number of Parties
Belgium	21	21.4	1.7
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Greece	34	34.0	1.0
Italy	54	54.0	1.0
Japan	29	29.0	1.0
Netherlands	15	15.0	1.0
Portugal	10	10.0	1.0
Spain	54	54.0	1.0
Sweden	19	19.0	1.0
Switzerland	19	19.0	1.0
United Kingdom	53	53.0	1.0
United States	53	53.0	1.0
West Germany	51	51.0	1.0
Yugoslavia	10	10.0	1.0

7. Issue Dimensions of Party Systems

- a. How to Measure
 - (1) Gauge contents of party programs, supporters preferences, & policies in govt, but each w/ care

- b/c problematic. **Discuss.**
- (2) Differences b/w parties, not w/in, b/c looking @ issue dim's of party sys
 - (a) Between relevant parties (as above) only.
 - (b) Durable (as above)
 - b. Seven Identifiable Dimensions Across 36 Democracies
 - (1) Socioeconomic: most important, present in all (*characterize Lft/Rt*).
 - (a) *Evidence*: Size govt, inequality, unemp, infl, & educ, health, soc welf spend
 - (b) May have declined some since 70s, but still universal & strong
 - (2) Religion: present in $>1/2$, often high salience, but $\downarrow\downarrow$ most places
 - (3) Cultural-Ethnic: present & high in most *plural societies*, some *semi-plural*
 - (4) Urban-Rural: in few, mostly faded from prty sys (partys rename as move)
 - (5) (Democratic) Regime Support:
 - (a) places where sizable comm existed, but mostly faded
 - (b) not usu present in developed dems
 - (6) Foreign Policy: present in a few obvious places among dev'd democracies
 - (7) Materialist/Post-materialist: participatory democracy & environment; only in more dev'd countries & only recently
8. "Data":Table 5.3




Fig. 5.1 The relationship between the effective number of parliamentary parties and the number of issue dimensions in thirty-six democracies 1945-1980

D. "Party Systems & Structures of Competition," Mair, ch3 LNN

1. Summary: "...whole notion prty sys centers on assumpt that stable struct partisan competition exists [in elects & for control of govt]. Structs of comp as *closed* (& predictable) or *open* (& unpredictable):
 - a. patterns alternation in govt,
 - b. degree of innovation or persistence in processes govt form, &
 - c. range of parties gaining access to govt" (p. 84).
2. Brief Intellect History Party-Sys Classification Schemes
 - a. Duverger (1954): # parties, esp. 2-prty v. multi-prty sys
 - (1) 2-party systems argued to foster/enhance:
 - (a) single-party govt
 - (b) accountability

- (c) alternation in govt
 - (d) moderate, centripetal competition
- (2) Multiparty systems argued to...
 - (a) ...foster coalition govts
 - (b) ...prevent voters from direct voice in govt formation
 - (c) ...not ensure alternation in govt
 - (d) ...can foster extremist, ideological confrontations narrowly based pol prtys
- (3) Excepts fairly common, but, broadly speaking, all roughly empirically true
- b. Dahl (1966): competitive strategies parties adopt at elect & legis levels
 - (1) Strictly competitive systems
 - (2) Cooperative-competitive systems
 - (3) Coalescent-competitive systems
 - (4) Strictly coalescent systems
- c. Blondel (1968): # parties & relative size (later, ideological placement too)
 - (1) 2-party systems
 - (2) 2.5-party systems
 - (3) Multiparty systems with a dominant party
 - (4) Multiparty systems without a dominant party
- d. Rokkan (1968): more disagg. of multiparty-sys category
 - (1) 2 + a small third-party systems (UK, Germany)
 - (2) 1 large party v. coalition (Swe, Nor, maybe Ire)
 - (3) 3 or more relatively even competitors (Netherlands)
- e. Sartori ('76): fractionalization & polarization, *anti-sys* parties
 - (1) Types:
 - (a) 2-prty, ideologically polarized (S considered none such)
 - (b) 2-party, moderate ideological distance (US, UK)
 - (c) Moderate Pluralism: multiparty, mod ideol distance (Den)
 - (d) Polarized Pluralism: multiparty, ideol polarized (Italy)
 - (e) Dominant-Party systems: Japan (until recently?; Ind, Mex)
 - (2) Virtues of Sartori's scheme
 - (a) most comprehensive scope & depth of available typologies
 - (b) proven utility in variety comparative studies, theoretical & empirical
 - (c) explicit concern compet. patterns & prtys' interax, ∴ more directly w/ prty sys
 - (d) highlights effects systemic charact's on prty strategy, elect behave, & outcomes
 - (3) Δ since Sartori's writings that maybe problematic for theoretical approach
 - (a) some see trend toward & thus crowding of *moderate pluralism* category
 - (b) some see ↓ *polarized pluralism*, since, by Sartori's def, that requires *anti-sys* parties on *both* sides (rt & lft) & most such disappearing, esp. left
- 3. Mair's Three Distinguishing Characteristics of ***Different Types of Party Competition for Govt***
 - a. **Degree of Alternation in Govt**
 - (1) Wholesale alternation
 - (a) single-party v. single-party
 - (b) single-party v. coalition
 - (c) coalition v. coalition
 - (2) Partial Alternation
 - (3) Non-alternation
 - (4) [Consider Powell's 3 aspects of dem perf (earlier book), & also account., mandate, & rep delegation (later one); how might variation in degree of alternation in govt affect those? ...affect policy and/or policy patterns?]
 - b. **Stability & Consistency of Govt Alternatives**

- (1) DEF: degree to which alternative govt formulas (i.e., combo of parties in govt) known or predictable before-hand (i.e., stable & consistent)
- (2) [Consider Powell's...; how might variation...?]
- c. **Range of Parties as Potential Govt Actors**
 - (1) Def: ° to which access to office widely/narrowly dispersed
 - (2) N.b., what matters: whether each party viewed by others as potential govt participant, not whether actually *legitimate* potential participant in abstract
 - (3) [Consider Powell's...; how might variation...?]
- 4. Combine to one dimension: **prty sys openness or closedness**
 - a. Definitions:
 - (1) **Closed: highly predictable, little or no change over time in range governing alternatives or pattern of alternation, & with new & /or "outsider" parties finding entry difficult**
 - (2) **Open: highly unpredictable, w/ varying alternation patterns, freq. & /or large shifts in composition alternatives, & relatively easy access to new parties & few or no real "outsiders"**
 - b. **Closedness or Openness depends on...**
 - (1) **Parties' ideologies & govt-formation strategies (e.g., DCI)**
 - (2) **Parties' electoral strategies of parties (e.g., Fianna Fail)**
 - (3) **[n.b., electoral & govt-formation strategies not so separable]**
 - (4) Closure ∴ depends heavily on norms of competition among parties & so requires time to establish => new dems open by definition, takes time to "close" them: a process of "structural consolidation" (e.g.: Gre, Por, Spa)
- 5. **Party Systems & Electoral Outcomes**
 - a. From this view, **party-sys Δ can occur w/o Δ in struct of electoral support for parties & v.v. Mair's 4 examples:**
 - (1) Denmark's "Earthquake" Election in 1973 (data below)
 - (a) pre-'73: 5 parties=93% vote; '73: 5 new parties, & old 5 ↓ to 65% vote, + new entrants include Comm's & rt-wng Progress Party so polar ↑ too
 - (b) some time before any govt able to amass majority parl support; typ. govt duration ↓ ; & elects called more freq'ly;
 - (c) but all this somewhat true before, & on Mair's 3 dims (° & stability alt & range parties allowed govt access), DEN was & remained quite open

DENMARK'S "EARTHQUAKE" ELECTION OF 1870

	1971 % Votes	N Seats	1973 % Votes	N Seats
Social Democrats	37.3	30	25.6	16
Conservatives	18.7	31	18.2	16
Liberals	15.18	30	12.3	28
Social Liberals	14.4	27	11.2	20
Socialist People's party	9.1	15	8.7	11
Christian People's party	2.0	-	4.0	7
Justice Party	1.7	-	2.9	5
Left Socialists	1.6	-	1.5	-
Communists	1.4	-	1.6	6
Progress party	-	-	15.0	28
Centre Democrats	-	-	7.8	14
Others	0.2	-	-	-
Total	100.0	175	100.0	175

Source: UNICEF, *State of the World's Children 2007*, based on data from 2005.
 Chapter 7, Table 1

- (2) Italy's Elect-Sys Δ & Party Electoral-Support Volatility in 1994
 - (a) total electoral volatility 37.2%, an Italian record & higher than almost any West European election 1885-1989
 - (b) many new parties & most old reconstituted (renamed): virtually no party 1994 parl same name or form as 1987
 - (c) polarization Δ radically also as both PCI becomes yet-more moderate left-wing PDS & far-right MSI becomes a (purportedly) reformed AN
 - (d) But, by Mair's def, party-sys Δ occurred only if pattern & type govt alternation Δ accordingly. This case, seems so:
 - (e) New sys major players seem coalescing into coalitional lft-rt camps as opposed to old DC-dom. centrist multiparty coals: [AN-Lega-Forza]-Centro-[PSI-Greens-PDS]-Rifondazione, + Rete

- (3) Canadian Electoral Watershed in 1993
 - (a) tot elect vol: 42%; Conserve's only 16% of vote (lowest since '49) & 2 seats (↓ from 169 before), Reform & Bloc Québécois, 2 new parties, gained many seats
 - (b) New govt, though, was Liberals, thus, pending next Δ of govt, alternation pattern so-far preserved: Progressive Conservatives ↔ Liberals
- (4) Ireland: govt-alternation pattern Δ in 1989 & 1993
 - (a) Pre-'89 alt. pattern: (Fianna Fáil) ↔ (Fine Gael + Labour): FF's refusal to enter coals=**an electoral strategy** aimed to keep self only prty able to offer 1-party govt & to keep Labour's govt options to 1: ally w/ FG
 - (b) in 1989, FF abandoned strategy, choosing to ally w/ new rightish lib prty, Prog Dems, rather than go into opposition as before when lost majority
 - (c) in 1993, they further erased any claim to credibility of old strategy by allying w/ Labour (formerly always opposing party) to form new coal govt
 - (d) Clearly, party sys Δ, but electoral volatility only 7.8% in 1989 election
- b. Mair concludes that elect sys can be frozen by 3 factors:
 - (1) Social structure (the Lipset & Rokkan model)
 - (2) Institutions: elect sys & org'l efforts of estab'd parties
 - (3) [*new*:] structure of party competition & govt formation
 - (a) closure of party systems helps "freeze" electoral alignments
 - (b) which ⇒ Δ prty sys, by Mair def., can destabilize electoral alignments
 - (c) Examples:
 - i) Italy: PCI becomes PDS, MSI becomes AN ⇒ new electoral alignments
 - ii) Ireland: FF chooses coal w/ PD '89 & then Lab in '93 ⇒ new elect aligns
- c. *Summary*: "structure of competition, compet for govt esp., may impose major constraint on voter choice & hence act to stabilize elect aligns. Thus, voters not simply expressing pref's for individual prty [or cand]; rather, albeit not always to same ° in diff prty sys, & this itself is important cross-national (& cross-institutional) to explain, but also expressing pref's for potential govts. & in much like how shift in range prtys on offer can undermine estab'd pref's, so too can shift in range governing options, & hence in struct compet, undermine estab'd pref's & promote instab" (pp. 103-4).
- d. Finally, Mair perceives some generally shared trends suggesting an increasing openness of party systems
 - (1) Many places ↑ range of acceptable governing parties in past 2 decades
 - (2) Many also ↑ set of coalitional permutations govern in recent times
 - (3) ↑ prty-sys openness ⇒ ↑ elect instab ⇒ ↑ uncertainty at multiple levels


Week 9: Voting, Participation, & Representation

Pt Ia: Voting: Partisanship & Partisan Representation

LI. Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, ch. 7-8 + ch. 13 in LNN

A. Broad Themes:

- 1. Parties' Positions (ch. 7):
 - a. Voter perceptions thereof core of vote choice
 - b. Party efforts to shape & maintain that image
 - c. Not of equal importance/balance across systems



THE SCOTOPOLITICAL STYLE FOR THE UNITED STATES

Source: American National Election Studies




FIGURE 7.2
PARTY POSITIONS ON TWO POLICY DIMENSIONS

SOURCE: Taver and Turr 1992, p. 100.

2. Partisan & Structural Voting (ch. 8, ch. 13 in LNN)
 - a. 2 prominent Δ 's in link SES to partisan voting

- (1) Traditional cleavages (esp. class & religion) transformed & weakened as predictors inds' votes
 - (2) Changing bases ideological conflict: ↑ "post-war"
- b. These producing general ↑ "issue-based" voting
 - (1) Less based soc'ly pre-determ'd & struct'd compet.
 - (2) A new calculus of electoral decisions
 - (a) Individualistic
 - (b) Varying issue positions & weights thereupon
- B. The post-war era through late 1960s to 1970s
 - 1. Party competition & voting patterns structured around social divisions within a polity
 - a. Review Lipset & Rokkan's "Diachronic" Model & Social-Cleavage/Party-System "Freezing" Hypoth.
 - b. **Expected to persist because...**
 - (1) Such cleavage structures long-lasting: underlying conflicts persist & grps developed collective ID
 - (2) Universal suffrage largely completed: new parties tend to form (only) when new grps enter electorate
 - (3) Political rules made by & so favor estab'd parties
 - (4) Estab'd party strategies: often try to isolate supporters from outside appeals
 - (5) Alignment w/ underlying social-structural groups advantageous to parties & voters [How?]
 - (a) The grps so divided provided soc & pol reference & source of info for their members (voters)
 - (b) Provide org'l struct, people, & pol. ally for parties
 - c. Why were these divisions so potent?
 - (1) Represented & (re-)produced deep ideol. divisions
 - (a) Class: conflict re: nature pol & econ, re: org. soc.
 - (b) Religion: conflict basic value-systems (rt & wrong)
 - (2) Soc grps enabled parties to inst'lize support basis
 - (a) Labor unions & firms provided org'l & people supp.
 - (b) Ditto for churches
- C. General ↓ in sociologically determined vote
 - 1. Figs. pp. 172, 183-4 [n.b., usu. said post-'68 or so, but seems pretty uniform since WWII to me]

	<i>class</i>	<i>class</i>	<i>class</i>
<i>United States, 1992</i>			
Democrat	56	58	47
Republican	34	42	53
Total	100	100	100
<i>Great Britain, 1992</i>			
Labour	51	24	18
Liberal Democrats	14	21	20
Conservatives	35	55	62
Total	100	100	100
<i>Germany, 1994</i>			
PDS	3	5	4
Alliance 90/Greens	3	12	8
SPD	51	38	17
FDP	2	7	10
CDU/CSU	42	38	58
Total	101	100	101
<i>France, 1988</i>			
PC	12	7	10
Socialists	51	47	30
Other Left	3	2	0
Greens	10	6	4
UDF	13	15	20
RPR	12	19	30
National Front	4	3	7
Total	101	99	101
SOURCES: <i>United States, 1992</i> : American National Election Study; <i>Great Britain, 1992</i> : British			




FIGURE 8.1
THE OVERALL LEVEL
OF CLASS VOTING, 1990

SOURCE: 1990-91 World Values Survey.
NOTE: Values in parentheses are Kramm's V correlations. Respondents without a party preference are excluded from the calculation of correlations.




FIGURE 8.2
TRENDS IN CLASS VOTING

SOURCES: *United States, 1948-92*, American National Election Studies; *Great Britain, 1959*, Civic Culture Study; 1964-92, British Election Studies; *Germany, 1953-94*, German Election Studies; *France, 1959*, Marlier (1967, 2001, 1978, Converse and Duhan study; 1962, IFOP survey; 1967, Converse and Duhan study; 1968, Inglehart study; 1973-88, Eurobarometer studies.

NOTE: American data are based on congressional elections, except for 1948. German data for 1950 and 1954 are from unified Germany. The values plotted are the Alford Class Voting Index, that is, the percentage of the working class voting for leftist parties minus the percentage of the middle-class voting for leftist parties.

TABLE 8.2
RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION AND PARTY SUPPORT
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	No relig. elect.	Jewish	Catholic	Priest- Protes- tant	Other Christian	Reforma- tion Pro- testant
<i>United States, 1992</i>						
Democrat	66	72	62	62	60	45
Republican	34	28	38	38	40	55
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Great Britain, 1992</i>						
	No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Church of Scotland	Anglican	
Labour	39	52	34	39	28	
Liberal Democrats	20	15	20	12	18	
Conservatives	41	34	46	49	55	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
<i>Germany, 1994</i>						
	No religion	Protestant	Catholic			
PDs	14	1	1	1		
Alliance 90/Greens	10	8	9			
SPD	38	47	32			
CDU/CSU	5	4	8			
Total	38	41	51			
	100	100	100			
<i>France, 1988</i>						
	Non-Catholic	Catholic				
PC	18	5				
Socialists	55	41				
Other Left	3	2				
Greens	10	6				
UDF	5	17				
RPR	3	25				
National Front	4	4				
Total	100	100				

SOURCES: *United States, 1992*, American National Election Study; *Great Britain, 1992*, British Election Study; *Germany, September 1994*, Politbarometer Study; *France, Politbarometer 30*, Fall 1988.





FIGURE 8.3
THE OVERALL LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS VOTING, 1990

SOURCE: 1990-91 World Values Survey.
NOTE: Values in parentheses are Cramer's V correlations. Respondents without a party preference are excluded from the calculation of correlations.

TABLE 8-3
CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND PARTY SUPPORT
[IN PERCENTAGES]

	Never	Occasionally	Weekly
<i>United States, 1992</i>			
Democrat	66	60	55
Republican	34	40	46
Total	100	100	101
<i>Great Britain, 1992</i>			
Labour	39	25	33
Liberal Democrats	17	18	21
Conservatives	44	53	47
Total	100	100	101
<i>Germany, 1994</i>			
PD5	7	1	1
Alliance 90/Greens	11	6	2
SPD	43	44	19
FDP	6	6	4
CDU/CSU	34	42	74
Total	101	99	100
<i>France, 1988</i>			
PC	15	4	3
Socialists	52	43	25
Other Left	3	2	2
Greens	10	6	1
UDF	7	17	10
RPR	9	25	17
National Front	3	3	1
Total	101	100	99

SOURCES: *United States*, 1992 American National Election Study; *Great Britain*, 1992 British Election Study; *Germany*, September 1994 Eurobarometer study; *France*, Eurobarometer (Fall 1988).



SOURCES: *United States*, 1952-92, American National Election Studies; *Great Britain*, 1967-92, British Election Studies; *Germany*, 1973-92, German Election Studies; *France*, 1967, Conservative and Prices study; 1968, Ingham study; 1973-88, Eurobarometer studies.

NOTE: The values plotted are the differences between *Leaves* voting preferences of those who never attend church from those who attend weekly.




FIGURE 8.6
THE OVERALL LEVEL
OF VALUES VOTING, 1990

SOURCE: 1990-91 World Values Survey.
NOTE: Values in parentheses are Gamma's γ correlations. Respondents without a party preference are excluded from the calculation of correlations.

TABLE 8.4
VALUE PRIORITIES AND PARTY SUPPORT
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	Postmaterial	—	—	Material
<i>United States</i>				
Democrat	57	59	52	50
Republican	33	42	48	50
Total	100	101	100	100
<i>Great Britain</i>				
Labour	70	56	47	26
Liberal Democrats	9	8	3	5
Conservatives	22	37	50	70
Total	101	101	100	101
<i>Germany</i>				
Alliance 90/Greens	14	4	1	2
SPD	52	38	33	29
FDP	11	8	10	4
CDU/CSU	21	46	52	61
Other party	2	4	3	5
Total	100	100	99	101
<i>France</i>				
PC	16	6	5	3
Socialists	46	42	35	35
Other Left	3	1	0	2
Greens	21	17	12	3
UDF	15	20	30	29
RPR	6	8	16	19
National Front	3	6	3	10
Total	100	100	101	101

SOURCE: 1990-91 World Values Survey.

NOTE: Value priorities are measured with the twelve-item index (see chapter 7).




FIGURE 8-7
TRENDS IN NEW POLITICS VOTING

SOURCES: 1990-91 World Values Survey, 1973 European Communities study, and 1973 Political Action Survey.

NOTE: The values plotted are the Percentage Difference Index (PDI) correlating postmaterial values priorities with leftist party preference.

2. Class-Voting Decline: **Define; Explanations:**
 - a. Class ÷ better def'd by ° job auton & author
 - b. ↑ middle class “salariat” & affluent blue-collar
 - c. Edu. divide: skill v. unskill lab, hum-cap rich v. pr
 - d. Sectoral: pub-priv; traded-non; serv-ind-agr
 - e. Life-style differences: industrial v. yuppie
3. Religious Voting “Decline”: **Def 2 types; Expl's:**
 - a. Secularization: ↓ mem & attend; Ethical ind'uality
 - b. Church/state, sec/rel conflict largely resolved
4. Other Key Social Divisions
 - a. Region: Occasional, dramatic, but general ↓
 - b. Urban/Rural & Center/Periphery:
 - (1) Differences ↓ b/c transport & comm revolutions
 - (2) But still-present agr-ind-service divide & lifestyle
 - c. Race/Ethnicity
 - (1) Prominent exception to general ↓,
 - (2) But many societies still homog. or nearly so.

D. Gen'l explan's (hypoth's) for ↓ Struct. Vote

1. **Underlying conflicts increasingly resolved:** N.b., ° to which underlying conflicts “resolved” might explain relative decline of some types of struct voting & relative persistence or rise of others
2. **D's pref'd explanation: struct'l & inst'l Δs** ⇒ ↓ relev. rel'ly fixed soc char's contemp elect pol
 - a. Social cleavages still very relev. to those deeply enmeshed in them, but that's fewer & fewer.

- b. ↑ proportion of population characterized by:
 - (1) “*Fragmentation of life spaces*” [Huh? Define]
 - (2) ↓ partic, mem, involve “*stable & bounded soc struct’s*”
 - (3) Lifestyles becoming ↑’ly individualized & diverse
- c. **Social fluidity & individual mobility** across structured divides? N.b., can explain relative ↓ class & less ↓ in religion & no ↓ in race/ethnicity.
- d. **Parties contributed to & reinforced all this:**
 - (1) Seeking to accom struct & inst Δs w/in existing party struct, they eroded core estab’d images/rep
 - (2) But not yet want commit to strng stands on new

E. New Bases Pol. Cleavages: “**Post-Materialism**”

- 1. **Define/Examples:**
- 2. **How did/do they arise?**
 - a. ↑ new issues benefits from ↓ old: “*open space*” arg.
 - b. Vv., new issues cross-cut old ÷, weakening ability to divide: “*emergence of cross-cutting issues*” arg.
 - c. Cit’s ev’where ↑ly demand ↑ opp’s to part. more act’ly p-mkng: “*further democratization of soc. & pol.*”
 - d. N.b., new issues appeal to exact grps ↑’ly outside traditional struct’d & inst’lized cleavages: “*↑ young, new middle class, educated, non-religious*”
 - e. [Other hypoths? esp. re: environmentalism, non-material problems ↑? ↑ affluence? ↑ education? cross-derivatives, i.e., Maslow’s hierarchy?]
 - f. Not so “all new” divides, cleavage patterns:
 - (1) Not all issues so terribly new, even if current prominence might be unprecedented.
 - (2) Compared to struct’d ideologies underlying class & rel. cleaves, mat v. post-mat diffuse & imprecise: what besides novelty links these concerns?

F. **Impact of all this change:**

- 1. ↓ **long-term partisan predispositions** ⇒
 - a. ↑ episodic factors like current issues & image?
 - b. ↑ performance-based voting, like econ voting?
 - c. ↑ “*cand-centrd*” pol [DEF; n.b. US more, Why?]
 - d. ↑ in “issue-voting”?
- 2. Issue-voting:
 - a. **Define Issue-Voting:**
 - b. Harder to study systematically because:
 - (1) Issues vary across elections & across individuals
 - (2) Multiplicity of issues at all times
 - c. Issues underlying old cleavages still here; new issues added thereto
- 3. Takes time for, & it’s uncertain process by which, new basis for partisan competition can arise.
 - a. Grps must org to represent & mobilize interested.
 - b. Parties must establish positions, reputations, & images on those interests (in uncertain environ).
- 4. New Politics orthogonal to old politics divides: Left v. Rt, Relig v. Sec (or Cath. v. Prot. etc.)
 - a. New ÷ is, maybe, *sustainable society & libertarian values v. conservative social values & struct’d life choices*.
 - b. **[Is this another dimension? or more like new manifestation or replacement relig v. sec or combo rel-sec & econ?]**

LII. **Partisanship & Electoral Behavior [ch. 9]**

A. “**Funnel of Causality**” predicting vote choice

- 1. *Heuristic* model to org. vote-choice thry [Fig 9.1]
- 2. From struct factors most temporally & psych’ly removed from voting through explicitly pol factors & beliefs more proximate

3. **Model=predictive success:** mod. usage predicts voter choices better than inds selves can!




Figure 9.4 The Funnel of Causality Predicting Vote Choice

B. Party Identification (Party I.D.)

1. DEF:

- Long-term, affective, psych. i.d. w/ pref'd pol prty
- Cumulative tally [*Bayesian updating & updated priors*]

2. To be **analytically relevant**, must be distinct from immediate voting preferences elect by elect

3. Difficult comparative concept:

- partisanship* means diff things in diff contexts & distinction b/w party affinity & vote choice of variable clarity depending on elect sys, etc.
- Yet, voters do hold some enduring partisan allegiances that influence other percepts & opins

4. Effects:

- Psychological basis stable party alignments
- Influences more-proximate attitudes & behaviors

C. Acquiring partisan identification ("Prty ID")

1. Acquired largely by an **early age**—primary school => **parents & family environ play cntrl role**

- Via explicit reinforce or subconscious internalize
- Corr. parent & child party ID very high (Tab 9.1)

Table 9.1 The Transmission of Parental Partisanship (in percentages)

United States				
Child's party preference	PARENTAL PARTY PREFERENCE			
	Democrat	Republican	Independent	
Democrat	70	25	40	
Republican	10	54	20	
Independent	20	21	40	
Total	100	100	100	
N	128	72	10	
Great Britain				
Child's party preference	PARENTAL PARTY PREFERENCE			
	Labour	Liberal	Conservative	None
Labour	51	17	8	29
Liberal	8	39	11	6
Conservative	1	11	50	5
None	40	33	33	59
Total	100	100	100	100
N	33	18	54	17
West Germany				
Child's party preference	PARENTAL PARTY PREFERENCE			
	SPD	FDP	CDU/CSU	None
SPD	53	8	14	19
FDP	6	59	1	3
CDU/CSU	9	=	32	12
None	34	33	53	66
Total	100	100	100	100
N	68	17	78	67

Source: Political Action Survey.

2. **Accum'd exper. party supp.** itself reinf. prty ID
 - a. Prty ID ↑ w/ age, & esp. w/ contin. elect supp prty
 - b. ⇒ **unstable prty sys tend to weaken party ID**
 - c. [Figure 9.2, note E. Germany, French 60+ group]




Figure 9.2 The Growth of Partisan Attachments by Age

Sources: United States: 1960s American National Election Study; Britain: 1995 British Election Study; Germany: 1998 German Election Study; France: 1996 French Election Study.

Note: Each nation uses a differently worded question on partisanship; as direct comparisons of the level of partisan attachments cross nationally are not appropriate.

- Summary: Partisanship formed early; Reinforced through life; evolves in response to exper., not quickly or easily; Prty ID more stable than opins on almost any set of issues except perhaps certain “moral” issues. [Bayesian update view.]

D. Tab 9.2: Partisanship more stable than vote pref's in Europe as in US, but less so, Why?

Table 9.2 The Relative Stability of Party Attachments and Vote (in percentages)

United States 1972-76		
Party Identification	VOTE	
	Stable	Variable
Stable	71	22
Variable	4	3
N = 500		
Great Britain 1970-74		
Party Identification	VOTE	
	Stable	Variable
Stable	72	10
Variable	5	10
N = 704		
West Germany 1976		
Party Identification	VOTE	
	Stable	Variable
Stable	71	17
Variable	0	3
N = 707		

Sources: Alderson (1980: 160); Berger (1984)

Note: The tables present percentages of the total (N=1000) those who were voters and identified with a political party at each time point. American and British results are based on changes between two elections; West German data are based on changes during a three-wave 1976 election panel.

1. **Type of voting:** candidate or party
2. **Freq. of voting:** more frequent voting facilitates distinguishing between partisan loyalty & vote

E. Impact of partisanship

1. ⇒ **cues** for eval events, policies, prop's, cand's
 - a. More broadly relevant than class or relig for this
 - b. Reliance on partisanship in this way could be thought of as "satisficing": a mental short-cut
 - c. Some interesting findings:
 - (1) Washington Post 'fictitious act' experiment
 - (2) Partisanship also colors econ. expects *[rational?]*
 - d. Strongest for cand image & govt perform, & like
2. **Party ID also mobilizes:** ↑s propensity to vote & to perform other political activities *[Why?]*
3. Converse's notion of Party ID Vote producing "**normal vote share**" for parties: vote-share when all other factors balance

4. Prty ID more easily countered in more prom. elects (e.g., pres elects v. off-year) [Why?]
5. Partisanship offers clear & low-cost info. voting cue: *n.b., can only serve so if prty label provides info. on likely policies—fail to maintain partisan rep eventually weaken prty ID among supporters*

F. **Partisan Dealignment** [Fig 9.3]

1. Partisan align, like (social) struct voting, ↓
 - a. esp. US & Ger (where was among largest) but all
 - b. Some contend many *non-partisans* = *closet-partisans*; consistently voting for one party, even so, # of partisans definitely declining




Figure 9.3 The Percentage of Partisan Identifiers

Sources: United States, 1952–2000, American National Election Studies; Great Britain, 1964–2001, British Election Studies; Germany, 1972–98, German Elections Studies (western Germany only, 1999–98); France, Laboratoire Surveys (1975, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1993, and 1996).

2. Consequences:
 - a. Decreased turnout might be linked to this
 - b. “Split-ticket” voting increasing (Fig 9.4)
 - c. More delay voting decisions (closer to elect day)
 - d. Number of “floating” voters increasing




Figure 9.4 The Growth of Split-Ticket Voting


Source: United States 1952-96: American National Election Studies (third-party votes and candidates were counted as split voting); Germany: Statistisches Bundesamt (various years) and Schoen (2000) for 1994 and 1998. German data for 1992-98 are from the German Bundestag.

3. Explanations:

- Crises & events: Vietnam, Watergate, scandals; but, if universal, such explan's weakened
- Many traditionally prty functions now by other orgs & grps, incl. even cand. select somewhat
- Mass media Δ s, personalizes campaigns
- Leading prtys' inability to address mod issues: *Keynesian Welfare State* crises, new issues, etc.
- Δ charact's contemp voter (D's pref'd explan)

G. **"Cognitive Mobilization" & Apartisans:** two types of independents & two types of partisans

- Define "cognitive mobilization"
- Four types cit's according to \circ cognitive mobilization & partisan identification [Figure 9.5]



- Apoliticals* (trend 0: '52=16%, '80=19%, '92=16%)
- Ritual Partisans* (↓↓↓: '52=42%, '80=28%, '92=20%)
- Cognitive Partisans* (↑↑: '52=32%, '80=35%, '92=41%)
- Apartisans* (↑↑: '52=10%, '80=18%, '92=24%)

3. Implications of rising Apartisans

- ↓ consistent voting patterns
- ↑ issue-voting
- ↑ demand for responsiveness to public opinion
- Press for expansion of citizen-input opportunities
- [Plus the above & below under “consequences”...]

4. Soc-Econ trends that ⇒ this voting-behavior trend: parties' actions can bolster or resist trend

- Young, educated, post-materialists
- Information revolution [...]

H. Consequences of these trends [discussion]

- Decreased turnout might be linked to this
- “Split-ticket” voting increasing
- More delayed voting decisions
- Number of “floating” voters increasing
- Electoral volatility
- Electoral unpredictability

7. Increased divided govt / fractionalization
8. Rise in independent candidates & “flash parties”
9. Factors further in funnel ↑ import rel to early [...]
10. Less consistent voting patterns
11. More issue-voting
12. ↑ demand for responsiveness to public opinion
13. ↑ demand for expansion cit-input opportunities
14. All these may produce increasing responsiveness of elected officials to public opinion [or not...]

LIII. Issue & Image Voting (Dalton, ch. 10)

A. **Struct & part vote** ↓ ⇒ ↑ **rel. issue & image vote**

B. Issue voting long seen **key to sophisticated, rational voting**. **Logical req's** for issue voting:

1. Citizens are interested in issue
2. Citizens hold an opinion on issue
3. Citizens know cand or parties' stands on issue
4. On most issues, most cit's do not meet req's ⇒ early conclusion: voters incapable issue voting

C. **Overlapping issue publics**

1. **DEFINE**

2. Most voters meet all 3 req's on 1 issue min.

D. Classification of issue types [discussion]

	Content of Issue		
Time Frame	Position Issues	Performance Issues	Cand/Prty Attributes
Retrospective	Policy appraisal	Performance eval	Attribute voting
Prospective	Policy mandate	Anticipatory judge	

E. Left/right attitudes as a “super-issue”




FIGURE 10.1
LEFT/RIGHT PLACEMENT OF THE PARTIES
AND VOTER SELF-PLACEMENT

SOURCES: 1992 American National Election Study; Eurobarometer 37A (June 1989).

NOTES: The values represented in the figure are mean scores. Note that a 7-point Liberal/Conservative scale was used in the American survey and a 10-point Left/Right scale was used in the Eurobarometer survey.

TABLE 16.2
LEFT/RIGHT ATTITUDES AND PARTY SUPPORT
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	Left	—	Center	—	Right
<i>United States</i>					
Democrat	76	76	59	41	47
Republican	24	24	41	59	53
Total	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Great Britain</i>					
Labour	94	88	49	16	22
Liberal Democrats	1	6	12	4	3
Conservatives	4	6	40	81	75
Total	99	100	101	101	100
<i>Germany</i>					
Greens	19	15	4	1	0
SPD	71	74	37	12	6
FDP	6	4	13	9	4
CDU/CSU	4	7	47	78	91
Total	100	100	101	100	101
<i>France</i>					
PCF	25	4	3	1	4
Socialists	53	79	27	6	0
Other Left	10	2	3	0	0
Greens	10	13	25	5	0
UDF	3	2	28	50	22
RPR	0	0	10	32	22
National Front	0	1	3	7	52
Total	101	101	99	101	100

SOURCE: 1990-91 World Values Survey.

NOTE: The German results are based on western Germany only.

F. **Image as issue:** pertains to voter eval of how cand's will behave in certain circumstances

1. Interesting that, actually, the more-educated are more likely to eval. on personal characteristics
2. More moderate but growing impact outside US
3. Coming @ end *causal funnel*, ⇒ analytical prob's
 - a. Somewhat predetermined by earlier factors
 - b. Hard disting. image eval. from vote choice itself

G. Opinions on ... issues ... influence vote choice

1. ... **Old Politics** (econ, moral, etc.) ... strongly ...
 - a. Econ issues still cntr pol debate; as grp, category on which lrgest share cit's meet issue-vote req's
 - b. Revival of ec-policy controversy (*Thatcher, Reagan, Kohl, Clinton, Blair, Schroeder*), but debate now less struct'd by S-E & partisan predispos.: now b/w opposing cognitive partisans & apartisans [?]
2. ... **New Politics** ... only modestly ...
 - a. B/c issues secondary? & could that explain party reluctance to take clear, strong stands on them?
 - b. Or causality other way? parties' vague stands ⇒ voters little reason to supp party on these bases?
3. ... **Foreign-policy** ... *typically* only weakly ...
 - a. **Exc. crises**, attracts primary attention of rel. few
 - b. Party diff's on foreign policy also tend lesser

TABLE 12.3
THE CORRELATION BETWEEN ISSUE OPINIONS
AND PARTY PREFERENCES

<i>Issue</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>Britain</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>France</i>
Left/Right attitudes	.73	.34	.35	.50
<i>Socioeconomic issues</i>				
Worker management	.11	.17	.15	.28
Income equality	.17	.20	.14	.18
Government ownership	.10	.21	.17	.10
Unemployment benefits	.15	.21	.19	.13
Governmental responsibility	.18	.24	.14	.16
<i>Environmental issues</i>				
Income vs. environment	.02	.11	.11	.19
Taxes vs. environment	.05	.06	.08	.21
Pollution vs. jobs	.04	.05	.13	.18
Environmental movement	.20	.06	.13	.18
<i>Gender issues</i>				
Male job preference	.01	.08	.15	.17
Abortion justified	.11	.12	.19	.13
Women's movement	.16	.10	.16	.17
<i>Foreign policy issues</i>				
Confidence in NATO	.01	.09	.17	.22
Confidence in EU	.13	.05	.08	.23
Disarmament movement	.16	.19	.18	.27
Human rights movement	.11	.06	.11	.23

SOURCE: 1990-91 World Values Survey.

NOTE: Table entries are Cramer's V coefficients.

H. Ec. vote: pers/soc, ret-/pro-spective [see Norpoth]

I. SUMMARY: Each issue usu small agg. impact b/c not all salient to all voters, but together issues key to agg. outcome & ind. or small # of issues usu. key to individual voters

J. Dalton refers to all of this trend toward personal, issue-centered politics as *citizen politics*:

1. ↓ lng-term determ vote: struct & partisan attach
2. ↑ shrt-term determ vote: issues & image
3. Among voting pop that ↑'ly *cognitively mobilized*
4. Δ nature of ec-voting illustrates:

"We can illustrate changing styles of citizen voting behavior by the changing impact of economics on the vote.

Traditionally, economic conflicts have been structured by social divisions: working class versus middle class, industrial versus agrarian interests. In this situation, one's social position was often a meaningful guide to voting decisions. As social divisions narrowed & group bases of political interests blurred, social class decreased as a source of voting cues. This does not mean that economic issues are unimportant. Quite the opposite. As recession weakened the economies of the industrial nations in the 1980s, economic issues again rose to the top of the political agenda for many citizens. Contemporary evidence of economic voting is widespread, but now issue positions are individually based rather than group derived. The political cues of a union leader or business association must compete with the voter's own opinions on economic policy & party programs. That a partial return to the old issues of economic growth & security has not revived traditional class divisions provides compelling evidence that a new style of citizen politics now affects voting patterns.” [pp. 235-6]

5. **Possible “pros” of citizen politics** [discuss]
 - a. Increasing policy implications of electoral results
 - b. May make candidates & parties more responsive
6. **Possible “cons” of citizen politics** [discuss]
 - a. Over-burdening, inconsist., non-agg’d demands
 - b. Cits w/o skills *sophist.* ind’ualistic vote = atomized grps w/o prty, soc cues⇒easy prey demagogue?
7. Possible roles of TV in campaigns illustrates

LIV. **Political Representation (ch. 11): how well do elected reps correspond to their *constit’s*?**

- A. **Collective correspondence:** dispersion b/w elite & public distributions of attitudes
- B. **Dyadic correspondence:** disp. b/w constit & rep
 1. E. Burke’s 2 Models **Constituency Representation**
 - a. **“Trustee” model**
 - b. **“Delegate” model** (Fig 11.1)




Figure 11.1 Constituency Influence in Congress

2. **Party-govt model:** dispersion b/w prty & supp
 - a. Nec. char's for *"responsible party govt"* (See Powell)
 - (1) competition between 2+ parties
 - (2) parties distinct, recognizable policy-differences
 - (3) voters recognize these diff's & care about them

- (4) parties act to important degree as units
- b. Constit-rep agree low-to-zero outside US. **Why?**
- c. Bidirectional causality: voters influence party positions, & parties attempt to sway their voters
- d. [Tables 11.1-2; Figures 11.2-11.7]

Table 11.2 The Distribution of Opinions for the European Public and Elites (in percentages)

	GREAT BRITAIN		WEST GERMANY		FRANCE	
	Public	Elites	Public	Elites	Public	Elites
Common self-placement	83	146	112	59	167	182
Domestic issues						
Public intervention in industry	30	35	34	27	111	40
Government manages economy	20	38	15	33	36	46
Control immigration	51	64	59	60	73	42
Control multinational	50	66	66	75	71	86
Reduce income inequality	65	64	76	83	95	52
Nuclear abolition	27	58	15	65	27	74
Foreign aid						
Aid PC regime	45	30	47	36	21	30
Aid Third World	23	35	41	33	32	32
Security						
Strengthen defense	18	25	30	22	34	32
Action against terrorists	5	29	12	36	38	10
New politics						
Nuclear energy	24	23	20	19	30	13
Protect environment	24	32	38	37	34	32
Free expression	72	70	86	79	76	88
Average liberal issue response	40	47	53	60	30	57

Source: 1979 International Survey, Eurobarometer 41. Public elites have been weighted to produce representative national samples.

Note: Table entries are the percentage of respondents expressing a liberal opinion on each issue.

Table 1

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


Figure 11.3 Voter and Party Elite Opinions on Further Nationalization of Industry

Source: 1970 European Parliament Study

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


Figure 11.4 Voter and Party Elite Opinions on Abortion

Source: 1974 European Parliament Study




Figure 11.5 Voter and Party Elite Opinions on Nuclear Energy

Source: 1979 Europarlamentary Study




Figure 11.6 Voter and Party Elite Opinions on Aid to Third World Nations

Source: 1979 Europarlamentary Study




Figure 11.7 Difference between Party Voters and Party Representatives in the United States

Source: 1987 Members of Congress Study and 1986 National Election Study

Note: Table shows the mean difference between voters and elites on each issue scale.

3. Gen'l patterns elite-citizen correspondence

- Elites tend to be more extreme than supporters
- Strong constit.-rep./party-voter agreement on economic & social policy, less on foreign policy
- Clarity of party issue positions tends to ↑ voter-party correspondence
- Fractionalized party systems tend to ↑ voter-party correspondence

C. Impact of *Citizen Politics* on political rep

- Issue-oriented, sophist. electorate may spur partys & cand's responsivity to voter interests
- Or, partisan dealignment & candidate-centered politics may weaken rep built on party govt

D. 2 distinct patterns democratic rep emerge

- (Presidential) Representative-Constituency model:*
 - Pro: Greater responsiveness to different interests of particular districts
 - Pro: Potentially more open to interests & rep of minority groups
 - Con: ↑ difficulty of monitoring & controlling govt (as opposed to ind reps) actions
 - Con: Encourages campaigns stress personalities & district service (pork) over policy & orientations

2. (Parliamentary) Party-Supporter model:
 - a. Pro: party votes as unified bloc so political responsibility for govt more clearly established
 - b. Con: may produce rigidity & resistance to change for this reason; parties may be very responsive to established clientele, but new social grps & minorities may have difficulty gaining such rep
- E. ***Empirical research (continues) to show policy does respond to voter pref's; broad conclusion overwhelming that democracy works reasonably well (representativeness & policy-responsiveness). So why all public outcry to contrary?***

Week 9: Voting, Participation, & Representation

Pt Ib Voting: Who, How Many, & How?

- LV. Electoral Participation (Franklin, ch. 8 of LN & N)
 - A. Three approaches to explaining voter participation
 1. *Individual-Resources Approach*: what ind's bring to political process—knowledge, wealth, time—determines voters
 2. *Political-Mobilization Approach*: heightened awareness of “duty” or “civicness” inculcated *via* media, parties, groups
 3. *Instrumental-Motivation Approach*: people respond to perceived costs & benefits voting; aim at political efficacy in terms of influencing policy (at least in concert w/ like-minded ind's)
 - B. F's broad arg: 3rd unduly neglected as explanation, esp., cross-national variation in VP, spec'ly he stresses small set of legal & political-system variables as explanators:
 1. “salience” of elections [DEFINE]
 2. compulsory voting
 3. proportionality of electoral system
 4. postal voting
 5. weekend/workday polling
 - C. F stresses, 1st, that cross-ctry variation VP much greater than b/w individuals w/ diff. characteristics [Tab 8.2]
 1. US has greatest differences b/w voting participation rates of types of ind's, but *individual-level* diff's explain much less of cross-ctry variation than *country-level* or *system-level* variables
 2. This suggests two things:
 - a. much of explanation for variation VP must come from differences in political system not from differences in demographics or average individual characteristics (e.g., education level)
 - b. follows, moreover, that if one aims to ↑ (or ↓) VP, changes in political institutions, environments, & rules are way, esp. since most individual-level characteristics less manipulable

TABLE 8.1 Average Turnout in Free Elections to the Lower House in 37 Countries, 1960-1995 (in percentages)

Australia ^a (14)	75	Costa Rica ^b (8)	81
Netherlands ^a (6)	74	Norway ^a (9)	81
Austria ^a (9)	72	Israel ^a (9)	80
Belgium ^a (13)	71	Portugal ^a (9)	79
Italy ^a (10)	70	Finland ^a (10)	78
Luxembourg ^a (7)	69	Canada ^a (11)	76
Iceland ^a (10)	69	France ^a (9)	76
New Zealand ^a (13)	68	United Kingdom ^a (10)	75
Denmark ^a (14)	67	Ireland ^a (11)	74
Venezuela ^a (7)	65	Spain ^a (6)	73
Bulgaria ^a (2)	61	Japan ^a (12)	71
Germany ^a (9)	65	Estonia ^a (2)	69
Sweden ^a (14)	66	Hungary ^a (2)	66
Greece ^a (10)	65	Russia ^a (2)	61
Lithuania ^a (1)	66	Lebanon ^a (6)	58
Larva ^a (1)	66	United States ^a (10)	54
Czech Republic ^a (2)	65	Switzerland ^a (8)	54
Brazil ^a (3)	62	Poland ^a (2)	51
Netherlands ^a (17)	63		

SOURCE: Mackay and Koss (1991), Koss (1995), and *Electoral Handbook* (1995).

NOTE: Turnouts in parentheses are the number of elections analyzed on an average. For the Lower States only, only congressional elections are included (no elections held in conjunction with presidential elections). U.S. midterm elections do not respond to the same tests as elections elsewhere, because executive power is held at Congress. For the Netherlands, the same data were used after the abolition of mandatory voting there.

a. Included in country-level analysis (20 countries).

b. Included in individual-level analysis. Romania (8), Czech Republic (1), and Poland (1) are included in the analysis (the number of elections analyzed is 10, 1, and 1, respectively, according to the criteria established in chapter 2).

TABLE 8.2 Turnout in Different Groups of Individuals in 22 Countries On Political Issues^a

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Turnout in Group With</i>		<i>Variance Explained by</i>	
	<i>Lowest</i>	<i>Highest</i>	<i>Individual Effects</i>	<i>Country Effects</i>
<i>Age</i>	58.8	80.9	12.3	11.1
<i>Strength of party identification</i>	70.1	88.3	11.1	18.4
<i>Political discussion</i>	60.1	81.1	2.1	11.9
<i>Education</i>	57.8	86.1	13.6	19.9
<i>Religious participation</i>	73.1	85.1	11.7	17.9
<i>Union membership</i>	70.8	81.6	13.3	11.1
<i>Income</i>	75.1	87.2	11.1	16.9
<i>N</i>	21,611	21,611	21,111	21,111

SOURCE: Based on data from the 1998 U.S. National Election Study, 1998 European Election Study, and 1998 Japanese Election Study.
NOTE: Number of countries—age 15 countries in party identification (1) political discussion (2) education (2) religious participation (3) union membership (1) income (2). The 22 countries are those listed in Table 8.1 and Table 8.2. ^a *N* = 21,611.

D. Comparing approaches w/ these considerations in mind:

1. Individual-resources approach
 - a. arg: people w/ time, \$, & intellectual where-w/-all to participate
 - b. evidence:
 - (1) w/in ctry, broadly true, though perhaps so strong as you'd think
 - (2) cross-ctry: not much variation on avg levels, so don't explain much
2. Political-mobilization approach:
 - a. arg: grps, orgs, & media can be very effective in exhorting, inculcating participatory ethic, etc.
 - b. evidence:
 - (1) no doubt that group efforts effective (esp. driving people to polls, register, etc.), media effect more debatable
 - (2) even less cross-ctry var mobilization efforts than in ind char's
3. Instrumental-motivation approach:
 - a. arg: people vote based on perceived C & B (largely perceived policy-influencing efficacy) of voting
 - (1) both other approaches indirectly address instrumental motivations
 - (a) education, experience, time, & money might well increase perception of efficacy & lower costs of voting
 - (b) mobilization largely an effort to increase those perceived benefits & reduce those perceived costs
 - (2) I-M approach subsumes these two & also allows election *contest* itself to be factor driving turnout
 - b. Specific hypotheses F derives from this approach

TABLE 8.3 Effects on Individual-Level Electoral Participation in 22 Countries

Variable	Individual Level Only		With National Effects Considered		With Missing Data Imputed	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	0.36	0.17	0.20	0.07	0.60	0.07
Age	0.04	0.00*	0.04	0.02*	0.02	0.02*
Strength of party identification	0.10	0.03	0.07	0.04*	0.32	0.04*
Political Ideology	0.07	0.03*	0.07	0.03*	0.03	0.03*
Education	0.05	0.02	0.25	0.05*	0.25	0.03*
Religious participation	0.08	0.03	0.24	0.05*	0.30	0.04*
Union member	-0.08	0.03*	-0.23	0.06*	0.24	0.06*
Gender	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02*	0.04	0.01*
Country effect			0.78	0.17*	0.80	0.17*
Missing religious participation					-0.41	0.01*
Adjusted R ²	0.55		0.66		0.55	
N	21,601		21,601		21,601	

SOURCE: See Table 8.1.

NOTE: Correlation = 0.80; $\alpha = 0.05$.

*p < 0.05.

- (1) ↑ policy relevance elect & voter's role in it ⇒ ↑ voter turnout [*salience*]
 - (a) is (executive) policymaking power clearly, unmitigatedly at stake? [federalism, division of power, etc. reduce turnout]
 - (b) is election expected to be close? (particularly in my district?)
 - (c) is outcome likely to affect public policy?
 - (d) are perceived differences between perceived alternatives large?
 - (2) electoral system that ↓ proportion of wasted votes ↑ turnout
 - (3) anything that ↑ vote difficulty (costly in time, \$, opp costs), ↓ VP
 - (a) compulsory voting
 - (b) registration laws
 - (c) weekend/workday polling
 - (d) advance and/or postal voting
 - (e) number of days polls are open
 - (4) *voter fatigue*: ↑ #distinct elects ⇒ ↓ VP [correlates highly w/ no on 1a]
- c. Evidence [review regression analysis]:
- (1) The individual-level results are given in Table 8.3
 - (2) Country-level results given in Table 8.4

LVI. Helmut Norpoth, “The Economy,” in LNN

- A. “Econ concern almost everywhere bonds electorates & govts as tightly as Siamese Twins joined at hip” (p. 300)
 - 1. Incumbents presiding over good economic times are more likely to win than those presiding over bad
 - 2. [Therefore] Govts try to bend economy to their will
 - 3. Economic adversity can kill an infant democracy & *vice versa* good times strengthens its foundation
- B. The Vote Function–Reward-and-Punishment Calculus
 - 1. Common or Conflicting Interests?
 - 2. Symmetric or Asymmetric Reward & Punishment?
 - 3. Personal or Sociotropic Concerns?
 - 4. Retro- or Prospective Evaluation?
- C. Vote fnctn, whatever form, varies across ctry-time. Why?
 - 1. Clarity of responsibility (Powell & Whitten)
 - 2. Alternatives for Discontent–2-prty sys clearest [US or UK?]
 - 3. [any other ideas?]
- D. N demonstrates simply that ec. voting exists [see fig.]
 - 1. No claim to explain it all [bit on *ceteris paribus*, stochastic v. systematic world, controlling for...]
 - 2. Still, what exactly does vote fnctn look like, when & where?

TABLE 8.4 Three Models Explaining Turnout in 29 Countries^a

	Mackinac-Ross		St. Ignace		Switzerland, 1991	
Variable	n	SE	n	SE	n	SE
Constant	11.94	10.78	20.40	13.53*	26.16	13.82*
Proportionality (79-91)	0.02	0.14	0.50	0.18*	0.60	0.15*
Compulsory vote (0-1)	7.29	2.12	1.30	1.79*	7.04	1.78*
Postal voting (0-1)	0.00	0.00*	0.07	0.74*	0.00	0.70*
Sandwich vote (0-1)	7.29	1.20	6.48	1.74*	6.37	1.84*
Number of polling days	0.80	0.03	5.03	0.02*	5.00	0.05*
Electoral justice (0-1)	28.10	3.24*	26.03	3.02*		
Adjusted R ²	0.806		0.681		0.757	
N	25		21		27	

Source: <http://www.fishbase.org/ID/Species/Summary.cfm?SpeciesID=10000>[illegible]

• The 2000 Internet and U.S. market for Japan




Figure 12.1. Map of Incumbent Party Vote and Change in Real GDP

NOTE: See also 8.1 for the 1980 election

E. Butler & Stokes (1974): Valence vs. Position Issues

1. Econ Prosperity=valence issue; How Pursue=position issue
2. To ° econ=valence issue, parties & cand compete for votes not by offering diff promises so much as claiming better plan to achieve promises—suggests perception of econ as or more important than actual (but surely former based on latter)
3. Tradeoffs? Cannot usu pursue growth, empl, & infl simult'y
 - a. Valence model: voters unaware of this⇒Govt perceived constantly *failing*⇒must dissemble, misdirect, etc. as much as possible
 - b. Position Model, contrarily, leads to L-R partisan politics (Hibbs)

F. Uninformed voters?

1. Perfectly rational to be uninformed
2. (Partisan) ideological filters? Reputation
3. If electorate *right-on-average (unbiased)*~irrelevant that uninf.

4. Why doesn't pay anyone to inform? \Rightarrow incentives to distort, voter must decide whom to believe, etc.
- G. Simple Reward & Punishment Model (Key 1964; Kramer 1971; Kiewiet & Rivers 1985): If incumb's performance satisfactory, reelect; if unsatisfactory, vote for challenger
 1. If true, notice how drastically \downarrow info requirement of voters
 - a. Reduces political universe to one actor
 - b. Retrospective—no need to eval promises of novel & unknown
 - c. Need only decide if you like outcomes, not evaluate policies
 2. [But do voters act so? (If “*some do, some don't*”: who? why?)]
 - a. good reason to believe pub better able to eval incumb [*risk aversion*]
 - b. but what about Party Reputations—can't ignore opposition
- H. Assymetric Reward & Punishment? (*Negativity effect*)
 1. Seems econ bigger news & \therefore perhaps bigger issue when bad
 2. *Negativity effect*: at 1st found some evidence, but more systematic, broader study seems to have lain it to rest
- I. Partisan Reward & Punishment?
 1. Facts perceived through partisan-tinted glasses
 2. Partisan rep's tend to attach certain econ issues to certain parties—e.g. Reps anti-inflation & Dems anti-unemployment
 - a. Votes do seem respond somewhat thus—when \uparrow infl issue, \uparrow R vote
 - b. *N.b.*: really strange incentives for partisan seeking re-elect [*no evidence they respond thereto, perhaps maintaining rep too import?*]
- J. Personal or Sociotropic Evaluation?
 1. Pocket-book voting little empirical support in US (Kinder & Kiewiet 1979, Kiewiet 1983). Ethic of self-reliance in US?
 2. However, not in UK, FR, GE, IT, or SP either! (Lewis-Beck 1988) \Rightarrow US self-reliance ethic not a very good explanation
 - a. Empirically, socio. seems dominate pers. in estimated vote fncts! [So, people so altruistic? If believe not, must explain this evidence:
 - (1) specification error: people are selfish after all, & evaluate based on personal economic conditions, but these are poorly measured
 - (2) Possibility voters attribute macro performance to politicians, not personal; & evaluate accordingly... They care about personal, but believe politicians only effect on personal is embodied in agg effect
 - (3) Agg. may be better predictor of own future than own past.]
- K. Retro- or Pro-spective: politicians rewarded for good past perform or for expected productivity if re-elected?
 1. Rationally, should be latter
 - a. In popularity functions, that appears to be so
 - b. In vote fnctns, much less clear, if anything voters retro
 2. Implications for political manipulation of the economy

Week 10: Voting, Participation, & Representation, Part II

Extra-electoral Participation & Interest Groups

Bashevkin, “Interest Groups & Social Movements,” in LNN

- LVII. Organized groups:
- A. At core of democratic debate:
 1. *Critics*: attacked as selfish & destructive of dem. process
 2. *Supporters*: celeb'd as crucial, constructive act's in proc.
 - B. Synonyms:
 1. Pressure grps, interest grp, lobby, & organized interest
 2. Social movement organization, social movement
 - C. Definitions:

1. Interest Groups (IG's):
 - a. *B*: "what IG's & social movements share is a set of norms, beliefs, or values that keep the 'interest' intact. These shared orientations are glue binding together the group constituency, leading it to act as a coherent entity...collectivities that have as their basis a shared outlook, identity, or framework of reference" (135)
 - b. *Truman (1951)*: 'IG' refers to any group that, on basis of 1 or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes... (pp. 135-6)
 - c. *Wilson (1990)*: org's, sep. from govt though often in close partnership, which attempt to influence pub pol.
2. Social Movements (SM's):
 - a. *Bashevkin*:
 - (1) Like IG's except "more pro-change, more challenging, *vis-à-vis* institutional status quo" (138)
 - (2) Protest groups that mobilize their adherents in more system-challenging ways than do IG's or parties
 - b. *Kitschelt*: social movements tend to follow experience of marginalization
 - c. *Blumer (1951)*: collective enterprise to establish new order of life, meaning a fundamental cultural shift that will either be pursued or opposed by SM adherents
 - d. *Bashevkin*: Less formal than interest grps, more heterogeneity of views typically within SM's than IG's (largely because former are typically broader)
3. Substantive distinct's b/w party-IG-SM not always clear

LVIII. Interest Group Functions:

- A. Social roles of IG's
 1. *Truman*: these [shared attitudes] afford participants frames of reference for interp. & eval. events & behave
 2. Like prtys, function as soc. networks as well as pol. org's
- B. Electoral roles of IG's:
 1. Evaluate competing candidates
 2. Help fund candidates
 3. Mobilize voters
- C. Policymaking roles of IG's
 1. Influence or pressure govt decision-makers, but not seek office (distinguishes them from parties)
 2. Provide information to policymakers
 - a. Where voters/citizens stand on issues
 - b. Information (possibly biased) about issue itself
- D. *Wilson*: IG's provide institutional linkages b/w govt (state) & major sectors of society

LIX. Substantive Q's regarding interest groups & movements

- A. Why some grps more diff. to org than others? [**Pap Top**]
 1. Mem's Hetero/homo-geneity: SE homog & unity views
 2. Size of the groups (Olson) [**LoCA**]
 3. Coercion/suasion & Selective benefits (Olson)
- B. What explains difference in *means* employed by different groups with shared interests?
 1. Means: Some form parties [Green parties]; Others IG's & lobbies [Sierra Club]; Others adopt "politics by other means" [Greenpeace]. [**Pap Top**]
 2. Hypotheses:
 - a. *Bashevkin*: groups form strategies based on their institutional & ideological settings [**Such as?**]
 - b. History? "diffusion of innovation"
 - c. Intensity of views?
 - d. Power config. of alternative & orthogonal views?
- C. What explains gen. ↑ # & importance of I.G.'s? [**Pap**]

1. Decline of parties [elaborate]
 2. Education & affluence => greater resources & abilities => lower relative cost to mobilize groups
 3. Advances in communications & transportation tech=> increased efficiency in organizing
 - D. What explains variation across space & time in activities of I.G.'s? (differing uses of *Voice*?) [**Paper Topic**]
 1. Change over time in US
 - a. Traditionally I.G.'s in US politics lobbied elected politicians in national & state capitals, 1stly they...
 - (1) Work in coalitions to lobby bureaucrats
 - (2) Present their arguments in court
 - (3) Go directly to pub *via* media interviews & ads
 - (4) Try to influence elections as well as traditional attempt to influence policy at legislative stage
 - b. What might explain these changing activities?
 - (1) Increasing professionalization of interest groups
 - (2) Societal changes? [Such as...]
 - (3) Voting-behavior changes?
 - (4) [Other ideas?]
 2. Why lobbying bureaucrats relatively more prevalent in FR than US? [**Generalize => Good Paper Topic**]
 - a. Differing nature of electoral competition?
 - b. Size of role of bureaucratic implementation on net effect of policy?
 - c. [Other ideas?]
 - E. Social Movements more willing to use extra-pol., even illegal, means than IG's. Why? [tautological?] [**Pap?**]
 1. Do mobilization needs of IG's & SM's differ?
 2. Does nature of IG's & SM's goal differ?
 3. Differing opp's to achieve their ends? [see Kitschelt's point above about SM's resulting from marginalization]
 - F. What explains differing success of various grps of interests in achieving their ends? [**Paper Topic**]
 1. *Tarrow (1983)*: brdth & flexblty grp's *tactical repertory*
 2. History, *e.g.*, novelty of SM's or IG's aims or tactics?
 3. Institutional differences in political process? [Such as...]
- LX. "Models" of Group Activity
- A. *Power-Elite Model*: Mills (1956), Hunter (1953)
 1. Small elite, sometimes covert, controls gt, limiting opp's for "average" citizens' political participation
 2. How does such a minority dominate majority in a dem?
 - a. Size, homog, intrst unity of grps serve their coherence
 - b. Relative soc., pol., & econ. power of elites enables them to dominate uninformed, excluded masses
 - B. *Pluralist Model*: Truman (1951), Dahl (1961)
 1. Struggles among competing grps=essence dem pol; govt maj role=estab & mntn orderly rltns among them
 2. "*Vectors of pol. inputs*" image: multiple (vector) forces push govt; resultant (vector) of those forces=>policy
 3. Multiple points of access for diverse interests => group participation in public policymaking is virtually assured
 4. What explains ° to which alter. collective demands met?
 - a. Emphasis on (relative) internal group characteristics, especially organizational resources.
 - (1) S-E status, media access or control, education, & skill of group leaders
 - (2) Internal organizational cohesion
 - (3) Strategic social position (in political issue-space rel. to other I.G.'s)
 - b. Later work discerns **4 key variables determining policy success of a group**
 - (1) *Group Resources*: financial & human resources positively related to policy influence

- (2) *Group Cohesion*: organizational control, unity, & discipline positively related to influence
- (3) *Leadership Expertise*: policy & administrative knowledge always helps
- (4) *Grp Representativeness*: favorable strategic position & /or comprehensive grp standing in policy domain

c. **Basic Argument/Assumption Pluralist Model**: open, fair competition naturally favors groups w/ highest net “score” on these factors

C. *Plur. Critics*: Schattschneider; Bachrach & Baratz

- 1. Non-decisions & agenda setting
- 2. Govt & bureauc interested, ≠ neutral, actors in process
- 3. Insiders v. Outsiders: some groups excluded
- 4. Basically reject image of govt as neutral arena in which grp interests fairly compete & policies neutrally emerge.

D. *State- & Institution-Centric* (Katzenstein; Krasner; Evans; Skocpol): **3 key vars: state prefs, capacity, & auton**

- 1. Policymakers can & do develop **preferences** that differ from those of constituent groups
- 2. Relative degree of **autonomy** of state from societal groups determines degree to which they may differ
- 3. **Capacity** = ability of bureaucratic state to execute its actions & so logically depends on ability to concentrate, coordinate, & exploit govtal resources

E. *Corporatist Model*: (Schmitter, Lijphart)

- 1. “‘system of interest rep in which constituent units org’d into limited # singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered & functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (sometimes created) by state & granted deliberate representational monop. w/in respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls leader selection, demand articulation, & [supporting activities]’ Schmitter (1979)” (149).
- 2. Core Characteristics:
 - a. IG’s operate as integral parts of, rather than external influences on, govt activity
 - b. State at apex of corp sys, org’s a hierarchy w/in which interests operate regarding govt & other interests
- 3. Important Aspects:
 - a. Incorporation of insider groups (with perhaps some exclusion implied) so that favored groups play a structured & significant role in policymaking
 - b. Competition among grps much more limited than in pluralist sys; state’s role is more assertive & sustained
- 4. [Ex.: *Tri-Partite Barg*: Govt–uni. lab–uni. employer]
- 5. Contrast “liberal” or “societal” corporatism from “state” corporatism [“from below” v. “from above”]

F. All actual country-times could be characterized to some degree by each of these models of politics, but...

- | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. US most nearly pluralist? | 4. Jap hybrid statist & corp? |
| 2. Britain bit more statist? | 5. Germ more purely corp? |
| 3. France lot more statist? | 6. Swe & Austria most corp |

LXI. Empirical “Findings”

A. Bashevkin claims that business groups generally most influential in most systems

- 1. Note the difficulty of establishing any such claim
- 2. [If business groups most influential, why are they among the most critical of govt policies?]

B. Most of work confirms importance of internal characteristics of grps to their success


C. Most also find “political opportunity structure”—attitudinal or institutional environ w/in which groups operate—are key to strategies, success, etc. Thus, influence rests on combination of internal assets & external situation [a pretty banal conclusion at this level of generality]

D. Groups adapt rapidly to their institutional circumstances: they seem to go where it matters in their system (e.g., Congress then courts in the US), subject to their abilities to go there. **[Paper Topic]**

- E. Evidence from transitional democracies indicates that democratic group competition does not emerge simply from establishment of rules allowing it
 - 1. Pre-transition traditions are key
 - 2. Pre-transition group organization also central
- LXII. Discussion: How could we evaluate common claim that “special interests” as opposed to avg citizens & /or their elected representatives hold power?
- LXIII. Status:
 - A. Socio-Economic Development/Structure & ...
 - 1. Democratization & Democratic Stability/Functioning
 - 2. Party System & (Citizen) Political Behavior
 - B. Comparative Govt'l Systems
 - 1. Theoretical & Empirical Variation in Political Systems
 - 2. Alternative Visions Democracy & Pol Sys that Support
 - C. Electoral Systems & ...
 - 1. Party Systems & (Partisan) Policymaker Behavior
 - 2. (Citizen) Political Behavior
 - D. Party Systems & ...
 - 1. (Partisan) Policymaker Behavior
 - 2. (Citizen) Political Behavior
 - E. Political Participation:
 - 1. Voting: who, how many, how
 - 2. Interest Groups Extra-electoral Participation
 - F. Given partisan, elected representatives, operating in strategic environment set by socio-econ struct, electoral & party systems, **next question = how policy-making authority allocates among/across those reps:**

**The Distribution of Govt'l Authority
& Govt Formation**

- LXIV. Lijphart, Ch. 7: Executive-Legislative Balance
 - A. Presidential v. Parliamentary Govt
 - 1. Three Crucial Differences
 - a. *Parl*: HoG (PM) resp to/dept on legislative confidence; *Pres*: HoG (Pres) elected for const'ly prescribed period & not under normal circumstances resp/dep to/on legis.
 - b. *Pres*: HoG pop'ly elect (usu directly); *Parl*: HoG leg. select
 - c. *Parl*: collective exec's; *Pres*: one-person, non-coll. exec.
 - (1) *PM* can vary: pre-eminence to virtual equal cab mins'
 - (2) *Pres* cab mins=his/her appoints: advisory, subord role
 - 2. ⇒ Fig 7.1 Executive Classification
 - a. 35/36 purely pres or parl by this def (but Fra & Isr shift)
 - b. Switz the exception; exec not dep on legis
 - c. US pres elect by HoR possibility would => category III
 - d. Columbia was category V hybrid for a time.
 - e. II, IV, VI somewhat log'ly contradict=> not surp no ex's



3. Semi-Presidential Systems: pop elect pres & parl PM
 - a. Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal
 - b. *Lijphart*: Austria, Ice, Ire, & , post-‘82 Port presidents weak
 - c. France:
 - (1) Pres=HoG, but ‘til ‘86 not tested whether effect pow rested on position as head of majority parl party (disciplined). Since tested: does seem so.
 - (2) Pres power seems largely confined to for & security pol.
 - d. Finland:
 - (1) Const’ly similar but weaker Fr. pres (& ind. elect -‘91)
 - (2) Esp. Kekkonen ‘56-‘81 period, strong, esp. for/sec pol.

- (3) '91 reform: abolished pres rt to dissolve parl, but also made direct elect. => Ambig Strength
- e. Short-Lived Israeli System: Pres...
- (1) Directly elected
 - (2) Fixed period, *except if Pres & Parl dissolve each other*
 - (3) Predominates over cabinet.
 - (4) Some argue (e.g., US '87 Committee on Const'l Reform) this help overcome and/or prevent deadlock; Others that it => *incessant elections*.
4. Other Important (but not as universal) Pres-Parl Diff's
- a. Sep v. Fuse Exec/Legis entail (non-) mem in both? Varies.
 - b. Pres/Cabs not right dissolve legis; PMs & Cabs do., but ° to which right unmitigated (UK) or lmted (Germ) varies.
 - c. (Non-)Separation HoS from HoG: many exceptions.
- B. Degrees of Executive Dominance
1. Legis-Exec Balance not fully determined by Pres-Parl.
 2. Presidential Power Sources
 - a. Const'l Powers: Reactive (Veto) & Proactive (Decree) [rel'y stable formally, but effectively varies w/ strat. sit.]
 - b. Strength & cohesion pres' party in legis [rel'y unstable & varies lot w/ strat. sit., esp. w/ party pres & leg & cohes.]
 - c. Direct election (& usu. only they have 1 national dist) [rel'y stable but varies some w/ margin electoral victory].
 3. Measuring Degrees of Exec Dominance [Table 7.1]
 - a. *Lijphart*: parl sys well measured by cab dur [BIG PROB's]
 - b. Tweaked for pres & some other *peculiarities* [more prob's]
 - c. Do not confuse cab (in)stability w/ policy (in)stability, govt (in)efficacy, or regime (in)stability:
 - (1) Cab pm position can move more in stable-govt sys
 - (2) Avg. Tenure of Cab Mins can & often is longer in less durable govt sys; even more stab of parties in govt.
 - (3) Regime instab seems corr. w/ govt ineffic. not instab.
 - d. Some issues re: what counts empirically as govt change...

Table 7.1. Average tenure of cabinet ministers in various democracies, 1945-1990

Source: Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, 1977, p. 100. Data for 1990 are from Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, 1999, p. 100.

Country	Average tenure of cabinet ministers (years)	Number of cabinet ministers (1990)	Number of cabinet ministers (1945-1990)	Number of cabinet ministers (1945-1990)
Israel	1.00	10	10	10
South Africa	1.00	10	10	10
Italy	1.00	10	10	10
Spain	1.00	10	10	10
France	1.00	10	10	10
Germany	1.00	10	10	10
Sweden	1.00	10	10	10
Denmark	1.00	10	10	10
Netherlands	1.00	10	10	10
Belgium	1.00	10	10	10
Switzerland	1.00	10	10	10
Austria	1.00	10	10	10
Portugal	1.00	10	10	10
Greece	1.00	10	10	10
Japan	1.00	10	10	10
South Korea	1.00	10	10	10
Taiwan	1.00	10	10	10
Singapore	1.00	10	10	10
Malaysia	1.00	10	10	10
Indonesia	1.00	10	10	10
Philippines	1.00	10	10	10
Thailand	1.00	10	10	10
Myanmar	1.00	10	10	10
Burma	1.00	10	10	10
Cambodia	1.00	10	10	10
Laos	1.00	10	10	10
Vietnam	1.00	10	10	10
North Vietnam	1.00	10	10	10
South Vietnam	1.00	10	10	10
China	1.00	10	10	10
Taiwan	1.00	10	10	10
South Korea	1.00	10	10	10
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Myanmar	1.00	10	10	10
Burma	1.00	10	10	10
Cambodia	1.00	10	10	10
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Thailand	1.00	10	10	10
Myanmar	1.00	10	10	10
Burma	1.00	10	10	10
Cambodia	1.00	10	10	10
Laos	1.00	10	10	10
Vietnam	1.00	10	10	10
North Vietnam	1.00	10	10	10
South Vietnam	1.00	10	10	10
China	1.00	10	10	10

4. Govt Types & Govt Durability [Table 7.2]
 - a. Reasons to expect pos rel. MW & 1-Prty Govt exec dom
 - (1) Same cluster of variables & concepts underlie exec-dom & MW+1-Prty
 - (2) Minority cabs by nature more at mercy of parl
 - (3) indep of indiv MP behav varies directly w/ cab's maj
 - b. [CIRCULARITY PROBLEMS]

Table 7.2 Frequency and average cabinet duration according to two criteria [in years] of five types of cabinets in thirty-one parliamentary democracies, 1945–86

Type of cabinet	Measure I		Measure II	
	Number of cabinets	Average cabinet duration (years)	Number of cabinets	Average cabinet duration (years)
Minimal winning, one-party	45	8.01	142	3.00
Minimal winning coalition	71	3.28	107	2.41
Minority, one-party	38	2.24	78	1.64
Minority coalition	52	1.01	89	0.91
Oversized coalition	81	2.07	120	1.71
All cabinets	297	3.08	504	2.12

Source: Based on data in Woldentrop, Roman, and Budge 1988; Banks, Day, and Miller 1987; Miller and Strom 1987; Strom 1988; von Beyme 1986; and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*.

5. 1-Party-Maj Govt & Exec Dom [Fig 7.2] [circ probs]
- C. Heads of State
1. N.b., almost half currently const'l monarchs
 2. Issue for parliamentary systems to limit authority HoS, logical contrapositive of parl sovereignty. Lijphart:
 - a. either via lack of election or
 - b. via election but strip of authority. [Weak]




Fig. 7.2 The relationship between type of cabinet and executive dominance in thirty-six democracies, 1945-95

LXV. Lijphart, ch. 14: 2D Conceptual Map Democracy

A. Strong Clustering 10-Variables Along 2-Dimensions

1. Executive-Parties Dimension
 - a. Effective Number Parliamentary Parties
 - b. ***Percentage Minimal Winning 1-Party Cabs (core element)***
 - c. Executive Dominance (of legislature)
 - d. Electoral Disproportionality
 - e. Interest-Group Pluralism (as opposed to Corporatism)
2. Federal-Unitary Dimension
 - a. ***Federalism & Decent (core element)*** (ch. 10) (DEF)
 - b. Symmetric & Incongruent Bicameralism (ch. 11) (DEF)
 - c. Constitutional Rigidity (ch. 12...)
 - d. Judicial Review (...ch. 12) (DEF)
 - e. Central Bank Independence (ch. 13) (DEF)

B. Tables 14.1 & 14.2 show clustering

C. Figures 14.1 & 14.2 show positioning & movement

D. Explanations for patterns/clustering:

1. Pol heritage & soc pluralism explain much of 1st D
2. Pop size & soc pluralism explain much of 2nd D
3. ⇒ perhaps representational dem & federal/decent functional substitutes/complements in redress soc het?

E. Sets stage for last part of book: So What?

1. Economic & Conflict Management
2. Quality of Democracy

Table 14.1 Correlation matrix of the ten variables distinguishing majoritarian from consensus democracy in thirty-six democracies, 1945–96

Variable 1: Effective number of parliamentary parties										
Variable 2: Minimal winning one-party cabinets										
Variable 3: Executive dominance										
Variable 4: Electoral disproportionality										
Variable 5: Interest group pluralism										
Variable 6: Federalism-decentralization										
Variable 7: Bicameralism										
Variable 8: Constitutional rigidity										
Variable 9: Judicial review										
Variable 10: Central bank independence										

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
[1]	1.00									
[2]	-0.87**	1.00								
[3]	-0.21**	0.68**	1.00							
[4]	-0.50**	0.57**	0.33*	1.00						
[5]	-0.55**	0.68**	0.38*	0.56**	1.00					
[6]	-0.26	-0.25	-0.23	-0.16	-0.28	1.00				
[7]	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.10	0.05	0.64**	1.00			
[8]	-0.02	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06	0.54**	0.35*	1.00		
[9]	-0.13	0.00	-0.05	0.26	0.20	0.48**	0.41**	0.39**	1.00	
[10]	-0.01	-0.14	-0.06	-0.06	-0.07	0.57**	0.32*	0.42**	0.39**	1.00

* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed test)

** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed test)

Table 14.2 Varimax orthogonal rotated factor matrix of the ten variables distinguishing majoritarian from consensus democracy in thirty-six democracies, 1945–96

Variable	Factor I	Factor II
Effective number of parliamentary parties	-0.90	0.02
Minimal winning one-party cabinets	0.93	-0.07
Executive dominance	0.74	-0.10
Electoral disproportionality	0.72	0.09
Interest group pluralism	0.78	-0.01
Federalism-decentralization	-0.28	0.86
Bicameralism	0.08	0.74
Constitutional rigidity	-0.05	0.71
Judicial review	0.20	0.73
Central bank independence	-0.07	0.71

Note: The factor analysis is a principal components analysis with eigenvalues over 1.00 extracted.




Fig. 14.1 The two-dimensional conceptual map of democracy

F. Not much interesting in movement; relative stability

LXVI. Comparative Govt'l Systems

A. CGS I: Executives & Legislatures (*Description*)

1. Power=function of rules, but also of strategic position
2. Centrality of PARTY DISCIPLINE

B. CGS II: Lij's Patterns of Dem & Pow's Visions of Dem

1. Lijphart: Majoritarian v. Consensus
 - a. Dem="govt by & for people," but which people if divergent prefs & disagrees?
 - (1) Majoritarian model: exclusive, compete, & adversary

- (2) *Consensus model*: inclusive, negotiate, comprom., barg.
- b. ⇒ clusters of inst'l arrange. along 2D: Conc/Diff Pow.
 - (1) Executives-Parties (Horizontal) Dimension:
 - (a) 1-party v. power-sharing in multi-party coal's
 - (b) Exec-dominant in exec-leg. v. exec-leg. balance
 - (c) 2-prty v. multi-prty sys (& , corr., 1 v. 2+ D. pol.)
 - (d) Maj & disprop v. prop electoral systems
 - (e) Pluralist IG's free-for-all competition v. coordinated & corporatist IG's w/ compromise & concertation
 - (2) Federal-Unitary (Vertical) Dimension:
 - (a) Unitary & centralized v. federal & decentralized
 - (b) Conc. leg pow in uni- v. bicam w/ diff constituencys
 - (c) Flexible constitutions w/ simple-maj amend v. rigid constits w/ extra-ordinary amend procedures.
 - (d) Legis final say legislation v. indep. judicial review
 - (e) Central banks dependent v. independent
 - (3) Examples: Westminster (UK, NZ1) v. Switz/Belg.
- 2. Powell: *Proportional v. Majoritarian*
 - a. *Majoritarian*: elections as instruments of cit control
 - (1) "Concentrated pol-mkng pow, whose exercise made target of citizen action"
 - (2) Elected = unobstructed ability make & impl pol's
 - (3) Responsibility for policy obvious to everyone
 - (4) ⇒ Elections choose b/w prospective teams & /or reward/punish incumbents
 - (5) N.b., concentrated power necessary but not sufficient. Probs w/ diffused power by this vision:
 - (a) ⇒ pol-mkng from complex bargain b/w mult reps
 - (b) ⇒ Retroactive responsibility difficult to pinpoint
 - (c) ⇒ Elect only indirect relation to form policy coals.
 - (6) Sum:
 - (a) decisiveness & effectiveness in response to pop will
 - (b) either prospective or retrospective view of elect role requires concentrated pol-mkng power which is simple & sole object of citizen electoral behavior
 - (c) Absolute sovereignty of majority ⇒ Majoritarian
 - b. *Proportional*: elections as instruments of citizen influence
 - (1) Dispersed pol-mkng power; elections indirect role: bring rep agents of all societal factions into pol-mkng arena, where they bargain over policy
 - (2) ⇒ premium on accurate reflect pop pref's in pol-mkng arena. JS Mill: "In really equal democracy, every or any section...represented, not disprop'ly, but prop'ly."
 - (3) Elections clumsy instruments, esp. as majoritarian
 - (4) Pref's all cit's, not just maj, should weigh in pol-mkng
 - c. Maj & Prop Proponents diff weighting of concerns
 - (1) Maj: suspicious reps' auton., less concern re: minoritys, emph. clear & direct account ⇒ pref concent'd pow
 - (2) Prop: suspicious majorities, esp. clumsy-elect created, less worried re: reps' auton., provided cit's strong role in selecting & re: negotiated inact ⇒ pref disperse pow
 - (3) Notes: suggests insofar as conflicts w/in democ b/w citizens (w/ harmonious pref's) vs. policymakers, edge to maj, insofar as b/w cit's diff pref's, to prop.
 - d. Views of Elections & Cit Relations to Policymakers
 - (1) Different Targets of Elections:
 - (a) Vote yay/nay Govt w/ pow to make policy v. Vote for rep agent, not control Govt, but agents who barg for

- (b) Voter anticipates decisive elect, directly determ pm's v. barg & negot coal-bldng after elect.
- (c) Notes:
 - i) Issues clear-cut, cit's w/ united prefs → voters may pref former. [N.b, game = pol-mkrs v. voters.]
 - ii) Issues complex & voters divided, probs that arise diff to anticipate, ⇒ each grp may pref trustworthy rep's who bargain on behalf [N.b, game=b/w voters]
- (2) Different Temporal Direction: Pro- v. Retro-spective
 - (a) Govt Retro⇒ (throw bums out) Eval. Incumb.
 - (b) Govt Pro⇒ (mandates) Forecast Incumb & Chall.
 - i) Elements of Forecast: credibility, desirability, etc. of promises⇒past record relevant, even prospective
 - (c) Agent Pro⇒(Representative Delegate) Choose agent believe will act as (informed) voter would
 - i) ⇒ seek agents whose pref's mirror own
 - ii) ⇒ seek effective bargaining agents
 - (d) Agent Retro⇒(Representative Trustee): bring home bacon, trust agent s.t. retro oversight
- e. Intermediate Cond's for Effective Voting Each Type
 - (1) Accountability Model:
 - (a) min req: periodic opportunity to change pol-mkrs
 - (b) How it Works/What it Needs:
 - i) Ability to reject unwanted policymakers
 - ii) Rejection Threat ⇒ all pol-mkrs consider cit react
 - iii) Simplicity & Limited Info Req's (E.g., no worries about credibility: "do or do not, there is no try.")
 - iv) But do need *clarity of responsibility*
 - v) Also: decisive incumbent replacement must follow voters' rejection (wholesale alternation)
 - (2) Electoral-Mandates Model:
 - (a) Ideal: strong, cohesive parties, incl. opp., offering effective, clear choice govts. Voters eval prospects alts
 - (b) How it Works/What it Needs
 - i) Possible for voters to identify alternative future govts @ election time: *identifiability*
 - ii) Expection tight link elect outcome to govt/pol form
 - iii) Winning party(ies) have full power in pol-mkng
 - (3) Accountability & Mandate=Majoritarian: [also called, jointly, *Responsible Party Govt* model]
 - (4) Representative Delegates Model:
 - (a) 2 stages: elect & post-el barg pro/retro- distin. less cntrl
 - (b) How it Works/What it Needs
 - i) @ soc grp must find prty near enough its prefs & views for it to support
 - ii) Grps rep'd prop'ly in pol-mkng bargaining
 - iii) pol-mkng=reprs bargain (not govt implements promises or anticipates future sanctions)
 - iv) Flexibility in post-elect coalition form, allowing different majorities to form on diff issues
 - (c) ⇒ Authorized Representation in Pol-mkng Bargain
 - (5) [Account, Mand, & Auth Rep in all but ↑↓°in *Maj/ Prop*]
- f. *Const'l Designs as Visions Maj/Prop Dem*:
 - (1) Concentration/dispersal political [rep &] power ⇒ Classify by elect & pol-mkng rules & implications
 - (2) *Electoral Systems*: Rules of Rep: Duverger's Law
 - (a) Strategic decisions of parties in offering candidates

- (b) Strategic decisions of citizens in voting for candidates
- (c) Mechanical effects rules aggregate votes into rep seats
- (3) *Pol-mkng Rules: Majoritarian & Proportional Visions*
 - (a) *Exec-Legislative Relations*
 - i) *Maj*: rules favor 1 prty maj full control pol-mkng, w/o check or division
 - ii) *Prop*: rules favor all rep'd parties prop'ly influence pol-mkng, govt to negotiate w/ others, esp. opp.
 - (b) *Opposition Influence: ↑=Prop, ↓=Maj*
 - i) Lack of tightly cohesive, disciplined parties
 - ii) Strength of Committee System (2 components)
 - a) *Committees influential*, not mere rubber stamp: # committees; Fixed areas spec. (jurisdictional expertise); Corresp. comm & minist. jurisdicts; Restrictions # comm assignments *per* legislator
 - b) *Committees give pol-mkng scope to actors not fully tied to govt (esp. opposition)*: Prop distrib comm chairs (not maj gets all); Or any other mech that prevents maj full-control of comm reflects
 - (c) *Other Institutional Features that Disperse Power*
 - i) *Independent Executives (presidentialism)*: veto & decree pows esp., & esp. diff constituency than parl
 - ii) *2nd Legis Chamber w/ Indep Select Base & Veto+ Pow*
 - iii) *Federalism*: local-level author not fully dep on cntrl
 - iv) *Judicial Review*

Table 1: Summary of the 1994-1998 US House of Representatives					
Year	Incumbent	Challenger	Incumbent	Challenger	Incumbent
1994	100	100	100	100	100
1995	100	100	100	100	100
1996	100	100	100	100	100
1997	100	100	100	100	100
1998	100	100	100	100	100
1999	100	100	100	100	100
2000	100	100	100	100	100
2001	100	100	100	100	100
2002	100	100	100	100	100
2003	100	100	100	100	100
2004	100	100	100	100	100
2005	100	100	100	100	100
2006	100	100	100	100	100
2007	100	100	100	100	100
2008	100	100	100	100	100
2009	100	100	100	100	100
2010	100	100	100	100	100
2011	100	100	100	100	100
2012	100	100	100	100	100
2013	100	100	100	100	100
2014	100	100	100	100	100
2015	100	100	100	100	100
2016	100	100	100	100	100
2017	100	100	100	100	100
2018	100	100	100	100	100
2019	100	100	100	100	100
2020	100	100	100	100	100

Table 2: Summary of the 1994-1998 US House of Representatives				
Year	Incumbent	Challenger	Incumbent	Challenger
1994	100	100	100	100
1995	100	100	100	100
1996	100	100	100	100
1997	100	100	100	100
1998	100	100	100	100
1999	100	100	100	100
2000	100	100	100	100
2001	100	100	100	100
2002	100	100	100	100
2003	100	100	100	100
2004	100	100	100	100
2005	100	100	100	100
2006	100	100	100	100
2007	100	100	100	100
2008	100	100	100	100
2009	100	100	100	100
2010	100	100	100	100
2011	100	100	100	100
2012	100	100	100	100
2013	100	100	100	100
2014	100	100	100	100
2015	100	100	100	100
2016	100	100	100	100
2017	100	100	100	100
2018	100	100	100	100
2019	100	100	100	100
2020	100	100	100	100

- g. Why constitutional designs so stable?
- (1) Incumbents won under exist sys, \therefore rarely incentive to Δ
 - (2) Internally log'ly consistent philos Maj or Prop
 - (3) If ~wide & grt disaff, voters grtly disapp. big rules manip
 - (4) 1st few elects under new elect rules, & first few acts under new pol-mkng rules, highly uncertain
 - (a) This important to note in its own right.
 - (b) Maybe too a reason constit's stable: risk aversion
- h. Consequences:
- (1) Citizens & Policymakers approach elections w/ great knowledge/expertise in how system works
 - (2) Unless can Δ sys self, prty & voter strategies highly dep on sys w/in which operate & \therefore grtly affectd by sys rules

Types of material for *Classmate* Papers:

Therapeutic regimes in Australia, Germany and the United States and the presidencies in France and the United States occasionally provide added possibilities for deeper and more in-depth policy-making. Legislation involving increased taxes required a two-thirds majority in Finland until 1906. The machine system was used in Denmark before 1853 and Sweden before 1872.

WHEATLAND Project Value = 2

Mixed: IR, JA, SP, US


LXVII. Accountability: Conditions for Citizen Control (Ch3)

A. One core dem/autoc diff: accountability

1. "throw rascals out": *retrospective*
2. threat of eviction \Rightarrow incentive follow cit pref's
3. Ultimate guarantee connection cit to pol-mkrs & key to majoritarian dem theory esp.

B. How freq'ly & eff'ly do voter pun/rew incumb $\Rightarrow \Delta$ govt

1. Table 3.1 & Fig 3.1:
 - a. Avg vote loss -2% for incumb's
 - b. Strong relation to govt change, but not perfect relation
 - c. Whole notion partial Δ strange from maj perspective
 - (1) In prop: partial Δ 38%, no Δ 44%, wholesale Δ just 14%
 - (2) In maj, no Δ 60%, wholesale 40%, partial=very rare
 - d. Jagged maj side reflects disprop, but also prox 50% seats
 - e. Smooth PR side reflects vision: $\uparrow \downarrow$ gov% w/ vote%
2. How cit's use this aspect/vision voting effectively?
 - a. Cit's need know clearly who's responsible for policy
 - b. Cit's need opportun. to vote simply & clearly for/against






Figure 3.1. *Impact of Vote on Government Change, by Constitutional Design*

C. Clarity of Responsibility:

1. Single, unified, identifiable set of policymakers [& alts]
2. ⇒ pm authority concentrated ntl leg & exec + unified & disciplined (*strong*) governing party & alternatives
3. *Govt Type* (in ↑ order of *CoR*):
 - a. Minority Govt:
 - (1) hard to know ° govt or opp resp;
 - (2) hard to know what coal behind what
 - b. Minority Govt w/ Fixed & Known Outside Support
 - (1) hard to know ° govt or opp resp or some other coal;
 - (2) hard, but easier than *a*, know what coal behind what
 - c. Post-Election Negotiated Majority Multiparty Govt
 - (1) Resp for control more-clearly concentrated in govt, *but*
 - (2) Parties ran against other, w/ diff individ platforms *and*
 - (3) Diff know ° prtys w/in govt resp & how comp'd/barg'd
 - d. Pre-Election Confirmed Majority Multiparty Govt
 - (1) Resp for control more-clearly concentrated in govt *and*
 - (2) Prtys ran togeth, w/ joint plat or states re: plan, *but*
 - (3) Still diff know ° prtys in gov resp issxiss b/c comp & barg
 - e. Majority Single-Party Govt:
 - (1) Esp if disc, *CoR* near-perfect

- (2) What still present to complicate matter for voters?
4. Evidence:
 - a. “Economic Voting” Evidence
 - b. Corr w/ “Expert Ratings” Opposition Influence (Table 3.2)
5. Table 3.2-3: Majority Status Govt




Table 1. Minority Status in Parliamentary Governments in 19 Elections, 1949-1991

Country	Minority Status of the Government					Average Minority Status Score
	Pure Minority [20]	Supported Minority [40]	Parliamentary	Parliamentary	Coalition	
			Minority [60]	Majority [80]	Minority [100]	
Australia	0	0	0	5	95	91 (91)
Austria	1	0	5	20	74	73 (88)
Belgium	0	0	9	0	91	60 (84)
Canada	2	0	0	0	98	77 (91)
Denmark	8	0	7	1	84	31 (41)
Finland	0	1	10	0	89	34 (70)
France	1	0	5	1	93	45 (81)
Germany	0	1	5	8	86	60 (80)
Greece	0	2	2	0	96	89 (91)
Ireland	2	1	2	1	94	63 (89)
Italy	1	1	0	0	98	52 (81)
Japan	0	2	0	0	98	85 (88)
Netherlands	0	0	15	1	84	85 (88)
New Zealand	0	0	0	0	100	100 (100)
Norway	5	0	1	1	93	34 (70)
Spain	0	1	1	0	98	72 (100)
Sweden	1	5	0	0	94	58 (100)
Switzerland	0	0	0	8	92	80 (86)
United Kingdom	1	0	0	0	99	80 (87)
United States	0	0	8**	0	92	67 (86)
Totals	26	12	44	24	17	6 (156)
Percentage	17	10	28	15	30	100

*Some of these governments held legislative minorities but lost them and the minorities returned to or passed legislation requiring the government to return. In some cases the minority status is more doubtful.

**The "hungary" refers to the "divided government" situation in which the majority controls Congress, the other the presidency.

Elections in 1987 and 1990 in France, Italy, and Austria are included. The number of percentages on the far right are the numbers of elections in each country. All elections are legislative. The number under each country name is the number of representative seats held by the majority of the government. From 20 to 100.

6. Additional Issues & Modifying Considerations

- a. Diff to assess pres relative to parl sys on this [P: US *Divided Govt*~maj coal, *Unifed*~1-prty maj **Disc?**]
- b. Leg & Exec sep-pow allows separate accountability, but also blurs respons & complicates voters' assessment task
- c. Party Cohesion also critical to *CoR*
- d. Govt Duration [as in Lijphart, circularity here]
- e. Federalism & Dcntrlztn [Powell too soft on Fed in this]
- f. Effective Bicam. Opposition (real power & distinct basis)
- g. Committee Influence (Power & Prop/Inclusive Allocation)
- h. [SE Struct Cond's: stuff *beyond pm control*? Globalization]

	Executive	Legislative	Judicial	Administrative	Other
1. Executive	100	0	0	0	0
2. Legislative	0	100	0	0	0
3. Judicial	0	0	100	0	0
4. Administrative	0	0	0	100	0
5. Other	0	0	0	0	100
6. Executive	100	0	0	0	0
7. Legislative	0	100	0	0	0
8. Judicial	0	0	100	0	0
9. Administrative	0	0	0	100	0
10. Other	0	0	0	0	100
11. Executive	100	0	0	0	0
12. Legislative	0	100	0	0	0
13. Judicial	0	0	100	0	0
14. Administrative	0	0	0	100	0
15. Other	0	0	0	0	100
16. Executive	100	0	0	0	0
17. Legislative	0	100	0	0	0
18. Judicial	0	0	100	0	0
19. Administrative	0	0	0	100	0
20. Other	0	0	0	0	100
21. Executive	100	0	0	0	0
22. Legislative	0	100	0	0	0
23. Judicial	0	0	100	0	0
24. Administrative	0	0	0	100	0
25. Other	0	0	0	0	100
26. Executive	100	0	0	0	0
27. Legislative	0	100	0	0	0
28. Judicial	0	0	100	0	0
29. Administrative	0	0	0	100	0
30. Other	0	0	0	0	100
31. Executive	100	0	0	0	0
32. Legislative	0	100	0	0	0
33. Judicial	0	0	100	0	0
34. Administrative	0	0	0	100	0
35. Other	0	0	0	0	100
36. Executive	100	0	0	0	0
37. Legislative	0	100	0	0	0
38. Judicial	0	0	100	0	0
39. Administrative	0	0	0	100	0
40. Other	0	0	0	0	100
41. Executive	100	0	0	0	0
42. Legislative	0	100	0	0	0
43. Judicial	0	0	100	0	0
44. Administrative	0	0	0	100	0
45. Other	0	0	0	0	100
46. Executive	100	0	0	0	0
47. Legislative	0	100	0	0	0
48. Judicial	0	0	100	0	0
49. Administrative	0	0	0	100	0
50. Other	0	0	0	0	100

D. Final Measure of CoR & Prelim Evidence

1. Govt Type & Cohesion most strongly & robustly corr w/ govt vote loss & expert judge opp infl [*poor tests*]
2. Table 3.5 (govt type adjusted for cohesion only)

Table 3.5. Clarity of Responsibility: A Preliminary Overview

Country	Average Majority Status of Incumbent Government	Definition of Responsibility Due to Lack of Government Party Cohesion	Modified Average Clarity of Responsibility
New Zealand	100	None (same party 1970)	100
Australia	91	None (same incumbent)	91
Denmark	89	1981 only	84
United Kingdom	80	None	80*
Canada	77	None	77
Austria	73	None	73
Germany	74	Not (same incumbent)	74
Spain	72	1979-82 only	68*
France	65	None	61
Netherlands	63	None	63
Ireland	60	None	60*
Japan	57	Substantial (=30)	53
Finland	51	None	54
Belgium	50	Early 1970s only	53
Switzerland	40	Substantial (=30)	50
Sweden	38	None	38
United States	27	Substantial (=30)	27
Norway	34	None	34
Denmark	11	None	31*
Italy	53	Substantial (=30)	23


* In these countries there were often sharp differences in govt opinion among majority parties prior to election or election standard of Japan over the 1960-1980 period (number of govt

LXVIII. Conditions Mandates: Identifiability & Majority (Ch4)

- A. Promises⇒winners auth'd & oblig'd: *prospective*
- B. Criteria: Voter needs to be able...
 1. ...to anticipate govt that will form as response to votes
 2. ...to expect govt's cohesive, durable efficacy to fulfill
 3. ⇒ *Identifiability & Efficacy (Responsivity & Responsibility)*

C. **Identifiability**: Key=nature elect & part comp for gov

1. Strong 2-prty comp govt maj \Rightarrow most identifiable, but (n.b., almost exclusively manufactured)
2. Formal Pre-election Coalitions
3. Highly predictable or regularized coalition patterns
4. No pre-determ'd or strongly expected post-elect govts
5. Table 4.1 gives specific operationalization
6. [N.b., many mixed situations: e.g., agreements or firm expectations on one side/part only.]



D. **Identifiability** (nec cond) **PLUS** strong majority (suff)

1. Normatively as well as positively important to *Mandate*
2. Maj voting-eligible cits exceedingly rare, maj of voters somewhat rare, so mostly accept maj parl (seats), which common in some systems.
3. Table 4.2 combines *Mandate Conditions*
4. Same set qualifying conditions as Accountability, but govt duration non-issue b/c strong majorities last
5. \Rightarrow **Table 4.3 Net Final Mandate Efficacy Measure**

E. **Fig 4.1: Map Const Designs \rightarrow Account & Mand**


LXIX. *Vision Dispersed Pow: Auth'd Representation (Ch5)*

A. Two Key Stages:

1. *Proportionality in Selection to Representative Arena*
2. *Proportionality in Input from Representatives to Pol-mkng*
3. \Rightarrow truer majorities & better minority protection
4. #2 never fully, ranges from opp \approx 0 influ (seek sway pub-op) to oversight & veto pow's, effect supra-maj req's etc.
5. N.b., apparent broad normative appeal:
 - a. Cab-seats typ. proportionally allocated among govt.
 - b. Comm-seat alloc. often prop (but chairs less uniformly)

B. *Proportionality in Selection to Representative Arena*

1. N.b., diversity w/in groups represented \Rightarrow
 - a. Difficult for delegate to act as perfect rep.
 - b. Only perfectly rep assembly is whole.
2. At party level, however, straightforward: Table 5.1



C. *Proportionality in Input from Representatives to Pol-mkng*

1. Powell's Approach: Weigh 3 Sets Voters
 - a. Supporters of Govt Parties: 100% effective representation
 - b. Supporters of Gov-Supp Parties: 75% effect rep
 - c. Supporters Opp Parties: 10%-50% effect rep, depending on institutional-structural conditions $\uparrow \downarrow$ opp influence
 - d. See Table 5.2

Country	Year of Election	Government Type	Committee Strength	Vocalism of Government
Argentina	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
Australia	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
Belgium	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
Canada	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
France	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
Germany	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
Italy	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
Japan	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
Netherlands	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
Portugal	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
Spain	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
Sweden	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
Switzerland	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
United Kingdom	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
United States	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
West Germany	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%
Yugoslavia	1983	Pro-Socialist	Majority	60%

2. Institutional-structural conditions ↑↓ opp influence
 - a. Majority Status Govt (Govt Type, roughly as above)
 - b. Committee Strength (as above)
 - c. See Table 5.3

- #### D. Fig 5.1: Map Const Designs \rightarrow Auth'd Rep




LXX. The Centrality of the “Politics of Coalition”

- ### LXXI. Two Central Q's Regarding Politics of Coalition:

- LXXII.** Executive Stability (Powell II, ch. 7)

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
2. Presence strong extremist parties key aspect rep. parl. sys. that \Rightarrow *negative* exec-perf outcomes (ch.5)
- B. Govt Formation & Stability Arguments:
 1. Parties' Motivations 2-fold (n.b., parties as unitary actors)
 - a. Desire to participate in & control (current) policymaking
 - (1) For both **intrinsic** ("**policy-seeking**") reasons—parties care about what policies are made—and
 - (2) **instrumental** ("**office-seeking**") reasons—parties & party members wish to remain in govt, which requires voter support, which presumably depends on policies
 - b. Parties also motivated by considering ramifications of current acts for future ability to participate (*i.e.*, esp. future elect ramifications)
 2. What sorts of govts will form then?
 - a. Implies that govts will tend to form that contain...
 - (1) as few parties as possible to max seats/party for spoils & influ reasons
 - (2) as little ideol dissent as possible to make pol's as close to ideal as possible
 - (3) sufficient parl. support to pass necessary initiatives
 - b. Goals often conflict, but knowing these goals will often suffice to predict what govt-types will form & endure
 3. Evidence on Govt Formation: Powell's 4 Rules
 - a. **#1: When a single-party majority can form it will**
 - (1) 23/25 such cases (1965-75) follow the rule
 - (2) 2 that didn't were "oversized" govts [DEF], formed after strong pre-elect. alliance yielded surprise maj for 1 ally
 - (3) But *Oversize & Minority*[DEF] govts not so rare, partly explained...
 - b. **#2: Coal's usu. formed of ideologically connected [DEF] parties**



- (1) Adding connecting party to o/w separated coal lowers avg ideol distance b/w govt parties & thereby perhaps facilitates compromise
- (2) lessens $^{\circ}$ to which separated parties seen (by mems & voters) as deviating from ideals in joining coalition
- (3) [parties b/w others in coal. can add legis. support w/o requiring much/any further policy-compromise]

- (4) however, adding *any* party does require further division of spoils]
- c. **#3: Where “Minimum-Winning-Connected-Coalition” Govts possible, they usually form**
- d. **#4: Non-maj govts & non-MWCC govts form most frequently where extremist party support high (>15%)**
- 4. Legislative Circumstances behind types of Minority Govt
 - a. *Crisis Caretakers*:
 - (1) Intense conflict among polarized major players ⇒ passive minority govt as temporary measure
 - (2) P. calls these *caretakers*, but other give term narrower meaning
 - b. *Pre-election Minorities*:
 - (1) Often formed after elect. in sys that usu⇒ 1-prty-maj fails to do so
 - (2) Larger of 2 holds office (assumed temporarily) while new elections prepared, which assumed to fix prob.
 - (3) If not, min. govt will typ. try to serve w/ outside supp.
 - c. *Active Minority Govt*:
 - (1) Minority party or coal. secures outside supp. from other legis. grps
 - (2) Vary in formality (tacit to written, detailed agree’s) & fixity (same outside supp always to potentially diff set of supp for each law)
- 5. Typical Govt Duration by Govt Type:
 - a. Expectations:
 - (1) 1-prty-maj most durable, then minimum-winning-connected
 - (2) Over-sized & unconnected govts should be less durable
 - (3) Minority govts among least durable; & among these:
 - (a) caretakers least durable,
 - (b) pre-election bit more durable,
 - (c) & externally-supported most durable
 - b. Evidence:
 - (1) SPMajG most durable, MWCC not much less, externally-supp Min can be reasonably dur., all others less, esp. crisis caretakers
 - (2) But perhaps surprisingly: oversized coals least stable of bunch
 - c. Fig7.2 sums P’s view: strong extremist presence again key

Figure 2.2 Cabinet durability: A path model of environmental and effects mediated through election outcomes and legislative coalition formation. Reduced standardised regression coefficients, 1967–1976.^a



^a The arrows and path coefficients represent the standardized regression coefficients estimated at the 1st level in a set of recursive regression equations. As indicated by the direction of the arrows, the model assumes that all variables with smaller identifying numbers are causal prior to variables with larger identifying numbers. Electoral outcome equations are computed on 66 elections, each country weighted equally. Cabinet outcome equations are computed on 30 cabinets, each country weighted equally. Specific equations, variables, and sources are described in the Appendix.

C. Comparing Presidential & Parliamentary Govts

1. Pres sys all have durable exec's relatively indep of party sys or political & social environ, but exec often lacks legis maj (*divided govt* common to pres. sys., not unique to US)
2. Pres sys assoc. w/ *weaker* parties (less unitary), perhaps exactly b/c party can vote against exec w/o risk dissolution
3. Weak party discipline also what makes exec remaining in power w/o legislative majority feasible
4. At same time, it means presidents do not enjoy anything like degree of legislative control that PM's do
5. If anything, separated powers work to require more complex negotiations b/w exec's & legis.'s, esp. since usu. different elect. constituencies (Pres=ntnl, Legis=sub-ntnl)

LXXIII. Lijphart, Ch.6: Concentration vs Sharing Exec Pow

A. **Core Maj vs Cons:**

1. 1-prty-maj vs multi-prty-coal;
2. more spec. ranking: 1-Prty-Maj—Multi-Prty MWC/1-Prty-Min—Multi-Prty Oversize/Minority

B. **Coalition Theories:**

1. If 1-prty maj possible, usu forms.
2. **Minimal-Winning Coalitions** (Riker '62): **DEF**
 - a. Base Assume: parties max pow, cab=pow, \Rightarrow as many cab seats poss
 - b. \Rightarrow Only include prtys strictly nec to install & maintain govt
3. **Minimum-Size Coal's**: extend MWC \Rightarrow smallest poss maj.
4. **Minimum-Parties Coal's** (Leiersen '70): Fewest prtys poss to MWC \Rightarrow \downarrow barg & negotiation costs form & maint coal
5. **Minimal Ideological-Range Coal's** (deSwaan '73): ease form & maintain coal's of prtys w/ similar pref's. Several versions:
 - a. Maj coal's w/ smallest L-R distance to obtain *its* majority (GLM use)
 - b. Maj coal's w/ smallest L-R distance of *possible* majorities (L uses)
6. **Minimum Connected Coal's that Win** (Axelrod '70):
 - a. Parties try to coalesce w/ ideol neighbors, continue until majority.
 - b. Adding connecting prty to o/w separated coal lowers avg ideol distance b/w govt prtys & thereby perhaps facilitates compromise
 - c. Additional logics to connected coal's from Powell & me above:
 - (1) lessens $^{\circ}$ to which separated parties seen (by mems & voters) as deviating from ideals in joining coalition
 - (2) [parties b/w others in coal. can add legis. support w/o requiring much/any further policy-compromise]
7. **Policy-Viable Coalitions** (Laver & Schofield '90):
 - a. If solely policy-motivated, & policy req's legis maj, then govt'l membership & majority irrel., just party pivotal-ness in leg barg \Rightarrow
 - b. 'Core-Prty' Govt: core \approx assuming sincere voting, cannot assemble majority w/o; e.g., in 1D, =median, so \Rightarrow Median-Party Govt
 - c. If add reasons to be in govt, e.g., office-seeking or agenda-power, then \Rightarrow MWC's containing median parties

Table 6.1 Cabinet coalitions predicted by six coalition theories for a hypothetical distribution of parliamentary seats

Parties	A (Left)	B	C	D	E (Right)
Seats	8	20	20	12	33
Theories:					
Minimal winning coalition		ABC	ABD	BCD	BE
Minimum size			ABD		
Balance of power proposition					BE
Minimal range		ABC		BCD	BE
Minimal connected winning		ABC		BCD	CDE
Policy-viable coalition		ABC		BCD	CE

C. *Empirical Prob*: all but Axelrod=MWC; all=maj, but oversize & minority govts not at all rare [Tab 6.2].
Expl?

Table 6.2 Proportions of time during which five types of cabinets were in power in thirty-two parliamentary democracies, 1945–90

Type of cabinet	All cabinets (%)	All cabinets except minimal winning, one-party cabinets (%)
Minimal winning, one-party	27.1	—
Minimal winning coalition	34.7	46.3
Minority, one-party	11.3	10.1
Minority coalition	5.6	5.2
Oversized coalition	21.0	33.4
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Based on data in Wohlenberg, Komson and Huggo (1988), Banks, Bay, and Muller (1997), Muller and Strom (1992), Strom (1990), van Duijn (1985), and *Journal of Contemporary Archives*.

1. **Why Minority Govt?** parties' time-perspective? Stay out for now to gain some future electoral advantage?
2. **Why Oversize Govt?**
 - a. Insurance against defection (uncertain & uncommitted allies)
 - b. Policy-based theories predict occasional oversize (not enough)
 - c. Grand coal's as unity signal re: foreign (& sometimes other) threats
3. But all still majoritarian, need real *theory minority govt*

- a. Lack vote investiture may preserve minority
- b. Constructive vote no confidence (in Germany, or sim *majority against* req in France) may preserve minority (as well as foster maj)
- c. Committee strength & other sources opposition influence
4. Likewise, need better **theory oversize govt**
 - a. Constitutional revisions may require >50% majorities
 - b. Some agenda policies may require >50% majorities
 - c. [n.b., these not truly **oversize** then.]
5. N.b., some similarity minority & oversize govt, esp. in somewhat optional & flexible nature of govt support.

D. Presidential Cabinets:

1. Re: keeping office, pres exec & cab always MWC 1-prty maj
2. Re: passing agenda, may be Min, MWC, or oversize (flex).

LXXIV. Building & Maintaining (Parl.) Govt (GLM ch.12)

A. 2 Cntrl Q's: Govt Comp & Cab-min Alloc; G Durability


B. The Party Composition of Govts

1. [Always recall that...] elects still paramount in that determine actual & expected legis wt of prty actors in govt-form drama
2. Politicians motivated by some combo (a) "fame & power" (**opportunistic/office-seeking**) & (b) desire influence pub pol (**polic-/outcome-seeking**), & these diff implic's in govt form
 - a. Pure office-seeking \Rightarrow min-win logic: don't share seats any further than must \Rightarrow oversized govts a puzzle
 - b. Pure pol-seeking \Rightarrow ideol/pref-compatibility \Rightarrow median-prty govt
 - c. Combination of these motivations may suggest:
 - (1) Minimum-winning-connected (Axelrod)
 - (2) Minimum-ideological-range-winning (de Swaan)

C. Min. (& oversize) govts not rare, so coal thry should expl them too; all such theories rely on prtys' pol motives

1. Minority Govts, Hypotheses:

- a. Strom: as ability of parties to influence pol from opp \uparrow , freq min govt \uparrow [Fig (mine): data strongly supports—Opp Infl measure used here from Laver & Hunt, not Strom, so helps his case]



- b. Luebbert: \uparrow role of interest grps & org's outside parl. (esp. corporatist-type policymaking) \downarrow necessity of being in govt to influ pol, so should \uparrow minority govts: might explain Scand, but Germany, Austria, & Italy? Need multivariate analysis to consider this...

- c. Laver & Shepsle: ↑ pol divisions among opp's ⇒ ↓ ability to form alt govt, which should enable minority-govt formation—especially centrist govts can do this [we'll see this arg closer later in Laver & Shepsle]

	Majoritarian	Comparativism	Opp Infr	% Min Govts	SPMe	MWYC	SimpleMac	SPMI	Min	Careaker
AU	0	1	4	33.33%	1	10	1	3	3	0
BE	0	0.5	2.6	8.11%	2	2	0	2	1	0
DE	0	0.75	6.5	88.89%	0	3	0	14	10	0
FI	0	0.75	4.9	41.03%	10	8	2	13	3	4
FR	1	0.25	3.4	13.21%	1	5	58	2	6	2
GE	1	0.75	3.5	4.17%	0	14	6	1	0	2
GR	1	0	2.2	0.00%						
IC	0	0.75	4.6	10.53%	0	15	1	2	0	0
IR	0	0.25	4.1	31.58%	2	5	0	4	2	1
IT	0	0.25	2.1	37.25%	0	2	26	11	8	4
LU	0	0.25	4	0.00%	0	14	1	0	0	0
MA	1	0.25	3.5	0.00%						
NE	0	0.5	3.6	0.00%	0	2	10	0	0	0
NG	0	1	6.6	60.87%	6	3	0	10	4	0
PG	1	0	4.6	0.00%						
SE	1	0	2	0.00%						
SW	0	1	5.2	63.64%	3	5	0	12	2	0
UK	1	0	2	5.26%	18	0	0	1	0	0

Regression Output			
Constant	0.341111		
Std. Err. of Y. Est.	0.2289675	Correlation	
R Squared	0.3279188		0.57264134
No. of Observations	18		
Degrees of Freedom	16		
X Coefficient(s)	Majoritarian		
Std. Err. of Coef	0.110511		
t-statistic	2.794038		

Regression Output			
Constant	-0.317961		
Std. Err. of Y. Est.	0.1665288	Correlation	
R Squared	0.6655412		0.8158071
No. of Observations	18		
Degrees of Freedom	16		
X Coefficient(s)	Corp	Opp Infr	
Std. Err. of Coef	0.2295141	0.1048517	
t-statistic	1.7326237	3.3522835	

Regression Output			
Constant	0.003028		
Std. Err. of Y. Est.	0.213252	Correlation	
R Squared	0.4199631		0.64418893
No. of Observations	18		
Degrees of Freedom	16		
X Coefficient(s)	Corp		
Std. Err. of Coef	0.4756424		
t-statistic	0.1411909		


Regression Output			
Constant	-0.313933		
Std. Err. of Y. Est.	0.1723685		
R Squared	0.6655613		
No. of Observations	18		
Degrees of Freedom	16		
X Coefficient(s)	Major	Corp	Opp Infr
Std. Err. of Coef	-0.003425	0.2276072	0.1045109
t-statistic	0.1181552	0.1520717	0.0357547


Regression Output			
Constant	-0.337041		
Std. Err. of Y. Est.	0.1766402	Correlation	
R Squared	0.5985052		0.77369581
No. of Observations	18		
Degrees of Freedom	16		
X Coefficient(s)	Opp Infr		
Std. Err. of Coef	0.1350178		
t-statistic	4.884729		

2. Oversized Govts, Hypotheses:


- Govts of national unity*: several observed oversized govts occur immed postwar, only occas. after & then usu. short-lived & arise in *crises*
- Policy agenda in some sit's may require super-maj. (Bel. notable) ⇒ not all seeming oversized govts actually "surplus"
- Laver & Shepsle: extra parties may be included for signals they send [to whom?] about govt's policy stance

- d. Luebbert: dominant party(s) in coal may want surplus minor parties so no one smaller-party ally has veto
 - e. [surplus govts maybe esp. likely when MWC bridges smaller intermed party b/c little further policy-compromise necessary to ↑ legis strength of govt. May add to Luebbert's argument in particular]
 - f. [party discipline? Surpluses in Italy, e.g., may have stemmed from need of extra "insurance" support]
3. Some examples of govt formation
- a. Figure 12-1: Ireland after January 1993 elect (MWC)





b. Figure 12-2: Sweden after Oct. 1991 elect (minority coal)



c. Figure 12-3: Italy after July 1987 elect (surplus majority)

D. The Allocation of Cabinet Portfolios

1. Cabinet govt:
 - a. Cab serves as cntrl decision-making committee: by time bills referred from cab. to parl. for full-parl votes, \approx done deal. In fact, most decisions do not require direct legislative assent.
 - b. Vote of confidence theoretically gives parl control of cab, & ultimately it does, but only if parl willing to risk govt collapse over issue in Q \Rightarrow much latitude to cab mems, esp. w/in dept competence (more in L & S)
 - c. Two Q's:
 - (1) How many seats to each party?
 - (2) Which portfolios to which parties?
2. How many seats allocated to each party?
 - a. Proportional to share of legis. maj.: 90% of variation in party share of cab seats explained by party share of govt's legis. maj. (e.g., Govt has 40 seats in parl, party Y has 10 \Rightarrow party Y gets 1/4 of cab. seats).
 - b. Among strngst empir rels p.s., even though not const'l req anywhere
3. Which seats to which parties?
 - a. Tendency for med prty on each pol D w/ a cab dept to get that portfol
 - b. Tendency for prtys most cntrly interested in pol D to get that portfolio
 - c. Why? Cab Mins=agenda-setters in their pol area & have considerable latitude in policymaking: \Rightarrow
 - (1) who gets what portfol cntrl to govt pol position & likely pol outputs
 - (2) cab reshuffles more important than often realized
 - (3) ideological positions of cab mins perhaps only credible signals govt's policy stance in that policy area
 - (4) power shifts w/in parties fund'ly affects rel's b/w them

E. The Stability of Parliamentary Govts

1. What exactly counts as Δ govt not universally agreed. Issues:
 - a. Agreed that change in partisan composition of cabinet is a change in govt & that change of PM is change of govt.
 - b. Not quite all agree that every govt forming after election=change govt even if same make-up
 - c. Nor do all agree that if govt resigns & then is reformed with same PM & party make-up, that this is a new govt
 - d. Such ambiguity not so common that makes much diff. It matters some, but can proceed from here
2. Explaining Duration: Three sets of factors
 - a. Features of Govt Itself
 - (1) Number of parties in the govt (fractionalization)
 - (2) Ideological distance b/w parties in govt (polarization)
 - (3) Majority/Minority status of govt
 - b. Features of the Political Environment
 - (1) Party System: Larger, more diverse party systems \downarrow govt duration because smaller shocks can change what coalition is an equilibrium
 - (2) Other factors? [Powell: extremist party support]
 - c. Shocks, events, & external circumstances [journalistic accounts invariably focus on these] (Warwick's work)
 - (1) Worsening economic conditions, esp. unemployment
 - (2) Unemp especially bad for ctr-right; infl esp'ly bad for socialist-led
 - d. [Note diff b/w journalism/*politics* & *political science*: pol sci not interested in specific circumstances & events that collapse specific govts, but systematic features which make govts more/less stable in general. Analogy: not interest in what particular spark caused some specific fire but what conditions make fires more likely.]

F. Evidence: from King, Alt, Burns, & Laver

Table 1. Reference Models of Coalition Duration

Model:	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4
Censoring:	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Identities:	Incl.	Incl.	Excl.	Excl.
Variables				
<i>Country attributes:</i>				
Identifiability (of alt. govts)			0.399 (0.145)	0.779 (0.085)
Opposition influence (auton. & spec. of committees)			0.104 (0.222)	
Investiture (legal - req. existence)			-0.369 (0.172)	
Volatility (elect. supp. Δ in prev. elect)			0.0002 (0.001)	
Responsiveness (prop. of entering parties that \uparrow vote share)			-0.005 (0.043)	
<i>Party structure attributes:</i>				
Fractionalization (effective # parties in parl.)			-0.0004 (0.001)	
Polarization (Powell's supp. for extremists)			-0.023 (0.010)	
<i>Coalition attributes:</i>				
Numerical status (1 = maj.; 0 = min.)			0.535 (0.154)	0.759 (0.130)
Crisis duration (#days before govt. formed)			0.009 (0.002)	0.008 (0.002)
Opposition concentration (-) (prop. to left or right, whichever larger, in parl.)			0.136 (0.088)	
Formation attempts (# failed coal. proposals before present)			-0.085 (0.048)	
Intercept	3.385 (0.242)	3.734 (0.289)	2.653 (1.03)	0.905 (0.208)
Log-likelihood	-1187	-1025	-1017	-1030

Note: All estimates are based on 314 observations. Estimated standard errors appear under each coefficient in parentheses. Data were provided by Kaare Strøm and are described in the text and i

Table 2. Unified Models of Coalition Duration

Model: Variables	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4
<i>Country attributes:</i>				
Identifiability (of altern. govts)	0.378 (0.084)			
Opposition influence (auton. espec. of comms)	-0.595 (0.134)	-0.131 (0.193)		
Investiture (existence of legal rep.)	-0.633 (0.140)	-0.504 (0.171)	-0.527 (0.138)	-0.384 (0.141)
<i>Party structure attributes:</i>				
Fractionalization (eff. # parties parl.)		-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.0013 (0.0008)
Polarization (supp. for extrem)		-0.025 (0.008)	-0.029 (0.006)	-0.016 (0.006)
<i>Coalition attributes:</i>				
Numerical status (1 = maj; 0 = min.)			0.471 (0.130)	0.526 (0.131)
Crisis duration (# days before govt installed)			0.006 (0.002)	
Formation attempts (# attempts to form)				-0.099 (0.045)
<i>Controls:</i>				
Postelection (1 = form rt. after elect; 0 if b/w elects)				0.771 (0.137)
Caretaker (1 if inter-govt caretaker; 0 = else)				-1.303 (0.260)
Intercept	3.566 (0.324)	5.305 (0.693)	5.000 (0.616)	3.845 (0.635)
Log-likelihood	-1041	-1038	-1025	-1002
Log-likelihood with country identities added	-1025 (p = 0.001)	-1024 (p = 0.01)	-1012 (p = 0.01)	-993 (p = 0.12)

Note: All estimates are based on 314 observations. Estimated standard errors appear under each coefficient in parentheses. The probabilities under the "log-likelihood with country identities added" test the statistical significance of adding the country variables to each model. The probabilities derive

Single-Dimensional Coalition-Formation Concepts

Minimal Winning Coalition (MWC): coalition whose member parties control parl majority & which contains no party unnecessary to do so; *i.e.*, coalition obtaining maj. w/o any “surplus” parties. Need not be minimum-connected winning coalition or minimum-ideological-range winning coalition.

Minimum-Connected Coalition (that wins) (MCC): coalition whose member parties are ideologically adjacent, w/o ideol’y intervening parties outside coal, & which contains no strict subset of parties sufficient for maj. Need not be MWC, but will be MIRCW.

Minimum-Ideological-Range Coalition (that wins) (MIRC): a coalition whose mems obtain majority w/o containing any other majority within its left-to-right span. I.e., coalition that spans no more ideological space, left-to-right, than necessary for maj. Need be neither MWC nor MCCW.

Single-Dimensional Coalition-Formation Concepts:

Example: Hypothetical Germany w/ parties arrayed left-to-right thus:

PDS — Greens — SPD — A — B — FDP — CDU/CSU — R

and with seats allocated thus:

1.4% — 7.0% — 44.5% — 2.0% — 1.0% — 6.4% — 36.62% — 1%

Minimum Winning Coalitions (*MWC*): (Riker)

Greens + SPD (also *MCC* & *MIRC*)

SPD + FDP (not *MCC* but *MIRC*)

SPD + CDU (neither *MCC* nor *MIRC*)

CDU/CSU + FDP + Greens (neither *MCC* nor *MIRC*)

Dummy Parties: PDS, A, B, R

Minimum Connected Coalitions that Win (*MCC*): (Axelrod)

Greens—SPD (also *MWC* & *MIRC*)

SPD—A—B—FDP (not *MWC* but *MIRC*)

Dummy Parties: PDS, R

Minimum Ideological Range Coalitions that Win (*MIRC*): (de Swaan)

Greens—SPD (also *MWC* & *MCC*)

SPD—FDP (also *MWC* but not *MCC*)

SPD—A—FDP (neither *MWC* nor *MCC*)

SPD—B—FDP (neither *MWC* nor *MCC*)

SPD—A—B—FDP (not *MWC* but *MCC*)

Dummy Parties: PDS, R

Examples from German Parls (*Bundestagen*) Elect 1994 & 1998

1994 Partisan Composition of the German Bundestag

Left to Right

PARTY	L/R IDEOL	SEATS	PERCENT
PDS	3.3025	38	4.5%
Greens	4.055	49	7.3%
SPD	6.605	252	37.5%
FDP	11.26	47	7.0%
CDU/CSU	13.975	294	43.8%
TOTAL		672	100.0%

Minimum Winning Coalitions (Need 337)

CDU/CSU + FDP	341	50.97%
CDU/CSU + SPD	546	81.25%
CDU/CSU + Greens	343	51.04%
SPD + Greens + FDP	348	51.79%

n.b. PDS is a "dummy party."

Minimum-Connected Winning (Need 337)

CDU/CSU + FDP	341	50.97%
SPD + Greens + FDP	348	51.79%

Notes

Both of the minimum-connected winning coalitions are also minimum winning coalitions in this case.

This does not have to be so. If, for example, PDS were between the greens and SPD, then

In 1994: Greens + PDS + SPD + FDP would be minimum connected winning but not both MWC and MCW.

This would leave only CDU/CSU + FDP as both MWC and MCW.

In 1995: Greens + PDS + SPD would be minimum connected winning but not both MWC and MCW.

This would leave only SPD + FDP as both MWC and MCW.

1998 Partisan Composition of the German Bundestag

Left to Right

PARTY	L/R IDEOL	SEATS	PERCENT
PDS	3.3025	96	5.4%
Greens	4.055	47	7.0%
SPD	6.605	298	44.5%
FDP	11.26	43	6.4%
CDU/CSU	13.975	245	36.6%
TOTAL		669	100.0%

Minimum Winning Coalitions (Need 335)

SPD + Greens	345	51.57%
SPD + FDP	341	50.97%
SPD + CDU/CSU	543	81.17%
CDU/CSU + FDP + Greens	335	50.07%

n.b. PDS is a "dummy party."

Minimum-Connected Winning (Need 335)

SPD + Greens	345	51.57%
SPD + FDP	341	50.97%

Notes

Both of the minimum-connected winning coalitions are also minimum winning coalitions in this case.

This does not have to be so. If, for example, PDS were between the greens and SPD, then

In 1994: Greens + PDS + SPD + FDP would be minimum connected winning but not both MWC and MCW.

This would leave only CDU/CSU + FDP as both MWC and MCW.

In 1995: Greens + PDS + SPD would be minimum connected winning but not both MWC and MCW.

This would leave only SPD + FDP as both MWC and MCW.

Minimum-Ideological-Range Winning (Need 337)

Range		SEATS	PERCENT
2.715	CDU/CSU + FDP	341	50.97%
7.205	SPD + Greens + FDP	348	51.79%

Minimum-Ideological-Range Winning (Need 335)

Range		SEATS	PERCENT
2.55	SPD + Greens	345	51.57%
4.655	SPD + FDP	341	50.97%

The following are not Minimum-Ideological-Range Winning Coalitions because they span one or the other coalitions above, but it may nonetheless be informative to note that these two minimum winning coalitions span greater ideological range than the above two.

7.37	CDU/CSU + SPD	546	81.25%
9.92	CDU/CSU + Greens	343	51.04%

7.37	SPD + CDU/CSU	543	81.17%
9.32	CDU/CSU + FDP + Greens	335	50.07%

Notes

It is possible to construct examples where the minimum-ideological-range winning coalitions are not minimum winning coalitions.

It's also possible to construct examples where minimum-ideological-range winning coalitions are not minimum connected winning.

The only necessary logical connection is that all minimum connected winning are also minimum ideological range winning. The opposite is not true. E.g. imagine 2 new parties, A&B, between SPD&Greens in 1998. Also imagine PDS and its 5.4% of the seats split among A&B.

Then the following coalitions are minimum-ideological-range winning


SPD + Greens	SPD + B + Greens
SPD + A + Greens	SPD + A + B + Greens

Of these 4, only SPD + Greens is minimum winning, and only SPD + A + B + Greens is minimum connected winning, but


it is still impossible to draw any minimum connected winning coalitions that is not also minimum ideological range winning.

What's a "game tree"?

The Prisoners' Dilemma



How do we model actors' preferences & decisions?



Govt FORMATION & DISSOLUTION (Part II)

Laver & Shepsle, Making & Breaking Govts

LXXV. Substantive Background (*Part I*)

A. Centrality of Govt Formation & Dissolution

1. Essence of parl dem: accountability govt (*syn*: cab., exec., admin.) to legis. where it must retain majority. (Leg., in turn, to voters.)
 - a. Votes of investiture
 - b. Votes of (no) confidence
2. Nonetheless, cabinet retains wide latitude while remains in office
 - a. Agenda setting
 - b. Control over administrative departments (*syn*: cab. ministries, portfolios)
3. Govt form & diss. at apex of set of links b/w voters, reps., parties...
4. \therefore govt $\Delta \Rightarrow$ at least potential policy Δ (e.g., financial mkts respond)

B. The Role of Analytic Modeling

1. Fundamental premise: general statements about politics of building & maintaining govt possible, & such general statements can give valuable insights into political processes.
2. The advantages of deriving such general statements formally:
 - a. Allows one logically to hold a set of variables constant & manipulate certain key variables—model may thus be used as discovery tool
 - (1) Allows counterfactuals (w/in logical/modeled, if not actual/empirical, world).
 - (2) Being more precise & explicit lets one check (mathematically) her intuitions & analyze further, sometimes discovering counter-intuitive features that may nonetheless prove empirically supported.
 - b. Analytical model also systematic aid to constructing empirical models: can less-ambiguously tell us what to look for & how to look for it in the data.
3. Logical abstraction (i.e. simplifying assumptions) essential to analytic models. BUT, no less essential to any other mode of theorizing. Theory *is* logical abstraction. Generally best to be as explicit as poss. about these *unavoidably* necessary assumptions.
4. Mathematical (here: set theory & geometry) Modeling [a sermon]:
 - a. Math just a language: specifically, symbolic language for expressing logic
 - (1) Anything that follows logical laws can be expressed mathematically, and
 - (2) Anything that cannot be expressed mathematically is illogical.
 - (3) *Non-mathematical logic*=oxymoron.
 - b. Like other foreign languages...
 - (1) Fluency by using & being immersion.
 - (2) No one born understanding it, & no one born without ability to learn it.
 - (3) My opinion & experience: “I suck at math” usually means...
 - c. Grad or prof. school?
 - (1) Take some calculus, linear algebra, and/or probability & statistics
 - (2) No *math escape hatches*! [OK, enough sermon]

C. Rationality & Analytic Modeling in the Social Sciences

1. Rationality & Methodological Individualism:
 - a. **Methodological Individualism**: Only human agency effects outcomes in social world that we study; therefore every social-scientific model must begin with establishing what motivates actors & how they make decisions
 - b. Steps in Rational Models
 - (1) Posit *aims* or *goals* (i.e., *utility*) (office & preferred policies) of key actors (politicians, esp. MPs) in phenom studied (govt formation & dissolution).
 - (2) Define *decision rule* by which those actors choose b/w alternative possible actions, usu. assume actors **rational** in sense that they calculate (implicitly or explicitly) costs & benefits of various

actions to achieve their aims & select course of action with highest net benefit (lowest net cost).

2. Specifically, in this model of govt formation, we assume:
 - a. Politicians policy-motivated; intrinsically or instrumentally doesn't matter
 - b. **Common Knowledge:** Policy aims of all players, all rules of govt-form. game, etc. known to all players.
 - c. Politicians act given this knowledge to achieve best their aims; i.e., vote for or against govts calculated to produce their most desired cabinet possible
3. [Aside: *rationality* lends itself easily to math-model b/c "maximize net benefits" easily expressed as math problem, but *any* logically immutable decision rule can, in principle, be modeled, & any rule that cannot be so defined cannot produce logical consistency.

D. Formal Theoretic Perspective on Govt Form & Diss Problem

1. Legacy: Some Important Prior Theoretical Results
 - a. One Dimension
 - (1) Black (1958) **Median Voter Theorem (MVT)**: (DEFINE)
 - (a) If voters *single-peaked* pref's defined on *single dimension* (e.g., left-right), then median-voter's *ideal point* is only point majority-preferred to all others.
 - (2) Hotelling(1928)-Downs(1957) **Party Competition Centripetal Tendency**:
 - (a) Applied to 2-prty elects, MVT⇒strong incents parties converge toward median voter's ideal
 - b. Multiple Dimension Extensions:
 - (1) McKelvey's & Schofield's "**Chaos Theorems**":
 - (a) w/ >1D, if choices not structured in restrictive ways: virtually certain that policy proposals will *cycle* around policy space, w/ no proposal majority-defeating all others
 - i) ⇒either perpetual flux or arbitrariness (Arrow's **Impossibility Theorem**).
 - ii) Strongly suggests inst'l restrictions on proposal- & decision-making process essential to non-arbitrary democratic decision-making: Shepsle's **Structurally Induced Equilibrium**
 - (b) Kadane (1972) showed that if eqbm exists in unstructured multi-D space (may not), then must be *multi-D median*, a.k.a. **Dimension-by-Dimension Median (DDM)**
2. Govt Formation-and-Dissolution Game in this context
 - a. These prior results refer to *policies* emerging from maj-rule voting, not to *govts* forming subject to maj approval. Govt form & diss process may add *structure* that brings eqba to multi-D prob. L & S key contribution: show particular conception of govt form can do this.
 - b. The Institutional Structure of Govt Decision-Making
 - (1) Policy decisions are made by the executive.
 - (2) Depts, & esp. their cab. mins, have agenda power & info., expertise, resource advantages that give them wide latitude in directing policy w/in their sphere
 - (3) Ministers appointed are govt's most credible signal of policy intent in that area
 - (4) *Overall policy position of govt given by partisan position of politicians' parties who are given the various cabinet portfolios.*
 - (a) ⇒ even in multi-dimensional space, the set of possible policies for govt is finite.
 - (b) Precisely this specifcness, & finiteness of set of poss. govt policies (given by set of poss. party combo's in cab. offices), limits"chaos" potential of multi-D decision-making.
 - c. ⇒ Most important lesson of the volume:
 - (1) Departmental Org. of Govt'l Decision-Making structures environment in which govts born, live, & die.
 - (2) Eqbm cabinets ∴ differ from eqbm policies in unstructured environment.
 - (3) Cabinet eqba common & usu. close to center of array of prty policy-positions.


LXXVI. Building Blocks of the Cabinet-Form.-and-Diss. Model

A. Motivations: office- and/or policy-motivated


1. Politician & voter interaction in elections brings office-seeking & policy-seeking politicians to act alike

2. ∴ L & S no stand either way; just let MPs act “as if” pol.-motivated
- B. Rational Foresight & Common Knowledge
 1. Politicians act (perhaps unconsciously) as if conducting (perhaps very sophisticated) C-B calculations regarding their options
 2. They can look ahead to do so: attempt to foresee consequences of actions & use that to inform current C-B analysis (chess analogy)
 3. Competing-players’ prefs *common knowledge* (& rules of game...)
 4. Important tool: “Game Tree” [see PD example]

The Prisoners' Dilemma




- C. Parties treated unitary actors
 1. Cabinet ministers discretion w/in their jurisdictions, but use it on behalf of, not against, their party.
 2. Practical implication: govt policy in each portfolio area given by partisan identity of its minister.
- D. Dimensionality: how many dimensions will we consider?
 1. Theoretically infinite # may exist, but empirically great correlation in party stances across substantive dimensions.
 2. => few core issues may suffice for fair party-pref descriptions
 3. Take competencies of core ministries (Finance, Foreign Affairs, & maybe Internal Affairs) as defining dimensions of policy space.
- E. Rationality (Cost-Benefit Analysis) in 2D: *Indifference Curves*




- F. *Ministerial Discretion*: Govts implement preferred policy of party holding each cab. min. in that min.'s area.
 3 sources:
1. Mins. may act in area on what whole cab. not explicitly decided
 2. Mins. may influence which matters come to cab. for such decision
 3. Mins. may influence content of proposals they or others put to cab.
- G. *Unitary parties + ministerial-policy + indivisible ministries* ==> *limited number of possible govts (and thus policies)* to consider, as given by ***lattice*** of perpendicular intersections of parties' ideal points [see example].
 2 key assumptions here:
1. Party's discretion in 1 portfolio not affected by who has others [?]
 2. Party's preferences on 1 D not affected by policies on other D's [?]

The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary N-Party System



- H. Parties incorporate *all expected* policy decisions into deciding whether to vote for particular cabinet => unforeseen matters (only) potential sources of cabinet collapse
- I. The *Status Quo*:
 1. Current govt remains in office until defeated by legis. majority, which can only happen when...
 - a. ...unforeseen circumstances Δ distrib. of legis. pow. that supp. govt at start,
 - b. ...some party or parties shift their ideological positions (unforeseen), or
 - c. ...some party or parties split or combine to new ideal points.
 2. When govt collapses, remains in office as caretaker until new govt receives majority support.
- J. Any participant in a proposed govt can *veto* that govt by refusing to accept its proposed role => *all govts require unanimous consent of parties in it & majority support of all legis. parties*
- K. [chronological (continuous) play of govt-formation game is given schematically in Figure 3.1, p. 52]



LXXVII. Working through the Model (*Part II*)

A. *Equilibrium Cabinet*: cabinet for which no actor with power to cause govt collapse has incentive to do so


1. Direct substantive implication of concept of eqba: eqbm cab's expected stable, non-eqbm cabinets expected unstable
2. Two types of eqba in general, & eqbm cabinets can be either sort
 - a. Attractive Equilibria [?]
 - b. Retentive Equilibria [?]
3. Core notion in determination of whether an eqbm cab exists & in characterizing it if so: *strong party*

B. Information necessary to analyze cabinet formation in model

1. About parties
 - a. Their identity (how many distinct parties)
 - b. Their legislative weight (seats for each party)
 - c. Their policy positions (ideological positions in determined policy-space)
2. About Policy Space & Departmental Structure of Govt
 - a. Set of (key) relevant policy dimensions
 - b. Set of (key) cabinet ministries & their competences (i.e., issue domains)
 - c. Relation b/w the two: simple 1-for-1 relationship assumed for most of book
3. About the formation process (assumptions)
 - a. Proposals can come from anyone at any time
 - b. *Unanimous internal consent is required*
 - c. *Majority legislative consent is required*

C. Important Concepts

1. Indifference Curves for Euclidean Preferences [e.g., fig. above]
2. The (*Policy*) *Winset* & the *Lattice (or Govt or Cabinet) Winset*:
 - a. *Winset* of some policy x : set of all alternative pol's majority-preferred to x
 - b. *Lattice Winset* of some cab. X : set of all alt. cab.'s majority-preferred to X
 - (1) Only diff: *lattice winset* concerned only w/ alt. cab.'s, which must lie on lattice
 - (2) [Can use example lattice to show how *winsets* found; L & S's example: Fig. 4.1]



3. The *Dimension-by-Dimension Median (DDM)* in this context
 - a. DEF: a cab. is the DDM *iff* its associated policy is the median on each dimension (has 50%+ on either side of itself, including itself).
 - b. Easy way to find this: read left to right & top to bottom (or v.v.) until find lattice line that turns minority into majority. [examples below + Figure 4.1]
 - c. DDM is an eqbm govt if no alternative govt lies in its *winset*, but no guarantee DDM will have empty winset (so it may not be an eqbm)
 - (1) DDM always a potential eqbm point, so useful place to start the analysis
 - (2) DDM more likely empty winset, & so be *an* eqbm, when # of parties & D low
 - d. [Example below can have either an eqbm DDM (empty winset) or non-eqbm DDM (non-empty winset) depending on legis.-seat distrib.; L & S's Fig. 4.2 shows non-empty winset DDM—one in which cycling can occur]





Figure 4.2 A Unit Circle with 100-Point Values

4. **Strong Parties**

- a. DEF: Party S is strong if it participates in all cab.'s maj pref'd to its ideal point (so can veto any cab. maj-pref to its ideal & so perhaps secure ideal)
- b. 2 types of "strong" party: "very strong" or "merely strong"; "strong"=either
 - (1) **very strong party**: no cab. maj-pref to its ideal exists; => party's ideal=DDM
 - (2) **merely strong party**: cab.'s maj-pref to its ideal exist, but it participates in all of them, & so can veto them
- c. [Examples (from end of these notes)]:
 - (1) fairly even seat dist. in ex. 1 gives an empty-winsset DDM at DD, => D is **v.s.**
 - (2) Party D may be merely strong in less even seat distributions in this example
 - (3) Party B is merely strong in L & S's Figure 4.3]



- d. **Highlander Theorem:** At most 1 strong party can exist; L & S claim common
 - e. Theorems (*syn*: predictions, hypotheses)
 - (1) Very strong party produces an attractive & retentive eqbm cabinet at its ideal
 - (a) N.b., the very-strong party gets all seats
 - (b) N.b., it's a special case of an empty-winset DDM
 - (c) N.b., this so whether the very strong party is itself "large" (in terms of its seats) or not
 - (2) If merely strong party exists, it will participate in every eqbm cab., & eqbm can be no less desirable from the merely strong party's view than the DDM
 - f. Whether & who's strong will depend on weights & positions of parties
 - (1) Δ s entirely external to strong party itself can Δ identity or existence of s.p.
 - (2) "Striking discontinuities"
 - (a) small Δ n weights or positions can have large effect on who's strong & thus on cab. form.
 - (b) conversely, large Δ in these same could have no effect on who's strong
 - (c) depends on how close eqbm is to some alternative govt in lattice that could be an eqbm if things were just somewhat different [refer back to diagrams]
 - g. Merely strong parties rely on their ability to continue (credibly) to veto maj. pref'd cab.'s in which they participate; thus standoffs can occur [see ex's]
 - h. Notice the strong centripetal tendencies:
 - (1) Either the DDM is an equilibrium, or
 - (2) strong party can move eqbm toward its ideal, but s.p. tend to be toward median
- D. "Strong" Parties Making & Breaking Govts
1. Analyzing a case vs. analyzing the process
 - a. To analyze specific case, we need to identify which, if any, party is strong
 - b. For general analysis of govt form & diss, we need to discover the conditions (e.g., distribution of legislative power, etc.) that produce them.
 2. Simplest Case: 2 Dimensions, 3 Parties, any 2 parties make a majority \implies "Triangular system"
 - a. Only "middle" party can be strong, & it usually is (but doesn't have to be)

- b. DEF “Middle” here: connect party ideal points to make triangle, party whose ideal point is vertex between two smaller legs of triangle is “middle”
 - c. [L & S’s first example shows this]
 - d. Outside the simplest case:
 - (1) Formal analysis produces few intuitive results (the mathematical conditions for strong parties are not readily understood substantively)
 - (2) Empirical analysis is limited because universe of coalition-generating party systems is too small to produce inductive generalizations of this breadth
 - (3) => *Simulations*:
 - (a) Program computer to find eqbm cab.’s, strong parties, etc. from given info. about parties, cabinet portfolios, etc.
 - (b) Then, holding some set of parameters fixed (e.g., # parties, relative strength, & # D’s), generate large number of random “virtual parliaments” that vary some other parameter(s) (e.g., their policy positions).
 - (c) Try to find patterns in outcomes (i.e., inductive reasoning from virtual reality)
 - (d) Simulations *NOT* empirical tests b/c program assumes model true to start, but
 - i) Useful for finding substantive “bite” of formal conclusions, which may be too complicated for intuition, (always with caveat that virtual world assumes “random” & assumes model)
 - ii) Often useful for various kinds of sensitivity analysis
 - iii) [In other contexts, many statistical procedures have known properties in infinite samples (asymptotic properties), but unknown properties in limited samples => simulate large number of small samples to observe properties: called Monte Carlo Experiments]
3. L & S’s Simulations
- a. Finding frequency of strong parties under alternative legis-seat dist., # of parties, & # of D (party policy-positions varied randomly) [Table 5.1]
 - (1) “Dominated Decisive Structure”, Fewer Parties, Fewer Dim. all foster SP’s
 - (2) Most usually it’s dominating party that’s strong, if SP exists, but not always, even “dummy party” can be strong (though not very strong)!
 - (3) Argue that dominant position in decisive structure (i.e., size) matters b/c it makes party more likely to be merely strong or even very strong (almost true that only dominant parties can be very strong).

[illegible][illegible]




Figure 3.1. Frequency of very strong parties in "egalitarian" party systems of different sizes and dimensionalities

- b. Finding frequency of strong parties as a function of party positions
 - (1) Almost imposs. for prty at no median on any D to be strong, almost regardless of party's size
 - (2) Mostly, being median on 1 of 2 D's gives party $\approx 25\%$ chance of being strong; only dominant parties in very dominated sys. have noticeably better odds
 - (3) Parties at DDM usu. strong regardless of size, although size helps it be median
- c. Conclusions
 - (1) Size & "median-ness" key to being big player in G-form, being in small, low-D party system also helps. (L & S:) these matter b/c make party 'strong'. [Parties can be 'strong' w/o these, so such parties \therefore key test of L & S thry against alt.'s]

- (2) Strong parties common (and very strong parties surprisingly so). They should always obtain govt according to the theory.

LXXVIII. Empirical Analysis (Part III)

A. Case-study Applications of the Theory

1. Necessary Info:
 - a. Number of parties & their seats in legislature
 - b. Number of dimensions & party positions on them
2. Germany 1987: Tables 6.1-6.4; Figures 6.1 & 6.2 (next pages)
3. Ireland 1992-3: Tables 6.7-6.8; Figures 6.3 & 6.4 (next pages)
4. An example may appear on test for you to analyze in various ways

B. Testable Implications of the Theory

1. Status Quo (SQ) govt at beginning of period either remains in place or is replaced by coalition in its winset
2. If SQ has an empty winset, then SQ remains in office
3. If party is very strong, then it gets all seats in the cabinet
4. If party is merely strong, then it gets at least one seat in cabinet
 - a. If party strong, & every cabinet in winset of its ideal gives some particular cabinet seat to that party, then party will get that seat
 - b. If party strong, then each cab. seat is assigned to that party or to one of its *partners* (= those parties participating in govts in winset of SP's ideal)

C. Data Required:

1. # Seats for each party across some countries over some time
2. Which party has which portfolio before & after each govt change
3. Party positions on the salient dimensions: prior issues
 - a. Which are the key portfolios?
 - b. Which are the key policy dimensions?
 - c. What is the correspondence between those two?
 - d. [Salience weighting is possible]

Table 6.1 *Deutscher Bundestag election of 1987*

	Seats
<i>Individual parties</i>	
Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union (CDU)	223
Social Democratic Party (SPD)	186
Free Democrats (FDP)	46
Greens (G)	12
Total	497
Majority threshold	249
<i>Winning coalitions</i>	
CDU + SPD	409
CDU + FDP	269
CDU + G	265
SPD + FDP + G	274
CD + SPD + FDP	458
CD + SPD + G	451
CD + G + FDP	311
CD + SPD + FDP + G	497

Table 6.1. Positioning of European parties on the economic policy dimension

Party	Mean position (standard error)			
	Influence from EU vs. other sources (1/2)		Promote public ownership (1) vs. oppose public ownership (2/3)	
Greens	5.2	(0.63)	7.1	(0.68)
SPP	6.5	(0.44)	8.1	(0.52)
CDU/CSU	13.7	(1.54)	13.6	(1.40)
FDP	15.7	(0.61)	17.4	(0.39)

Source: Lavie and Hail (1992: 107)

Note: Estimates are based on 1988 election results

Table 6.3. Rankings of German cabinet portfolios

Portfolio	Mean ranking of portfolio	Standard error
Foreign affairs	1.8	(1.29)
Finance	2.1	(1.27)
Interior	3.3	(1.29)
Defense	4.6	(1.46)
Labor and social affairs	4.7	(1.38)
Economics	4.9	(1.42)
Justice	6.3	(1.35)
Youth, family, women, and health	7.3	(1.58)
Rural agriculture, and forestry	8.8	(1.29)
Environment	8.8	(1.54)

Source: Laver and Thur, 1992: 198

Note: Estimates are based on 19 expert responses

Table 6.4. Positions of German parties on foreign policy dimension

Party	Mean position (standard error)	Proxies with 1200 USSR
Greens	4.0	(1.48)
SPD	4.6	(1.35)
FDP	6.5	(1.17)
CDU/CSU	8.8	(1.68)

Source: Laver and Thur, 1992: 197

Note: Estimates are based on 19 expert responses




Figure 3.1 Two-dimensional German policy space: indifference curves relating to CDU ideal point




Figure 3.2 Two-dimensional German policy space: indifference curves relating to SPD ideal point

Table A.3 Electoral structure after the 1992 Irish election

	S seats
<i>Individual parties</i>	
Fianna Fail (FF)	68
Proinseal (PU)	45
Labour (Lab)	33
Progressive Democrats (PD)	10
Democratic Left (DL)	4
Others	5
Total	165
Chair	1
Majority threshold	83
<i>Winning coalitions</i>	
FF+PU	113
FF+Lab	101
PU+Lab+PD	88
FF+PU+Lab	146
FF+PU+PD	123
FF+PU+DL	117
FF+Lab+PD	111
FF+Lab+DL	105
PU+Lab+PD+DL	92
FF+PU+Lab+PD	156
FF+PU+Lab+DL	150
FF+PU+PD+DL	127
FF+Lab+PD+DL	116
FF+PU+Lab+PD+DL	160

Table 8. Positions of Irish parties on territorial policy dimensions

Party	Irish position (estimated error)		Pro British, Anti (20)	
	Irish references (20)		British presence in N-Ireland	
Fianna Fail	12.05	(0.85)	16.25	(0.31)
Free Gael	14.23	(0.42)	10.60	(0.54)
Labour	7.45	(0.10)	12.07	(0.50)
Prog. Demts	10.07	(0.12)	10.07	(0.51)
Dem. Left	4.57	(0.74)	8.06	(0.86)

Source: Leeson (1984).




Figure 6-3: Indifference curves relating DC and AC power. The intersection of the two circles is shaded.




Figure 6-4: Indifference curves relating DC and AC power. The intersection of the four circles is shaded.

D. L & S “test” these implications against null of random portfolio allocation [*wimpy null*: L & S overstate absence of alt. theories]

1. Data

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

Thema 3: Polymere Halbleiterschichten für organische Photovoltaik

<i>Landnamen</i>	<i>Teilparität</i>	<i>Gesamtparität</i>	<i>Teilparität</i>
Australien	Finanzien	Innerer	Fremde Affairs
Belgien	Finanzen	Politik	-
Dänemark	Finanzen	Äußerer Bereich	-
Frankreich	Finanzen	Fremde Affairs	-
Germanien	Finanzen	Äußerer Bereich	Innerer
Irland	Finanzen	Fremde Affairs	-
Italien	Finanzen	Äußerer Bereich	Äußerer Bereich
Japan	Finanzen	Fremde Affairs	Innerer
Luxemburg	Finanzen	Äußerer Bereich	-
Niederlande	Finanzen	Finanzen Affairs	Finanzen Affairs
Norwegen	Finanzen	Äußerer Bereich	-
Schweden	Finanzen	Äußerer Bereich	-

2. Test results:

- a. Table 8.1 assesses implication B.1 from above
- b. Table 8.2 assesses implication B.2 from above
- c. Table 8.3 assesses implication B.3 from above
- d. Table 8.4 assesses implication B.4 from above
- e. Table 8.5 assesses implication B.4a from above
- f. Table 8.6 assesses implication B.4b from above

Variable	Descriptive Statistics		
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum
Age	35.2	12.5	22
Gender	1.5	0.7	1
Education	12.8	1.5	10
Income	45000	15000	30000
Health	2.1	0.8	1
Marital Status	1.8	0.9	1
Employment	1.2	0.4	1
Home Ownership	0.7	0.4	0
Vehicle Ownership	0.9	0.3	0
Life Satisfaction	4.2	1.1	3
Overall Score	55.8	10.2	40

Table 8.1. Assessment of applicability of $U(T)$ (Type 1)
 $WISQ_{L,T} = 0$ (for $SO_L \equiv SO_T = 1$)

Country (U_L, U_T)	Value (implication)		
	Global literature	Scandinavia	Other Europe
Australia (0, 0)	IS/A	N/A	N/A
Belgium (1, 0)	459	164	1
Denmark (0, 0)	1,053	429	45
Finland (0, 2)	1,270	0	0
Germany (0, 0)	740	N/A	N/A
Iceland (0, 3)	1,017	0	0
Ireland (1, 0)	841	589	0
Italy (8, 0)	3,000	2,022	0
Luxembourg (0, 0)	2,007	2,107	444
Netherlands (0, 0)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Norway (4, 0)	2,344	2,800	0
Sweden (0, 0)	9,441	9,441	0
United (24, 0)	20,352	21,557	1,057

Table B.3 Assessment of triplication: If $|\Delta t_i| = v_i$ then $\text{sign} = 1$

Country (ITE) (n_i, m_i)	Time triplication		
	Count t_{base} held	Count t_{tr} held	Held by shares
Austria (0, 0)	NA	NA	NA
Belgium (2, 13)	3,603	467	92
Denmark (2, 1)	1,835	1,181	69
Finland (0, 4)	2,062	0	47
Germany (0, 0)	NA	NA	NA
Indonesia (1, 4)	2,558	1,132	233
Ireland (0, 1)	1,974	1,792	34
Italy (1, 5)	7,000	3,011	13
Luxembourg (9, 1)	15,942	1,503	1,259
Netherlands (0, 0)	NA	NA	NA
Norway (6, 5)	7,310	4,354	205
Sweden (12, 7)	13,100	10,071	643
Wales (40, 4)	53,534	29,111	2,995

Table 3.4 Assessment of Implication 3: If S parameters in early version of VICE³, then S participation in SLD₂

Country (date access)	Data implication		
	Could have held	Actually held	Area by change
Austria (2, 3)	8,000	6,136	4,982
Belgium (15, 15)	15,100	8,638	4,016
Denmark (3, 11)	8,580	1,470	3,370
Finland (11, 7)	2,720	2,000	1,885
Germany (10, 7)	9,500	3,821	7,121
France (2, 10)	16,000	8,000	6,444
Ireland (3, 1)	1,864	1,442	1,432
Italy (13, 10)	7,900	5,257	3,235
Netherlands (11, 1)	17,820	15,900	11,229
Norway (1, 0)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Sweden (2, 8)	10,000	5,000	3,527
Switzerland (13, 8)	11,000	11,138	11,039
Total (108, 79)	115,000	74,149	48,651

Table 8.5 Assessment of Implication as if one strongly and if only slightly of
WFO's assessment of particular portfolio as a basis for assessing that portfolio in SCA

Country this measures	Page Implication		
	Could have held	Actually held	diff. by claims
Austria (2, 3)	117	1,116	70
Belgium (7, 17)	11,086	8,451	2,833
Denmark (5, 16)	11,351	1,608	1,741
Finland (11, 23)	9,031	2,135	800
Germany (6, 11)	11,552	4,145	2,038
Ireland (8, 16)	15,989	5,089	3,588
Iceland (9, 3)	1,971	1,722	34
Italy (5 th , 24)	9,854	1,161	554
Luxembourg (25, 7)	17,235	11,235	2,701
Netherlands (10, 11)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Switzerland (1, 3, 13)	13,788	5,044	1,530
Sweden (26, 11)	14,105	10,841	264
Yield (11, 13, 14, 15)	117,412	25,146	16,185

Table 3.6 Assessment of Implications 2B of 545 at 100% Portwater pumping
in 2024. Expressed in terms of the maximum total effect (H) in MW

Country (H) in MW	Dep. implication		
	Could have had	Actually had	Dep. difference
Austria (11, 10)	8,468	5,506	2,962
Belgium (26, 34)	14,225	7,882	6,343
Denmark (12, 24)	8,055	3,007	5,048
Finland (16, 36)	5,260	2,172	3,088
Germany (44, 11)	10,352	6,130	4,222
France (20, 18)	16,032	9,306	6,726
Ireland (9, 3)	1,174	1,772	-598
Italy (67, 20)	9,364	7,213	2,151
Luxembourg (2, 1)	17,817	11,255	6,562
Netherlands (1, 1)	NA	NA	NA
Norway (16, 18)	11,007	5,044	5,963
Sweden (25, 13)	14,005	10,841	3,164
Total (24, 207)	121,571	71,082	50,489

3. Conclusions [Mine, not L & S's]:
 - a. Not all do terribly well, & clear cross-country variation in how well they do
 - b. *Random* alt. hypoth. is weak & irrelevant:
 - (1) Could use *MinWinCoal*, e.g., to narrow range prtys from which to draw rndmly
 - (2) Hard to say, \therefore , whether performance reported is "good"; how would *reasonable* alternatives have done
 - c. That said, this one of only going theories that offers predictions at level of which parties will get which seats [brainstorm for any alternatives?]

E. L & S's much better test: the regression on page 189

1. Dependent Variable: $G_{ij} = 1$ if party i is in govt j , $G_{ij} = 0$ if not
2. Independent Variables:
 - a. MSP = 1 if party is a merely strong party, = 0 if it is not
 - b. VSP = 1 if party is a very strong party, = 0 if it is not
 - c. PSP = 1 if party is a partner of a strong party, = 0 if it is not
 - d. W = the party's percentage of the legislative seats
 - e. MD1 = the party's policy distance from dimension 1 median
 - f. MD2 = the party's policy distance from dimension 2 median

3. Results (next page, and...):

G=	-.970	-.151	MSP	+.630	VSP	+.248	PSP	+.041	W	-.047	MD1	-.157	MD2
s.e.	(0.34)	(0.184)		(0.182)		(0.144)		(.004)		(.031)		(0.041)	
t=	(2.85)	(0.82)		(3.46)		(1.72)		(10.5)		(1.54)		(3.84)	

Recall: We like coefficients near twice their standard error or better. That's the same as wanting t-stats around 2 or better.

Table 9.1: Variables Involved in Evaluating L & S's Making & Breaking Govts			
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Operationalization</i>	<i>Source</i>
Govt	G_{ij}	1 = party i is in govt j 0 = party i is not in govt j	EJPR
“Merely” Strong Party	MSP_{ij}	1=party i merely strong at time of govt j 0=party i not merely strong in govt j	WINSET
“Very” Strong Party	VSP_{ij}	1=party i very strong at time of govt j 0=party i not very strong in govt j	WINSET
“Partner” of a Strong Party	PSP_{ij}	1 = party i is partner of merely strong party at time of govt j 0 = party i is not partner of merely strong party at time of govt j	WINSET
Weight	W_{ij}	Party i 's percentage of legislative seats at time of govt j	MR
Centrality	MD_{ijk}	Ideological distance on dimension k of party i from the median on that dimension at the time of govt j	LH

Who Gets Into Govt?

$$G_{ij} = -0.72 + 1.01(S_{ij}) \quad \text{where } S_{ij} = MSP_{ij} + VSP_{ij}$$

t-statistics: (2.72) (10.93)

$$G_{ij} = -0.51 + 0.68(MSP_{ij}) + 1.66(VSP_{ij}) + 0.73(PSP_{ij})$$

t-statistics: (1.90) (4.62) (11.01) (5.86)

What Makes a Party Strong?

$$MSP_{ij} = -0.77 + 0.03(W_{ij}) - 0.49(MD_{ij1}) - 0.03(MD_{ij2})$$

t-statistics: (5.23) (6.24) (8.79) (0.55)

$$VSP_{ij} = -1.77 + 0.05(W_{ij}) - 0.29(MD_{ij1}) - 0.10(MD_{ij2})$$

t-statistics: (9.67) (10.19) (6.43) (1.61)

$$PSP_{ij} = -0.86 + 0.01(W_{ij}) + 0.18(MD_{ij1}) - 0.45(MD_{ij2})$$

t-statistics: (6.96) (2.89) (6.75) (10.51)

Who Gets Into Govt? Take 2

$$G_{ij} = -0.97 - 0.15MSP_{ij} + 0.63VSP_{ij} + 0.25PSP_{ij} + 0.04W_{ij} - 0.05MD_{ij1} - 0.16MD_{ij2}$$

t: (2.85) (0.82) (3.46) (1.72) (10.53) (1.54) (3.84)

LXXIX. Portfolio-Allocation Model & Cabinet Stability (*Part IV*)

- A. Eqbm cabs more durable than any non-eqbm cabs that do form
- B. Same factors (info.) needed to determine eqbm cabinets are factors that must Δ to alter what is the eqbm cabinet:
 1. [List of parties, their weights, & their policy positions]
 2. [Dimensionality of policy space & its allocation to portfolios]
- C. Only unforeseen shocks can destabilize an eqbm cab [why?]. Examples: [how do these link with I.B.]


above?]

1. Party splits or fusions
2. Defections or by-elections
3. Emergence of new issues or fading of old
4. Events may shift party preferences
5. Δ parties' percept's of others (esp. ability to win standoffs)

D. Compare Fig. 10.1 & 10.2: which cabinet more stable? Why? What general implications might be drawn from this?

E. General Simulations

1. Take some set of fixed situations, described by...
 - a. The # parties; b. Their initial policy positions; c. Their weight in parliament
2. Computerize the following steps
 - a. Calculate initial equilibrium
 - b. Generate 1000 random perturbations of party positions
 - c. Calculate new equilibria
 - d. Draw inferences from proportion of time eqbm changes in various settings all subjected to same-variance random shocks
3. [Tables 10.2 & 10.3 show results]



4. Conclusions:
 - a. Empty winset DDMs are most stable
 - b. If empty winset DDM is an ideal point (v.s.p.), then extremely stable
 - c. Least stable appears to be where dominant party is not median


F. Note on PM's ability to call elections:

1. PM can threaten coalition partners & parl. w/ calling elections when expects to gain by doing so
 - a. Certainly won't do so when expects to lose
 - b. Threat, if successful, will cause Δ in govt in PM's party's favor
2. Thus, L & S conclude, shifts in potential electoral support favoring PM's party can cause govt Δ
3. [Will Δ other parties' electoral potential have effects? Compare govt, non-govt parties, & parts of govt'l parl-maj & opp.?)

LXXX. Relaxing assumptions to reconsider aspects of policy space

A. Reminder:


1. Options not *whether* to make assumptions (A's). All logical arg. has some set A's. Options: which A's to make & how explicitly?
2. So, when re-considering A's, questions are:



- a. How much do alternative A's alter conclusions?
- b. How do conclusions drawn from one set of A's fare empirically compared to those drawn from another?
3. Agree w/ L & S that, *cet. par.*, more explicit A's (usu. from formal arg's) better than less (usu. from informal arg.'s).

B. Dimensionality—allowing for many dimensions?

1. Policy-space dimensionality likely infinite or large & indeterminate
 2. Even in lattice subset, $\uparrow D \Rightarrow \downarrow \text{prob}(\text{eqba})$ in random party systems
 3. Two approaches to determining policy space:
 - a. Take existing portfolios as simple & given (fixed at start of process)
 - b. Use the policy issues on which parties take a public stance
 - c. Both seem to produce D too large to reconcile w/ apparent stability of govts
 4. Empirically, parties' policy positions highly correlated across D 's
 - a. Esp., across related D 's, but even across seemingly unrelated dims
 - b. such correlation reduces the effective dimensionality of politics
 - c. [demonstrate this in 2D, perfect correlation case: Figs. 11.1 & 11.2]
 - d. [why might parties adopt correlated policy stances like this?]
- C. Differing issue salience & policy-pref dependence across D 's
1. Equal salience \Rightarrow circular indifference curves: pure distance pref's
 - a. Unequal salience \Rightarrow distance along one D 'more distasteful' than distance along others \Rightarrow ellipsoidal indifference curves
 - b. Still linear, orthogonal policy reaction curves \Rightarrow theoretical propositions still hold, but actual eqba case by case may differ
 2. Independent preferences across D 's \Rightarrow indifference ellipses or circles that are perpendicular to axes
 - a. *Non-separable* policy pref's \Rightarrow non-orthogonal policy reaction-curves
 - b. \Rightarrow can radically change the analysis.
- D. Complex jurisdictions [define]
1. If still assume min's free reign in portfolios' areas, then allocating multiple portfolios to 1 party reduces set of possible cabs (lattice space): fewer ways to allocate control over policy areas
 2. Some new results
 - a. Party ideal points are always in set of possible cabinets: e.g., pure prime-ministerial govt.
 - b. If strong (either type) under simple jurisdictions, then strong under any complex jurisdictioning [why?]
 - c. If empty-winsset DDM under simple jurisdiction remains an option under complex, then remains an eqbm [how might it disappear?]
 - d. Reminder that effective jurisdictional complexity is what matters (policy stances are correlated across issues)
- E. Implications of these three extensions
1. *Correlated preferences* between parties across dimensions reduces dimensionality & simplifies analysis, increases prob. eqba
 2. *Jurisdictional complexity* reduces the set of possible cabinets & so likewise simplifies & increases prob. eqba



3. *Unequal salience* doesn't make that much difference, but *non-separability* makes a large difference

LXXXI. Extensions

A. Factions & intra-party politics

1. Party leaders are potential cabinet ministers
 - a. Leadership involves a established set of policy reputations & credibility
 - b. Reputations take time to build & generally valuable enough to be maintained
 - c. => parties have set of possible issue stances to which can credibly commit in govt given by established policy reputations of their leaders
 - d. In this view, factions arise from party leads w/ (prob'ly slightly) diff. prefs
 - e. By having diverse set of leaders, party retains some ability to strategically shift its policy stance on issues by rearranging its leadership assignments
2. Three effects arise from this possibility
 - a. Effect of having more than 1 poss. party ideal point (L & S still maintain not any point possible, but those for which some leader-combo have estab. rep.)
 - b. Effect of factionalism on the stability of cabinets
 - c. Incentives for leaders to split from or fuse with parties
3. L & S work from the premises that:
 - a. A dominant party leadership controls the entire party's votes
 - b. Subordinate party leadership:
 - (1) Does not control any votes
 - (2) Cannot veto any cabinet, cannot even veto its own participation in cabinet
 - (3) BUT, once minister, can pursue own ideal, not forced to pursue dom. leaders'
 - c. Under these conditions, addition of factions adds lattice points to set of possible cabinets. Its like adding parties with zero votes & no veto power.
4. One interesting implication: Δ w/in opp. parties can alter strategic options of governing party(ies)

B. Minority & surplus-majority govts

1. One of portfolio-allocation model's most attractive features is that it predicts *minority govts* under certain conditions
2. *Surplus-majorities* also possible: parties=>votes but also credible policy stances (i.e., add lattice points to possible govt sets—added points may be eqba even if party in question not nec. to maj.)

C. Endogenizing issue assignment to portfolios:

1. B/c diff. jurisdictional allocations can produce diff. eqbm cabs, parties have prefs over portfolio allocation schemes.
2. => another element in bargaining to form a govt.

LXXXII. Some very key elements of theory & what if relaxed:


A. Extreme departmentalism:

1. But compromise within cabinet goes on all the time
2. Finance min. esp. has considerable influence on other ministries
3. Prime minister has strong influence across board
4. As departmentalism relaxed, lattice becomes *fuzzy*
 - a. => back toward govt policy as some compromise among its members' ideals on all issues rather than policy as ideal of party holding that portfolio
 - b. => back toward chaos theories

- B. Party positions (or faction-leader positions) given, fixed exog. to model: if these instead strategic, may get very diff. dynamic

LXXXIII. L & S: Applying the Model to Find Equilibrium Cabinets


- A. Step 0: Draw & Label the Lattice of Possible Govts
- B. Step 1: Find the DDM Govt
- C. Steps 2+:




Example 1:

Empty winset DDM at a party's ideal point =>
that party is very strong & govt where it gets the portfolios is *the* (1) eqbm:

The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System



The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System




Example 2:


Non-Empty Winset DDM, not at a party's ideal, but merely strong party exists

=> eqbm govts (>1) are that party's ideal & all govts maj-pref'd to it
(in all of which the m.s.p. participates, by definition of "merely strong")


The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System



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The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System




Example 3:

Empty Winset DDM, not at any party's ideal, but merely strong party exists =>


eqbm govts (>1) are that party's ideal & all govts maj-pref to it (in all of which m.s.p. participates, by def. of "merely strong"),

but only those that no farther away from m.s.p.'s ideal than empty-winset DDM


The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System



The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System




The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System





Example 4:

Non-Empty Winsset DDM & no strong party => no (0) equilibrium govts

The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System





One more possibility exists, which was not drawn: Empty Winset DDM with No Strong Party => **the** (1) equilibrium is the empty-winset DDM.

PS341: Outcomes, Part II (GLM, Ch. 13; Lijphart Chs. 15-17)

LXXXIV. Gallagher, Laver, & Mair, chpt. 13.

A. The central question: does politics matter?

1. Diff. to determine whether partic. govt made diff. in partic. instance b/c counter-factual: would something diff. have happened if diff. govt in office?
2. Approaches
 - a. Detailed 'case study' of major policy interventions
 - (1) Logic: pick dramatic policy initiative, if world changes some way, then initiative caused it
 - (2) [Strengths & Weaknesses?]
 - b. Compare elect promises w/ govt programs at investiture
 - c. Compare elect promises & /or govt programs w/ policy actions
 - d. Spec'ly gov spend or other directly observable govt action
 - e. Broad outcomes like gov size, econ outcomes (UE, INF, ineq.)

B. Case Studies: privatization in France & UK

1. Privatization in France 1986-1993-Present

- a. French right, RPR (Gaullists), fought 1986 election heavily on platform of privatization
- b. 3/20/86, Gaullists, w/ UDF, won parl control, install govt replace left PSF-led coal.
- c. Decrees implementing 1st stages of priv. officially 10/24/86
- d. Plan (Decree): priv. 66 firms, w/ 900,000 workers, value FF300B: 1/4± of Paris Bourse (\$50B±)
- e. <1yr, implement 1/3 of 5-yr plan
- f. # of small shareholders ↑ from 1.5 Million in 1985 to 8 Million in 1987 [Significance?]
- g. 10/87 stock-market crash=>big losses on those investors (et al., but perhaps esp. newer)
- h. Right loses pres. & then parl. elects mid-88
- i. PSF-led coal. halts privatization
- j. 1993 election returned right coal. to control parl., govt.
- k. Balladur govt renews priv.

2. Privatization in the UK 1979-Present

- a. Conservative govt that took office 1979 (Thatcher) had not fought elect. on priv.
- b. Began selling profitable British Aerospace & Britoil for needed cash (unwilling to raise taxes or run larger deficits)
- c. These early successes => privatization more central party's 1983 election campaign
- d. Privatization Plans extended to electricity, gas, water, & other previous *untouchables*
- e. Virtually all this privatization completed by 1990:
 - (1) 50 +/- companies, 1/2 total state sector +/-, well over 24B Pounds by 1988 (about \$40B)
 - (2) shareholding population tripled to 10 million people
 - (3) 600,000 jobs shifted from public to private sector

3. Some but more lmted priv. also in Ger., It., Neth., Bel., even Swe. & Austria

C. Party manifestos & govt policy-programs [2nd ed.]

TABLE 13-2 PARTY AND GOVERNMENT POLICY ON FREE MARKET ECONOMICS IN NORWAY

Party	Average Government Policy Emphasis: Party in Government, %	Average Government Policy Emphasis: Party out of Government, %
Labor Party	3.8	13.5
Conservative Party	14.2	4.3

Note: An analysis of variance shows a statistically significant difference in economic policy between "party in" and "party out" for each party (F-ratio significant at $p = 0.001$). Source: Calculated directly from data on Norwegian party manifestos, 1945-1982, used in Sivori (1992).

TABLE 13-4 PARTY POLICY EMPHASES ON FREE MARKET ECONOMICS IN NORWAY

Party	Average Percentage Manifesto Advocates Free Market Economics
Communist Party	0.7
Labor Party	0.9
Christian People's Party	3.2
Liberal Party	3.6
Center Party	5.8
Conservatives	15.5

Source: Calculated directly from data on Norwegian party manifestos, 1945-83, used in Sivori (1992).

THE IMPACT OF PARTY PARTICIPATION ON THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF GOVERNMENT

Party	Percentage of Policy Document Giving Emphasis to Free Market Economics		
	Average Manifesto Emphasis	Average Government Emphasis: Party in Government	Average Government Emphasis: Party out of Government
Denmark			
Social Democrats*	1.6	5.6	18.6
Social Liberals	7.3	5.9	10.1
Liberals*	19.4	18.0	5.5
Conservatives*	25.2	18.8	8.6
Germany			
Social Democrats*	7.2	10.1	10.1
Free Democrats	5.7	9.3	10.5
Christian Democrats	3.0	10.1	8.5
Italy			
Socialists	1.0	3.2	2.5
Social Democrats	0.5	3.2	2.4
Republicans	1.1	3.1	2.5
Liberals	3.0	2.8	2.6
Christian Democrats	1.9	2.7	1.1
Luxembourg			
Socialists	1.8	8.6	10.8
Democratic Party	5.6	12.0	6.2
Christian Social Party	5.7	8.2	1.1
Netherlands			
Labor Party (PvdA)	8.2	9.8	18.5
Liberals	20.8	14.3	11.2
CHU	10.2	13.5	13.0
ARP	13.2	14.2	11.1
KVP/CDA	10.3	12.8	1.1
Norway			
Labor*	0.9	3.8	13.5
Liberals	3.8	11.5	5.9
Center Party*	5.6	12.4	5.1
Conservatives*	15.5	14.2	4.3
Christian People's Party*	3.2	12.4	5.1

*Analysis of variance between "party in" and "party out" yields F-ratio significant at $p = .05$ or better. Party always, or almost always, in government; statistics meaningless. Parties never, or almost never, in government have also been omitted.

Source: Computed directly from data on party manifestos, 1945-82, collected by authors in 1985 and 1986.

TABLE 13-3

TABLE 13-4 HOW BRITISH PARTIES ACTED ON THEIR MANIFESTOS, 1970-79

Policy Area	Conservatives, 1970-74			Labour, 1974-79		
	Acted on	Ambiguous	No Action	Acted on	Ambiguous	No Action
Economy	22	2	5	28	4	9
Environment	13	1	1	8	1	1
Home affairs	11	1	1	5	1	1
Health, social security	17	2	1	10	2	1
Education, science	7	1	1	2	1	1
Foreign affairs, defence	5	1	1	3	1	1
Agriculture	2	1	1	3	1	1
Total, N	77	10	8	57	19	26
Total, %	80	10	8	54	19	26

Source: Rose, p. 85.

1. First step from campaign promise to outcomes is govt's announced program (its intentions) at start of

tenure

2. Must code both doc's consistently: content analysis [def]
 - a. GLM focus on % of doc expressly promoting free-market econ
 - b. Q=whether govt alt. \Rightarrow promised changes in govt prog's
 3. In some cases (e.g., Nor: Tab 13.1-2), correspondence remarkable; varies some gen'ly (Table 13-3)
 4. [Discuss Table 13-3]
 5. General conclusions:
 - a. When parties' elect manifestos diverge much, progs reflect this
 - b. Conversely, where parties' manifestos show little pol debate, lack of debate reflected in their respective programs
 - c. Where govt alt partial [DEF], response in govt prog's also partial
 - d. Prog's tend closer to 'perm fixtures' of govt than partners
- D. Party manifestos & actual govt policy
1. Methodological issues
 - a. What's a pledge & what's just a platitude or aspiration?
 - b. Disting. pledges would have power to fulfill if elect from not
 - c. Fulfillment is going to be a matter of degree
 2. Previous findings:
 - a. Richard Rose: *Do Parties Make a Difference?* (1980) compared Conservatives 1970-4 with Labour 1974-9: Finds that parties overwhelmingly do what they promise
 - b. Rallings (1987) extends it to UK '45-'79 & finds 70% fulfill rate (similar rates found elsewhere in other studies)
 - (1) Clarity of promise (esp. those regarding \uparrow benefits etc.) increases its odds of being fulfilled
 - (2) Promises to repeal ideologically unacceptable acts of previous govt almost always fulfilled
 - c. Evidence from multiparty coalition govts is currently lacking:
 - (1) [Some rough evidence from Hofferbert et al. 1996 indicates generally, across countries & time, policies react to vote-weighted policy-programs of parties, with some lag (inertia).]
 - d. Criticisms:
 - (1) Many focus only on 'doable' promises
 - (2) Lots of promises are straightforward & uncontroversial
 - (3) Parties may choose to make only promises that easily kept so it can carry their fulfillment to electorate [how much a 'criticism'?]
 3. However you slice it, evidence continues to mount that 'reasonable' promises remarkably well fulfilled
- E. Party govt & public policy: Left/Right & Size of Govt, Bdgt Categories/Priorities, & Environment
- a. Broad association b/w L/R govt partisanship & govt size [see Tables 13.1-3 in 3rd ed.], but considerable exceptions
 - b. Resolving this apparent (mild) puzzle
 - (1) Narrow focus to more specific bdgtry elements, e.g. welf spend
 - (2) Partisan effects, esp. in short run, more readily observed in changes in budgets than in their levels since latter tend to reflect long accumulated histories of decisions & change incrementally
 - (3) Greater need to control other factors—econ. & struct. cond's, e.g.
 - (4) Move beyond simple L/R as partisan impact on policy (e.g. Castles & others have considered distinctive impact of Christian Dem)
 - (5) Other confitions/features of govt; e.g., veto actors

TABLE 13-1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LONG-TERM IDEOLOGICAL COMPLEXION OF GOVERNMENT AND SIZE OF PUBLIC SECTOR

	Soc. dem. & left percentage of total cabinet seats	Mean left score of government	Govt. spending as % GDP	Govt. employ- ment as % total employment
Year	1950-54	1945-55	1956	1956
Portugal	5.7	na	41.1	18.1
Ireland	9.7	1.5	38.1	12.8
Italy	12.4	1.5	49.4	15.8
Netherlands	16.5	2.0	40.9	13.6
Denmark	19.7	1.8	52.1	16.1
Switzerland	23.8	1.9	33.9	14.0
France	24.5	2.0	51.8	22.1
Germany	24.8	2.1	45.8	15.5
Spain	26.0	1.8	34.1	13.8
Belgium	27.8	2.1	49.9	18.7
UK	28.1	2.3	41.4	14.7
Luxembourg	28.4	2.1	45.0	11.1
Iceland	31.7	2.5	54.0	18.1
Finland	33.8	2.8	58.2	22.1
Denmark	50.7	3.1	59.8	30.3
Austria	58.7	3.4	47.2	22.8
Norway	73.1	4.0	42.4	30.4
Sweden	76.3	4.1	62.3	30.7
Correlation with left cabinet seats			0.47	0.20
Correlation with left score			0.48	0.23

Sources: Cabinet list taken for left column, 1988, p.160. Scores by G. Brown, Phillips, and Rose (1988) in *Journal of Public Policy* (1988), p.160. Scores by G. Brown, Phillips, and Rose (1988) in *Journal of Public Policy* (1988), p.160. Scores by G. Brown, Phillips, and Rose (1988) in *Journal of Public Policy* (1988), p.160.

Portugal	5.7	na	5.9	36
Ireland	9.7	1.5	10.3	40
Italy	12.4	1.5	7.8	25
Netherlands	16.5	2.0	41.3	8
Denmark	19.7	1.8	7.7	52
Switzerland	23.8	1.9	6.3	4
France	24.5	2.0	6.2	17
Germany	24.8	2.1	19.8	23
Spain	26.0	1.8	6.5	33
Belgium	27.8	2.1	12.0	34
UK	28.1	2.3	9.4	34
Luxembourg	28.4	2.1	20.0	31
Iceland	31.7	2.5	8.8	39
Finland	33.8	2.8	12.5	20
Denmark	50.7	3.1	14.8	34
Austria	58.7	3.4	7.8	30
Norway	73.1	4.0	7.8	34
Sweden	76.3	4.1	6.0	11
Correlation with left cabinet seats			0.20	
Correlation with left score			0.23	

TABLE 13-2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LONG-TERM IDEOLOGICAL COMPLEXION OF GOVERNMENT AND SELECTED PUBLIC SPENDING INDICATORS

	Soc. dem. & left percentage of total cabinet seats	Mean left score of government	Social security & welfare as % GDP	Govt. spending on educational institutions as % GDP	Public sector health spending as % GDP	Overseas development aid as % GDP
Year	1950-54	1945-55	1956	1956	1956	1956
Portugal	5.7	na	0.3	5.4	1.8	0.05
Ireland	9.7	1.5	na	4.7	3.2	1.8
Italy	12.4	1.5	0.7	4.3	3.5	2.1
Netherlands	16.5	2.0	0.7	4.8	5.2	0.8
Denmark	19.7	1.8	0.7	na	5.2	na
Switzerland	23.8	1.9	na	5.5	7.1	0.1
France	24.5	2.0	1.3	5.8	7.1	0.4
Germany	24.8	2.1	3.0	4.5	8.2	0.1
Spain	26.0	1.8	0.4	4.8	5.8	0.1
Belgium	27.8	2.1	1.0	na	6.6	0.1
UK	28.1	2.3	1.3	4.8	5.1	0.2
Luxembourg	28.4	2.1	na	4.3	8.2	0.35
Iceland	31.7	2.5	1.2	4.5	6.8	1.7
Finland	33.8	2.8	3.5	11.5	5.1	0.03
Denmark	50.7	3.1	6.7	8.5	11.1	0.2
Austria	58.7	3.4	3.4	5.3	8.7	0.33
Norway	73.1	4.0	2.0	3.8	6.3	0.46
Sweden	76.3	4.1	6.7	11.8	7.1	0.14
Correlation with left cabinet seats			0.70	0.57	0.34	0.20
Correlation with left score			0.62	0.73	0.33	0.26

Sources: See sources for Table 13-1. Levels of public spending OECD.

LXXXV. LIJPHART ch15: Macro Mngmnt & Viol Control

A. "So what?" Does maj v. cons dem matter? How?

1. Conventional Wisdom:

a. Based on PR v. Plur/Maj, extended to maj v. consensus

b. Tradeoff b/w "quality" & "effectiveness" dem govt

(1) PR/Cons \Rightarrow more accurate rep, esp. Minority rep & protect

(2) Plur/Maj \Rightarrow 1-prty maj more decisive & effective govt

2. Hypotheses:

- a. Conv Wis: conc. pol pow in 1, unified, maj prty \Rightarrow unified, decisive ldrshp, coherent & effective pol-mkng
- b. Counter-arguments:
 - (1) Fast decisions not nec. = wise (or effective) decisions
 - (2) Alternation may undermine coherence of 1 govt's policies
 - (a) Perhaps esp. in ec pol, policy consistency may be paramount
 - (b) Pol by broad cons/conciliation more effective & eff'ly implem
 - (3) Maintaining civil peace in divided society esp. may require broad conciliation/consensus & broad inclusion grps

3. Preliminary/Prior Evidence

- a. Katzenstein & Rogowski: small ctry PR & corp to compensate for disadvantages small size in int'l trade
- b. Rose & Castle: no signif diff macro 'cross broad types, but Crepaz finds some infl & UE effects, & esp. strikes
- c. Roubini & Sachs find multiparty coal & debt assoc, but others challenge. (Franzese chpt. 3 offers resolution.)
- d. *P*: representational dem signif advant maintain civ order

B. L's Evidence (n.b., lack controls...implications?)

Table 15.1 Bivariate regression analyses of the effect of consensus democracy (executives-parties dimension) on nineteen macroeconomic performance variables and on four indicators of violence

	Estimated regression coefficient	Standardized regression coefficient	Absolute t-value	Countries (N)
Economic growth (1960-93)	-0.07	-0.04	0.22	39
Economic growth (1970-95)	-0.14	-0.20	0.81	18
Economic growth (1980-95)	-0.07	-0.13	0.57	21
GDP deflator (1980-93)	-1.87*	-0.28	1.58	39
GDP deflator (1970-95)	-0.51	-0.25	1.04	18
GDP deflator (1980-95)	-1.01	-0.28	1.26	21
Consumer price index (1970-95)	-0.36	-0.19	1.25	18
Consumer price index (1980-95)	-1.13*	-0.31	1.34	21
Unemployment, standardized (1971-95)	-0.70	-0.35	1.22	13
Unemployment, unstandardized (1971-95)	-0.69	-0.27	1.13	18
Unemployment, standardized (1980-95)	-1.38*	-0.38	1.42	14
Unemployment, unstandardized (1980-95)	-1.19*	-0.32	1.45	23
Strike activity (1970-94)	-0.02	-0.23	0.95	18
Strike activity (1980-94)	-21.99	0.26	1.28	23
Budget deficits (1970-95)	-0.07	-0.02	0.09	16
Budget deficits (1980-95)	-0.41	-0.13	0.40	19
GLB freedom index (1993-95)	-0.13	-0.16	0.89	32
HIK freedom index (1996)	0.04	0.08	0.52	35
Freedom House index (1996)	0.04	0.01	0.07	26
Riots (1963-82)	-0.40	-0.12	0.51	41
Riots (1963-82)	-1.26***	-0.55	2.19	25
Political deaths (1963-82)	-2.62*	-0.33	1.42	11
Political deaths (1963-82)	-19.37***	-0.38	2.01	25

*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level (one-tailed test)

**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test)

***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed test)

Source: Based on data in United Nations Development Programme 1990, 1991-97, 2008; United Nations Development Programme 1992, 2002-3, 2003, 2004, 2005; OECD 1991, 2003-9; OECD 1995, 22-23; OECD 1996a, A9, A15, A19, A24-A25, A33; OECD 1996b, 22-23; International Labour Organization 1996 (and earlier volumes); Gwartney, Lawson, and Block 1996: 881; Palmer, Johnson, and Kirkpatrick 1997: xxx-xxxix; Messick 1996: 12-14; Taylor and Jones 1993, 1, 81-93, 2: 33-48, 49-51; Taylor 1989

Table 15.2 Bivariate regression analyses of the effect of consensus democracy (federal-unitary dimension) on five measures of inflation

	Estimated regression coefficient	Standardized regression coefficient	Absolute t-value	Countries (N)
GDP deflator (1980-95)	-2.38**	-0.30	2.07	34
GDP deflator (1970-95)	-1.06***	-0.62	3.14	18
GDP deflator (1980-95)	-1.41**	-0.45	2.21	21
Consumer price index (1970-95)	-1.04***	-0.65	3.42	18
Consumer price index (1980-95)	-1.41**	-0.46	2.36	21

*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level (one-tailed test)

**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed test)

***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed test)

Source: Based on data in United Nations Development Programme (1998, 1998-99, 2000); OECD (1996a, 1997, 1999)

C. Conclusions:

1. Evidence w/ regard macro mngmnt (1st dim)
 - a. Regarding growth & "econ freedom": mixed
 - b. Regarding inflation: consensus signif edge
 - c. Regarding rest: consensus perhaps slightly better
 - d. All relationships weaken, though, with controls
2. Evidence w/ regard control of violence (1st dim)
 - a. Consensus dem significantly better,
 - b. But, again, relationships weaken dramatically w/ controls
3. Inflation only thing to corr w/ 2nd dim, but this prob entirely due to CBI inclusion in 2nd dim
4. Broad conclusions:
 - a. Consensus better record than majoritarian, esp. re: infl, but also, albeit less, re: rest macro & control violence
 - b. *But* evidence weak/mixed, & cntrls/outliers weaken further
 - c. Most important, ∴, negative conclusion: majoritarian clearly not significantly better in govt efficacy.

LXXXVI. LIPHART ch16: *Quality of Democracy*

A. L's Evidence

Table 10.2 Bivariate regression analyses of the effect of consensus democracy (executives-parties dimension) on ten indicators of welfare statism, environmental performance, criminal justice, and foreign aid

	Estimated regression coefficient	Standardized regression coefficient	Absolute t-value	Countries (N)
Welfare state index (1980)	4.00***	0.68	3.70	18
Adjusted welfare index (1980)	4.29**	0.58	2.80	15
Social expenditure (1992)	2.66***	0.44	1.94	18
Palmer index (c. 1990)	4.90*	0.30	1.67	34
Energy efficiency (1990-94)	0.93***	0.51	3.50	36
Incarceration rate (1992-95)	-32.12*	-0.30	1.30	23
Health penalty (1996)	-0.35***	-0.44	2.08	30
Foreign aid (1982-85)	0.09*	0.30	1.38	21
Foreign aid (1992-95)	0.10***	0.39	1.86	21
Aid versus defense (1992-95)	5.94***	0.51	2.58	21

* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level (one-tailed test)

** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed test)

*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed test)

Source: Based on data in Esping-Andersen 1990, 82; Schmidt 1997, 156; Palmer 1997, 16-20; World Bank 1992, 26-27; World Bank 1993, 26-27; World Bank 1994, 26-27; World Bank 1995, 26-27; World Bank 1997, 26-27; Mann 1994, 3; Mann 1997, 4; Dehl 1997, 36-42; United Nations Development Programme 1994, 197; United Nations Development Programme 1995, 404, 206; United Nations Development Programme 1996, 199; 200; United Nations Development Programme 1997, 81-83

** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed test)

* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed test)

Source: Based on data in Dehl 1971, 232; Vanhanen 1991, 27-28; Inter-Parliamentary Union 1995; Banks 1993; Banks, Day, and Müller 1996; Wilensky 1990, 2; and additional data provided by Harold L. Wilensky; United Nations Development Programme 1996, 170-71, 198; Atkinson, Rawwater, and Smeeding 1995, 40; Vanhanen 1997, 86-89; International IDEA 1997, 51-56; Powell 1980, 6; Klugemann 1985; Anderson and Guillory 1997, and additional data provided by Christopher J. Anderson; Huber and Powell 1994, and additional data provided by John D. Huber; Transparency International 1997

B. Conclusions

1. Consensus democracy (1st dim: exec-prtys) makes big diff w/ almost all measures of democratic quality & “kindler & gentler” policy directions.
2. AND, relations get stronger with controls/outliers.
3. Fed-unitary (2nd dim) assoc. only w/ soc expend (-) & incarceration rate (+), odd by L’s reasoning:
 - a. Latter turns out fully due to US outlier.
 - b. Cntrls/outliers not affect former; 3 fed sys (US, Can, Austral) only 3 systems <20%GDP in soc spend.

LXXXVII. LIPHART ch17: Conclusions

A. Two main conclusions:

1. Variety dem instits well reflected on 2D’s Maj-Cons

2. Cons maybe slight edge perf, strong edge quality dem
- B. *Implication*: adopt consensus if possible
 1. Good News:
 - a. no tradeoff at all, consensus dominates
 - b. not diff to construct consensus constitution; know how

2. Bad News:
 - a. Coherence in 2D's suggest strong inst'l equilibria & so resistance to change.
 - b. Cultural resistance to change too.
3. Tempered bad news: inst's & culture evolve jointly

LXXXVIII. *Testing Visions: Responsiveness in Gov Select & pm*

A. *Responsiveness* [DEF]

1. Policymaker select & effect. pm follow directly cit votes
2. Each vision carries own ideal for responsiveness
 - a. *Maj*: tight, mech connection from cit votes to single-party maj w/ clear responsibility & mandate, & unchecked power impl
 - b. *Prop*: multiparty elect compet \Rightarrow accurate reflect cit pref in *pm*
3. \Rightarrow *Figure 6.1*: continuous or discontinuous mapping vote-shares into "govt" & effective pm-share

B. *Responsiveness in Majoritarian Systems*

1. 45 elections in 5 maj sys: AL, CA, FR, GR, NZ
2. *Figure 6.2*: Near-perfect fit seat-maj to govt maj, but
 - a. Exceptions rare, but highly problematic
 - b. Almost *no* actual vote majorities \Rightarrow full retreat to *plurality*
 - c. **Failures**: 15-20%, & 1/sys+, leg- & gov-maj to plurality *loser*!
3. *Figure 6.3*: Govt much, but not all pm power \Rightarrow effect pm
4. \Rightarrow Avg plurality prty: 45% vote, 55% seats, 74% gov, 72% pm

C. *Responsiveness in Proportional Systems*

1. 74elects, 9 prop sys: AU, BE, DE, FI, GE, IT, NE, NO, SW, SZ
2. *Figure 6.4*: Near-perfect fit vote-seat fit, but
 - a. While vote-govt much more prop-deal than maj was, heavy maj-ideal also. (Not mysterious: parl decisionmaking maj.)
 - b. *Practicality*: Maj retreats to *plur*, prop cedes some maj in pm
 - c. Govt fit to ideal not great, some tend 2nd party under-rep, but
3. *Figure 6.5*: Vote-effect pm fit much stronger. Govt only look much more misleading in this vision of lmted govt.
 - a. Slope \approx 1.3, still too high, but \ll then \approx 4 in maj sys.
 - b. Pluralities mostly over, 2nds mostly under

D. \Rightarrow First Set Conclusions & a Common Metric:

1. Maj $\pm \Rightarrow$ *plurality*-ideal, but w/ some *large* failures
2. Prop $\pm \Rightarrow$ prop, but some maj bias & freq (*smaller*) errors

E. \Rightarrow **Common Metric**: *actual(pm|vote) - ideal(pm|vote)*

1. On maj-grounds, maj utter failure, retreat to plurality
2. *Table 6.1*: Average deviations in govt & pm shares.
3. *Table 6.1a*: Averages may cancel +/- \Rightarrow avg abs(dev).
4. *Table 6.2*: Aggregate across parties to election level.
5. \Rightarrow Each well in own terms (*maj=plur*), terrible in other's

F. Trade-Offs or Design Flaws?

1. $\uparrow \downarrow$ maj/plur approx \Rightarrow compensating $\uparrow \downarrow$ plur/maj?
2. Two types Maj Failures:
 - a. No seat-maj \Rightarrow min govt \Rightarrow \downarrow *mand & account*, but \uparrow prop
 - b. Seat maj to vote min \Rightarrow \downarrow *mand & account*, but also \downarrow prop!

3. ⇒ *Figure 6.6*: Some design flaw in Maj, none in Prop.
4. ⇒ *Fig 6.7*: Comparing both sys:
 - a. Most elects in 2 sys on 1 maj v. prop cost-ben trade-off line
 - b. Plur fit their ideal, & bunched in range of prop costs
 - c. Prop fit their ideal, but more spread in plur costs
 - d. Only Plur sys produce unmitigated failures

G. Govt change between elections

1. Cost from maj/plur view: very rare therein
2. Common in prop, but actually tend to ben (Tab 6.3): ↑ diversity govt b/w elects & ↑ avg effect pm-vote match

H. Wrap-up

1. See Powell's Excellent Summary pp. 153-4
2. Next: votes ≠ prefs
 - a. Strategic voting & party shaping of offerings
 - b. ⇒ Illusion to think vote-govt more mech connect cit prefs to pm in plur, that elite pm less control than in prop where elite barg between...

LXXXIX. Powell, ch. 7: Citizen Preferences & Party Positions

A. Previously Powell had shown how maj & prop visions generally perf'd pretty well on own terms (but maj suscept. to occasional full failure) *on basis of vote-policy connection*

B. Vote-Policy Connection Insufficient:

1. Even though some argue...
 - a. ...conceptually impossible to compare cit pref's to pol action
 - b. ...votes adequate or only possible measure cit pref's
2. Substance of Dem=Pub Pol Responds to *Cit Pref* ⇒ must try
 - a. Not just partic. & compet...these to make PubPol resp CitPref
 - b. Free & fair elects=instruments of dem, not dem itself.
3. Votes insufficient:
 - a. Even set aside irrationality: i.e., emotional symbols, attractive cand's, irrelevant side-issues...
 - b. ...voters constrained by party sys offerings of candidates, current issue promises, long-term partisan reps & group ties.
 - c. Strategic voting based on expects of others' votes, rules of rep, post-elect bargaining b/w parties in policy-making
 - d. Plus votes rarely reveal much/anything voters feel re: other parties

C. Powell uses pub-opinion, self-placement, but still probs...

1. Many issues, rel salience of those varies cross time & space
2. ⇒ voters not know details of what want, just general direction.
3. ⇒ Left/Right:
 - a. Common language: Gabel & Huber show rough comparability of expert L-R scales, elite & voter self-place, & manifesto
 - b. Need not, for P's purpose, compare cross ctry, just voter-elite w/in
 - c. [Still rubber ruler issues, but probably best can do...]
4. ⇒ **Representational Congruence**:
 - a. Median Voter Criterion
 - (1) only pref not beaten by majority, both visions have that (=min in prop)
 - (2) problematic:
 - (a) for prop vision, which would seek mapping of whole pref distribution into policymaking-influence distribution.
 - (b) assumes 1-dim politics *ab initio*; part of prop is diff maj on diff issues
 - (c) disallows "minority protection"
 - (d) Powell interchanges Median Voter & Median Citizen: likely problematic; not same; maj

dampens turnout (as will see...)

(3) more polarized society \Rightarrow greater average distance to median, but this too only problematic from prop vision

b. \Rightarrow median-based approach decidedly pro-majoritarian eval. tool.

5. Voter Self-Placements (Table 7.1)

6. Alt Visions of Processes that Create Rep Congruence (T7.2)

a. Maj: 1 elect stage, party nearest median wins, centrip press \Rightarrow rep cong

b. Prop: elect stage, then govt form & pol-mkng barg stages \Rightarrow rep cong

7. Position of Policymaking Influence:

a. Govt Position:

(1) If 1-party majority govt=position of that party (expert-placement scale)

(2) If multi-party govt=weighted average (by % seats) of party positions

b. Wtd influence scale as before:

(1) 1 * govt parties (seats)

(2) .75 * non-govt support parties (seats)

(3) .5 to .1 weighting of opposition parties (seats) depending on opp infl.

Table 7.1. Voter Self-Placement on Left-Right Scale: Early 1980s at Closest Election Strategy

Country	Year	Percentage of Citizens at Each Scale Point ^a										Median	Mean	Standard Deviation
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Australia	1981	1	5	9	9	16	14	12	10	4	5	5.5	5.8	1.9
Austria	1978	1	1	10	10	16	19	13	11	8	7	6.0	6.0	0.8
Belgium	1981	3	11	9	8	21	22	11	9	4	9	5.5	5.8	2.2
Canada	1981	2	11	4	6	32	20	12	11	4	3	5.7	5.9	1.9
Denmark	1981	Table 7.2 Visions of Democracy and Processes That Create Congruence Between the Median Citizen and the Policymakers											5.6	1.9
Finland	1981												5.9	2.0
France	1981												4.8	2.0
Germany	1981												5.5	1.9
Greece	1981												5.2	2.4
Ireland	1981												6.2	2.4
Italy	1981												4.6	2.1
Japan	1981												6.0	1.8
Netherlands	1981												5.5	1.4
New Zealand	1981 ^b												5.3	new
Norway	1981												5.8	2.1
Spain	1981												4.9	2.0
Sweden	1981												5.4	2.3
Switzerland	1976												5.8	n.a.
United Kingdom	1981												5.8	2.0
United States	1981												6.2	2.1

^aSurvey in New Zealand (Beattie)

^bMost 1981 distribution and

Oct 1981, others in the middle

Values from 1981-1982

Values from 1981-1982

Values from 1981-1982

Values from 1981-1982

Values from 1981-1982

Values from 1981-1982

Values from 1981-1982

Values from 1981-1982

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Values from 1981-1982

XC. Powell, ch. 8:
Maj=Decisive
Elects, Govts, &
Med Cit

A. Analytical
Strategy:

1. Assume:

a. Single L-
R
continuum

Note: Both visions assume that the median voter will be at the same position on the left-right scale as the median citizen.

m meaningful to voters & parties, etc...

b. Normative desirability policy @ median from maj view

2. ⇒ Compare med cit L-R self-place w/ govt & policy-influ med from expert judgements.

B. How Maj Vision Supposed to Work:

1. Competition b/w 1 incumb & 1 major challenger

2. Voters eval past perform (account) & future promises (mand)

3. Voter-chosen pref'd cand implements & performs in office

4. Voters can evict at next elect if underperform/outpromised

C. ⇒ Vision consummation in *Representative Congruence* terms rests on victory of party near median.

1. How Achieve?

a. 2-Party Hotelling/Downs Competition ⇒ Convergence

(1) N.b., could evolve rather than parties know & go to med immed'ly

(2) For most sample ctrys, enough stable time pub opin & prty sys to expect H/D convergence even by evolution.

b. Alternatively, only one prty near median & it wins.

2. Potential Problems (i.e., how can it fail?):

a. Neither converges (convergence failure).

b. Prty farther from median wins election (voter failure).

c. Vote winner close to median, but not win govt (election failure).

D. *Tab 8.1: Med L-R Pub Opin., Elects, & Govt L-R ca. 1981*

Table 8.2. Ideological Distance Between the Two Alternative Governments in Sixteen Democracies, Early 1980s

Country	Year	Alternative Governments Identified	Left-Right Positions			Distance Between New Government and Median Citizen
			Left Contender	Median Citizen	Right Contender	
Both contenders within 1 1/2 scale points of median citizen						
Canada	1980	LIBERAL v. PC	5.8	5.7	6.9	.4
Ireland	1981	FG/LAB v. FF	6.6	6.2	6.6	.4
New Zealand	1981	LABOUR v. NATIONAL	6.0	5.5	6.4	.8
United States	1980	DEM v. REP	5.1	5.8	7.1	1.3
Only one contender within 1 1/2 scale points of median citizen						
Spain	1982	SOC v. AP	3.2	3.4	8.0	>1
Denmark	1981	SOCDEM v. CD/CH/HR/CON	4.4	5.5	7.0	>1
Netherlands	1982	LABOUR v. CDA/HR	3.3	5.0	6.8	>1
Germany	1983	SPIG v. CDU/CDU	4.0	5.0	7.0	>1
Sweden	1982	SOCDEM v. BG/LIB/CON	3.6	5.3	6.6	>1
Neither contender within 1 1/2 scale points of median citizen						
France	1981	COMMUNOC v. UDI/RTM	1.2	4.8	7.6	>1
Norway	1981	LABOUR v. AG/CH/CON	3.7	5.0	7.9	>1
United Kingdom	1983	LABOUR v. CON	3.1	5.7	8.0	>1
Australia	1980	LABOUR v. LIB/CFV	3.8	5.5	7.8	>1
Alternative future governments not identified in election ^a						
Italy	1983	COMM v. DC	3.4	4.8	3.9	.8
England	1983	SOC v. NAT	4.7	5.7	7.3	.8
Belgium	1981	SOC v. CH/LIB	3.4	5.7	7.0	1.3
Missing data countries						
Austria	1983	SPO v. GVP	n.a.	6.5	n.a.	—
Greece	1981	SOC v. NEW DEM	n.a.	5.0	n.a.	—
Switzerland	1983	SOC v. CATH-CON	n.a.	6.0	n.a.	—
Japan	1983	SOC v. LIB DEM	n.a.	5.2	n.a.	—

^a Average placement of parties in government weighted by their size, by experts in 1983 survey (Cusack and Nien 1983). Scale (0-10) converted to correspond to 1-10 citizen scale.

^b Party alternatives are illustrative only; see discussion of predictability of future governments in chapter 4 above.

^c Boldface type identifies the position of the party or coalition that would form the government after the election.

1. Convergence not so great in maj: only 1/3 cases < 1.5 pts = avg

2. 1.5 ~ 50% farther from med than clearly non-maj elects (~ 1pt)

E. Same thing for ca 1991 (Table 8.2):

Table 8.1 Ideological Distance Between the Two Alternative Governments in Twenty Democracies, Early 1990s

Country	Year	Alternative Governments Identified	Left-Right Positions			Distance Between New Government ¹ and Median Citizen
			Left Contender	Median Citizen	Right Contender	
Both contenders within 1 1/2 scale points of median citizen						
United States	1988	DEM v. REP ²	4.2	4.0	6.3	1.3
Only one contender within 1 1/2 scale points of median citizen						
Spain	1991	SOC. v. PP	4.0	4.4	7.5	.4
Germany	1990	SPD v. CDU/CDP ³	3.8	4.5	6.4	.7
Austria	1990	SPO v. ÖVP	4.8	6.9	6.3	1.0
Australia	1990	LABOUR v. LIB/CTY	4.8	3.8	7.4	1.0
New Zealand	1993	LABOUR v. NATIONAL	5.8	3.6	7.3	1.7
Canada	1988	LIBERAL v. PC	5.1	5.5	7.3	1.8
United Kingdom	1992	LABOUR v. CONS	4.4	5.0	7.7	2.4
France	1995	COMB/SEC v. UDF/RRR	3.0	4.8	7.8	2.5
Neither contender within 1 1/2 scale points of median citizen						
Sweden	1991	S. DEM v. LIB v. LNP	4.1	5.6	7.6	1.0
Denmark	1990	S. DEM v. LHM/CON	4.2	5.5	7.8	2.1
Japan	1990	SOC ⁴ v. LIB DEM	3.8	5.9	8.4	2.5
Alternative future governments not identified in election ⁵						
Iceland	1992	FI v. BF ⁶	5.8	5.5	7.0	.2
Netherlands	1989	LABOUR v. VVD	4.2	5.1	6.3	.2
Belgium	1991	PS/SP v. FDF/PRI	4.1	5.0	7.1	.4
Switzerland	1987	SOC v. CATH-RAD	2.6	5.5	5.3	.8
Norway	1993	LABOUR v. CON	4.1	5.1	8.0	1.0
Italy	1992	PDS v. DC	2.5	4.8	6.1	1.2
Norland	1991	SOC v. NAT ⁷	4.4	5.0	7.4	1.2
Missing data scenarios						
Greece	1993	SOC v. NEW DEM	NA	5.4	NA	—

¹Average placement in parties of government, weighted by their size by experts in 1993 survey (Bridon and Ingelfinger 1993).

²Party alternatives are all major parties, see discussion of prediction identifiability of future governments in chapter 4 above.

³Both free type identifies the position of party or coalition that formed the government after the election.

1. Sum Tables: in ½ cases, both or winner w/in 1.5 pts; not noticeably superior to non-majoritarian. Other ½, both or winner far (avg≈2 pts of ≈5 possible) from cit med.

F. Fig 8.1: ↑ Cases by use expert scales good for ±5yrs; graph cit-leg, leg-gov, & cit-gov median distances by identifiability




Figure 8.1 Left-Right Distances: Citizens, Legislators and Governments by Level of Government Identifiability

1. ↑ Identifiability ⇒ ↑ distance govt from median voter
 2. Add “unchecked govt” (mandate) (Tab 8.3) ⇒ ↑↑ distance
 3. High id-able ≈ 1.6 pts > 0.8 pts ≈ low id-able (≈ 2x).
- G. Prob (*rep cong* perspect) w/ maj: voters rarely create maj for 1 party w/o *artificial* aids, which aids undermine *rep cong*
1. Three Ways Disprop Elect Sys ⇒ Majorities
 - a. (1) Voter & party mutual anticipation of *viable* parties ⇒ Cox’s M+1 rule; (2) perhaps explicitly via pre-election coalitions (*strategic*)
 - b. (3) Vote-seat disproportionality (*mechanical*).
 2. Fig 8.2 reveals vote-seat disprop main source lack *rep cong*: in creating shift from voted median to legislative median.




Figure 8.2: Left-Right Distances: Citizens, Voted Party Median and Legislative Median by Election Laws

- Big part of this=party coordination-failure: >1 party competing in same ideological space allows less-supported opposition to win plur/maj
- w/o converge: L- or R-side fail (NZ '83, Can '88) \Rightarrow farther prty wins
- w/ 1-side converge: Center fail (UK '83 or AL '80) \Rightarrow far party wins

H. Why Majoritarian Vision (of Rep Cong) So Often Fail?

- Broadly:
 - Small *errors* magnified by maj winner-take-all knife-edge.
 - Asking too much for simple yay/nay of A/B vote to connect voters well to policymakers in complex (multi-D) world.
- Further, 3 ways to produce identifiability given (assume) simple normal, continuous, & symmetric pub-opinion distrib:
 - 2-party electoral dominance \Rightarrow natural or earned majority
 - 2-party govtal (w/o elect) dom \Rightarrow manufactured majority
 - Pre-electoral coalition [\Rightarrow same as other 2 w/ coal's the competitors]
 - Maj Vision Assumes *a* but *b* far more comm (only US close to *a*)
- Cox:
 - Coord fails common, & conseq \uparrow in SMD (as $T_{eff} \uparrow$)
 - >2 or even anticipated >2 prtys (**entry deterrence**), convergence not robust (parties likely position evenly space in# voters b/w them).
- Alternatively: how form govtl maj that Account & Mandate require w/o electoral maj? \Rightarrow must trade rep cong for A & M.**

XCI. Chapt. 9: Prop=Rep Med Cit by Multistage Process

- Continue strategy & assumpts as before (n.b., using median congruence if anything biased against prop

vision).

B. How Prop Vision Supposed to Work:

1. Multiple, diverse parties proportionally (to voter-pref distrib) rep'd in parliament \Rightarrow govt formation.
2. Govt more rep'd in policy than legis \Rightarrow some \circ opposition influence (ideally, prop'ly) via minority gov, committee sys, etc)

C. Three Elements to Accurate Reflect Voter Opin in Policy:

1. Multiple parties avail to voter (so latter can pick close former)
2. Voters choose closer (rational & not much cause strategic)
3. Accurate reflection voter choice in effective governance (in legis, govt, & , most important, effective policymaker).

D. Results:

1. From Fig 8.2: Voted med & leg med close (w/in .6 pts); diffs seem from prty-spacing *lumpiness*: not-so-even ideol-spacing.
2. Tables 9.1 & 9.2 (Govts in early 80s & 90s):
 - a. Govts gen'ly several prtys, spanning rel wide ideol range
 - b. Maj govts usually include median party; sometimes straddling cit med so avg near it, but sometimes ctr-lft or ctr-rt so avg not so near, but still w/in .8 of it on avg.
 - c. Minority govts typically farther from median
3. Problems:
 - a. Pre-electoral coals \Rightarrow more maj-like outcomes, including \downarrow rep cong
 - b. Minority govts \Rightarrow low govt rep cong, but these more common in maj systems & opposition influence often higher in prop systems...
4. Fig 9.1: Govt & Effective Policymaker Rep Cong by \circ Auth Rep




Figure 9.1. Left-Right Distances: Citizens, Governments and Policymakers by Level of Effective Authorized Representation

5. Complications: Govt Change Remote from Election

- a. Three Theoretical Possibilities:
 - (1) Govts far from cit med tend to fall & replace by closer
 - (2) (Antic) electorate $\Delta \Rightarrow \uparrow$ govt dist pre-elect cit med, closer current/next
 - (3) Govt shift unrelated cit prefs, & elite manip takes farther from cit med
- b. Evidence: if anything, intra-elect $\Delta \Rightarrow \uparrow$ rep cong

E. General Conclusions (Fig 9.3 & Table 9.4):

1. **Majoritarian Vision works “only fitfully”:** *Exacts high rep cong cost for majority generation [n.b., on which its accountability & mandate advantages rest] & oppositions lack influence to alter*
2. **Proportional Vision works fairly well:** *Post-election bargaining typically \Rightarrow near-median govts, Govt change b/w elects only \uparrow that, & even where not opposition influence brings effective policymaking closer to median [but at cost of \downarrow efficacy account & mand mechanisms]*




Figure 9.3- Left-Right Distances: Citizens, Legislatures, Governments and Policy Makers by Constitutional Design Type

3. Tracing mechanisms of performance differences (Table 9.4):

Table 9-4. Regression Overview of Relations in Chambers 1-9

Constitutional Arrangements		Party System		Distance: Citizen		Distance from Citizen		R(S)
Electoral Rules	Government Formation	Median-Median	Identifiable Future Government	Government Majority	Vote/Seat Disproportion	Legislature	Government	
Threshold (1-7=5)	Control (1-5=3.5)	Voted Party	(5=100)	(5=11)	(5=24)			
Standardized regression coefficients								
Left-right distance between citizen median and legislative median								
.41**	.13	.43**	=	=	=	=	=	.69 (.78)
-.02	.21	.42**	.00	.06	.38**	=	=	.73 (.78)
Left-right distance between citizen median and government position								
.41**	.13	.21*	=	=	=	=	=	.37 (.79)
-.26	.13	.20*	.34**	-.12	.34*	=	=	.51 (.79)
-.18	-.01	-.19	.26*	-.15	.07	.69**	=	.70 (.79)
Left-right distance between citizen median and policymaker position								
.34**	.25	.13	=	=	=	=	=	.59 (.79)
-.41	.40**	.12	.18	.22**	.60**	=	=	.33 (.79)
-.40*	.28*	-.13	.13	-.19**	.38**	.38**	=	.83 (.79)
-.07	.18**	-.08	= .00	-.04**	.04**	.21*	.54**	.62 (.79)

Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors:

Left-right distance between citizen median and legislative median

.022 (.008) .21 (.24) .57 (.11) = = =
 -.001 (.011) .34 (.26) .54 (.11) .001 (.002) .09 (.14) .054 (.020)

Left-right distance between citizen median and government position

.021 (.009) = .20 (.29) .26 (.15) = = =
 -.010 (.014) .21 (.31) .25 (.15) .006 (.002) = .18 (.17) .047 (.024) =
 -.000 (.002) .03 (.26) -.11 (.12) .005 (.002) -.24 (.13) .010 (.021) .07 (.11)

Left-right distance between citizen median and policymaker position

.015 (.007) .30 (.22) .16 (.10) = = =
 -.018 (.009) .54 (.21) .12 (.09) .003 (.002) .00 (.11) .070 (.018) = =
 -.018 (.008) .38 (.18) .13 (.08) .003 (.001) .25 (.09) .044 (.014) .48 (.08) =
 -.013 (.006) .39 (.18) -.09 (.06) -.000 (.001) .36 (.07) .040 (.010) .17 (.07) .46 (.06)

*Significant at .05 level

**Significant at .01 level

XCII. Ch10: Conclusion—Elections as Instruments Democracy

- Gen'ly negative relation b/w achieve alt ideals (Fig 10.1)
- Const'l designs gen'ly performing as expected.
- None give effective representation to <50% (i.e., all Dems)




Figure 10.11 Majoritarian and Proportional Processes: Twenty Democracies

- D. **[Democratic Constitutional PPF?]** Some substantial maj failings, & some doing better than avg tradeoff on both, but, generally, ctrys doing worse on maj do better on prop & v.v. Dual failures possible (e.g., post-sov Russia & Poland) but seem not occur here.
- E. This crude beginning; where more work needed:
1. Pre-elect coalitions
 2. Need know more about exec-legis relation:
 - a. Opposition influence; Minority govts
 - b. Other inst'l power dispersion (Madisonian): bicameralism, federalism
 3. Votes inadequate measure cit prefs \Rightarrow Need more about context-conditional preferences & behavior
 4. Multi-dimensional issues
 5. Deadlock v. compromise from power dispersal
 6. Corruption & better agency (see below)
 7. Functioning of young party-systems
 8. These govt systems mostly rel simple; many newer ones more mixed (Pres-Parl, PR/Maj); how do mixed systems work?
 9. Dynamics, Variance, & Stability: this mostly about *static match*
- F. **Tradeoff:** (a) *decisiveness & accountability (mandate problematic)* & (b) *accurate effective representation*.
1. If game largely of cit's v. pm's, perhaps advantage maj
 2. If game largely of conflict intrst among cit's, advantage prop.

XCIII. Franzese, ch. 2: “Political Participation, Income Distrib, & Public Transfers in Dev’d Dems”

A. Start with std Meltzer-Richard-type argument:

1. Median person poorer than average, \therefore median desires positive net transfers
2. Tax/Transfer \Rightarrow \downarrow incentives to work/invest, \therefore median desires larger net transfers until this cost outweighs greater redistrib garnered. Greater the diff b/w median & mean, the larger transfers before this occurs.

B. However, not everyone votes, &, in particular, relatively wealthy vote more than relatively poor.

1. \therefore , greater positive effect of \uparrow income skew on trans. as voter-participation \uparrow
2. Conversely, positive impact on transfers of \uparrow voter partic. larger the greater underlying income skew

XCIV. Franzese, ch. 3: “Positive Political Econ of Public Debt: Empirical Exam OECD Postwar”

A. Much of expansion in public debt since mid-seventies due to econ. conditions; specifically:

1. \uparrow UE & \downarrow growth \Rightarrow \downarrow rev’s & \uparrow expend’s, given current taxation & expend. system
2. That initial impact amplified by ensuing rise in real interest rates \Rightarrow explosive public-debt path in many

B. Key political factor is govt fractionalization (and less so polarization)

1. Where govts fractionalized, fiscal-policy adjustments to address rising debt delayed as parties in govt, may have agreed on need for adjust, naturally disagreed over whose constituents would pay the costs
2. Where govts more unified (fewer parties, not divided govt), adjust. plans easier to implement: governing party more easily placed adjust costs on opponents
3. Where poor econ conditions hit environments with fractionalized govts, debt path yet more explosive

C. Several other political, structural, & institutional factors had some, but more minor, effects