

PS 460.2 Week 2b-3b: Socio-Economic Structure (SES), Development, Modernization, and Democratic Politics

Introduction: Politics=means by which conflicts (of opinion, of interests, of views) reconciled (not necessarily resolved) so policies may be decided & implemented. Liberal-democratic countries aim to manage this in as orderly, efficient, & peaceful manner as possible while remaining democratic. Analysis of socio-economic development and socio-economic *cleavage* structures, then, is our inroad into understanding the fundamental, enduring, & potentially prominent schisms in society across which such conflict arises.

I. Introduction

- A. Our analysis of SE development & cleavage-structure and politics has four goals
 - 1. Definition of concepts
 - 2. Introduction of empirical facts, two parts
 - a. variation & similarity in broad, cross-sectional features within & across countries
 - b. change & continuity over time
 - 3. Arguments relating SE cleavage-structure to outcomes
 - a. Democratic Perform: participation, stability, violence
 - b. Party Systems
 - 4. Arguments relating SE development to outcomes:

- a. Democracy & democratization
- b. Democratic Perform: participation, stability, violence

II. Definition & Typology of cleavages & cleavage structure

- A. Lane & Ersson: “a *division* on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups, or organizations [b/w] whom *conflict may* arise” (p. 53) [emphases added]
- B. Rae & Taylor: ““Cleavages are the criteria which divide members of a community or subcommunity into groups...”” (p. 53). A typology:
 1. Ascriptive/trait: race, caste, ethnicity, language
 2. Attitudinal/opinion: ideology, preference, class, relig
 3. Behavioral/act: “those elicited through voting & organizational membership”
- C. [I’d say R&T’s first two are sufficient; let’s call them:]
 1. Ascriptive Cleavages
 2. Preference/Value Cleavages]
- D. Some of the characteristics by which cleavages differ:
 1. criteria that determine group membership: objectivity v. subjectivity, *e.g.*
 2. exclusivity of the groups so divided
 3. nature of disagreement: policy differences v. general belief & value differences
 4. salience

5. latent v. manifest
- E. Abstract typology by membership criteria is difficult, but more concrete enumeration may suffice (Daalder):
1. *class or sectoral (economic) interests*: worker/employer; traded/non-traded; private/public
 2. *religion*: Cath/Prot; Christian/Non-C; relig/secular; fundamentalist/moderate
 3. *geographical*: urban/rural, center/periphery
 4. *nationality or nationalism*: ethnic, nationalist, & regionalist separatism
- F. Multifarious cleavages, basically infinite in principle, so Q of which cleavages matter best seen as entirely a practical one of *explanatory power v. parsimony*. Lane & Ersson's choices [paraphrased] are a reasonable set:
1. Religious
 2. Ethnic/Linguistic
 3. Class/Economic
 4. Regional/Geographic
- G. Some other definitions:
1. Powell: "A set of attitudes that divides the nation's citizens into major political groups."
 - a. "Sometimes... 'purely' political: they reflect opinions about [particular] policies [or policy areas] & are developed, sustained, & organized by political leaders committed to such policies..."

- b. “more frequently alignment of large groups based on deep social, economic, & cultural divisions in the fabric of society...[e.g.] occupation, religion, language, race, custom, & geography...” (42)
 - c. focuses on two:
 - (1) ethnic (cultural) divisions
 - (2) economic divisions
 - d. one often-raised Q is relative weight of these two
 - (1) [Pink Floyd quote: “With/Without/& who’ll deny/it’s what the fighting’s all about” from ‘Us & Them’ off ‘Dark Side of the Moon’]
 - (2) but avoid any false dichotomy
 - (3) [Both ethnic/cultural & economic always matter though relative weight may vary—any hypotheses as to why & how the relative might vary?]
2. GLM: “implies much more than mere division, more even than outright conflict, b/w 2 sets of people...
- a. *fundamental* cleavage...3 specific connotations: [GLM reviewing Lipset&Rokkan here]
 - (1) “involves a *social division* that separates people who can be distinguished from one another in terms of key social characteristics such as occupation, status, religion, or ethnicity...Cannot be defined at the political level alone” (210)
 - (2) “the groups involved in the division must be *conscious of their collective identity*...& be willing to act on this basis”
 - (3) “must be expressed in organizational terms ...

usually achieved as a result of the activities of a trade union, a church, a political party, or some other organization that gives formal institutional expression to the interests of those on one side of the division” (p. 211)

- b. following Lipset & Rokkan, focus is on four:
 - (1) Center-Periphery
 - (2) Church-State
 - (3) Rural-Urban
 - (4) Class Structure

H. SUMMARY of DEFINITIONS & TYPES:

1. Definitions of Cleavages

- a. **L&E:** “a division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups, or organizations [between] whom conflict may arise” (p. 53)
- b. **Powell:** “a set of attitudes which divides the nation’s citizens into major political groups”
 - (1) “Sometimes purely political: they reflect opinions about policies or & are developed, sustained, & organized by political leaders committed to such policies...”
 - (2) “more frequently [they are the] alignment of large groups...based on deep social, economic, & cultural divisions in the fabric of society[:] occupation, religion, language, race, custom, geography” (p.42)
- c. **GLM:** “[cleavage] implies much more than mere division, more even than outright conflict, between 2 sets of people.” Cleavages have **3 properties:**

- (1) Social divisions on the basis of **identifiable characteristics** (e.g., occupation, status, religion, ethnicity); cannot be defined at the political level alone (e.g., *not* parties)
- (2) Groups involved must possess a **group consciousness** & be willing to act on that basis
- (3) The cleavage must be **expressed in organizational terms** (e.g., unions, action groups, etc.) [We stress this less as a criteria for being a cleavage]

2. Typologies of Cleavages:

a. We distinguish **2 Broad Cleavage-Types:**

- (1) **Ascriptive or “Trait” Cleavages:** bases for division are inherent characteristics of the individuals involved, there’s no element of choosing to belong to some group: e.g., race, caste, ethnicity, language
- (2) **Functional, Preference, or Value Cleavages:** these are adopted views or, at least to some degree, chosen affiliations: e.g., class, preferences, ideology, & possibly religion

b. We identify **4 Common Cleavage-Bases:**

- (1) **Religious:** Christian/Non-Christian, Catholic/Protestant, Fundamentalist/Moderate, Religious/Secular
- (2) **Ethnic/Linguistic:** Race, Language, Cultures
- (3) **Class/Economic:** social class, income & wealth, worker/employer, manual/skilled labor, traded/non-traded sector, private/public sector
- (4) **Regional/Geographic:** Urban/Suburban/Rural, Center/Periphery, Regionalism

III. Powell's Arguments & Finding on Socio-Econ Cleavages & Cleavage-Structure and Democratic Performance

A. Ethnic-/Linguistic-/Religious-ly divided societies

1. **Preliminary Analytical Problems/Issues:**

- a. Which divides matter?
- b. Whether E/L/R divides cause the conflict or economic differences coinciding therewith do?

2. **Argument:** E/L/R divisions are less divisible ("compromisable" or "bargainable") and, thus, greater prevalence & saliency of E/L/R divisions worsens democratic performance

3. **Implications:**

- a. **participation** could go either way,
- b. **govt stability** should decline as E/L/R divisions rise
- c. **social order** should decline as E/L/R divisions rise

4. **Findings:** (in broad sample of democracies)

- a. Some weak indication that **participation** decreases with E/L/R fractionalization
- b. Stronger evidence that **government stability** & "effectiveness" declines with E/L/R fractionalization
- c. complicated relationship with upheaval & violence
 - (1) no greater tendency to riot apparent
 - (2) however, given social upheaval, appears more likely to become violent & deadly—latter frequently

occurring as govts attempt to restore order

- (3) I.e., Greater E/L/R fractionalization produces no greater **tendency to riot**, but, given some degree of social upheaval, it appears more likely to become **violent** the greater is E/L/R fractionalization

B. Economically Divided Societies

1. Classical Arguments: (date back to Aristotle)

- a. Economic **inequality** produces political instability
- b. Large **middle class** key to defusing this potential

2. Powell's Arguments:

- a. "little doubt that occupational divisions & the inequalities that usually accompany them are a convenient basis for constructing political organizations" (p.47)
- b. still less question, I'd say, that they're a natural basis for potentially disruptive conflict
- c. What's less clear is the mechanism by which economic inequality produces political instability
 - (1) how are such inequalities so frequently tolerated in traditional societies & become issues in modernizing & modern ones?
 - (2) n.b. it's usually the abrogation of traditional peasant "rights" which triggers revolutions, doesn't appear to be the awareness of inequality *per se*
 - (3) [concepts: relative deprivation, perceived v. objective inequality, justice]

3. Powell's Hypotheses: Economic inequality reduces

participation, government stability, & social order

4. **Powell's Findings:** Weak evidence of any relationship between inequality & democratic functioning

C. Powell Summary:

1. Arguments: Small population, high development, homogeneity (ethnic, etc.), & low inequality reduce riots & deaths
2. Findings: Yes to population & development, some evidence for ethnic homogeneity, weak evidence for economic inequality. Why do you suppose?

D. Powell's findings refer to entire sample of democracies (*ca.* 1980). We study developed democracies; findings in that sample differ somewhat. [See scatterplots & regressions below.]

E. **Further Considerations/Discussion: why have some divided societies functioned democratically, peaceably, and stably, but others not?**

1. History?
 - a. History of oppression & repression & of internal & external war: US, UK/N.Ire.; Israel; former Yugoslavia; the Franco-German, Franco-Spanish, German-Danish, Italian-Austrian, Italian-French border regions
 - b. History of homogeneity or heterogeneity: Compare reactions of massive immigration in Germany v. Switzerland; Italy v. Canada

2. Structure or Nature of Cleavages [see below]?
 - a. Reinforcing v. cross-cutting cleavages?
 - (1) US v. Switzerland
 - (2) Finland v. Spain
 - b. Relative size of the factions?
 - (1) Too small to be a “threat”
 - (2) So large it “must be dealt with”
 - (3) Hypothesis: 15-40% range most severe problems?
 - c. Divisibility of issues? Ascriptive v. functional?
 - d. Fractionalization? Polarization?
3. Institutional structure?
 - a. *Regional autonomy* (Switzerland, Canada, US, Germany, Australia, Italy, Spain: federalism or special relationships with peripheral groups)
 - b. *Parliamentary representation* of minorities (Netherlands, Belgium: highly proportional systems)
 - c. *Functional representation* (Austria: *proporz*, Netherlands: *pillarization*)
 - d. *Checks & balances* (US); *constitutionally ensconced liberties* (all developed democracies)

F. Powell does a very nice job of summarizing the chapter—read last 3 paragraphs carefully

IV. Characteristics of Socio-Econ Cleavages & Cleavage Structure that May Affect Democratic Performance

A. Reinforcing (coinciding) Cleavages & Cross-cutting (not coinciding) Cleavages

1. Definitions:

- a. Reinforcing: two cleavages are reinforcing to the degree that they divide society into the same two groups of people
- b. Cross-cutting: two cleavages are cross-cutting to the degree that their divisions of society do not coincide

2. N.b. this is a property of the cleavage structure, of relations between cleavages (dividing lines), not of one specific cleavage line.

3. [Examples & So What?]

B. **Cross-Cutting v. Reinforcing:** Cleavage structures (a set of cleavages) are **cross-cutting** to the degree that each divides the nation differently into different groups & **reinforcing** to the degree that each divides the nation into the same groups

1. **Argument:** cleavages are more (less) likely to be more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more they reinforce (cross-cut) each other.

C. **Salience:** importance of dividing line & its associated conflicts to those involved. (Some refer to dormant cleavages as “latent” & active cleavages as “manifest”.)

1. **Argument:** cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more salient the issues involved.

D. **Divisibility:** degree to which issues over which groups divided by cleavage easily *bargainable* or *compromisable* as opposed to absolute (0-1).

1. **Argument:** cleavages more likely less detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more divisible the issues involved.

E. **Relative Power** of groups divided by the cleavage

1. **Argument 1:** cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more closely is power distributed among the groups.

2. **Argument 2:** cleavages more likely more detrimental to democratic stability & social order as the power of ascendant groups approaches that of dominant groups.

F. **Fractionalization & Polarization:** Fractionalization refers to the number of cleavages operating (manifest); polarization refers to the “distance” separating the parties’ preferred policies & outcomes

1. **Argument:** cleavages are more likely to be more detrimental to democratic stability & social order the more fractionalized & polarized the cleavage structure

V. Patterns of Cleavages & the Number of Political Parties

A. Pattern of Cleavages & the Number of Parties

1. SE cleavage structure of polity could be described in various dimensions

a. fractionalization of society (# of sub-groups, *possibly overlapping*)

- b. polarization of society (“distance” between groups)
 - c. degree to which cleavages reinforce or cross-cut
 - d. relative salience of the various cleavages
2. These factors combine to suggest number of political parties that may evolve to represent various issues
 - a. they tell us number of relevant *disjoint* subgroups
 - b. if political parties evolve to represent groups of people with distinct interests, that should be at least suggestive of number of parties that evolve
 3. Social-structural data that would enable operationalize the abstract concepts above & process them into the number of disjoint subgroups has not been attempted & would be no simple task (though I think it might be feasible). However, subjectively, my impression is that the relationship is not as strong as might be expected:
 - a. US—many disjoint subgroups, effectively 2 parties
 - b. Italy—relatively homogenous, many parties
 - c. Denmark—relatively homogenous, many parties
 - d. [Any guesses why this might be?]
- B. Argument:** Cleavage structure suggests number & types of social groups that parties could evolve to represent; *i.e.*, social structure gives basis for political organization suggesting that societal fractionalization & polarization may be mirrored by party-system fract & polar
- C. Evidence:**

1. To measure adequately effective number of relevant social groupings would be daunting empirical task: only crudest of attempts have been made so far.
 2. However, my subjective impression is correlation b/w number of social groups & number of parties weak at best: US: many groups, 2 parties; Switzerland: many groups, many parties; Italy: relatively homogenous, many parties; UK: relatively homogenous, 2 parties.
 3. Why? Probably because b/w social structure & party system intervenes extremely powerful institutional variables, esp. electoral law & institutions
- D. **Some Key Concepts:** cleavage; cleavage structure; salience/intensity; latent v. manifest; cross-cutting v. reinforcing; fractionalization & polarization; modernization & social-mobilization; post-materialism

VI. Modernization & Democratic Performance

A. **Key features of development:**

1. Growth & spread of affluence
2. Economic- & social-structural change
3. Urbanization
4. Education, literacy, & spread of mass media
5. Greater social & occupational mobility

B. **Classical Hypotheses:** Democracies with modernized social structures & developed economies expected to have higher participation, more stable & effective

governments, & less political violence than countries with more traditional social structures & underdeveloped economies & democracies. Why?

1. Simple, monotonic arguments:

- a. *Education & Modern Person* hypotheses (Lerner, Inkeles: rational/scientific life views)
- b. *Value-harmonization hypothesis*
- c. *Affluence hypothesis*: (Maslow's hierarchy of needs)
- d. *Government-resources hypothesis*: affluence allows greater fulfillment of social demands, partly *via* increase of government resources
- e. *Increasing-interdependence hypothesis*

2. Non-monotonic, Conditional (complicated) arguments

- a. *Ratio econ dev'p to soc-pol mobilization* (Huntington)
- b. *Level of Econ dev'p at intro of political competition*
- c. *Pace-of-development hypothesis*

C. Powell: Impact on political perf? [generate hypoth's]

1. **Participation**

- a. **Argument**: modernization raises participation
 - (1) greater information, education, & psychological involvement of modern person
 - (2) more extensive & specialized grp structures, more effective organizations (esp. parties & related org's)
- b. **Finding**: Modernization => Lesser Participation

c. Why?

2. **Government Stability/Effectiveness:**

a. **Hypothesis:** Seems logical that modernization => greater government stability & effectiveness

b. **Finding:** Modernization => no apparent relation to government stability & effectiveness

c. Why?

3. **Social Order & Violence:**

a. **Hypothesis:** Again, seems logical that modernization => greater social order & less violence

b. **Findings:** Relationship b/w development & “social upheaval” (riots) seems different than that b/w development & political violence




(1) Soc disorder most in early stages of modernization, less at undeveloped & developed stages; i.e., curvilinear w/ early modernization appearing worst




(2) Violence, contrarily, strictly declines (increases) in modernization (underdevelopment); i.e., linear




c. Why?

VII. Some data and simple evidence on S-E Development & Cleavage-Structure and Democratic Performance

A. Participation











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


R-squared = 0.8833

vpart	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
lpop	-3.336463	1.212639	-2.751	0.019	-6.005463	-.6674632
lrgdpc	1.848647	6.740736	0.274	0.789	-12.98761	16.68491
ethind	.0623695	7.192933	0.009	0.993	-15.76917	15.89391
relind	12.3443	7.94188	1.554	0.148	-5.13566	29.82426
gini	-111.8817	44.40408	-2.520	0.028	-209.6144	-14.14894
edsec	-.2808857	.1271328	-2.209	0.049	-.5607032	-.0010682
age65o	1.203603	.7275164	1.654	0.126	-.3976493	2.804856
US	-17.27092	6.455974	-2.675	0.022	-31.48042	-3.061414
SZ	-46.59973	6.659673	-6.997	0.000	-61.25757	-31.94189
_cons	144.9013	57.75213	2.509	0.029	17.78975	272.0129

B. Government Stability












Number of obs = 21


R-squared = 0.6162

dgov80	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
lpop	-1.208241	1.905755	-0.634	0.538	-5.360524	2.944042
lrgdpc	-21.06676	11.06763	-1.903	0.081	-45.18106	3.047533
ethind	24.58645	10.87294	2.261	0.043	.8963491	48.27655
relind	28.05811	12.91752	2.172	0.051	-.0867556	56.20297
gini	-48.43518	70.82302	-0.684	0.507	-202.7453	105.8749
edsec	.220791	.2004675	1.101	0.292	-.2159903	.6575722
age65o	1.553841	1.179984	1.317	0.212	-1.017124	4.124805
US	18.08332	10.5959	1.707	0.114	-5.003161	41.1698
_cons	192.649	94.03041	2.049	0.063	-12.2256	397.5237

C. Social Order & Violence







Number of obs = 16 R-squared = 0.6063

lattopp	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
lpop	.6046398	.3707692	1.631	0.142	-.2503556	1.459635
lrgdpc	-3.45209	1.985412	-1.739	0.120	-8.030458	1.126277
ethind	1.977078	1.950378	1.014	0.340	-2.520503	6.474659
relind	1.822315	2.361272	0.772	0.462	-3.622789	7.267419
gini	3.157216	13.30192	0.237	0.818	-27.51707	33.8315
edsec	.0401198	.033673	1.191	0.268	-.0375303	.1177698
age65o	.7656431	.2847183	2.689	0.028	.1090814	1.422205
_cons	9.059294	16.14223	0.561	0.590	-28.16475	46.28334

VIII. Interpreting Regression-Analysis Results

- A. Output refers to equation, where name in top-left, here “lattopp”, is dependent variable & rest of names in first column are independent variables, “lpop”, “lrgdpc” etc.
- B. Second column contains estimated coefficients on those independent variables. Last such coefficient, on “_cons”, is coefficient on a constant (one), otherwise known as intercept. Coefficients tell you how much dependent variable tends to move for each 1-unit increase in independent variable. **Sign**, therefore, tells you direction of the relationship & **size** tells you magnitude (keeping in mind substantive scales of

independent & dependent variables). So, above estimated equation is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{lattopp} = & 9.06 + .605(\text{lpop}) - 3.45(\text{lrgdpc}) + 1.98(\text{ethind}) \\ & + 1.82(\text{relind}) + 3.16(\text{gini}) + .040(\text{edsec}) \\ & + .766(\text{age65o}) \end{aligned}$$

C. All data are for the 1980s:

1. *lattopp* = avg # of “political attacks & oppressions”
2. *lpop* = natural log of size of population
3. *lrgdpc* = natural log of real GDP per capita
4. *ethind* = ethnic fractionalization index: probability that 2 persons chosen at random will be of diff ethnic grps
5. *relind* = religious fractionalization index: probability 2 persons chosen at random will be of diff relig grs
6. *gini* = GINI index of income inequality
7. *edsec* = percentage of population in relative age grp that attained at least secondary edu (high school)
8. *age65o* = percentage of population over 65 years old

D. Third column is standard error. It tells you precision of the estimated relationship: with how great certainty do increases in independent variable lead to movements in the dependent variable? You can read these as loosely something like the +/- number that comes with every survey. E.g., “When percent of population high-school

educated or better goes up by 1, natural log of political attacks & oppressions go up by about .04 [coefficient on *edsec*] give or take .034 [std error on *edsec* coeff].”

- E. Next column contains t-statistics. Std errors should at very least be smaller than coefficient for us to lend any credence to coefficient estimate. We’d prefer them to be no larger than half as large as coefficient. T-statistic is just coefficient divided by standard error. So, loosely, larger t-statistics imply more precise relationships (tighter relationships, not necessarily larger ones). We like t-stats approaching or exceeding about 2 (very crude advice, please don’t ever tell a statistician this).
- F. Next column is probability, under certain assumptions, of having estimated a coefficient this far or farther from zero if the true relationship actually were zero. We look to these to see if we can say with any statistical certainty that a relationship (positive or negative) exists. We like these “p-levels” approaching or smaller than 0.10 (again, this very rough statement would make a statistician cringe).
- G. Last two columns are “95% confidence interval”. Again, exceedingly crudely but good enough for now, we can say, under certain assumptions, we are 95% confident that the true relationship b/w these bounds.
- H. This is *multiple regression*. It’s just like the scatter-plots for two variables above, only now looking for relation between a *set* of possible independent variables & the dependent variable. Thus, each coefficient is “the effect

of X on Y, holding all else constant” or “the effect of X on Y after having ‘netted out’ all relationships between the other x’s & Y”.

1. Coefficients (and standard errors, t-stats, and p-levels) defined above all related to how (and the certainty with which) *each variable, controlling for all the others*, relates to the dependent variable.
2. R² term (“R-squared” at top-right of table) indicates share of total variation of dependent variable that can be explained by, that is systematic in, (*all of*) the independent variables.

I. Questions? We will see this again, so:

1. Do not panic if you did not get all of this right now. We will see it again (& again) & I will explain it again.
2. However, do not hope that it will just go away if you ignore it. We *will* see it again (& again).

IX. Some Further Questions regarding **Development & the Saliency of Different Cleavages:**

1. Does development increase the saliency of functional cleavages relative to ascriptive ones?
2. Does rise of **post-industrial society & post-materialism** decrease saliency of economic cleavages?
3. Did the rise of the welfare state & the more recent plateau-ing or receding of the welfare state increase or decrease the saliency of economic cleavages?
4. More broadly, are *new* cleavages replacing *old* ones?

X. Summary of What We Have So Far on Socio-Econ Development & Cleavage-Structure and Politics:

A. Basic Notion & Definition of Social Cleavage & Cleavage-Structure

B. Typologies of Social Cleavages:

1. *Ascriptive v. Functional Cleavages*

2. *Religious, Ethnic/Linguistic, Class/Economic, Regional/Geographic*

C. Characteristics of Social Cleavages & Cleavage-Structures Potentially Important to Key Elements of Democratic Performance

1. *Salience of the Divide (“latent” — “manifest”)*

2. *Divisibility (“Bargainability” or “Compromisability”)*

3. *Relative Power of the Groups Involved*

4. *Fractionalization & Polarization (of Cleavage Structure)*

5. *Cross-Cutting v. Reinforcing (Cleavage Structure)*

D. Modernization & Democratic Perf; Key Hypotheses

1. *Modernization & Participation, Govt Stab, & Soc Order*

a. *Education & the “Modern Person” Arg.*

b. *Value-Harmonization Arg.*

c. *Increasing Density of Interactions (Increasing Interdependence of Individuals in Society) Arg.*

2. *Impact of Modernization Depends (is complicated)*

- a. Ratio of Econ Dev't to Social Mobilization Arg.
- b. Economic Dev'p at Time of Democratization Arg.
- c. Pace of Development Arg.

E. Why do some democracies function well & others not? Answer in this material emphasizes nature & severity of underlying potential conflicts as expressed in social-structure & the way they are expressed. This omits other important parts of answer, some of which we will emphasize later. For now, note:

- 1. *History*: of oppression & repression & of homogeneity or heterogeneity
- 2. *Institutional Structure*: Checks & Balances, Regional Autonomy, Minority Representation in Parliament; Functional Representation of Minorities, Guaranteed Rights in Constitutions

F. Social-Cleavage Patterns & the Party System: basic notion that party system, *i.e.*, number, sizes, & ideological positioning of parties, reflects somehow underlying social-structure. But relation moderated by:

- 1. *Institutions operating b/w social structure & party system (most centrally, electoral institutions).*
- 2. *Party & other elite strategies, & history (loosely, inertia)*

XI. Lipset & Rokkan's Diachronic Model of Cleavage-Structure Formation & Freezing

A. Two stages, Process of Nation-Building & Industrial Revolution, each bringing two fundamental conflicts,

form underlying cleavage structure. The nature of their resolution forms the party system.

1. Nation Building I: Center v. Periphery

- a. Those seeking to standardize laws & consolidate power in nation-state (center) against those striving to maintain local powers & privileges (periphery)
- b. The struggle can end in:
 - (1) secession (Ireland from UK),
 - (2) absorption of periphery & its gradual fading as distinct (Bretton or Occitan in France),
 - (3) local autonomy (some Spanish & Italian regions),
 - (4) or retention of diffuse, persistent tension (e.g., Germany, except Bavaria which is more 3)
- c. Only last two likely to result in this cleavage being reflected in party system

2. Nation-Building II: Church v. State

- a. Conflict b/w (Catholic) Church's claim of rights & privileges, esp. its supremacy in certain moral areas, *vs.* state consolidators; central issue often education
- b. Resolution depends centrally on nation's history & role in Protestant Ref. & later secularist movements:
 - (1) Where Protestant movements allied with state & won, party system does not usually reflect Church-State cleavage (e.g., UK, Scandinavia)
 - (2) Where Catholicism continued to dominate, Church-State cleavage tended to persist (e.g., Latin Europe)

- (3) Where secularists most momentum (e.g., France), party system often evolved anti-clerical elements

3. **Industrial Revolution I: Urban v. Rural**

- a. Conflict b/w traditionally dominant rural interests & new commercial & industrial classes
- b. These have almost universally faded (basically because urban interests won), but...
 - (1) ...in some places agrarian parties emerged, & these often persisted if leading strategists allowed party flexibility from its early aims & purposes, (e.g., Sweden, Finland)
 - (2) ...split has seen rebirth in reverse as urban decline began, (e.g., US, UK)
 - (3) ...some rebirth also in conflicts over agricultural protectionism (e.g., esp. Europe & Japan)

4. **Industrial Revolution II: Labor v. Employers**

- a. Increased concentration of production, & the accompanying increased organization of labor & employers as a group, led to almost-inherently-organized conflict
- b. Resolution occurred by two patterns:
 - (1) Where workers rose & the bourgeoisie adopted an accommodative strategy, Socialist parties arose as the representatives of labor (e.g., UK, Sweden)
 - (2) Where workers rose & the bourgeoisie adopted a stonewalling and/or repressive strategy, Communist parties arose as the representatives of labor (e.g., France, Italy, Germany, Spain)

B. **Argument:** The pattern of how these conflicts arose in each country & how they had been or were being resolved at time mass democracy arrived was frozen. I.e., **cleavage structure is *frozen* in party system by mid-20th Century because:**

1. **Underlying conflicts persist & groups involved have developed collective identities**
2. Major new political entities typically can arise only w/ large increases in suffrage & **universal suffrage was mostly completed** by then.
3. **Political rules made by & so favor established parties**
4. **Established parties follow electoral strategies to isolate their supporters from outside appeals**

C. Perceived increases in **electoral volatility** in 1970s led some to seek **explanations for unfreezing:**

1. **Social-Structural Changes in Developed Democracies**
 - a. **Sectoral-Structure:** industrial decline, massive agricultural decline, massive service-sector rise
 - b. **Erosion of Class Boundaries**
 - (1) general education & more wide-spread higher edu
 - (2) changing work modes: relative ↓ manual labor
 - (3) increasingly widespread affluence (though relative disparities may have widened too)
2. **Changes in Patterns of Individual Voting Behavior: Decline of Structural Voting**

- a. Decline of class voting & of religious voting but still recognizably different.
- b. **Arguments:** suggested reasons for former listed above, to which add:
 - (1) secularization & decreasing coherence of views among religious & secular alike
 - (2) increased individuality & political sophistication

3. **Changes in the Issues about which those Individuals:** *Dealignment v. Realignment*

- a. **Realignment:** new parties & changing support among existing parties
 - (1) Some see a “New Politics” movement
 - (a) new, highly educated, young middle class
 - (b) distinctive new values & issues: environment, feminism, etc.
 - (c) new-left parties: greens, new communists; new-right: anti-government, xenophobic, protest
 - (2) GLM suggest this may be exaggerated
 - (a) these new parties are still marginal electorally
 - (b) parliamentary and/or electoral necessity implies increasing association of the “new” lefts & rights with “old” ones
 - (3) Conclusion: “Realignment” is very limited, some new dimensions in a still-recognizable left-right divide. Great electoral stability remains across left-right blocks; instability is within blocks.
- b. **Dealignment:** non-partisan allegiances & no

allegiances. Supposed evidence: (a) declining party identification, (b) rise of new parties & party-system fractionalization, & (c) increased electoral volatility. All of which are questionable.

XII. Dalton, Russell J. “Political Cleavages, Issues, & Electoral Change,” in LeDuc, Niemi, & Norris, Comparing Democracies, Sage (1996), & Citizen Politics, 2nd ed., ch. 7-8, Chatham House (1996).

A. Broad Theme:

1. Two prominent changes in link from socioeconomic structure to voting behavior
 - a. Traditional cleavages (esp. class & religion) transformed & weakened as predictors of individuals’ electoral choices
 - b. Changing bases of ideological conflict: the rise of “post-materialism”
2. These producing general rise in “issue-based” voting
 - a. Less based on socially pre-determined & structured competition
 - b. A new calculus of electoral decisions
 - (1) Individualistic
 - (2) Varying issue positions & weights thereupon

B. The post-war era through late 60s to 70s

1. Party competition & voting patterns structured around social divisions within a polity

- a. Review Lipset & Rokkan's "Diachronic" Model & the Social-Cleavage/Party-System "Freezing" Hypothesis
- b. **Expected to persist because...**
 - (1) Such cleavage structures long-lasting: underlying conflicts persist & grps developed collective ID
 - (2) Universal suffrage largely completed: new parties tend to form (only) when new grps enter electorate
 - (3) Political rules made by & so favor estab'd parties
 - (4) Established party strategies: often try to isolate their supporters from outside appeals
 - (5) Alignment with underlying social-structural groups advantageous to parties & voters [*How? See below.*]
- c. Why were these divisions so potent?
 - (1) Represented & (re-)produced deep ideological divisions
 - (a) Class: conflict over nature of politics & economics, over very organization of society
 - (b) Religion: basic value-systems (right & wrong) in conflict
 - (2) Social groups enabled parties to institutionalize a basis for support
 - (a) Labor unions & firms provided organizational & people support
 - (b) Ditto for churches

2. **What does (reputation for) alignment of parties with social-structural groups do for voters & parties?**

- a. The groups so divided provided a social & political

- reference & source of info for their members (voters)
 - b. They provide organizational structure, people, & political ally for parties
- C. General decline in sociologically determined vote [n.b., see fig. pp. 172, 183-4, usually said post-1968 or so, but seems pretty much uniform since the war to me]
1. Simple Class-Voting Decline
 - a. **Define class voting:**
 - b. Blue/White collar divide appears to be decreasingly relevant as a predictor of party vote
 - c. **Explanations for specifically this cleavage decline:**
 - (1) Class division better defined by degree of job autonomy & authority
 - (2) Rise of the middle class “salariat” & affluent blue-collar worker
 - (3) Educational divide: skilled v. unskilled labor, human-capital rich v. poor
 - (4) Broad sectoral: public v. private; traded v. non; service v. industry v. agriculture
 - (5) Life-style differences: industrial v. yuppie
 - d. Even so, general decline in ability of such socio-economic status indicators to predict vote choices
 2. Religious Voting “Decline”
 - a. **Define religious voting, two types:**
 - (1) Denominational voting

- (2) Religious v. secular
- b. **Explanations for specifically this cleavage decline:**
 - (1) Secularization
 - (a) Decreasing church memberships & attendance
 - (b) Ethical individuality—e.g. US Catholic Church
 - (2) Church/state, secular/relig conflict largely resolved
- c. N.b,
 - (1) other structural voting, esp. religious/secular, seems to have persisted to much greater degree than has class voting
 - (2) Dalton's broader claim of falling structural voting rests more solidly therefore on fact that divisions of relevance to declining proportion of population

3. Other Key Social Divisions

- a. Region
 - (1) Occasional, dramatic flare-ups
 - (2) Still, some general fall in region's predictive power
- b. Urban/Rural & Center/Periphery
 - (1) Differences diminishing due to transport & communications revolutions
 - (2) But still-present agricultural-industry-service divide
- c. Race/Ethnicity
 - (1) Prominent exception to general declining relevance of socioeconomic structure to one's vote-choice
 - (2) Many societies are still homogeneous or nearly so,

less relevant there obviously

D. General explanations (hypotheses) for decline of socioeconomic structure as predictor of vote choice

1. Underlying conflicts have increasingly been resolved
 - a. Nieuwbeerta (1995) finds that strength of class voting declines in the size of the welfare state
 - b. [Note: this would also explain persistence of race-ethnicity & relative decline of other cleavages]
 - c. Dalton dismisses this, though, noting:
 - (1) Periodic recessions bring economic issues back to front [doesn't this weaken his other claims?]
 - (2) Persisting poverty, homelessness [yes, but do these segments of the population vote? It varies.]
 - (3) Crime [not exactly clear to me how this fits with any of the above cleavages *per se*]
 - (4) Large differences remain on abortion, homosexual rights, & other "moral issues" [yes, but it's exactly in this that religious/secular divide persists]
 - d. [As is clear from my comments here, I think the case for "relative resolution of underlying conflicts" argument could be made more strongly. **Notice that deg. to which underlying conflicts "resolved" might explain relative decline of some types of struct voting & relative persistence or rise of others**]
2. Parties have broadened or have sought to broaden their appeals across cleavage lines
 - a. Some evidence of platform convergence on broad

socio-economic issues [e.g., industrial nationalization], but recently evidence indicates a reversal of that trend: increasingly polarized politics. Perhaps, the polarization is diminishing again? (Pragmatic left winning in US, UK, France, Germany?) Remains to be seen.

b. Dalton notes that voters, party leaders, & “political experts” still perceive large and/or clear partisan differences which would imply...

(1) ...that it's not that voters don't perceive or are unclear about partisan differences, nor that parties no longer express such differences, but rather...

(2) ...that the socio-economic status of the voter serves less as a determinant of how the voter will interpret & react to the different signals sent by parties & received by voters.

3. **Dalton's preferred explanation** emphasizes structural & institutional changes that have produced a declining relevance of relatively fixed social characteristics for contemporary electoral politics

a. These social cleavages still very relevant to those deeply enmeshed in them, but that's fewer & fewer.

b. Increasing proportion of population characterized by:

(1) “Fragmentation of life spaces” [Huh? Define]

(2) Less participation, membership, or involvement in “stable & bounded social structures” [?]

(3) Lifestyles becoming increasingly individualized & diverse [?]

c. **[How about social fluidity & individual mobility**

across structured divides? Notice how this explains relative decline of class & less decline in religion & no decline in race/ethnicity.]

- d. Dalton acknowledges that parties have contributed to & reinforced all this:
 - (1) By seeking to accommodate these changes in structure & institutions within the existing party structure they have eroded their core, established images/reputations
 - (2) But they do not wish to commit yet to any strong stand on the new issues.

E. New Bases of Political Cleavages, *i.e.* Post-Materialism

1. **Define/Examples of “Post-Materialism”:**

2. **How did/do they arise?**

- a. The rise of new issues benefitted from the decline of old ones: the “open space” argument
- b. *Vice versa*, the new issues cut across old divides, weakening their ability to divide: the “emergence of cross-cutting issues” argument
- c. Meanwhile, citizens everywhere have increasingly demanded more opportunities to participate more actively in policy-making: the general “further democratization of society & politics” argument
- d. Finally, notice that the new issues appeal exactly to those groups increasingly outside of traditional structured & institutionalized cleavages: young, new middle class, educated, non-religious, [others?]
- e. [Other hypoths? esp. regarding environmentalism,

are non-material problems increasing? affluence? education? cross-derivatives, i.e. implications of Maslow's hierarchy?]

- f. Before we proclaim “all new” divides, new cleavage patterns, though, we need to keep in mind:
 - (1) Not all of these issues are so terribly new, even if perhaps their current prominence might be unprecedented.
 - (2) Compared to the structured ideologies underlying class & religious cleavages, materialist vs. post-materialist framework (still) diffuse & imprecise: what beside their novelty links these concerns?

F. So what is the impact of all this change?

- 1. **Decline in long-term partisan predispositions ==>**
 - a. Rise short-term factors like issues & image?
 - b. Rise performance-based voting, like econ voting?
 - c. Rise “candidate-centered” politics [define, *n.b.* US always more so perhaps? Why?]
 - d. Rise in “issue-voting”?
- 2. Issue-voting:
 - a. **Define Issue-Voting:**
 - b. Harder to study systematically because:
 - (1) Issues vary across elections & across individuals
 - (2) Multiplicity of issues at all times
 - c. Issues underlying old cleavages still around; new

issues are added thereto

3. Takes some time for, & its an uncertain process by which a new basis, for partisan competition can arise.
 - a. Grps must org to represent & mobilize interested.
 - b. Parties must establish positions, reputations, & images on those interests (in uncertain environ).
4. New Politics is orthogonal to old politics divides: Left v. Right, Religious v. Secular (or Cath. v. Prot. etc.)
 - a. The new divide is, maybe, sustainable society & libertarian values v. conservative social values & structured life choices.
 - b. **[Is this another dimension? or more like new manifestation or replacement of relig v. secular?]**