Comparative Politics of Developed Democracies

INTRODUCTION (Part 1)

I. Start with definition of subject matter: What is a “Developed Democracy”?

A. LNN: “Although elections & democracy are not synonymous concepts, the existence of free, competitive elections is invariably considered one of the critical features that define a nation as ‘democratic’ (Inkeles 1991; Beetham 1994)” (p. 4)

B. Powell II:
   1. “working political democracies[...]: Citizens...able to organize & vote in competitive elections[, and] the national political leaders are held accountable to their citizens through electoral means” (p. 1).
   2. “‘democracy’[...:] political systems where representative leaders chosen through competitive elections. The competitive electoral context, with several political parties organizing the alternatives that face voters, is the identifying property of contemporary democratic process. ...competitive elections...most citizens eligible to participate” (3)

   3. Case-selection criteria (p. 3):
      a. legitimacy of govt rests on claim to represent desires of its citizens [Monte Python: “Arthur, King of the Britons.” “Well I didn’t vote for you.” “King, eh? How’d you get that, eh?...” “Supreme exec. pow. derives from a mandate from the masses...”]
      b. organized relationship that regulates this bargain of legitimacy is the competitive political election. Leaders elected at regular intervals, & voters choose among alternative candidates. In practice 2+ parties with a chance of winning is minimal
      c. Most adults can participate in the electoral process, both as voters & as candidates for important political office
      d. Citizens’ votes are secret & not coerced
      e. Citizens & leaders enjoy basic freedoms of speech, press, assembly, & organization

   4. “Although definitionally possible to have a democratic context in which power did not change hands (because of continuing support of the incumbents by a majority of citizens [e.g., Japan, Switzerland, Italy, Sweden for long periods]), such power changes seem a clear indication of importance of competitive elections” (p. 6).

C. Lane & Ersson:
   1. “West European Democracies[...]: legitimate operation of democratic political institutions within state structures that involve big govt” (p. 10).
   2. “A liberal democratic political order is combined with a welfare state & a mixed economy. The public sector plays a major role in the economy of the West European countries, allocating & redistributing resources by means of various institutions at different levels of govt” (p. 10)
   3. “open competition between political parties for the allegiance of the voter in free elections recruiting a legislative assembly that shares the exercise of power with govt institutions in a national setting” (p. 10).

D. Powell:
   1. Democracies: govs in which the people participate in policymaking (pp. 3-4)
      a. w/ many people, dem. indirect: choose policymakers in competitive elections
      b. Elections are instruments of dem. to degree give people influence over pol-makers
      c. Elections not only, but universally seen as crucial instrument, compel or encourage p-m’s to pay attention to citizens.

   2. Two Views (each normative & positive): Majoritarian v. Proportional Visions

E. Lijphart:
   1. Democracy: govt for & by the people (Daniel Webster, 1830) (pp. 1-3). But, what if the people disagree & have divergent preferences?
      a. The majority of people.
      b. As many people as possible, [proportionally].

   2. Many ways to organize democracy, but cluster around Majoritarian v. Consensus. In that distinction, two dimensions discernable:
a. Executive-Legislative Dimension
b. Federal-Unitary Dimension

F. Why do we choose to study developed democracies together & distinctly from ‘developing democracies’ & ‘non-democracies’?
1. Theories assume relatively “liberal democracy” & “free-market capitalism” no longer part of but rather the general boundaries within which citizens & leaders (actors of our models) conduct day-to-day politics
2. Empirics: something distinct re these countries & related about dem & dev

The Relationship Between the
Degree of Democracy and of Economic Development

![Graph showing the relationship between degree of democracy and economic development.](image)

[We didn’t cover the following material this year. I have scaled the font down to 10 for such omitted materials.]

II. Notable Trends, Events, & Topics to Consider

A. Lane & Ersson: “A Changing Scenario”
1. “1950-65: End of Ideology, & Apathy” (pp. 1-2)
   a. Attributed causes of perceived decline in conflict
      (1) Some saw disappearing/reduced ideological conflict, ↑ harmony of views
      (2) Some saw very effective welfare society succeeding in providing security & thus reduced divisive consequences of socio-economic cleavages
   b. The west was certainly thriving in this period
      (1) strong economic growth
      (2) stable law & order
      (3) legitimacy of established political institutions not questioned
         (a) either evolutionary result of long process toward peaceful & prosperous democratic society
         (b) or result of recent (re-)establishment of same, hard-won by war

2. “1965-80: Rejection of Political Authority” (pp. 2-6)
   a. Increased citizen activism in 60s turned scholars toward participation
      (1) demands for institutional autonomy in UK, Belgium, Spain
      (2) demands for increased decentralization in Sweden, France, Germany
   b. Affluence:
      (1) Some saw rising affluence as increasingly diminishing the intensity of socio-economic cleavages relative to “new” post-materialist (Inglehart) issues.
      (2) Others noted that affluence itself can exacerbate economic cleavages through the perception of relative deprivation
c. Economic Hardship (Rising Inflation, then OPEC I (1973-4) & OPEC II (1979-80) & the responses thereto) & Increasing
Dissatisfaction with Govt
(1) Corporatism: tri-partite bargaining over (particularly) macroeconomic management b/w organizations of labor, business, & govt (Berger, Lehmbuch, Schmitter)
(2) New/re-emerging parties & movements (Greens, radical left & right) & protest parties
d. Perceived Upshot (caveat not to exaggerate change or continuity):
(1) changing voter alignments & behavior
(2) changing party systems, patterns of support, & behavior
(3) everything is now questioned
   (a) legitimacy of govt—though this is always relatively strong in developed democracies
   (b) efficiency of the Welfare State
   (c) social disorder becomes less unheard of if still not exactly common

a. Slower growth, higher unemployment, more variant if not always higher inflation
   (1) certainty & optimism characterizing Keynesian macroecon. management gone
   (2) New Ideas: monetarism, supply-side economics, the “Rational-Expectations revolution” all (to varying degrees) reject policy effectiveness of macro mgmt
b. immigration & refugees–new issue for many of these homogenous societies: consider Ireland, Italy, France, Germany
c. Continued (for a time) growth of govt, but economic slowdown produces huge deficit & debt issues in many
countries–Crises of the Welfare State

4. “1990s: Integration, Unemployment, & Immigration”
a. The European Community (http://europa.eu.int/, click on “Welcome”)
   (1) ECSC–France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg (1950)
   (2) EC: Treaty of Rome 1957; EFTA 1960–Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, UK
   (3) Grows over time:
      (a) membership additions:
         i) UK, Ireland, & Denmark (1973) == > 9
         ii) Greece (1981) == > 10
         iii) Portugal & Spain (1986) == > 12
         iv) Austria, Finland & Sweden (1995) == > 15
      (b) scope:
         i) ECSC weak, loose, protectionist agreement on coal & steel quotas, stds, etc. tentative first step
         ii) Treaty of Rome: more general trade-agreement, supposed internal free trade & common external trade
         policy, Common Agricultural Program
         iii) EurCurrUnion & the snake (exchange-rate convention) 1973
         iv) VAT harmonization 1977
         v) E.C.U. & the ERM: 1979
         vi) The Delors Programme 1985
         vii) Maastricht 1993
b. High unemployment remains, slow growth, fiscal crisis; democracy is stronger than ever, but its form–especially its
national locus—is more open to question

B. LeDuc, Niemi, & Norris:
1. Three Waves of Democratization: late 19th to early 20th C; following WWII, & 1990s
2. Recent Democratizations
   a. “Triple transformation” in Eastern Europe–party systems, constitutional structures, & economic systems
   b. Collapse of last authoritarian regimes in West Europe: Greece, Portugal, & Spain
   c. End of Apartheid in South Africa
d. growth and/or re-establishment of democracy in Latin America & Southeast Asia
3. N.b. these waves are not unidirectional == > democracy is not secure or “established” once initially instituted
4. Major Changes in Established Democracies also
   a. party systems–traditional patterns of conflict changing (Mair, ch. 3)
b. attitudes & voting behavior of citizens (Dalton, ch. 13)
c. rise of cynicism & “legitimacy crises”
d. even changes in the foundations of representative institutions in some cases (New Zealand, Italy, Japan)
e. Again, though, should not exaggerate these changes
   (1) Generally changes w/in systemic confines of relatively liberal, relatively free-market democratic capitalism
   (2) And new & re-emerging democracies are not near “established” yet
5. N.b. These last changes (B.4.) plus the experience of Eastern Europe draws our attention to the electoral system as a
C. **Powell II:**

1. **Electoral participation** is relatively consistent within nations over time, but the US is exceptional in having seen considerable decline between late 60s to 80s

2. Important incidents of breakdown of democratic order, even into violence:
   a. Northern Ireland (U.K.)—violence flares up in late 60s
      (1) Catholic minority in mostly Protestant Ulster region of mostly Catholic island
      (2) Catholic minority demands greater political equality & economic advance; draws our attention to reinforcing cleavages
   b. U.S.—race riots in late 60s through 70s—again draws our attention to disruptive potential of reinforcing cleavages (IV.D.2.c-e; Vietnam)
   c. Various other occasionally violent problem areas (almost all (have) had their problems)
      (1) Ireland—I.R.A. actions supporting Irish intervention in Ireland
      (2) Germany—far-left Bader-Meinhof in late 60s, far right against immigrants in the 90s
      (3) Canada—periodic separatist turmoil
      (4) France—student riots in late 60s (eventually commingled with other issues, esp. Algeria, bringing down the regime), massive strikes especially of late
      (5) Spain—separatist struggles: Basque & Catalan
      (6) Belgium—Fleming & Walloon—language, religion, & class

III. **POWELL II (Chapters 1 & 2)**

A. Working Political Democracies

1. Definition (I.B.1, +selection criteria, I.B.3)

2. Some Work “Well”
   a. Participate **via** elections
   b. Stable govts
   c. Discontent expressed through Democratic competition not violent conflict

3. Some Work “Less Well”
   a. Involvement characterized by turmoil not elected parties
   b. Govt is unstable, unresponsive, or both
   c. Violence widespread—at worst “the life expectancy of democracy itself is a matter of constant calculation.”

4. Why?
   a. Social & economic environment?
   b. Political institutions & organizations?
   c. Beliefs & strategies of leaders/citizens?
   d. System of political parties?

B. Social Structure ==> Institutions & Parties ==> Democratic Functioning

C. Role of Parties

1. The link between social, economic, & constitutional setting & political performance
   a. Examining citizen partisanship, party strategies, & election outcomes (party factors) helps us understand relationship between economic development & voter participation or between electoral laws & govt stability
   b. Not all effects of environmental conditions work through party system but many do

2. Independent Effects: The configurations of memory, organizations, & perception the system represents have direct effects once established

D. Three focal Dimensions of Political Performance

1. Citizen Electoral Participation: (Voter Turnout = # voting/eligible population)
   a. Not only form of participation, but essential in forcing policy-makers to respond
   b. Symbolic—especially with increased secularization, legitimacy has come to rest on claim to respond to citizen’s preferences
   c. STOP HERE: What is the empirical puzzle?
(1) Some Data
(2) Why do people vote?
   (a) Generate some hypotheses
   (b) Tell the irrational to vote story
   (c) Generate more hypotheses

2. Govt Stability & “Effectiveness”
   a. Definitions:
      (1) Stability: (Govt Duration)--Some issues/problems in defining
      (2) Effectiveness: Def? (% of legislative support for executive)
   b. STOP HERE: Note diff b/w defs (theoretical, abstract) & operationalization (empirical, concrete)
(1) Some data on duration
(2) Generate some hypotheses
(3) Some data on effectiveness?--or generate some alternative ideas on how to measure it
c. Aside on party discipline

3. Political Order--Absence of turmoil & violence & maintenance of basic forms of democratic regime
   a. Distinguish observing order from attributing “blame” or “credit” for it; order breakdown may reflect:
      (1) regime policy failures
(2) bargaining intransigence by either party to another
(3) efforts by either party to dispute to undermine democracy itself
b. Democracies unique in providing citizens (a) resources, & (b) freedom to use, (c) expand it by organizing & mobilizing other citizens, & (d) allowing use to express discontent
c. Democracy=a gamble that discontent can be channeled through legitimate (electoral & other) channels--an outbreak of serious, collective violence is a sign it is not working (whose fault is another question)
d. Measures: Riots, Deaths from Political Violence, Suspension/Replacement of Regime
  (1) Some Data
  (2) Generate some hypotheses

Political Attacks and Acts of Repression per Million
in 21 Developed Democracies, 1950-82

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E. Relations between the Three Dimensions of Performance
1. Mutually reinforcing Hypothesis
2. Participation ==> (In)stability, & (In)effectiveness
3. Stability ==> Effectiveness & Order or ==> Corruption & Disorder
4. Powell finds
   a. Participation...
      (1) ... ==> Order (low violence, turmoil, & no regime Δ)
      (2) ... ==> Low govt durability,
   b. otherwise the three generally unrelated

IV. Organization of the Course Material & The Cycle of Democratic Policymaking
A. Syllabus:
1. Introduction; Cycle (Schematic Overview Democratic Politics); Intellectual History
2. Socio-Politico-Economic Structure & Politics
3. Comparative Govtal Systems
   a. Description of Alternative Democratic Arrangements
   b. Alternative Visions
4. Electoral Systems
5. Parties & Party Systems
6. Participation & Representation
   a. Voting
   b. Extra-electoral Participation & Interest Groups
7. CGS: Political-Authority Allocation; Accountability, Mandates, & Representation
8. (Parliamentary) Govtal Formation & Dissolution
   a. Unidimensional Models
   b. Multidimensional Models
9. Policies & Outcomes
   a. Do the Varieties of Democracy Matter?
   b. How Do the Varieties of Democracy Matter? Recent Research
B. *The Cycle of Democratic Policymaking*

**Figure 1.22: The Cycle of Political Economy**

Example Elements at Each Stage:
(A) Interests:
- Sectoral Structure
- Income Distribution
- Age Distribution
- Trade Openness
Elections:
- Electoral Law
- Voter Participation
Government Formation:
- Fractionalization
- Polarization
(B) Representation:
- Partisanship
Policy:
- Fiscal Policy
- Monetary Policy
- Institutional Adjustment
Government Termination:
- Replacement Risk
(C) Outcomes:
- Unemployment
- Inflation
- Growth
- Sectoral Shift
- Debt
- Institutional Change

C. More Data, or “How Does It All Matter?”, or “So What?”
Figure 1.1: Total Public Fiscal Activity by Country-Year

Bars separate annual data for each country, 1948-97 (as available).

Figure 1.2: Total Public Fiscal Activity by Country

Dot marks postwar mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum.

Figure 1.3: Total Public Fiscal Activity by Year

Dot marks 21-country mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation.
Figure I.4: Public Transfer Payments by Country-Year

![Chart showing public transfer payments by country-year.](chart1.png)

Bars separate annual data for each country, 1948-97 (as available).

Figure I.5: Public Transfer Payments by Country

![Box plot showing public transfer payments by country.](chart2.png)

Dot marks postwar mean, box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean, lines extend to maximum and minimum.

Figure I.6: Public Transfer Payments by Year

![Line graph showing public transfer payments by year.](chart3.png)

Dot marks 21-country mean, box extends plus to minus one standard deviation.
Figure I.7: Public Debt by Country-Year

Bars separate annual data for each country, 1948–97 (as available).

Figure I.8: Public Debt by Country

Dot marks postwar mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum.

Figure I.9: Public Debt by Year

Dot marks 21-country mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean.
Figure I.10: Public Employment by Country-Year

Bars separate annual data for each country, 1948-97 (as available).

Figure I.11: Public Employment by Country

Dot marks postwar mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum.

Figure I.12: Public Employment by Year

Dot marks 21-country mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean.
Figure I.13: Unemployment by Country-Year

Barches separate annual data for each country, 1948-97 (as available).

Figure I.14: Unemployment by Country

Dot marks posterior mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean; lines extend to maximum and minimum.

Figure I.15: Unemployment by Year

Dot marks 21-country mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation.
Figure I.16: Inflation by Country-Year

Bars separate annual data for each country, 1948-97 (as available).

Figure I.17: Inflation by Country

Dot marks postwar mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean, lines extend to maximum and minimum.

Figure I.10: Inflation by Year

Dot marks 21-country mean, box extends plus to minus one standard deviation.
Figure I.19: Real Per-Capita Growth by Country-Year

Bars separate annual data for each country, 1940-97 (as available).

Figure I.20: Real Per-Capita Growth by Country

Dot marks postwar mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean, lines extend to maximum and minimum.

Figure I.21: Real Per-Capita Growth by Year

Dot marks 21-country mean; box extends plus to minus one standard deviation from mean, lines extend to maximum and minimum.
V. Intellectual History of Comparative Politics as a Field of Inquiry (built from Lane & Ersson, intro-ch. 1)

A. Theoretical Framework: “We organize our[study]...in terms cleavages, pol institutions, & pub pols”

B. “Traditional” (to ca. 1950s) Study of Politics: 5 Characteristics

1. Configurative Description: just describe from A to Z everything political that exists/happens some ctry
2. Parochialism: Western ( & predominantly US) slant on identification of issues to be considered
3. Formal Legalism: Excessive focus on the constitutional & legal details of a country
4. Absence of Empiricism, Methodology, & Theory: description & legalism w/ no attempt to relate aspects & outcomes systematically
5. Non-Comparative: despite the name, the field tended to focus on one country at a time (relates to previous problem)

C. Continuing Methodological Problems & Debates

1. Case Study vs. Comparative Method
2. Political Sociology evolving into Political Institutionalism
3. Newer Debates
   a. Formal (i.e. mathematical) v. Qualitative (linguistic) theoretical derivation of arguments
   b. Quantitative (i.e. statistical) v. Qualitative empirical evaluation
   c. Positive theory (positivism) v. Interpretation & “Understanding” (interpretivism) as the goal
4. “Either/Or” divisions somewhat arbitrary in that all involve some degree of other; further, several quite highly related; still, some controversy remains around these divides

D. Gabriel Almond & the Parsonian Revolution (mid 1950s)

1. Influence of Sociology
   a. Gabriel Almond “Comparative Political Systems” (1956)
   b. Talcott Parsons [Toward a General Theory of Action (with Shils, 1951), The Social System (1951), & Economy & Society (with Smelser, 1956)] brought Weber’s new systematic approach to the study of social behavior (“Sociology”) to the forefront of political science (and social science more generally)
2. Intro’s Central Q: What fosters (stable) (democratic) political development
3. Theory/Argument: Almond argued Anglo-American political systems stable b/c high degree consensus on political means & ends & b/c political roles of individuals & institutions clearly differentiated & delineated. (As a theoretical conjecture, interesting; empirically, he neither defined nor measured either independent or dependent variables. Still, huge advance over what preceded.)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Socio-Pol Struct (Culture) – Political Role Structure</th>
<th>Homogenous</th>
<th>Fragmented</th>
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<tr>
<td>Highly Differentiated</td>
<td>Anglo-American</td>
<td>Continental European</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Differentiation</td>
<td>Totalitarian</td>
<td>Pre-Industrial (Traditional)</td>
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E. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (1959): “‘conditions necessary for democracy in societies & organizations’ (p. 9)” (p. 19)

1. “Democracy ‘implies
   a. political formula or body of beliefs specifying which institutions–parties, free press, etc–legitimate (all accept as proper);
   b. one set of political leaders in office; and
   c. one or more sets of recognized leaders attempting to gain office’ (p. 45)”
2. Seeks to explain which systems exhibit these characteristics stably & why?; i.e. stability of democracy not govt stability in democracy
3. Democracy requires govt. & opp.; thus democracy cannot exist without cleavages; question which cleavages are “too much”/too irascible, & which factors may serve to mitigate conflict arising out of cleavages
4. Factors facilitating stability
a. Economic Development: produces greater income, economic security, & widespread education—all considered conducive in that they form the terms of the ‘class struggle’ permitting the less well-off to take a long-term [and optimistic] view
b. Class Structure: large middle class good
c. 2-Party System: claims two-party competition fosters integrative rather than divisive politics
d. Cross-Cutting Cleavages: claims territorial rather than proportional rep help in this regard
e. Federal, not Unitary, System: (claims concentration of power frequently a threat to democracy; others note Weimar)
f. Historical development of conflict resolution (problematic?)

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<tr>
<th>Cleavage Structure</th>
<th>Cross-Cutting</th>
<th>Reinforcing</th>
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<tr>
<td>Highly Stratified</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Least Stable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Stratification</td>
<td>Most Stable</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
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1. Four fundamental developmental processes in democratic transformations of Western Democracies (note the historicism)
a. Protestant Reformation–divided Catholic/Protestant
b. National Revolution–breaking local & regional affiliations (Germany & Italy mid to late 19th century)
c. Industrial Revolution–replacing diffuse agrarian & religious loyalties w/ class
d. Communist Revolution–international fault lines

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<th>CLEAVAGE TYPOLOGY</th>
<th>National/Center</th>
<th>Local/Periphery</th>
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<tr>
<td>Interests/Economy</td>
<td>worker v. employer/owner</td>
<td>primary v. secondary econ.</td>
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<td>Ideology/Culture</td>
<td>church v. state</td>
<td>subject v. dominant culture</td>
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The Two Dimensions of Political Systems

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<th>Contestation</th>
<th>Participation</th>
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<th>Low</th>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Polyarchies: Italy, Finland</td>
<td>Competitive Oligarchies: Switz., Ire.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Inclusive Hegemonies: Hungary, Poland (pre-Dem.)</td>
<td>Closed Hegemonies: Portugal, Spain (pre-Dem.)</td>
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a. Peaceful evolution of democracy (transferring legitimacy from old to new regime)
b. Decentralized economy (avoiding concentration of economic power)
c. Economic development
d. Economic equality
e. Social homogeneity
f. Elite pro-democratic beliefs (best when authority structures same in most institutions of society)
g. Popular beliefs in democratic efficacy & in sincere intentions of adversaries
h. Passive or supportive international conditions

H. Merkl, Almond & Verba: “Political Culture”
a. Common State of Democracy is Change, Instability, & Disequilibrium
b. Culture (beliefs, attitudes) explain this best since they change observably (survey research): problems with cultural arguments:
(1) Descriptive at best
(2) Tautological at worst

2. G. Almond & Sid Verba, *The Civic Culture* (1965): key to democracy is how citizens relate (sub & objectively) to political system
   a. People have attitudes toward:
      (1) political system
      (2) input activities of citizens (e.g., voting)
      (3) output activities of govt (policies & programs)
      (4) themselves as political participants
   b. These configure into three archetypes of society

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<td>[Not Considered]</td>
<td>Parochial Society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. => Peoples attitudes, (a), defined public orientation toward political system, (b), which produced politics of identifiable patterns

   1. Social Cohesion not directly or Necessarily linked to Political Cohesion
   2. Governing Institutions structure Actors’ Incentives from Voters to Leaders

3. **Sociological Structure Works through Political Institutions to Determine Democratic Functioning**
   4. Critique came at point when structuralism & culturalism were losing steam

J. Arend Lijphart: *Consociationalism* (Consensus), Institutionalism, & Democ
   1. Social heterogeneity creates impetus to instability, but impetus modified or redirected by institutions
   2. ==> two original foci
      a. **capacity** of pol institutions & pol leaders to respond to stimuli from society
      b. institutional means of dividing power to diffuse disruptive conflict:
         (1) Minority representation
         (2) Division of power: geographic, demographic, or functional
   3. Then on elite behavior:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Structure - Elite Behavior</th>
<th>Homogenous</th>
<th>Plural (Heterogenous)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalescent</td>
<td><em>Depoliticized Democracy</em>: Switzerland</td>
<td><em>Consociational Democracy</em>: Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversarial</td>
<td><em>Centripetal Democracy</em>: United States</td>
<td><em>Centrifugal Democracy</em>: Italy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Only bottom-right unstable ==> Heterogeneity only a necessary condition for instability, absent consociation it becomes sufficient


6. Two ideal-types of democracy:
   a. **The Westminster Model**
      (1) 1 party, bare-majority govts
      (2) fused legis & exec pow, & cab dom
      (3) asymmetric bicameralism
   b. *Two-party System*
   c. *One-dimensional party-system*
   d. *Plurality electoral system*
   e. *Unitary & cntrzlized territorial govt*
   f. *Unwritten const & parl sovereignty*
b. *The Consensus Model*
   (1) Executive power-sharing
   (2) Sep. powers, formal & informal
   (3) Balanced Bicam & minority rep
   (4) Multi-party system

(5) Multi-dimensional party system
(6) Proportional representation
(7) Territorial & non-terr. fed, decent
(8) Written const & minority vetoes

1. B/w interests created by social structure & polices implemented by govts lie organizations that aggregate, mobilize, & press for policies: Parties + Other actors... (esp. economic actors: unions, employers, banks, etc.)
2. Corporatist Policymaking [DEFINE] credited with successful macroecon. management & thereby facilitation of democratic stability
3. Recent innovations have begun to shift the focus toward the role of firms as employers & allocators of capital

1. Parties do not simply reflect underlying cleavage structure of society ==> independent role of party systems for stability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party-System Polarization ↓</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Segmented Multipartism: Ireland</td>
<td>Polarized Multipartism: Italy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Also emphasizes key role of anti-system parties

M. Comparative Party Research
1. Schumpeter (1942): defined party role
   a. interest articulation, aggregation, policy-making, & system legitimation
   b. parties offer voters choice b/w ideologies represented in election manifestos & implemented by govts in office: voters evaluate
2. V.O. Key (1966): do parties set agenda for voters or do voters choose parties?
3. Pateman, Rose, Lawson (*When Parties Fail?*) => parties increasingly failed these roles (?): studied “why stability ended” (?)
4. Strategies of Parties (Rokkan, Otto Kirchheimer): Mobilize a *niche* or manufacture a *catch-all* coal ==> probability of success for party strategy depends on social structure, institutional rules, & *strategies of other parties*
   a. Strength: highlights strategic behavior of political actors
   b. Weakness: tends to explain change by actor mistakes & stability by actor wisdom
5. Comparative Party Research, New directions: why parties at all? “Post-materialist” values stress independence & critical of system => crisis for parties

N. Origins of Modern Institutionalism
   a. *Duverger’s Law & Beyond*
      (1) Voters’ incentives & actions
      (2) Policymakers’ incentives & actions
      a. Argues that multiparty parliaments ==> coalition govts; coalition govts unstable; so multiparty systems unstable = false
c. Implications
   (1) MWC’s are stable: Single-party majority or Multiparty
   (2) Emphasis on......willingness to enter coalition and......informational uncertainty in coalition
   bargaining...
   (3) ==> Re-emphasis on fractionalization & polarization

d. Extensions:
   (1) Minority govts’ workings: Kaare Strom & George Tsebelis
   (2) Parliamentary behavior: Party discipline; “Constituency”

   a. Introduces notion of Minimal-winning coalitions–MWCs are stable
      (1) Single-party govts are usually MWCs, so they’re usually stable
      (2) Multi-party govts are stable too if they’re MWCs
   b. Formation of MWCs is a function of **parties’ willingness to enter coalitions & informational
      uncertainty in bargaining with potential coalition members**
   c. Minority govts: how they work & conditions under which they work well (Strom, Tsebelis)
   d. Parliamentary behavior: **party discipline** a key factor related to electoral system & govt structure

4. Modern Successors:

O. Political Outputs & Outcomes:
   1. Traditionally little focus on what govts actually did (!)
      a. All about societal inputs & how political institutions produced govts from them (corporatism
         exceptional here), but
      b. Little or nothing about what policies were produced, *i.e.*, “So What?”
   2. **Increasing focus on policies & outcomes produced by structure & institutions ==>**
      a. **Focus on Actors’ Opportunities, Objectives, & Constraints**
      b. **Focus also on outcomes that concretely affect citizens’ lives in democracy**
      c. **Empirical Analysis: attempt to link differences in policies & outcomes across time & countries to structure & institutions**
   3. The Keynesian Welfare State & Successor Policies become a central focus for modern comparative study
      a. E.g.: Countries faced similar economic conditions & responded differently, Why?
         (1) Partisan differences?
         (2) Socio-economic-structure differences?
         (3) Institutional differences?

   1. One of the first systematic analyses of structure & institutions ==> Participation & Stability & Order
   2. Fertile ground by then: rich in theory & assumption, empirical vacuum

Q. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy* (1999) [We’ll return to this]

R. Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy* (2000) [We’ll return to this]

Socio-Economic Structure (SES) & Democratic Politics

**Introduction:** Politics=means by which conflicts (of opinion, interests, views) reconciled (not necessarily resolved)
so policies may be decided & implemented. Liberal-democratic countries aim to manage this in as orderly, efficient,
& peaceful manner as possible while remaining democratic. Analysis of socio-economic development & socio-
economic cleavage structures, then, is our inroad into understanding fundamental, enduring, & potentially prominent
schisms in society across which such conflict arises.

VI. Introduction
   A. Our analysis of SE cleavage-structure & politics has 4 goals
      1. Definition of concepts
      2. Introduction of empirical facts, two parts
a. variation & similarity broad, cross-sectional features w/in & cross ctry
b. change & continuity over time

3. Arguments relating SE cleavage-structure to outcomes
   a. Democratic Perform: participation, stability, violence
   b. Party Systems

4. Arguments relating SE development to outcomes:
   a. Democracy & democratization
   b. Democratic Perform: participation, stability, violence

VII. Definition & Typology of cleavages & cleavage structure

A. L & E: “a division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups, or org’s [b/w] whom conflict may arise” (p. 53) [emph. added]

B. Rae & Taylor: ‘‘Cleavages are the criteria which divide members of a community or subcommunity into groups...” (p. 53). Typology:
   1. Ascriptive/trait: race, caste, ethnicity, language
   2. Attitudinal/opinion: ideology, preference, class, relig

C. [I’d say R & T’s first two are sufficient; let’s call them:]
   1. Ascriptive Cleavages
   2. Preference/Value Cleavages

D. Some of the characteristics by which cleavages differ:
   1. criteria that determine group mem’ship: objectivity v. subjectivity
   2. exclusivity of the groups so divided
   3. nature of disagreement: policy differences v. belief & value diff’s
   4. salience
   5. latent v. manifest

E. Abstract typology by membership criteria is difficult, but more concrete enumeration may suffice (Daalder):
   1. class or sectoral (economic) interests: worker/employer; traded/non-traded; private/public
   2. religion: Cath/Prot; Christian/Non-C; relig/secular; fundamentalist/moderate
   3. geographical: urban/rural, center/periphery
   4. nationality or nationalism: ethnic, nationalist, & regionalist separatism

F. Multifarious cleavages, basically infinite in principle, so Q of which cleavages matter best seen as entirely a practical one of explanatory power v. parsimony. L & E’s set [paraphrased] reasonable:
   1. Religious
   2. Ethnic/Linguistic
   3. Class/Economic
   4. Regional/Geographic

G. Some other definitions:
   1. Powell II: “A set of attitudes that divides the nation’s citizens into major political groups.”
      a. “Sometimes... ‘purely’ political: they reflect opinions about [particular] policies [or policy areas] & are developed, sustained, & organized by political leaders committed to such policies...”
      b. “more frequently alignment of large groups based on deep social, economic, & cultural divisions in the fabric of society...[e.g.] occupation, religion, language, race, custom, & geography...” (42)
      c. He focuses on two:
         (1) ethnic (cultural) divisions
         (2) economic divisions
   d. one often-raised Q is relative weight of these two
      (1) [Pink Floyd quote: “With/Without/ & who’ll deny/it’s what the fighting’s all about” from ‘Us & Them’ off ‘Dark Side of the Moon’]
      (2) but avoid any false dichotomy
      (3) [Both ethnic/cultural & econ always matter though relative weight may vary–any hypotheses as
to why & how the relative might vary?]

2. GLM: “implies much more than mere division, more even than outright conflict, b/w 2 sets of people...
   a. fundamental cleavage...3 specific connotations: [GLM are reviewing Lipset & Rokkan here]
      (1) “involves a social division that separates people who can be distinguished from one another in terms of key social characteristics such as occupation, status, religion, or ethnicity...Cannot be defined at the political level alone” (210)
      (2) “the groups involved in the division must be conscious of their collective identity... & be willing to act on this basis”
      (3) “must be expressed in organizational terms... usually achieved as a result of the activities of a trade union, a church, a political party, or some other organization that gives formal institutional expression to the interests of those on one side of the division” (p. 211)
   b. following Lipset & Rokkan, focus is on four (more on this later):
      (1) Center-Periphery
      (2) Church-State
      (3) Rural-Urban
      (4) Class Structure

H. SUMMARY of DEFINITIONS & TYPES:
   1. Definitions of Cleavages
      a. L & E: “a division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups, or organizations [between] whom conflict may arise” (p. 53)
      b. Powell II: “a set of attitudes which divides the nation’s citizens into major political groups”
         (1) “Sometimes purely political: they reflect opinions about policies or & are developed, sustained, & organized by political leaders committed to such policies...”
         (2) “more frequently [they are the] alignment of large groups...based on deep social, economic, & cultural divisions in the fabric of society[... occupation, religion, language, race, custom, geography” (p.42)
      c. GLM: “[cleavage] = much more than mere division, more even than outright conflict, between 2 sets of people.” Cleavages 3 properties:
         (1) Social divisions on the basis of identifiable characteristics (e.g., occupation, status, religion, ethnicity); cannot be defined at political level alone (e.g., not parties)
         (2) Grps must possess grp consciousness & willing to act on that basis
         (3) Cleavage must be expressed in organizational terms (e.g., unions, action groups, etc.) [We stress this less as a criteria...]
   2. Typologies of Cleavages:
      a. We distinguish 2 Broad Cleavage-Types:
         (1) Ascriptive or “Trait” Cleavages: bases for division are inherent characteristics of individuals involved, there’s no element of choosing to belong to some group: e.g., race, caste, ethnicity, language
         (2) Functional, Preference, or Value Cleavages: these are adopted views or, at least to some degree, chosen affiliations: e.g., class, preferences, ideology, & possibly religion
      b. We identify 4 Common Cleavage-Bases:
         (1) Religious: Christian/Non-Christian, Catholic/Protestant, Fundamentalist/Moderate, Religious/Secular
         (2) Ethnic/Linguistic: Race, Language, Cultures
         (3) Class/Economic: social class, income & wealth, worker/employer, manual/skilled labor, traded/non-traded sector, private/public sector
         (4) Regional/Geographic: Urb/Sub/Rural, Cntr/Periph, Regionalism

VIII. Powell’s (II) Arguments & Findings on Socio-Econ Cleavages & Cleavage-Structure & Democratic Perform
A. Ethnic-/Linguistic-/Religious-ly divided societies
   1. Preliminary Analytical Problems/Issues:
a. Which divides matter?
b. Whether E/L/R divides cause the conflict or economic differences coinciding therewith do?

2. **Argument:** E/L/R divisions are less divisible (“compromisable” or “bargainable”) & thus, greater prevalence & saliency of E/L/R divisions worsens democratic performance

3. **Implications:**
   a. **participation** could go either way,
   b. **govt stability** should decline as E/L/R divisions rise
   c. **social order** should decline as E/L/R divisions rise

4. **Findings:** (in broad sample of democracies)
   a. Some weak indication that **participation** decreases with E/L/R fractionalization
   b. Stronger evidence that **govt stability** & “effectiveness” declines with E/L/R fractionalization
   c. Complicated relationship with upheaval & violence
      (1) no greater tendency to riot apparent
      (2) however, given social upheaval, appears more likely to become violent & deadly—latter frequently occurring as govt's attempt to restore order
      (3) I.e., Greater E/L/R fractionalization produces no greater **tendency to riot**, but, given some degree of social upheaval, it appears more likely to become violent the greater is E/L/R fractionalization

**B. Economically Divided Societies**

1. **Classical Arguments:** (date back to Aristotle)
   a. Economic **inequality** produces political instability
   b. Large **middle class** key to defusing this potential

2. **Powell II’s Arguments:**
   a. “little doubt that occupational divisions & the inequalities that usually accompany them...convenient basis for construct. political org’s” (p.47)
   b. Still less Q, I’d say, that natural basis for potentially disruptive conflict
   c. What’s less clear is mech. by which econ. inequality ⇒ pol. instability
      (1) How are such inequalities so frequently tolerated in traditional societies & become issues in modernizing & modern ones?
      (2) N.b. it’s usu. abrogation of traditional peasant “rights” which triggers revolutions, doesn’t appear to be the awareness of inequality per se
      (3) [concepts: relative deprivation, perceived v. objective inequality, justice]

3. **Powell II’s Hypotheses:** Economic inequality reduces participation, govt stability, & social order

4. **Powell II’s Findings:** Weak evidence of any relationship between inequality & democratic functioning

C. Powell Summary:

1. Arguments: Small population, high development, homogeneity (ethnic, etc.), & low inequality reduce riots & deaths
2. Findings: Yes to pop. & dev., some evidence for ethnic homog., weak evidence for economic inequality. [Why do you suppose?]

D. Powell’s findings refer to entire sample of democracies (ca. 1980). We study developed democracies; findings in that sample differ somewhat. [See scatterplots & regressions below.]

E. **Further Considerations/Disc.: why some divided soc’s function dem’ly, peacefully, & stably, but others not?**

1. History?
   a. History of oppression & repression & of internal & external war: US, UK/N.Ire.; Israel; former Yugo.; Franco-German, Franco-Spanish, German-Danish, Italian-Austrian, Italian-French border regions
   b. History of homogeneity or heterogeneity: Compare reactions of massive immigration in Germany v. Switzerland; Italy v. Canada

2. Structure or Nature of Cleavages [see below]?
a. Reinforcing v. cross-cutting cleavages?
   (1) US v. Switzerland
   (2) Finland v. Spain
b. Relative size of the factions?
   (1) Too small to be a “threat”
   (2) So large it “must be dealt with”
   (3) Hypothesis: 15-40% range most severe problems?
c. Divisibility of issues? Ascriptive v. functional?
d. Fractionalization? Polarization?

3. Institutional structure? [more on this later]
   a. Regional autonomy (Switzerland, Canada, US, Germany, Australia, Italy, Spain: federalism or special relationships with peripheral groups)
   b. Parliamentary representation of minorities (Neth., Bel.: highly prop. sys.)
   c. Functional representation (Austria: proporz, Netherlands: pillarization)
   d. Checks & balances (US); constitutionally ensconced liberties (all dev’d dem’s)

F. Powell summarizes chapt nicely–read last 3 paragraphs carefully

IX. Characteristics of Socio-Econ Cleavages & Cleavage Structure that May Affect Democratic Performance

A. Reinforcing (coinciding) Cleavages & Cross-cutting Cleavages
   1. Definitions:
      a. Reinforcing: two cleavages are reinforcing to the degree that they divide society into the same two groups of people
      b. Cross-cutting: two cleavages are cross-cutting to the degree that their divisions of society do not coincide
   2. N.b. this a property of cleavage structure, of relations between cleavages (dividing lines), not of one specific cleavage line.
   3. [Examples & So What?] 

B. Cross-Cutting v. Reinforcing: Cleavage structures (a set of cleavages) are cross-cutting to the degree that each divides the nation differently into different groups & reinforcing to the degree that each divides the nation into the same groups
   1. Argument: cleavages are more (less) likely to be more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more they reinforce (cross-cut) each other.

C. Salience: importance of dividing line & its associated conflicts to those involved. (Some refer to dormant cleavages as “latent” & active cleavages as “manifest”.)
   1. Argument: cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more salient the issues involved.

D. Divisibility: degree to which issues over which groups divided by cleavage easily bargainable or compromisable as opposed to categorical (0-1).
   1. Argument: cleavages more likely less detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more divisible the issues involved.

E. Relative Power of groups divided by the cleavage
   1. Argument 1: cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more closely is power distributed among the groups.
   2. Argument 2: cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order as the power of ascendant groups approaches that of dominant groups.

F. Fractionalization & Polarization: Fractionalization refers to number of cleavages operating (manifest); polarization refers to “distance” separating the parties’ preferred policies & outcomes
   1. Argument: cleavages are more likely to be more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more fractionalized & polarized the cleavage structure

X. Patterns of Cleavages & the Number of Political Parties
A. Pattern of Cleavages & the Number of Parties
   1. SE cleavage struct. of polity described in various dimensions
      a. fractionalization of society (# of sub-groups, possibly overlapping)
      b. polarization of society (“distance” between groups)
      c. degree to which cleavages reinforce or cross-cut
      d. relative salience of the various cleavages
   2. These factors combine to suggest number of political parties that may evolve to represent various issues
      a. they tell us number of relevant disjoint subgroups
      b. if political parties evolve to represent groups of people with distinct interests, that should at least
         suggest number of parties that evolve
   3. Social-structural data that would enable operationalize the abstract concepts above & process them into
      the number of disjoint subgroups has not been attempted & would be no simple task (though I think it
      might be feasible). However, subjectively, my impression is that relationship not as strong as might
      expect:
      a. US–many disjoint subgroups, effectively 2 parties
      b. Italy–relatively homogenous, many parties
      c. Denmark–relatively homogenous, many parties
      d. [Any guesses why this might be?]

B. Argument: Cleavage structure suggests # & types of social groups that parties could evolve to represent;
   i.e., soc. struct. gives basis for political org. suggesting that societal fractionalization & polarization may be
   mirrored by party-system fract. & polar.

C. Evidence:
   1. To measure adequately effective number of relevant social groupings daunting empirical task: only crude
      attempts so far.
   2. However, my subjective impression is correlation b/w # social groups & # parties weak at best: US:
      many groups, 2 parties; Switzerland: many groups, many parties; Italy: relatively homogenous, many
      parties; UK: relatively homogenous, 2 parties.
      electoral law & inst’s

D. Some Key Concepts: cleavage; cleavage structure; salience/intensity; latent v. manifest; cross-cutting v.
   reinforcing; fractionalization & polarization; modernization & social-mobilization; post-materialism

XI. Modernization & Democratic Performance

A. Key features of development:
   1. Growth & spread of affluence
   2. Economic- & social-structural change
   3. Urbanization
   4. Education, literacy, & spread of mass media
   5. Greater social & occupational mobility

B. Classical Hypotheses: Democracies with modernized social structures & developed economies expected
   to have higher participation, more stable & effective govts, & less political violence than countries with
   more traditional social structures & underdeveloped economies & democracies. Why?
   1. Simple, monotonic arguments:
      a. Education & Modern Person hypotheses (Lerner, Inkeles: rational/scientific life views)
      b. Value-harmonization hypothesis
      c. Affluence hypothesis: (Maslow’s hierarchy of needs)
      d. Govt-resources hypothesis: affluence allows greater fulfillment of social demands, partly via
         increase of govt resources
      e. Increasing-interdependence hypothesis
   2. Non-monotonic, Conditional (complicated) arguments
      a. Ratio econ dev’p to soc-pol mobilization (Huntington)
b. *Level of Econ dev’p at intro of political competition*

c. *Pace-of-development hypothesis*

C. Powell II: Impact on political perf? [generate hypoth’s]

1. **Participation**
   a. **Argument:** modernization raises participation
      (1) greater info., edu., & psychological involvement of modern person
      (2) more extensive & specialized grp structures, more effective organizations (esp. parties & related org’s)
   b. **Finding:** Modernization=> Lesser Participation
   c. **Why?**

2. **Govt Stability/Effectiveness:**
   a. **Hypothesis:** Seems logical that modernize ⇒ ↓ govt stab & effect
   b. **Finding:** Modernization ⇒ no apparent relation to govt stab. & effect.
   c. **Why?**

3. **Social Order & Violence:**
   a. **Hypothesis:** Again, seems logical that modernization ⇒ greater social order & less violence
   b. **Findings:** Relationship b/w development & “social upheaval” (riots) seems different than that b/w development & political violence
      (1) Soc disorder most in early stages of modernization, less at undeveloped & developed stages; i.e., curvilinear w/ early modernization appearing worst
      (2) Violence, contrarily, strictly declines (increases) in modernization (underdevelopment); i.e., linear
   c. **Why?**

XII. Some data & simple evidence on S-E Development & Cleavage-Structure & Democratic Performance
Number of obs = 21
R-squared = 0.8833
| Variable | Coef. | Std. Err. | t | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------|-------|-----------|---|------|------------------------|
| lpop     | -3.336463 | 1.212639 | -2.751 | 0.019 | -6.005463 -.6674632 |
| lrgdpc   | 1.848647  | 6.740736  | 0.274 | 0.789 | -12.98761 16.68491 |
| ethind   | 0.0623695 | 7.192933  | 0.009 | 0.993 | -15.76917 15.89391 |
| relind   | 12.3443   | 7.94188   | 1.554 | 0.148 | -5.13561 29.82426 |
| gini     | -111.8817 | 44.40408  | -2.520 | 0.028 | -209.6144 -14.14894 |
| edsec    | -0.2808857| 0.1271328 | -2.209 | 0.049 | -0.5607032 -.0010682 |
| age65o   | 1.203603  | 0.7275164 | 1.654 | 0.126 | -0.3976493 2.804856 |
| US       | -17.27092 | 6.455974  | -2.675 | 0.022 | -31.48042 -3.061414 |
| SZ       | -46.59973 | 6.659673  | -6.997 | 0.000 | -61.25757 -31.94189 |
| _cons    | 144.9013  | 57.75213  | 2.509 | 0.029 | 17.78975 272.0129 |
B. Govt Stability
Number of obs = 21
R-squared = 0.6162

|     | Coef.  | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t| | 95% Conf. Interval |
|-----|--------|-----------|-------|------|---------------------|
| lpop | -1.208241 | 1.905755  | -0.634 | 0.538 | -5.360524 -2.944042 |
| lrgdpc | -21.06676 | 11.06763  | -1.903 | 0.081 | -45.18106 3.047533 |
| ethind | 24.58645 | 10.87294  | 2.261  | 0.043 | .8963491 48.27655 |
| relind | 28.05811 | 12.91752  | 2.172  | 0.051 | -.0867556 56.20297 |
| gini | -48.43518 | 70.82302  | -0.684 | 0.507 | -202.7453 105.8749 |
| edsec | .220791  | .2004675  | 1.101  | 0.292 | -.2159903 .6575722 |
| age65o | 1.553841 | 1.179984  | 1.317  | 0.212 | -1.017124 4.124805 |
| US  | 18.08332 | 10.5959  | 1.707  | 0.114 | -.003161 41.1698 |
| _cons | 192.649  | 94.03041  | 2.049  | 0.063 | -12.2256 397.5237 |

C. Social Order & Violence
XIII. Interpreting Regression-Analysis Results

A. Output refers to equation, where name in top-left, here “lattopp”, is dependent variable & rest of names in first column are independent variables, “lpop”, “lrgdpc” etc.

B. Second column contains estimated coefficients on those independent variables. Last such coefficient, on “_cons”, is coefficient on a constant (one), otherwise known as intercept. Coefficients tell you how much dependent variable tends to move for each 1-unit increase in independent variable. **Sign**, therefore, tells you direction of the relationship & **size** tells you magnitude (keeping in mind substantive scales of independent & dependent variables). So, above estimated equation is:

\[
lattopp = 9.06 +0.605(lpop) -3.45(lrgdpc) +1.98(ethind) +1.82(relind) +3.16(gini) +.040(edsec) +.766(age65o)
\]

C. All data are for the 1980s:
1. lattopp=avg # of “political attacks & oppressions”
2. lpop=natural log of size of population
3. lrgdpc=natural log of real GDP per capita
4. ethind=ethnic fractionalization index: probability that 2 persons chosen at random will be of diff ethnic grps
5. relind=religious fractionalization index: probability 2 persons chosen at random will be of diff relig grs
6. gini=GINI index of income inequality
7. edsec=percentage of population in relative age grp that attained at least secondary edu (high school)
8. age65o=percentage of population over 65 years old

D. Third column is standard error. It tells you precision of the estimated relationship: with how great certainty do increases in independent variable lead to movements in the dependent variable? You can read these as loosely something like the +/- number that comes with every survey. E.g., “When percent of population high-school educated or better goes up by 1, natural log of political attacks & oppressions go up by about .04 [coefficient on edsec] give or take .034 [std error on edsec coeff].”

E. Next column contains t-statistics. Std errors should at very least be smaller than coefficient for us to lend any credence to coefficient estimate. We’d prefer them to be no larger than half as large as coefficient. T-statistic is just coefficient divided by standard error. So, loosely, larger t-statistics imply more precise relationships (tighter relationships, not necessarily larger ones). We like t-stats approaching or exceeding about 2 (very crude advice, please don’t ever tell a statistician this).

F. Next column is probability, under certain assumptions, of having estimated a coefficient this far or farther from zero if the true relationship actually were zero. We look to these to see if we can say with any statistical certainty that a relationship (positive or negative) exists. We like these “p-levels” approaching or smaller than 0.10 (again, this very rough statement would make a statistician cringe).

G. Last two columns are “95% confidence interval”. Again, exceedingly crudely but good enough for now, we can say, under certain assumptions, we are 95% confident that the true relationship b/w these bounds.

H. This is **multiple regression**. It’s just like the scatter-plots for two variables above, only now looking for
relation between a set of possible independent variables & the dependent variable. Thus, each coefficient is “the effect of X on Y, holding all else constant” or “the effect of X on Y after having ‘netted out’ all relationships between the other x’s & Y”.

1. Coefficients (and standard errors, t-stats, & p-levels) defined above all related to how (and the certainty with which) each variable, controlling for all the others, relates to the dependent variable.

2. R² term (“R-squared” at top-right of table) indicates share of total variation of dependent variable that can be explained by, that is systematic in, (all of) the independent variables.

I. Questions? We will see this again, so:
1. Do not panic if you did not get all of this right now. We will see it again ( & again) & I will explain it again.
2. However, do not hope that it will just go away if you ignore it. We will see it again ( & again).

XIV. Further Q’s regarding Dev & Saliency of Diff Cleavages:
1. Does development increase the saliency of functional cleavages relative to ascriptive ones?
2. Does rise of post-industrial society & post-materialism decrease saliency of economic cleavages?
3. Did the rise of the welfare state & the more recent plateau-ing or receding of the welfare state increase or decrease the saliency of economic cleavages?
4. More broadly, are new cleavages replacing old ones?

XV. Summary of What We Have So Far on Socio-Econ Development & Cleavage-Structure & Politics:
A. Basic Notion & Definition of Social Cleavage & Cleavage-Structure
B. Typologies of Social Cleavages:
   1. Ascriptive v. Functional Cleavages
   2. Religious, Ethnic/Linguistic, Class/Economic, Regional/Geographic
C. Characteristics of Social Cleavages & Cleavage-Structures Potentially Important to Key Elements of Democratic Performance
   1. Salience of the Divide (“latent” — “manifest”)
   2. Divisibility (“Bargainability” or “Compromisability”)
   3. Relative Power of the Groups Involved
   4. Fractionalization & Polarization (of Cleavage Structure)
   5. Cross-Cutting v. Reinforcing (Cleavage Structure)
D. Modernization & Democratic Perf; Key Hypotheses
   1. Modernization ↓ Participation, Govt Stab, & Soc Order
      a. Education & the “Modern Person” Arg.
      b. Value-Harmonization Arg.
      c. Increasing Density of Interactions (Increasing Interdependence of Individuals in Society) Arg.
   2. Impact of Modernization Depends (is complicated)
      a. Ratio of Econ Dev’t to Social Mobilization Arg.
      c. Pace of Development Arg.
E. Why do some democracies function well & others not? Answer in this material emphasizes nature & severity of underlying potential conflicts as expressed in social-structure & the way they are expressed. This omits other important parts of answer, some of which we will emphasize later. For now, note:
   1. History: of oppress & repress & of homogeneity or heterogeneity
   2. Institutional Structure: Checks & Balances, Regional Autonomy, Minority Representation in Parliament; Functional Representation of Minorities, Guaranteed Rights in Constitutions
F. Social-Cleavage Patterns & the Party System: basic notion that party system, i.e., number, sizes, & ideological positioning of parties, reflects somehow underlying social-structure. But relation moderated by:
   1. Institutions operating b/w soc struct & party sys (most centrally, electoral inst’s).
   2. Party & other elite strategies, & history (loosely, inertia)
Lipset & Rokkan’s Diachronic Model of Cleavage-Structure Formation & Freezing

XVI. 2 stages, Process of Nation-Building & Industrial Revolution, each bringing 2 fundamental conflicts, form underlying cleavage structure. Nature of resolution forms party system.

A. Nation Building I: Center v. Periphery
1. Those seeking to standardize laws & consolidate power in nation-state (ctr) v. those striving to maintain local powers & privileges (periph)
2. The struggle can end in:
   a. secession (Ireland from UK),
   b. periph. absorption & its gradual fade as distinct (France: Bretton, Occitan),
   c. local autonomy (some Spanish & Italian regions),
   d. or retention of diffuse, persistent tension (e.g., Germany, except Bavaria which is more local-autonomy resolution)
3. Only last 2 likely to result in cleavage’s reflection in party system

B. Nation-Building II: Church v. State
1. Conflict b/w (Cath) Church’s claim of rights & privileges, esp. its supremacy in certain moral areas, v. state consolidators; central issue often education
2. Resolution depends centrally on nation’s history & role in Protestant Ref. & later secularist movements:
   a. Where Protestant movements allied with state & won, party system does not usually reflect Church-State cleavage (e.g., UK, Scandinavia)
   b. Where Catholicism continued to dominate, Church-State cleavage tended to persist (e.g., Latin Europe)
   c. Where secularists most momentum (e.g., France), party system often evolved anti-clerical elements

C. Industrial Revolution I: Urban v. Rural
1. Conflict b/w traditionally dominant rural interests & new commercial & industrial classes
2. Have almost universally faded (largely b/c urban int’s won), but...
   a. ...in some places agrarian parties emerged, & some persist if lead strategists allowed party flexibility from early aims & purposes, (e.g., Sweden, Finland)
   b. ...split has seen rebirth in reverse as urban decline began, (e.g., US, UK)
   c. ...some rebirth also in conflicts over agr. protection (e.g., esp. Eur & Jap)

D. Industrial Revolution II: Labor v. Employers
1. ↑ concentration of production, & accompanying ↑ organization of labor & employers as grps, = almost-inherently-organized conflict
2. Resolution occurred by two patterns:
   a. Where workers rose & bourgeoisie adopted an accommodative strategy, Socialist parties arose as the representatives of labor (e.g., UK, Sweden)
   b. Where workers rose & bourgeoisie adopted stonewalling & /or repressive strategy, Communist parties arose as rep’s of labor (e.g., Fra, Ita, Ger, Spa)

XVII. Argument: Pattern of how these conflicts arose in each ctry & how had been or were being resolved at time mass democ. arrived frozen. I.e., cleavage structure frozen into party system by mid-20th Century because:

A. Underlying conflicts persist & groups involved have developed collective identities
B. Major new political entities typ’ly can arise only w/ large ↑ in suffrage & universal suffrage mostly completed by then.
C. Political rules made by & so favor established parties
D. Established parties follow electoral strategies to isolate their supporters from outside appeals

XVIII. Perceived ↑ electoral volatility in 1970s led some to seek explanations for unfreezing (thawing):

A. Social-Structural Changes in Developed Democracies
1. Sectoral-Structure: industry ↓, agriculture ↓↓, service-sector ↑↑
2. Erosion of Class Boundaries
a. general education & more wide-spread higher education
b. changing work modes: relative ↓ manual labor; more-fluid occup. Δ
c. increasingly widespread affluence (though relative disparities widened too)

B. Changes in Patterns of Individual Voting Behavior: Decline of Structural Voting
1. Decline class voting & religious voting but still recognizably diff.
2. Arg’s: suggested reasons for former listed above, to which add:
   a. secularization & decreasing coherence of views among relig. & secular alike
   b. increased individuality & political sophistication

C. Changes in Issues on which basis those Individuals Vote: Dealignment v. Realignment
1. Realignment: new parties & changing support among existing
   a. Some see a “New Politics” movement
      (1) new, highly educated, young middle class
      (2) distinctive new values & issues: environment, feminism, etc.
      (3) new-left: greens, new comm.; new-right: anti-govt, xenophobic, protest
   b. GLM suggest this may be exaggerated
      (1) most of these new parties are still marginal electorally
      (2) parliamentary and/or electoral necessity implies increasing association of the “new” lefts & rights with “old” ones
   c. Conclusion: Realignment very limited, some new dim’s in still-recognizable left-right divide. Great electoral stability remains across left-right blocks of parties/issues; instability w/in blocks.
2. Dealignment: non-partisan allegiances & no allegiances. Supposed evidence: (a) ↓ party ID, (b) ↓ new parties & party-sys fractionalization, & (c) ↓ elect volatility. All of which questionable.

Dalton, ch. 13 in LNN, & ch.8 in Cit. Pol., 2nd ed.

XIX. Broad Theme:
   A. 2 prominent changes in link from SES to voting behavior
      1. Traditional cleavages (esp. class & religion) transformed & weakened as predictors of individuals’ electoral choices
      2. Changing bases of ideological conflict: rise of “post-materialism”
   B. These producing general rise in “issue-based” voting
      1. Less based on socially pre-determined & structured competition
      2. A new calculus of electoral decisions
         a. Individualistic
         b. Varying issue positions & weights thereupon

XX. The post-war era through late 1960s to 1970s
A. Party competition & voting patterns structured around social divisions within a polity
   1. Review Lipset & Rokkan’s “Diachronic” Model & Social-Cleavage/Party-System “Freezing” Hypothesis
   2. Expected to persist because...
      a. Such cleavage structures long-lasting: underlying conflicts persist & grps developed collective ID
      b. Universal suffrage largely completed: new parties tend to form (only) when new grps enter electorate
      c. Political rules made by & so favor estab’d parties
      d. Estab’d party strategies: often try to isolate supporters from outside appeals
      e. NEW: Alignment w/ underlying social-structural groups advantageous to parties & voters
         [How? See below.]
   3. Why were these divisions so potent?
      a. Represented & (re-)produced deep ideological divisions
         (1) Class: conflict over nature of politics & economics, over very org. of society
         (2) Religion: basic value-systems (right & wrong) in conflict
      b. Social groups enabled parties to institutionalize a basis for support
         (1) Labor unions & firms provided organizational & people support
         (2) Ditto for churches
B. What does (reputation for) alignment of parties with social-structural groups do for voters & parties?
   1. The groups so divided provided a social & political reference & source of info for their members (voters)
   2. They provide org'l structure, people, & political ally for parties

XXI. General ↓ in sociologically determined vote
   A. Figs. pp. 172, 183-4 [n.b., usu. said post-'68 or so, but seems pretty uniform since the war to me]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Non-Catholic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 8.2**

**Figure 8.4**

**Legend**

- PSC
- PLP
- GB
- US

**Sources:** Various studies, 1948-99, American National Election Studies, British Election Study, German Election Study, etc.
TABLE 8.3

Church Attendance and Party Support

IN PERCENTAGES

United States
- Never
- Occasionally
- Weekly

Never: 79%
Occasionally: 15%
Weekly: 6%

Total
United States (93)

Each unit is the average of two or more units.

Source: 1969-70 World Values Survey

FIGURE 8.4

The Overall Level of Religious Voting, 1990
FIGURE 8.4
TRENDS IN DENOMINATIONAL VOTING


NOTE: Comparisons for the United States and Germany are between Protestants and Catholics. “GB-1” is a comparison of the Labour Party vote of Anglicans and Catholics; “GB-2” is a comparison of the Conservative Party vote of Anglicans and nonconformists.
FIGURE 8.6
THE OVERALL LEVEL
OF VALUES VOTING, 1990

NOTE: Values in parentheses are Cramer's V correlations. Respondents without a party preference are excluded from the calculation of correlations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Postmaterial</th>
<th>Material</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance 90/Greens</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Left</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Value priorities are measured with the twelve-item index (see chapter 5).
B. Simple Class-Voting Decline

1. **Define class voting:**

   2. Blue/White collar divide appears to be decreasingly relevant as a predictor of party vote

3. **Explanations for specifically this cleavage decline:**
   a. Class division better defined by degree of job autonomy & authority
   b. Rise of the middle class “salariat” & affluent blue-collar worker
   c. Educational divide: skilled v. unskilled labor, human-capital rich v. poor
   d. Broad sectoral: public v. private; traded v. non; service v. industry v. agr
   e. Life-style differences: industrial v. yuppie

4. Even so, general decline in ability of such socio-economic status indicators to predict vote choices

C. Religious Voting “Decline”

1. **Define religious voting, two types:**
   a. Denominational voting
   b. Religious v. secular

2. **Explanations for specifically this cleavage decline:**
   a. Secularization
      (1) Decreasing church memberships & attendance
      (2) Ethical individuality—e.g. US Catholic Church
   b. Church/state, secular/relig conflict largely resolved

3. N.b,
   a. other structural voting, esp. religious/secular, seems to have persisted to much greater degree than has class voting
b. Dalton’s broader claim of falling structural voting rests more solidly therefore on fact that divisions of relevance to declining prop. of pop.

D. Other Key Social Divisions
1. Region
   a. Occasional, dramatic flare-ups
   b. Still, some general fall in region’s predictive power
2. Urban/Rural & Center/Periphery
   a. Differences diminishing due to transport & communications revolutions
   b. But still-present agricultural-industry-service divide
3. Race/Ethnicity
   a. Prominent exception to general declining relevance of socioeconomic structure to one’s vote-choice
   b. Many societies still homogeneous or nearly so, less relevant there obviously

XXII. General explanations (hypotheses) for decline of SES as predictor of vote choice
A. Underlying conflicts have increasingly been resolved
1. Nieuwbeerta (1995) finds that strength of class voting declines in the size of the welfare state
2. [Note: this would also explain persistence of race-ethnicity & relative decline of other cleavages]
3. Dalton dismisses this, though, noting:
   a. Periodic recessions bring economic issues back to front [doesn’t this weaken his other claims?]
   b. Persisting poverty, homelessness [yes, but do these segments of population vote? It varies.]
   c. Crime [not quite clear how this fits with any of above cleavages per se]
   d. Large differences remain on abortion, homosexual rights, & other “moral issues” [yes, but it’s exactly in this that religious/secular divide persists]
4. [As is clear from my comments here, I think case for “relative resolution of underlying conflicts” arg. could be made more strongly. Notice that deg. to which underlying conflicts “resolved” might explain relative decline of some types of struct voting & relative persistence or rise of others]

B. Parties broadened, or sought to, appeals across cleavage lines
1. Some evidence of platform convergence on broad socio-economic issues [e.g., industrial nationalization], but recently evidence indicates a reversal of that trend: increasingly polarized politics. Perhaps, the polarization is diminishing again? (Pragmatic left winning in US, UK, France, Germany?) Remains to be seen.
2. Dalton notes that voters, party leaders, & “political experts” still perceive large & /or clear partisan differences which would imply...
   a. ...that it’s not that voters don’t perceive or are unclear about partisan differences, nor that parties no longer express such differences, but rather...
   b. ...that socio-economic status of voter serves less as determinant of how voter will interpret & react to different signals parties send & voters receive.

C. Dalton’s preferred explanation emphasizes structural & institutional changes that have produced ↓ relevance relatively fixed social characteristics for contemporary electoral politics
1. These social cleavages still very relevant to those deeply enmeshed in them, but that’s fewer & fewer.
2. Increasing proportion of population characterized by:
   b. partic., membership, or involve “stable & bounded social structures” [?]
   c. Lifestyles becoming increasingly individualized & diverse [?]
3. [How about social fluidity & individual mobility across structured divides? Notice how this explains relative ↓ class & less ↓ in religion & no ↓ in race/ethnicity.]
4. D acknowledges that parties contributed to & reinforced all this:
   a. By seeking to accommodate these changes in structure & institutions within existing party struct. they have eroded their core estab’d images/reputations
   b. But they do not wish to commit yet to any strong stand on the new issues.

XXIII. New Bases of Political Cleavages, i.e. Post-Materialism
A. Define/Examples of “Post-Materialism”:

B. How did/do they arise?
   1. New issues benefitted from old ones: the “open space” arg.
   2. Vice versa, new issues cut across old divides, weakening their ability to divide: the “emergence of cross-cutting issues” arg.
   3. Meanwhile, cit’s ev’ where ly demanded opp’s to part. more act’ly in p-mkng: gen’l “further democratization of soc. & pol.” arg
   4. Finally, notice that new issues appeal exactly to those groups increasingly outside traditional struct’d & inst’lized cleavages: young, new middle class, educated, non-religious, [others?]  
   5. [Other hypoths? esp. regarding environmentalism, are non-material problems increasing? affluence? education? cross-derivatives, i.e. implications of Maslow’s hierarchy?]
   6. Before we proclaim “all new” divides, new cleavage patterns, though, we need to keep in mind:
      a. Not all of these issues are so terribly new, even if perhaps there current prominence might be unprecedented.
      b. Compared to the structured ideologies underlying class & religious cleavages, materialist vs. post-materialist framework (still) diffuse & imprecise: what beside their novelty links these concerns?

XXIV. So what is the impact of all this change?

A. Decline in long-term partisan predispositions ==>
   1. short-term factors like issues & image?
   2. performance-based voting, like econ voting?
   4. in “issue-voting”?

B. Issue-voting:
   1. Define Issue-Voting:
   2. Harder to study systematically because:
      a. Issues vary across elections & across individuals
      b. Multiplicity of issues at all times
   3. Issues underlying old cleavages still here; new issues added thereto

C. Takes some time for, & its an uncertain process by which a new basis, for partisan competition can arise.
   1. Grps must org to represent & mobilize interested.
   2. Parties must establish positions, reputations, & images on those interests (in uncertain environ).

D. New Politics is orthogonal to old politics divides: Left v. Right, Religious v. Secular (or Cath. v. Prot. etc.)
   1. The new divide is, maybe, sustainable society & libertarian values v. conservative social values & structured life choices.
   2. [Is this another dimension? or more like new manifestation or replacement of relig v. secular?]

XXV. Overview of Material to Date

A. Introduction
   1. DEF subject matter: “Developed Democracy”
   2. Intellectual History of Comparative Politics
   4. Cycle-of-Democratic-Politics Schematic

B. Soc-Ec Development & Structure & Democ. Politics
   1. Basic Notion & Def Social Cleavage & Cleavage-Structure
   2. Typologies of Social Cleavages:
      a. By membership bases: Ascriptive v. Functional/Preference
      b. By dimension of conflict: Religious; Ethnic/Linguistic; Class/Economic; Regional/Geographic
   3. Characteristics of SE Cleavages & Cleavage-Structures Potentially Important to Democratic Performance
      a. Salience of the Divide (“latent” — “manifest”)
b. Ascriptive v. functional bases of most salient cleavages

c. Divisibility (“Bargainability” or “Compromisability”)

d. Relative Power of the Groups Involved

e. Fractionalization & Polarization (of Cleavage Structure)

f. Cross-Cutting v. Reinforcing (Cleavage Structure)

C. Modernization & Democratic Perf; Key Hypotheses

1. Modernization ↑ Participation, Govt Stab, & Soc Order

a. Education & the “Modern Person” Arg.

b. Value-Harmonization Arg.

2. Impact of Modernization Depends (is complicated)

a. Ratio of Econ Dev’t to Social Mobilization Arg.


c. Pace of Development Arg.

D. Social-Cleavage Patterns & Party System:

1. basic notion that party system, i.e., #, sizes, & ideological positioning of parties, reflects underlying social-structure.

2. But relation heavily moderated by:

a. Institutions b/w soc struct & party system (esp., elect. inst’s).

b. Party & other elite strategies, & history (loosely, inertia)

E. L & R’s Cleavage-Struct. Formation & Freezing Hypoth

1. 2 stages, Nation-Build & Indust. Rev., each brings 2 fundamental conflicts, form cleavage structure. Nature of resolve forms party sys.

a. Nation Building I: Center v. Periphery

b. Nation-Building II: Church v. State

c. Industrial Revolution I: Urban v. Rural

d. Industrial Revolution II: Labor v. Employers

2. Arg: cleavage struct frozen in party sys by mid-20th C:

a. Underlying conflicts persist & grps developed collective ID

b. Universal suffrage largely completed

c. Political rules made by & so favor estab’d parties

d. Estab party strategies to isolate supporters from outside appeals

e. Soc-Grp/Party Alignment advantages parties & voters [How?]

F. Perceived ↑ electoral volatility post-70s⇒ explain thaw

1. 2 big changes in link from SES to voting behavior

a. Changing Patterns Ind. Voting Behave: ↑ Struct Vote. Traditional cleaves (esp. class & rel) transformed & weakened as predicts of inds’ vote choices

b. Changing bases ideol conflict: De-v. Re-alignment, ↑ post-materialism

2. These producing general rise in “issue-based” voting

a. Less socially pre-determined & structured competition

b. New calculus electoral choice: Individualistic, Varying issue positions & wts

3. Why were these divisions so potent?

a. Represented & (re-)produced deep ideological divisions

b. Social grps enable parties to inst’l-ize basis for support

4. Decline in sociologically determined vote


c. Other Key Soc Div’s: Region, Urb/Rur & Ctr/Periph, Race/Eth

d. Relative ↑ Struct Vote: Class>(Relig><Region)>Eth/Ling

5. General explanations (hypoths) for decline of SES vote
a. Underlying conflicts increasingly resolved (explain rel ?)
b. Parties (tried to) broaden appeals across lines (explain rel ?)
c. Structural & institutional changes produced relevance relatively fixed social characteristics for contemporary electoral politics
d. Social cleavages still very relevant to those deeply enmeshed in them, but that’s fewer & fewer.
e. Increasing proportion characterized by social fluidity & individual mobility across struct divides. (could explain relative decline)
f. Parties have contributed to & reinforced all this

XXVI. Comparative Govtal Systems I: Executives & Legislatures (Courts, Administration, & Local Govt)

A. Overview (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, chs. 2, 3, 4, 6):
1. To compare dem’s, asking how diff ways of constructing inst’s of dem might affect key soc, pol, & econ outcomes, must first have some grasp range of diff inst’l sys poss.
2. Branches of govt: exec, legis, judic, admin (bureauc); plus, some mech’s for subdividing jurisdiction: local governance

B. Executive (ch. 2)
1. DEFINE:
   a. classically, implements policy set by legislation;
   b. in practice, more than that:
      (1) consolidated leadership of govt, of country: CEO
      (2) often agenda setter, designer, enforcer of law
      (3) figurehead: personal embodiment of state
2. Key distinctive features of democratic exec’s (beyond US)
   a. Separation of Powers
      (1) Executive-legislative separation non-existent in most democracies
      (2) Head of State (HoS) & Chief Executive (CEO) strongly separated (separation non-existent in US): (historical evolution)
   b. Indirect Elect.: Execs not usu. directly elected, usually indirectly from legis
3. Head of State
   a. Types of Head of State (where differ, usu. longer term than CEO):
      (1) Const’l Monarchies: CA, AL, NZ (Queen rep. by Gov.-Gen.), JA (Emp.), BE, DE, LU (GrDuke), NE, NO, SP, SW, UK
      (2) Republics (Pres. HoS):
         (a) Direct Election: US, AU, FI, FR, IC, IR, PO
         (b) Election by Legislature: GE, GR, IT, MA, SZ
   b. Roles:
      (1) Symbolic: personal embodiment of nation
      (2) Procedural: preside@big state events (open parl, ratify laws, etc.)
      (3) Diplomatic: greeting visiting dignitaries, attending funerals, etc.
   c. Variation in Effective Powers:
      (1) Effective influence varies, but France (“Semi-Presidential” since 1958) a major exception (=> rest, w/ poss. exception Switz., Fin., & 1 or 2 others, more strictly Parliamentary Democracies)
         (a) Formal Powers: appoint PM, chair cab mtgs, dismiss PM, dissolve parl
         (b) Seems formidable, but w/ parl maj req’d to pass legis & to back a PM...
            i) only last much effective when Pres & Parl differ (cohabitation: ‘86-88, ‘93-5, ‘97-)
            ii) & blunt weapon, plus only likely useful when expect could win in elect.
      (2) All directly elected pres have at least that potency as (usu.) only leader elected by whole nation, often some other, usu. minor, powers beyond that
         (a) Fin: pres ctrl role in for. policy, can lever dom.-policy influence therefrom
         (b) Even Ire, where P can’t leave or speak any policy issue w/o govt. OK: 2 powers
            i) refer bills passed by parl to Supreme Ct for judicial review (see below)
ii) refuse petition to dissolve legis. (more later; n.b. weighs against too-freq ele.-calling)

(3) Indirectly elected pres & , *a fortiori*, monarchs lack that adv., but still not wholly powerless; many have some dissolution-refusal & such powers also, plus:

(a) **Italy**: can refuse diss., +bully pulpit: aloofness from day-to-day pol can be adv.
(b) Monarchs: some have intervened or spoken too strongly, & many presidents exist today as result, but even there still powerful symbol, which can also matter
   i) Belg (King Baudouin, the only Belgian): illustrates value in divided cty
   ii) Sp (modernising monarch): illustrates potential value in emerging dems
   iii) Elsewhere (SW & NE notably): royalty self-consciously avoids pomp

d. Explaining varying efficacy of Heads of State (to generalize):
   (1) Formal powers in constitution,
   (2) *Plus* pol.-strategic & social situation (e.g., Fra, Fin, but also, e.g., Ita, Bel, Spa)
   (3) Direct election helps

4. **Prime Minister (PM)/Chancellor** (“political boss” or C.E.O.)
   a. Usu. far more pow than US pres, esp. in 1-prty gov, but in coals too. *Why?*
      (1) Usu. PM obtains position by strong barg power in legislature
      (2) Usu. head of a key, often largest, party as well as head of govt
   b. **Aspects/Sources of PM Power**: again, formal description part of it, but key is political position:
      (1) PM=leg’s choice to head govt: tight party discipline also key
      (2) Given modest role of HoS, PM=nation’s ctrl pol fig: Thatcher’s England, e.g.
      (3) Cab & party leader: *first among equals*–hires & fires cab mins => *gatekeeper* to power (controls careers), so demands & gets strong party loyalty
      (4) at apex of political info, & usu. govt’s agenda-setter: which proposals discussed, in what order
   c. **Replacing PM’s**: PMs*dictators*, can be replaced at any time
      (1) **Electoral Loss**:
         (a) If party loses enough seats that PM no longer maintain parl maj to retain office
         (b) If loses parl supp b/w mandated elections, or if former supporters thinks may have, opponents (new & old) can force early election...
      (2) **Legislative-Majority Loss w/o Election**: current supporters can abandon if get better offer or begin to doubt or dislike current deal: PM ( & cab, see below) serves at will of parl majority
      (3) **Loss of Own-Party Leadership**: own party could also lose faith & decide to replace PM as party leader; does not *per se* remove PM title, but party could always abandon govt & replace it.
   d. Conclusions on PM:
      (1) => relatively small # MPs shifting support could topple PM ( & cab govt) w/o voters immediate & direct say, but, ultimately, all return to voter for approval, so estimates of voter support continually key
      (2) powerful but replaceable
      (3) formal powers detailed, but key is political position

5. **Cabinet (Govt)**: Cab=Board of Directors; set of ministers that comprise govt & head depts.
   a. Department Head:
      (1) **portfolio responsibility**: responsible for affairs of dept to cab as a whole, which is responsible to parl, which is responsible to voters
   b. Govt Member
      (1) **collective responsibility**: may debate issues in cab, but once decided, they’re unanimous & all sink or swim together (n.b., this distinguishes cab in parl. from in pres. dem.)
      (2) *coll. resp.* often taken to => secrecy of cab discussion, but veterans know how to leak strategically (personally, collectively) & veterans how to read tea leaves
      (3) *ministers w/o portfolio*: rare, have only this second role
   c. **Ministerial Autonomy**: GLM argue ministerial sys exhibits strong division labor
      (1) complexity of modern policymaking means only dept has expertise & resources to create, to
amend, etc. policy in its area =>
(2) minister generates policy in his/her area for cab disc. => choice structured on departmental lines
(n.b., this claim key to L & S model of govt form., later)
   a. **Fundamental Principle of Parliamentary Democracy**: Exec. (PM & Cab) responsible to Legis. (Parl)
   b. Govt cannot form, survive, or act w/o parl-maj supp. Key tools:
      (1) *Vote of Investiture*: DEF; even if not explicitly req’d, must survive votes *ab initio*
      (2) *Vote of (No) Confidence*: DEF
         (a) in almost all, govt must resign if lose [SZ: govts not face: not strictly Parl Dem]
         (b) opp. may propose vote of no confidence at any time [Why?]
         (c) govt may convert no-conf into conf vote or call conf vote at any time [Why?]
         (d) budgets often formally, &, if not, informally, votes of confidence
   c. (some major) Consequences:
      (1) Govt’s do not have fixed terms
      (2) major source of parliamentary power over govt
   d. Caretaker Govts: DEFINE
      (1) can last indef., sometimes act’ly long (months in Bel & Neth not uncommon)
      (2) by convention, usu. not initiate new legis agendas or implement new policies
   e. HoS, Formateurs, & Informateurs: the logistics of the process
      (1) Formateur: DEFINE; Informateur: DEFINE
      (2) HoS role usu. to name Form or Inform, sometimes mech’y prescribed choice
      (3) Form. names (proposes) PM & cab & portfol. alloc., for parl vote
         (a) Form. only names; parl (party) leaders bargain & make the decision
         (b) Ministries are career goals of parliamentarians–key prize & pow, so much sought
         (c) b/c, once installed, policy control only re-arranged by reforming govt (*ministerial autonomy*
            again), portfolio allocation central to debate & bargain over new govt
   f. Party Leaders (PM) Choosing Cabinet Members; characteristics sought/rewarded, punished
      (WHY?):
      (1) party loyalty (key tool in maintaining party discipline)
      (2) representation of party strands (WHY?)
      (3) PM internal-party supporters and/or opponents (WHY?)
      (4) seniority (WHY?)
      (5) ability (WHY?)
      (6) typ. must be MP’s, but not always, & some even prohib. both at same time
   g. Civil Service: politicized v. depoliticized (DEF & DISC)
   h. **Minority Govts**: DEF; how maintain pow? one key: maj. coal. may vary from policy to policy;
      something less possible within majority-govt model
   i. Defeat in Conf Vote: often not played to end-game, govt resigns before, but sometimes is to force
      public play
7. Summary Conclusion: 2 paragraphs on p. 38 (4th ed.)
C. Legislatures (Parliaments): (GLM ch. 3)
   a. Legislatures in Presidential & Parliamentary Systems:
      (1) Legislature usu. pow to create & enact legislation, including, critically, budgets
      (2) Presidents usu. pow to ratify or veto leg., to implement & monitor/enforce it
   b. In parliamentary systems:
      (1) **Govt** (PM & Cab) *the* decisive power: creates, implements, monitors/enforces,
      (2) Legislature (parl): merely enacts/ratifies, *but* parl can usu. dismiss govt at any time => “Govt
         responsible to Parliament”
(3) Key to govt dominance of parl in practicality: **party cohesion & discipline**


a. **Char’s**: Most bicam., w/ lower direct elect & upper, usu. less pow, elsewise

b. Bicameralism & Upper Houses

   (1) Methods of Selecting Upper Houses
       (a) Heredity, (Lifetime) Appoint: UK House Lords, LU Council State; CA Senate; these usu. have least power
       (b) Direct Election, approx. same system as lower: most of IT, SP, & BE Senates; among most powerful. Indeed, IT & SP selection & powers mirror lower chambers’ => point of such bicameralism obscure
       (c) Direct Election, diff. sys (dist’s, terms) than lower (usu. geographic basis rep):
           i) examples: US, AL, JA, SZ
           ii) notable, but usu. lesser, pows; diff intrsts/org than lower => these most interesting
       (d) Indirect Election or Appointment by Local Govt:
           i) selected differently than lower House, have appreciable powers, but usu. lesser => these also typ. more interesting
           ii) E.g.: GE, NE, AU, plus IR & FR (although these complicated mix)

   (2) Typ Powers of Upper Houses: (Italy exceptional: same as lower)
       (a) Delay implement leg enacted by lower (usu. const’ly lmtd; cannot overturn)
       (b) Obstruct certain types of leg (veto, or indef delay): usu. on const’l grounds, sometimes more
           i) E.g., GE Bundesrat Veto
           ii) Stronger still in some: can initiate & approve legis: US, IT, others
       (c) Often controlled by diff block (b/c diff. select meth, terms) than lower => check on govt

   c. Unicameral: DE, FI, GR, IC, MA, NO, PO, SW, NZ ( & Nebraska), but even these often have some mechanism that partly simulates bicameralism: Norway lower house divides itself, FI & PO has one large permanent committee, acts somewhat like U.H.

3. **Lower House Roles**: Make & Break Govts; Legislating; Govt Oversight

a. Appointing & Dismissing Govts

   (1) Parl sys: legis usu. power to remove govt & usu. to call elections
       (a) Exceptions:
           i) SZ neither power; many say :: not parliamentary;
           ii) NO fixed 4-yr ele. cycle;
           iii) GE & SP constructive vote no confidence
       (b) Stronger than legis. in pres. sys. in this way: important implications

   (2) => Govt responsiveness to legis; govt requires legis majority
       (a) Prop Rep=>multiparty parl, & govt :: often relies on parl coalition
       (b) => shifts in power, expectations can induce sudden change in govt, *without direct electoral input*

   (3) Govt usu. converse power to dissolve parl. & call new elections
       (a) => Elect timing=战略 var. (n.b. max inter-elect period always const’ly fix)
       (b) => Govt & Parl gun to each other’s head, but party disc. => govt usu. leads

   (4) Partisan Balance Pow reflected in 1 ntnl arena (*but* not much action there usu.)

b. Legislating

   (1) Party disc + Govt’l legis. maj => Govt can usu. pass its program
   (2) + Govt controls civ serv => plans, implements, monitors, enforces legis.
   (3) Little committee development or resources in most => little parl ability to design legis, although trend of ↑ resources & stronger committee systems
   (4) Representation:
       (a) Unlike sys where reps legislate effectively, & where party discipline weaker, MP’s see selves less as legislators, less as rep’s elect dist, more as of (partisan) interests
(b) Provisions for *private-member bills* usu. exist, & can intro & pass if govt not oppose

(5) Still, enough variation that not all parl simply rubber stamp:

(a) *Majoritarian (Westminsterian)* systems:
   i) single-party govt typ., strong party disc. => little role for *backbenchers*
   ii) however, PM & Cab must keep party supp, so even here must keep some eye to maintaining party unity
   iii) opp sees role more as vocal critic; offering *shadow (alternative) govt*

(b) *Proportional & Consensual systems*:
   i) multiparty govt norm; more explicit give & take among gov’ing parties
   ii) SZ, by convention, explicitly consensus; others varyingly operative consensual norms

(6) Role of Opposition:

(a) Obstruct as much as can in majoritarian:
   i) Filibuster or equivalent: GR
   ii) Speeches against govt plans: embarrass govt, offer alternative

(b) Stronger role w/ more bargaining w/ govt in consensual:
   i) govt negotiation with opposition plays stronger role
   ii) more dev’d committee sys, although role more in details than policy per se; bills often to committee for negotiation & compromise before to floor (as opp. to majoritarian)
   iii) some can even set own agenda & timetable & sometimes amend bills

(7) Examples of parliamentary roles:

(a) Scand. parl’s closest to congressional model:
   i) rel. strong committees w/ stable membership, often govt commissions to form policy
   ii) parl arranged by geog rather than party=>more cross-party barg, esp. regional issues
   iii) FI (repealed ‘92): almost all bills req’d 2/3 maj=>more compromise
   iv) **DE**: minority govt. illustrates strength of parl. function of govt’s strategic position in parl

(b) IT at one far extreme:
   i) party ldrs set policy agenda; much policy even designed in party comm
   ii) secret ballot in legis. through ‘88 => harder to enforce party discipline => more govt.-opp. & govt.-backbench negotiation & compromise
   iii) parl. comm’s very strong: explicit lawmaking powers to scrutinize all legis. & even finalize & approve some without going to floor!
   iv) but even so: *leggine* [DEFINE] & *partitocrazia* [DEFINE]

(c. Govtl Oversight: watchdog role, background question of degree replaced by media in this role; methods differ across systems:

(1) *Question Time* [DEFINE]:
   (a) frequency & required response time varies
   (b) cat & mouse game of words with opp. trying to embarrass govt, govt trying not to give too much away while not lying
   (c) Pattern: !!! # Q’s=>more effective oversight? or still no bite, or devalued by use?

(2) Interpolation: like Q time, except response debated in parl if sufficient # ask

(3) Oversight comm’s: exist, but not near as dev’d as pres sys [Why?]

4. *Party Discipline* (e.g., a study: 99.8% party-line votes in Nor):

a. The Centrality of Party Discipline to Govtal Dominance:
   (1) MP virt’ly must vote party line+Gov must have parl maj⇒Gov passes its agenda
   (2) ⇒ “legislature” acts as grp of parties, not some large # individs

b. Sources of Party Disc (discussed above, & more later, for now):
   (1) Party ldrs have *unpleasant punishments* for backbenchers [*e.g.?]*
      (a) party label needed for election, can be denied
      (b) ambitious MP’s must note leaders gatekeepers to pow positions (ministries etc)
(2) Positive reinforcements:
   (a) Sense of i.d., loyalty to common purpose: e.g., share party ideology
   (b) Opt-out provisions often exist for individ MP’s on key issues [when more, when less?], but,
       n.b., usu. not to any effect on vote pass [in PO, MP steps aside, replaced by other party mem
to take vote]
   (c) Decision w/in party on its govt’l program may be fairly democratic
   (d) Some negotiation (degree hard to ascertain with certainty) occurs before bill proposed to
       floor

(3) Some evidence backbenchers ‘ly assertive (i.e., party discipline ↓)
c. P.D. key to dem responsibility in parl sys: Govt resp. to Parl. resp. to Voters, w/ clear links on whom
to blame/credit (easy for voters)
   (1) => Voters vote for Parties (smaller “personal vote”)
   (2) => MP’s think of selves as rep’ing block of interests behind party
   (3) 1+2 => less distributive & more national politics
   (4) 1+2 => less incumbent advantage
   (5) 1+2 => party label, w/ disc. to ensure its full meaningfulness, valuable to MPs, backbenchers &
leaders (so maintain it), & voters (so demand it)

5. Summary Assessment:
a. Role of Parliaments ↑ or ↓?
   (1) Arguments for ↑:
      (a) ↑ tech sophist. & complexity legis. & policymaking; parl lacks resources, org.
      (b) ↑ # grps in compromise (follows from above) ⇒ ↓ gov willing to allow parl. amend
      (c) ↑ scrutiny role replacement by media
      (d) ↑ casework workloads => ↑ casework workloads => ↓ time for signif leg?, but...
   (2) Arguments for ↓
      (a) ↑ casework workloads => ↓ citizen appreciation of parl role?
      (b) ↑ professional MP
      (c) ↑ resources of common MP

(3) GLM say seems parliaments on rise despite all the critics
b. Variation in parl pow: function of rules, but also of strategic position of govt in legis.
c. Centrality of PARTY DISCIPLINE

[If Time, we will cover GLM ch. 4,6.]

D. Courts & Constitutions: Gallagher, Laver, Mair ch. 4
   1. Background:
      b. As ↑ edu. & ↑ single-issue politics, ↑ # issues taken not to legis (seen as slow, ineffective) but to
courts [DISC]
      c. Cts once ignored in discussing most dems’ politics, but now judicial review ctrl everywhere
   2. Common Law & Civil Law traditions
      a. Civil Law (Roman system): Most of Europe (plus Lat.Am., Louisiana, & parts of Can.)
         (1) Laws of parl are the law–every legal decision begins from legal code, not from precedent
         (2) Two strands/sources: Code Napoléon (BE,LU,NE,IT,SP,PO), German Civil Code
             (GE,NO,SW,DE,FI,IC)
         (3) Judges apply, they do not make, the law; see selves & are seen as more civil servants
         (4) Parl is supreme; indeed, judges often search travaux préparatoires to aid interpretation.
      b. Common Law (British system): UK, most of US, most of CA, AL, NZ, IR, MA)
         (1) Less emph. on “laws” of parl, more on “The Law” of accumulated precedent: previous
judgements (& constitution) are the law, until explicitly overwritten (by hard process specifically
described)
         (2) Judges interpret, but here only the final law as written (not travaux préparatoires) is usually base
for it.

(3) ==> greater judicial-legislature conflict potential under Common Law

c. Much evidence of convergence; degree to which Civil Law converging toward common partly function of declining specificity (rising vagueness) with which laws written.

3. Judge Appointment Procedures: in virtually all places, top judges appointed by govt & , to varying degree, removable by parl majority
a. can & do appoint by partisan persuasion, but also can be difficult to keep in line because:
   (1) strength of removal provisions varies +
   (2) legal tradition/strong norm of judicial independence +
   (3) strong public opinion against partisan-eering of judges =>

b. Results:
   (1) No UK judge removes since 19th C
   (2) Publics gen’ly strong belief in indep.(n.b., sim in US toward Sup Ct. but Gore v. Bush)
   (3) Accusations of partisan bias abound [DISC why in appointment sys; & elected judges]
   (4) Esp. IT case cited for partisan judges–much more overt there => IT ( & US?) most highly politicized judges

4. Judicial Review: DEFINE
a. Extent of Judicial Review Varies: non-existent; in reg. cts; in “supreme” cts; both (US, PO, etc.)

b. European Court of Justice (ECJ) has judicial review over any mem’s domestic laws for accord w/ EU constitution

c. No Explicit Judicial Review
   (1) UK: no written constitution => vague => issue of unconstitutionality doesn’t arise, or different guise; ultra vires [DEFINE] exists, but nothing stops parliament from simply writing such law
      (a) constitution from: statute law (written laws accepted as big ones)...
      (b) ...common law (customs of basic govt forms & processes)
      (c) ...convention (elite accepts some set of implicit prohibitions)
      (d) ...works of (scholarly) authority
   (2) NE: courts expressly forbidden judicial review (undermines parliamentary supremacy)

d. Limited judicial review
   (1) SZ: court can strike down canton but not federal law
   (2) BE: only those laws concerning balance of powers b/w levels of govt reviewable
   (3) Traditionally weak in Scandinavia:
      (a) only NO long history w/ review, not much significant;
      (b) SW strong constitutional provisions for review, but not much used (seen to undermine parl. supr.)
      (c) FI: pres. may refuse to ratify legis. as unconst., but parl. uses legal advisors to pre-vet

e. Explicit, extensive judicial review: 75 of 160 constitutions in world; many use separate constitutional courts
   (1) Types of Review:
      (a) Concrete v. Abstract review [DEFINE]
      (b) A Priori v. A Posteriori review [DEFINE]

f. Strong Const’l Cts: US, CA, FR, GE, IT, AU, SP, PO (JA weak; AL, NZ mid-to-weak)
   (1) All appointed by govt, usually to longer terms than govt & hard to remove
   (2) All are highly political appointments, & likely becoming more so
   (3) Recall: in many sys, some of pres. power stems from being able to call for such review.
   (4) French Constitutional Council illustrates many further points about strong const’l cts:
      (a) Courts are inherently weak political actors:
         i) often decisions only declaratory;
         ii) enforcement always lacking;
      (b) So courts rely for their efficacy on
i) moral (and intellectual) authority
ii) public support
iii) political-elite willingness to follow its decisions.

(c) Most adopt several strategies to accommodate this weakness:
i) if they can, delay addressing politically contentious issues until attention fades
ii) sometimes disting. b/w unconst’l & null & void
iii) relatively few laws actually revoked (e.g., French C.C. about 5%)–this partly b/c govt’s
pre-vet bills)
iv) conditional constitutionality: if bill means X, then constitutional, taking most
constitutional view of what law means, which may dampen lawmakers’ intent without
outright revoking it.

E. We skip GLM ch. 5 on the EU because too big & other courses here spend whole semester on EU

F. Administration (Bureaucracy) & Local Govt: Gallagher, Laver, Mair ch. 6

1. Administration
   a. Background:
      (1) “Bureaucrats” do most day-to-day implement of most of what is vital to Jane & Joe Cit
      (2) Ideal of depoliticized bureaucracy: administration merely a technical prob, not political...
   b. Two Key Factors in Political Relation between Civil Service & Policymakers/Politicians
      (1) Civil Service “Culture”: Generalist (e.g., UK, IR, IT, SP, PO) v. Technocratic (e.g., FR, GE)
Civil Service
         (a) assessed on general administrative & managerial skills (human skills, liberal arts) v.
specialist, technical training (economist, lawyer, engineer)
         (b) occurs through & matters because training & recruitment, socialization differ
         (c) Why some technocratic others generalist? one influential argument: naval v. land-army based
territorial domination implies different needs for domestic organization
      (2) Politicization of Senior Civil Service (mostly via appointment, promotion processes)
         (a) Spoils system [DEFINE] most dev’d in US, but general to all dems, perhaps growing
         (b) Anglo-world (except US) at one end: staunchly non-partisan bureaucracy the norm
         (c) Continental Europe b/w: Francophone world–ministerial cabinets: teams of trusted upper
civil servants brought with the minister, far less formalized elsewhere in Europe
   c. Self-Interested Bureaucracy:
      (1) budget & size maximization (Niskanen; Wildavsky)
      (2) “bureau-shaping”: making job more congenial in various ways, implies inter alia status quo bias
         (Dunleavy)
   d. Other key question in comparative public administration: relative autonomy of bureaucracy
      (1) Yes, Minister! [great show, catch an episode]: view that bureaucrats know what’s really
happening, pol’s not, so b’s great latitude to make effective policy what they want (or at least not
to move if don’t want)
      (2) Ministerial (political) power: opposite view that ultimate responsibility with pol., pol. has
complete authority & real power over b’s “quality of life” ==> all real power w/ pol., b’s just at
margin
      (3) Obviously, matter of degree, & it varies [hyps] [Principal-Agent Situations]

2. Local Govts: Federal v. Unitary States; Systems of Local Govt
   a. Federalism: (const’l) entrenchment of some level local/regional govt in national policymaking
      (1) Examples (in rough order of degree): SZ, US, now BE, (order uncertain) AL, CA, GE, AU,
(now UK?)
      (2) Most bicameral legislatures in which upper house rep’s regions & signif pows, e.g. veto
      (3) Fed local govt gen’ly more powerful than unitary...GLM do not stress enough: even if explicit
powers at any moment might be less, b/c federal localities have constitution, courts, & Upper-
House protection
(4) [DISC] Explain varying “degree of fed”, i.e., varying power regions v. center in fed sys?
   (a) Constitutional provisions:
      i) residual powers to whom,
      ii) power of the purse,
      iii) constitutionally ensconced protectors like courts, upper houses, etc.
   (b) Strategic sit at national level, & among set of local levels–complicated interplay here
   (c) Social structure, history, & jurisdictional map overlay:
      i) SZ cantons date to 13th C, language homog./religious nearly by canton not nation, strong
         ID, etc.
      ii) ...to...US history, some ID...to...
      iii) Germany: fed more-recent political construct (some historical root, but match poor)

b. [DISC] Ctrl- v. dectrl-izing pressures? What logical issues involved in power alloc across levels?

c. Local Govt:
   (1) federal or unitary, all: at least one level local govt (commune, municipality), most have one
      intermed level (province, region); in unitary, though, local only has whatever power center
      chooses to give
   (2) degree of local accountability–election v. appointment; budgetary control–varies
   (3) relation across levels not usu. strictly hierarchical; more separate responsibilities/powers: in
      federal, constitutionally defined, in unitary, by legislation, so more easily changed
   (4) typical local powers:
      (a) nearly all: land use & environ control, services to property (fire, garbage, utilities)
      (b) some: police but varies widely, usu. several law-enforcement divisions at mult. levels
      (c) often: some combo of local pub trans, roads, schools, health & hum serves, pub housing
   (5) Sev. unitary ctrys special regions w/ more fed-like prescribed pows: e.g., UK, SP, IT, DE
   (6) Key to local autonomy is budgetary control, esp. on revenue side:
      (a) sources: local prop, bus, & inc taxes; local service charges; transfers from other levels
      (b) most argue: greater reliance on first two & less on last => more effectively auton

Comparative Govtal Systems II: Lijphart & Powell

XXVII. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (1999): Chs. 1-3
A. Ch1: Many ways to org dem, but clear patterns & regular’s along Majoritarian v. Consensual nature rules
   & practices
1. All agree Dem=“govt by & for people,” but which people if divergent prefs & disagreement?
   a. The majority (=> median rule) or
   b. As many as possible (weighted accordingly)
2. Majoritarian model: exclusive, competitive, & adversarial
4. Logically internally consistent & unified principles=>clusters of inst’l arrange. corresponding thereto,
   but along 2 dims:
   a. Executives-Parties Dimension:
      (1) Concentration of exec. Power in single-party cabinets v. exec. power-sharing in broad multi-party
          coal’s
      (2) Exec-dominant in exec-leg. v. exec-leg. balance
      (3) Two-party v. multi-party systems ( & , correlated, 1 v. 2+ dim. pol.)
      (4) Majoritarian & disproportional v. proportional electoral systems
      (5) Pluralist interest-groups w/ free-for-all competition v. coordinated & corporatist interest-groups
         w/ compromise & concertation
   b. Federal-Unitary Dimension:
      (1) Unitary & centralized govt v. federal & decentralized govt
      (2) Concentrate leg pow in uni- v. bicam legis power w/ diff constituencies
      (3) Flexible constitutions w/ simple-majority amendment v. rigid constits w/ extra-ordinary
amendment procedures.
(4) Legis final say on own legislation v. independent judicial review final
(5) Central banks dependent v. independent on/of executive.

5. Federalist explan, for empirical clustering of characteristics:
   a. Guarantee of fed sep.pow. requires clear statement pow div. in firm const., & separately accountable
      force at national lvl to protect local, & indep. judge of disputes over power boundaries
   b. →Expects link of 4 of 5 2nd-dim. characteristics, but not 5th & not why Federal-Unitary a distinct
      dimension from Exec-Party.

6. Goodin Explanation:
   a. Collective Agency & Shared Responsibility
   b. vs. Divided Agencies & Responsibilities

7. Lijphart/Goodin: Concentrated v. Diffuse Power, Authority, & Responsibility, w/ Diffusion having 2
dims: ctrl-local & exec-leg. ⇒
   a. 2D conceptual map of potential democratic characteristics
   b. Much clustering & much stability of location on that map (pure maj. rare: UK, NZ through ‘96)
      [prob. pure consens. too]

8. Evaluation: guard against majoritarianist tendency to over-emph.
   a. Opposition existence/nature
   b. One, single goal “to become govt”
   c. Turnover tests

9. So What? Effect of such Differences?
   (1) Small differences on (economic) broad governing efficacy. [Lrgr diff’s in more fine-grained
      policies & outcomes & in nature of tradeoffs made.]
   (2) Large diff’s on democratic quality, favoring consensual systems.

XXVIII. Ch2: The Westminsterian (Majoritarian) Model
A. Old, storied, much-revered model dem. from UK to colonies
B. 10 Elements of Majoritarian/Westminster Democracy

1. Concentration of Exec Pow in 1-Party, Bare-Maj. Cabinets
   a. Cab composed of disciplined members of majority party
   b. Usu 1 of 2 main parties in system
   c. Usu bare majority; in fact, more-usually just plurality & times not even
   d. Coalition & minority govt rare. (Labour ‘70s examples)
   e. ⇒ Majoritarian Principle: vast pol pow to rule as rep of & in interest of a narrow majority.

2. Cabinet Dominance
   a. Parl Govt ⇒ Cab resp to & dep on confidence of Parl, but...
   b. Combo Maj Parl Supp & Party Cohesion/Discipline ⇒ Cabs dom Parl [n.b., ° dom = f(mps,pcd);
      e.g., Labour ‘70s v. Thatcher ‘80s]
   c. So, disciplined 2-partism more than parliamentarism that ⇒ cab dom.
   d. N.b., Pres sys decidedly more balanced (more than consensus parl); Lijphart incorrect to put French
      Pres w/ Lat Am as more pow US pres.

3. Two-Party System
   a. Vote-, & esp. seat-, share dominance of two major, roughly even parties
   b. E.g., UK, Labour+Tory = 70-90% vote & 93+% seats
   c. Notes/Examples:
      (1) Lib, SD, LibDem as much as 25%, but only 25 (of 659) seats
      (2) N. Ire.+ Scot Nts & Plaid Cymru, seats%>vote%, but very small numbers.
   d. Strong Correlate 2-Party Sys: 1-dim party sys. (minor excepts. in UK)

4. Majoritarian & Disproportional Electoral System
   a. Single-Member Simple-Plurality (SMSP) (DEFINE) archetypal system
   b. Highly disproportional (i.e., seat-vote ratios far from 1).
c. *Manufactured Majorities* (DEF). E.g., 100% manufactured post-‘45 UK
d. Small-party disadv.; Large-party adv. *Note:* LibDem hardest hit; N. Ire, SNP, & *Plaid Cymru* over-rep. (EXPLAIN)
e. *Exceptions or Trend?:* N. Ire. locals by PR post-violence outbreak in ‘70s, EU by PR since ‘99, discussion of general switch continues

5. **Interest-Group Pluralism**
a. “Free-for-all” conflict in “competitive IG market” as opposed to...
b. Corporatist arrangements of concertation & coordination in system of large & powerful peak-associations in (tri-partite) barg’s w/ govt.
c. UK Example: General lack integration of unions or management in ec policymaking, except the (mostly failed) ‘75 Social Contract.

6. **Unitary & Centralized Govt** (n.b., 2nd dim)
a. Local govt at behest of ctr; has what author ctr gives (& can retract).
b. Notably, local financially dependent on center; centralized fisc.
c. E.g., UK “most cntrlzd govt any large dem state,” but *exceptions or trend?*
   (1) N Ire. home rule ‘21-’72, but, *note*, ntl parl can & did remove by simple maj
   (2) Gradual *devolution* to Scotland & Wales (& some, broader fisc decent too), culminates in ‘97 ref’s that estab local parl.

7. **Legislative-Power Concentration in Unicameral Legislature**
a. Concentrated unicameralism
b. UK deviates slightly, but strongly *asymmetrical bicam:* Lords (hereditary & life-peers) power to delay: 1mo bdgtry; 1yr other; & rarely used.

8. **Constitutional Flexibility**
a. Unwritten (or not one, single written) constitutional document. E.g., UK: Magna Carta 1215, BoR 1689, Parl Acts 1911, 1949, common law principles, customs, conventions (& which const’l also unwritten)
b. Simple majority to change constitution.

9. **Absence of Judicial Review**
a. Pure parl sovereignty (of (current) majority) ⇒ no authority beyond parl to determine const. & const’l interepretation.
b. *Exceptions or Trends:* EU mem⇒ECJ & EConventionHR ⇒ EcourtHR rev.

10. **Central Bank Dependence**
a. Pure parl sovereignty ⇒ ... Same principle: nothing over parl maj
b. However, EU mem, & econ thry & ... ⇒ ‘97 change in BoE status.

a. Conc. *1-party bare-maj cab:* ‘35-‘93 (as sys Δ loomed) w/o excepts.
b. Cab dom: always maj & tight party disc through mid-‘90s (as sys Δ...)
c. *2-Party sys:*
   (1) *Labour & National* Parties 95+% (of 99) seats.
   (2) Almost exclusively 1-dim (soc-econ left-right) ideol. space.
d. *Maj & Disprop Elect Sys:*
   (1) SMSP, but also 4 lrg dists over-lap geog’ly reserved for Maori (12% pop); minority rep. being reserved a deviation.
   (2) Severeely disprop: ‘78 & ‘81 *National* won w/o even a plurality! (Seeds of sys Δ lie in these events.). All post ‘54 *manufactured majorities.*
e. *Interest-Group Pluralism:* until very recently, no coord/peak-assoc IG
f. Unitary & Centralized Govt: fully ctrld since 1875 when UK bequethed 6 rel’y auton provinces abolished. (Is small ctry: less surprising.)
g. Legis Concentration in Unicameral Parl: fully uni-C since 1950 when UK bequethed upper house abolished.
h. **Constitutional Flexibility:**
   (1) Basic Laws (Const Acts ‘56 & ‘93; BoR Act ‘90), conventions, customs,
   (2) Some require 3/4 maj of HoReps or maj referendum, but that status removable by simple
       majority, so...

i. **Absence Judicial Review:** HoR only & final judge constitutionality.

j. **Central Bank Dependence:** to ‘89 Res Bnk NZ lowest cbir, but since: most!

k. **October 1996 Radical Shift to PR System (act’ly, German MMP sys):**
   (1) After ‘78, ‘81 fiascos, Labour appoints commission on elect sys.
   (2) Rec’s rad. shift to full PR, but Lab, being in govt, killed it in committee
   (3) Issue arises in ‘87 elect campaign; Lab promises referendum, then reneges!
   (4) National uses that in ‘90 campaign, pledges ref, wins, & so had to fulfil.
   (5) Ref passes...twice! ‘92 & ‘93. PR elects set for ‘96:
      (a) 65 SMD, including 5 special Maori districts.
      (b) 55 by strict Party List, allocated to make ntl result proportional as poss.
      (c) German MMP right down to 5% or 1-dist (Austrian; E.Ger.) minimum & nature of 2-vote-
          per-ballot process.

   (6) Results: almost everything on 1st dim, swiftly, Maj to more Cons style
      (a) Proportionality ↑↑↑
      (b) Parties ↑↑, from 2 to 6
      (c) No majority party
      (d) Ethnic dimension added to party system ( & almost religious too).
      (e) 2-party coalition govt of National & NZ First formed.
      (f) [So, most of Lijphart’s 1st dim seems electoral-system based.]

**XXIX. Ch3: The Consensus (Proportionalism) Model**

A. To extent democracy≡those affected by policy have say in its making, majoritarian can conflict w/
   democratic principles.
   1. Conflict mitigated by alternation & homogeneity.
   2. **Plural Societies** lack homog. & perhaps voter behavior & societal divisions more rigid ⇒ maj not only
      somewhat undemocratic but also quite often/possibly dangerous.
      a. **Example:** N. Ire. ‘21-'72 Prot Maj won all elects, formed all govts ⇒ (perhaps) late ‘60s Cath
         protests, which grew into, essent’ly, civ war
      b. **Consensus sys:** cons. not opposition, inclusion not excl., max size ruling maj not bare-min, limit &
         constrain maj power not concentrate it.
   3. N.b., cons sys. may esp. help here, but may work eff’ly anywhere

B. **Consensus Principles:** Share, disperse, & restrain rather than concentrate majority power. Switzerland,
   Belgium, EU
   1. **Executive Power Sharing in Broad Coalitions:**
      a. **Swiss** 2:2:2:1 party & 4±:2±:1± language formulae.
      b. **Belg:** balanced-lang cabs (pre-’70 informal, post=form);all but 1yr coal
   2. **Executive-Legislative Balance of Power:**
      a. **Swiss Fed Council** elected to fixed 4-yr terms by Parl, but ~confidence votes
      b. **Belg:** std parl sys, but somewhat less party cohesion, & mostly coal & sometimes minority govts.
   3. **Multiparty System:**
      a. Multiple parties in parl & potential real players in govt-form game.
      b. Multi-D societal struct (relig, lang, reg, +econ) reflected in party sys:
         (1) **Swiss:** regional/language struct w/in relative noncohesive single-D parties
         (2) **Belg:** like Swiss, 3 dom parties on relig & class, but sub-divide lang & reg.
   4. **Proportional Representation:** prop elect sys not inhibit trans. societal cleavages into party system.
   5. **Interest-Group Corporatism:**
      a. Both business-led or “liberal corporatist”
b. Encompassing & strongly cohesive peak assoc’s, big role in pol-make

6. Federal & Decentralized Govt (2nd dim):
   a. Swiss: 20 cantons + 6 half-cantons; 46 member upper house; role in const. amend; one of world’s most decentralized states.
   b. Belg: unitary & centralized state through ‘70, but gradual decent., & full formal fed in ‘93. Unique, Byzantine Federalism: both lang-cult rep (French, Dutch, Germ) & geog-cult (Flem, Wall, Bruss)

7. Strong Bicameralism:
   a. Different selection mechanism to two houses ⇒ diff constit struct
   b. Strong 2nd chamber (ideal-type: equal power).
   c. Swiss: perfect match to ideal-type; Belg: pre-fed lacked a, now perfect.

8. Constitutional Rigidity:
   a. Swiss & Belg both written.
   b. Swiss: req’s ref, majority & majority in majority of cantons, to Δ
   c. Belg: req’s 2/3 maj both house to Δ plus, for law on community org & powers, 2/3 maj both houses + maj of Dutch & French in each house.

9. Judicial Review:
   a. Swiss: Federal Tribunal has right of const’l review
   b. Belg: No judicial review (but int’l agree like UK) ‘til ‘84 & ‘88 steps gave full rev to Court of Arbitration. [likely v.import. now/new fed sys.]

10. Central Bank Independence:
   a. Swiss Central Bank: always as/more indep as/than Fed & BB.
   b. Belg: exception, among more dep CB’s until Maastricht (‘92-‘93)

11. European Union, supranat’l inst. but not fed or even confed state (yet?), but if seen as (approaching) such, fits cons sys well

XXX. Ch4: Criteria for selecting dem’s for study & Soc-Econ cond’s expected to influence type of dem & dem perform.

A. Definition(s) of Democracy
1. Dahl’s Polyarchy
   a. Right to Vote
   b. Right to Run
   c. Right of political leaders to Compete
   d. Free & Fair Elections
   e. Freedom of Association
   f. Freedom of Expression
   g. Alternative Sources of Information
   h. Institutions of Policymaking Depend on Votes & Other Pref Express

2. 20th C phenom., NZ prob first 1893 all vote, 1919 all run

3. Table 4.1 by Freedom House: free & compet. elects + civ libs

4. Also long & stable duration of democracy (=Table 4.2)

B. Diversity among Democracies
1. Huntington’s Three Waves: 1828-1926, 43-62, 74-(Greece in all three & in reverses)
2. Pop., Hum. Dev. (wealth, edu, life-expect), Soc Frag: Table 4.3
   a. Problems w/ frag indices:
      (1) Exclusive focus on eth (or eth & relig) may miss much.
      (2) May miss important within group fragmentation.
      (3) Fails to weigh depth of division (salience)
   b. Lijphart: crude 3-fold categorical classification:
(1) subjective & rougher
(2) reflects 1990s situation, but these things very sticky

C. Broad Socio-Econ Struct Variation
1. May partly explain both democracy type & performance [prob?]
2. Interrelations among these var’s (e.g., lrgr & more het):
   a. Ln(pop) & pluralism corr: .26
   b. Plur & dev’p corr: -.24 (but lrgly India & PNG driven)
   c. Ln(pop) & dev’p corr: -.10 (but not significant)
   d. Older dems more dev’d (r=.57), but no relation dev & (pop or plur)

XXXI. Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*: Ch1

A. Central Issue/Subject of Powell’s Study:
1. De Tocqueville (p. 3): “2 opinions...old as world... & perpetually met...diff forms & names in all free... 1 to limit & oth to extend indef’ly...pow of people”
2. Pow: role competitive elects in give cits influ. over pm’s.
3. Pitkin: “concern w/ elects & elect machinery... from conviction...nec. to ensure systematic responsiveness”
4. Pow: driven by normative concern: claim of democ’s to be govts in which cit’s participate in policymaking.
   a. With many people, must be indirect.
   b. ⇒Participate by choosing policymakers in compet. elects
   c. Elects= *instruments of democracy* to ° pop influence pol-mkng
5. Elects not only instrument, but seem crucial...
   a. Compel or greatly encourage policymakers to pay attent. cit’s
   b. Consensus that *free & compet elects* more than any other feature signals presence of true democracy
6. Disagree about whether & how link cits to pol
   a. Normative, reflecting different ideals relationship cit’s to pm’s
   b. Conceptual: diff understandings how cit pref’s can aggregate
   c. Theor./Emp.: altern. theories what instit’s best link cits to pols

B. Two Camps: *Majoritarian* & *Proportional*
1. Altern., positive conceptions of democratic ideals.
   a. Positive (not neg.) conceptions: e.g., Prop. >limit maj. pow.
   b. Maj. to control & Prop. to influence pm’s, but>°, of conception
   c. Each has closely assoc norm concept of approp cit inflence, & empirical model of wrkng electoral & legislative institutions
2. Powell: i.d. contrasting elements & test expectations
3. Majoritarian: elections as instruments of cit control
   a. “Concentrated pm pow, whose exercise made trgt cit act”
   b. Elected officers able to make & implement policies
   c. Responsibility for policy obvious to everyone
   d. Elects: choose b/w prospective teams or reward/punish incumb’s
   e. N.b., concentrated power nec but not suff:
      (1) Diffuse power ⇒ pm results from complex bargain b/w sev. reps
      (2) Retroactive responsibility difficult to pinpoint
      (3) Elect only indirect relation to formation winning policy coals.
   f. Sum: decisiveness & effectiveness in resp. to pop. will: either pro- or retro- view of elect role req’s concentrated pm power which is object of cit electoral behavior (i.e., one elects govts).
   g. Absolute sovereignty of majority ⇒ Majoritarian
4. Prop: elections as instruments of cit influence
   a. Dispersed pm power; elects indirect role: bring representative agents of all societal factions into pm arena, where bargain
b. premium on accurate reflect of pop. prefs. in pm arena. JS Mill: “In really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not disprop’ly, but prop’ly.”
c. [N.b., alt. view of prop./maj. as dimxdim maj⇒plebiscitory dem or broadly representative arena to replicate societal DxD]
d. Elections clumsy instruments, esp. as held in maj. sys.
e. Pref’s of all cit’s, not just maj, should weigh in pm

5. Maj & Prop Proponents diff weighting of concerns
   a. Maj: suspicious of rep auton., less concerned re: minorities, emph. clear & direct accountability ⇒prefer concentrated pow
   b. Prop: suspicious of majorities, esp. created by clumsy elects, less worried re: rep auton, provided cit’s role in select, & less worried re: negotiated inaction⇒prefer dispersed power

6. Diff empirical tests of visions appropriate:
   a. Maj assumes can i.d. cit. pref., or at least who wins maj, prob of elects is to make pm’s follow that directive.
   b. Prop assumes cit’s highly het., problem of elects is to ensure all grps proportional say in pm.

C. Views of Elections & Cit Relations to Policymakers
   1. 2D Vote Choice (Fig I.1): Target & Time Perspective
      2. Target:
         a. Vote for/against Govt w/ power to make policy v. Vote for rep agent, not control Govt, but barg on behalf
         b. Voter anticipates decisive elect, directly determines pm’s v. barg & negot coal-bldng (discrete or contin.) follows elect.
         c. Both may be desirable to voters (not @ same time):
            (1) Issues clear-cut, cit’s w/ united prefs, voters may pref former. [N.b, in game of elected v. voters.]
            (2) Issues complex & voters divided, prob’s arise diff to antic., each grp may prefer rep by trustworthy rep’s [N.b, game b/w voters.]
   3. Temporal Direction: Prospective v. Retrospective
      a. Govt Retro⇒(throw rascals out) Evaluate Incumbents.
      b. Govt Pro⇒(mandates) Forecast perform Incumb & Chall.
         (1) Elements of Forecast: credibility, desirability, etc. promises
         (2) =past record relevant, even though prospective
      c. Agent Pro⇒(Representative Delegate)Choose agent believe will act as (informed) voter would
         (1) = seek agents whose pref’s mirror voter’s own
         (2) = seek effective bargaining agents
      d. Agent Retro⇒(Representative Trustee): bring home bacon
         (1) Despite centrality: Fenno’s Homestyle, Burke (1774): trust agent s.t. retro oversight, Tip O’Neill: “All politics is local.” ...
         (2) ...Powell essentially punts on this aspect/possibility

D. Intermediate Cond’s for Effective Voting Each Type
   1. Each has correspond vision, info req, & ideal gov types
   2. Incumb Eval: support Ins when going well, Outs when badly essence dem (Lippmann)⇒Accountability Model:
      a. minimum: periodic opp to change pms
      b. appeal to those desire clear cit cntrl yet skept of cit inform & capacity to form one, stable opin on complex policy issues
      c. How it Works/What it Needs:
         (1) Ability to reject unwanted pm’s.
         (2) Threat of rejection ⇒ all pm’s worry about cit reaction.
         (3) Simplicity & Limited Information Requirements (E.g., no worries about credibility: “do or do not, there is no try.”)
(4) But do need **clarity of responsibility**

(a) *Westminster Ideal*: Single, unified party controls all pm, cits can vote simply for or against that party in elects.
(b) N.b., if pm divided among numerous parties (prop parl) or if pm coalitions changed from issue to issue (pres-cong), not work well.

(5) Also: **decisive incumbent replacement**: must follow v’s reject

3. **Electoral-Mandates Model**:
   a. Ideal party sys: strong, cohesive parties, including opp, offer effective choice. Voters eval prospects of each @ each elect.
   b. How it Works/What it Needs
      (1) Possible voters to i.d. alternative future govts @ election time
      (2) Expectation of tight link from elect outcome to govt/policy form
      (3) Winning party(ies) have full power to make policy

4. Both *Accountability & Mandate* models are *Majoritarian*: [n.b., also called, jointly, *Responsible Party Govt* model]

5. **Representative Delegates Model**:
   a. Two stages: election & post-election bargaining
   b. Pro-/Retro- distinct less cntrl [but could do same as above]
   c. How it Works/What it Needs
      (1) Each voter group must find party near enough its prefs & views
      (2) Voter groups represented proportionally in the pm bargaining
      (3) pm begins as reps bargain (not as collective govt implements its promises or anticipates future sanctions).
      (4) Flexibility in post-electoral coalition formation, allowing different majorities to form on different issues.
   d. **Authorized Representation in Policymaking Bargaining**

6. [N.b., not that *Account & Mandates* not occur in *Prop* or that *Auth Rep in Barg* not occur in *Maj*, but that these weaker/stronger in each model.]

E. Responsiveness & Representation

1. Concepts of *Citizen Preferences, Political Influence*, & *Policy Consequences* “exquisitely complex”
2. Powell’s Fig I.2:
   a. P emph’s links A to D, recognizing that E links back to A
   b. Parties central at B & D:
      (1) link individual candidates & collective policy commitments
      (2) greatly ↑ coherence of possible connections via compet elects
      (3) critical in elect & govt-form stages of all dem’s [but not equally]

3. Using votes to reveal preferences:
   a. Advantage: Objective, measurable, large body work to build
   b. Disadvantages:
      (1) Know little-to-nothing re: how satisfactory options presented
      (2) Know only weakly & rel’ly about how well chosen party rep’s
      (3) Know even less about pref’s over not-chosen parties
      (4) Know little about how informed votes are
      (5) And could be strategic voting

4. Using Voter Left-Right Self-positioning
   a. Advantage: allows gauge *representational congruence*
   b. Disadvantages:
      (1) How meaningful & cntrl single left-right scale?
      (2) *Rubber Ruler* effects, across voters & across dem’s

5. Perhaps more confidence if both approaches agree.
XXXII. Const’l Designs as Visions Maj/Prop Dem (ch2)

A. Const Design:
1. Stable dems = rules re: how pm’s chosen & policies made
2. These rules shape context & conseq. democratic elects
3. Embody spec visions/thrys of dem: maj or prop
4. Many-layered text, result historic moment intense barg, reflect val’s & concerns const-writers, but, for us key is:
5. Implications for conc/disp political [rep & ] power
   a. Do rep rules encourage leg majorities that can control exec?
   b. Do rules for pol-making conc pow this party govt’s hands?
   c. Both yes ⇒ Maj; Both no ⇒ Prop Vision; Mixed otherwise.
6. Alternative Statement of Distinction (Mueller):
   a. Elect a govt, i.e. party whose policies preferred to leg & exec.
   b. Elect truly rep body to vote as they would pol by pol.
   c. Diff electoral rule req’d to produce each.

B. Class by elect & pm rules & their thrtcl implications
C. Not rdnm sample; set 21± dev’d dems w/ nec. data
   1. Much common: ec devp, Western (exc Jap), much dem experience & stable, most pol parties around for most voters lives, stable rules & orgs, parliamentary (exc US), & competition considerably summarizable by 1 L-R dim
   2. =controls these, but also ↑ Q’s how well extend beyond

D. Electoral Systems: Rules of Representation by which cit’s votes aggregated to determine winning cand’s
   1. Duverger’s Law, rests 3 theoretical aspects [EXPLAIN]
      a. (Strategic) Decisions parties in offering candidates for election
      b. (Strategic) Decisions citizens in voting for candidates
      c. (Mechanical) Effects rules aggregate votes into represent seats
      d. ⇒ limit # cands to slightly > # realistic chance (M+1 rule)
   2. Notes:
      a. D’s Law works @ district level, further considerations nec. to explain degree to which, e.g., 2/district ⇒ ≈2 nationally [e.g.]
      b. D’s Law: force toward 2-prty as M1, but only allow >2 as M1: soc struct key in manifestation of latter.
      c. Many poss. strategic mistakes, esp. 1st few elects new rules
      d. Effects help assure majority, fits maj vision, but also disp, esp. to o rely on mechanical, disconcert prop vision, even poss that plur vote-winner not plur seat, disconcert both.
      e. In any sys, proportionality also rests eq. apportionment
   3. Source key effects–prop, # parties, maj–can sum in Effective Threshold: \( T_{\text{eff}} = \text{Max}\{.75/(M+1), \text{LegThresh}\} \)
   4. Empirical Exploration: Table 2.1 [basically: works]

E. Policymaking Rules: Majoritarian & Proportional Visions
   1. Elects allow cits choose reps, but after elects more rules affect how reps make policy: decision rules.
   2. Again, sample much common: all dem’s, elect ntl ass’y usu. ultimate authority, many relatively cntrlzd parl sys
   3. Key: Executive-Legislative / Govt-Opp Relations
      a. Maj: rules favor 1 parl maj full cntrl pm, w/o check or division
      b. Prop: rules favor all parties influence pm prop’ly, govt to negotiate w/ other grps, esp. opp. grps.
      c. N.b., Powell assumes tight cohesion, ° lack ⇒ ↑ opp/leg infl
      d. Strom (1984): Gauge by Strength of Committee System
         (1) Number of standing committees
         (2) Fixed areas of committee specialization (jurisdiction, expertise)
(3) Correspondence comm & ministerial jurisdictions
(4) Restrictions # comm assignments per legislator
(5) Proportional distribution committee chairs
e. Two parts to Comm Sys Strength as gauge leg/opp influence:
   (1) Comm’s influential, not mere rubber stamp govt-formed policy
   (2) Comm’s ➔ pm scope to actors (esp. opp) not fully tied to govt
   (3) Strom’s 1st four on part (1), 5th on part (2).
f. Table 2.2: Committee-System Strength (Leg-Opp Influence)

4. Other Inst’l Features Disperse Power (beyond Parl)
b. 2nd Legis Chamb w/ Indep Selection Base & Veto+ Pows
c. Federalism: local-level authority not fully dep on central
d. Judicial Review

5. Table 2.3: Electoral & Policymaking Institutions & Concentration/Diffusion Representation & Authority
a. Seems most systems more-purely maj or prop than mix.
b. Large Δ rare, esp cross types, smaller Δ w/in more common
c. Why const’l designs so stable?
   (1) Incumbs won under existing sys, :: rarely incentive to Δ
   (2) Supportive, internally logically consistent phil of Maj or Prop
   (3) Unless very widespread & large disaffection, voters strongly disapprove short-term manipulation
       [elaborate?].
   (4) [1st few elects new elect rules, & presumably first few acts new pm rules, highly uncertain.]
d. Consequences:
   (1) Cits & Pols approach elects w/ great know/exp how sys works
   (2) Unless can Δ sys itself, party & voter strategies highly dependent & likely quite variant on
       system w/in which operating.

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (GLM ch. 11, Lijphart ch. 8)
(+ L & E, pp. 226-40; Powell II, ch. 4; Blais & Massicotte in LNN; Lijphart II)

XXXIII. Importance of Elections
A. Practically
   1. Produce parliaments--legislative & executive policy-makers
   2. Determine who becomes part of political elite
   3. Bearing on the formation of govts
      a. Direct, especially in presidential systems
      b. Indirect, partic. in systems characterized by coalition govts
   4. Focal point for activity for: Parties; Citizens (often only activity)--input mechanism; Interest groups
B. Symbolically
   1. Legitimization of the political system
   2. Citizen means of partic., express opinion, evaluate
   3. Give cit’s feel of exercising choices (even if ind’ly little wt)

XXXIV. General Background Matters Regarding Elections
A. Suffrage Expansion
   1. Universal male typ. by WWI; female typ. by WWII except:
      a. BE, FR, GR, IT: universal female just after WWII
      b. PO, SP, Switz.: uni. female in 1970’s (1991 in 1 Swiss canton)
      c. HYPOTHESES on late & early to full female suffrage? [fig.]
   2. Voting age generally reduced 21 to 18 postwar...[WHY?]
B. Suffrage Restrictions
   1. Generally citizens only (but UK/IR)
2. Prisoners & mentally ill usually excluded
3. Otherwise—gen’ly 18+ & gen’ly who can vote can run
4. Registration: in most places govt’s responsibility, in some places individual’s (Implications?)
C. Turnout: Gen’ly higher non-US, ↓ since 70s (Implic’s?)

D. Election Timing: **Endogenous v. Exogenous**
   1. Gen’ly incumbent govt can call elects when wants, sbjt to:
      a. Must be an election within X years (usually 4 or 5)
      b. Often must call an election if fails a vote-of-confidence
   2. Exceptions
      a. Presidents, where directly elected, are usually fixed term
      b. FR: Parliament elections at President’s discretion
      c. US: Legislature fixed terms & elections fixed timing
      d. NO & SZ: Fixed four-year election interval
      e. SW: El. ev. 3 yrs; gov may call, but still in 3rd yr (clock not restart)
   3. Implications?

E. Other Elections
   1. All countries also at least some local elections; offices so-elected vary greatly in practical importance
   2. EU Parl every 5 yrs, nationally determined elect systems
   3. Directly elected Presidents, (importance in *’s): Austria (½*), Finland (*), Iceland (¼*), Ireland (¼*), Port (*), France (1 ½*), US (***)--others have appointed (usu. by legislature) presidents--more “figure-headish” typically but can have some importance (e.g., Italy, maybe ½*)

F. Other Voting--Referenda
   1. Most frequently used in Switzerland (nearly ½ world’s referenda in Switz.; recently California rivals)
      a. => “voter fatigue?”
      b. => democracy by referendum? [ASIDE: Condorcet paradox & “chaos theorems”]
   2. Others employing it:
      a. Italy: Approx. 1/year--key ones on Divorce, Abortion, Elect Law
      b. France: President may call one
      c. Most other places, at discretion of parliament & very rare
   3. Issues over which referenda tend to called
      a. Issues that cut across party lines
      b. Constitutional Issues
      c. Constitutional amendments require referenda in Den., Ire., & Switz.; optional in France & Italy
      d. Major & fundamental changes in nations “place in the world”
         (1) NATO or EC membership
         (2) Neutrality/Allegiance
      e. Moral/Ethical questions--esp. divorce & abortion in Catholic ctrys
      f. **Why do you suppose there’s a rising use of referenda?**

XXXV. Types of Electoral Systems

A. **Definition of electoral systems**: “mechanisms that turn votes cast by people on election day into seats ... occupied by deputies in parl...elect. sys. is what converts voters choices into legislature.” GLM (p. 274)

B. **Where do electoral systems come from?**
   1. “Determined by the political elite of the day, some of whose motivations may be partisan” GLM (p. 274)
   2. “Their designs reflect constitution-makers’ values, expects regarding consequences various arrangements, their often laboriously negotiated compromises” Powell II (p. 66)
3. Cultural/Historical Legacy: See Powell Table 4.3 (p. 67)

4. Generally not frequently tinkered with for electoral advantage, despite obvious opportunities
   a. France & Greece (especially the latter) exceptional on this
   b. Germany's famous 5% threshold
   c. Recent Italian & New Zealand changes
   d. French IVth to Vth transition

5. [If such a potent political engineering tool, why do you suppose it is so rarely manipulated?]
   a. Why would those in power change system that put them there?
   b. Parties uncertainty about future electoral position
   c. Difficult to Δ (constitutional Δs usually require super-majorities)
   d. Relatively obvious opportunism when employed, may trigger negative voter-reaction
   e. Sometimes imposed from abroad (e.g. Ger., Jap., Ita., Aust.)
C. Key distinctions between types of electoral systems
   1. Primary Distinction: Proportional Representation (PR) vs. Plurality/Majority (P/M) systems
      a. Former stresses representation & concept of proportionality
      b. Latter stresses decisiveness & “accountability model”
   2. Other key features [define each]
      a. District magnitude
      b. Degree of candidate vs. party voting (preference voting)
      c. Number of tiers
      d. Electoral formula (within the PR-P/M divisions)
      e. (Legal) Thresholds
      f. Constituency (District) pattern ((mal)apportionment)

XXXVI. Plurality/Majority Systems
A. Historically, plurality common system (through 19th C)
B. Single-Member Plurality (SMP)
   a. a.k.a. “first past the post,” “winner take all” (UK, US, CA, NZ-pre-1993)
      1. Argued Merits
         a. Simplicity--for voters, parties, & all involved
         b. Produces majorities, & therefore decisiveness & accountability
         c. Since one rep./MP per district, fosters MP-constit. bond
      2. Criticisms
         a. Unrepresentative/Winner may be disliked by a majority
         b. Encourages “strategic voting”
         c. Anti-small party, &, possibly, anti-minority (pol & soc min’s)
      3. [Aside: plurality need not be conducted in single-member districts; multiple member, winner take-all possible, tends to be even more disproportional & even more likely to produce elected majorities; e.g., US Presidential Electoral College, India used to have multiple-member districts]
C. Majority Systems:
   1. STV: Alternative or Single-Transferable (maj ver) vote
      a. In Australia (some in France); was used in Illinois; was used more widely in US at one time
      b. Voters rank candidates; candidate with majority wins; if no majority, drop lowest contender &
         transfer his/her votes to those voters’ second choices; continue until someone has a majority
      c. Therefore, a Majority system
   2. Multiple-Round Majority Balloting: e.g., French (Vth) system(s), many US local elections (“run-off)
      a. French Vth Parliament: Simple vote; if no majority, eliminate candidate(s) < 12.5% of vote; vote
         again--plurality candidate then wins (often-called plurality-plurality system, but usu. => majority)
      b. French Vth President: Simple vote; if no majority, drop all but top 2; second election will produce
         a majority winner (a plurality-majority, or “run-off” system)
      c. [Describe French party systems of IVth & Vth; What do you suppose impact of Vth’s electoral
         process & introduction of a strong President has been on party systems & party behavior?]
   3. Argued Merits & Demerits of Majority Systems
      a. Largely the same as SMP, but:
      b. Slightly more choice usually preserved because more parties usually persevere (why?)
      c. Less simple (and “run-off” versions requires two trips to polls)

XXXVII. Proportional Representation (PR) Systems
A. The key feature of PR is the Multi-member district
   1. Cannot divide one seat proportionally, so PR requires multiple seats per district
   2. In fact, proportionality of result [define] tends to increase w/ number of seats per district (magnitude)
B. Key types of PR: “List” sys; STV sys (e.g., Ire & Malta)
C. List Systems
   1. Each party lists a number of candidates (usually equal to the number of seats available in district)
   2. List systems vary by
3. **Formulas: 2 Base Types (Blais & Massicotte Tab 2.1-2)**
   a. **Largest Remainders (Quotas) Methods** (Hare, Droop)
   b. **Highest Averages (Divider) Methods** (d’Hondt, Sainte-Lague & Mod. SL, Imperiali=old IT system)
   c. **Basics:**
      1. **Highest Averages**: divide votes for each party by series of divisors, allocating seats 1-by-1; then dividing party’s vote by next divisor, each stage awarding seat to party w/ most votes so-divided
      2. **Largest Remainders**: divide total votes in district by number of seats (Hare) or # seats +1 (Droop). That’s a quota (Q). Each Q votes for party buys 1 seat. When no party can *buy* further seats, remaining allocated to parties with “largest remainders,” one for each until done
d. Relative Proportionality (roughly)

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<td>2. But, the relative proportionality is also considered</td>
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<td>4. Tiers:</td>
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<td>c. Large-</td>
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Table 2: Distribution of seats by the largest remaining parties

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4. Tiers:

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Note: The relative proportionality is also considered in the distribution of seats.
whole ctry)
(2) Option 2: Higher tiers to redress proportionality deficiencies

b. Fixed vs. Variable 2nd-Tier allocation
(1) Fixed: DE (20%), IC (20%), (25%), NO (5%), SW (11%), GE (50%)

Fixed # Second-Tier Seats reserved for allocation to move district-level results closer to national-lvl prop...
(e.g. Vote Shares: Red=30%; White=40%; Blue=20%; Green=10%
District-level Results in Seats: Red=25%; White=42%; Blue=19%; Green=5%)
===> Allocate set-aside seats to try to make 2nd row match the first
===> Larger 2nd-Tier proportion seats set-aside produces more proportionality
(2) Variable: Austria, Belgium, Greece

Variable # Second-Tier Seats; All votes for all parties that were not used in winning seats at district level are pooled at regional or national level & another round of PR allocation undertaken (not necessarily by the same formula)

5. (Legal) Thresholds:
a. Primary features designed to limit proportionality & in particular limit small parities. Why?
(1) Self-interest on the part of larger parties
(2) Concern unmitigated prop. => proliferation of small parties => difficulty forming stable govts
(3) Aim to exclude extremists (e.g., Germany’s 5% rule)
b. Examples:
(1) Germany’s famous 5% rule
(2) Sweden 4%; Aust. 4% or 1 seat; Neth. .62% (=almost meaningless)
(3) Greece--PASOK manipulate it relentlessly: “loaded/reinforced” PR--as high as 17%, removed for 1989-90 (3 ele’s), 3% by New Democracy in 1990 => Very good example elect.-law manip.

6. Preferential vs. Non-Pref. List: Who decides which of parties’ listed candidates gets seat(s) party won?
a. Non-Pref. or “straight” list: Relatively rare--FR (‘86), GE, IT (‘94+, for PR seats), PO, SP; Party orders its candidates & their allotted seats go in order
b. Preferential List--Many variations
(1) IT (until 1994): Voters give up to 3-4 preferences, voters’ prefs. decide who gets seats--can choose party’s default ordering though. System received much blame in IT for‘clientelistic” politics & corruption (“vote-buying”) that prevailed.
(2) FI--Voters obliged to choose one candidate
(3) SZ & LU--As many preference votes as seats, can cross party lines in pref. ordering (panachage)
(4) DE--Party discretion as to how to list
(5) In some cases, party default very hard to override though nominal pref. option exists--BE, AU (pref. intro. ’71, restrictive, altered ‘92 purportedly to more effective choice), NE (parties usu. demand any “preferenced-in” candidate cede his/her seat to party order), NO, SW

D. Single-Transferable-Vote (PR version)
1. Very Rare (rel. new): Ire., Malta, & N. Ire. (since 1972)
2. Aims proportionality, not assume prefs org’d by prty
3. Mechanics:
a. Voters rank cand’s listed (∴ relatively small DM’s required)
b. Droop Quota calculated
(1) Anyone over quota elected & remaining votes allotted to 2nd pref’s (e.g. 100 1st pref’s, quota = 75 => elected, 25 votes transferred to 2nd pref’s in proportion to 2nd pref’s of these 100 voters)
(2) Continue until no one > quota, then eliminate cand. w/ fewest votes, transfer his/her votes, & ...
(3) Continue until number of seats in that district are allocated.

4. Merits (argued)
a. More information on voter preferences revealed
b. Not constrained by party lines
c. Votes can’t harm favored candidate => no incentive strategic vote
d. Allows voter input at polls on which tendencies within party to expand/contract (via ranking)

5. **Demerits (argued)**
   a. May weaken party discipline [Aside: effects of party cohesion?]
   b. May spur vague candidate positioning--as much incentive not to be disliked as to be liked almost
   c. Disproportionality b/c small district mag. (too complicated to have large lists of candidates to rank)
   d. GLM’s read of Evidence:
      (1) The Ireland case seems to support a & b, but Malta does not
      (2) IR & MA not much different than others in practice on c
      (3) ==> GLM are advocates of STV-PR

XXXVIII. **Assessing the Impacts of Electoral Systems**

A. **The Simple Standard Story**
   1. Plurality/Majority => Disprop., but largest 2 parties take all/near-all seats & so => stable majority govts.
   2. PR => Prop., but parties proliferate => coalition govt, fractionalized & polarized legis., & unstable govts
   3. Obviously, not quite so simple, but broad outline roughly correct (i.e., strongly supported by evidence)

B. Many other questions, however
   1. Which affords better “constituency” [n.b., not unambig. term] representation?
   2. Which offers better access to pol. & soc. minorities?
   3. Redistricting/gerrymandering opp’s & incentives?
   4. [etc.--see Powell, Blais, & Massicotte; OTHERS?]

C. G, L, & M’s Assess 6 possible effects elect. sys.
   1. Proportionality: absolutely no doubt PR => more; in fact, tight relation w/ Dist. Mag. (see graphs)
   2. Number of parties (in legislature; parliament usually)
      a. Effective (size-weighted) vs. raw number of parities
         Taagepera & Laakso (n*\(=\)Effective # parties, P\(_i\)\= prty i’s share seats/votes): n*\(=\sum(1/P_i)^\frac{1}{2}\)
      b. # partys in legis. or # contesting elects? Either: PR => 1 partys.
      c. (direct, mechanical effects) Non-PR => big mathematical bonus to large parties => fewer parties,
         esp. fewer effect. parties, in legis.
      d. (indirect, psychological, strategic effects) Non-PR => strategic voting & strategic party/candidate
         entry
      e. Q: So, which relation stronger, DM to Parl Prtys or Elect prtys?
      f. Some counter-evidence
         (1) Several countries: Bel, Den, Ger, Nor had multiparty before PR
         (2) Number of parities in Austria reduced after 1919 switched to PR
         (3) Malta nearly pure 2-party but a PR system
         (4) => PR not always cause prolif. parties, more nec. than suff. cond.
         (5) GLM: “PR systems will give parliamentary expression to a multiparty system if other factors,
             such as the number of political or social cleavages, cause voters to create one I the first place,
             but PR does not by itself bring a multiparty system into being”
      g. Still: Most fract’d parl’s: Bel, Den, Fin, Ita, Net, & Swi all PR
   3. Coalition or Single-Party Govt?
      a. Again no doubt simple story broadly correct: Single-party-majority govts in 10% of PR, 60% P/M
      b. Again, many exceptions
         (1) Minority govs have occurred in UK & elsewhere in P/M systems
         (2) Single-party govs have occurred in Ger & elsewhere in PR systems
         (3) four key parties in France (usually compete as 2-party coalitions)
      c. Tradeoff: Clarity responsibility vs. accuracy electoral message
   4. Constituency (i.e., district/locality) Representation
      a. Could argue: 1 rep per district facilitates constituent service
      b. Could counter: multiple rep’s/district helps ensure at least 1 of your political persuasion to approach
      c. What little evidence exists shows no discernible relationship
5. **Backgrounds of Parliamentarians:** [E.g., what features of various elect sys do you suppose might affect probability of female & /or minority cand’s being elected? Evidence: PR raises female representation in parliament. Why?]

6. **Gerrymandering possibilities & incentives:** Obv. gerrymandering much more effective in P/M...

7. **GLM state differences in econ perform little relation to differences in elect sys. This somewhat misleading.**
   a. **Economic policy** varies a lot by electoral system, esp. insofar as produce different types of govts
   b. Some evidence that some econ perf varies by elect sys too


XXXIX. Describing Various Types Elect Sys: Plur, Maj, PR; Magnitude; Tiers; Thresholds; Cand Select

XL. (Positive) Political Consequences

A. **Psychological (Strategic, Behavioral) & Mechanical**

1. Psychological (Strategic, Behavioral) Effects:
   a. P/M/PR & the number of parties
   b. Electoral System & ideology / cohesion
   c. Electoral System & strategic voting
   d. Obvious impact in plurality elections: Gunther (1989) found supporters of small parties less likely to vote for them in districts of smaller mag–make sense? what’s logic here?

2. Mechanical (Mathematical) Effects
   a. Vote-seat proportionality
   b. Duverger’s Law & number parties (raw v. effective number)
   c. Lijphart finds: Plurality ==> about 2.0 effective parties, Majority ==> about 2.8, PR ==> about 3.6
   d. Threshold effects too
   e. **Ordeshook & Shvetsova** find: relation b/w # parties & ethnic het. increases & tightens w/ dist. mag.
   f. presence/absence of parl. majority: Lijphart II: Plur => maj 93% of cases, Majority => 50%, PR => 20–30% depending on threshold

XLI. **Normative Debate–informed by Postive Theory, Evidence, & Debates**

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<tr>
<td>npgov80</td>
<td>-0.2504 0.1249 -0.0328 -0.2107 0.0856 -0.0468 0.3556 -0.0776 0.3345 -0.3579 0.3393 1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>attopp</td>
<td>0.2792 0.0093 0.1424 0.1441 0.2152 -0.0428 -0.2643 -0.1296 -0.2204 -0.2986 0.4303 0.0928 -0.2025 1.0000</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| lpop: natural log of population |
| lrgdpc: natural log of real GDP per capita |
| ethind: ethnic fragmentation index |
| reilnd: religious fragmentation index |
| gini: GINI index of income inequality |
| edsec: index primary & secondary sch. enroll. |
| lmag: natural log electoral district mag. |
| vpart: voter participation rate |
| prop: proportionality of legislative seat distribution to vote distribution |
| enpp: effective number of parliamentary parties |
| dgov80: average duration of govt (in months) in the 1980s |
| psupg80: average percent of seats in parliament supporting the govt in the 1980s |
| npgov80: average number of parties in govt in 1980s |
| attopp: natural log of the number of political attacks & oppressions in 1980s |
### Determinants of the Proportionality of Electoral Outcomes

Number of obs = 21  
R-squared = 0.6983

|      | Coef. | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|------|-------|-----------|-------|-----|----------------------|
| **lmag** | 2.568204 | .7283494 | 3.526 | 0.004 | .994701 4.141707 |
| **lpop** | -1.886149 | .9376368 | -2.012 | 0.065 | -3.91179 .139418 |
| **lrgdpc** | 2.941667 | 4.083722 | 0.720 | 0.484 | -5.880679 11.76401 |
| **ethind** | -5.946238 | 6.171297 | -0.964 | 0.353 | -19.27851 7.386038 |
| **edsec** | -0.0141931 | .0961284 | -0.148 | 0.885 | -0.2218658 0.1934797 |
| **US** | 13.95252 | 5.210637 | 2.678 | 0.019 | 2.69562 25.20941 |
| **SZ** | 4.030246 | 5.213686 | 0.773 | 0.453 | -7.233238 15.29373 |
| **_cons** | 80.45612 | 31.88155 | 2.524 | 0.025 | 11.58023 149.332 |

Number of obs = 23  
R-squared = 0.6303

|      | Coef. | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|------|-------|-----------|-------|-----|----------------------|
| **lmag** | 2.394217 | .681835 | 3.511 | 0.003 | .9556706 3.832763 |
| **lpop** | -0.9292101 | .5964194 | -1.558 | 0.138 | -2.187545 .3291249 |
| **ethind** | -7.55057 | 5.362998 | -1.408 | 0.177 | -18.86551 3.764366 |
| **US** | 12.91222 | 4.860203 | 2.657 | 0.017 | 2.658084 23.16635 |
| **SZ** | 6.514613 | 4.677849 | 1.393 | 0.182 | -3.354785 16.38401 |
| **_cons** | 96.9738 | 5.687898 | 17.049 | 0.000 | 84.97338 108.9742 |

### Determinants of the Effective Number of Parties in Parliament

Number of obs = 21  
R-squared = 0.2939

|      | Coef. | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|------|-------|-----------|-------|-----|----------------------|
| **lmag** | .4464824 | .3087327 | 1.446 | 0.172 | -.220494 1.113459 |
| **lpop** | -1.250728 | .3974454 | -0.315 | 0.758 | -.9837014 .735557 |
| **lrgdpc** | .925385 | 1.731008 | 0.535 | 0.602 | -2.81423 4.665 |
| **ethind** | .5329234 | 2.615889 | 0.204 | 0.842 | -5.118361 6.184208 |
| **edsec** | .0055997 | .0407469 | 0.137 | 0.893 | -.0824286 .093628 |
| **US** | -1.144733 | 2.208684 | -0.518 | 0.613 | -5.916305 3.62684 |
| **SZ** | 1.341764 | 2.209977 | 0.607 | 0.554 | -3.432601 6.116129 |
| **_cons** | -4.88439 | 13.51395 | -0.361 | 0.724 | -34.0795 24.31072 |

Number of obs = 21  
R-squared = 0.2581

|      | Coef. | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|------|-------|-----------|-------|-----|----------------------|
| **lmag** | .5087292 | .285378 | 1.783 | 0.095 | .095395 1.116998 |
| **lpop** | -.2890912 | .324563 | -0.891 | 0.387 | -.9808809 .4026984 |
| **lrgdpc** | 1.046867 | 1.603379 | 0.653 | 0.524 | -2.370654 4.464388 |
| **ethind** | 1.081365 | 2.262387 | 0.478 | 0.640 | -3.740798 5.903528 |
| **edsec** | -.0026652 | .0366468 | -0.073 | 0.943 | -.0807759 .0754456 |
| **_cons** | -3.897634 | 12.48691 | -0.312 | 0.759 | -30.51286 22.71759 |

Number of obs = 21  
R-squared = 0.2460

|      | Coef. | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|------|-------|-----------|-------|-----|----------------------|
| **lmag** | .4335446 | .2316949 | 1.914 | 0.073 | -.0452888 .9323701 |
| **lpop** | -.2552405 | .2989749 | -0.854 | 0.405 | -.8860225 .3755414 |
| **lrgdpc** | 1.237125 | 1.12866 | 1.096 | 0.288 | -1.144139 3.61839 |
| **_cons** | -5.798764 | 10.07684 | -0.575 | 0.573 | -27.05904 15.46151 |
Number of obs = 21  R-squared = 0.1745
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
enpp | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
  lmag | .4554715 .2272422 2.004 0.059 -.0201518 .9310948
  _cons | 2.907758 .5454194 5.331 0.000 1.766182 4.049333
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Determinants of the Number of Parties in Govt

Number of obs = 21  R-squared = 0.7386
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
npgov80 | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
   lpop | -.0857474 .1697331 -0.505 0.623 -.455564 .2840692
  lrgdpc | .126545 .7444957 0.170 0.868 -.1.495572 1.748662
  ethind | .0155078 1.114686 0.014 0.989 -.2.431385 2.4442
  edsec | -.0084333 .0173481 -0.486 0.636 -.0.462315 .0.293649
   lmag | .0064405 .1415198 0.046 0.964 -.3019047 .3147857
   enpp | .5247365 .1179966 4.447 0.001 .267644 .781829
   US | .1011615 .9493274 0.107 0.917 -.1.967245 2.169568
    SZ | .7775238 .9534556 0.815 0.431 -.1.299877 2.854925
   _cons | .5166641 5.778226 0.089 0.930 -.12.07301 13.10634
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Determinants of Voter Participation

Number of obs = 21  R-squared = 0.8380
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
vpart | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    lpop | -4.246587 1.577331 -2.692 0.021 -7.71827 -.7749051
  lrgdpc | 13.62715 6.147855 2.217 0.049 .0958134 27.15849
  ethind | -3.3292375 .141427 -2.328 0.040 -.6405162 -.0179588
   edsec | -.3283281 .141427 -2.328 0.040 -.6405162 -.0179588
   lmag | 2.831868 1.509369 1.876 0.087 -.4902306 6.153967
   prop | -.4603597 .4176456 -1.102 0.294 -1.379591 .4588722
  US | -10.9058 9.83255 -1.109 0.291 -32.54709 10.7355
   SZ | -41.02204 6.447967 -6.362 0.000 -54.95201 -27.09208
   _cons | 64.44762 58.44081 1.103 0.294 -64.17974 193.075
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Determinants of Govt Durability

Number of obs = 21  R-squared = 0.8379
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
vpart | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
   lpop | -4.235734 1.446679 -2.928 0.012 -7.361094 -.1110374
  lrgdpc | 13.77331 5.398993 2.551 0.024 2.0.10942 25.43712
  edsec | -3.3283281 .1299159 -2.527 0.025 -.0689943 -.0.476618
   lmag | 2.831868 1.356566 2.092 0.057 -.0.925245 5.76884
   prop | -.4568824 .3620822 -1.262 0.229 -1.239114 .3253487
   US | -11.0263 8.544266 -1.290 0.219 -29.48507 7.432461
   SZ | -41.02204 6.447967 -6.362 0.000 -54.95201 -27.09208
   _cons | 63.03857 52.37633 1.204 0.250 -50.11361 176.1907
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Determinants of Political Attacks & Oppressions

| Variable  | Coef. | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t|  | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|------|---------------------|
| lattopp   |       |           |       |      |                     |
| lpop      | 1.421063 | 0.5419046 | 2.622 | 0.039 | 0.09507 2.747056    |
| lrgdpc    | 0.3458066 | 1.710578 | 0.202 | 0.846 | -3.839827 4.53144   |
| ethind    | -3.110833 | 2.794551 | -1.113 | 0.276 | -9.948853 3.727188  |
| relind    | -2.244102 | 2.512261 | -0.893 | 0.381 | -8.391384 3.90318   |
| gini      | 9.470207 | 15.16302 | 0.625 | 0.555 | -27.63238 46.57279  |
| edsec     | 0.0360057 | 0.0400388 | 0.893 | 0.381 | -0.619657 1.33977   |
| imag      | -3.206208 | 2.987685 | -1.073 | 0.284 | -1.051681 0.410439  |
| US        | -3.668315 | 1.954821 | -1.877 | 0.100 | -8.451588 3.114959  |
| SZ        | 3.554796 | 2.143322 | 1.659 | 0.148 | -1.689725 8.799317  |
| _cons     | -22.13167 | 16.97318 | -1.304 | 0.240 | -63.66356 19.40021  |

Number of obs = 16  
R-squared = 0.6223
XLII. Lijphart, Electoral Systems (ch. 8)

A. Elect Sys most ctrl & direct diff Maj & Cons philo’s.
   1. Maj=SMD, plurality or majority; Cons=prop rep
   2. Δ cross type rare, & each ctry tends be attached to own

B. 7 Key Aspects Elect Sys Produce 2 Key Outcomes
   2. Outcomes: Proportionality & Number Parties

C. Electoral Formulae: Figure 8.1
   1. Plurality: Simple [impl’s?]; DM=1 => disp, few prty, maj
      a. Common: Legis in 12 of 36 Dems (+ sev pres) [Examples]
   2. Majority: Maj-Runoff & Alt Vote => disp, few prty, & maj
      a. Simple (not quite as simple as plurality); DM=1
      b. Not very common [Examples]
   3. Proportional Representation
      a. More complex (not nec. by a lot) than Plur/Maj.
      b. DM>1 => prop, allows more parties & tends not produce maj.
      c. Three Main Types:
         (1) List Systems: [...] Very common: Leg in 18/36 Dems
         (2) Mixed Systems; e.g., Mixed-Member Plurality (MMP) (Germany)
            (a) Each cit 2 votes (cand/district & party/national).
(b) List PR seats (usu. ½± total) *compensatory*, & usu. national dist.
(c) Supposedly allows tighter dist-constit/rep tie & proportionality.
(d) Rare, but recently pop: 4/36, incl 2 key recent changes (NZ, It)

3. Single Transferable Vote (STV) [...see GLM...]

4. Semi-Proportional Systems
   a. *Lmtd & Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV); Cumulative Vote*
      (1) Cits vote cands, not ranking, #votes fewer #seats.
      (2) Prop as seat-vote gap increases.
      (3) Very Rare (unique): Japan through ‘46–’95
   b. *Parallel Plurality-PR System*
      (1) Like MMP, 2-ballots etc., but non-compensatory ⇒ less prop
      (2) Very Rare (unique): Japan through ‘95-

D. *District Magnitude [DEF]*
   1. Plurality/Majority not req. SMD, but usually SMD
      a. MMD Maj possible but never used; MMD Plur not so rare [e.g.?]; MM provisions to assure some
         minority rep not so rare [e.g.?]
      b. Disprop ↑ w/ DM in Plur/Maj.
   2. DMag the key factor in prop & other effects PR
      a. Prop ↑ w/ DM Tight relation.
      b. *Upper Tiers* common, very lrg M’s, dom proportionality effect

E. *Legal* Thresholds
   1. Purpose: to limit extreme fragmentation of very high M
   2. Typically, bite seems to start @ around 4-5%.
   3. b/c *effective threshold* depends heavily on M ( & # cand’s), roughly according to $T_{eff} = 0.75/(M+1)$, s.t.
      legal thresh min.

4. *[ELABORATE ON EFFECTIVE THRESHOLD]*

F. *Assembly Size*
   1. Size<³rt-rule [def], esp <100, consequential for disprop
   2. [Also, ↑ Assy Size may ↑ poss disprop in dists to cancel]

G. *Presidentialism*
   1. Powerful pop-elect pres, esp. if simultaneously or nearly so elect w/ legis, ⇒ own force toward 2-partism
      [Why?]
   2. Esp. if pres by plurality rather than maj-runoff [Why?]

H. *Malapportionment [DEF]*
   1. Hard to avoid in plur/maj w/ pre-exist geog divisions as district, easy in PR (just vary magnitude w/ pop).
   2. Typically result in rural over-representation [Examples]
      a. US: Senate, Elect Coll, even house through ‘60s reapportion.
      b. *[Other examples? Expected effects?]*
   3. Rural over-rep not nec. translates partisan disprop.

I. *Apparentement [DEF]*
   1. Poss. to link lists in list-PR (Switz, Isr, & Neth ‘77+)
   2. Some rules linking possible by nature: AV, STV, Runoff

J. Gauging Disproportionality:
   1. Gallagher Index: $\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{1}{N}\sum(v_i-s_i)^2\right)^{0.5}$ (i.e., $\frac{1}{2}$ sum sqrd dev’s)
   2. Complicating Issues:
      a. Systems with multiple votes:
         (1) MMP: use party’s vote. (Arg: better rep partisan prefs.)
         (2) AV/STV: use 1st-pref votes (rather than final tally)
            (a) more available
(b) better rep pref distribution
(3) Runoff: use decisive, i.e. usu. 2nd-rnd, vote
(a) arg better rep final pref's
(b) [n.b., contradicts logic from AV/STV, likely understates disprop]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Legislative disproportionality (%)</th>
<th>Legislative elections (N)</th>
<th>Presidential disproportionality (%)</th>
<th>Presidential elections (N)</th>
<th>Geometric mean (%)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49.51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>38.04</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>45.11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>48.49</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45.38</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>11.34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>46.23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: \textsuperscript{a}Only the 1996 election, in which the prime minister was directly elected.
\textsuperscript{b}Not including the 1986 and 1993 elections, which led to parliamentary phases.

Source: Based on data in Mackie and Rose 1991; Mackie and Rose 1997; Nahlen 1993; Goldey and Williams 1983; and data provided by Michael Coppege, Brian F. Crisp, Gary Hoskin, Mark P. Jones, and J. Ray Kennedy

K. Pres Elects in Pres Sys & Disprop (Table 8.1)
   1. Pres, almost by def, SMD ⇒ highly disprop (e.g., in 2-cand, disprop=losing cand vote share).
   2. Lijphart uses geometric mean pres & leg disp for pres. sys.

L. Emp Eval: Table 8.2. [Explain rel. low US leg disprop:
   1. Wk prty+open prim’s⇒13\textsuperscript{rd} prty; run as dissident w/in prty
   2. Very large # districts.]
M. Elect Sys & Prty Sys: Duverger’s Law; Mech & Psych...

1. Rae: Three things all elect sys do
a. Yield disproportional results.
b. Reduce effective # parliamentary rel to electoral parties
c. Can manufacture seat-majority for non-electoral-majority

2. All 3 effects ↑ strength w/ $T_{eff}$ & essentially via disprop.

3. Disprop systematic, not random: favors larger parties [with essentially one exception...what?].

4. [DEF] Manufactured & Earned Maj, Natural Min

N. Empirical Evaluation: Table 8.3 & Figure 8.2

---

**Table 8.2** Average electoral disproportionality and type of electoral system (used in legislative elections) in thirty-six democracies, 1945–96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disproportionality (%)</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Disproportionality (%)</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>PR Spain</td>
<td>8.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>PR Australia</td>
<td>9.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>PR Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>10.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>PR United Kingdom</td>
<td>10.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>PR-STV Colombia</td>
<td>10.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>PR Canada</td>
<td>11.72</td>
</tr>
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<td>PR Botswana</td>
<td>11.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>PR Costa Rica</td>
<td>13.65</td>
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<td>PR Trinidad</td>
<td>13.66</td>
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<tr>
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<td>PR Venezuela</td>
<td>14.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>PR-STV United States</td>
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<td>15.47</td>
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<tr>
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<td>PR Barbados</td>
<td>15.75</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>PR Mauritius</td>
<td>16.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>SNTV Jamaica</td>
<td>17.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>8.08</td>
<td>PR France</td>
<td>21.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Presidential systems

Note: The number of elections on which these averages are based may be found in Table 5.2

Source: Based on data in Mackie and Rose 1991; Mackie and Rose 1997; Nohlen 1999; Singh 1994; Lijphart 1994; and data provided by Pradeep K. Chhibber, Michael Gogdedge, Brian P. Crisp, Gary Hoskin, Mark P. Jones, J. Ray Kennedy, Hassan Mithaur, Shahaen Mozaffan, Bin Reilly, and Andrew S. Reynolds
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8.3</th>
<th>Manufactured majorities, earned majorities, and natural minorities in three types of electoral systems, 1945–96</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manufactured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>majority (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality and majority systems (14 countries)</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiproportional systems (Japan)</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation (22 countries)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All legislative elections in 36 democracies</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on data in Mackie and Rose 1991; Mackie and Rose 1997; Nohlen 1993; Singh 1994; Lijphart 1994; and data provided by Piadeep K. Chhibber, Michael Coppedge, Brian F. Crisp, Gary Hoskin, Mark P. Jones, J. Ray Kennedy, Hansraj Mathur, Shaheen Mozaffar, Ben Reilly, and Andrew S. Reynolds.
XLIII. Elaboration, Clarification, & Further Topics:

A. Effective Thresholds: roughly set by dist. mag. (or exactly legal threshold if that higher)
   1. Three Problems in determining \( T_{\text{eff}} \)
      a. \( \exists \) lower threshold (lowest vote share that could produce a seat) & upper threshold (lowest vote share that assures a seat)
      b. Both thresholds also depend on formula & # parties competing
      c. # prtys, DM, etc. & \( \therefore T_{\text{eff}} \) can vary dist-to-district w/in system
   2. Roughly equal to the larger of
      a. Legal Threshold or
      b. Approx.: \( T_{\text{eff}} \approx \frac{0.75}{(DM+1)} \)
      c. Except in SMP where Lijphart assumes it 35% by assumption

B. [interesting fact/Q: US has had 100% congressional maj, only 8.7% manufactured; UK has had 92% maj, all manu. What produces the difference do you suppose?]

C. Why is relationship w/ # parties not stronger still, esp. w/ # electoral parties? [relation exists]
   1. Bi-directional causality [Ne \( \Rightarrow \) +Disprop, Disprop \( \Rightarrow \) -Ne]
   2. Psychological: parties never forced to leave electoral arena; can keep losing as long as want
   3. Multiple other factors involved here (e.g., geographic concentration of support)
   4. Can be statistical artifact: systems performing oddly (too many or too few parties relative to designers’ aims) will tend to be changed... E.g., US plurality = 1 case of elect sys; Greece’s less than proportional PR =many cases.

D. Refining question: Why eNpp so much more responsive to electoral system than eNep? Why eNep appears basically unaffected in fact in this longitudinal analysis?
   1. Takes Time for Expectational Effects to Manifest;
      a. Politicians presumably know expected effects of electoral systems, voters have to work them out.
      b. Historicity: 2 (effect.) prty sys won’t become 3 over-night, etc.
      c. Uncertainty over elect support for various potential new parties, or over who will lose by new rules, & whose support now vulnerable
         (1) => risk-aversion => less changing of rules
         (2) => “winner’s curse” => excessive net party entry as rules change
      d. Spurious/Endogeneity: when do electoral rules change? Isn’t it likely that the same conditions which trigger electoral law change are likely to be producing party system changes?
      e. Periods of time compared usu. long => questionable whether reliably controlled cases–too much else also changing. On other hand, this “else” ought to avg out across some # such comparisons.
   2. Lijphart II partly addresses last: compare last election under old w/ 2\textsuperscript{nd} or 3\textsuperscript{rd} under new rather than all elections under old w/ new. Drawback: single election less reliable indicator of functioning of electoral system than avg over several.

XLIV. Basic conclusion:

A. Some support for expected effects on most dimensions
   1. \( T_{\text{eff}} \) is key factor (n.b. it subsumes the PR/PM distinction, which is itself a very strong predictor)
   2. Disproportionality is dependent variable most completely explained by electoral system

XLV. Impact of 4 ancillary properties of elect sys

A. Ballot structure: categorical (w/in-party voting only) v. ordinal (potential cross-party voting)
B. Malapportionment: differing numbers of voters per representative across districts
C. Presidential govt & elections
D. Interparty electoral links:

E. See Lijphart II & Class Lecture Notes from Previous Years

XLVI. Grand Summary of Findings: tables 6.2 & 6.3, though perhaps understate strength of conclusion in favor of the elect formula & AS links eNpp. Remains broad conclusion that \( T_{\text{eff}} \) the main factor & Disprop. the most completely determined

Parties & Party Systems, Part I
XLVII.  **Review of Electoral Systems Material**

A. Importance of Elections: Practically & Symbolically

B. General Matters of Importance Regarding Elections

1. Suffrage Expansion
2. Suffrage Restrictions
3. Turnout—Gen’ly higher outside US, ↓ since 70’s

C. Other Elections: EU & Pres & Local

D. Other Voting--Referenda

1. “voter fatigue?”
2. democracy by referendum? [Chaos Theorems]
3. Issues over which referenda tend to called

E. Types of Electoral Systems

1. **DEF electoral systems:** “the mechanisms that turn votes cast by people on election day into seats to be occupied by deputies in the parliament. The electoral system is what converts the choices of voters into a legislature.” GLM (p. 274)
2. **Where do electoral systems come from?**
   a. “Determined by the political elite of the day, some of whose motivations may be partisan” GLM (p. 274)
   b. “designs reflect...constitution-makers’ values, their expectations regarding the consequences of various arrangements, their often laboriously negotiated compromises” Powell (p. 66)
   c. Cultural/Historical Legacy: *See Powell II Table 4.3* (p. 67)
   d. Generally not frequently manip’d for electoral advantage, despite obvious opportunities. **If such a potent political engineering tool, why not?**
      (1) Why would those in power change system that put them there?
      (2) Parties uncertainty about future electoral position
      (3) Difficult to change (constitutions usually require super-majorities)
      (4) Relatively obvious opportunism, may trigger negative voter-reaction
      (5) Sometimes imposed from abroad (e.g. Germ., Jap., It., Aust.)
3. **Key distinctions between types of electoral systems**
   a. **Primary Distinction:** Proportional Representation (PR) vs. Plurality/Majority (P/M) systems
   b. **Other key features** [define each]
      (1) District magnitude
      (2) Degree of candidate vs. party voting (preference voting)
      (3) Number of tiers
      (4) Electoral formula (within the PR-P/M divisions)
      (5) Legal Thresholds
      (6) Constituency pattern (e.g., Malapportionment, Gerrymanders)

4. **Plurality/Majority Systems**
   a. **Single-Member Plurality (SMP)**
   b. **Majority Systems**
      (1) **STV:** *alternative or single-transferable vote* (majority version)
      (2) **Multiple-Round Majority Balloting**

5. **Proportional Representation (PR) Systems**
   a. The key feature of PR is the Multi-member district
   b. **Key types of PR:** List & STV
   c. **List Systems’ Formulas**
      (1) **Two Basic Types**
         (a) **Largest Remainders (Quotas) Methods** (Hare, Droop)
         (b) **Highest Averages (Divisor) Methods** (d’Hondt, Sainte-Lague, & Mod. SL, Imperiali--
Defunct Italian system)

(2) Tiers
(3) Legal Thresholds
(4) Preferential vs. Non- Preferential List
d. Single-Transferable-Vote (PR version)

F. Assessing the Impacts of Electoral Systems

1. The Simple Standard Story
a. Pluralist/Majoritarian => Disproportionality, but largest two parties take all or nearly all of the seats & thus the system produces stable majority govts
b. PR ==> Proportionality, but parties proliferate & thus system produces coalition govts, fractionalized & polarized legislatures, & thus unstable govts

2. GLM's Assessment on 6 possible effects of elect systems
a. Proportionality-- absolutely no doubt PR ==> more; in fact, tight relation with District Magnitude (see pictures)
b. Number of parties in legislature & in elections
   (1) Effective (size-weighted) vs. raw number of parities
   (2) direct, mechanical effects
   (3) psychological, strategic effects (2: cand/prtys & voters)
   (4) PR more necessary than sufficient condition for party syst fract: disprop acts as governor, dampens soc struct reflect in prty syst

c. Coalition or Single-Party Govt?
d. Constituency Representation
e. Backgrounds of Parliamentarians
f. Gerrymandering possibilities & incentives
g. Differences in broad econ perform little, simple relation to elect syst, but spec economic policies vary significantly by elect sys, especially insofar as they produce different types of govts

G. Psychological (Strategic, Behavioral) v. Mechanical Effects (From Blais & Massicotte, in LNN)

1. Psychological (Strategic, Behavioral) Effects:
a. P/M/PR & the number of parties
b. Electoral System & ideology / cohesion
c. Electoral System & strategic voting
d. Obvious impact in plurality elections: Gunther (1989) found supporters of small parties less likely to vote for them in districts of smaller mag (explain)

2. Mechanical (Mathematical) Effects
a. Vote-seat proportionality
b. Duverger's Law & number parties (raw v. effective number)
c. Lijphart II: Pl => 2.0+/– effective parties , Maj => 2.8+/–, PR => 3.6+/–
d. Legal Threshold effects too
e. Ordeshok & Shvetsova: relation b/w # parties & ethnic het. increases & tightens w/ dist. mag. (EXPLAIN & ELABORATE)
f. presence/absence of parl. maj: Lijphart II: Pl => maj 93% cases, Maj => 50%, PR => 20-30% depending on threshold

H. Sample Empirical (Regression) Results

lpop: natural log of population
lrgdpc: natural log of real GDP per capita
ethind: ethnic fragmentation index
relin: religious fragmentation index
gini: GINI index of income inequality
edsec: index primary & secondary sch. enroll.
lmag: natural log electoral district mag.
vpart: voter participation rate
prop: proportionality of legislative seat distribution to vote distribution
enpp: effective # parliamentary parties
dgov80: average duration of govts (in months) in the 1980s
psupg80: average % seats in parliament supporting
the govt in the 1980s

**npgov80**: average # parties in govt in 1980s

**lattopp**: natural log of the number of political attacks & oppressions in 1980s

### Determinants of the Proportionality of Electoral Outcomes

|          | Coef. | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------|-------|-----------|-------|----|----------------------|
| **lmag** | 2.568 | .728      | 3.526 | 0.004 | 0.995 - 4.137 |
| **lpop** | -1.886 | .938      | -2.012 | 0.065 | -3.912 - 0.139 |
| **lrgdpc** | 2.942 | 4.084 | 0.720 | 0.484 | -5.881 - 11.764 |
| **ethind** | -5.946 | 6.171 | -0.964 | 0.353 | -19.278 - 7.386 |
| **edsec** | -.014 | .096 | -0.148 | 0.885 | -0.221 - 0.135 |
| **US** | 13.953 | 5.211 | 2.678 | 0.019 | 2.396 - 25.510 |
| **SZ** | 4.030 | 5.214 | 0.773 | 0.453 | -2.219 - 10.280 |
| **_cons** | 80.456 | 31.9 | 2.524 | 0.025 | 11.6 - 149.33 |

### Determinants of the Effective Number of Parties in Parliament

|          | Coef. | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------|-------|-----------|-------|----|----------------------|
| **lmag** | 2.394 | .682 | 3.511 | 0.003 | 0.956 - 3.833 |
| **lpop** | -.929 | .596 | -1.558 | 0.138 | -2.187 - 0.329 |
| **ethind** | -7.551 | 5.363 | -1.408 | 0.177 | -18.865 - 3.764 |
| **US** | 12.912 | 4.860 | 2.657 | 0.017 | 2.658 - 23.166 |
| **SZ** | 6.515 | 4.678 | 1.393 | 0.182 | -3.355 - 16.384 |
| **_cons** | 96.974 | 5.688 | 17.049 | 0.000 | 84.973 - 108.974 |

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### Determinants of the Effective Number of Parties in Parliament

|          | Coef. | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------|-------|-----------|-------|----|----------------------|
| **lmag** | 0.509 | .286 | 1.783 | 0.095 | -0.099 - 1.117 |
| **lpop** | -.289 | .325 | -0.891 | 0.387 | -.988 - .403 |
| **lrgdpc** | 1.046 | 1.603 | 0.653 | 0.524 | -2.370 - 4.464 |
| **ethind** | 1.081 | 2.263 | 0.478 | 0.640 | -3.741 - 5.903 |
| **edsec** | -.002 | .037 | -0.073 | 0.943 | -.081 - 0.076 |
| **_cons** | -3.898 | 12.5 | -0.312 | 0.759 | -30.513 - 22.717 |

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### Determinants of the Effective Number of Parties in Parliament

|          | Coef. | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------|-------|-----------|-------|----|----------------------|
| **lmag** | .444 | .309 | 1.446 | 0.172 | -.220 - 1.113 |
| **lpop** | -.125 | .398 | -0.315 | 0.758 | -.983 - .733 |
| **lrgdpc** | .925 | 1.731 | 0.535 | 0.602 | -2.814 - 4.665 |
| **ethind** | .533 | 2.616 | 0.204 | 0.842 | -5.118 - 6.184 |
| **edsec** | .006 | .041 | 0.137 | 0.893 | -.082 - 0.093 |
| **_cons** | -4.898 | 13.5 | -0.361 | 0.724 | -30.513 - 22.717 |


### Determinants of the Number of Parties in Govt

| Variable | Coef. | Std. Err. | t | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------|-------|-----------|---|------|----------------------|
| lpop     | -0.0857474 | 0.1697331 | -0.505 | 0.623 | -0.455564 .2840692 |
| lrgdpc   | 0.126545 | 0.7444957 | 0.170 | 0.868 | -1.495572 1.748662 |
| ethind   | 0.0155078 | 1.114686  | 0.014 | 0.989 | -2.413185 2.4442  |
| edsec    | -0.0084333 | 0.0173481 | -0.486 | 0.636 | -0.0462315 0.293649 |
| lmag     | 0.0064405 | 0.1415198 | 0.046 | 0.964 | -.3019047 0.314783 |
| enpp     | 0.5247365 | 0.1179966 | 4.447 | 0.001 | 0.267644 0.781829 |

US | 0.1011615 | 0.9493274 | 0.107 | 0.994 | -1.967245 2.169568 |
SZ | 0.7775238 | 0.9534556 | 0.815 | 0.431 | -1.299877 2.854925 |

_cons | 0.5166641 | 5.778226  | 0.089 | 0.930 | -12.07301 13.10634 |

Number of obs = 21  R-squared = 0.7386

### Determinants of Voter Participation

| Variable | Coef. | Std. Err. | t | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------|-------|-----------|---|------|----------------------|
| lpop     | -4.246587 | 1.577331 | -2.692 | 0.021 | -7.71827 -.7749051 |
| lrgdpc   | 13.62715 | 6.147855 | 2.217 | 0.049 | 0.958134 27.15849 |
| ethind   | 0.3665997 | 9.440726  | 0.039 | 0.970 | -20.4123 21.1455 |
| edsec    | -0.3292375 | 0.014427 | -2.328 | 0.040 | -0.6405162 -.0179588 |
| lmag     | 2.831868 | 1.509369 | 1.876 | 0.067 | -0.4902306 6.153967 |
| prop     | -0.4603597 | 0.4176456 | -1.102 | 0.294 | -1.379591 0.4588722 |
| enpp     | 0.0927027 | 0.9582923 | 0.094 | 0.927 | -2.075911 2.261316 |
| US       | -10.9058 | 9.83255 | -1.109 | 0.291 | -32.54709 10.7355 |
| SZ       | -41.28559 | 7.886355 | -5.235 | 0.000 | -58.64333 -23.92784 |

_cons | 64.44762 | 58.44081  | 1.103 | 0.294 | -64.17974 193.075 |

Number of obs = 21  R-squared = 0.8379

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### Determinants of Govt Durability

| Variable   | Coef.  | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t|  | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|------------|--------|-----------|-------|-----|---------------------|
| lpop       | -.3782 | 2.8133    | -0.13 | 0.89 | -6.865687 -6.10928  |
| lrgdpc     | -4.09  | 9.8452    | -0.42 | 0.69 | -26.79741 18.61148 |
| ethind     | 15.23  | 12.93     | 1.18  | 0.27 | -14.58243 45.05183 |
| edsec      | .1928  | .2382     | 0.81  | 0.44 | -.356555 6.447957  |
| imd        | 1.06   | 9.84      | 0.11  | 0.90 | -9.402317 10.6351  |
| prop       | .01    | .5973     | 0.03  | 0.98 | -1.175458 1.167957 |
| vpart      | .0249  | .4149     | 0.06  | 0.95 | -1.163583 1.213484 |
| enpp       | -.61   | 2.18      | -0.29 | 0.78 | -5.625478 4.415092 |
| psupg80    | .2609 | .2984     | 0.87  | 0.41 | -.4271431 6.523576 |
| npgov80    | -4.54 | 3.26      | -1.40 | 0.19 | -12.06129 2.973955 |
| US         | 19.76 | 14.06     | 1.41  | 0.19 | -12.66086 52.18469 |
| SZ         | 24.22 | 19.61     | 1.24  | 0.25 | -20.98437 69.4352  |

### Determinants of Political Attacks & Oppressions

| Variable   | Coef.  | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t|  | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|------------|--------|-----------|-------|-----|---------------------|
| ethind     | 9.01  | 10.86     | 0.83  | 0.42 | -13.91175 31.92498 |
| psupg80    | .64   | .27       | 2.38  | 0.02 | .0720871 1.207021  |
| npgov80    | -4.39 | 1.98      | -2.30 | 0.02 | -9.102461 -1.159712 |
| US         | 22.63 | 11.40     | 1.98  | 0.05 | 5.205769 46.68059  |
| SZ         | 11.60 | 11.95     | 1.00  | 0.34 | -13.62187 36.82416 |

### Determinants of Political Attacks & Oppressions

| Variable   | Coef.  | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t|  | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|------------|--------|-----------|-------|-----|---------------------|
| lpop       | 1.42  | .54       | 2.62  | 0.04 | 0.09507 2.747056   |
| lrgdpc     | -.31  | 2.79      | -0.11 | 0.90 | -9.48883 3.727188  |
| relind     | -2.24 | 2.51      | -0.89 | 0.40 | 8.391384 3.90318  |
| gini       | 9.47  | 3.55      | 2.70  | 0.01 | -10.60337 28.04186 |
| edsec      | .036  | .04       | 0.89  | 0.39 | -0.619657 1.33977  |
| imd        | -1.32 | .29       | -4.50 | 0.00 | 1.051681 0.410394  |
| US         | 3.67  | 1.45      | 2.54  | 0.01 | 1.114959 5.20769  |
| SZ         | 3.55  | 1.66      | 0.16  | 0.49 | -1.689725 8.799317 |

Number of obs = 16  R-squared = 0.6223

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Number of obs = 16  R-squared = 0.5978

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I. Lijphart, *Electoral Systems* (ch. 8) (points not in GLM, or not fully)
   1. Elect Sys most ctrl & direct diff Maj & Cons philosophies
   2. 7 Key Aspects Elect Sys => 2 Key Outcomes
      a. Aspects: EForm, DMag, LegThresh, AssySize, Pres, Malapp, Apparent: first three esp. key. (1st 3 + malapp. covered in GLM)
      b. Outcomes: Proportionality & Number Parties
   3. *Semi-Proportional Systems*
      a. Lmtd & Single-Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) (Japan)
      b. Cumulative Vote (Not currently in use @ national level)
      c. Parallel Plurality-PR System (German System)
   4. Assembly Size: when less than cube-root rule [def], esp<100, consequential for disprop
   5. Presidentialism
      a. Powerful pop-elect pres, esp. if simultaneously or nearly so elect w/ legis, own force toward 2-partism [Why?]
      b. Esp. if pres by plurality rather than maj-runoff [Why?]
   6. Apparentement [DEF]
   7. Gauging Disproportionality:
      a. Gallagher Index: \[\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\sum (v_i - s_i)^2}\] (i.e., sq. rt. of \(\frac{1}{2}\) sum sqrd dev's)
      b. Complicating Issues:
         (1) Multiple-vote systems (e.g., MMP, AV/STV); run-offs; presidential sys.
         (2) What counts as a party?
   8. Rae: Three things all elect sys do
      a. Yield disproportional results (favoring larger parties).
      b. Reduce effective # parliamentary rel to electoral parties
      c. Can manufacture seat-majority for non-electoral-majority
      d. All 3 effects 1 strength w/ T_eff & essentially via disprop.
   9. [DEF] Manufactured & Earned Maj, Natural Min

J. Elaboration, Clarification, & Further Topics (Lijphart II)
   1. Effective Thresholds \((T_{\text{eff}})\): roughly set by dist. mag. (or exactly legal threshold if that higher)
      a. Three Problems in determining \(T_{\text{eff}}\)
         (1) \(\exists\) lower threshold (lowest vote share that could produce a seat) & upper threshold (lowest vote share that assures a seat)
         (2) Both thresholds also depend on formula & # parties competing
         (3) # prtys, DM, etc. & \(\cdot\) \(T_{\text{eff}}\) can vary dist-to-district w/in system
      b. Roughly equal Max(Legal Threshold, \(0.75/(DM+1)\)), except in SMP where Lijphart assumes it 35% by assumption
   2. [interesting fact/Q: US has had 100% congressional maj, only 8.7% manu.; UK has had 92% maj, all manu. What explains?]
   3. Why is relationship w/ # parties not stronger still, esp. w/ # electoral parties? [relation exists]
      a. Bi-directional causality [Ne => +Disprop, Disprop => -Ne]
      b. Psychological: parties never forced to leave electoral arena; can keep losing
c. Multiple other factors involved here (e.g., geog. concentration of support)
d. Can be statistical artifact: systems performing oddly (too many or too few parties relative to
designers' aims) will tend to be changed...

4. Refining Question: Why eNpp so much more responsive to electoral system than eNep?
a. Takes Time for Expectational Effects to Manifest;
   (1) Politicians presumably know expected effects of electoral systems, voters have to work them out.
   (2) Historicity: 2 (effect.) prty sys won't become 3 over-night, etc.
b. Uncertainty over elect support for various potential new parties, or over who will lose by new rules,
   & whose support now vulnerable
   (1) => risk-aversion => less changing of rules
   (2) => "winner's curse" => excessive net party entry as rules change
c. Spuriousness/Endogeneity: when do electoral rules change? Isn't it likely that the same conditions
   which trigger electoral law change are likely to be producing party system changes?

5. Basic conclusions:
a. Some support for expected effects on most dimensions
b. T_{eff} is key factor (n.b. it subsumes PR/PM distinction, which alone strong)
c. Disproportionality is dependent variable most completely explained by electoral system, then sort
   of "slippages" away as go down chain.

XLVIII. Parties & Party Systems, Part I

A. Patterns in Party Politics (GLM ch. 7)

1. Party System:
a. DEF: character of political competition in ctry, described in terms of relative strengths & policy
   positions of its parties (GLM, p. 151)
b. Each sys somewhat unique, but many sim’s across party sys

2. Seven West European Party Sys Described: common basis in left/right divide defines the competition
a. UK
   (1) Description:
      (a) Major Parties: the players
      (b) Relative Strengths:
      (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time
   (2) “Responsible Party Govt”
      (a) ideological decision sharply defined for voters
      (b) cabinet govt with relatively unchecked power
b. Sweden
   (1) Description:
      (a) Major Parties: the players
      (b) Relative Strengths:
      (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time
   (2) Key differences from the UK
      (a) Soc Dems much more successful than Lab
      (b) Soc Dems not quite monop of left–small but persistent comm party
      (c) Moderates quite far from monopoly non-soc opposition
         i) Liberals–center-type libs
         ii) Center Party–agrarian
         iii) Christian Democrats–newer
      (d) Rel. recent strength Ecology Party & New Dem (rt, protest)
c. Germany
   (1) Description:
      (a) Major Parties: the players
      (b) Relative Strengths:
(c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time

(2) Key differences from the UK

(a) relatively strong position of FDP; it more “conservative” than UK Liberals; sec. opp. to Cath. pol. rather than lib. opp. to sec. conserv.

(b) CDU/CSU=Christian-Dem not secular conservative party
   i) gen. more receptive to *social justice* concerns= somewhat more centrist on econ. pol.
   ii) gen. more concerned w/ moral issues & more conserv. on soc. pol., esp. where main churches have stance
   iii) CSU is the more Catholic & socially conservative of two

(c) SPD was one of most radical in 19th C, one of most moderate now
   i) excluded for its extremism pre-'66 Bad Godesberg commit. to free-mrkt & NATO
   ii) post-'66 increasingly de-ideologized, ↑ly pro-sys, & toward consensual politics

(d) TRIANGULAR POLITICS: CDU/CSU–FDP–SPD, how do they ally on different sorts of issues?

(3) Changes in the 80s & 90s

(a) Greens–right around threshold since 80s; beginning to affect govtal coalition patterns?

(b) 1990 Unification: 12 mill. new, presumably volatile voters, originally mostly to CDU & FDP benefit, recently turned against them. Why?

(c) Greens allying w/ related social movements, becoming more effectively organized to compete

(d) *Die Republikaner*–not yet parliamentary player, but disturbing coupled w/ recently rising social strife

(e) *Politikverdrossenheit*–disillusionment w/ politics
d. Netherlands

(1) Description:
   a) Major Parties: the players: PvdA, CDA, VVD
   b) Relative Strength: 1/3+1/3+1/5+ smaller, episodic players
   c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time

(2) Triangular + small party complications
e. Italy (pre-1994)

(1) Description:
   a) Maj Parts: MSI-Lib-Rep-DC-PSDI-PSI-PCI+many smaller
   b) Relative Strengths: DC 1/3, PCI 1/3
   c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time

(2) More fractionalized & polarized than most other sys (nearest was FR IVth)

(3) Apparent Changes
   a) Major Parties: AN-Lega-Forza-Centro-PSI-Greens-PDS-Rifond, + Rete
   b) Relative Strengths: roughly even left-right blocks
   c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time (so far steady alternation: RtBlck-LftBlck-RtBlck...)
f. France

(1) IVth: *PCF (.25)–PSF (.2)–Rad (.1)–Cath MRP (.25)–Gauls (.2)–Pouj (.1) + small*

(2) Fifth Republic: PCF–PS–UDF–RPR, + smaller
   a) Two-bloc system: what facilitated the change?
   b) Shift in balance of strength within each bloc
   c) *Front National, Generation Ecologie, Les Verts*
g. Spain

(1) early volatility & flux, ill-defined loose alliances

(2) early dom by Suarez’ UnionDemCtr => broad Ctr-Rt & Ctr-Lft coals

(3) collapses about ‘82, replaced by PSOE dom w/ right in frag’d disarray
3. Uniformity & Diversity
   a. Maj commonality: tendency toward Lft-Rt competition, occasional exceptions dominated by center
   b. Core Differences
      (1) location of liberals:
         (a) Egalitarian (center-left): e.g., UK Liberal Democrats
         (b) Libertarian (center-right): e.g., German FDP or Italian PLI
      (2) whether maj lft or, more rarely, rt party can govern alone
      (3) strongly structured v. loose/fragmented govt’l alliances
      (4) Degree of party discipline
   c. Nature of Left-Right Competition
      (1) Lft wrkng-class prtys: common hist origins both maj strands (Soc, Comm)
      (2) Right middle/upper-class parties: more variegated origins & politics
         (a) religious v. secular conservatives
         (b) rural/farming v. industrial/service
         (c) some rightist cultural linguistic, subcultural, regional
      (3) Compare development of Welf State across config’s of left/right compet
      (4) Complications arising: New Lft & New Rt & new issues
   d. Conflict within Left & Right
      (1) Soc/Comm & Right/Far-Right more usually bitter enemies than allies
      (2) Systems w/ much elect strength at extremes tend⇒ centrist multiprty coals
      (3) Growing Disillusionment w/ Politics⇒anti-party parties
         (a) sources of this trend?
         (b) effects of this trend?
   e. Other Dimensions of Party Politics
      (1) Other cleavage lines: religion, cultural/ethnic/linguistic, mat/post-mat
      (2) Within broad rubric of Left-Right Competition: soc & econ dim’s

B. Party Families (GLM ch. 8)
   1. Definition/Grouping Characteristics
      a. Origins
      b. Links they form among selves, w/in & across countries
      c. Similarity of (broad) policy stances
   2. Families of the Left
      a. Social Democrats (↓ support or unchanged)
      b. Comms (↓↓ in most, recent IT except but not so comm any more)
      c. New Left (↓ in most places, soc dems usu moving to absorb...)
      d. Greens (↑ or unchanged support in most places)
   3. Families of the Center & Right
      a. Christian Dems (↓ or unchanged in most places, until recently)
      b. Secular Conservatives (↓ or unchanged in most places, until recent)
      c. Libs (most ↓, but some CDs/SecCons moving to absorb) (Explain?)
      d. Agrarian/Rural (↓ or unchanged support)
      e. Far Right (↑ support in some places)
   4. Other
      a. regionalist, nationalist (unchanged or ↑ support)
      b. miscellaneous, protest (↑ support in most places)
   5. Patterns of Partisan Competition among Families
      a. Christian-Democrat-led Right
         (1) left strong, united (AU, GE)
(2) left strong, divided (IT)
(3) left weak, united or divided (BE, LU, NE, SZ)

b. Secular-Conservative-led Right
   (1) left strong, united (UK)
   (2) left strong, divided (Fin, Ice, Fra)

c. Fragmented Right, Left strong, united (Den, Nor, Swe)

Parties & Party Systems

XLIX. Parties & Party Systems I: Description
A. Patterns in Party Politics (GLM ch. 7)

1. Party System:
   a. DEF: character of political competition in ctry, described in terms of relative strengths & policy
      positions of its parties (GLM, p. 151)
   b. Each sys somewhat unique, but many sim’s across party sys

2. Seven West European Party Sys Described: common basis in left/right divide defines the competition
   a. UK
      (1) Description:
         (a) Major Parties: the players
         (b) Relative Strengths:
         (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time
      (2) “Responsible Party Govt” (Accountability & Mandate Model)
         (a) ideological decision sharply defined for voters
         (b) cabinet govt with relatively unchecked power

Table 7-1: Elections in the United Kingdom Since 1983

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<td>Seats</td>
<td>% Votes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>229</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberals*</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats*</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scottish Nationalists</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welsh Nationalists</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irish Nationalists</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irish Unionists</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>Referendum party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100.0%</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>650</td>
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</table>

Party Composition of Government in the 1990s:
   1979-97: Conservative single-party government
   1997-: Labour single-party government

*The Social Democrats and the Liberal's formed an electoral pact—the Alliance—in 1979 and 1983; the two parties subsequently
merged under the name Liberal Democrats.

Source: The sources used for these results and all others reported in this chapter are Mackie and Rose (1991, 1997), the Political
Data Yearbook, and for the most recent results, various national and international websites.

b. Sweden
   (1) Description:
      (a) Major Parties: the players
      (b) Relative Strengths:
      (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time
   (2) Key differences from the UK
(a) Soc Dems much more successful than Lab
(b) Soc Dems not quite monop of left–small but persistent comm party
(c) Moderates quite far from monopoly non-soc opposition
   i) Liberals–center-type libs
   ii) Center Party–agrarian
   iii) Christian Democrats–newer
(d) Rel. recent strength Ecology Party & New Dem (rt, protest)

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<td>43.8</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>36.6</td>
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<td>Center party</td>
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<td>5.1</td>
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<td>Christian Democrats</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
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<td>Moderate (Conservative)</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
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<td>New Democracy</td>
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<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>Others</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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Party Composition of Government in the 1990s:
1982-91: Social Democratic single-party government
1991-94: Coalition of Moderates, Liberals, Center, & Christian Democrats
1994-: Social Democratic single-party government

(c) Germany
(1) Description:
   (a) Major Parties: the players
   (b) Relative Strengths:
   (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time
(2) Key differences from the UK
   (a) relatively strong position of FDP; it more “conservative” than UK Liberals; sec. opp. to Cath. pol. rather than lib. opp. to sec. conserv.
   (b) CDU/CSU=Christian-Dem not secular conservative party
      i) gen’ly more receptive to social justice concerns→somewhat more centrist on econ.
      ii) gen’ly more emph. moral issues & more conserv soc pol, esp. if churches take stance
      iii) CSU is the more Catholic & socially conservative of two
   (c) SPD was one of most radical in 19th C, one of most moderate now
      i) excluded for its extremism pre-’66 Bad Godesberg commit. to free-mrkt & NATO
      ii) post-’66 increasingly de-ideologized, ↑ly pro-sys, & toward consensual politics
   (d) TRIANGULAR POLITICS: CDU/CSU–FDP–SPD, how do they ally on different sorts of issues?
(3) Changes in the 80s & 90s
   (a) Greens–near threshold since 80s; beginning to affect govt’l coalition patterns.
(b) 1990 Unification: 12 mill. new, presumably volatile voters, originally mostly to CDU & FDP benefit, recently turned against them. Why?

(c) Greens allying related soc moves, becoming more effectively org’d to compete

(d) Die Republikaner—not yet parl. player, but disturbing coupled w/ rising soc strife

(e) Politikverdrossenheit—disillusionment w/ politics

### Table 7.3: Elections in United Germany since 1990

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<td>Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU)</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>246</td>
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<td>Social Democrats (SPD)</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>40.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Free Democrats (FDP)</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greens*</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td>Democratic Socialists (PDS)</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>Republicans</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>German Peoples Union (DVU)</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
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<td>662</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>669</td>
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**Party Composition of Government in the 1990s:**

- **1982–93:** Coalition of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats
- **1998–:** Coalition of Social Democrats and Greens

*Includes (West German) Greens and (East German) Alliance ’90/Greens in 1990.

### Netherlands

1. **Description:**
   - (a) Major Parties: the players: PvdA, CDA, VVD
   - (b) Relative Strength: 1/3+1/3+1/5+ smaller, episodic players
   - (c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time

2. **Triangular + small party complications**

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<td>2.1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>People’s Party</td>
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<td>Christian Democrats</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Socialists</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Includes (West German) Greens and (East German) Alliance ’90/Greens in 1990.
e. Italy (pre-1994)

(1) Description:
(a) Maj Prt: MSI-Lib-Rep-DC-PSDI-PSI-PCI+ #smaller
(b) Rel Str: DC 1/3, PCI 1/3
(c) Types govt & time pattern

(2) More fractionalized & polarized than most other sys (nearest was FR IVth)

(3) Apparent Changes
(a) Major Parties: AN-Lega-Forza-Centro-PSI-Greens-PDS-Rifond, + Rete
(b) Relative Strengths: roughly even left-right blocks
(c) Describe types of govt & their general pattern through time (so far steady alternation: RtBlck-LftBlck-RtBlck...)

f. France

(1) 4th: PCF (.25)–PSF (.2)–Rad (.1)–Cath MRP (.25)–Gauls (.2)–Pouj (.1) + small

(2) 5th Republic: PCF–PS–UDF–RPR, + smaller
(a) Two-bloc system: what facilitated the change?
(b) Shift in balance of strength within each bloc
(c) Front National, Generation Ecologie, Les Verts

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<td></td>
<td>% Votes</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<td>10.3</td>
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<td>Social party (PS)</td>
<td>10.7</td>
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<td>Union for March Democracy (UDC)</td>
<td>16.6</td>
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<td>19.1</td>
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<td>Other</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
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<td>National Front (FN)</td>
<td>9.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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Party Composition of Government in the 1980s:
1982-4: Coalition of Social party and Left Parties
1986: Coalition of Right and the Republican, Union for March Democracy
1995: Coalition of Social party, Left Radicals, Communist party, Greens and Church

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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1988</td>
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<td>30.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
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</table>

g. Spain

(1) early volatility & flux, ill-defined loose alliances
(2) early dom by Suarez’ UnionDemCtr => broad Ctr-Rt & Ctr-Lft coals
(3) collapses about ‘82, replaced by PSOE dom w/ right in frag’d disarray
(4) Emerging system: PCE+PSOE+smaller lefts vs. PP (sec cons) + PC (people’s coal, loose lib-cath-cons coal) + bunch of regional parties
3. Uniformity & Diversity
   a. **Maj commonality**: tend to Lft-Rt competition, occas. excepts dom’d by cntr
   b. **Important Differences**:
      (1) location of liberals:
         (a) Egalitarian (center-left): e.g., UK Liberal Democrats
         (b) Libertarian (center-right): e.g., German FDP or Italian PLI
      (2) whether maj lft or, more rarely, rt party can govern alone
      (3) strongly structured v. loose/fragmented govt’l alliances
      (4) Degree of party discipline
   c. **Nature of Left-Right Competition**:
      (1) Lft wrkng-class prtys: common hist origins both maj strands (Soc, Comm)
      (2) Right middle/upper-class parties: more variegated origins & politics
         (a) religious v. secular conservatives
         (b) rural/farming v. industrial/service
         (c) some rightist cultural linguistic, subcultural, regional
      (3) Complications arising: New Lft & New Rt & new issues
   d. **Conflict within Left & Right**
      (1) Soc/Comm & Right/Far-Right more usually bitter enemies than allies
      (2) Systems w/ much elect strength at extremes tend⇒ centrists multiprty coals
      (3) Growing Disillusionment w/ Politics⇒anti-party parties
         (a) sources of this trend?
         (b) effects of this trend?
   e. **Other Dimensions of Party Politics**
      (1) Other cleavage lines: religion, cultural/ethnic/linguistic, mat/post-mat
      (2) Within broad rubric of Left-Right Competition: soc & econ dim’s

B. **Size & Growth Welfare State by prty sys/govt pattern**
<table>
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<th>CTRY</th>
<th>TYPICAL GOVERNING PATTERNS:</th>
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<td>US</td>
<td>Alternation Rep-Dem in Presidency</td>
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<td>Dem Domination in Legis., until recently</td>
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<td>JA</td>
<td>Lib Dem (LDP) Dominant until recently</td>
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<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>Alt. CDU/CSU+FDP v. SDP+FDP, C+F dom ’82-98; CDU+FDP v. SDP+Gr</td>
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<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Alternation PS &amp; PCF -- RPR &amp; UDF</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>DC-led in coal w/ PSI-PRI-PSDL-PLI or subset thereof until recently</td>
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<td>Last 3 alternations: Lega-Allianza-Forza -- PDS + various left</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Alternation Cons -- Lab, former dominated 1979-97</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Alternation Cons -- Lib, recent upheaval leaves questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Pattern of SPO (Soc) &amp; OVP (ChrDem) coal broken in 1966 by</td>
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<td>Alternation SPO -- OVP, then SPO dom 70-86, 82-86 w/ FPO (Lib)</td>
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<td>Returns to SPO--OVP coal in 1986</td>
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<td>BE</td>
<td>Partial Alternation Coalitions: CVP (ChrDem), BSP (Soc), PLP (Lib)</td>
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<td>Three smaller ethnic parties players since 1974</td>
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<td>DE</td>
<td>Alternation SocDem -- some subset of Cons/Agr/3 Lib Parties/CD</td>
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<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>Fluid Partial Alternation Ranging from SocDem or even Comms to Cons</td>
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<td>GR</td>
<td>Alternation PASOK -- New Dem (each has occasional coal allies)</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>Alternation Fianna Fail -- Fine Gael &amp; Labour until 1989</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>now FF or FG with Lab or Lib</td>
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<tr>
<td>NE</td>
<td>Fluid Partial Alternation across the board until ’78, since then appears</td>
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<td>Alternation b/w CDA (ChrDem)+VVD (LIB) &amp; CDA+PvdA (SocDem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Alternation DNA (Soc) -- Cons+Lib+Agr+ChrDem, more DNA than other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>PSOE domination 1983 to recently, 1977-83 fluid</td>
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<td>SW</td>
<td>SAP (soc) dom until 1976, alternation SAP -- Lib+Agr+Cons since</td>
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<tr>
<td>SZ</td>
<td>Practically fixed coalition Soc-Lib-Cons-Agr</td>
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<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>Lib-Nat coal dominates through 1972, alternates with ALP (lab) since</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>Alternation Lib (lab) -- Nat (cons); until recently?</td>
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<th>CTRY</th>
<th>Trans % GDP</th>
<th>GovPartisan</th>
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<th>GovType</th>
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Regression Equation: Trans Govt = 15.620 -1.08GP + .93Hnty
s.e. (.616) [.583]
t= -1.753 1.607

R2 0.342 t= -0.585
C. Party Families (GLM ch. 8)
   1. Definition/Grouping Characteristics
      a. Origins
      b. Links they form among selves, w/in & across countries
      c. Similarity of (broad) policy stances

   2. Families of the Left
      a. Social Democrats (↑ support or unchanged)
      b. Comms (↑↑ in most, recent IT except but not so comm any more)
      c. New Left (↑ in most places, soc dems usu moving to absorb...)
      d. Greens (↑ or unchanged support in most places)
3. Families of the Center & Right

a. Christian Dems (unchanged in most places, until recently)

b. Secular Conservatives (unchanged in most places, until recent)

c. Libs (most, but some CD's/SecCons moving to absorb) (Explain?)

d. Agrarian/Rural (unchanged support)

e. Far Right (support in some places)

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Note: Mean electoral support is reported only for the 1950s and 1960s.
4. Other
   a. regionalist, nationalist (unchanged or ⤠ support)
   b. miscellaneous, protest (⤠ support in most places)

   **TABLE B1: Mean Electoral Support for the Nine Party Families in the 1960s**

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   **Note:** Greece, Portugal, and Spain did not become fully democratic until the mid-1970s, hence data are only for the 1980s and 1990s.

   *This table reflects the party families as classifications in the late 1980s and early 1990s.*

5. Patterns of Partisan Competition among Families

   a. Christian-Democrat-led Right
      (1) left strong, united (AU, GE)
      (2) left strong, divided (IT)
      (3) left weak, united or divided (BE, LU, NE, SZ)
   b. Secular-Conservative-led Right
      (1) left strong, united (UK)
      (2) left strong, divided (Fin, Ice, Fra)
   c. Fragmented Right, Left strong, united (Den, Nor, Swe)

L. Parties & Party Systems II: Analyses

   A. GLM, “Inside Political Parties,” (Mair) ch. 10

      1. The Standard “Basic Party Organization”
         a. **Party Mems** belong in local, geog’ly based units: **branches**
         b. Branches usu some role in select cand’s & send **delegates** to prty’s **ann conference**, in principle: final decision-mkng body
         c. Ann conf usu elect most or all mems of party’s **ntnl exec** which runs party b/w conf’s & adjudicates internal disputes
         d. Exec usu selects, & party employs, **permanent prty bureauc.**
         e. The **parliamentary group** = party’s MPs
         f. [To which, add: **prty’s actual & potential elect supporters**]

      2. Partial Exceptions to the Standard BPO
         a. Some parties highly **factionalized**:
            (1) divided into tendencies or grps w/ often highly personalized leadership
            (2) US, FR, IT, & JA parties are or have been highly fractionalized
            (3) Often these factions have own organizational structure &; in the extreme, operate nearly as parties themselves
         b. Esp. in fed sys (SZ, US, CA, GE, AL) provincial (state) branches often considerable decision-making
c. Comm ptys are/were usu org’ed by democratic centralism
   (1) More centralized than democratic
   (2) Same written struct, but party exec final decision-maker
   (3) Some argue this partly responsible for ↓ in mem & elect support for most

3. The usual battle lines:
   a. Party activists who emph adherence to ideals that 1st prompted joining
   b. Party legislators who, as MPs, often must compromise ideologically to win elect, to enter govt, &
      to pass legislation
   c. Party’s actual & potential elect supporters, & perhaps mems if mass-mem prty so many mems
      not activist, judge battle.

4. Membership
   a. Most voters for prty, even those reg’ly vote 1 prty not mems
   b. Complications in calc mem & compare cross ctrys & prty
      (1) Some parties do not know themselves how many mems
      (2) Even if know, some reluctant to reveal true membership
         (a) Parties have obvious reasons to inflate their count
         (b) Branches similar reasons to inflate report to party conf/exec
      (3) Some parties have affiliated org’s whose members are automatically party mems (e.g., UK Lab
         & trade unions)
      (4) Rules in some pol sys encourage party mem (e.g., US primaries)
   c. Comparison of mem levels & trends (Table 10-1)

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   Source: For fifteen of the nineteen countries, data relate to 1985–98 and are from Mair and van Biezen,
p. 12. For Iceland, the figure relates to 1987 (Hardarson, p. 145). For Luxembourg, the figure relates to the
late 1980s (Jacobs, pp. 235–47). For Malta, data are from party web sites (www.mlpl.org.mt/struct.htm,
sites.waldorum.net.mt/alternative/frames.htm), and information supplied by the PN. For Sweden, the figure

d. Socio-demographics of party members
   (1) Working class
(a) Less rep among prty mems than voters (esp. if exclude union auto mem)
(b) This increasingly true as ascend party hierarchy.
(c) becoming increasingly true over time also (becoming still less well-rep’d)
(d) true even lft prty’s (where white-collar pub-sect wrkrs ’ly import many places)

(2) **Women & minorities** under-rep’d also, but trends in opp (↑) direct.

e. What members do:
   (1) Elect del’s to conf & so indirectly choose party leadership
   (2) Mobilize electorate [define?], esp. at election times
   (3) Once, being prty mem ≈ belong to sep subcult, w/ own news, clubs, soc events, & services for mems only. Faded & Fading [Why? Implic’s?]

5. Important Decisions within the Party
a. Types of party: Cadre v. Mass Parties (Duverger)
b. Resolution of disputes & conflict w/in party: over policy & over spoils (e.g., *lotizzazione*). Specifically differ over:
   (1) **Party Manifesto** [define] & **Party Program** [define]
   (2) **Select party leadership**: often, but not always, synonymous w/...
   (3) **Select cands & cand order** [most important thing prty’s do]

6. **Candidate Selection**
a. Except FI, GE, & NO, where ntl law, how cands selected decided by prty’s
b. In Eur, prty mems choose cands, not ordinary prty voters (e.g., US primary)
c. Two basic methods of candidate selection
   (1) Convention system [define] (p. 255, first paragraph):
      (a) Party mems @ constituency send delegates to local nom. convent. to pick cands
      (b) From as few as 1-2% prty mems to (rare) >33% participate in this
   (2) National-executive system [define] (p. 255, 2nd para):
      (a) In most places, ntl exec right to veto local cand-select, but used rarely
      (b) In FR, IT, MA, PO, exec chooses cands directly, some w/ local rt to challenge
   (3) GR: prty leader (esp. PASOK’s Papandreou) chooses cands person’ly; SP & perhaps PO, strong but lesser roles for very cntrl leadership also
d. **Consequences of the selection processes**
   (1) Incumbs extremely high probability re-selected in all sys [why?]
   (2) Cands in all sys always, except UK sometimes, have some local ties
   (3) In MMD sys, cand list almost always balanced [Define. Why?]
   (4) Prty activist & esp. leadership control selection ⇒ ↑ prty disc.
   e. ⇒trade-off: strong prty (disciplined, responsible) v. democracy w/in prties

7. **Parties & Money: unlike US, most dems almost all cands’ money from party** ⇒ discipline

a. **Sources of party income**
   (1) Internal Sources
      (a) Membership fees (about 1/4 of total)
      (b) MP’s salary (up to 10% is “requested” to be “re-donated”)
      (c) Fund-raising events
      (d) Party shops, banks, & newspapers (but many lose $ now)
   (2) External Sources
      (a) Interest-group backing (in many cases there are no, or only ineffective, laws to limit or requiring party disclosure funding sources)
      (b) Individual backing (ditto re: requiring party disclosure funding sources)
      (c) Pub assistance ($ & in-kind (media time), $ usu. in rough prop to elect strength)

b. **Arguments for or against state-funding**
   (1) For (evidence scarce, but what’s avail gen’ly supports)
      (a) Reduces reliance on interest-group funding
(b) Evens playing field: not all supporters equally able to finance parties
(c) Parties essential to dem=perform pub serv & so should be pub funded
(2) Against (evidence scarce, but also supports)
  (a) Pub fund supports status quo as funds existing prtys only [ & usu. % to prev size]
  (b) Pub fund ↓ prty incentive to raise own money & so to recruit new activist mems
  (c) Campaigns becoming ↓ly costly, so public funding will too

8. Trends & future (in terms of party-org. form):
   b. Epstein: ↓ mass media & campaign cost make Mass Parties less ideal than parties seeking few big
      donors (corps, unions, etc.): “contagion from right”
   c. Kirchheimer: w/ ↓ middle class & success welfare state, &, Epstein added, w/ ↓ individualism, type
      of party best suited to competition ↓ly “catch-all”
   d. Sjöblom & Rantala further: ↓ly, party mems=liability, not asset, & so parties ↓ly rely on strategists
      & TV, not mems

9. Final thoughts:
   a. One might join party for 3 reasons (Clark & Wilson)
      (1) Material: some tangible reward (patronage, position)
      (2) Solidarity: social contact & sense comradeship (party as like-minded club)
      (3) Purposive: desire to advance certain policy goals
   b. What think re: party mems lrgly depends on what think trends in saliency of these goals & impacts
      of having mem’s predominantly w/ such ambitions

B. “Party Sys & Elect Outcomes” Powell II, ch. 5

1. Strong (weak) prty sys contrib to good (poor) democratic perform
   a. Disagreement on how to recognize such strength
      (1) Partly reflects differing emph on participation, stability, & order in defining “good” democratic
          performance
      (2) Partly reflects differing theories about what ⇒ such perform
   b. “One line of thought emphasizes value of a de-fractionalized, two-party, ‘centrist’ party system that
      will aggregate citizens’ resources behind govtal majorities responsive to citizen pressures.
   c. Another…emphasizes expressive, mobilizing system of parties that will pull all major factions in
      society into its representative, democ decision-making institutions, co-opting dissent &
      accommodating demands that might otherwise turn to violence” (p. 74)

2. Three broad types of systems advocated
   a. “Aggregative” party systems
      (1) Characteristics
         (a) 2 or small # parties, each capable of achieving leg maj
         (b) Centrist tendencies, not too stark alternatives
         (c) Parties’ support cuts across social groups
      (2) [Examples; Effects; Pros & Cons]
   b. “Representative” party systems
      (1) Characteristics
         (a) More parties representing a broader range of groups
         (b) Clearer rep by these parties of those specific grps
         (c) Accommodating leadership, willing to compromise & coal.
         (d) Majorities avoided
         (e) Participatory
      (2) [Examples; Effects; Pros & Cons]
   c. “Responsible” party systems
      (1) Characteristics
         (a) Two parties, alternation in (majority) govt
(b) Parties w/ closer ties to (large) social grps than “agg” sys
(c) Centralized, disciplined parties representing clearly distinct, ideolog. sharp alts
(2) [Examples; Effects; Pros & Cons]
d. Notes:
(1) Almost no one advocates fract sys w/ weak tie to soc grps
(2) All agree that a fractionalization & type of alignments with groups the keys; disagree & what’s desirable therein
(3) All agree that extreme, anti-sys parties detrimental; disagree on what to do about them or about forces that might support them: Exclude or Coopt
(4) Most agree that elect volatility a sign of a weak system
   (a) Symptom of citizen dissatisfaction
   (b) Make stable govt & policy difficult

3. Summary of hypotheses (Tab 5.1)
4. Summary of Empirical Findings (Tab 5.6-7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party system attributes</th>
<th>Performance Expectations</th>
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<tr>
<td>Multiparty system</td>
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<td>Strong party linkage to social</td>
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<tr>
<td>groups</td>
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<td>Strong support for extremist</td>
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<tr>
<td>parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Volatility of support for parties</td>
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</table>

(a) The arguments for multiparty systems assume that such systems reflect strong linkages between social groups and political parties and apply only to that condition.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Dimension</th>
<th>Party-system attributes</th>
<th>Major environmental advantages</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-party Fractionalization</td>
<td>Strong party-group linkages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting turnout, 1958–1976</td>
<td>Correlation: 0.30, R^2 = 52%</td>
<td>Correlation: 0.58, R^2 = 74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive durability, 1967–1976</td>
<td>Correlation: 0.71, R^2 = 74%</td>
<td>Correlation: 0.48, R^2 = 74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority control, 1967–1976</td>
<td>Correlation: 0.37, R^2 = 22%</td>
<td>Correlation: 0.17, R^2 = 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low rioting, 1958–1976</td>
<td>Correlation: 0.48, R^2 = 81%</td>
<td>Correlation: 0.46, R^2 = 81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Low voting, 1967–1976**
- Correlation: 0.28, R^2 = 69%
- Correlation: 0.43, R^2 = 69%
- Correlation: 0.18, R^2 = 69%
- Correlation: 0.80, R^2 = 69%
- Correlation: 0.29, R^2 = 69%
- Correlation: 0.30, R^2 = 69%

**Low deaths, 1958–1976**
- Correlation: 0.57, R^2 = 76%
- Correlation: 0.62, R^2 = 76%
- Correlation: 0.06, R^2 = 76%
- Correlation: 0.65, R^2 = 76%
- Correlation: 0.72, R^2 = 76%
- Correlation: 0.37, R^2 = 76%

- Correlation: 0.40, R^2 = 62%
- Correlation: 0.53, R^2 = 62%
- Correlation: 0.03, R^2 = 62%
- Correlation: 0.46, R^2 = 62%
- Correlation: 0.72, R^2 = 62%
- Correlation: 0.41, R^2 = 62%

---

a. Regression entries are standardized regression coefficients. For consistency, only the cases with all party variables measured are used. Including the missing countries (Ceylon, Costa Rica, Greece, Turkey, and Uruguay) does not substantially change results. Voting turnout and riot and deaths are 1967–1976 based on 23 cases; riots and deaths for 1958–1967 based on 23 cases. Executive durability and control equations based on 17 parliamentary systems (see table 4.1).<ref>Appendix for party-system averages.</ref>

b. Sources as in table 5.6. Fractionalization and extremist voting measures are the averages from all elections in the 1965–1976 period. See <ref>Appendix for party-system averages.</ref>

c. Population size and GNP/capita are logged. Compulsory voting measure described in Chapter 6, table 6.1. Ethnicity from table 3.4.

d. Extreme outliers on riots and deaths have been truncated to the ninetieth percentile values to prevent bias. A log transformation yields similar results.

---

**C. Lijphart, Chapter 5, Party Systems**

1. Two-Party v. Multiparty Systems key distinction
2. 2-Party supposedly 2 direct & 1 indirect advantage
   a. Direct:
      (1) Voters clear choice b/w two alternative govs & sets policies
      (2) Moderating influence as parties agglomerate & compete for median
      (3) BUT, these somewhat contradict! (N.b., a ≈ UK; b ≈ US)
   b. Indirect: Nec for stable, single-party maj govs & effect pol-mkng
3. Prior Classification Schemes: How to Count Which Parties?
   a. Sartori: size & political relevance parties
      (1) = seat winners only
      (2) = those w/ "coalition potential" or "blackmail potential" (i.e., players)
   b. Blondel: size & configuration of set of sizes ⇒ 4 possibilities
      (1) Two-party (Examples)
      (2) 2.5 party (Examples)
      (3) Multiparty w/ dominant (Examples)
      (4) Multiparty w/o dominant (Examples)
4. Summary Measure: Effective Number Parties \( N = \frac{1}{\sum s_i^2} \)
5. Complications: Closely Allied Parties & Factionalized Parties
   a. Usual Rule: if calls self party, is party
   b. Closely Allied Parties: "so tightly twinned that look more 1 than 2" E.g.? Criteria? [below]
      Lijphart's Compromise?
      (1) Compete for votes?
      (2) Cooperate in legislature? To degree that form 1 caucus?
      (3) Always Coalition in or out together?
      (4) Time: Durable such alliance? [L splits the diff for 5 pairs prty]
      (1) Such extreme lack cohesion that very unclear unitary actor at all appropriate
      (2) Evidence that some effects like multiple parties, but counting each faction or even each org’d
      faction ⇒ unrealistically extreme counts.
6. Data: Table 5.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.2</th>
<th>Average, lowest, and highest effective numbers of parliamentary parties resulting from elections in thirty-six democracies and the number of elections on which these averages are based, 1945–96</th>
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<tbody>
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</table>

7. Issue Dimensions of Party Systems
   a. How to Measure
      (1) Gauge contents of party programs, supporters preferences, & policies in govt, but each w/ care
b/c problematic. **Discuss.**

(2) Differences b/w parties, not w/in, b/c looking @ issue dim’s of party sys
   (a) Between relevant parties (as above) only.
   (b) Durable (as above)

b. Seven Identifiable Dimensions Across 36 Democracies
   (1) Socioeconomic: most important, present in all *(characterize Lft/Rt)*.
      (a) **Evidence**: Size govt, inequality, unemp, infl, & educ, health, soc welf spend
      (b) May have declined some since 70s, but still universal & strong
   (2) Religion: present in >½, often high salience, but ↓ in most places
   (3) Cultural-Ethnic: present & high in most *plural societies*, some *semi-plural*
   (4) Urban-Rural: in few, mostly faded from prty sys (partys rename as move)
   (5) (Democratic) Regime Support:
      (a) places where sizable comm existed, but mostly faded
      (b) not usu present in developed dems
   (6) Foreign Policy: present in a few obvious places among dev’d democracies
   (7) Materialist/Post-materialist: participatory democracy & environment; only in more dev’d countries & only recently

8. “Data”: Table 5.3
Table 5.3  Issue dimensions of thirty-six democratic party systems, 1945–96

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Socio-economic</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Urban-rural</th>
<th>Regime support</th>
<th>Foreign policy</th>
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Total 34.0 16.5 9.5 4.0 4.0 8.5 2.5 77.0

Note: H indicates an issue dimension of high salience and M a medium-salience dimension.

9. Reasons to Expect Link # Issue Dems & # Partys
   a. Practically by definition, & hard for 2 parties more than 1 dim
   b. But also (societal) issue dims ⇒ potential bases partys
   c. Data: Figure 5.1
D. “Party Systems & Structures of Competition,” Mair, ch3 LNN
1. Summary: “...whole notion prty sys centers on assumpt that stable struct partisan competition exists [in elects & for control of govt]. Structs of comp as closed ( & predictable) or open ( & unpredictable):
   a. patterns alternation in govt,
   b. degree of innovation or persistence in processes govt form, &
   c. range of parties gaining access to govt” (p. 84).
2. Brief Intellect History Party-Sys Classification Schemes
   a. Duverger (1954): # parties, esp. 2-prty v. multi-prty sys
      (1) 2-party systems argued to foster/enhance:
         (a) single-party govt
         (b) accountability
(c) alternation in govt
(d) moderate, centripetal competition

(2) Multiparty systems argued to...
(a) ...foster coalition govs
(b) ...prevent voters from direct voice in govt formation
(c) ...not ensure alternation in govt
(d) ...can foster extremist, ideological confrontations narrowly based pol prts

(3) Excepts fairly common, but, broadly speaking, all roughly empirically true

b. Dahl (1966): competitive strategies parties adopt at elect & legis levels
(1) Strictly competitive systems
(2) Cooperative-competitive systems
(3) Coalescent-competitive systems
(4) Strictly coalescent systems

c. Blondel (1968): # parties & relative size (later, ideological placement too)
(1) 2-party systems
(2) 2.5-party systems
(3) Multiparty systems with a dominant party
(4) Multiparty systems without a dominant party

d. Rokkan (1968): more disagg. of multiparty-sys category
(1) 2 + a small third-party systems (UK, Germany)
(2) 1 large party v. coalition (Swe, Nor, maybe Ire)
(3) 3 or more relatively even competitors (Netherlands)

e. Sartori (‘76): fractionalization & polarization, anti-sys parties
(1) Types:
(a) 2-prty, ideologically polarized (S considered none such)
(b) 2-party, moderate ideological distance (US, UK)
(c) Moderate Pluralism: multiparty, mod ideol distance (Den)
(d) Polarized Pluralism: multiparty, ideol polarized (Italy)
(e) Dominant-Party systems: Japan (until recently?; Ind, Mex)

(2) Virtues of Sartori’s scheme
(a) most comprehensive scope & depth of available typologies
(b) proven utility in variety comparative studies, theoretical & empirical
(c) explicit concern compet. patterns & prts’ interax, more directly w/ prty syst
(d) highlights effects systemic charact’s on prty strategy, elect behave, & outcomes

(3) Δ since Sartori’s writings that maybe problematic for theoretical approach
(a) some see trend toward & thus crowding of moderate pluralism category
(b) some see ¶ polarized pluralism, since, by Sartori’s def, that requires anti-sys parties on both sides (rt & lft) & most such disappearing, esp. left

3. Mair’s Three Distinguishing Characteristics of Different Types of Party Competition for Govt

a. Degree of Alternation in Govt
(1) Wholesale alternation
(a) single-party v. single-party
(b) single-party v. coalition
(c) coalition v. coalition
(2) Partial Alternation
(3) Non-alternation
(4) [Consider Powell’s 3 aspects of dem perf (earlier book), & also account., mandate, & rep delegation (later one); how might variation in degree of alternation in govt affect those? ...affect policy and/or policy patterns?]

b. Stability & Consistency of Govt Alternatives
(1) DEF: degree to which alternative govt formulas (i.e., combo of parties in govt) known or predictable before-hand (i.e., stable & consistent)
(2) [Consider Powell’s...; how might variation...?]

c. Range of Parties as Potential Govtal Actors
(1) Def: to which access to office widely/narrowly dispersed
(2) N.b., what matters: whether each party viewed by others as potential govt participant, not whether actually legitimate potential participant in abstract
(3) [Consider Powell’s...; how might variation...?]

4. Combine to one dimension: party sys openness or closedness
   a. Definitions:
      (1) **Closed**: highly predictable, little or no change over time in range governing alternatives or pattern of alternation, & with new & /or “outsider” parties finding entry difficult
      (2) **Open**: highly unpredictable, w/ varying alternation patterns, freq. & /or large shifts in composition alternatives, & relatively easy access to new parties & few or no real “outsiders”

   b. Closedness or Openness depends on...
      (1) Parties’ ideologies & govt-formation strategies (e.g., DCI)
      (2) Parties’ electoral strategies of parties (e.g., Fianna Fail)
      (3) [n.b., electoral & govt-formation strategies not so separable]
      (4) Closure : depends heavily on norms of competition among parties & so requires time to establish => new dems open by definition, takes time to “close” them: a process of “structural consolidation” (e.g.: Gre, Por, Spa)

5. Party Systems & Electoral Outcomes
   a. From this view, party-sys Δ can occur w/o Δ in struct of electoral support for parties & v.v.
   Mair’s 4 examples:
      (1) Denmark’s “Earthquake” Election in 1973 (data below)
         (a) pre-’73: 5 parties=93% vote; ‘73: 5 new parties, & old 5 ↓ to 65% vote, + new entrants include Comm’s & rt-wng Progress Party so polar ↓ too
         (b) some time before any govt able to amass majority parl support; typ. govt duration ↓; & elects called more freq’ly;
         (c) but all this somewhat true before, & on Mair’s 3 dims (° & stability alt & range parties allowed govt access), DEN was & remained quite open
(2) Italy’s Elect-Sys Δ & Party Electoral-Support Volatility in 1994
   (a) total electoral volatility 37.2%, an Italian record & higher than almost any West European election 1885-1989
   (b) many new parties & most old reconstituted (renamed): virtually no party 1994 parl same name or form as 1987
   (c) polarization Δ radically also as both PCI becomes yet-more moderate left-wing PDS & far-right MSI becomes a (purportedly) reformed AN
   (d) But, by Mair’s def, party-sys Δ occurred only if pattern & type govt alternation Δ accordingly. This case, seems so:
   (e) New sys major players seem coalescing into coalitional lft-rt camps as opposed to old DC-dom. centrist multiparty coals: [AN-Lega-Forza]-Centro-[PSI-Greens-PDS]-Rifondazione, + Rete
(3) Canadian Electoral Watershed in 1993
(a) tot elect vol: 42%; Conserve’s only 16% of vote (lowest since ‘49) & 2 seats (↓ from 169 before), Reform & Bloc Québécois, 2 new parties, gained many seats
(b) New govt, though, was Liberals, thus, pending next Δ of govt, alternation pattern so-far preserved: Progressive Conservatives -- Liberals

(4) Ireland: govt-alternation pattern Δ in 1989 & 1993
(a) Pre-‘89 alt. pattern: (Fianna Fáil) -- (Fine Gael + Labour): FF’s refusal to enter coals=an electoral strategy aimed to keep self only prty able to offer 1-party govt & to keep Labour’s govt options to 1: ally w/ FG
(b) in 1989, FF abandoned strategy, choosing to ally w/ new rightish lib prty, Prog Dems, rather than go into opposition as before when lost majority
(c) in 1993, they further erased any claim to credibility of old strategy by allying w/ Labour (formerly always opposing party) to form new coal govt
(d) Clearly, party sys Δ, but electoral volatility only 7.8% in 1989 election

b. Mair concludes that elect sys can be frozen by 3 factors:
   (1) Social structure (the Lipset & Rokkan model)
   (2) Institutions: elect sys & org’l efforts of estab’d parties
   (3) [new:] structure of party competition & govt formation
      (a) closure of party systems helps “freeze” electoral alignments
      (b) which ⇒ Δ prty sys, by Mair def., can destabilize electoral alignments
      (c) Examples:
         i) Italy: PCI becomes PDS, MSI becomes AN => new electoral alignments
         ii) Ireland: FF chooses coal w/ PD ’89 & then Lab in ’93 => new elect aligns

   c. Summary: “structure of competition, compet for govt esp., may impose major constraint on voter choice & hence act to stabilize elect aligns. Thus, voters not simply expressing pref’s for individual prty [or cand]; rather, albeit not always to same ° in diff prty sys, & this itself is important cross-national (& cross-institutional) to explain, but also expressing pref’s for potential govts. & in much like how shift in range prty sys on offer can undermine estab’d pref’s, so too can shift in range governing options, & hence in struct compet, undermine estab’d pref’s & promote instab” (pp. 103-4).

d. Finally, Mair perceives some generally shared trends suggesting an increasing openness of party systems
   (1) Many places ↑ range of acceptable governing parties in past 2 decades
   (2) Many also ↑ set of coalitional permutations govern in recent times
   (3) ↑ prty-sys openness⇒↑ elect instab⇒↑ uncertainty at multiple levels

**Week 9: Voting, Participation, & Representation**

Pt 1a: Voting: Partisanship & Partisan Representation

LI. Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, ch. 7-8 + ch. 13 in LNN
A. Broad Themes:
   1. Parties’ Positions (ch. 7):
      a. Voter perceptions thereof core of vote choice
      b. Party efforts to shape & maintain that image
      c. Not of equal importance/balance across systems
FIGURE 7.1.
THE SOCIOPOLITICAL SPACE IN THE UNITED STATES

2. Partisan & Structural Voting (ch. 8, ch. 13 in LNN)
   a. 2 prominent Δ’s in link SES to partisan voting
(1) Traditional cleavages (esp. class & religion) transformed & weakened as predictors inds’ votes
(2) Changing bases ideological conflict: ↑“post-mat”
b. These producing general ↓“issue-based” voting
   (1) Less based soc’ly pre-determ’d & struct’d compet.
   (2) A new calculus of electoral decisions
      (a) Individualistic
      (b) Varying issue positions & weights thereupon

B. The post-war era through late 1960s to 1970s
   1. Party competition & voting patterns structured around social divisions within a polity
      b. Expected to persist because...
         (1) Such cleavage structures long-lasting: underlying conflicts persist & grps developed collective ID
         (2) Universal suffrage largely completed: new parties tend to form (only) when new grps enter electorate
         (3) Political rules made by & so favor estab’d parties
         (4) Estab’d party strategies: often try to isolate supporters from outside appeals
         (5) Alignment w/ underlying social-structural groups advantageous to parties & voters [How?]
            (a) The gps so divided provided soc & pol reference & source of info for their members (voters)
            (b) Provide org’l struct, people, & pol. ally for parties
      c. Why were these divisions so potent?
         (1) Represented & (re-)produced deep ideol. divisions
            (b) Religion: conflict basic value-systems (rt & wrong)
         (2) Soc grps enabled parties to inst’lize support basis
            (a) Labor unions & firms provided org’l & people supp.
            (b) Ditto for churches
   C. General ↓ in sociologically determined vote
      1. Figs. pp. 172, 183-4 [n.b., usu. said post-‘68 or so, but seems pretty uniform since WWII to me]
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TRENDS IN CLASS VOTING

FIGURE 8.1

THE OVERALL LEVEL OF CLASS VOTING, 1990


NOTE: Values in parentheses are Cramer's V correlations. Respondents without a party preference are excluded from the calculation of correlations.
FIGURE 8.6
THE OVERALL LEVEL
OF VALUES VOTING, 1990


NOTE: Values in parentheses are Cramer's V
  correlations. Respondents without a party
  preference are excluded from the calculation
  of correlations.

TABLE 8.4
VALUE PRIORITIES AND PARTY SUPPORT
(IN PERCENTAGES)

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NOTE: Value priorities are measured with the twelve-item index (see chapter 5).
2. Class-Voting Decline: Define; Explanations:
   a. Class = better def’d by 0 job auton & author
   b. ↑ middle class “salariat” & affluent blue-collar
   c. Edu. divide: skill v. unskill lab, hum-cap rich v. pr
   d. Sectoral: pub-priv; traded-non; serv-ind-agr
   e. Life-style differences: industrial v. yuppie

3. Religious Voting “Decline”: Def 2 types; Expl’s:
   a. Secularization: ↓ mem & attend; Ethical ind’uality
   b. Church/state, sec/rel conflict largely resolved

4. Other Key Social Divisions
   a. Region: Occasional, dramatic, but general ↓
   b. Urban/Rural & Center/Periphery:
      (1) Differences ↓ b/c transport & comm revolutions
      (2) But still-present agr-ind-service divide & lifestyle
   c. Race/Ethnicity
      (1) Prominent exception to general ↓,
      (2) But many societies still homog. or nearly so.

D. Gen’l explan’s (hypoth’s) for ↓ Struct. Vote
   1. Underlying conflicts increasingly resolved: N.b., 0 to which underlying conflicts “resolved” might explain relative decline of some types of struct voting & relative persistence or rise of others
   2. D’s pref’d explanation: struct’l & inst’l Δs = ↓ relev. rel’ly fixed soc char’s contemp elect pol
      a. Social cleavages still very relev. to those deeply enmeshed in them, but that’s fewer & fewer.
b. proportion of population characterized by:
   (1) “Fragmentation of life spaces” [Huh? Define]
   (2) partic, mem, involve “stable & bounded soc struct’s”
   (3) Lifestyles becoming †ly individualized & diverse

Social fluidity & individual mobility across structured divides? N.b., can explain relative † class & less † in religion & no † in race/ethnicity.

d. Parties contributed to & reinforced all this:
   (1) Seeking to accom struct & inst Δs w/in existing party struct, they eroded core estab’d images/reps
   (2) But not yet want commit to strng stands on new

   1. Define/Examples:
   2. How did/do they arise?
      a. † new issues benefits from † old: “open space” arg.
      b. ‟new issues cross-cut old ‡, weakening ability to divide: “emergence of cross-cutting issues” arg.
      c. Cit’s ev’where †ly demand † opp’s to part. more act’ly p-mkng: “further democratization of soc. & pol.”
      d. N.b., new issues appeal to exact grps †ly outside traditional struct’d & inst’lized cleavages: “† young, new middle class, educated, non-religious”
      e. [Other hypoths? esp. re: environmentalism, non-material problems †? † affluence? † education? cross-derivatives, i.e., Maslow’s hierarchy?]
      f. Not so “all new” divides, cleavage patterns:
         (1) Not all issues so terribly new, even if current prominence might be unprecedented.
         (2) Compared to struct’d ideologies underlying class & rel. cleaves, mat v. post-mat diffuse & imprecise: what besides novelty links these concerns?

F. Impact of all this change:
   1. † long-term partisan predispositions ⇒
      a. † episodic factors like current issues & image?
      b. † performance-based voting, like econ voting?
      c. † “cand-cntrd” pol [DEF; n.b. US more, Why?]
      d. † in “issue-voting”?
   2. Issue-voting:
      a. Define Issue-Voting:
      b. Harder to study systematically because:
         (1) Issues vary across elections & across individuals
         (2) Multiplicity of issues at all times
      c. Issues underlying old cleavages still here; new issues added thereto
   3. Takes time for, & it’s uncertain process by which, new basis for partisan competition can arise.
      a. Grps must org to represent & mobilize interested.
      b. Parties must establish positions, reputations, & images on those interests (in uncertain environ).
   4. New Politics orthogonal to old politics divides: Left v. Rt, Relig v. Sec (or Cath. v. Prot. etc.)
      a. New ‡ is, maybe, sustainable society & libertarian values v. conservative social values & struct’d life choices.
      b. [Is this another dimension? or more like new manifestation or replacement relig v. sec or combo rel-sec & econ?]
3. **Model=predictive success**: mod. usage predicts voter choices better than indvs themselves can!

---

**B. Party Identification (Party I.D.)**

1. **DEF:**
   a. Long-term, affective, psych. i.d. w/ pref’d pol prty
   b. Cumulative tally *[Bayesian updating & updated priors]*
2. To be **analytically relevant**, must be distinct from immediate voting preferences elect by elect
3. **Difficult comparative concept:**
   a. *partisanship* means diff things in diff contexts & distinction b/w party affinity & vote choice of variable clarity depending on elect sys, etc.
   b. Yet, voters do hold some enduring partisan allegiances that influence other percepts & opins
4. **Effects:**
   a. Psychological basis stable party alignments
   b. Influences more-proximate attitudes & behaviors

---

**C. Acquiring partisan identification (“Prty ID”)**

1. Acquired largely by an **early age**—primary school => parents & family environ play cntrl role
   a. *Via* explicit reinforce or subconscious internalize
   b. Corr. parent & child party ID very high (Tab 9.1)

---

**Figure 9.1 The Funnel of Causality Predicting Vote Choice**
Table 9.1  The Transmission of Parental Partisanship (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PARENTAL PARTY PREFERENCE</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child’s party preference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
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<td>21</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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Great Britain

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PARENTAL PARTY PREFERENCE</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>None</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child’s party preference</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>Liberal</td>
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<td>Conservative</td>
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<td>17</td>
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</table>

West Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PARENTAL PARTY PREFERENCE</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child’s party preference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>SPD</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Political Action Survey.

2. **Accum’d exper. party supp.** itself reinf. prty ID
   a. Prty ID ↑ w/ age, & esp. w/ contin. elect supp prty
   b. **⇒ unstable prty sys tend to weaken party ID**
   c. [Figure 9.2, note E. Germany, French 60+ group]
3. Summary: Partisanship formed early; Reinforced through life; evolves in response to exper., not quickly or easily; Prty ID more stable than opins on almost any set of issues except perhaps certain “moral” issues. [Bayesian update view.]

D. Tab 9.2: Partisanship more stable than vote pref’s in Europe as in US, but less so, Why?
1. **Type of voting**: candidate or party
2. **Freq. of voting**: more frequent voting facilitates distinguishing between partisan loyalty & vote

### E. Impact of partisanship

1. **=cues** for eval events, policies, prop’s, cands
   a. More broadly relevant than class or relig for this
   b. Reliance on partisanship in this way could be thought of as “satisficing”: a mental short-cut
   c. Some interesting findings:
      (1) Washington Post ‘fictitious act’ experiment
      (2) Partisanship also colors econ. expects [rational?]
   d. Strongest for cand image & govt perform, & like
2. **Party ID also mobilizes**: l’s propensity to vote & to perform other political activities [Why?]
3. Converse’s notion of Party ID Vote producing **“normal vote share”** for parties: vote-share when all other factors balance
4. Prty ID more easily countered in more prom. elects (e.g., pres elects v. off-year) [Why?]
5. Partisanship offers clear & low-cost info. voting cue: n.b., can only serve so if prty label provides info.
on likely policies–fail to maintain partisan rep eventually weaken prty ID among supporters

F. Partisan Dealignment [Fig 9.3]
1. Partisan align, like (social) struct voting, ↓
   a. esp. US & Ger (where was among largest) but all
   b. Some contend many non-partisans = closet-partisans; consistently voting for one party, even so,
      # of partisans definitely declining

![Graph showing the percentage of partisan identifiers over time for USA, GB, FRG, and F.]

**Figure 9.3 The Percentage of Partisan Identifiers**


2. Consequences:
   a. Decreased turnout might be linked to this
   b. “Split-ticket” voting increasing (Fig 9.4)
   c. More delay voting decisions (closer to elect day)
   d. Number of “floating” voters increasing
3. **Explanations:**
   a. Crises & events: Vietnam, Watergate, scandals; but, if universal, such explan’s weakened
   b. Many traditionally prty functions now by other orgs & grps, incl. even cand. select somewhat
   c. Mass media Δs, personalizes campaigns
   d. Leading prtys’ inability to address mod issues: *Keynesian Welfare State* crises, new issues, etc.
   e. Δ charact’s contemp voter (D’s pref’d explan)

G. **“Cognitive Mobilization” & Apartisans**: two types of independents & two types of partisans
   1. **Define** “cognitive mobilization”
   2. **Four types** cit’s according to 🡪 cognitive mobilization & partisan identification [Figure 9.5]
a. *Apoliticals* (trend 0: ‘52=16%, ‘80=19%, ‘92=16%)

b. *Ritual Partisans* (↓↓↓: ‘52=42%, ‘80=28%, ‘92=20%)

c. *Cognitive Partisans* (↑↑: ‘52=32%, ‘80=35%, ‘92=41%)

d. *Apartisans* (↑↓: ‘52=10%, ‘80=18%, ‘92=24%)

3. **Implications of rising Apartisans**
   a. ↑ consistent voting patterns
   b. ↑ issue-voting
   c. ↑ demand for responsiveness to public opinion
   d. Press for expansion of citizen-input opportunities
   e. [Plus the above & below under “consequences”...]

4. **Soc-Econ trends that → this voting-behavior trend**: parties’ actions can bolster or resist trend
   a. Young, educated, post-materialists
   b. Information revolution [...]
7. Increased divided govt / fractionalization
8. Rise in independent candidates & “flash parties”
9. Factors further in funnel ↑ import rel to early […]
10. Less consistent voting patterns
11. More issue-voting
12. ↑ demand for responsiveness to public opinion
13. ↑ demand for expansion cit-input opportunities
14. All these may produce increasing responsiveness of elected officials to public opinion [or not…]

LIII. Issue & Image Voting (Dalton, ch. 10)
A. Struct & part vote ↑ ⇐ ↑ rel. issue & image vote
B. Issue voting long seen key to sophisticated, rational voting. Logical req’s for issue voting:
   1. Citizens are interested in issue
   2. Citizens hold an opinion on issue
   3. Citizens know cands or parties’ stands on issue
   4. On most issues, most cit’s do not meet req’s ⇒ early conclusion: voters incapable issue voting
C. Overlapping issue publics
   1. DEFINE
   2. Most voters meet all 3 req’s on 1 issue min.
D. Classification of issue types [discussion]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Frame</th>
<th>Position Issues</th>
<th>Performance Issues</th>
<th>Cand/Ppty Attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective</td>
<td>Policy appraisal</td>
<td>Performance eval</td>
<td>Attribute voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective</td>
<td>Policy mandate</td>
<td>Anticipatory judge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. Left/right attitudes as a “super-issue”

![Graph showing United States, 1992, Britain, 1989, Germany, 1989, and France, 1989 party placements.](image)
F. **Image as issue**: pertains to voter eval of how cand’s will behave in certain circumstances

1. Interesting that, actually, the more-educated are more likely to eval. on personal characteristics
2. More moderate but growing impact outside US
3. Coming @ end causal funnel, ⇒ analytical prob’s
   a. Somewhat predetermined by earlier factors
   b. Hard disting. image eval. from vote choice itself

G. Opinions on ... issues ... influence vote choice

1. **Old Politics** (econ, moral, etc.) ... strongly ...
   a. Econ issues still cntr pol debate; as grp, category on which lrgest share cit’s meet issue-vote req’s
   b. Revival of ec-policy controversy (*Thatcher, Reagan, Kohl, Clinton, Blair, Schroeder*), but debate
      now less struct’d by S-E & partisan predisp.: now b/w opposing cognitive partisans & apartisans [?]

2. **New Politics** ... only modestly ...
   a. B/c issues secondary? & could that explain party reluctance to take clear, strong stands on them?
   b. Or causality other way? parties’ vague stands ⇒ voters little reason to supp party on these bases?

3. **Foreign-policy** ... **typically** only weakly ...
   a. *Exc. crises*, attracts primary attention of rel. few
   b. Party diff’s on foreign policy also tend lesser

---

**TABLE 10.2**

**LEFT/RIGHT ATTITUDES AND PARTY SUPPORT**

*(IN PERCENTAGES)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Center</th>
<th>Right</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>24</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Great Britain</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
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<td>49</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Conservatives</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<td><strong>France</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** 1990–91 World Values Survey.

**Note:** The German results are based on western Germany only.
**TABLE 10.3**  
THE CORRELATION BETWEEN ISSUE OPINIONS  
AND PARTY PREFERENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
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<td>Left/Right attitudes</td>
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<td>.34</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.50</td>
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<td><strong>Socioeconomic issues</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Worker management</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income equality</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government ownership</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment benefits</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental responsibility</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.16</td>
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<td><strong>Environmental issues</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Income vs. environment</td>
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<td>.11</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taxes vs. environment</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pollution vs. jobs</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environmental movement</td>
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<td>Confidence in NATO</td>
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<td>Confidence in EU</td>
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<td>.08</td>
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<td>Disarmament movement</td>
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<td>Human rights movement</td>
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<td>.06</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** 1990–91 World Values Survey.

**Note:** Table entries are Cramer’s V coefficients.

---

H. Ec. vote: pers/soc, ret-/pro-spective [see Norpoth]

I. SUMMARY: Each issue usu small agg. impact b/c not all salient to all voters, but together issues key to agg. outcome & ind. or small # of issues usu. key to individual voters

J. Dalton refers to all of this trend toward personal, issue-centered politics as citizen politics:
   1. Long-term determ vote: struct & partisan attach
   2. Shrt-term determ vote: issues & image
   3. Among voting pop that 'ly cognitively mobilized
   4. ∆ nature of ec-voting illustrates:

"We can illustrate changing styles of citizen voting behavior by the changing impact of economics on the vote."
Traditionally, economic conflicts have been structured by social divisions: working class versus middle class, industrial versus agrarian interests. In this situation, one's social position was often a meaningful guide to voting decisions. As social divisions narrowed & group bases of political interests blurred, social class decreased as a source of voting cues. This does not mean that economic issues are unimportant. Quite the opposite. As recession weakened the economies of the industrial nations in the 1980s, economic issues again rose to the top of the political agenda for many citizens. Contemporary evidence of economic voting is widespread, but now issue positions are individually based rather than group derived. The political cues of a union leader or business association must compete with the voter's own opinions on economic policy & party programs. That a partial return to the old issues of economic growth & security has not revived traditional class divisions provides compelling evidence that a new style of citizen politics now affects voting patterns.” [pp. 235-6]

5. **Possible “pros” of citizen politics** [discuss]
   a. Increasing policy implications of electoral results
   b. May make candidates & parties more responsive

6. **Possible “cons” of citizen politics** [discuss]
   a. Over-burdening, inconsist., non-agg’d demands
   b. Cits w/o skills sophist. ind’’ualistic vote = atomized grps w/o prty, soc cues=easy prey demagogue?

7. Possible roles of TV in campaigns illustrates

LIV. **Political Representation** (ch. 11): how well do elected reps correspond to their consti’s?

A. **Collective correspondence**: dispersion b/w elite & public distributions of attitudes

B. **Dyadic correspondence**: disp. b/w consti & rep

1. E. Burke’s 2 Models **Constituency Representation**
   a. “Trustee” model
   b. “Delegate” model (Fig 11.1)

2. **Party-govt model**: dispersion b/w prty & supp
   a. Nec. char’s for “responsible party govt” (See Powell)
      (1) competition between 2+ parties
      (2) parties distinct, recognizable policy-differences
      (3) voters recognize these diff’s & care about them
(4) parties act to important degree as units 
b. Constit-rep agree low-to-zero outside US. **Why?**  
c. Bidirectional causality: voters influence party positions, & parties attempt to sway their voters  
d. [Tables 11.1-2; Figures 11.2-11.7]  

| Table 11.1 The Distribution of Opinions for the European Public and Elites (in percentages) |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|                                                | **GREAT BRITAIN** |               | **WEST GERMANY** |               | **FRANCE** |               |
|                                                | Public  | Elites | Public  | Elites | Public  | Elites |
| Leftist self-placement                        | 42     | 46    | 42     | 57     | 47     | 68     |
| Old Politics                                  |         |       |         |        |         |        |
| Public ownership of industry                   | 30     | 35    | 34     | 27     | 41     | 48     |
| Government manages economy                    | 44     | 38    | 45     | 32     | 56     | 44     |
| Codetermination                                | 52     | 54    | 69     | 60     | 73     | 52     |
| Control multinationals                        | 50     | 66    | 66     | 75     | 72     | 86     |
| Reduce income inequality                      | 65     | 64    | 76     | 88     | 93     | 93     |
| Liberalize abortion                            | 77     | 58    | 75     | 65     | 77     | 74     |
| Foreign aid                                   |         |       |         |        |         |        |
| Aid EC regions                                 | 45     | 90    | 47     | 98     | 71     | 90     |
| Aid Third World                                | 35     | 85    | 40     | 93     | 52     | 82     |
| Security                                      |         |       |         |        |         |        |
| Strengthen defense                             | 18     | 25    | 30     | 22     | 34     | 32     |
| Action against terrorists                      | 5      | 29    | 12     | 30     | 8      | 15     |
| New Politics                                  |         |       |         |        |         |        |
| Nuclear energy                                 | 21     | 23    | 34     | 19     | 34     | 15     |
| Protest environment                            | 94     | 92    | 88     | 97     | 94     | 92     |
| Free expression                                | 72     | 78    | 76     | 79     | 74     | 86     |
| Average liberal issue response                 | 46     | 57    | 53     | 60     | 60     | 62     |

*Sources: 1979 Eurocandidate Survey, Eurobarometer II; both studies have been weighted to produce representative national samples.*

*Note: Table entries are the percentages of respondents expressing a liberal opinion on each item.*
Table: Liberal,Govern,Govern,Attitude,Spend,Cooper,Interv
MaintaLiberal,Con,Mod,Libe
Source 1986 A
Notes: (abort Items Membe with t

**Figure 11.3** Voter and Party Elite Opinions on Further Nationalization of Industry

*Source: 1979 Europarlament Study.*

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**Figure 11.4** Voter and Party Elite Opinions on Abortion

*Source: 1979 Europarlament Study.*
Figure 11.5 Voter and Party Elite Opinions on Nuclear Energy

Source: 1979 Europarlament Study.

Figure 11.6 Voter and Party Elite Opinions on Aid to Third World Nations

Source: 1979 Europarlament Study.
3. Gen’l patterns elite-citizen correspondence
   a. Elites tend to be more extreme than supporters
   b. Strong constit.-rep./party-voter agreement on economic & social policy, less on foreign policy
   c. Clarity of party issue positions tends to ↑ voter-party correspondence
   d. Fractionalized party systems tend to ↑ voter-party correspondence

C. Impact of Citizen Politics on political rep
   1. Issue-oriented, sophist. electorate may spur partys & cands responsivity to voter interests
   2. Or, partisan dealignment & candidate-centered politics may weaken rep built on party govt

D. 2 distinct patterns democratic rep emerge
   1. (Presidential) Representative-Constituency model:
      a. Pro: Greater responsiveness to different interests of particular districts
      b. Pro: Potentially more open to interests & rep of minority groups
      c. Con: ↑ difficulty of monitoring & controlling govt (as opposed to ind reps) actions
      d. Con: Encourages campaigns stress personalities & district service (pork) over policy & orientations
2. **(Parliamentary) Party-Supporter model:**
   a. Pro: party votes as unified bloc so political responsibility for govt more clearly established
   b. Con: may produce rigidity & resistance to change for this reason; parties may be very responsive to established clientele, but new social grps & minorities may have difficulty gaining such rep

E. **Empirical research (continues) to show policy does respond to voter pref’s; broad conclusion overwhelming that democracy works reasonably well (representativeness & policy-responsiveness). So why all public outcry to contrary?**

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**Week 9: Voting, Participation, & Representation**

**Pt Ib Voting: Who, How Many, & How?**

LV. Electoral Participation (Franklin, ch. 8 of LN & N)

A. Three approaches to explaining voter participation
   1. **Individual-Resources Approach:** what ind’s bring to political process–knowledge, wealth, time–determines voters
   2. **Political-Mobilization Approach:** heightened awareness of “duty” or “civicness” inculcated via media, parties, groups
   3. **Instrumental-Motivation Approach:** people respond to perceived costs & benefits voting; aim at political efficacy in terms of influencing policy (at least in concert w/ like-minded ind’s)

B. F’s broad arg: 3rd unduly neglected as explanation, esp., cross-national variation in VP, spec’ly he stresses small set of legal & political-system variables as explanators:
   1. “salience” of elections [DEFINE]
   2. compulsory voting
   3. proportionality of electoral system
   4. postal voting
   5. weekend/workday polling

C. F stresses, 1st, that cross-ctry variation VP much greater than b/w individuals w/ diff. characteristics [Tab 8.2]
   1. US has greatest differences b/w voting participation rates of types of ind’s, but individual-level diff’s explain much less of cross-ctry variation than country-level or system-level variables
   2. This suggests two things:
      a. much of explanation for variation VP must come from differences in political system not from differences in demographics or average individual characteristics (e.g., education level)
      b. follows, moreover, that if one aims to 1 (or 1) VP, changes in political institutions, environments, & rules are way, esp. since most individual-level characteristics less manipulable
**TABLE 8.1** Average Turnout in Free Elections to the Lower House in 37 Countries, 1960-1995 (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia(^a) (14)</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta(^a) (6)</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria(^a) (9)</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium(^a, b) (12)</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy(^a, b) (9)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg(^a, b) (7)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland(^a, b) (10)</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand(^a) (12)</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark(^a, b) (14)</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela(^a) (7)</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria(^b) (2)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany(^a, b) (9)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden(^a) (14)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece(^a, b) (10)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania(^b) (1)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia(^b) (1)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic(^b) (2)</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil(^a) (3)</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands(^a, b) (7)</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica(^a) (8)</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway(^a) (9)</td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel(^a) (9)</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>Portugal(^a, b) (9)</td>
<td>79</td>
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<td>Finland(^a) (10)</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada(^a) (11)</td>
<td>76</td>
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<td>France(^a, b) (9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom(^a, b) (9)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland(^a, b) (11)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain(^a, b) (6)</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan(^a) (12)</td>
<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia(^b) (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary(^b) (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia(^b) (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>India(^a) (6)</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States(^a, b) (9)</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland(^a) (8)</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland(^b) (2)</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Mackie and Rose (1991), Katz (1996), and *Electoral Studies* (vols. 5-14).

**NOTE:** Numbers in parentheses are the number of elections included in each average. For the United States, only “on year” congressional elections are included (i.e., elections held in conjunction with presidential elections). U.S. midterm elections do not respond to the same forces as elections elsewhere, because executive power is not at stake. For the Netherlands, the series starts in 1968, after the abolition of compulsory voting there.

- **a.** Included in country-level analysis (29 countries).
- **b.** Included in individual-level analysis. Romania (86 percent turnout) is included in these analyses (for a total of 22 countries), but it does not qualify as a democracy according to the criteria established in chapter 1.
D. Comparing approaches w/ these considerations in mind:

1. Individual-resources approach
   a. arg: people w/ time, $, & intellectual where-w/-all to participate
   b. evidence:
      (1) w/in ctry, broadly true, though perhaps so strong as you’d think
      (2) cross-ctry: not much variation on avg levels, so don’t explain much

2. Political-mobilization approach:
   a. arg: grps, orgs, & media can be very effective in exhorting, inculcating participatory ethic, etc.
   b. evidence:
      (1) no doubt that group efforts effective (esp. driving people to polls, register, etc.), media effect more debatable
      (2) even less cross-ctry var mobilization efforts than in ind char’s

3. Instrumental-motivation approach:
   a. arg: people vote based on perceived C & B (largely perceived policy-influencing efficacy) of voting
      (1) both other approaches indirectly address instrumental motivations
         (a) education, experience, time, & money might well increase perception of efficacy & lower costs of voting
         (b) mobilization largely an effort to increase those perceived benefits & reduce those perceived costs
      (2) I-M approach subsumes these two & also allows election contest itself to be factor driving turnout
   b. Specific hypotheses F derives from this approach
(1) ↑ policy relevance elect & voter's role in it ⇒ ↑ voter turnout [salience]

   (a) is (executive) policymaking power clearly, unmitigatedly at stake? [federalism, division of power, etc. reduce turnout]
   (b) is election expected to be close? (particularly in my district?)
   (c) is outcome likely to affect public policy?
   (d) are perceived differences between perceived alternatives large?

(2) electoral system that ↑ proportion of wasted votes ↑ turnout

(3) anything that ↑ vote difficulty (costly in time, $, opp costs), ↑ VP

   (a) compulsory voting
   (b) registration laws
   (c) weekend/workday polling
   (d) advance and/or postal voting
   (e) number of days polls are open

(4) voter fatigue: ↑ #distinct elects ⇒ ↑ VP [correlates highly w/ no on 1a]

   c. Evidence [review regression analysis]:
      (1) The individual-level results are given in Table 8.3
      (2) Country-level results given in Table 8.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Individual Level Only</th>
<th></th>
<th>With National Effects Considered</th>
<th></th>
<th>With Missing Data Indicators</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.636</td>
<td>.017*</td>
<td>.665</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.669</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.002*</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.002*</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.002*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of party identification</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.004*</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discussion</td>
<td>.097</td>
<td>.006*</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.006*</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.006*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.003*</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.003*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious participation</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.005*</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union member</td>
<td>-.081</td>
<td>.006*</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>.006*</td>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>.006*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.009*</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.001*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average country effect</td>
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<td>.017*</td>
<td>.489</td>
<td>.017*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Missing religious participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.041</td>
<td>.009*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.195</td>
<td>.195</td>
<td>.195</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>21,601</td>
<td></td>
<td>21,601</td>
<td></td>
<td>21,601</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See Table 8.2.
Note: For number of categories, see Table 8.2.
*p < .001.
LVI. Helmut Norpoth, “The Economy,” in LNN

A. “Econ concern almost everywhere bonds electorates & govts as tightly as Siamese Twins joined at hip” (p. 300)
   1. Incumbents presiding over good economic times are more likely to win than those presiding over bad
   2. [Therefore] Govts try to bend economy to their will
   3. Economic adversity can kill an infant democracy & *vice versa* good times strengthens its foundation

B. The Vote Function—Reward-and-Punishment Calculus
   1. Common or Conflicting Interests?
   2. Symmetric or Asymmetric Reward & Punishment?
   3. Personal or Sociotropic Concerns?
   4. Retro¬ or Prospective Evaluation?

C. Vote fnctn, whatever form, varies across ctry-time. Why?
   1. Clarity of responsibility (Powell & Whitten)
   2. Alternatives for Discontent—2-prty sys clearest [US or UK?]
   3. [any other ideas?]

D. N demonstrates simply that ec. voting exists [see fig.]
   1. No claim to explain it all [bit on *ceteris paribus*, stochastic v. systematic world, controlling for...]
   2. Still, what exactly does vote fnctn look like, when & where?

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 8.4</th>
<th>Three Models Explaining Turnout in 29 Countries&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Mackie-Rose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>21.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportionality&lt;sup&gt;(79-99)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory voting&lt;sup&gt;(0-1)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>7.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal voting&lt;sup&gt;(0-1)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday voting&lt;sup&gt;(0-1)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of polling days</td>
<td>−1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral salience&lt;sup&gt;(0-1)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>−28.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Analysis of data is from Mackie and Rose (1991), and Katz (1996, Table 13.3).
NOTE: Number of categories—proportionality (numerical, range is from 79-99); compulsory voting (2); postal voting (2); Sunday voting (2); number of polling days (numerical, 1-5) electoral salience (2).
<sup>a</sup> The 29 countries are those marked " in Table 8.1.
<sup>*</sup>$p < .5$. 

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1. Econ Prosperity=valence issue; How Pursue=position issue
2. To ° econ=valence issue, parties & cands compete for votes not by offering diff promises so much as claiming better plan to achieve promises—suggests perception of econ as or more important than actual (but surely former based on latter)
3. Tradeoffs? Cannot usu pursue growth, empl, & infl similt'ly
   a. Valence model: voters unaware of this→Govt perceived constantly failing→must dissemble, misdirect, etc. as much as possible
   b. Position Model, contrarily, leads to L-R partisan politics (Hibbs)
F. Uninformed voters?
1. Perfectly rational to be uninformed
2. (Partisan) ideological filters? Reputation
3. If electorate right-on-average (unbiased)≈irrelevant that uninf.
4. Why doesn’t pay anyone to inform? ⇒ incentives to distort, voter must decide whom to believe, etc.

G. Simple Reward & Punishment Model (Key 1964; Kramer 1971; Kiewiet & Rivers 1985): If incumb’s performance satisfactory, reelect; if unsatisfactory, vote for challenger

1. If true, notice how drastically ↓ info requirement of voters
   a. Reduces political universe to one actor
   b. Retrospective–no need to eval promises of novel & unknown
   c. Need only decide if you like outcomes, not evaluate policies

2. [But do voters act so? (If “some do, some don’t”: who? why?)]
   a. good reason to believe pub better able to eval incumb [risk aversion]
   b. but what about Party Reputations–can’t ignore opposition

H. Asymmetric Reward & Punishment? (Negativity effect)

1. Seems econ bigger news & ∴ perhaps bigger issue when bad
2. Negativity effect: at 1st found some evidence, but more systematic, broader study seems to have lain it to rest

I. Partisan Reward & Punishment?

1. Facts perceived through partisan-tinted glasses
2. Partisan rep’s tend to attach certain econ issues to certain parties–e.g. Reps anti-inflation & Dems anti-unemployment
   a. Votes do seem respond somewhat thus–when ↑ infl issue, ↑ R vote
   b. N.b.: really strange incentives for partisan seeking re-elect [no evidence they respond thereto, perhaps maintaining rep too import?]

J. Personal or Sociotropic Evaluation?

2. However, not in UK, FR, GE, IT, or SP either! (Lewis-Beck 1988) ⇒ US self-reliance ethic not a very good explanation
   a. Empirically, socio. seems dominate pers. in estimated vote fncts! [So, people so altruistic? If believe not, must explain this evidence:
      (1) specification error: people are selfish after all, & evaluate based on personal economic conditions, but these are poorly measured
      (2) Possibility voters attribute macro performance to politicians, not personal; & evaluate accordingly... They care about personal, but believe politicians only effect on personal is embodied in agg effect
      (3) Agg. may be better predictor of own future than own past.]

K. Retro- or Prospective: politicians rewarded for good past perform or for expected productivity if re-elected?

1. Rationally, should be latter
   a. In popularity functions, that appears to be so
   b. In vote fncts, much less clear, if anything voters retro
2. Implications for political manipulation of the economy

Week 10: Voting, Participation, & Representation, Part II
Extra-electoral Participation & Interest Groups

Bashevkin, “Interest Groups & Social Movements,” in LNN

LVII. Organized groups:

A. At core of democratic debate:
   1. Critics: attacked as selfish & destructive of dem. process
   2. Supporters: celeb’d as crucial, constructive act’s in proc.

B. Synonyms:
   1. Pressure grps, interest grp, lobby, & organized interest
   2. Social movement organization, social movement

C. Definitions:
1. Interest Groups (IG’s):
   a. B: “what IG’s & social movements share is a set of norms, beliefs, or values that keep the ‘interest’ intact. These shared orientations are glue binding together the group constituency, leading it to act as a coherent entity...collectivities that have as their basis a shared outlook, identity, or framework of reference” (135)
   b. Truman (1951): ‘IG’ refers to any group that, on basis of 1 or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes... (pp. 135-6)
   c. Wilson (1990): org’s, sep. from govt though often in close partnership, which attempt to influence pub pol.

2. Social Movements (SM’s):
   a. Bashevkin:
      (1) Like IG’s except “more pro-change, more challenging, vis-à-vis institutional status quo” (138)
      (2) Protest groups that mobilize their adherents in more system-challenging ways than do IG’s or parties
   b. Kitschelt: social movements tend to follow experience of marginalization
   c. Blumer (1951): collective enterprise to establish new order of life, meaning a fundamental cultural shift that will either be pursued or opposed by SM adherents
   d. Bashevkin: Less formal than interest grps, more heterogeneity of views typically within SM’s than IG’s (largely because former are typically broader)

3. Substantive distinct’s b/w party-IG-SM not always clear

LVIII. Interest Group Functions:
A. Social roles of IG’s
   1. Truman: these [shared attitudes] afford participants frames of reference for interp. & eval. events & behave
   2. Like prty, function as soc. networks as well as pol. org’s
B. Electoral roles of IG’s:
   1. Evaluate competing candidates
   2. Help fund candidates
   3. Mobilize voters
C. Policymaking roles of IG’s
   1. Influence or pressure govt decision-makers, but not seek office (distinguishes them from parties)
   2. Provide information to policymakers
      a. Where voters/citizens stand on issues
      b. Information (possibly biased) about issue itself
D. Wilson: IG’s provide institutional linkages b/w govt (state) & major sectors of society

LIX. Substantive Q’s regarding interest groups & movements
A. Why some grps more diff. to org than others? [Pap Top]
   1. Mem’s Hetero/homo-geneity: SE homog & unity views
   2. Size of the groups (Olson) [LoCA]
   3. Coercion/suasion & Selective benefits (Olson)
B. What explains difference in means employed by different groups with shared interests?
   1. Means: Some form parties [Green parties]; Others IG’s & lobbies [Sierra Club]; Others adopt “politics by other means” [Greenpeace]. [Pap Top]
   2. Hypotheses:
      a. Bashevkin: groups form strategies based on their institutional & ideological settings [Such as?]
      b. History? “diffusion of innovation”
      c. Intensity of views?
      d. Power config. of alternative & orthogonal views?
C. What explains gen. ↑ # & importance of I.G.’s? [Pap]
1. Decline of parties [elaborate]
2. Education & affluence => greater resources & abilities => lower relative cost to mobilize groups
3. Advances in communications & transportation tech => increased efficiency in organizing

D. What explains variation across space & time in activities of I.G.’s? (differing uses of Voice?) [Paper Topic]
   1. Change over time in US
      a. Traditionally I.G.’s in US politics lobbied elected politicians in national & state capitals, † ‘ly they...
         (1) Work in coalitions to lobby bureaucrats
         (2) Present their arguments in court
         (3) Go directly to pub via media interviews & ads
         (4) Try to influence elections as well as traditional attempt to influence policy at legislative stage
      b. What might explain these changing activities?
         (1) Increasing professionalization of interest groups
         (2) Societal changes? [Such as...]
         (3) Voting-behavior changes?
         (4) [Other ideas?]

   a. Differing nature of electoral competition?
   b. Size of role of bureaucratic implementation on net effect of policy?
   c. [Other ideas?]

E. Social Movements more willing to use extra-pol., even illegal, means than IG’s. Why? [tautological?] [Pap?]
   1. Do mobilization needs of IG’s & SM’s differ?
   2. Does nature of IG’s & SM’s goal differ?
   3. Differing opp’s to achieve their ends? [see Kitschelt’s point above about SM’s resulting from marginalization]

F. What explains differing success of various grps of interests in achieving their ends? [Paper Topic]
   1. Tarrow (1983): brdth & flexblty grp’s tactical repertory
   2. History, e.g., novelty of SM’s or IG’s aims or tactics?
   3. Institutional differences in political process? [Such as...]

LX. “Models” of Group Activity
A. Power-Elite Model: Mills (1956), Hunter (1953)
   1. Small elite, sometimes covert, controls gt, limiting opp’s for “average” citizens’ political participation
   2. How does such a minority dominate majority in a dem?
      a. Size, homog, intrst unity of grps serve their coherence
      b. Relative soc., pol., & econ. power of elites enables them to dominate uninformed, excluded masses

B. Pluralist Model: Truman (1951), Dahl (1961)
   1. Struggles among competing grps=essence dem pol; govt maj role=estab & mntn orderly rltns among them
   2. “Vectors of pol. inputs” image: multiple (vector) forces push govt; resultant (vector) of those forces=>policy
   3. Multiple points of access for diverse interests => group participation in public policymaking is virtually assured
   4. What explains ° to which alter. collective demands met?
      a. Emphasis on (relative) internal group characteristics, especially organizational resources.
         (1) S-E status, media access or control, education, & skill of group leaders
         (2) Internal organizational cohesion
         (3) Strategic social position (in political issue-space rel. to other I.G.’s)
      b. Later work discerns 4 key variables determining policy success of a group
         (1) Group Resources: financial & human resources positively related to policy influence
Group Cohesion: organizational control, unity, & discipline positively related to influence
Leadership Expertise: policy & administrative knowledge always helps
Grp Representativeness: favorable strategic position &/or comprehensive grp standing in policy domain

Basic Argument/Assumption Pluralist Model: open, fair competition naturally favors groups w/ highest net “score” on these factors

Plur. Critics: Schattschneider; Bachrach & Baratz
1. Non-decisions & agenda setting
2. Govt & bureau interested, neutral, actors in process
3. Insiders v. Outsiders: some groups excluded
4. Basically reject image of govt as neutral arena in which grp interests fairly compete & policies neutrally emerge.

State- & Institution-Centric (Katzenstein; Krasner; Evans; Skocpol): 3 key vars: state prefs, capacity, & auton
1. Policymakers can & do develop preferences that differ from those of constituent groups
2. Relative degree of autonomy of state from societal groups determines degree to which they may differ
3. Capacity = ability of bureaucratic state to execute its actions & so logically depends on ability to concentrate, coordinate, & exploit govtal resources

Corporatist Model: (Schmitter, Lijphart)
1. ‘‘system of interest rep in which constituent units org’d into limited # singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered & functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (sometimes created) by state & granted deliberate representational monop. w/in respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls leader selection, demand articulation, & [supporting activities]’ Schmitter (1979)” (149).
2. Core Characteristics:
   a. IG’s operate as integral parts of, rather than external influences on, govt activity
   b. State at apex of corp sys, org’s a hierarchy w/in which interests operate regarding govt & other interests
3. Important Aspects:
   a. Incorporation of insider groups (with perhaps some exclusion implied) so that favored groups play a structured & significant role in policymaking
   b. Competition among grps much more limited than in pluralist sys; state’s role is more assertive & sustained
4. [Ex.: Tri-Partite Barg: Govt–uni. lab–uni. employer]
5. Contrast “liberal” or “societal” corporatism from “state” corporatism [“from below” v. “from above”]

Empirical “Findings”
A. Bashevkin claims that business groups generally most influential in most systems
1. Note the difficulty of establishing any such claim
2. [If business groups most influential, why are they among the most critical of govt policies?]
B. Most of work confirms importance of internal characteristics of grps to their success
C. Most also find “political opportunity structure”—attitudinal or institutional environ w/in which groups operate—key to strategies, success, etc. Thus, influence rests on combination of internal assets & external situation [a pretty banal conclusion at this level of generality]
D. Groups adapt rapidly to their institutional circumstances: they seem to go where it matters in their system (e.g., Congress then courts in the US), subject to their abilities to go there. [Paper Topic]
E. Evidence from transitional democracies indicates that democratic group competition does not emerge simply from establishment of rules allowing it
   1. Pre-transition traditions are key
   2. Pre-transition group organization also central

LXII. Discussion: How could we evaluate common claim that “special interests” as opposed to avg citizens & /or their elected representatives hold power?

LXIII. Status:
   A. Socio-Economic Development/Structure & ...
      1. Democratization & Democratic Stability/Functioning
      2. Party System & (Citizen) Political Behavior
   B. Comparative Govtal Systems
      1. Theoretical & Empirical Variation in Political Systems
      2. Alternative Visions Democracy & Pol Sys that Support
   C. Electoral Systems & ...
      1. Party Systems & (Partisan) Policymaker Behavior
      2. (Citizen) Political Behavior
   D. Party Systems & ...
      1. (Partisan) Policymaker Behavior
      2. (Citizen) Political Behavior
   E. Political Participation:
      1. Voting: who, how many, how
      2. Interest Groups Extra-electoral Participation
   F. Given partisan, elected representatives, operating in strategic environment set by socio-econ struct, electoral & party systems, next question = how policy-making authority allocates among/across those reps:

      The Distribution of Govtal Authority
      & Govt Formation

LXIV. Lijphart, Ch. 7: Executive-Legislative Balance
   A. Presidential v. Parliamentary Govt
      1. Three Crucial Differences
         a. Parl: HoG (PM) resp to/dept on legislative confidence; Pres: HoG (Pres) elected for const’ly prescribed period & not under normal circumstances resp/dep to/on legis.
         b. Pres: HoG pop’ly elect (usu directly); Parl: HoG leg. select
         c. Parl: collective exec’s; Pres: one-person, non-coll. exec.
            (1) PM can vary: pre-eminence to virtual equal cab mins’
            (2) Pres cab mins=his/her appoints: advisory, subord role
      2. ⇒ Fig 7.1 Executive Classification
         a. 35/36 purely pres or parl by this def (but Fra & Isr shift)
         b. Switz the exception; exec not dep on legis
         c. US pres elect by HoR possibility would => category III
         d. Columbia was category V hybrid for a time.
         e. II, IV, VI somewhat log’ly contradict=> not surp no ex’s
   a. Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal
   b. *Lijphart*: Austria, Ice, Ire, & , post-'82 Port presidents weak
   c. France:
      (1) Pres=HoG, but ‘til ‘86 not tested whether effect pow rested on position as head of majority parl party (disciplined). Since tested: does seem so.
      (2) Pres power seems largely confined to for & security pol.
   d. Finland:
      (1) Const’ly similar but weaker Fr. pres ( & ind. elect ’91)
      (2) Esp. Kekkonen ‘56–‘81 period, strong, esp. for/sec pol.
(3) '91 reform: abolished pres rt to dissolve parl, but also made direct elect. ⇒ Ambig Strength

e. Short-Lived Israeli System: Pres...

(1) Directly elected
(2) Fixed period, except if Pres & Parl dissolve each other
(3) Predominates over cabinet.
(4) Some argue (e.g., US '87 Committee on Const'l Reform) this help overcome and/or prevent deadlock; Others that it ⇒ incessant elections.

4. Other Important (but not as universal) Pres-Parl Diff’s

a. Sep v. Fuse Exec/Legis entail (non-) mem in both? Varies.
b. Pres/Cabs not right dissolve legis; PMs & Cabs do., but not to which right unmitigated (UK) or limtd (Germ) varies.
c. (Non-)Separation HoS from HoG: many exceptions.

B. Degrees of Executive Dominance

1. Legis-Exec Balance not fully determined by Pres-Parl.

2. Presidential Power Sources

a. Const'l Powers: Reactive (Veto) & Proactive (Decree) [rel'ly stable formally, but effectively varies w/ strat. sit.]
b. Strength & cohesion pres’ party in legis [rel'ly unstable & varies lot w/ strat. sit., esp. w/ party pres & leg & cohes.]
c. Direct election (& usu. only they have 1 national dist) [rel'ly stable but varies some w/ margin electoral victory].

3. Measuring Degrees of Exec Dominance [Table 7.1]

a. Lijphart: parl sys well measured by cab dur [BIG PROB’s]
b. Tweaked for pres & some other peculiarities [more prob’s]
c. Do not confuse cab (in)stability w/ policy (in)stability, govt (in)efficacy, or regime (in)stability:
   (1) Cab pm position can move more in stable-govt sys
   (2) Avg. Tenure of Cab Mins can & often is longer in less durable govt sys; even more stab of parties in govt.
   (3) Regime instab seems corr. w/ govt ineffic. not instab.
d. Some issues re: what counts empirically as gov't change...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.1</th>
<th>Average cabinet duration according to two criteria (in years), the mean of these two measures, and the index of executive dominance in thirty-six democracies, 1945–98</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>life I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>4.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>16.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2.93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.1 Continued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average cabinet life I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Trinidad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These values of the index of executive dominance (for the five presidential systems, Switzerland, and five former British colonies) differ from the values of the mean of measures I and II.

Source: Based on data in Wehling, Keman, and Hodge 1998; Banks, Frey, and Müller 1997; Müller and Strøm 1997; Strøm 1990; von Beyme 1988; Kreutzer’s Contemporary Archipelago and data provided by Octavio Amorim-Neto.
4. Govt Types & Govt Durability [Table 7.2]
   a. Reasons to expect pos rel. MW & 1-Prty Govt exec dom
      (1) Same cluster of variables & concepts underlie exec-dom & MW+1-Prty
      (2) Minority cabs by nature more at mercy of parl
      (3) indep of indiv MP behav varies directly w/ cab’s maj
   b. [CIRCULARITY PROBLEMS]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.2  Frequency and average cabinet duration according to two criteria (in years) of five types of cabinets in thirty-one parliamentary democracies, 1945–96</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of cabinet</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal winning, one-party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal winning coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority, one-party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversized coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All cabinets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Based on data in Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge 1998; Banks, Day, and Muller 1997; Müller and Strøm 1997; Strøm 1990; von Beyme 1985; and Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*

5. 1-Party-Maj Govt & Exec Dom [Fig 7.2] [circ probs]

C. Heads of State
   1. N.b., almost half currently const’l monarchs
   2. Issue for parliamentary systems to limit authority HoS, logical contrapositive of parl sovereignty.
      Lijphart:
      a. either via lack of election or
      b. via election but strip of authority. [Weak]
Fig. 7.2 The relationship between type of cabinet and executive dominance in thirty-six democracies, 1945–96
LXV. Lijphart, ch. 14: 2D Conceptual Map Democracy

A. Strong Clustering 10-Variables Along 2-Dimensions
   1. Executive-Parties Dimension
      a. Effective Number Parliamentary Parties
      b. **Percentage Minimal Winning 1-Party Cabs (core element)**
      c. Executive Dominance (of legislature)
      d. Electoral Disproportionality
      e. Interest-Group Pluralism (as opposed to Corporatism)
   2. Federal-Unitary Dimension
      a. **Federalism & Decent (core element)** (ch. 10) (DEF)
      b. Symmetric & Incongruent Bicameralism (ch. 11) (DEF)
      c. Constitutional Rigidity (ch. 12...)
      d. Judicial Review (...ch. 12) (DEF)
      e. Central Bank Independence (ch. 13) (DEF)

B. Tables 14.1 & 14.2 show clustering

C. Figures 14.1 & 14.2 show positioning & movement

D. Explanations for patterns/clustering:
   1. Pol heritage & soc pluralism explain much of 1st D
   2. Pop size & soc pluralism explain much of 2nd D
   3. Perhaps representational dem & federal/decent functional substitutes/complements in redress soc het?

E. Sets stage for last part of book: So What?
   1. Economic & Conflict Management
   2. Quality of Democracy
### Table 14.1 Correlation matrix of the ten variables distinguishing majoritarian from consensus democracy in thirty-six democracies, 1945–96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>[1]</td>
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<tr>
<td>[3]</td>
<td>−0.71**</td>
<td>0.88**</td>
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<td>[4]</td>
<td>−0.50**</td>
<td>0.57**</td>
<td>0.33*</td>
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<td>[5]</td>
<td>−0.55**</td>
<td>0.68**</td>
<td>0.38*</td>
<td>0.56**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>[6]</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>−0.25</td>
<td>−0.23</td>
<td>−0.16</td>
<td>−0.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>[7]</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.64**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[8]</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
<td>−0.09</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
<td>0.54**</td>
<td>0.35*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[9]</td>
<td>−0.13</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.48**</td>
<td>0.41**</td>
<td>0.39**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[10]</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>−0.14</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
<td>0.57**</td>
<td>0.34*</td>
<td>0.42**</td>
<td>0.39**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed test)
**Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed test)

### Table 14.2 Varimax orthogonal rotated factor matrix of the ten variables distinguishing majoritarian from consensus democracy in thirty-six democracies, 1945–96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor I</th>
<th>Factor II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective number of parliamentary parties</td>
<td>−0.90</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal winning one-party cabinets</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive dominance</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral disproportionality</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest group pluralism</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism-decentralization</td>
<td>−0.28</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicameralism</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional rigidity</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial review</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central bank independence</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* The factor analysis is a principal components analysis with eigenvalues over 1.0 extracted.
F. Not much interesting in movement; relative stability

**LXVI. Comparative Govtal Systems**

A. CGS I: Executives & Legislatures (*Description*)
   1. Power=function of rules, but also of strategic position
   2. Centrality of PARTY DISCIPLINE

B. CGS II: Lij’s *Patterns of Dem & Pow’s Visions of Dem*
   1. Lijphart: *Majoritarian v. Consensus*
      a. Dem=“govt by & for people,” but which people if divergent prefs & disagrees?
         (1) *Majoritarian model*: exclusive, compete, & adversary
(2) *Consensus model*: inclusive, negotiate, comprom., barg.

b. Clusters of inst’l arrange. along 2D: Conc/Diff Pow.

(1) Executives-Parties (Horizontal) Dimension:
   (a) 1-party v. power-sharing in multi-party coal’s
   (b) Exec-dominant in exec-leg. v. exec-leg. balance
   (c) 2-prty v. multi-prty sys (, corr., 1 v. 2+ D. pol.)
   (d) Maj & disprop v. prop electoral systems
   (e) Pluralist IG’s free-for-all competition v. coordinated & corporatist IG’s w/ compromise & concertation

(2) Federal-Unitary (Vertical) Dimension:
   (a) Unitary & centralized v. federal & decentralized
   (b) Conc. leg pow in uni- v. bicam w/ diff constituencys
   (c) Flexible constitutions w/ simple-maj amend v. rigid constits w/ extra-ordinary amend procedures.
   (d) Legis final say legislation v. indep. judicial review
   (e) Central banks dependent v. independent

(3) Examples: Westminster (UK, NZ1) v. Switz/Belg.

2. Powell: *Proportional v. Majoritarian*

a. **Majoritarian**: elections as instruments of cit control
   (1) “Concentrated pol-mkng pow, whose exercise made target of citizen action”
   (2) Elected = unobstructed ability make & impl pol’s
   (3) Responsibility for policy obvious to everyone
   (4) Elections choose b/w prospective teams & /or reward/punish incumbents
   (5) N.b., concentrated power necessary but not sufficient. Probs w/ diffused power by this vision:
      (a) pol-mkng from complex bargain b/w mult reps
      (b) Retroactive responsibility difficult to pinpoint
      (c) Elect only indirect relation to form policy coals.
   (6) Sum:
      (a) decisiveness & effectiveness in response to pop will
      (b) either prospective or retrospective view of elect role requires concentrated pol-mkng power
      (c) Absolute sovereignty of majority = Majoritarian

b. **Proportional**: elections as instruments of citizen influence
   (1) Dispersed pol-mkng power; elections indirect role: bring rep agents of all societal factions into pol-mkng arena, where they bargain over policy
   (2) premium on accurate reflect pop pref’s in pol-mkng arena. JS Mill: “In really equal democracy, every or any section...represented, not disprop’ly, but prop’ly.”
   (3) Elections clumsy instruments, esp. as majoritarian
   (4) Pref’s all cit’s, not just maj, should weigh in pol-mkng
   (5) Maj & Prop Proponents diff weighting of concerns
   (a) Maj: suspicious reps’ auton., less concern re: minoritys, emph. clear & direct account = pref conc’d pow
   (b) Prop: suspicious majorities, esp. clumsy-elect created, less worried re: reps’ auton., provided cit’s strong role in selecting & re: negotiated inact = pref disperse pow
   (3) Notes: suggests ins as far as conflicts w/in democ b/w citizens (w/ harmonious pref’s) vs. policymakers, edge to maj, insofar as b/w cit’s diff pref’s, to prop.

d. Views of Elections & Cit Relations to Policymakers
   (1) Different Targets of Elections:
      (a) Vote yay/nay Govt w/pow to make policy v. Vote for rep agent, not control Govt, but agents who barg for
(b) Voter anticipates decisive elect, directly deter pm’s v. barg & negot coal-bldng after elect.

(c) Notes:
   i) Issues clear-cut, cit’s w/ united prefs ⇒ voters may pref former. [N.b, game = pol-mkrs v. voters.]
   ii) Issues complex & voters divided, probs that arise diff’to anticipate, ⇒ each grp may pref trustworthy rep’s who bargain on behalf [N.b, game=b/w voters]

(2) Different Temporal Direction: Pro- v. Retro-spective
   (a) Govt Retro⇒ (throw bums out) Eval. Incumbs.
   (b) Govt Pro⇒ (mandates) Forecast Incumb & Chall.
      i) Elements of Forecast: credibility, desirability, etc. of promises⇒past record relevant, even prospective
   (c) Agent Pro⇒(Representative Delegate) Choose agent believe will act as (informed) voter would
      i) ⇒ seek agents whose pref’s mirror own
      ii) ⇒ seek effective bargaining agents
   (d) Agent Retro⇒(Representative Trustee): bring home bacon, trust agent s.t. retro oversight

e. Intermediate Cond’s for Effective Voting Each Type
   (1) Accountability Model:
      (a) min req: periodic opportunity to change pol-mkrs
      (b) How it Works/What it Needs:
         i) Ability to reject unwanted policymakers
         ii) Rejection Threat ⇒ all pol-mkrs consider cit react
         iii) Simplicity & Limited Info Req’s (E.g., no worries about credibility: “do or do not, there is no try.”)
         iv) But do need **clarity of responsibility**
         v) Also: decisive incumbent replacement must follow voters’ rejection (wholesale alternation)
   (2) Electoral-Mandates Model:
      (a) Ideal: strong, cohesive parties, incl. opp., offering effective, clear choice govts. Voters eval prospects alts
      (b) How it Works/What it Needs
         i) Possible for voters to identify alternative future govts @ election time: **identifiability**
         ii) Expection tight link elect outcome to govt/pol form
         iii) Winning party(ies) have full power in pol-mkng
   (3) Accountability & Mandate=Majoritarian: [also called, jointly, Responsible Party Govt model]
   (4) Representative Delegates Model:
      (a) 2 stages: elect & post-el barg pro/retro- distin. less cntrl
      (b) How it Works/What it Needs
         i) @ soc grp must find prty near enough its prefs & views for it to support
         ii) Grps rep’d prop’ly in pol-mkng bargaining
         iii) pol-mkng=reps bargain (not govt implements promises or anticipates future sanctions)
         iv) Flexibility in post-elect coalition form, allowing different majorities to form on diff issues
      (c) ⇒ **Authorized Representation in Pol-mkng Bargain**
   (5) [Account, Mand, & Auth Rep in all but 89°in Maj/ Prop]

   f. **Const’l Designs as Visions Maj/Prop Dem:**
      (1) Concentration/dispersal political [rep & ] power ⇒ Classify by elect & pol-mkng rules & implications
      (2) **Electoral Systems:** Rules of Rep: Duverger’s Law
         (a) Strategic decisions of parties in offering candidates
(b) Strategic decisions of citizens in voting for candidates
(c) Mechanical effects rules aggregate votes into rep seats

(3) Pol-mkng Rules: Majoritarian & Proportional Visions

(a) Exec-Legislative Relations
   i) Maj: rules favor 1 prty maj full control pol-mkng, w/o check or division
   ii) Prop: rules favor all rep’d parties prop’ly influence pol-mkng, govt to negotiate w/ others, esp. opp.

(b) Opposition Influence: 1=Prop, 1=Maj
   i) Lack of tightly cohesive, disciplined parties
   ii) Strength of Committee System (2 components)
      a) Committees influential, not mere rubber stamp: # committees; Fixed areas spec.  
         (jurisdictional expertise); Corresp. comm & minist. jurisdicts; Restrictions # comm  
         assignments per legislator
      b) Committees give pol-mkng scope to actors not fully tied to govt (esp. opposition):  
         Prop distrib comm chairs (not maj gets all); Or any other mech that prevents maj full-  
         control of comm reflects

(c) Other Institutional Features that Disperse Power
   i) Independent Executives (presidentialism): veto & decree pows esp., & esp. diff  
      constituency than parl
   ii) 2nd Legis Chamber w/ Indep Select Base & Veto+ Pow
   iii) Federalism: local-level author not fully dep on cntrl
   iv) Judicial Review
g. Why constitutional designs so stable?
(1) Incumbs won under exist sys, rarely incentive to Δ
(2) Internally log’ly consistent philos Maj or Prop
(3) If ~wide & grt disaff, voters grtly disapp. big rules manip
(4) 1st few elects under new elect rules, & first few acts under new pol-mkng rules, highly uncertain
   (a) This important to note in its own right.
   (b) Maybe too a reason constit’s stable: risk aversion

h. Consequences:
(1) Citizens & Policymakers approach elections w/ great knowledge/expertise in how system works
(2) Unless can Δ sys self, prty & voter strategies highly dep on sys w/in which operate & Δ grtly affected by sys rules

---

Table 2.2: Legislative Decision Rules: Concentrating Governmental Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Over Ten Standing Committees</th>
<th>Corresponding to Government Departments</th>
<th>Committee Chair to Opposition</th>
<th>Rules encourage some dispersal of influence in legislature?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Shared</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Shared</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Shared</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Shared</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Shared</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Shared</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Table 2.2. Election Rules and Consequences in Twenty Democratic Newer Parties and Greater Disproportionality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative Elections Rules¹</th>
<th>Effective Number of Parties²</th>
<th>New/Seats</th>
<th>Disproportionality¹</th>
<th>Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multinumer districts – pure proportional representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>(2.6)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>(4.9)</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>(1.9)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>(5.4)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>(3.0)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>(3.3)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>(2.0)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>(7.1)</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>(4.0)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>(8.8)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*Major changes: Greece in 1986–90 only; Norway 1989; H, France 1986 (CR); Austria and Sweden used higher PR thresholds only for the very unionization council; 1994 excluded; N = 155.

*Effective Thresholds* (Lijphart 1994, 15–20) in parentheses.
*Effective Number of Parties* from Lijphart and Toumpos 1979.
*Collegial disproportionality measure (Lijphart 1994, 85).
Table 2.3. Two Dimensions of Constitutional Rules:
The Potential to Concentrate Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative Election Rules¹</th>
<th>Legislative Committee Rules²</th>
<th>Mixed: Weak Committee with Shared Chairs or Vice Versa</th>
<th>Government Domination of Committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pure proportional representation</td>
<td>Opposition Influence Facilitated in Committees</td>
<td>Finland*</td>
<td>Greece 1989–92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multimember districts with increased distortion potential</td>
<td>Norway pre-1989</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-member districts</td>
<td></td>
<td>United States*</td>
<td>Australia*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>France*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The upper houses in Australia, Germany, and the United States and the presidencies in France and the United States occasionally provide added possibilities for dispersed power in policymaking. Legislation involving increased taxes required a two-thirds majority in Finland until 1992. Committee systems were mixed in Denmark before 1973 and Sweden before 1970.

¹Classification from table 2.1
²Classification from table 2.2.

Predom’ly Prop: AU, BE, DE, FI, GE, IT, NE, NO, SW, SZ
Predom’ly Maj: AL, CA, FR, GR, NZ, UK
Mixed: IR, JA, SP, US
LXVII. Accountability: Conditions for Citizen Control (Ch3)

A. One core dem/autoc diff: accountability
   1. “throw rascals out”: retrospective
   2. threat of eviction ⇒ incentive follow cit pref’s
   3. Ultimate guarantee connection cit to pol-mkrs & key to majoritarian dem theory esp.

B. How freq’ly & eff’ly do voter pun/rew incumbent⇒ Δgovt
   1. Table 3.1 & Fig 3.1:
      a. Avg vote loss -2% for incumbent’s
      b. Strong relation to govt change, but not perfect relation
      c. Whole notion partial Δ strange from maj perspective
         (1) In prop: partial Δ 38%, no Δ 44%, wholesale Δ just 14%
         (2) In maj, no Δ 60%, wholesale 40%, partial=very rare
      d. Jagged maj side reflects disprop, but also prox 50% seats
      e. Smooth PR side reflects vision: 11% gov% w/ vote%
   2. How cit’s use this aspect/vision voting effectively?
      a. Cit’s need know clearly who’s responsible for policy
      b. Cit’s need opportun. to vote simply & clearly for/against

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incumbent Vote Change</th>
<th>Change in Government Parties After Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loses over 5%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loses 1-5%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None or gain</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Cases: 155 legislative elections in twenty democracies, from 1969 through 1994. Also includes elections in 1957 and 1968 in France, Italy, and Sweden. United States includes only congressional elections in years of concurrent presidential elections. Elections in Norway 1973, Italy 1994, and Spain 1982 are excluded because the configuration of parties changed so much between elections that it was not possible to calculate gains or losses of governing parties.
C. Clarity of Responsibility:
1. Single, unified, identifiable set of policymakers [ & alts]
2. pm authority concentrated ntl leg & exec + unified & disciplined (strong) governing party & alternatives
3. Govt Type (in 1 order of CoR):
   a. Minority Govt:
      (1) hard to know ° govt or opp resp;
      (2) hard to know what coal behind what
   b. Minority Govt w/ Fixed & Known Outside Support
      (1) hard to know ° govt or opp resp or some other coal;
      (2) hard, but easier than a, know what coal behind what
   c. Post-Election Negotiated Majority Multiparty Govt
      (1) Resp for control more-clearly concentrated in govt, but
      (2) Parties ran against other, w/ diff individ platforms and
      (3) Diff know ° prtys w/in govt resp & how comp’d/barg’d
   d. Pre-Election Confirmed Majority Multiparty Govt
      (1) Resp for control more-clearly concentrated in govt and
      (2) Prtys ran togeth, w/ joint plat or states re: plan, but
      (3) Still diff know “prtys in gov resp issxiss b/c comp & barg
   e. Majority Single-Party Govt:
      (1) Esp if disc, CoR near-perfect
(2) What still present to complicate matter for voters?

4. Evidence:
   a. “Economic Voting” Evidence
   b. Corr w/ “Expert Ratings” Opposition Influence (Table 3.2)

5. Table 3.2-3: Majority Status Govt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Majority Status of Incumbent Government¹</th>
<th>Rating of Influence of Opposition Parties on Government Policy² (Average Score)</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pure minority</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported minority</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postelection majority coalition</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preelection majority coalition</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-party majority government</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹The government status of the countries in 1989 was as follows: pure minority = Denmark, Ireland, Norway; supported minority = Sweden; postelection coalition majority = Austria, Belgium, Italy; preelection coalition majority = Germany, Netherlands; single-party majority = Australia, Canada, Greece, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, United Kingdom. Because of unreliable majority status, Finland, France and the United States are not included here. See text note 6. For individual country scores, see Table 5.1 below.

²The opposition ratings are averages from a survey of experts in each country initiated in February 1989; because of too few respondents, results were not reported for Switzerland (Juffer and Hunt 1991).
Table 3.3: Majority Status of Incumbent Governments in 156 Elections, 1969–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pure Minority</th>
<th>Supported Minority</th>
<th>Postelection Coalition Majority</th>
<th>Preelection Coalition Majority</th>
<th>Single-Party Majority</th>
<th>Average Majority Status Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>91 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>75 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>77 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5**</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>65 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>74 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>89 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53 (8)</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>85 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>65 (8)</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>100 (8)</td>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>72 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>80 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5**</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>67 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Totals</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>67 (156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Percentage</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Some of these governments held legislative majorities but fell short of the two-thirds required to pass legislation requiring tax increases, hence their majority status is more doubtful.

**This category refers to the U.S. "divided government" situation in which one party controls Congress, the other the presidency.

*Elections in 1967 and 1968 in France, Italy, and Sweden are included. The numbers in parentheses on the far right are the numbers of elections in each country. All elections are legislative. The number under each majority status category is the clarity of responsibility score assigned to that category (from 20 to 100).
6. Additional Issues & Modifying Considerations
   a. Diff to assess pres relative to parl sys on this [P: US Divided Govt≈maj coal, Unified≈1-prty maj Disc?]
   b. Leg & Exec sep-pow allows separate accountability, but also blurs respons & complicates voters’ assessment task
   c. Party Cohesion also critical to CoR
   d. Govt Duration [as in Lijphart, circularity here]
   e. Federalism & Dcntrlztn [Powell too soft on Fed in this]
   f. Effective Bicam. Opposition (real power & distinct basis)
   g. Committee Influence (Power & Prop/Inclusive Allocation)
   h. [SE Struct Cond’s: stuff beyond pm control? Globalization]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>No*</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
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<td>29</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
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<td>No*</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some</td>
</tr>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>No*</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>36</td>
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</tr>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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<td>United States</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Some</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Democratic parties experienced divisions on the language issue in the late 1960s and 1970s, eventually leading the major parties to split. Disputes in the Greek New Democracy Party precipitated early elections in 1991. In Spain the PPDC disintegrated into competing factions between 1979 and 1981 and did not contest the 1982 elections as a united party.

*Months in office figured from the last election or from the time the government was formed, whichever is less, to a maximum of thirty-six months.

*Opposition parties' share legislative committee chairmanships and committees have significant influence (see chap. 2).
D. Final Measure of CoR & Prelim Evidence
1. Govt Type & Cohesion most strongly & robustly corr w/ govt vote loss & expert judge opp infl [poor tests]
2. Table 3.5 (govt type adjusted for cohesion only)

**Table 3.5. Clarity of Responsibility: A Preliminary Overview**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Average Majority Status of Incumbent Government</th>
<th>Diffusion of Responsibility Due to Lack of Government Party Cohesion</th>
<th>Modified Average Clarity of Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>None (some post-1993)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>No (some bicameral)</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1993 only</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>80*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>77*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>No (some bicameral)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1979–82 only</td>
<td>68*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>60*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Substantial (−30)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Early 1970s only</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Substantial (−30)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Substantial (−30)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Substantial (−30)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In these countries there were often sharp differences in government majority status from election to election. (Standard deviation over the cross-national average of 3%)*

LXVIII. *Conditions Mandates: Identifiability & Majority (Ch4)*
A. Promises=winners auth’d & oblig’d: prospective
B. Criteria: Voter needs to be able...
   1. ...to anticipate govt that will form as response to votes
   2. ...to expect govt’s cohesive, durable efficacy to fulfill
   3. = Identifiability & Efficacy (Responsivity & Responsibility)
C. **Identifiability**: Key=nature elect & part comp for gov  
1. Strong 2-prty comp govt maj ⇒ most identifiable, but (n.b., almost exclusively manufactured)  
2. Formal Pre-election Coalitions  
3. Highly predictable or regularized coalition patterns  
4. No pre-determ’d or strongly expected post-elect govts  
5. Table 4.1 gives specific operationalization  
6. [N.b., many mixed situations: e.g., agreements or firm expectations on one side/part only.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Can Elector</th>
<th>Does an Identified Government Receive a Legislative Majority?</th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>27% (N=42)</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>22% (N=37)</td>
<td>Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Legislative majority only! Pre-election coalition</td>
<td>8% (N=13)</td>
<td>Australia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single party</td>
<td>26% (N=40)</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, France, Greece, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, United Kingdom, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Voter Majority Pre-election coalition</td>
<td>10% (N=14)</td>
<td>Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single party</td>
<td>6% (N=10)</td>
<td>Austria, Ireland, Sweden, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percent Cases</td>
<td></td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>156 Elections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In seven of these cases the legislative majority was won by the party or coalition that finished second in the voting, see text n. 7 and also the discussion in chapter 6.

D. **Identifiability (nec cond) PLUS strong majority (suff)**  
1. Normatively as well as positively important to *Mandate*  
2. Maj voting-eligible cits exceedingly rare, maj of voters somewhat rare, so mostly accept maj parl (seats), which common in some systems.  
3. Table 4.2 combines *Mandate Conditions*  
4. Same set qualifying conditions as Accountability, but govt duration non-issue b/c strong majorities last  
5. ⇒ *Table 4.3 Net Final Mandate Efficacy Measure*

E. **Fig 4.1: Map Const Designs – Account & Mand**
### Table 4.3: Problems Attenuating Conditions for Party Mandates linkage: Even Where Election Governments Were Identifiable and One Received a Majority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Basic Mandate</th>
<th>Blocked Mandate</th>
<th>Net Mandate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Subtract 2.5</td>
<td>Less 25 for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Opposition Controls</td>
<td>Committee System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Average identifiability of future governments at time of next election scored 25 points: low = 0, moderate = 25, high = 50; from categories in Table 4.3. If government does not command a legislative majority after election, basic mandate score is 0.
2. Subtract 2.5 points from basic mandate score if, after the election, the opposition controls either a lower house or strong presidency, or that government party lacks legislative cohesion.
3. Majority is 100.
4. Subtract an additional 2.5 points from blocked mandate score if majority government loses legislative control or shares power with opposition, even if mixed system (from Table 4.1). Majority is 100.

---

![Graph](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

**Figure 4.1: Majority Control Conditions, by Constitutional Design**
LXIX. Vision Dispersed Pow: Auth’d Representation (Ch5)

A. Two Key Stages:
1. Proportionality in Selection to Representative Arena
2. Proportionality in Input from Representatives to Pol-mkng
3. = truer majorities & better minority protection
4. #2 never fully, ranges from opp=0 influ (seek sway pub-op) to oversight & veto pow’s, effect supra-maj req’s etc.
5. N.b., apparent broad normative appeal:
   a. Cab-seats typ. proportionally allocated among govt.
   b. Comm-seat alloc. often prop (but chairs less uniformly)

B. Proportionality in Selection to Representative Arena
1. N.b., diversity w/in groups represented ⇒
   a. Difficult for delegate to act as perfect rep.
   b. Only perfectly rep assembly is whole.
2. At party level, however, straightforward: Table 5.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative Election Rules</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proportionally Allocated</th>
<th>Seats in the Opp.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multi-member districts</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Proportionality in Input from Representatives to Pol-mkng
1. Powell’s Approach: Weigh 3 Sets Voters
   a. Supporters of Govt Parties: 100% effective representation
   b. Supporters of Gov-Supp Parties: 75% effect rep
   c. Supporters Opp Parties: 10%-50% effect rep, depending on institutional-structural conditions↓↓ opp influence
   d. See Table 5.2
2. Institutional-structural conditions on opp influence
   a. Majority Status Govt (Govt Type, roughly as above)
   b. Committee Strength (as above)
   c. See Table 5.3
### Table 5.4: How Final Adjusted Measure Effect Rep Works

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Opportunity for Influence</th>
<th>Opportunity for Influence confiscated or low</th>
<th>Opportunity for Influence Carnegie or High</th>
<th>Opportunity for Influence Carnegie or High and Influence Carnegie or High (Carnegie or High and Opportunity for Influence Carnegie or High)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **Table 5.4: How Final Adjusted Measure Effect Rep Works**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of Vote</th>
<th>Voters Who Voted for Parties Now in Government</th>
<th>Voters Who Voted for Parties Supporting Government from Outside</th>
<th>Voters Who Voted for Parties Now in Opposition</th>
<th>Total Conditions for Effective Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(39 * .63) = 24</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(14 * .35) = 5</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(62 * .75) = 47</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(41 * .63) = 26</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(46 * .45) = 21</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(43 * .35) = 15</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(43 * .35) = 15</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(51 * .63) = 32</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(45 * .35) = 16</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(51 * .52) = 27</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(41 * .22) = 9</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(42 * .35) = 15</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(38 * .35) = 13</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(45 * .10) = 5</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(43 * .22) = 9</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(41 * .20) = 8</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(37 * .10) = 4</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(40 * .10) = 4</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(37 * .10) = 4</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>18 * .75 = 13</td>
<td>(41 * .10) = 4</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1From Table 4.2, except that in Denmark, France, and Norway the governments did not last the entire period between the elections. The scores for these three countries are the average for each government term after the election.
2Scores are percentage of seats won by opposition parties.
3Scores of percentage of seats won by opposition parties, as in Table 5.3, for the appropriate years and situations (as in
4. *Ch 5 Appendix*: Alternative formulation for minority govts would weigh opp by prob it part pm coal, which one could perhaps relate to ideol distance from govt ctr.

D. **Fig 5.1: Map Const Designs – Auth’d Rep**

**Figure 5.1. Effective Authorized Representation, by Constitutional Design**

**Wk 12: Parliamentary Govt Formation & Dissolution, Pt 1: Unidimensional Models**

**LXX. The Centrality of the “Politics of Coalition”**

A. 1-prty-maj govt rel’ly rare in democ, esp. in PR systems

B. Even parl sys, even 1-prty leg maj not abrogate *pol coal*
   1. Single-party govt more often minority than majority
   2. Potential alt govts (possibly coals) bckgrnd even if maj now
   3. Even in single-party sys., “politics of coalition” often w/in party, amongst factions (Jap LDP, e.g.)

C. In pres. sys, can view day-to-day pol of assembling maj behind individ pieces legis. as repeated play of coal pol

D. Once formed, govt continually subject to parl’s ability to unseat it → more politics of coalition

E. Dem Pol-mkng virtually all about form & maintain coals

**LXXI. Two Central Q’s Regarding Politics of Coalition:**

A. Govt partisan composition & cab-ministry allocation

B. Durability / instability of govts

**LXXII. Executive Stability (Powell II, ch. 7)**

A. **P** had already estab’d 2 key facts re: exec performance
   1. Const’l factors dominate explanation of exec perf (ch.2-4)
      a. Presidential sys => durable, but often minority, govts
      b. Majoritarian Parl. sys. => durable, usually maj, govts
      c. Representative Parl. sys. => unstable, occas’ly min, govts
2. Presence string extremist parties key aspect resp. parl. sys. that \textit{\(=\text{negative}\)} exec-perf outcomes (ch.5)

B. Govt Formation & Stability Arguments:

1. Parties’ Motivations 2-fold (n.b., parties as unitary actors)
   a. Desire to participate in & control (current) policymaking
      (1) For both \textit{intrinsic (“policy-seeking”) reasons} parties care about what policies are made—and
      (2) \textit{instrumental (“office-seeking”) reasons} parties & party members wish to remain in govt,
         which requires voter support, which presumably depends on policies
   b. Parties also motivated by considering ramifications of current acts for future ability to participate
      \textit{(i.e., esp. future elect ramifications)}

2. What sorts of govt will form then?
   a. Implies that govt will tend to form that contain...
      (1) as few prty as poss to max seats/prty for spoils & infl u reasons
      (2) as little ideol dissent as poss to make pol’s as close to ideal as poss
      (3) sufficient parl. support to pass necessary initiatives
   b. Goals often conflict, but knowing these goals will often suffice to predict what govt-types will form
      & endure

3. Evidence on Govt Formation: Powell’s 4 Rules
   a. \textbf{#1: When a single-party majority can form it will}
      (1) 23/25 such cases (1965-75) follow the rule
      (2) 2 that didn’t were “oversized” govt [DEF], formed after strong pre-elec. alliance yielded
         surprise maj for 1 ally
      (3) But \textit{Oversize & Minority}[DEF] govt not so rare, partly explained...
   b. \textbf{#2: Coal’s usu. formed of ideologically connected [DEF] prty}

\begin{center}
\begin{figure}[h!]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure7_1.png}
\caption{Single-dimensional view of parties in Finland and Italy: Basis of connected coalitions, 1967-1976.}
\end{figure}
\end{center}

(1) Adding connecting prty to o/w separated coal lowers avg ideol distance b/w govt prty & thereby
perhaps facilitates compromise
(2) lessens \(\circ\) to which separated parties seen (by mems & voters) as deviating from ideals in joining
coalition
(3) \text{[parties b/w others in coal. can add legis. support w/o requiring much/any further policy-}
compromise]
(4) however, adding any party does require further division of spoils]
c. #3: Where “Minimum-Winning-Connected-Coalition” Govts possible, they usually form
d. #4: Non-maj govts & non-MWCC govts form most frequently where extremist party support high (>15%)

4. Legislative Circumstances behind types of Minority Govt
a. Crisis Caretakers:
   (1) Intense conflict among polarized major players ⇒ passive minority govt as temporary measure
   (2) P. calls these caretakers, but other give term narrower meaning
b. Pre-election Minorities:
   (1) Often formed after elect. in sys that usu⇒1-prty-maj fails to do so
   (2) Larger of 2 holds office (assumed temporarily) while new elections prepared, which assumed to fix prob.
   (3) If not, min. govt will typ. try to serve w/ outside supp.
c. Active Minority Govt:
   (1) Minority party or coal. secures outside supp. from other legis. grps
   (2) Vary in formality (tacit to written, detailed agree’s) & fixity (same outside supp always to potentially diff set of supp for each law)

5. Typical Govt Duration by Govt Type:
   a. Expectations:
      (1) 1-prty-maj most durable, then minimum-winning-connected
      (2) Over-sized & unconnected govts should be less durable
      (3) Minority govts among least durable; & among these:
         (a) caretakers least durable,
         (b) pre-election bit more durable,
         (c) & externally-supported most durable
   b. Evidence:
      (1) SPMajG most durable, MWCC not much less, externally-supp Min can be reasonably dur., all others less, esp. crisis caretakers
      (2) But perhaps surprisingly: oversized coals least stable of bunch
   c. Fig7.2 sums P’s view: strong extremist presence again key
Figure 7.2  Cabinet durability: A path model of environmental effects mediated through election outcomes and legislative coalition formation. Reduced standardized regression coefficients, 1967–1976.\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental conditions</th>
<th>Electoral outcomes</th>
<th>Cabinet outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP per capita (log) (1)</td>
<td>(-.59) \rightarrow\text{Volatility of party representation in legislature (9)}</td>
<td>(-.27) \rightarrow\text{Minimum winning coalition government (11)} +.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian election laws (2)</td>
<td>(+.20) \rightarrow\text{Fractionalization of legislature (8)}</td>
<td>(-.20) \rightarrow\text{Cabinet durability (12)}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social heterogeneity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic minority (3)</td>
<td>(+.10) \rightarrow\text{Fractionalization of legislature (8)}</td>
<td>(\ldots)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization (4)</td>
<td>(+.27) \rightarrow\text{Single-party majorities (10)}</td>
<td>(\ldots)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural minority (5)</td>
<td>(+.20) \rightarrow\text{Extremist-party representation in legislature (7)}</td>
<td>(\ldots)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian election laws (2)</td>
<td>(-.40) \rightarrow\text{Extremist-party representation in legislature (7)}</td>
<td>(\ldots)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social heterogeneity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic minority (3)</td>
<td>(+.15) \rightarrow\text{Extremist-contender-party voting support, early 1960s (6)}</td>
<td>(\ldots)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization (4)</td>
<td>(+.66) \rightarrow\text{Extremist-contender-party voting support, early 1960s (6)}</td>
<td>(\ldots)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural minority (5)</td>
<td>(\ldots)</td>
<td>(\ldots)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} The arrows and path coefficients represent the standardized regression coefficients significant at the .10 level in a set of recursive regression equations. As indicated by the direction of the arrows, the model assumes that all variables with smaller identifying numbers are causally prior to variables with larger identifying numbers. Election outcome equations are computed on 60 elections, each country weighted equally. Cabinet outcome equations are computed on 84 cabinets, each country weighted equally. Specific equations, variables, and sources are described in the Appendix.
C. Comparing Presidential & Parliamentary Govts
   1. Pres sys all have durable exec’s relatively indep of party sys or political & social environ, but exec often lacks legis maj (divided govt common to pres. sys., not unique to US)
   2. Pres sys assoc. w/ weaker parties (less unitary), perhaps exactly b/c party can vote against exec w/o risk dissolution
   3. Weak party discipline also what makes exec remaining in power w/o legislative majority feasible
   4. At same time, it means presidents do not enjoy anything like degree of legislative control that PM’s do
   5. If anything, separated powers work to require more complex negotiations b/w exec’s & legis.’s, esp. since usu. different elect. constituencies (Pres=ntnl, Legis=sub-ntnl)

LXXIII. Lijphart, Ch.6: Concentration vs Sharing Exec Pow

A. Core Maj vs Cons:
   1. 1-prty-maj vs multi-prty-coal;
   2. more spec. ranking: 1-Prty-Maj—Multi-Prty MWC/1-Prty-Min—Multi-Prty Oversize/Minority

B. Coalition Theories:
   1. If 1-prty maj possible, usu forms.
      a. Base Assume: parties max pow, cab=pow, ⇒ as many cab seats poss
      b. ⇒Only include prtys strictly nec to install & maintain govt
   4. Minimum-Parties Coal’s (Leierson ‘70): Fewest prtys poss to MWC ⇒ ↓ barg & negotiation costs form & maint coal
   5. Minimal Ideological-Range Coal’s (deSwaan ‘73): ease form & maintain coal’s of prtys w/ similar pref’s. Several versions:
      a. Maj coal’s w/ smallest L-R distance to obtain its majority (GLM use)
      b. Maj coal’s w/ smallest L-R distance of possible majorities (L uses)
   6. Minimum Connected Coal’s that Win (Axelrod ‘70):
      a. Parties try to coalesce w/ ideol neighbors, continue until majority.
      b. Adding connecting prty to o/w separated coal lowers avg ideol distance b/w govt prtys & thereby perhaps facilitates compromise
      c. Additional logics to connected coal’s from Powell & me above:
         (1) lessens to which separated parties seen (by mems & voters) as deviating from ideals in joining coalition
         (2) [parties b/w others in coal. can add legis. support w/o requiring much/any further policy-compromise]
   7. Policy-Viable Coalitions (Laver & Schofield ‘90):
      a. If solely policy-motivated, & policy req’s legis maj, then govt’l membership & majority irrel., just party pivotal-ness in leg barg ⇒
      b. ‘Core-Prty’ Govt: core≈assuming sincere voting, cannot assemble majority w/o; e.g., in 1D, =median, so ⇒ Median-Party Govt
      c. If add reasons to be in govt, e.g., office-seeking or agenda-power, then ⇒ MWC’s containing median parties
C. **Empirical Prob:** all but Axelrod=MWC; all=maj, but oversize & minority govts not at all rare [Tab 6.2].

**Expl?**

1. **Why Minority Govt?** parties’ time-perspective? Stay out for now to gain some future electoral advantage?

2. **Why Oversize Govt?**
   a. Insurance against defection (uncertain & uncommitted allies)
   b. Policy-based theories predict occasional oversize (not enough)
   c. Grand coal’s as unity signal re: foreign ( & sometimes other) threats

3. But all still majoritarian, need real **theory minority govt**

---

**Table 6.1** Cabinet coalitions predicted by six coalition theories for a hypothetical distribution of parliamentary seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties:</th>
<th>A (Left)</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E (Right)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seats:</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theories:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal winning coalition</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>ADE</td>
<td>BCD</td>
<td>BE</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum size</td>
<td></td>
<td>ADE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bargaining proposition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BE</td>
<td></td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal range</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td></td>
<td>BCD</td>
<td></td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal connected winning</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td></td>
<td>BCD</td>
<td></td>
<td>CDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-viable coalition</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td></td>
<td>BCD</td>
<td></td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.2** Proportions of time during which five types of cabinets were in power in thirty-two parliamentary democracies, 1945–96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of cabinet</th>
<th>All cabinets (%)</th>
<th>All cabinets except minimal winning, one-party cabinets (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimal winning, one-party</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal winning coalition</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority, one-party</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority coalition</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversized coalition</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Based on data in Woldendorp, Keman, and Fudge 1998; Banks, Day, and Muller 1997; Müller and Strøm 1997; Strøm 1990; von Beyme 1985; and Koos’s Contemporary Archives*
a. Lack vote investiture may preserve minority
b. Constructive vote no confidence (in Germany, or sim majority against req in France) may preserve minority (as well as foster maj)
c. Committee strength & other sources opposition influence

4. Likewise, need better theory oversize govt
a. Constitutional revisions may require >50% majorities
b. Some agenda policies may require >50% majorities
c. [n.b., these not truly oversize then.]

5. N.b., some similarity minority & oversize govt, esp. in somewhat optional & flexible nature of govt support.

D. Presidential Cabinets:
1. Re: keeping office, pres exec & cab always MWC 1-prty maj
2. Re: passing agenda, may be Min, MWC, or oversize (flex).

LXXIV. Building & Maintaining (Parl.) Govt (GLM ch.12)

A. 2 Cntrl Q’s: Govt Comp & Cab-min Alloc; G Durability
B. The Party Composition of Govts
1. [Always recall that...] elects still paramount in that determine actual & expected legis wt of prty actors in govt-form drama
2. Politicians motivated by some combo (a) “fame & power” (opportunistic/office-seeking) & (b) desire influence pub pol (polic-/outcome-seeking), & these diff implic’s in govt form
   a. Pure office-seeking ⇒ min-win logic: don’t share seats any further than must ⇒ oversized govts a puzzle
   b. Pure pol-seeking ⇒ ideol/pref-compatibility ⇒ median-prty govt
   c. Combination of these motivations may suggest:
      (1) Minimum-winning-connected (Axelrod)
      (2) Minimum-ideological-range-winning (de Swaan)

C. Min. ( & oversize) govts not rare, so coal thry should expl them too; all such theories rely on prty’s pol motives
1. Minority Govts, Hypotheses:
   a. Strom: as ability of parties to influence pol from opp ↑, freq min govt↑ [Fig (mine): data strongly supports–Opp Influ measure used here from Laver & Hunt, not Strom, so helps his case]

   b. Luebbert: ↑ role of interest grps & org’s outside parl. (esp. corporatist-type policymaking) ↓ necessity of being in govt to influ pol, so should ↑ minority govts: might explain Scand, but Germany, Austria, & Italy? Need multivariate analysis to consider this...
c. Laver & Shepsle: ↑ pol divisions among opp’s ⇒ ↓ ability to form alt govt, which should enable minority-govt formation—especially centrist govts can do this [we’ll see this arg closer later in Laver & Shepsle]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Majoritarian/Corporatism</th>
<th>Opp infl</th>
<th>% Min. Govt</th>
<th>SPMa</th>
<th>MWC</th>
<th>SurgMaC</th>
<th>SPMi</th>
<th>MiC</th>
<th>Caretaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6.67%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.15</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.25</td>
<td>13.21%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>13.21%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
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<td>0.25</td>
<td>31.58%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>31.58%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>31.58%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>31.58%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE</td>
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<td>0.25</td>
<td>43.64%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

Regression Output:

- Constant: 0.341111
- Std Err of Y Est: 0.2265675
- R Squared: 0.8291034
- No. of Observations: 18
- Degrees of Freedom: 16
- X Coefficient(s): -0.308772
- Std Err of Coef: 0.110511
- t-statistic: -2.794039
- Opp infl: X Coefficient(s): 0.2295141
- Std Err of Coef: 0.1324652
- t-statistic: 1.7320235

2. Oversized Govts, Hypotheses:
   a. *Govts of national unity:* several observed oversized govts occur immed postwar, only occas. after & then usu. short-lived & arise in *crises*
   b. Policy agenda in some sit’s may require super-maj. (Bel. notable)⇒ not all seeming oversized govts actually “surplus”
   c. Laver & Shepsle: extra parties may be included for signals they send [to whom?] about govt’s policy stance
d. Luebbert: dominant party(s) in coal may want surplus minor parties so no one smaller-party ally has veto
e. [surplus govts maybe esp. likely when MWC bridges smaller intermed party b/c little further policy-compromise necessary to ↑ legis strength of govt. May add to Luebbert’s argument in particular]
f. [party discipline? Surpluses in Italy, e.g., may have stemmed from need of extra “insurance” support]

3. Some examples of govt formation
a. Figure 12-1: Ireland after January 1993 elect (MWC)
b. Figure 12-2: Sweden after Oct. 1991 elect (minority coal)

c. Figure 12-3: Italy after July 1987 elect (surplus majority)
D. The Allocation of Cabinet Portfolios

1. Cabinet govt:
   a. Cab serves as cntrl decision-making committee: by time bills referred from cab. to parl. for full-parl votes, = done deal. In fact, most decisions do not require direct legislative assent.
   b. Vote of confidence theoretically gives parl control of cab, & ultimately it does, but only if parl willing to risk govt collapse over issue in Q = much latitude to cab mems, esp. w/in dept competence (more in L & S)
   c. Two Q’’s:
      (1) How many seats to each party?
      (2) Which portfolios to which parties?

2. How many seats allocated to each party?
   a. Proportional to share of legis. maj.: 90% of variation in party share of cab seats explained by party share of govt’s legis. maj. (e.g., Govt has 40 seats in parl, party Y has 10 => party Y gets 1/4 of cab. seats).
   b. Among strongest empir rels p.s., even though not const’l req anywhere

3. Which seats to which parties?
   a. Tendency for med prty on each pol D w/ a cab dept to get that portfol
   b. Tendency for prty most cntrly interested in pol D to get that portfolio
   c. Why? Cab Mins=agenda-setters in their pol area & have considerable latitude in policymaking: ⇒
      (1) who gets what portfol cntrl to govt pol position & likely pol outputs
      (2) cab reshuffles more important than often realized
      (3) ideological positions of cab mins perhaps only credible signals govt’s policy stance in that policy area
      (4) power shifts w/in parties fund’ly affects rel’s b/w them

E. The Stability of Parliamentary Govts

1. What exactly counts as Δgov not universally agreed. Issues:
   a. Agreed that change in partisan composition of cabinet is a change in govt & that change of PM is change of govt.
   b. Not quite all agree that every govt forming after election=change govt even if same make-up
   c. Nor do all agree that if govt resigns & then is reformed with same PM & party make-up, that this is a new govt
   d. Such ambiguity not so common that makes much diff. It matters some, but can proceed from here

2. Explaining Duration: Three sets of factors
   a. Features of Govt Itself
      (1) Number of parties in the govt (fractionalization)
      (2) Ideological distance b/w parties in govt (polarization)
      (3) Majority/Minority status of govt
   b. Features of the Political Environment
      (1) Party System: Larger, more diverse party systems ↓ govt duration because smaller shocks can change what coalition is an equilibrium
      (2) Other factors? [Powell: extremist party support]
   c. Shocks, events, & external circumstances [journalistic accounts invariably focus on these] (Warwick’s work)
      (1) Worsening economic conditions, esp. unemployment
      (2) Unemp especially bad for ctr-right; infl esp’ly bad for socialist-led
   d. [Note diff b/w journalism/politics & political science: pol sci not interested in specific circumstances & events that collapse specific govs, but systematic features which make govs more/less stable in general. Analogy: not interest in what particular spark caused some specific fire but what conditions make fires more likely.]

F. Evidence: from King, Alt, Burns, & Laver
Table 1. Reference Models of Coalition Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model:</th>
<th>1.1</th>
<th>1.2</th>
<th>1.3</th>
<th>1.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Censoring:</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variables

**Country attributes:**

- Identifiability (of alt. govs)
  - 0.399 (0.145)
- Opposition influence (auton. & spec. of committees)
  - 0.104 (0.222)
- Investiture (legal - req. existence)
  - -0.369 (0.172)
- Volatility (elect. supp. & in prev. elect)
  - 0.0002 (0.001)
- Responsiveness (prop. of entering parties that vote share)
  - -0.005 (0.043)

**Party structure attributes:**

- Fractionalization (effective # parties in parl.)
  - -0.0004 (0.001)
- Polarization (Powell's supp. for extremists)
  - -0.023 (0.010)

**Coalition attributes:**

- Numerical status (1 = maj.; 0 = min.)
  - 0.535 (0.154)
- Crisis duration (# days before govt. formed)
  - 0.009 (0.002)
- Opposition concentration (-)
  - 0.136 (0.088)
- Formation attempts (# failed coal. proposals before present)
  - -0.085 (0.048)

- Intercept
  - 3.385 (0.242)
  - 3.734 (0.289)
  - 2.653 (1.03)
  - 0.905 (0.208)

- Log-likelihood
  - -1187
  - -1025
  - -1017
  - -1030

**Note:** All estimates are based on 314 observations. Estimated standard errors appear under each coefficient in parentheses. Data were provided by Kaare Strom and are described in the text.
Table 2. Unified Models of Coalition Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model: Variables</th>
<th>2.1</th>
<th>2.2</th>
<th>2.3</th>
<th>2.4</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Country attributes:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifiability (of altern. govs)</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition influence (auton. dspec. of comm's)</td>
<td>-0.595</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investiture (existence of lega. req.)</td>
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<td>-0.504</td>
<td>-0.527</td>
<td>-0.384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Party structure attributes:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fractionalization (eff. #parties parl.)</td>
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<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.0013</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.0008)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polarization (supp. for extrem.)</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition attributes:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Numerical status (1 = maj; 0 = min.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crisis duration (#days before govt installed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Formation attempts (# attempts to form)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Controls:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postelection (1 = form rt. after elect; 0 if b/welects)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caretaker (1 if inter-govt caretaker; 0 = else)</td>
<td>-1.303</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.260)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.566</td>
<td>5.305</td>
<td>5.000</td>
<td>3.845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.324)</td>
<td>(0.693)</td>
<td>(0.616)</td>
<td>(0.635)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-1041</td>
<td>-1038</td>
<td>-1025</td>
<td>-1002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood with country identities added</td>
<td>-1025</td>
<td>-1024</td>
<td>-1012</td>
<td>-993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p = 0.001)</td>
<td>(p = 0.01)</td>
<td>(p = 0.01)</td>
<td>(p = 0.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All estimates are based on 314 observations. Estimated standard errors appear under each coefficient in parentheses. The probabilities under the "log-likelihood with country identities added" test the statistical significance of adding the country variables to each model. The probabilities derive.
Single-Dimensional Coalition-Formation Concepts

Minimal Winning Coalition (MWC): coalition whose member parties control parl majority & which contains no party unnecessary to do so; i.e., coalition obtaining maj. w/o any “surplus” parties. Need not be minimum-connected winning coalition or minimum-ideological-range winning coalition.

Minimum-Connected Coalition (that wins) (MCC): coalition whose member parties are ideologically adjacent, w/o ideol’ly intervening parties outside coal, & which contains no strict subset of parties sufficient for maj. Need not be MWC, but will be MIRCW.

Minimum-Ideological-Range Coalition (that wins) (MIRC): a coalition whose mems obtain majority w/o containing any other majority within its left-to-right span. I.e., coalition that spans no more ideological space, left-to-right, than necessary for maj. Need be neither MWC nor MCCW.

Single-Dimensional Coalition-Formation Concepts:

Example: Hypothetical Germany w/ parties arrayed left-to-right thus:

- PDS — Greens — SPD — A — B — FDP — CDU/CSU — R
- and with seats allocated thus:
  1.4% — 7.0% — 44.5%—2.0%—1.0%— 6.4% — 36.62% — 1%

Minimum Winning Coalitions (MWC): (Riker)
- Greens + SPD (also MCC & MIRC)
- SPD + FDP (not MCC but MIRC)
- SPD + CDU (neither MCC nor MIRC)
- CDU/CSU + FDP + Greens (neither MCC nor MIRC)
- Dummy Parties: PDS, A, B, R

Minimum Connected Coalitions that Win (MCC): (Axelrod)
- Greens—SPD (also MWC & MIRC)
- SPD—A—B—FDP (not MWC but MIRC)
- Dummy Parties: PDS, R

Minimum Ideological Range Coalitions that Win (MIRC): (de Swaan)
- Greens—SPD (also MWC & MCC)
- SPD—FDP (also MWC but not MCC)
- SPD—A—FDP (neither MWC nor MCC)
- SPD—B—FDP (neither MWC nor MCC)
- SPD—A—B—FDP (not MWC but MCC)
- Dummy Parties: PDS, R

Examples from German Parls (Bundestagen) Elect 1994 & 1998
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>L/R IDEOL</th>
<th>SEATS</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>L/R IDEOL</th>
<th>SEATS</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>3.025</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>3.025</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>4.055</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>4.055</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>6.055</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>6.055</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>11.25</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>11.25</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>13.975</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>13.975</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>672</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>669</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Minimum Winning Coalitions (Need 337):**

- CDU/CSU + FDP: 341 seats (60.7%)
- SPD + Greens: 347 seats (60.7%)

**Minimum Winning Coalitions (Need 335):**

- SPD + Greens: 341 seats (51.57%)
- CDU/CSU + SPD: 341 seats (51.57%)

**Notes:**

- Both of the minimum-connected winning coalitions are also minimum winning coalitions in this case.
- In 1994, Greens + PDS + SPD + FDP would be minimum connected winning but not both MWC and MCW.
- This would leave only CDU/CSU + FDP as both MWC and MCW.
- In 1998, Greens + PDS + SPD would be minimum connected winning but not both MWC and MCW.
- This would leave only SPD + FDP as both MWC and MCW.

**Minimum-Ideological-Range Winning (Need 337):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>CDU/CSU + FDP</th>
<th>SPD + Greens + FDP</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>SPD + Greens + FDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.715</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.205</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>51.75%</td>
<td>4.655</td>
<td>50.97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

- The following are not Minimum Ideological Range Winning Coalitions because they span one or the other coalitions above, but it may nonetheless be informative to note that these two minimum winning coalitions span greater ideological range than the above two.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>CDU/CSU + SPD</th>
<th>SPD + Greens + FDP</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>CDU/CSU + SPD</th>
<th>SPD + Greens + FDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.32</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>31.25%</td>
<td>7.37</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>31.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.32</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>51.04%</td>
<td>9.32</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>50.07%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Minimum-Ideological-Range Winning (Need 335):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>SPD + Greens + FDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.655</td>
<td>50.97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

- It is possible to construct examples where the minimum ideological-range winning coalitions are not minimum winning coalitions.
- It’s also possible to construct examples where minimum ideological-range winning coalitions are not minimum connected winning.
- The only necessary logical connection is that all minimum connected winning are also minimum ideological range winning. The opposite is not true. E.g., imagine 2 new parties, A&B, between SPD & Greens in 1996. Also imagine PDS and its 5.4% of the seats split among A&B.
- Then the following coalitions are minimum-ideological-range winning:
  - SPD + Greens
  - SPD + B + Greens
  - SPD + A + Greens
  - SPD + A + B + Greens
- Of these 4, only SPD + Greens is minimum winning, and only SPD + A + B + Greens is minimum connected winning, but it is still impossible to draw any minimum connected winning coalitions that is not also minimum ideological range winning.
What's a "game tree"?

The Prisoners' Dilemma

Confess

Stay Silent

(10 years, 10 years)

(5 years, 5 years)

(15 years, free)

(free, 15 years)

Stay Silent

Stay Silent

Prisoner One

Prisoner Two

How do we model actors' preferences & decisions?

Indifference Curves for (Simple) Euclidean Preferences

Foreign Policy

Economic Policy
Govt FORMATION & DISSOLUTION (Part II)
Laver & Shepsle, Making & Breaking Govts

LXXV. Substantive Background (Part I)

A. Centrality of Govt Formation & Dissolution
   1. Essence of parl dem: accountability govt (*syn*: cab., exec., admin.) to legis. where it must retain majority. (Leg., in turn, to voters.)
      a. Votes of investiture
      b. Votes of (no) confidence
   2. Nonetheless, cabinet retains wide latitude while remains in office
      a. Agenda setting
      b. Control over administrative departments (*syn*: cab. ministries, portfolios)
   3. Govt form & diss. at apex of set of links b/w voters, reps., parties...
   4. ∴ govt $\Delta \Rightarrow$ at least potential policy $\Delta$ (e.g., financial mkts respond)

B. The Role of Analytic Modeling
   1. Fundamental premise: general statements about politics of building & maintaining govt possible, & such general statements can give valuable insights into political processes.
   2. The advantages of deriving such general statements formally:
      a. Allows one logically to hold a set of variables constant & manipulate certain key variables—model may thus be used as discovery tool
         (1) Allows counterfactuals (w/in logical/modeled, if not actual/empirical, world).
         (2) Being more precise & explicit lets one check (mathematically) her intuitions & analyze further, sometimes discovering counter-intuitive features that may nonetheless prove empirically supported.
      b. Analytical model also systematic aid to constructing empirical models: can less-ambiguously tell us what to look for & how to look for it in the data.
   3. Logical abstraction (i.e. simplifying assumptions) essential to analytic models. BUT, no less essential to any other mode of theorizing. Theory is logical abstraction. Generally best to be as explicit as poss. about these *unavoidably* necessary assumptions.
   4. Mathematical (here: set theory & geometry) Modeling [a sermon]:
      a. Math just a language: specifically, symbolic language for expressing logic
         (1) Anything that follows logical laws can be expressed mathematically, and
         (2) Anything that cannot be expressed mathematically is illogical.
         (3) *Non-mathematical logic* = oxymoron.
      b. Like other foreign languages...
         (1) Fluency by using & being immersion.
         (2) No one born understanding it, & no one born without ability to learn it.
         (3) My opinion & experience: “I suck at math” usually means...
      c. Grad or prof. school?
         (1) Take some calculus, linear algebra, and/or probability & statistics
         (2) No math escape hatches! [OK, enough sermon]

C. Rationality & Analytic Modeling in the Social Sciences
   1. Rationality & Methodological Individualism:
      a. *Methodological Individualism*: Only human agency effects outcomes in social world that we study; therefore every social-scientific model must begin with establishing what motivates actors & how they make decisions
      b. Steps in Rational Models
         (1) Posit *aims or goals* (i.e., *utility*) (office & preferred policies) of key actors (politicians, esp. MPs) in phenom studied (govt formation & dissolution).
         (2) Define *decision rule* by which those actors choose b/w alternative possible actions, usu. assume actors rational in sense that they calculate (implicitly or explicitly) costs & benefits of various
actions to achieve their aims & select course of action with highest net benefit (lowest net cost).

2. Specifically, in this model of govt formation, we assume:
   a. Politicians policy-motivated; intrinsically or instrumentally doesn’t matter
   b. **Common Knowledge**: Policy aims of all players, all rules of govt-form. game, etc. known to all players.
   c. Politicians act given this knowledge to achieve best their aims; i.e., vote for or against govt's calculated to produce their most desired cabinet possible

3. **[Aside: rationality lends itself easily to math-model b/c “maximize net benefits” easily expressed as math problem, but any logically immutable decision rule can, in principle, be modeled, & any rule that cannot be so defined cannot produce logical consistency.**

D. Formal Theoretic Perspective on Govt Form & Diss Problem

1. Legacy: Some Important Prior Theoretical Results
   a. One Dimension
      (1) **Black (1958) Median Voter Theorem (MVT)**: (DEFINE)
         (a) If voters *single-peaked* pref’s defined on *single dimension* (e.g., left-right), then median-voter’s *ideal point* is only point majority-preferred to all others.
      (2) **Hotelling(1928)-Downs(1957) Party Competition Centripetal Tendency**:
         (a) Applied to 2-prty elects, MVT → strong incents parties converge toward median voter’s ideal
   b. Multiple Dimension Extensions:
      (1) McKelvey’s & Schofield’s “Chaos Theorems”:
         (a) w/ >1D, if choices not structured in restrictive ways: virtually certain that policy proposals will *cycle* around policy space, w/ no proposal majority-defeating all others
            i) => either perpetual flux or arbitrariness (Arrow’s *Impossibility Theorem*).
            ii) Strongly suggests inst’l restrictions on proposal- & decision-making process essential to non-arbitrary democratic decision-making: Shepsle’s *Structurally Induced Equilibrium*
      (b) Kadane (1972) showed that if eqbm exists in unstructured multi-D space (may not), then must be *multi-D median*, a.k.a. **Dimension-by-Dimension Median (DDM)**

2. Govt Formation-and-Dissolution Game in this context
   a. These prior results refer to *policies* emerging from maj-rule voting, not to *govts* forming subject to maj approval. Govt form & diss process may add *structure* that brings eqba to multi-D prob. L & S key contribution: show particular conception of govt form can do this.
   b. The Institutional Structure of Govt Decision-Making
      (1) Policy decisions are made by the executive.
      (2) Depts, & esp. their cab. mins, have agenda power & info., expertise, resource advantages that give them wide latitude in directing policy w/in their sphere
      (3) Ministers appointed are govt’s most credible signal of policy intent in that area
      (4) **Overall policy position of govt given by partisan position of politicians’ parties who are given the various cabinet portfolios.**
         (a) => even in multi-dimensional space, the set of possible policies for govt is finite.
         (b) Precisely this specificness, & finiteness of set of poss. govt policies (given by set of poss. party combo’s in cab. offices), limits “chaos” potential of multi-D decision-making.
   c. => Most important lesson of the volume:
      (1) Departmental Org. of Govt’l Decision-Making structures environment in which govt’s born, live, & die.
      (2) Eqbm cabinets :. differ from eqbm policies in unstructured environment.
      (3) Cabinet eqba common & usu. close to center of array of prty policy-positions.

LXXVI. Building Blocks of the Cabinet-Form.-and-Diss. Model

A. Motivations: office- and/or policy-motivated
   1. Politician & voter interaction in elections brings office-seeking & policy-seeking politicians to act alike
2. \( \therefore \) L & S no stand either way; just let MPs act “as if” pol.-motivated

B. Rational Foresight & Common Knowledge
   1. Politicians act (perhaps unconsciously) as if conducting (perhaps very sophisticated) C-B calculations regarding their options
   2. They can look ahead to do so: attempt to foresee consequences of actions & use that to inform current C-B analysis (chess analogy)
   3. Competing-players’ prefs common knowledge ( & rules of game...)
   4. Important tool: “Game Tree” [see PD example]

The Prisoners' Dilemma

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Confess} \\
\text{Stay Silent} \\
\text{Confess} \\
\text{Stay Silent} \\
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{(10 years, 10 years)} \\
\text{(free, 15 years)} \\
\text{(15 years, free)} \\
\text{(5 years, 5 years)} \\
\end{array} \]

- ● Prisoner One
- ○ Prisoner Two

C. Parties treated unitary actors
   1. Cabinet ministers discretion w/in their jurisdictions, but use it on behalf of, not against, their party.
   2. Practical implication: govt policy in each portfolio area given by partisan identity of its minister.

D. Dimensionality: how many dimensions will we consider?
   1. Theoretically infinite # may exist, but empirically great correlation in party stances across substantive dimensions.
   2. =>few core issues may suffice for fair party-pref descriptions
   3. Take competencies of core ministries (Finance, Foreign Affairs, & maybe Internal Affairs) as defining dimensions of policy space.

E. Rationality (Cost-Benefit Analysis) in 2D: Indifference Curves
F. *Ministerial Discretion:* Govts implement preferred policy of party holding each cab. min. in that min.’s area.
   3 sources:
   1. Mins. may act in area on what whole cab. not explicitly decided
   2. Mins. may influence which matters come to cab. for such decision
   3. Mins. may influence content of proposals they or others put to cab.

G. *Unitary parties + ministerial-policy + indivisible ministries* $\implies$ *limited number of possible govts (and thus policies)* to consider, as given by *lattice* of perpendicular intersections of parties’ ideal points [see example].
   2 key assumptions here:
   1. Party’s discretion in 1 portfolio not affected by who has others [?]
   2. Party’s preferences on 1 D not affected by policies on other D’s [?]
H. Parties incorporate *all expected* policy decisions into deciding whether to vote for particular cabinet => unforeseen matters (only) potential sources of cabinet collapse

I. The *Status Quo*:
   1. Current govt remains in office until defeated by legis. majority, which can only happen when...
      a. ...unforeseen circumstances Δ distrib. of legis. pow. that supp. govt at start,
      b. ...some party or parties shift their ideological positions (unforeseen), or
      c. ...some party or parties split or combine to new ideal points.
   2. When govt collapses, remains in office as caretaker until new govt receives majority support.

J. Any participant in a proposed govt can *veto* that govt by refusing to accept its proposed role => *all govts require unanimous consent of parties in it & majority support of all legis. parties*

K. [chronological (continuous) play of govt-formation game is given schematically in Figure 3.1, p. 52]
LXXVII. Working through the Model (Part II)

A. Equilibrium Cabinet: cabinet for which no actor with power to cause govt collapse has incentive to do so
   1. Direct substantive implication of concept of eqba: eqbm cab’s expected stable, non-eqbm cabinets expected unstable
   2. Two types of eqba in general, & eqbm cabinets can be either sort
      a. Attractive Equilibria [?]
      b. Retentive Equilibria [?]
   3. Core notion in determination of whether an eqbm cab exists & in characterizing it if so: strong party

B. Information necessary to analyze cabinet formation in model
   1. About parties
      a. Their identity (how many distinct parties)
      b. Their legislative weight (seats for each party)
      c. Their policy positions (ideological positions in determined policy-space)
   2. About Policy Space & Departmental Structure of Govt
      a. Set of (key) relevant policy dimensions
      b. Set of (key) cabinet ministries & their competences (i.e., issue domains)
      c. Relation b/w the two: simple 1-for-1 relationship assumed for most of book
   3. About the formation process (assumptions)
      a. Proposals can come from anyone at any time
      b. Unanimous internal consent is required
      c. Majority legislative consent is required

C. Important Concepts
   1. Indifference Curves for Euclidean Preferences [e.g., fig. above]
   2. The (Policy) Winset & the Lattice (or Govt or Cabinet) Winset:
      a. Winset of some policy x: set of all alternative pol’s majority-preferred to x
      b. Lattice Winset of some cab. X: set of all alt. cab.’s majority-preferred to X
         (1) Only diff: lattice winset concerned only w/ alt. cab.’s, which must lie on lattice
         (2) [Can use example lattice to show how winsets found; L & S’s example: Fig. 4.1]
3. The *Dimension-by-Dimension Median (DDM)* in this context
   a. DEF: a cab. is the DDM *iff* its associated policy is the median on each dimension (has 50%+ on either side of itself, including itself).
   b. Easy way to find this: read left to right & top to bottom (or v.v.) until find lattice line that turns minority into majority. [examples below + Figure 4.1]
   c. DDM is *an* eqbm govt if no alternative govt lies in its *winset*, but no guarantee DDM will have empty winset (so it may not be an eqbm)
      (1) DDM always a potential eqbm point, so useful place to start the analysis
      (2) DDM more likely empty winset, & so be *an* eqbm, when # of parties & D low
   d. [Example below can have either an eqbm DDM (empty winset) or non-eqbm DDM (non-empty winset) depending on legis.-seat distrib.; L & S’s Fig. 4.2 shows non-empty winset DDM–one in which cycling can occur]
4. **Strong Parties**
   a. **DEF**: Party S is strong if it participates in all cab.’s maj pref’d to its ideal point (so can veto any cab. maj-pref to its ideal & so perhaps secure ideal)
   b. 2 types of “strong” party: “very strong” or “merely strong”; “strong”=either
      (1) **very strong party**: no cab. maj-pref to its ideal exists; => party’s ideal=DDM
      (2) **merely strong party**: cab.’s maj-pref to its ideal exist, but it participates in all of them, & so can veto them
   c. [Examples (from end of these notes)]:
      (1) fairly even seat dist. in ex. 1 gives an empty-winset DDM at DD, => D is v.s.
      (2) Party D may be merely strong in less even seat distributions in this example
      (3) Party B is merely strong in L & S’s Figure 4.3]
d. **Highlander Theorem**: At most 1 strong party can exist; L & S claim common
e. Theorems (syn: predictions, hypotheses)
   1. Very strong party produces an attractive & retentive eqbm cabinet at its ideal
      a. N.b., the very-strong party gets all seats
      b. N.b., it’s a special case of an empty-winset DDM
      c. N.b., this so whether the very strong party is itself “large” (in terms of its seats) or not
   2. If merely strong party exists, it will participates in every eqbm cab., & eqbm can be no less desirable from the merely strong party’s view than the DDM
f. Whether & who’s strong will depend on weights & positions of parties
   1. As entirely external to strong party itself can Δ identity or existence of s.p.
   2. “Sriking discontinuities”
      a. small Δ in weights or positions can have large effect on who’s strong & thus on cab. form.
      b. conversely, large Δ in these same could have no effect on who’s strong
      c. depends on how close eqbm is to some alternative govt in lattice that could be an eqbm if things were just somewhat different [refer back to diagrams]
g. Merely strong parties rely on their ability to continue (credibly) to veto maj. pref’d cab.’s in which they participate; thus standoffs can occur [see ex’s]
h. Notice the strong centripetal tendencies:
   1. Either the DDM is an equilibrium, or
   2. strong party can move eqbm toward its ideal, but s.p. tend to be toward median
D. “Strong” Parties Making & Breaking Govts
   1. Analyzing a case vs. analyzing the process
      a. To analyze specific case, we need to identify which, if any, party is strong
      b. For general analysis of govt form & diss, we need to discover the conditions (e.g., distribution of legislative power, etc.) that produce them.
   2. Simplest Case: 2 Dimensions, 3 Parties, any 2 parties make a majority ==> “Triangular system”
      a. Only “middle” party can be strong, & it usually is (but doesn’t have to be)
b. DEF “Middle” here: connect party ideal points to make triangle, party whose ideal point is vertex between two smaller legs of triangle is “middle”

c. [L & S’s first example shows this]

d. Outside the simplest case:
   (1) Formal analysis produces few intuitive results (the mathematical conditions for strong parties are not readily understood substantively)
   (2) Empirical analysis is limited because universe of coalition-generating party systems is too small to produce inductive generalizations of this breadth
   (3) => Simulations:
      (a) Program computer to find eqbm cab.’s, strong parties, etc. from given info. about parties, cabinet portfolios, etc.
      (b) Then, holding some set of parameters fixed (e.g., # parties, relative strength, & # D’s), generate large number of random “virtual parliaments” that vary some other parameter(s) (e.g., their policy positions).
      (c) Try to find patterns in outcomes (i.e., inductive reasoning from virtual reality)
      (d) Simulations NOT empirical tests b/c program assumes model true to start, but
         i) Useful for finding substantive “bite” of formal conclusions, which may be too complicated for intuition, (always with caveat that virtual world assumes “random” & assumes model)
         ii) Often useful for various kinds of sensitivity analysis
         iii) [In other contexts, many statistical procedures have known properties in infinite samples (asymptotic properties), but unknown properties in limited samples => simulate large number of small samples to observe properties: called Monte Carlo Experiments]

3. L & S’s Simulations
   a. Finding frequency of strong parties under alternative legis-seat dist., # of parties, & # of D (party policy-positions varied randomly) [Table 5.1]
      (1) “Dominated Decisive Structure”, Fewer Parties, Fewer Dim. all foster SP’s
      (2) Most usually it’s dominating party that’s strong, if SP exists, but not always, even “dummy party” can be strong (though not very strong)!
      (3) Argue that dominant position in decisive structure (i.e., size) matters b/c it makes party more likely to be merely strong or even very strong (almost true that only dominant parties can be very strong).
Table 5.1. Simulation experiments: frequency of strong and very strong parties under various dimensionalities and alliance structures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance structure</th>
<th>Frequency of</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of</td>
<td>Strong party</td>
<td>Very strong party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.33, .33, .33)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.40, .20, .20, .20)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.30, .30, .30, .10)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.40, .15, .15, .15, .15)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.20, .20, .20, .20)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.40, .12, .12, .12, .12, .12)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.28, .28, .18, .18, .18, .10)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.46, .09, .09, .09, .09, .09)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.14, .14, .14, .14, .14, .14, .14)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. Finding frequency of strong parties as a function of party positions
(1) Almost imposs. for prty at no median on any D to be strong, almost regardless of party’s size
(2) Mostly, being median on 1 of 2 D’s gives party 25% chance of being strong; only dominant parties in very dominated sys. have noticeably better odds
(3) Parties at DDM usu. strong regardless of size, although size helps it be median

c. Conclusions
(1) Size & “median-ness” key to being big player in G-form, being in small, low-D party system also helps. (L & S:) these matter b/c make party ‘strong’. [Parties can be ‘strong’ w/o these, so such parties : key test of L & S thrty against alt.’s]
Strong parties commonly (and very strongly) surprise. They should always obtain government seats, according to the theory. However, this is not always the case. For example, in Germany 1987, Tables 6.1-6.4 (next pages) Figures 6.1 & 6.2 (next pages) and Ireland 1992, Tables 6.7-6.8, Figures 6.3 & 6.4 (next pages), the data shows that strong parties did not always obtain government seats.

### Table 6.1: Relations between number and positions of parties & legislature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6.2: Relations between number and positions of parties & government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6.3: Relations between number and positions of parties & their relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6.4: Relations between number and positions of parties & their governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Testable Implications of the Theory
   1. Status Quo (SQ) govt at beginning of period either remains in place or is replaced by coalition in its winset
   2. If SQ has an empty winset, then SQ remains in office
   3. If party is very strong, then it gets all seats in the cabinet
   4. If party is merely strong, then it gets at least one seat in cabinet
      a. If party strong, & every cabinet in winset of its ideal gives some particular cabinet seat to that party, then party will get that seat
      b. If party strong, then each cab. seat is assigned to that party or to one of its partners (= those parties participating in govts in winset of SP’s ideal)

C. Data Required:
   1. # Seats for each party across some countries over some time
   2. Which party has which portfolio before & after each govt change
   3. Party positions on the salient dimensions: prior issues
      a. Which are the key portfolios?
      b. Which are the key policy dimensions?
      c. What is the correspondence between those two?
      d. [Salience weighting is possible]
Table 6.1. Decisive structure after the Bundestag election of 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual parties</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Union/</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Social Union (CD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SPD)</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Democrats (FDP)</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens (G)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority threshold</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Winning coalitions</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CD + SPD</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD + FDP</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD + G</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD + FDP + G</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD + SPD + FDP</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD + SPD + G</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD + G + FDP</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD + SPD + FDP + G</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.2. Positions of German parties on two economic policy dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Increase taxes (1) vs. cut services (20)</th>
<th>Promote public ownership (1) vs. oppose pub. ownership (20)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>5.2 (0.65)</td>
<td>7.1 (0.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>6.5 (0.44)</td>
<td>8.1 (0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>13.5 (0.54)</td>
<td>13.6 (0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>15.7 (0.61)</td>
<td>17.4 (0.39)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992: 197

Note: Estimates are based on 19 expert responses.
Table 6.3. Rankings of German cabinet portfolios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Portfolio</th>
<th>Mean ranking of portfolio</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor and social affairs</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth, family, women, and health</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food, agriculture, and forestry</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992: 196
Note: Estimates are based on 19 expert responses.

Table 6.4. Positions of German parties on foreign policy dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Mean position (standard error): Pro (1) vs. anti (20) USSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>4.0 (0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>4.6 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>6.6 (0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>9.8 (0.68)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992: 197
Note: Estimates are based on 19 expert responses.
Figure 6.1. Two-dimensional German policy space: Indifference curves relating to CD-FDP cabinet

Figure 6.2. Two-dimensional German policy space: Indifference curves relating to CD ideal point
### Table 6.7. Decisive structure after the 1992 Dáil election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual parties</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fianna Fáil (FF)</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine Gael (FG)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour (Lab)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Democrats (PD)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left (DL)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority threshold</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Winning coalitions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FF+FG</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+Lab</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FG+Lab+PD</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+FG+Lab</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+FG+PD</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+FG+DL</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+Lab+PD</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+Lab+DL</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FG+Lab+PD+DL</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+FG+Lab+PD</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+FG+Lab+DL</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+FG+PD+DL</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+Lab+PD+DL</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+FG+Lab+PD+DL</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Increase taxes (1) vs. cut services (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fianna Fáil</td>
<td>12.05 (0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine Gael</td>
<td>14.23 (0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>7.45 (0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prog. Dems</td>
<td>16.97 (0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Left</td>
<td>4.77 (0.74)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.3. Two-dimensional Irish policy space: Indifference curves relating to FF ideal point

Figure 6.4. Two-dimensional Irish policy space: Indifference curves relating to FF-Labour coalition
D. L & S “test” these implications against null of random portfolio allocation [wimpy null: L & S overstate absence of alt. theories]

1. Data

**Table 7.1. Data set for empirical analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Although there was another election before the end of the study period on January 1, 1982, the government that subsequently formed had not existed by the end of the study period.

**Table 7.2. Length of study period**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Beginning</th>
<th>End</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1983/70</td>
<td>1987/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1955/46</td>
<td>1983/92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1947/85</td>
<td>1977/89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1944/47</td>
<td>1983/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1941/61</td>
<td>1981/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>1944/47</td>
<td>1983/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1965/73</td>
<td>1987/92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1977/81</td>
<td>1989/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1957/61</td>
<td>1985/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1950/68</td>
<td>1985/90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, we needed data on which party held each government post at the beginning and the end of each government formation.

Third, we needed data on party positions on salient issue di.

In order to describe how we have proceeded on this matter, it is to identify a number of operational decisions that have led to Most European cabinets comprise at least a dozen and summer as two dozen ministerial positions. This number does not the capacity of our model, which can in principle handle any number of positions, but it does exceed our practical ability to collect data on party positions.3

More important than the practical problems associated with complete analysis of the allocation of the full range of useful

**Table 7.3. Policy jurisdictions of key cabinet portfolios**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1st portfolio</th>
<th>2nd portfolio</th>
<th>3rd portfolio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>Home affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Test results:
   a. Table 8.1 assesses implication B.1 from above
   b. Table 8.2 assesses implication B.2 from above
   c. Table 8.3 assesses implication B.3 from above
   d. Table 8.4 assesses implication B.4 from above
   e. Table 8.5 assesses implication B.4a from above
   f. Table 8.6 assesses implication B.4b from above

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (init., issues)</th>
<th>Could have held</th>
<th>Actually held</th>
<th>Held by choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria (7, 2)</td>
<td>6,761</td>
<td>5,738</td>
<td>3,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (17, 9)</td>
<td>14,273</td>
<td>9,946</td>
<td>4,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (18, 4)</td>
<td>13,392</td>
<td>12,685</td>
<td>5,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (19, 9)</td>
<td>10,023</td>
<td>5,950</td>
<td>5,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (12, 5)</td>
<td>10,552</td>
<td>8,889</td>
<td>3,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland (11, 7)</td>
<td>15,339</td>
<td>9,577</td>
<td>6,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (4, 3)</td>
<td>5,977</td>
<td>4,592</td>
<td>1,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (30, 11)</td>
<td>15,741</td>
<td>9,815</td>
<td>4,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg (10, 4)</td>
<td>17,326</td>
<td>10,780</td>
<td>2,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (6, 1)</td>
<td>4,635</td>
<td>4,581</td>
<td>832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway (13, 4)</td>
<td>11,808</td>
<td>3,392</td>
<td>4,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (15, 2)</td>
<td>11,471</td>
<td>11,471</td>
<td>1,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (162, 55)</td>
<td>133,304</td>
<td>102,116</td>
<td>40,121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8.2: Assessment of Implication 1: If, at time $t$, $W(SQ_{t-1}) = \sigma$, then $SQ_t = SQ_{t-1}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (hits, misses)</th>
<th>Could have held</th>
<th>Actually held</th>
<th>Held by chance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria (0, 0)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (1, 1)</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (1, 1)</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (0, 2)</td>
<td>1,773</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (0, 0)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland (0, 3)</td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (1, 1)</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (8, 3)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,022</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg (8, 0)</td>
<td>7,107</td>
<td>7,107</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (0, 0)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway (4, 1)</td>
<td>2,844</td>
<td>2,816</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (11, 0)</td>
<td>9,440</td>
<td>9,440</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (34, 12)</td>
<td>28,457</td>
<td>22,557</td>
<td>1,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country (hits, misses)</td>
<td>Could have held</td>
<td>Actually held</td>
<td>Held by chance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (0, 0)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (2, 1C)</td>
<td>3,603</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (2, 1)</td>
<td>1,835</td>
<td>1,181</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (0, 4)</td>
<td>2,062</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (0, 0)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland (1, 4)</td>
<td>4,658</td>
<td>1,172</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (3, 1)</td>
<td>1,974</td>
<td>1,722</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (11, 5)</td>
<td>5139</td>
<td>3,011</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg (9, 6)</td>
<td>15,942</td>
<td>6,503</td>
<td>1,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (0, 0)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway (6, 5)</td>
<td>7,316</td>
<td>4,384</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (12, 7)</td>
<td>14,105</td>
<td>10,471</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (46, 43)</strong></td>
<td><strong>55,634</strong></td>
<td><strong>39,111</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,795</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8.4. Assessment of Implication 3: If $S$ participates in every element of $W(s^*)$, then $S$ participates in $\mathcal{Q}_1$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(hits, misses)</th>
<th>Days implication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Could have held</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>(7, 3)</td>
<td>8,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>(15, 15)</td>
<td>15,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>(3, 11)</td>
<td>8,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>(11, 7)</td>
<td>5,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>(10, 7)</td>
<td>9,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>(9, 10)</td>
<td>16,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>(3, 1)</td>
<td>1,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>(14, 10)</td>
<td>7,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>(14, 1)</td>
<td>17,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>(0, 0)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>(9, 8)</td>
<td>10,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>(13, 6)</td>
<td>14,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(108, 79)</td>
<td>115,920</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8.5. Assessment of Implication 3A: If $S$ is strong and if every element of $W(c^*)$ assigns a particular portfolio to $S$, then $S$ receives that portfolio in $SQ_t$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (hits, misses)</th>
<th>Could have held</th>
<th>Actually held</th>
<th>Held by chance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria (2, 0)</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (7, 17)</td>
<td>14,056</td>
<td>7,450</td>
<td>2,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (5, 16)</td>
<td>11,351</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>1,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (10, 25)</td>
<td>9,031</td>
<td>2,135</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (6, 11)</td>
<td>11,552</td>
<td>4,145</td>
<td>2,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland (8, 16)</td>
<td>15,989</td>
<td>5,089</td>
<td>3,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (9, 3)</td>
<td>1,974</td>
<td>1,722</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (53, 24)</td>
<td>9,854</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg (25, 7)</td>
<td>17,735</td>
<td>11,235</td>
<td>2,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (0, 0)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway (15, 13)</td>
<td>10,708</td>
<td>5,644</td>
<td>1,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (25, 13)</td>
<td>14,105</td>
<td>10,841</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (163, 145)</td>
<td>117,482</td>
<td>55,146</td>
<td>16,195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8.6. Assessment of Implication 3B: If $S$ is strong, then each portfolio in $SQ_t$ is assigned to one of the parties identified in $(s^*)$ $\mathcal{W}(s^*)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (inls, misses)</th>
<th>Could have held</th>
<th>Actually held</th>
<th>Held by chance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria (10, 20)</td>
<td>8,468</td>
<td>3,706</td>
<td>873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (26, 34)</td>
<td>14,823</td>
<td>7,883</td>
<td>1,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (12, 24)</td>
<td>8,689</td>
<td>3,607</td>
<td>1,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (16, 38)</td>
<td>7,561</td>
<td>2,175</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (40, 11)</td>
<td>10,552</td>
<td>8,150</td>
<td>834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland (20, 18)</td>
<td>16,332</td>
<td>9,306</td>
<td>2,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (9, 3)</td>
<td>1,974</td>
<td>1,722</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (67, 20)</td>
<td>9,503</td>
<td>7,213</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg (23, 7)</td>
<td>17,817</td>
<td>11,235</td>
<td>2,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (0, 0)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway (16, 19)</td>
<td>11,957</td>
<td>5,644</td>
<td>1,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (25, 13)</td>
<td>14,105</td>
<td>10,841</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (264, 207)</td>
<td>121,731</td>
<td>71,382</td>
<td>12,623</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Conclusions [Mine, not L & S’s]:
   a. Not all do terribly well, & clear cross-country variation in how well they do
   b. Random alt. hypoth. is weak & irrelevant:
      (1) Could use MinWinCoal, e.g., to narrow range prty from which to draw rndmly
      (2) Hard to say, -., whether performance reported is “good”; how would reasonable alternatives have done
   c. That said, this one of only going theories that offers predictions at level of which parties will get which seats [brainstorm for any alternatives?]

E. L & S’s much better test: the regression on page 189
1. Dependent Variable: $G_{ij} = 1$ if party $i$ is in govt $j$, $G_{ij} = 0$ if not
2. Independent Variables:
   a. MSP = 1 if party is a merely strong party, = 0 if it is not
   b. VSP = 1 if party is a very strong party, = 0 if it is not
   c. PSP = 1 if party is a partner of a strong party, = 0 if it is not
   d. W = the party’s percentage of the legislative seats
   e. MD1 = the party’s policy distance from dimension 1 median
   f. MD2 = the party’s policy distance from dimension 2 median
3. Results (next page, and...):

$$
G = -.970 - .151 \text{MSP} + .630 \text{VSP} + .248 \text{PSP} + .041 \text{W} - .047 \text{MD1} - .157 \text{MD2}
$$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>t=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>3.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>(3.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.004</td>
<td>(1.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.031</td>
<td>(10.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>(1.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.84)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recall: We like coefficients near twice their standard error or better. That’s the same as wanting t-stats around 2 or better.
Table 9.1: Variables Involved in Evaluating L & S’s Making & Breaking Govts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>$G_{ij}$</td>
<td>$1 = $party$i$ is in govt $j$ &lt;br&gt;$0 = $party$i$ is not in govt $j$</td>
<td>EJPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Merely” Strong Party</td>
<td>$MSP_{ij}$</td>
<td>$1 =$party$i$ merely strong at time of govt $j$ &lt;br&gt;$0 =$party$i$ not merely strong in govt $j$</td>
<td>WINSET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Very” Strong Party</td>
<td>$VSP_{ij}$</td>
<td>$1 =$party$i$ very strong at time of govt $j$ &lt;br&gt;$0 =$party$i$ not very strong in govt $j$</td>
<td>WINSET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Partner” of a Strong Party</td>
<td>$PSP_{ij}$</td>
<td>$1 =$party$i$ is partner of merely strong party at time of govt $j$ &lt;br&gt;$0 =$party$i$ is not partner of merely strong party at time of govt $j$</td>
<td>WINSET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight</td>
<td>$W_{ij}$</td>
<td>Party$i$’s percentage of legislative seats at time of govt $j$</td>
<td>MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality</td>
<td>$MD_{ik}$</td>
<td>Ideological distance on dimension $k$ of party$i$ from the median on that dimension at the time of govt $j$</td>
<td>LH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Who Gets Into Govt?

$$G_{ij} = -0.72 + 1.01(S_{ij})$$
where $S_{ij} = MSP_{ij} + VSP_{ij}$

$t$-statistics: (2.72) (10.93)

$$G_{ij} = -0.51 + 0.68(MSP_{ij}) + 1.66(VSP_{ij}) + 0.73(PSP_{ij})$$

$t$-statistics: (1.90) (4.62) (11.01) (5.86)

What Makes a Party Strong?

$$MSP_{ij} = -0.77 + 0.03(W_{ij}) - 0.49(MD_{ij1}) - 0.03(MD_{ij2})$$

$t$-statistics: (5.23) (6.24) (8.79) (0.55)

$$VSP_{ij} = -1.77 + 0.05(W_{ij}) - 0.29(MD_{ij1}) - 0.10(MD_{ij2})$$

$t$-statistics: (9.67) (10.19) (6.43) (1.61)

$$PSP_{ij} = -0.86 + 0.01(W_{ij}) + 0.18(MD_{ij1}) - 0.45(MD_{ij2})$$

$t$-statistics: (6.96) (2.89) (6.75) (10.51)

Who Gets Into Govt? Take 2

$$G_{ij} = -0.97 - 0.15MSP_{ij} + 0.63VSP_{ij} + 0.25PSP_{ij} + 0.04W_{ij} - 0.05MD_{ij1} - 0.16MD_{ij2}$$

$t$: (2.85) (0.82) (3.46) (1.72) (10.53) (1.54) (3.84)

LXXIX. Portfolio-Allocation Model & Cabinet Stability (Part IV)

A. Eqbm cabs more durable than any non-eqbm cabs that do form

B. Same factors (info.) needed to determine eqbm cabinets are factors that must $\Delta$ to alter what is the eqbm cabinet:
   1. [List of parties, their weights, & their policy positions]
   2. [Dimensionality of policy space & its allocation to portfolios]

C. Only unforeseen shocks can destabilize an eqbm cab [why?]. Examples: [how do these link with I.B.
above?]
1. Party splits or fusions
2. Defections or by-elections
3. Emergence of new issues or fading of old
4. Events may shift party preferences
5. Δ parties’ percept’s of others (esp. ability to win standoffs)

D. Compare Fig. 10.1 & 10.2: which cabinet more stable? Why? What general implications might be drawn from this?

E. General Simulations
1. Take some set of fixed situations, described by...
   a. The # parties; b. Their initial policy positions; c. Their weight in parliament
2. Computerize the following steps
   a. Calculate initial equilibrium
   b. Generate 1000 random perturbations of party positions
   c. Calculate new equilibria
   d. Draw inferences from proportion of time eqbm changes in various settings all subjected to same-variance random shocks
3. [Tables 10.2 & 10.3 show results]
4. Conclusions:
   a. Empty winset DDMs are most stable
   b. If empty winset DDM is an ideal point (v.s.p.), then extremely stable
   c. Least stable appears to be where dominant party is not median

F. Note on PM’s ability to call elections:
   1. PM can threaten coalition partners & parl. w/ calling elections when expects to gain by doing so
      a. Certainly won’t do so when expects to lose
      b. Threatful, if successful, will cause Δ in govt in PM’s party’s favor
   2. Thus, L & S conclude, shifts in potential electoral support favoring PM’s party can cause govt Δ
   3. [Will Δ other parties’ electoral potential have effects? Compare govt, non-govt parties, & parts of govt’ parl-maj & opp.]

LXXX. Relaxing assumptions to reconsider aspects of policy space

A. Reminder:
   1. Options not whether to make assumptions (A’s). All logical arg. has some set A’s. Options: which A’s to make & how explicitly?
   2. So, when re-considering A’s, questions are:

Table 10.2: The impact of 5% shock streams on generic party systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party system</th>
<th>Cases with</th>
<th>Cases with</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>same strong</td>
<td>same empty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.1: strong party</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>1,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.2: no strong party</td>
<td>no m*</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four party (Party D central)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.3: big party median on 1 dimension</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.5: big party median on 2 dimensions</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.7: big party median on no dimension</td>
<td>no m*</td>
<td>no m*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four party (Party D decentralized)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.8: big party median on 1 dimension</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.10: big party median on 2 dimensions</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.12: big party median on no dimension</td>
<td>no m*</td>
<td>no m*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.9: SD median on 2 dimensions</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.10: Center median on 1 dimension</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.11: SD median on 2 dimensions</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.3: The impact of 10% shock streams on generic party systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party system</th>
<th>Cases with</th>
<th>Cases with</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>same strong</td>
<td>same empty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.1: strong party</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.2: no strong party</td>
<td>no m*</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four party (Party D central)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.3: big party median on 1 dimension</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.5: big party median on 2 dimensions</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.7: big party median on no dimension</td>
<td>no m*</td>
<td>no m*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four party (Party D decentralized)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.8: big party median on 1 dimension</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.10: big party median on 2 dimensions</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.12: big party median on no dimension</td>
<td>no m*</td>
<td>no m*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.9: SD median on 2 dimensions</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.10: Center median on 1 dimension</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig 10A.11: SD median on 2 dimensions</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>856</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. How much do alternative A’s alter conclusions?

b. How do conclusions drawn from one set of A’s fare empirically compared to those drawn from another?

3. Agree w/ L & S that, cet. par., more explicit A’s (usu. from formal arg’s) better than less (usu. from informal arg.’s).

B. Dimensionality–allowing for many dimensions?
1. Policy-space dimensionality likely infinite or large & indeterminate
2. Even in lattice subset, \( \uparrow D \Rightarrow \downarrow \text{prob(eqba)} \) in random party systems
3. Two approaches to determining policy space:
   a. Take existing portfolios as simple & given (fixed at start of process)
   b. Use the policy issues on which parties take a public stance
   c. Both seem to produce D too large to reconcile w/ apparent stability of govts
4. Empirically, parties’ policy positions highly correlated across D’s
   a. Esp., across related D’s, but even across seemingly unrelated dims
   b. such correlation reduces the effective dimensionality of politics
   c. [demonstrate this in 2D, perfect correlation case: Figs. 11.1 & 11.2]
   d. [why might parties adopt correlated policy stances like this?]

C. Differing issue salience & policy-pref dependence across D’s
1. Equal salience => circular indifference curves: pure distance pref’s
   a. Unequal salience => distance along one D ‘more distasteful’ than distance along others => ellipsoidal indifference curves
   b. Still linear, orthogonal policy reaction curves => theoretical propositions still hold, but actual eqba case by case may differ
2. Independent preferences across D’s => indifference ellipses or circles that are perpendicular to axes
   a. Non-separable policy pref’s => non-orthogonal policy reaction-curves
   b. => can radically change the analysis.

D. Complex jurisdictions [define]
1. If still assume min’s free reign in portfolios’ areas, then allocating multiple portfolios to 1 party reduces set of possible cabs (lattice space): fewer ways to allocate control over policy areas
2. Some new results
   a. Party ideal points are always in set of possible cabinets: e.g., pure prime-ministerial govt.
   b. If strong (either type) under simple jurisdictions, then strong under any complex jurisdictioning [why?]
   c. If empty-winset DDM under simple jurisdiction remains an option under complex, then remains an eqbm [how might it disappear?]
   d. Reminder that effective jurisdictional complexity is what matters (policy stances are correlated across issues)

E. Implications of these three extensions
1. Correlated preferences between parties across dimensions reduces dimensionality & simplifies analysis, increases prob. eqba
2. Jurisdictional complexity reduces the set of possible cabinets & so likewise simplifies & increases prob. eqba
3. *Unequal salience* doesn’t make that much difference, but *non-separability* makes a large difference

LXXXI. Extensions

A. Factions & intra-party politics

1. Party leaders are potential cabinet ministers
   a. Leadership involves a established set of policy reputations & credibility
   b. Reputations take time to build & generally valuable enough to be maintained
   c. => parties have set of possible issue stances to which can credibly commit in govt given by established policy reputations of their leaders
   d. In this view, factions arise from party leads w/ (prob’ly slightly) diff. prefs
   e. By having diverse set of leaders, party retains some ability to strategically shift its policy stance on issues by rearranging its leadership assignments

2. Three effects arise from this possibility
   a. Effect of having more than 1 poss. party ideal point (L & S still maintain not any point possible, but those for which some leader-combo have estab. rep.)
   b. Effect of factionalism on the stability of cabinets
   c. Incentives for leaders to split from or fuse with parties

3. L & S work from the premises that:
   a. A dominant party leadership controls the entire party’s votes
   b. Subordinate party leadership:
      (1) Does not control any votes
      (2) Cannot veto any cabinet, cannot even veto its own participation in cabinet
      (3) BUT, once minister, can pursue own ideal, not forced to pursue dom. leaders’
   c. Under these conditions, addition of factions adds lattice points to set of possible cabinets. Its like adding parties with zero votes & no veto power.

4. One interesting implication: Δ w/in opp. parties can alter strategic options of governing party(ies)

B. Minority & surplus-majority govts

1. One of portfolio-allocation model’s most attractive features is that it predicts *minority govts* under certain conditions

2. *Surplus-majorities* also possible: parties=>votes but also credible policy stances (i.e., add lattice points to possible govt sets–added points may be eqba even if party in question not nec. to maj.)

C. Endogenizing issue assignment to portfolios:

1. B/c diff. jurisdictional allocations can produce diff. eqbm cabs, parties have prefs over portfolio allocation schemes.

2. => another element in bargaining to form a govt.

LXXXII. Some very key elements of theory & what if relaxed:

A. Extreme departmentalism:

1. But compromise within cabinet goes on all the time

2. Finance min. esp. has considerable influence on other ministries

3. Prime minister has strong influence across board

4. As departmentalism relaxed, lattice becomes *fuzzy*
   a. => back toward govt policy as some compromise among its members’ ideals on all issues rather than policy as ideal of party holding that portfolio
   b. => back toward chaos theories

B. Party positions (or faction-leader positions) given, fixed exog. to model: if these instead strategic, may get very diff. dynamic

LXXXIII. L & S: Applying the Model to Find Equilibrium Cabinets

A. Step 0: Draw & Label the Lattice of Possible Govts

B. Step 1: Find the DDM Govt

C. Steps 2+:
Then that party is "very strong" and its ideal point is THE equilibrium.

Then the Empty-Winset DDM is THE equilibrium.

Then the "merely strong" party's ideal point and all governments which are (a) majority preferred to it and which are (b) no farther from the party's ideal than is the empty winset DDM are equilibria.

Then there are NO equilibria.
Example 1:

Empty winset DDM at a party’s ideal point =>
that party is very strong & govt where it gets the portfolios is the (1) eqbm:

The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
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<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>C</td>
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</table>

20 Seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
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<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 Seats
The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System

- Left
- Economic Policy Position
- Right
- Left
- Foreign Policy Position
- Right

Coalition Points:
- AA
- AB
- AC
- AD
- AE
- BB
- BC
- BD
- BE
- CC
- CD
- CE
- DE
- EE

20 Seats indicators at key coalition points.
Example 2:

Non-Empty Winset DDM, not at a party’s ideal, but merely strong party exists
=> eqbm govts (>1) are that party’s ideal & all govts maj-pref’d to it
(in all of which the m.s.p. participates, by definition of “merely strong”)

The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System
Example 3:

Empty Winset DDM, not at any party’s ideal, but merely strong party exists =>

eqbm govts (>1) are that party’s ideal & all govts maj-pref to it (in all of which m.s.p. participates, by def. of “merely strong”),

but only those that no farther away from m.s.p.’s ideal than empty-winset DDM

The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System
Example 4:

Non-Empty Winset DDM & no strong party => no (0) equilibrium govts

The Lattice of Possible 2-Ministry Coalitions in an Arbitrary 5-Party System
One more possibility exists, which was not drawn: Empty Winset DDM with No Strong Party $\Rightarrow$ the (1) equilibrium is the empty-winset DDM.
PS341: Outcomes, Part II (GLM, Ch. 13; Lijphart Chs. 15-17)

LXXXIV. Gallagher, Laver, & Mair, chpt. 13.

A. The central question: does politics matter?

1. Diff. to determine whether partic. govt made diff. in partic. instance b/c counter-factual: would something diff. have happened if diff. govt in office?

2. Approaches

a. Detailed ‘case study’ of major policy interventions

   (1) Logic: pick dramatic policy initiative, if world changes some way, then initiative caused it

   (2) [Strengths & Weaknesses?]

b. Compare elect promises w/ govt programs at investiture

c. Compare elect promises & /or govt programs w/ policy actions

d. Spec’ly gov spend or other directly observable govt action

e. Broad outcomes like gov size, econ outcomes (UE, INF, ineq.)

B. Case Studies: privatization in France & UK

1. Privatization in France 1986-1993-Present

a. French right, RPR (Gaullists), fought 1986 election heavily on platform of privatization

b. 3/20/86, Gaullists, w/ UDF, won parl control, install govt replace left PSF-led coal.

c. Decrees implementing 1st stages of priv. officially 10/24/86

d. Plan (Decree): priv. 66 firms, w/ 900,000 workers, value FF300B: 1/4± of Paris Bourse ($50B±)

e. <1yr, implement 1/3 of 5-yr plan

f. # of small shareholders ↑ from 1.5 Million in 1985 to 8 Million in 1987 [Significance?]

g. 10/87 stock-market crash=>big losses on those investors (et al., but perhaps esp. newer)

h. Right loses pres. & then parl. elects mid-88

i. PSF-led coal. halts privatization

j. 1993 election returned right coal. to control parl., govt.

k. Balladur govt renews priv.

2. Privatization in the UK 1979-Present

a. Conservative govt that took office 1979 (Thatcher) had not fought elect. on priv.

b. Began selling profitable British Aerospace & Britoil for needed cash (unwilling to raise taxes or run larger deficits)

c. These early successes => privatization more central party’s 1983 election campaign

d. Privatization Plans extended to electricity, gas, water, & other previous untouchables

e. Virtually all this privatization completed by 1990:

   (1) 50 +/- companies, ½ total state sector +/-, well over 24B Pounds by 1988 (about $40B)

   (2) shareholding population tripled to 10 million people

   (3) 600,000 jobs shifted from public to private sector

3. Some but more lmtd priv. also in Ger., It., Neth., Bel., even Swe. & Austria

C. Party manifestos & govt policy-programs [2nd ed.]
1. First step from campaign promise to outcomes is govt’s announced program (its intentions) at start of
tenure

2. Must code both doc’s consistently: content analysis [def]
   a. GLM focus on % of doc expressly promoting free-market econ
   b. Q=whether govt alt. ⇒ promised changes in govt prog’s

3. In some cases (e.g., Nor: Tab 13.1-2), correspondence remarkable; varies some gen’ly (Table 13-3)

4. [Discuss Table 13-3]

5. General conclusions:
   a. When parties’ elect manifestos diverge much, progs reflect this
   b. Conversely, where parties’ manifestos show little pol debate, lack of debate reflected in their respective programs
   c. Where govt alt partial [DEF], response in govt prog’s also partial
   d. Prog’s tend closer to ‘perm fixtures’ of govt than partners

D. Party manifestos & actual govt policy

1. Methodological issues
   a. What’s a pledge & what’s just a platitude or aspiration?
   b. Disting. pledges would have power to fulfill if elect from not
   c. Fulfillment is going to be a matter of degree

2. Previous findings:
   b. Rallings (1987) extends it to UK ‘45-‘79 & finds 70% fulfill rate (similar rates found elsewhere in other studies)
      (1) Clarity of promise (esp. those regarding ↑ benefits etc.) increases its odds of being fulfilled
      (2) Promises to repeal ideologically unacceptable acts of previous govt almost always fulfilled
   c. Evidence from multiparty coalition govts is currently lacking:
      (1) [Some rough evidence from Hofferbert et al. 1996 indicates generally, across countries & time, policies react to vote-weighted policy-programs of parties, with some lag (inertia).]

3. However you slice it, evidence continues to mount that ‘reasonable’ promises remarkably well fulfilled

E. Party govt & public policy: Left/Right & Size of Govt, Bdgt Categories/Priorities, & Environment

a. Broad association b/w L/R govt partisanship & govt size [see Tables 13.1-3 in 3rd ed., but considerable exceptions

b. Resolving this apparent (mild) puzzle
   (1) Narrow focus to more specific bdgtry elements, e.g. welf spend
   (2) Partisan effects, esp. in short run, more readily observed in changes in budgets than in their levels since latter tend to reflect long accumulated histories of decisions & change incrementally
   (3) Greater need to control other factors—econ. & struct. cond’s, e.g.
   (4) Move beyond simple L/R as partisan impact on policy (e.g. Castles & others have considered distinctive impact of Christian Dem)
   (5) Other confitions/features of govt; e.g., veto actors
A. "So what?" Does maj v. cons dem matter? How?

1. Conventional Wisdom:
   a. Based on PR v. Plur/Maj, extended to maj v. consensus
   b. Tradeoff b/w "quality" & "effectiveness" dem govt

(1) PR/Cons ⇒ more accurate rep, esp. Minority rep & protect
(2) Plur/Maj $\Rightarrow$ 1-prty maj more decisive & effective govt

2. Hypotheses:
   a. Conv Wis: conc. pol pow in 1, unified, maj prty $\Rightarrow$ unified, decisive ldrshp, coherent & effective pol-mkng
   b. Counter-arguments:
      (1) Fast decisions not nec. = wise (or effective) decisions
      (2) Alternation may undermine coherence of 1 govt’s policies
         (a) Perhaps esp. in ec pol, policy consistency may be paramount
         (b) Pol by broad consconciliation more effective & eff’ly implem
      (3) Maintaining civil peace in divided society esp. may require broad conciliation/consensus & broad inclusion grps

3. Preliminary/Prior Evidence
   a. Katzenstein & Rogowski: small ctry PR & corp to compensate for disadvantages small size in int’l trade
   b. Rose & Castle: no signif diff macro ‘cross broad types, but Crepaz finds some infl & UE effects, & esp. strikes
   c. Roubini & Sachs find multiprty coal & debt assoc, but others challenge. (Franzese chpt. 3 offers resolution.)
   d. $P$: representational dem signif advant maintain civ order

B. L’s Evidence (n.b., lack controls...implications?)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimated regression coefficient</th>
<th>Standardized regression coefficient</th>
<th>Absolute t-value</th>
<th>Countries (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth (1980–93)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth (1970–95)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth (1980–95)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP deflator (1980–93)</td>
<td>-1.87*</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP deflator (1970–95)</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP deflator (1980–95)</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer price index (1970–95)</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consumer price index (1980–95)</td>
<td>-1.13*</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment, standardized (1971–95)</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>1.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment, unstandardized (1971–95)</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>1.13</td>
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<td>Unemployment, standardized (1980–95)</td>
<td>-1.38*</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>1.42</td>
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<td>Unemployment, unstandardized (1980–95)</td>
<td>-1.19*</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>1.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strike activity (1970–94)</td>
<td>-39.02</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike activity (1980–94)</td>
<td>-71.99</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget deficits (1970–95)</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget deficits (1980–95)</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLB freedom index (1993–95)</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.89</td>
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<tr>
<td>HJK freedom index (1996)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom House index (1996)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots (1948–82)</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots (1963–82)</td>
<td>-1.26***</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political deaths (1948–82)</td>
<td>-2.62*</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political deaths (1963–82)</td>
<td>-35.37**</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level (one-tailed test)  
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed test)  
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed test)

C. Conclusions:
1. Evidence w/ regard macro mngmnt (1st dim)
   a. Regarding growth & “econ freedom”: mixed
   b. Regarding inflation: consensus signif edge
   c. Regarding rest: consensus perhaps slightly better
   d. All relationships weaken, though, with controls
2. Evidence w/ regard control of violence (1st dim)
   a. Consensus dem significantly better,
   b. But, again, relationships weaken dramatically w/ controls
3. Inflation only thing to corr w/ 2nd dim, but this prob entirely due to CBI inclusion in 2nd dim
4. Broad conclusions:
   a. Consensus better record than majoritarian, esp. re: infl, but also, albeit less, re: rest macro & control violence
   b. But evidence weak/mixed, & cntrls/outliers weaken further
   c. Most important, :, negative conclusion: majoritarian clearly not significantly better in govt efficacy.

LXXXVI. LUPHART ch16: Quality of Democracy
A. L’s Evidence
Table 16.2  Bivariate regression analyses of the effect of consensus democracy (executives-parties dimension) on ten indicators of welfare statism, environmental performance, criminal justice, and foreign aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimated regression coefficient</th>
<th>Standardized regression coefficient</th>
<th>Absolute t-value</th>
<th>Countries (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Welfare state index (1980)</td>
<td>4.90***</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>3.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted welfare index (1980)</td>
<td>4.29**</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social expenditure (1992)</td>
<td>2.66**</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palmer index (c. 1990)</td>
<td>4.99*</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy efficiency (1990–94)</td>
<td>0.93***</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incarceration rate (1992–95)</td>
<td>–32.12*</td>
<td>–0.30</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty (1996)</td>
<td>–0.35***</td>
<td>–0.44</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign aid (1982–85)</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign aid (1992–95)</td>
<td>0.10**</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid versus defense (1992–95)</td>
<td>5.94***</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level (one-tailed test)
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed test)
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed test)


*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed test)
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed test)


B. Conclusions
1. Consensus democracy (1<sup>st</sup> dim: exec-prtys) makes big diff w/ almost all measures of democratic quality & "kindler & gentler" policy directions.
2. AND, relations get stronger with controls/outliers.
3. Fed-unitary (2<sup>nd</sup>) dim assoc. only w/ soc expend (-) & incarceration rate (+), odd by L’s reasoning:
   a. Latter turns out fully due to US outlier.
   b. Cntrs/outliers not affect former; 3 fed sys (US, Can, Austral) only 3 systems <20%GDP in soc spend.

LXXXVII. LIPHART ch17: Conclusions
A. Two main conclusions:
   1. Variety dem instits well reflected on 2D’s Maj-Cons
2. Cons maybe slight edge perf, strong edge quality dem

B. Implication: adopt consensus if possible
1. Good News:
   a. no tradeoff at all, consensus dominates
   b. not diff to construct consensus constitution; know how
2. Bad News:
   a. Coherence in 2D’s suggest strong inst’l equilibria & so resistance to change.
   b. Cultural resistance to change too.
3. Tempered bad news: inst’s & culture evolve jointly

LXXXVIII. Testing Visions: Responsiveness in Gov Select & pm
A. Responsiveness [DEF]
1. Policymaker select & effect. pm follow directly cit votes
2. Each vision carries own ideal for responsiveness
   a. Maj: tight, mech connection from cit votes to single-party maj w/ clear responsibility & mandate, & unchecked power impl
   b. Prop: multiparty elect compet⇒accurate reflect cit pref in pm
3. ⇒Figure 6.1: continuous or discontinuous mapping vote-shares into “govt” & effective pm-share

B. Responsiveness in Majoritarian Systems
1. 45 elections in 5 maj sys: AL, CA, FR, GR, NZ
2. Figure 6.2: Near-perfect fit seat-maj to govt maj, but
   a. Exceptions rare, but highly problematic
   b. Almost no actual vote majorities ⇒ full retreat to plurality
   c. Failures: 15-20%, & 1/sys+, leg- & gov-maj to plurality loser!
3. Figure 6.3: Govt much, but not all pm power⇒effect pm
4. ⇒Avg plurality prty: 45% vote, 55% seats, 74% gov, 72% pm

C. Responsiveness in Proportional Systems
1. 74 elects, 9 prop sys: AU, BE, DE, FI, GE, IT, NE, NO, SW, SZ
2. Figure 6.4: Near-perfect fit vote-seat fit, but
   a. While vote-govt much more prop-deal than maj was, heavy maj-ideal also. (Not mysterious: parl decisionmaking maj.)
   b. Practicality: Maj retreats to plur, prop cedes some maj in pm
   c. Govt fit to ideal not great, some tend 2nd party under-rep, but
3. Figure 6.5: Vote-effect pm fit much stronger. Govt only look much more misleading in this vision of limtd govt.
   a. Slope≈1.3, still too high, but < then ≈4 in maj sys.
   b. Pluralsities mostly over, 2nd’s mostly under

D. ⇒First Set Conclusions & a Common Metric:
1. Maj⇒plurality-ideal, but w/ some large failures
2. Prop⇒prop, but some maj bias & freq (smaller) errors

E. ⇒Common Metric: actual(pm|vote) - ideal(pm|vote)
1. On maj-grounds, maj utter failure, retreat to plurality
2. Table 6.1: Average deviations in govt & pm shares.
3. Table 6.1a: Averages may cancel +/- ⇒ avg abs(dev).
4. Table 6.2: Aggregate across parties to election level.
5. ⇒Each well in own terms (maj=plur), terrible in other’s

F. Trade-Offs or Design Flaws?
1. ↑↓ maj/plur approx ⇒ compensating ↑↓ plur/maj?
2. Two types Maj Failures:
   a. No seat-maj ⇒ min govt ⇒ ↓ mand & account, but ↑ prop
   b. Seat maj to vote min ⇒ ↓ mand & account, but also ↑ prop!
3. \(\Rightarrow\) *Figure 6.6*: Some design flaw in Maj, none in Prop.

4. \(\Rightarrow\) *Fig 6.7*: Comparing both sys:
   a. Most elects in 2 sys on 1 maj v. prop cost-ben trade-off line
   b. Plur fit their ideal, & bunched in range of prop costs
   c. Prop fit their ideal, but more spread in plur costs
   d. Only Plur sys produce unmitigated failures

G. Govt change between elections
   1. Cost from maj/plur view: very rare therein
   2. Common in prop, but actually tend to ben (Tab 6.3): \(\dagger\) diversity govt b/w elects & \(\dagger\) avg effect pm-vote match

H. Wrap-up
   1. See Powell’s Excellent Summary pp. 153-4
   2. Next: votes \(\neq\)prefs
      a. Strategic voting & party shaping of offerings
      b. \(\Rightarrow\) Illusion to think vote-govt more mech connect cit prefs to pm in plur, that elite pm less control than in prop where elite barg between...

LXXXIX. Powell, ch. 7: Citizen Preferences & Party Positions

A. Previously Powell had shown how maj & prop visions generally perf’d pretty well on own terms (but maj suscept. to occasional full failure) on basis of vote-policy connection

B. Vote-Policy Connection Insufficient:
   1. Even though some argue...
      a. ...conceptually impossible to compare cit pref’s to pol action
      b. ...votes adequate or only possible measure cit pref’s
   2. Substance of Dem/ Pub Pol Responds to *Cit Pref*=must try
      a. Not just partic. & compet...these to make PubPol resp CitPref
      b. Free & fair elects=instruments of dem, not dem itself.
   3. Votes insufficient:
      a. Even set aside irrationality: i.e., emotional symbols, attractive cand’s, irrelevant side-issues...
      b. ...voters constrained by party syss offerings of candidates, current issue promises, long-term partisan reps & group ties.
      c. Strategic voting based on expects of others’ votes, rules of rep, post-elect bargaining b/w parties in policy-making
      d. Plus votes rarely reveal much/anything voters feel re: other parties

C. Powell uses pub-opinion, self-placement, but still probs...
   1. Many issues, rel salience of those varies cross time & space
   2. \(\Rightarrow\)voters not know details of what want, just general direction.
   3. \(\Rightarrow\)Left/Right:
      a. Common language: Gabel & Huber show rough comparability of expert L-R scales, elite & voter self-place, & manifesto
      b. Need not, for P’s purpose, compare cross ctry, just voter-elite w/in
      c. [Still rubber ruler issues, but probably best can do...]

4. \(\Rightarrow\) *Representational Congruence*:
   a. Median Voter Criterion
      1) only pref not beaten by majority, both visions have that (=min in prop)
      2) problematic:
         a) for prop vision, which would seek mapping of whole pref distribution into policymaking-influence distribution.
         b) assumes 1-dim politics *ab initio*; part of prop is diff maj on diff issues
         c) disallows “minority protection”
         d) Powell interchanges Median Voter & Median Citizen: likely problematic; not same; maj
dampens turnout (as will see...)
(3) more polarized society → greater average distance to median, but this too only problematic from prop vision
b. → median-based approach decidedly pro-majoritarian eval. tool.
5. Voter Self-Placements (Table 7.1)
6. Alt Visions of Processes that Create Rep Congruence (T7.2)
a. Maj: 1 elect stage, party nearest median wins, centrip press→rep cong
b. Prop: elect stage, then govt form & pol-mkng barg stages→rep cong
7. Position of Policymaking Influence:
a. Govt Position:
   (1) If 1-party majority govt=position of that party (expert-placement scale)
   (2) If multi-party govt=weighted average (by % seats) of party positions
b. Wtd influence scale as before:
   (1) 1 * govt parties (seats)
   (2) .75 * non-govt support parties (seats)
   (3) .5 to .1 weighting of opposition parties (seats) depending on opp infl.

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<th>Country</th>
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*Survey in New Zealand (Bean, 1981).

Table 7.2. Visions of Democracy and Processes That Create Congruence Between the Median Citizen and the Policymakers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process Stages</th>
<th>Majority Control Vision</th>
<th>Proportional Influence Vision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral stages</td>
<td>Identifiable alternative governments, one a responsible incumbent; one or both close to the median citizen</td>
<td>Wide range of party choices; absence of explicit coalition commitments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election outcomes</td>
<td>Party close to median citizen wins majority: Median legislator close to median citizen</td>
<td>Proportional legislative representation of all parties: Median legislator close to median citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postelection stages</td>
<td>Government formation Election winner forms majority government</td>
<td>Bargaining: government coalition includes party of median legislator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy making between elections</td>
<td>Government dominates all policy making</td>
<td>Coalitions may change but still include median; negotiation with opposition parties may help balance government parties right or left of median party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Both visions assume that the median voter will be at the same position on the left-right scale as the median citizen.

XC. Powell, ch. 8: Maj=Decisive Elects, Govts, & Med Cit
A. Analytical Strategy:
1. Assume:
   a. Single L-R continuum
m meaningful to voters & parties, etc...
b. Normative desirability policy @ median from maj view

2. Compare med cit L-R self-place w/ govt & policy-influ med from expert judgements.

B. How Maj Vision Supposed to Work:
1. Competition b/w 1 incumb & 1 major challenger
2. Voters eval past perform (account) & future promises (mand)
3. Voter-chosen pref’d cand implements & performs in office
4. Voters can evict at next elect if underperform/outpromised

C. Vision consummation in Representative Congruence terms rests on victory of party near median.
1. How Achieve?
   a. 2-Party Hoteling/Downs Competition ⇒ Convergence
      (1) N.b., could evolve rather than parties know & go to med immed’ly
      (2) For most sample ctrys, enough stable time pub opin & prty sys to expect H/D convergence even by evolution.
   b. Alternatively, only one prty near median & it wins.
2. Potential Problems (i.e., how can it fail?):
   a. Neither converges (convergence failure).
   b. Prty farther from median wins election (voter failure).
   c. Vote winner close to median, but not win govt (election failure).

D. Tab 8.1: Med L-R Pub Opin., Elects, & Govt L-R ca. 1981
Table 8.1. Ideological Distance Between the Two Alternative Governments in Sixteen Democracies, Early 1980s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Alternative Governments Identified</th>
<th>Left-Right Positions</th>
<th>Distance Between New Government and Median Citizen</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left Contender</td>
<td>Median Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both contenders within 1 1/2 scale points of median citizen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>LIBERAL v. PC</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>6.2</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>DEM v. REP</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Only one contender within 1 1/2 scale points of median citizen</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>SOC v. AP</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>S.DEM v. CD/CH/LIB/CON</td>
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<td>LABOUR v. CDA/LIB</td>
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<td>Alternative future governments not identified in election²</td>
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1. Average placement of parties in government, weighted by their size, by experts in 1982 survey (Castles and Mair 1984). Scale (0–10) converted to correspond to 1–10 citizen scale.
2. Party alternatives are illustrative only; see discussion of pre-election identifiability of future governments in chapter 4 above.
3. Boldface type identifies the position of the party or coalition that in fact formed the government after the election.

1. Convergence not so great in maj: only 1/3 cases < 1.5 pts = avg
2. 1.5–50% farther from med than clearly non-maj elects (~ 1pt)
E. Same thing for ca 1991 (Table 8.2):
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<th>Median Citizen</th>
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<td>Both contenders within 1 1/2 scale points of median citizen</td>
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<td>LABOUR v. NATIONAL</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>LIBERAL v. PC</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>LABOUR v. CONS</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>COMM/SOC v. UDF/RPR</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neither contender within 1 1/2 scale points of median citizen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>S. DEM v. LIB/CON</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>S. DEM v. LIB/CON</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>SOC* v. LIB DEM</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
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<td>Alternative future governments not identified in election²</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>.2</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>LABOUR v. CDA</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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<td>.2</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
<td>.4</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>SOC v. CATH-RAD</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>PDS v. DC</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
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<td>SOC v. NEW DEM</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
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</table>

¹Average placement of parties in government, weighted by their size by experts in 1993 survey (Huber and Inglehart 1995).
²Party alternatives are illustrative only; see discussion of preelection identifiability of future governments in chapter 4 above.
³Boldface type identifies the position of party or coalition that formed the government after the election.

1. Sum Tables: in ½ cases, both or winner w/in 1.5 pts; not noticeably superior to non-majoritarian. Other ½, both or winner far (avg ±2 pts of ±5 possible) from cit med.

F. Fig 8.1: 1 Cases by use expert scales good for ±5yrs; graph cit-leg, leg-gov, & cit-gov median distances by identifiability.
1. Identifiability = distance govt from median voter

2. Add “unchecked govt” (mandate) (Tab 8.3) \( \Rightarrow \) distance

3. High id-able \( 1.6 \text{ pts} > 0.8 \text{ pts} = \) low id-able \( (\times 2) \).

G. Prob (rep cong perspect) w/ maj: voters rarely create maj for 1 party w/o artificial aids, which aids undermine rep cong

1. Three Ways Disprop Elect Sys \( \Rightarrow \) Majorities
   a. (1) Voter & party mutual anticipation of viable parties \( \Rightarrow \) Cox’s M+1 rule; (2) perhaps explicitly via pre-election coalitions (strategic)
   b. (3) Vote-seat disproportionality (mechanical).

2. Fig 8.2 reveals vote-seat disprop main source lack rep cong: in creating shift from voted median to legislative median.
a. Big part of this = party coordination-failure: >1 party competing in same ideological space allows less-supported opposition to win plur/maj

b. w/o converge: L- or R-side fail (NZ ’83, Can ’88) ⇒ farther prty wins

c. w/ 1-side converge: Center fail (UK ’83 or AL ’80) ⇒ far party wins

H. Why Majoritarian Vision (of Rep Cong) So Often Fail?

1. Broadly:
   a. Small errors magnified by maj winner-take-all knife-edge.
   b. Asking too much for simple yay/nay of A/B vote to connect voters well to policymakers in complex (multi-D) world.

2. Further, 3 ways to produce identifiability given (assume) simple normal, continuous, & symmetric pub-opinion distrib:
   a. 2-party electoral dominance ⇒ natural or earned majority
   b. 2-party govtal (w/o elect) dom ⇒ manufactured majority
   c. Pre-electoral coalition [⇒ same as other 2 w/ coal’s the competitors]
   d. Maj Vision Assumes a but b far more comm (only US close to a)

3. Cox:
   a. Coord fails common, & conseq ↑ in SMD (as T_eff ↑)
   b. >2 or even anticipated >2 prtys (entry deterrence), convergence not robust (parties likely position evenly space in# voters b/w them).

4. Alternatively: how form govtl maj that Account & Mandate require w/o electoral maj? ⇒ must trade rep cong for A & M.

XCI. Chapt. 9: Prop=Rep Med Cit by Multistage Process

A. Continue strategy & assumpts as before (n.b., using median congruence if anything biased against prop
B. How Prop Vision Supposed to Work:
   1. Multiple, diverse parties proportionally (to voter-pref distrib) rep’d in parliament ⇒ govt formation.
   2. Govt more rep’d in policy than legis ⇒ some ° opposition influence (ideally, prop’ly) via minority gov, committee sys, etc)

C. Three Elements to Accurate Reflect Voter Opin in Policy:
   1. Multiple parties avail to voter (so latter can pick close former)
   2. Voters choose closer (rational & not much cause strategic)
   3. Accurate reflection voter choice in effective governance (in legis, govt, &, most important, effective policymaker).

D. Results:
   1. From Fig 8.2: Voted med & leg med close (w/in .6 pts); diffs seem from prty-spacing lumpiness: not-so-even ideol-spacing.
   2. Tables 9.1 & 9.2 (Govts in early 80s & 90s):
      a. Govts gen’ly several ptys, spanning rel wide ideol range
      b. Maj govts usually include median party; sometimes straddling cit med so avg near it, but sometimes ctr-lft or ctr-rt so avg not so near, but still w/in .8 of it on avg.
      c. Minority govts typically farther from median
   3. Problems:
      a. Pre-electoral coals ⇒ more maj-like outcomes, including ↓ rep cong
      b. Minority govts ⇒ low govt rep cong, but these more common in maj systems & opposition influence often higher in prop systems...
   4. Fig 9.1: Govt & Effective Policymaker Rep Cong by ° Auth Rep

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**Figure 9.1. Left-Right Distances: Citizens, Governments and Policymakers: By Level of Effective Authorized Representation**

5. Complications: Govt Change Remote from Election
a. Three Theoretical Possibilities:
   (1) Govts far from cit med tend to fall & replace by closer
   (2) (Antic) electorate Δ ⇒ ↑ govt dist pre-elect cit med, closer current/next
   (3) Govt shift unrelated cit prefs, & elite manip takes farther from cit med
b. Evidence: if anything, intra-elect Δ ⇒ ↑ rep cong

E. General Conclusions (Fig 9.3 & Table 9.4):
   1. **Majoritarian Vision** works “only fitfully”: Exacts high rep cong cost for majority generation [n.b., on which its accountability & mandate advantages rest] & oppositions lack influence to alter
   2. **Proportional Vision** works fairly well: Post-election bargaining typically ⇒ near-median govts, Govt change b/w elects only ↑ that, & even where not opposition influence brings effective policymaking closer to median [but at cost of ↓ efficacy account & mand mechanisms]

### Figure 9.3. Left-Right Distances: Citizens, Legislatures, Governments and Policy-makers by Constitutional Design Type

3. Tracing mechanisms of performance differences (Table 9.4):
XCII. **Ch10: Conclusion—Elections as Instruments Democracy**

A. Gen’ly negative relation b/w achieve alt ideals (Fig 10.1)
B. Const’l designs gen’ly performing as expected.
C. None give effective representation to <50% (i.e., all dems)
D. **Democratic Constitutional PPF?** Some substantial maj failings, & some doing better than avg tradeoff on both, but, generally, ctrys doing worse on maj do better on prop & v.v. Dual failures possible (e.g., post-sov Russia & Poland) but seem not occur here.

E. This crude begininng; where more work needed:
1. Pre-elect coalitions
2. Need know more about exec-legis relation:
   a. Opposition influence; Minority govt;
   b. Other inst’l power dispersion (Madisonian): bicameralism, federalism
3. Votes inadequate measure cit prefs ⇒ Need more about context-conditional preferences & behavior
4. Multi-dimensional issues
5. Deadlock v. compromise from power dispersal
6. Corruption & better agency (see below)
7. Functioning of young party-systems
8. These govt systems mostly rel simple; many newer ones more mixed (Pres-Parl, PR/Maj); how do mixed systems work?
9. Dynamics, Variance, & Stability: this mostly about static match

F. Tradeoff: (a) decisiveness & accountability (mandate problematic) & (b) accurate effective representation.
1. *If game largely of cit’s v. pm’s, perhaps advantage maj*
2. *If game largely of conflict intrst among cit’s, advantage prop.*
XCIII. Franzese, ch. 2: “Political Participation, Income Distrib, & Public Transfers in Dev’d Dems”

A. Start with std Meltzer-Richard-type argument:
   1. Median person poorer than average, $\therefore$ median desires positive net transfers
   2. Tax/Transfer $\Rightarrow$ incentives to work/invest, $\therefore$ median desires larger net transfers until this cost outweighs greater redistrib garnered. Greater the diff b/w median & mean, the larger transfers before this occurs.

B. However, not everyone votes, &, in particular, relatively wealthy vote more than relatively poor.
   1. $\therefore$, greater positive effect of $\uparrow$ income skew on trans. as voter-participation $\uparrow$
   2. Conversely, positive impact on transfers of $\uparrow$ voter partic. larger the greater underlying income skew


A. Much of expansion in public debt since mid-seventies due to econ. conditions; specifically:
   1. $\uparrow$ UE & $\downarrow$ growth $\Rightarrow$ $\downarrow$ rev’s & $\uparrow$ expend’s, given current taxation & expend. system
   2. That initial impact amplified by ensuing rise in real interest rates $\Rightarrow$ explosive public-debt path in many

B. Key political factor is govt fractionalization (and less so polarization)
   1. Where govt’s fractionalized, fiscal-policy adjustments to address rising debt delayed as parties in govt, may have agreed on need for adjust, naturally disagreed over whose constituents would pay the costs
   2. Where govt’s more unified (fewer parties, not divided govt), adjust. plans easier to implement: governing party more easily placed adjust costs on opponents
   3. Where poor econ conditions hit environments with fractionalized govt’s, debt path yet more explosive

C. Several other political, structural, & institutional factors had some, but more minor, effects