Political Science 651 (version 4.0: 30 November 2011)
Positive Comparative & International Political Economy (P-C&IPE)
Fall 2011; Class Sessions Meet: Weds 1-3pm, Location: 7603 Haven Hall

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Course Description:

This reading list aims to provide an introduction and overview to/of modern political-economy research, specifically: the positive comparative and international political economy of developed democracies and developing countries. Its readings emphasize how domestic and international political configurations (institutions, structures, etc.) and events (elections, coups, etc.) systematically produce certain sorts of economic policies and on how these comparative and international contexts might condition the effects of the policy so made. In other words, the course takes political economy primarily to mean the politics and economics of macro and international economic policymaking, policies, and outcomes, more so than (at least) three other broad areas of inquiry also referred to as political economy: (a) the microeconomics of politics, which studies how self-interested, rational policymakers make choices in a institutionalized environment, employing the utility-maximization theories and game-theoretic tools of microeconomics; (b) normative political economy, which studies, alternatively, what economic policy should be enacted to produce ideal effects or what policy would be enacted under some set of ideal circumstances that may or will not obtain; or (c) the political consequences of economic outcomes wherein political effects are treated as outputs of (typically exogenous) economic causes, e.g., the impact of economic performance on presidential approval or voting.

Requirements and Grading:

We meet 2 hours on Wednesdays for some mixture of lecture and discussion of the week’s required readings. Although everyone is responsible for being prepared to discuss all of the material every week, some of the readings are technically demanding, and the list is quite long in many weeks: a combination that renders preparing yourselves individually virtually impossible. Previous experience has taught me that I simply cannot recommend strongly enough that you form a study group to divide the readings and assist each other in preparation, so I will require such cooperative behavior. For most weeks, I will assign reading(s), as much as possible by student choice, to individual students who will serve as our resident expert on that (those) reading(s). As a resident expert, your duties include (a) preparing a detailed outline of your assigned materials, complete with two or more well and carefully conceived discussion questions; (b) for distribution to the class and to me, (b) presenting your material and starting discussion about it in class (5-10 minutes), and (c) being ready to field any questions from me or classmates about your assigned material. (Developing your skills in skimming material and learning from the summaries and presentations of others will also be important.) The outlines will be due (to me and to each other, by email) no later than late-night Monday. The discussion questions can follow (to me and to each other, by email) no later than late-night Tuesday. Lastly, each student will prepare a final research-paper on a topic to which the student and I will agree in advance. Approach these seminar papers with the full intent of producing publishable-quality work (eventually, at least) and start them as soon as possible. We will have individualized meetings about your final-paper ideas sometime around the semester mid-point. The “further suggestions” readings and the reference lists from them and the assigned readings may be good places to begin looking for material for your seminar paper, but you should feel constrained by them neither in the breadth of the topics covered nor in the depth of their coverage.

General Participation...20% Seminar Paper...40% Resident Expert Duties...40%

Due Dates: Our paper-proposal meetings will be scheduled sometime around mid-November; the paper is due (to me, by email) no later than Wednesday, December 21st, at noon. The resident-expert outlines are due (to me and to each other, by email) no later than late-night Monday. The discussion questions can follow (to me and to each other, by email) no later than late-night Tuesday.

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1 Ideally, these outlines should be preceded by an old-format AJPS abstract (Theory, Hypotheses, Methods, Results/Findings/Conclusion); they should follow standard outline format (I,II,III,IV... ,A,B,C,...,1,2,3,...,a,b,c,...); the software you use likely has a template); and they must be detailed enough for your reader to summarize the article (its main arguments, approach, findings, and conclusions) based only upon a reading of the outline (use my lecture-notes outlines as an example in this regard).

2 Please give considerable thought to these questions, and think of your material also in relation to the rest of the week’s readings in doing so. We would like to use your questions as the starting point for our discussion; in fact, consider this on-the-job training for graduate-seminar teaching. One helpful step in these directions is for you to have responses to your own questions ready, at least sketched in your head if not more-thoroughly developed.

3 Treat these presentations very seriously also; consider them on-the-job training for professional presentations. Assume we, your audience, have read your outline and at least skinned your material. Use the presentation to show us how the argument(s), model(s), and/or empirics work(s), and to raise some issues about the material (perhaps in relation to other readings that week and/or applications, critiques, and/or extensions) that seem important to you.

4 In other words, as the resident expert, you are pedagogically responsible for your assigned material.

5 “Late-night” means, at the very latest, in our inboxes when we wake the following morning, which we will assume to be 05:30.
Books Ordered for Purchase (at the University’s *troika* of bookstores):


**Outline of the Course:**

**Part I: Preliminaries & Background**

*Week 1 (9/7):* Introduction & Logistics; What is (Positive) C&IPE?

*Week 2 (9/14):* Basic Economic Theory for C&IPE (Part I)

*Week 3 (9/21):* Basic Economic Theory for C&IPE (Part II)

**Part II: The Building Blocks of Positive Political Economy**

*Week 4 (9/28):* Models and Tools for C&IPE (Part I)

*Week 5 (10/5):* Models and Tools for C&IPE (Part II)

*Week 6 (10/12):* Preferences, Collective Action, & Transaction Costs

*Week 7 (10/19):* Institutions: Perspectives, Approaches, & Theoretical Roles

**Part III: Alternative Views of the Central Conflict in C&IPE**

*Week 8 (10/26):* Credibility, Uncertainty, Information, & Time-Consistency: PE as a Technocratic Problem


**Part IV: Topics in Comparative & International Political Economy:**

*Previously Prepared Topics (Further Alternatives Possible):* Electoral & Partisan Cycles; Distributive & Redistributive Politics & Policy; Fiscal Policy (in a Global Economy); Monetary Policy (in a Global Economy); Trade Policy; Development & Growth; Reform & Transition; International Regimes, Cooperation, and Security

*Weeks 11-14 (11/16, 11/23, 11/30, 12/7):* Topics I-IV

(11/23 is day before Thanksgiving; if class meeting voted, we may reschedule day-time.)

**READING NOTES:** Throughout the syllabus, I have indicated the more-central readings in larger (11pt.) font and the less-central readings in smaller (9pt.) font in an attempt to help render these very demanding lists more manageable. I will also try to provide some guidance to reading by e-mail and/or in *Reading Notes* on my web page and/or on CTools. I will try to update these *Reading Notes* weekly, and I may update the syllabus font-size variations indicating reading priority, and, indeed, the entire syllabus, throughout the semester. Stay tuned to announcements by e-mail and in class and check back here regularly.

**SPECIAL ACCOMMODATIONS:** If you think you need an accommodation for a disability, please let me know at least two weeks prior to the time when the accommodation will be needed. Some aspects of this course, the assignments, the in-class activities, and the way the course is usually taught may be modified to facilitate your participation and progress. As soon as you make me aware of your needs, we can work with the Office of Services for Students with Disabilities (SSD) to help us determine appropriate academic accommodations. SSD (734-763-3000; [http://www.umich.edu/sswd](http://www.umich.edu/sswd)) typically recommends accommodations through a Verified Individualized Services and Accommodations (VISA) form. Any information you provide is private and confidential and will be treated as such.
Part I: Preliminaries & Background

Week 1 (9/7): What is (Positive) Comparative & International Political Economy?


PE Methodology:

Alt&Sh, Intro (Alt & Shepsle), Ch. 1 (Ordeshook), Ch. 6 (Riker), Ch. 9 (Olson).

PE of Development:

Alt&Sh, Ch. 2 (Bates).

BDM:?, Ch. 1, pp. 3-35.

Ace&Rob, Ch. 1.

Macroeconomic/Developed-Democratic PE:

One closely, One more quickly: Drazen, Ch. 1, pp. 3-19; P&T, Ch. 1, pp. 1-14.


International PE:


Further Suggestions:


Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.


Barry, Brian, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy.


Lane, Jan-Erik and Svante Ersson, Comparative Political Economy, Introduction, Chs. 1, 2 (pp. 1-54).

Lange, Peter and Marino Regini, eds., State, Market and Social Regulation: New Perspectives on Italy, Introduction (pp. 1-25).


Week 2 (9/14): Basic Economic Theory for C&IPE

Core Concepts & Topics in Economic Theory for Political Economists:

1. How markets work, and the efficiency of market exchange under competition
   a. Supply & Demand and Harberger Traingles (Deadweight Loss: DWL)
   b. Consumer & Producer Surplus and Rents
   c. Marginals (returns, utility, productivity, etc.), Returns to Scale, & Elasticities

2. Market Failures
   a. Market power: (Natural) Monopoly, monopsony, imperfect competition
   b. Positive & Negative Externalities
   c. Information asymmetry: credibility, moral hazard, adverse selection

3. (Neo)Keynesian & (Neo)Classical Macroeconomics, with Money
   a. IS-LM (Hicks):
      i. Aggregate Supply & Demand: AS=AD => Y=C+I+G+(C-M)

(LECTURE NOTES: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/PS651.FranzeseHays.BasicEconNotes.pdf)

(Core Readings Listed Under Week 3; Suggestions on Econ Phil / PE Econ Ideas Below)

Classics in Socio-Politico-Economic Philosophy:
- Heilbroner, Robert L., *The Worldly Philosophers*; see “Guide to Further Reading” also.
- Parsons, Talcott, *Introduction to Weber, Max*, *Economy and Society*.
- Heilbroner, Robert L., *Teaching from the Worldly Philosophy*.
- Marx, Karl, *Das Kapital*, *The Communist Manifesto*, etc.
- Weber, Max, *Economy and Society*.
- Weber, Max, “Class, Status, and Party”
- Schumpeter, Joseph, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*.
- Polanyi, Karl, “The Economy as Instituted Process,” Ch. XIII of *Polanyi et al., Trade and Market in the Early Empires*.
- Polanyi, Karl, “Aristotel Discovers the Economy,” in *Trade and Market in the Early Empires*.

Some New(er) Classics:

- Offe, Claus, *Contradictions of the Welfare State*.
- van den Doel, Hans, *Democracy and Welfare Economics*.

Research on Politics of Economic Ideas: Going From Theory/Ideology to Policy/Politics:
- Goldstein, Judith and Robert Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, esp. pieces by Ikenberry and Garrett and Weingast.
Week 3 (9/21): Basic Economic Theory for C&IPE


Further Suggestions:

- Brian Doyle’s New Open-Economy Macroeconomics Webpage: [http://www.geocities.com/brian_m_doyle/open.html](http://www.geocities.com/brian_m_doyle/open.html)
- John Stiver’s Syllabus for Economics 242 at the University of Connecticut: [http://www.sp.uconn.edu/~jstiver/Eco242/syllabus%20242.htm](http://www.sp.uconn.edu/~jstiver/Eco242/syllabus%20242.htm)
Part II: The Building Blocks of Political Economy

Weeks 4&5 (9/28, 10/5): Models & Tools for C&IPE


From Political Science:

**Morrow, James D.** 1994. *Game Theory for Political Scientists,* on:
- Median-Voter Theorem (Black-Downs) and Nash Bargaining, pp. 104-116.
- Legislative Bargaining (Baron-Ferejohn), pp. 149-156.


**Franzese, R.** 2003. *Lecture Notes on Coalition Models:*


- Non- & 1-Dimensional Models (Riker: MWC; Min-Size; deSwaan: Min-Range; Axelrod: Min-Connected).
- Multi-Dimensional Model (Laver & Shespe Portfolio-Allocation Model).


**Franzese.** on:
- *Struct 3.2.4:* Basic Distributive-Politics Model (Weingast-Shespe-Johnsen), pp. 139-40.


From Economics:

**Ace&Rob,** Chs. 4-5, “Democratic Politics” & “Nondemocratic Politics”, pp. 89-172.

**P&T,** Ch. 2-3, “Preferences and Institutions” and “Electoral Competition,” pp. 15-68.


Further Suggestions:


Diermeier, Daniel, models of coalition government:


Ordeshook, Peter. *A Political Theory Primer.*

Ordeshook, Peter. *Game Theory and Political Theory.*


Preferences:

Franzese, Robert J., Jr., “Lecture Notes on Cleavage Structure and Politics,”


Collective Action:


Transaction Costs:


Further Suggestions on Income Distribution (an important component on “interest structure”):


Further Suggestions on Collective-Action, Transaction Costs, & Rent-seeking:


Lane, Jan-Erik and Svante Ersson, Comparative Political Economy, Chs. 8, 9 (pp. 190-228).


**Week 7 (10/19): Institutions: Perspectives, Approaches, and Theoretical Roles**

**Institutional Approaches:**

- **Hall, Peter,** *Governing the Economy*, ch. 1, pp. 3-22. [Lecture Notes: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/ps641.hall.pdf]


- **Hall, Peter and Rosemary Taylor.** 1996. ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.” *Political Studies* 44: 936-957.


**Exogenous Institutions:**


**Endogenous Institutions?**


**Further Suggestions:** [THIS LIST COULD OBVIOUSLY BE EXTENDED TREMENDOUSLY]


Part III: Alternative Views of the Central Conflicts in C&IPE

Week 8 (10/26): Credibility, Time-Consistency, Uncertainty, Information (Technocratic PE)


Further Suggestions:

[Large literatures exist on “time-consistency, credibility, and commitment” (some of which appears below in the ‘topical applications Part IV’), “uncertainty & information” in policymaking, and “policy learning” or “policy laboratories”, but this section is new to this syllabus & I have not yet developed a further-readings list.]

BdMS², Ch. 4, “Institutions for Kleptocracy or Growth,” pp. 129-71.


Applications to Corruption & Rent Extraction:


Further Suggestions:

[Large literatures on agency, accountability, corruption, & rent-extraction (some of which appears below in ‘topical applications Part IV’) …]


From Acemoglu, Banerjee, & Duflo, MIT Ecn 14.773, “Political Economy of Institutions and Development”:


**Hibbs**, (review Chs. 1-5) Chs. 6, 9, pp. 185-210, 280-326.  

**REVIEW: P&T**, Ch. 2-3, “Preferences and Institutions” and “ Electoral Competition,” pp. 15-68.  


**Ale&Ros**, *Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy*:  
Chs. 1-2: Intro & models of policy divergence (42pp.)  
Chs. 3-4: Theory of (voters’) institutional balancing, & the midterm cycle (68pp.)  
Chs. 5-6: Divided government, and incumbency & moderation (40pp.)  
Chs. 7-8: Partisan cycles, & a model of PE of US (43pp.)  
Chs. 9-10: Ec growth & partisan cycles in U.S.; extension to parliamentary democracies (55pp.).


**Further Suggestions:**  
[The literatures on partisanship, “heterogeneity” (as Drazen entitles the core of this view), and conflict of interest in political economy is absolutely massive, but this section as such is new to this syllabus so I have not yet developed an extensive further-readings list for this week per se. However, a great many of the readings from the topical modules emphasize and elaborate this view, as it represents the traditional core of PE...]

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We will select 3-4 from among the Topical Modules that follow, taking the opportunity to update those we choose. We can also discuss substituting expanded coverage of some topic from above, or from among these modules, or from student or my own alternative suggestions for one of these modules. The previously prepared modules listed below are: Electoral & Partisan Cycles; Distributive & Redistributive Politics & Policy; Fiscal Policy (in a Global Economy); Monetary Policy (in a Global Economy); Trade Policy; Development & Growth; Transition & Reform; International Regimes, Cooperation, & Security.
Week 11 (11/16): Development & Growth


Further Suggestions: [Note, this suggestion list over-represents “inequality & growth”; that was once the narrower focus of the module.]

Acemoglu & Robinson:


Barro, Robert J.
... 1999, “Inequality, Growth and Investment,” *NBER Working Paper* 7038.

Bates, Robert H.


Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Hilton L. Root, eds. 2000. * Governing for Prosperity*. Yale UP.


Hibbs, Douglas, *Mass Political Violence*. Hirschman, Albert:
... “Rise and Decline of Development Economics,” and “Policy-making and Policy Analysis in Latin America,” in Hirschman, Essays in Trepassing, Cambridge UP 1-24 and ??-??.


Przeworski's Politics of Economic Growth Syllabus:
http://www.nyu.edu/gasg/dept/politics/grad/syllabi/G53.2424_przeworski_f99.html


Rodrik, D. Entire CV (b/w this week & int'l trade week), especially:
... *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* (1997)
... *Making Openness Work* (1999)


Sen, Amartya, “The Concept of Development,” in *Chenery and Srinivasan,*


Symposium on the State and Economic Development in *J Ec Perspectives* 4(3), articles by Bardhan (Intro, pp. 3-7), Kreuger (9-23), Datta-Chaudhuri (25-39), Westphal (41-59), and Fishlow (61-74).


Weede, E. “Rent-Seeking or Dependency as Explanations of Why Poor People Stay Poor,” and “Urban Bias and Economic Growth in Cross-National Perspective.” in Seligson, Mitchell A. and John Passe-Smith, eds., *Development and Underdevelopment*.


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**Week 12 (11/23): Happy Thanksgiving**
Week 13 (11/30): TOPIC: Trade Policy

BACKGROUND/REVIEW: Franzese & Hays, Basic Econ Lecture Notes, pp. 17-35:
http://www.umich.edu/~franzese/PS5631_FranzeseHays_BasicEconNotes.pdf


Further Suggestions:

Pincus, Jonathan, “Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs,” JPE 1975, 757-78.
Krugman, “Is Free Trade Passe?” JET Perspectives 1(2), Fall 1987, pp. 131-44.
[As a general rule, if it’s by Krugman and it sounds possibly useful for your work: read it.]
Magee, Stephen, William A. Brock, and Leslie Young, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory, rest.
Milner, Helen, Resisting Protectionism.
Rogowski, Ronald, Commerce and Coalitions.
**Week 14 (12/7): Electoral & Partisan Cycles AND (Re)Distributive Politics & Policy**


**REVIEW:** Tufto, entire, 154pp. [Franzese’s Lecture Notes: http://www.umich.edu/~franzese/ps343.Tufto.FranzeseLectureNoteSlides.pdf]


**REVIEW:** Ale&Ros, *Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy*, Chs. 1-8, esp. 7-8: Partisan cycles, & a model of PE of US (43pp.)


**REVIEW:** Franzese, ch. 5: 256-78. [Franzese’s Lecture Notes: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/ps343.Franzese.pdf; esp. pp. 51-54, 88-91]

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RE2a: *Ale&Ros*. Chs. 9-10: Ec growth & partisan cycles in U.S.; extension to parliamentary democracies (55pp.)


RE4c: *Duch, R.M., Stevenson, R.T.* SELECT FROM FOLLOWING SUFFICIENTLY TO REPORT ON WHAT THEY FIND MAGNITUDE OF ECONOMIC VOTING TO BE CONDITIONAL (& ON WHAT NOT SO), AND THEIR THEORY FOR WHY:


RE8: P&T, Chs. 6 “General-Interest Politics” and 7 “Special-Interest Politics”


TOPIC: Electoral & Partisan Cycles

Further Suggestions on Electoral & Partisan Cycles:


Persson, Torsten, Guido Tabellini, Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and Politics, Harwood, 1990, esp. ch. 5.

Alt, James and Alex Chrystal, Political Economics, ch. 5, pp. 109-25.

Alt, James, “World Demand...” APSR.

Clark, William Roberts, Capitalism not Globalism.


Lane, Jan-Erik and Svante Ersson, Comparative Political Economy, Chs. 6 (pp. 144-76).


Economic Effects on Elections and Voting:


Alt, James and Alex Chrystral, Political Economics, ch. 7.


[Inglehart, Ronald. Any or All of the Culture Shift offerings.]


Kittscheit, Herbert, The Transformation of Swedish Social Democracy.


Lane, Jan-Erik and Svante Ersson, Comparative Political Economy, Chs. 6 (pp. 144-76).

[Lewis-Beck, Michael, et al., Any or All of econ-&-elects, comparative offerings.]


Payne, James, “Inflation, Unemployment, and Left-Wing Political Parties, APSR 73, 1979, 183-90 and Hibbs’ reply.


Przeworski, Adam and John Sprague, Paper Stones, chs. 1-3.

Further Sources on Redistrib.: [Many, many more cites could go here.]

TOPIC: Distributive and Redistributive Politics & Policy


http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/Franzese.ComparativeDemocraticBudgeteering.15april09.pdf
Further Suggestions: [Many, many more cites could go here.]
TOPIC: Electoral & Partisan Cycles
Electoral Cycles:
(1) Adaptive Explanations & Keynesian:
(2) Rational Expectations & Neoclassical:
Alesina & Roubini with Cohen. Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, Ch. 2, pp. 15-44.
P&T, Sects. 16-16.1, pp. 419-25.
Partisan Cycles:
(3) Adaptive Expectations & Keynesian:
Hibbs, Ch. 7, pp. 213-54. [Franzese’s Lecture Notes: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/ps489.Hibbs.pdf]
(4) Rational Expectations & Neoclassical
Ale&Ros, Chs. 7-10, pp. 161-259.
Alesina & Roubini with Cohen, Chs. 3-7, pp. 45-209.
P&T, Sects. 16.2-16.4, pp. 426-34.
Economic Effects on Elections and Voting:
Further Considerations:


Further Suggestions:


Alt, James and Alex Chryystal, Political Economics, ch. 5, pp. 103-25.

Alt, James, “World Demand...” APSR.


Clark, William Roberts, Capitalism not Globalism.


Lane, Jan-Erik and Svante Ersson, Comparative Political Economy, Chs. 6 (pp. 144-76).


Economic Effects on Elections and Voting:


Alt, James and Alex Chryystal, Political Economics, ch. 7.


[Inglehart, Ronald. Any or All of the Culture Shift offerings.]


Kitschelt, Herbert, The Transformation of Swedish Social Democracy.


Lane, Jan-Erik and Svante Ersson, Comparative Political Economy, Chs. 6 (pp. 144-76).

[Lewis-Beck, Michael, et al., Any or All of econ-&-elects, comparative offerings]


Payne, James, “Inflation, Unemployment, and Left-Wing Political Parties, APSR 73, 1979, 185-90 and Hibbs’ reply.


Przeworski, Adam and John Sprague, Paper Stones, chs. 1-3.

TOPIC: Transition & Reform


RE2: Drazen, Ch. 13, “Reform and Transition” pp. 615-674.

RE3: BDMFS2, Ch. 8, “Institutional Preferences: Change from Within,” pp. 329-403.


--pol of reform (intro), creating private property, beating inflation


--pol tactics of stable money, stagnation syndrome, pathologies of federal finance


--search for a cure, tentative proposal, reforming w/o a map

**Further Suggestions:**


Treisman’s *Topics in Postcommunist Political and Economic Reform Syllabus*: http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/treisman/pages/TOPICS.PDF

Treisman’s *Topics in Property Rights and Political Institutions Syllabus*: http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/treisman/pages/PROPER.PDF

**TOPIC: Fiscal Policy (in a Global Economy)**


RE3: *Drazen*, Ch. 10 “Inaction, Delay, & Crisis” pp. 403-54.


The Debate on International Exposure, Government Size, & Fiscal Convergence

RE7: Pick Any Three of...

RE8: Pick Any Three of...
Political Studies 46: 671-692.

Further Suggestions:
Alesina & Roubini with Cohen, Ch. 9, “Political Parties, Institutions, and Budget Deficits,” pp. 227-52.
All Cites in Alesina & Perotti: “The Political Economy of Budget Deficits.”
Blanchard, Olivier, Stanley Fischer, Lectures in Macroeconomics MIT, 1989, ch. 11.
Frieden, Jeffrey, Debt, Development, and Democracy, Princeton UP, pp. 15-41.
Johnson, Chalmers, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford UP 1982).
Mark Hallerberg’s & Jurgen Von Hagen’s work on bdgt inst’s & debts/deficits.
**TOPIC:** Monetary Policy (in a Global Economy)

*Central Bank Independence & Monetary Credibility:*

**BACKGROUND/REVIEW:**


**ADDITIONAL MATERIALS:**


**BACKGROUND/REVIEW:**


**ADDITIONAL MATERIALS:**


**Emerging Syntheses:**

**ADDITIONAL MATERIALS:**


**BACKGROUND/REVIEW:**


**Comparative & International Monetary Political Economy:**

*Doszen, Ch. 12, “The International Economy,”* pp. 526-614.


**RE1:** *P&T,* Ch. 18, “International Policy Coordination,” pp. 458-78.


SEE ALSO BY BERNHARD & LEBLANG (and, do your own search, by Bernhard or Leblang):


“Parliamentary politics & foreign exchange markets: the world according to GARCH,” *International Studies Quarterly* 2006


“Polls and pounds: Public opinion and exchange rate behavior in Britain,” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science,* 2006

“Cabinet collapses and currency crashes,” *Political Research Quarterly,* 2008


More on Labor Markets and Unemployment:

More Syntheses:
[Cites from Franzese review pieces.]


Lange and Garrett, “The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance, 1974-1980,” *JoP* 47, 1985: 792-802. (There are a number of co-authored pieces by these two on this topic. Any early one plus the APSR article in the required list should do.)


Further Suggestions
[Cites from Franzese review pieces.]


More on Labor Markets and Unemployment:
More Syntheses:

TOPC: International Regimes, International Cooperation, and International Security


Further Suggestions


Goldstein, Joshua. 1988, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age (Yale University Press), Chapters 2-6, pp. 21-147.


[Hirschman, Albert O., National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, (University of California Press, 1980), Part I, pp. 3-81, Reprise.]


Gourevitch, Peter, Politics in Hard Times, Chs. 1,2,5,6 (pp. 17-70, pp. 181 240).


Katzenstein, Peter. Small States in World Markets, Corporatism and Change Between Power and Plenity, Cornell UP.


Milner, Helen, Resisting Protectionism, ch. 1-2, 6-9 (pp. 3-44, 222-302).


Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolution (Cambridge UP 1979).


Viner, Jacob, “Power vs. Plenity as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the 17th and 18th Centuries,” World Politics I (1948).


Baldwin, “Paradoxes of Power” (Basil Blackwell 1989).


Cox, Robert W., Power, Production, and World Order (Columbia 1987).


Doyle, Michael, Empires (Cornell UP 1996).
