

# Modeling and Interpreting Interactions

**JWAC Mini-Course TSCS**

9-11 September 2009

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# Overview

- Interactions in Pol-Sci: ubiquitous, but should be more
- From theory to empirical-model specification: Arguments that imply interactions (& some that don't), & how to write.
- Interpretation:
  - Effects=derivatives & differences, not coefficients!
  - Std Errs (etc.): effects vary, so do std errs (etc.)!
- Presentation: Tables & Graphs, & Choosing between equivalent Specifications
- Use & abuse of some common-practice “rules”
- Extensions:
  - Split-sample v. dummy-interaction
  - Common 2<sup>nd</sup>-moment implications of interactions
  - Interactions with uncertainty = random coefficients  $\approx$  hierarchical.

# Interactions in Pol-Sci Research

- Common. '96-'01 *AJPS*, *APSR*, *JoP*:
  - 54% some stat meth (=s.e.'s), of which 24% = interax (so interax  $\approx$  12.5% or 1/8<sup>th</sup> total).
  - (N.b., most rest QualDep & frml thry, not counted, & “thry” in denom) so understate tech nature discipline)

<i>Journal (1996-2001)</i>	<i>Total Articles</i>	<i>Statistical Analysis</i>		<i>Interaction-Term Usage</i>		
		<i>Count</i>	<i>% of Tot</i>	<i>Count</i>	<i>% of Tot</i>	<i>% of Stat</i>
<i>American Political Science Review</i>	279	274	77%	69	19%	25%
<i>American Journal Political Science</i>	355	155	55%	47	17%	30%
<i>Comparative Politics</i>	130	12	9%	1	1%	8%
<i>Comparative Political Studies</i>	189	92	49%	23	12%	25%
<i>International Organization</i>	170	43	25%	9	5%	21%
<i>International Studies Quarterly</i>	173	70	40%	10	6%	14%
<i>Journal of Politics</i>	284	226	80%	55	19%	24%
<i>Legislative Studies Quarterly</i>	157	104	66%	19	12%	18%
<i>World Politics</i>	116	28	24%	6	5%	25%
<b><i>TOTALS</i></b>	<b>2446</b>	<b>1323</b>	<b>54%</b>	<b>311</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>24%</b>

# Interactions in Pol-Sci Theory<sup>1</sup>

- Ubiquitous, but our Theories/Substance say should be even more; core classes of argument inherently interactive:
  - **INSTITUTIONAL**: institutions are inherently interactive variables:
    - Institutions funnel, moderate, shape, condition, constrain, refract, magnify, augment, dampen, mitigate political processes that...
      - ...translate societal interest-structures into effective political pressures,
      - ...&/or pressures into public-policy responses,
      - ...&/or policies to outcomes.
    - I.e., they *affect effects*≡*interaction*.

# Interactions in Pol-Sci Theory<sup>2</sup>

- Views from across institutionalist perspectives:
  - Hall: “institutionalist model=>policy more than sum countervailing pressure from soc grps; that press mediated by organizational dynamic.”
  - Ikenberry: “[Political struggles] mediated by inst’l setting where [occur]”
  - Steinmo & Thelen: “inst’s...constrain & refract politics... [effects of] macro-structures magnify or mitigated by intermediate-level inst’s... help us...explain the contingent nature of pol-econ development...”
  - Shepsle: “SIE clearly a move [to] incorporating inst’l features into R-C. Structure & procedure combine w/ preferences to produce outcomes.”

# Interactions in Pol-Sci Theory<sup>3</sup>

- Ubiquitous, but our Theories/Substance say should be even more; core classes of argument inherently interactive:
  - **INSTITUTIONAL**: ...
  - **STRATEGIC**: actors' choices (outcomes) conditional upon institutional/structural environ., opportunity set, & other actors' choices.
  - **CONTEXTUAL**: actors' choices (outcomes) conditional upon environment, opportunity set, & aggregates of other actors' choices.

# Interactions in Pol-Sci Theory<sup>4</sup>

- Across subfields:
  - Comparative Politics *examples*:
    - Electoral system & societal structure  $\Rightarrow$  party system.
    - Divided government & polarization  $\Rightarrow$  legislative productivity.
    - Corruption depends institutional & societal structures.
  - International Relations *examples*:
    - System polarity & offense-defense balance  $\Rightarrow$  war propensity.
    - Terrorist targeting & counterterrorism responses depend “grievance” & resources
  - American Politics ...


# Interactions in Pol-Sci Theory<sup>5</sup>

- Political Economy:
  - Electoral & partisan cycles depend on inst'l & econ conditions
- Political Behavior:
  - Gov't inst's shape voter behavior: balancing (Kedar, Alesina); economic voting (Powell & Whitten); etc.
- Legislative Studies:
  - Effects divided gov't depend presidential v. parliamentary.
- Political Development:
  - Effect inequality on democratization depends cleavage structure.



# Theory & Substance: Everyone's Favorite "Model"

Economics Affects Politics and Society  
Politics Affects Economics and Society  
Society Affects Politics and Economics



# Theory & Substance:

## An Old (& still) Favorite “Model” of Mine

### The Cycle of Political Economy

Examples of the Elements at Each Stage:

(A) Interests:

- Sectoral Structure of Economy
- Income Distribution
- Age Distribution
- Trade Openness

Elections:

- Electoral Law
- Voter Participation

Government Formation:

- Fractionalization
- Polarization

(B) Representation:

- Partisanship

Policy:


- Fiscal Policy
- Monetary Policy
- Institutional Adjustment

Government Termination:

- Replacement Risk

(C) Outcomes:

- Unemployment
- Inflation
- Growth
- Sectoral Shift
- Debt
- Institutional Change



# Theory & Substance:

## An Newer Favorite “Model” of Mine

- *Complex Context-Conditionality:*
  - Effect of (almost) everything depends on (almost) everything else.
  - E.g., Principal-Agent Situations
    - If fully principal,  $y_1=f(\mathbf{X})$ ; if fully agent,  $y_2=g(\mathbf{Z})$ ; institutions:  $0\leq h(\mathbf{I})\leq 1$ .

$$y = h(\mathbf{I})f(\mathbf{X}) + \{1 - h(\mathbf{I})\} g(\mathbf{Z})$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} = h(\mathbf{I}) \frac{\partial f(\mathbf{X})}{\partial x} \quad ; \quad \frac{\partial y}{\partial z} = -h(\mathbf{I}) \frac{\partial g(\mathbf{Z})}{\partial z} ;$$

$$\frac{\partial y}{\partial i} = \frac{\partial h(\mathbf{I})}{\partial i} [f(\mathbf{X}) - g(\mathbf{Z})]$$

# (Complex) Context-Conditionality: (Hallmark of Modern Pol-Sci Theory?)

- Principal-Agent (Shared Control) Situations, for example:
  - If fully principal:  $y_1=f(\mathbf{X})$ ;
  - If fully agent:  $y_2=g(\mathbf{Z})$ ;
  - Institutions=>Monitoring & Enforcement costs principal must pay to induce agent behave as principal would:  $0\leq h(\mathbf{I})\leq 1$ .

– RESULT:

- In words...

$$y = h(\mathbf{I})f(\mathbf{X}) + \{1 - h(\mathbf{I})\}g(\mathbf{Z})$$

...

...

...i.e., effect of anything depends on everything else!

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} = h(\mathbf{I}) \frac{\partial f(\mathbf{X})}{\partial x} ;$$

$$\frac{\partial y}{\partial z} = -h(\mathbf{I}) \frac{\partial g(\mathbf{Z})}{\partial z} ;$$

$$\frac{\partial y}{\partial i} = \frac{\partial h(\mathbf{I})}{\partial i} [f(\mathbf{X}) - g(\mathbf{Z})]$$

# Not Every Argument Is an Interactive Argument

- Not Interactive:
  - $\mathbf{X}$  affects  $\mathbf{Y}$  through its effect on  $\mathbf{Z}$ :  $\mathbf{X} \Rightarrow \mathbf{Z} \Rightarrow \mathbf{Y}$ 
    - In (political) psychology / behavior, this called *mediation*. Interaction is called *moderation* in this literature.
  - $\mathbf{X}$  and  $\mathbf{Z}$  affect each other:  $\mathbf{X} \Leftrightarrow \mathbf{Z}$ .
    - I.e.,  $\mathbf{X}$  and  $\mathbf{Z}$  endogenous to each other. Note: irrelevant to Gauss-Markov (OLS is BLUE); merely implies care to what partials (coefficients) mean.
  - $\mathbf{Y}$  depends on  $\mathbf{X}$  controlling for  $\mathbf{Z}$ , or  $\mathbf{Y}$  depends on  $\mathbf{X}$  &  $\mathbf{Z}$ :  $E(\mathbf{Y}|\mathbf{X},\mathbf{Z})=f(\mathbf{Z})$ ,  $E(\mathbf{Y}|\mathbf{X})=f(\mathbf{Z})$ ,  $\mathbf{Y}=f(\mathbf{X},\mathbf{Z})$ 
    - I.e., the outcomes differ across 2x2 of  $\mathbf{X}$  and  $\mathbf{Z}$ .
- **Interactive**: **Effect of X on Y** depends on  $\mathbf{Z}$  ( $\Rightarrow$  converse: Effect of  $\mathbf{Z}$  on  $\mathbf{Y}$  depends on  $\mathbf{X}$ ):

$$\frac{\partial Y}{\partial X} = f(Z) \Leftrightarrow \frac{\partial Y}{\partial Z} = f(X)$$

# From Theory/Substance to Empirical-Model Specification

- **Classic Comparative-Politics Example:**

- Societal Fragmentation, *SFrag*, &
- Electoral-System Proportionality, *DMag*,
- $\Rightarrow$  Effective # Parliamentary Parties: *ENPP*

- “Theory”:  $ENPP = f(SFrag, DMag, \cdot, \varepsilon)$

- Hypotheses:  $\frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial SFrag} \geq 0$   $\frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial DMag} \geq 0$

$$\frac{\partial \left\{ \frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial SFrag} \right\}}{\partial DMag} \equiv \frac{\partial \left\{ \frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial DMag} \right\}}{\partial SFrag} \equiv \frac{\partial^2 ENPP}{\partial SFrag \partial DMag} \equiv \frac{\partial^2 ENPP}{\partial DMag \partial SFrag} \geq 0$$

- Empirical Specification: Lots ways get there!<sup>14</sup>

# A Typical Linear-Interactive Specification

- Want linear  $f(\cdot)$  w/ these properties; many ways to get there:

$$ENPP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 SFrag + \beta_2 DMag + \varepsilon$$

$$\frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial SFrag} = \beta_1 \xrightarrow{?} f(DMag) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 DMag$$

$$\frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial DMag} = \beta_2 \xrightarrow{?} f(SFrag) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 SFrag$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow ENPP &= \beta_0 + (\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 DMag) SFrag + (\gamma_0 + \gamma_1 SFrag) DMag + \varepsilon \\ &= \beta_0 + \alpha_0 SFrag + \alpha_1 DMag SFrag + \gamma_0 DMag + \gamma_1 SFrag DMag + \varepsilon \\ &= \beta_0 + \alpha_0 SFrag + \gamma_0 DMag + (\alpha_1 + \gamma_1) SFrag DMag + \varepsilon \\ &= \beta_0 + \beta_{SF} SFrag + \beta_{DM} DMag + \beta_{SFDM} SFrag DMag + \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial SFrag} = \beta_{SF} + \beta_{SFDM} DMag$$

$$\frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial DMag} = \beta_{DM} + \beta_{SFDM} SFrag$$

# Interpretation of *Effects*:

## Derivatives & Differences, *Not* Coefficients

- Standard Linear Interactive Model:

$$EN = \beta_0 + \beta_{SF} SF + \beta_{DM} DM + \beta_{SFDM} SF \times DM + \dots + \varepsilon$$

- Effect of *SFrag* on *ENPP* (is a *function* of *DMag*):

$$Effect(SF) \equiv \frac{\partial EN}{\partial SF} = \beta_{SF} + \beta_{SFDM} DM$$

$$\Delta EN = \beta_{SF} \Delta SF + \beta_{SFDM} DM \cdot \Delta SF$$

$$\equiv \frac{\Delta EN}{\Delta SF} = \beta_{SF} + \beta_{SFDM} DM$$

- Effect of *DMag* on *ENPP* (is *f* of *SFrag*):

$$Effect(DMag) \equiv \frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial DMag} = \beta_{DM} + \beta_{SFDM} SFrag$$

$$\equiv \Delta ENPP = \beta_{DM} \Delta DM + \beta_{SFDM} SFrag \cdot \Delta DM$$

$$\equiv \frac{\Delta ENPP}{\Delta DM} = \beta_{DM} + \beta_{SFDM} SFrag$$



# Interpretation of *Effects*: NOTES<sup>1</sup>

- “Main Effect” & “Interactive Effect”:
  - For example,  $\beta_{SF}$  = “*main effect* of **SFrag**”
  - ....but  $\beta_{SF}$  is merely the effect of **SFrag** at other variable(s) involved in interaction with it=0, so:
    - *Other-var(s)=0* may be extreme in the sample, or beyond sample range, or even logically impossible.
    - *Other-var(s)=0* substantive meaning of 0 altered by rescaling
      - E.g., by “centering” (centering changes nothing, btw...)
    - *Other-var(s)=0* may not have anything substantively *main* about it
  - Is no Main Effect or separately & Interactive Effect; is just the effect, which conditional, varies:

$$Effect(SF) \equiv \frac{\partial EN}{\partial SF} = \beta_{SF} + \beta_{SFDM} DM \quad ; \quad Effect(DM) \equiv \frac{\partial EN}{\partial DM} = \beta_{DM} + \beta_{SFDM} SF$$

# Interpretation of *Effects*: NOTES<sup>2</sup>

- **COEFFICIENTS ARE NOT EFFECTS. EFFECTS ARE DERIVATIVES &/OR DIFFERENCES.**
  - Only in *purely* linear-additive-separable model are they equal because only there do derivatives simply = coefficients.
  - $\beta_{SF}$  is *not* “effect of **SFrag** ‘independent of’...” & definitely not its “effect ‘controlling for’...other variable(s) in the interaction”
- Cannot substitute linguistic invention for under-standing model’s logic (its simple math<sub>8</sub>)

# Interpretation of *Effects*: NOTES<sup>3</sup>

- Interactions are logically symmetric:
    - For any function, not just lin-add.
    - If argue effect  $x$  depends  $z$ , must also believe effect  $z$  depends  $x$ .
- $$\frac{\partial \left\{ \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} \right\}}{\partial z} \equiv \frac{\partial \left\{ \frac{\partial y}{\partial z} \right\}}{\partial x} \equiv \frac{\partial^2 y}{\partial x \partial z} \equiv \frac{\partial^2 y}{\partial z \partial x}$$
- Interactions often have 2<sup>nd</sup>-moment (variance, i.e., heteroskedacity) implications too:
    - **Larger district magnitudes,  $DMag$** , are “permissive” elect sys: allow more parties...
    - Fewer ***Veto Actors*** allow greater policy-change... (both need additional assumpts)
  - All of this holds for any type of variable:
    - Measurement: binary, continuous...
    - Level: micro or macro;  $i, j, k, \dots$


# Frequent 2<sup>nd</sup>-Moment Implications Interactions

- *DMag* permissive ele sys: allows more parties...

$$NP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DM + \varepsilon ; V(\varepsilon) = f(DM) , \text{ e.g., } \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 DM$$

- Note: unmodeled interactions look like heteroskedasticity; that's general, actually. Anything unmodeled gets into  $\varepsilon^2$ ...

- Few *Veto Actors* allows greater policy-change...



$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 VP + \varepsilon ; V(\varepsilon) = f(VP) , \text{ e.g., } \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 VP$$

- I.e., these are Rndm-Coeff &/or Het-sked Props... 20

# Interpretation of *Effects*:

## Standard Errors for *Effects*

$$ENPP = \beta_0 + \beta_{SF} SFrag + \beta_{DM} DMag + \beta_{SFDM} SFragDMag + \dots + \varepsilon$$

- Std Errs reported with regression output are for coefficients, not for effects.
  - The s.e. (*t*-stat, *p*-level) for  $\hat{\beta}_{SF}$  is std. err. for est'd effect *SFrag* at *DMag*=0 (...which is logically impossible).
- Effect of *x* depends on *z* & v.v. (i.e., which was the point, remember?), so does the s.e.:

$$Effect(x) \equiv \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} = \beta_x + \beta_{xz}z \Rightarrow Est.Eff.(x) \equiv E\left(\frac{\partial y}{\partial x}\right) = \hat{\beta}_x + \hat{\beta}_{xz}z$$

$$\begin{aligned} Est.Var.\{Est.Eff.(x)\} &\equiv E\left[Var\left\{E\left(\frac{\partial y}{\partial x}\right)\right\}\right] = E\left[Var\{\hat{\beta}_x + \hat{\beta}_{xz}z\}\right] \\ &= \widehat{V\{\hat{\beta}_x + \hat{\beta}_{xz}z\}} = \widehat{V\{\hat{\beta}_x\}} + \widehat{V\{\hat{\beta}_{xz}\}} \cdot z^2 + 2 \cdot C(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_{xz})z \end{aligned}$$

- In words... More Generally:

$$\widehat{V(\mathbf{x}'\hat{\beta})} = \mathbf{x}' \left[ \widehat{V(\hat{\beta})} \right] \mathbf{x}$$

# From Hypotheses to Hypotheses Tests:

Does  $Y$  Depend on  $X$  or  $Z$ ?

$$ENPP = \beta_0 + \beta_{SF} SFrag + \beta_{DM} DMag + \beta_{SFDM} SFragDMag + \dots + \varepsilon$$

<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Mathematical Expression</i> <sup>91</sup>	<i>Statistical test</i>
$x$ affects $y$ , or $y$ is a function of (depends on) $x$	$y=f(x)$ $\partial y/\partial x = \beta_x + \beta_{xz}z \neq 0$	<i>F- test:</i> $H_0: \beta_x = \beta_{xz} = 0$
$x$ increases $y$	$\partial y/\partial x = \beta_x + \beta_{xz}z > 0$	<i>Multiple t-tests:</i> $H_0: \beta_x + \beta_{xz}z \leq 0$
$x$ decreases $y$	$\partial y/\partial x = \beta_x + \beta_{xz}z < 0$	<i>Multiple t- tests:</i> $\beta_x + \beta_{xz}z \geq 0$
$z$ affects $y$ , or $y$ is a function of (depends on) $z$	$y=g(z)$ $\partial y/\partial z = \beta_z + \beta_{xz}x \neq 0$	<i>F- test:</i> $H_0: \beta_z = \beta_{xz} = 0$
$z$ increases $y$	$\partial y/\partial z = \beta_z + \beta_{xz}x > 0$	<i>Multiple t-tests:</i> $H_0: \beta_z + \beta_{xz}x \leq 0$
$z$ decreases $y$	$\partial y/\partial z = \beta_z + \beta_{xz}x < 0$	<i>Multiple t- tests:</i> $H_0: \beta_z + \beta_{xz}x \geq 0$

# From Hypotheses to Hypotheses Tests:

Is  $Y$ 's Dependence on  $X$  Conditional on  $Z$  & v.v.? How?

<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Mathematical Expression</i> <sup>92</sup>	<i>Statistical test</i>
<i>The effect of <math>x</math> on <math>y</math> depends on <math>z</math></i>	$y=f(xz, \bullet)$ $\partial y/\partial x = \beta_x + \beta_{xz}z = g(z)$ $\partial(\partial y/\partial x)/\partial z = \partial^2 y/\partial x\partial z = \beta_{xz} = 0$	<i>t-test: <math>H_0: \beta_{xz} = 0</math></i>
<i>The effect of <math>x</math> on <math>y</math> increases in <math>z</math></i>	$\partial(\partial y/\partial x)/\partial z = \partial^2 y/\partial x\partial z = \beta_{xz} > 0$	<i>t-test: <math>H_0: \beta_{xz} \leq 0</math></i>
<i>The effect of <math>x</math> on <math>y</math> decreases in <math>z</math></i>	$\partial(\partial y/\partial x)/\partial z = \partial^2 y/\partial x\partial z = \beta_{xz} < 0$	<i>t-test: <math>H_0: \beta_{xz} \geq 0</math></i>
<i>The effect of <math>z</math> on <math>y</math> depends on <math>x</math></i>	$y=f(xz, \bullet)$ $\partial y/\partial z = \beta_z + \beta_{xz}x = h(x)$ $\partial(\partial y/\partial z)/\partial x = \partial^2 y/\partial z\partial x = \beta_{xz} = 0$	<i>t-test: <math>H_0: \beta_{xz} = 0</math></i>
<i>The effect of <math>z</math> on <math>y</math> increases in <math>x</math></i>	$\partial(\partial y/\partial z)/\partial x = \partial^2 y/\partial z\partial x = \beta_{xz} > 0$	<i>t-test: <math>H_0: \beta_{xz} \leq 0</math></i>
<i>The effect of <math>z</math> on <math>y</math> decreases in <math>x</math></i>	$\partial(\partial y/\partial z)/\partial x = \partial^2 y/\partial z\partial x = \beta_{xz} < 0$	<i>t-test: <math>H_0: \beta_{xz} \geq 0</math></i>

**Does  $Y$  Depend on  $X$ ,  $Z$ , or  $XZ$ ?**

<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Mathematical Expression</i> <sup>93</sup>	<i>Statistical Test</i>
<i><math>y</math> is a function of (depends on) <math>z</math>, <math>z</math>, and/or their interaction</i>	$y=f(x,z,xz)$	<i>F-test: <math>H_0: \beta_x = \beta_z = \beta_{xz} = 0</math></i>

# Use & Abuse of Some Common ‘Rules’

- *Centering to Redress Colinearity Concerns:*
  - Adds no info, so changes *nothing*; no help with colinearity or anything else; only moves substantive content of  $x=0, z=0$ .
  - Specifically, makes coeff. on  $x$  ( $z$ ), effect when  $z$  ( $x$ ) at sample-mean, the new 0. Do only if aids presentation.
- *Must Include All Components (if  $x \cdot z$ , then  $x \& z$ ):*
  - Application of Occam’s Razor &/or scientific caution (e.g., greater flexibility to allow linear w/in lin-interax model), but
  - **Not** a logical or statistical requirement.
  - Safer rule than opposite & to check almost always, but
  - **Not** override *theory & evidence if (strongly) agree to exclude*
- *Pet-Peeve: Linguistic Gymnastics to Dodge the Math*
  - “Main effect, Interactive effect”: **the** effect in model is  $dy/dx$ .
  - Discussion of [coefficients & s.e.’s] as if [effects & s.e.’s]. <sup>24</sup>




# Presentation: Marginal-Effects / Differences Tables & Graphs

- Plot/Tabulate **Effects**,  $dy/dx$ , over Meaningful &/or Illuminating Ranges of  $z$ , with Conf. Int.'s

$$- \hat{dy}/dx \pm t_{df,p} \sqrt{Var(\hat{dy}/dx)} = \hat{\beta}_x + \hat{\beta}_{xz}z \pm t_{df,p} \sqrt{V(\hat{\beta}_x) + V(\hat{\beta}_{xz})z^2 + 2C(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_{xz})z}$$

- Explain axes
- Explain shape
- Linear-interax:
  - *Will* cross 0 & be insig @ 0.
- Rescaling &
  - “main effect”
  - “centering”
  - Max(Asterisks)

Figure 5. Marginal Effect of *Runoff*, Extending the Range of *Groups*



# Presentation: Expected-Value/Predictions Tables & Graphs

- *Predictions,  $E(y|x,z)$ :*

$$\hat{y} \pm t_{df,p} \sqrt{Var(\hat{y})} =$$

$$\hat{\beta}_0 + \hat{\beta}_x x + \hat{\beta}_z z + \hat{\beta}_{xz} xz \pm t_{df,p} \sqrt{\begin{aligned} &V(\hat{\beta}_0) + V(\hat{\beta}_x)x^2 + V(\hat{\beta}_z)z^2 + V(\hat{\beta}_{xz})(xz)^2 \\ &+ 2C(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_x)x + 2C(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_z)z + 2C(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_{xz})xz \\ &+ 2C(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_z)xz + 2C(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_{xz})x^2z + 2C(\hat{\beta}_z, \hat{\beta}_{xz})xz^2 \end{aligned}}$$

- Here's one place a little matrix algebra would help:

$$\hat{y} \pm t_{df,p} \sqrt{Var(\hat{y})} = \hat{\beta}_0 + \hat{\beta}_x x + \hat{\beta}_z z + \hat{\beta}_{xz} xz \pm t_{df,p} \sqrt{\mathbf{x}' \hat{V}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}) \mathbf{x}}$$

$$= \hat{\beta}_0 + \hat{\beta}_x x + \hat{\beta}_z z + \hat{\beta}_{xz} xz \pm t_{df,p} \sqrt{\begin{bmatrix} 1 & x & z & xz \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \hat{V}(\hat{\beta}_0) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_x) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_z) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_{xz}) \\ \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_x) & \hat{V}(\hat{\beta}_x) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_z) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_{xz}) \\ \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_z) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_z) & \hat{V}(\hat{\beta}_z) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_z, \hat{\beta}_{xz}) \\ \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_{xz}) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_{xz}) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_z, \hat{\beta}_{xz}) & \hat{V}(\hat{\beta}_{xz}) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ x \\ z \\ xz \end{bmatrix}}$$

- Use spreadsheet or stat-graph software (...list coming...)<sup>26</sup>

# Presentation<sup>1</sup>:

## Choose Illuminating Graphics & Base Cases


- Interpretation same regardless of “type” of interaction: *effect* always  $\equiv dy/dx$ , but present appropriately:
  - All combos Dummy, Discrete, or Continuous:
    - Dummy-Dummy  $\Rightarrow$  4 (or  $2^{\# \text{interacting variable}}$ ) points estimated, so box & whisker or histograms effective
    - Dummy-Continuous or Discrete(*few*)-Continuous  $\Rightarrow$  2 (or  $\#$  categories) slopes, so  $E(y|x,z)$  as line or  $dy/dx$  as box & whisker or histograms effective
    - Continuous – Continuous (or DiscMany)  $\Rightarrow$  Effect-lines best or (slices from) contour plot (i.e., slices from 3D)
  - Powers (e.g.,  $X$  &  $X^2 \Rightarrow$  parabola) viewable as interaction w/ self; certain slope shifts too (e.g.,  $dy/dx = a$  for  $x < x^0$  &  $b$  for  $x > x^0$  is  $x$  interact w/ dummy for condition)

# Presentation<sup>2</sup>:

## Choose Illuminating Graphics & Base Cases


- Interpretation same regardless of “type” of interax: *effect* always  $\equiv dy/dx$ , but present appropriately...
  - Always plot over substantively revealing ranges.
  - Especially with sets of dummies, have several (identical) specification options:
    - (full-set or set-less-1): choose which (& what base if use set-less-1) to abet presentation & discussion
    - (overlapping or disjoint): choose to facilitate presentation & discussion.
  - Scale Effectively: e.g., center only if & to extent that aids presentation & discussion (b/c centering does nothing else)

# Presentation<sup>3</sup>: Choose Illuminating Graphics & Base Cases. Examples.




**Dummy-Continuous Interaction:** could also plot two  $E(\text{Cands}|\text{Groups})$  lines, with c.i.'s, effectively.

# Presentation<sup>4</sup>: Choose Illuminating Graphics & Base Cases. Examples.



**Dummy-Dummy Interaction: could also plot four  $E(\text{Supp}|\text{gender},\text{party})$  box-whiskers effectively.**


# Presentation<sup>5</sup>: Choose Illuminating Graphics & Base Cases. Examples.



Quadratic Model of Government Duration as Function of  $\beta_1$  Parliamentary Support of Governing Parties.

# Presentation<sup>6</sup>: Choose Illuminating Graphics & Base Cases. Examples.

Figure 14. Marginal Effect of *Parliamentary Support for Government*, Pairwise-Interaction Model, with 90% Confidence Intervals



$$GovDur = \beta_0 + \beta_{np} NP + \beta_{ps} PS + \beta_{pd} PD + \beta_{np\ ps} NP \times PS + \beta_{np\ pd} NP \times PD + \beta_{pd\ ps} PD \times PS + \varepsilon \quad [25]_2$$



# Elaborations, Complications, & Extensions: Sample-Splitting v. (Dummy-)Interacting<sup>1</sup>

- Split-sample (e.g., unit-by-unit)  $\approx$  Full-Dum Interax:
  - Subsample by binary (or multinomial, e.g., CTRY in TSCS) category to estimate separately  $\approx$  Include dummy for each category (or set-less-1) & interact each dummy with each  $x$  (and include  $x$  by itself also if set-less-1)
    - Coeff's same (or equal substantive content if using *set-1* dummies).
    - S.E.'s same except  $s^2$  part of OLS's  $s^2(\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1}$  is  $s_i^2$  for splitting
    - Can make essentially exact by allow  $s_i^2$  (FWLS)
  - Subsample by hi/lo values some non-nominal var equivalent to *nominalizing* the extra-nominal info & dummy-interact;
    - I.e., wasting information, when usually have too little (non-parametric or extreme-measurement-error arguments might justify)
    - So usually a bad idea...

# Elaborations, Complications, & Extensions: Sample-Splitting v. (Dummy-)Interacting


- Split-sample abets eyeballing, obfuscates statistical analysis, of the main point: the different effects by category.
  - What's s.e./signif. of  $b_{1i}-b_{1j}$ ? Need:  
$$s.e.(b_{1i} - b_{1j}) = \sqrt{V(b_{1i}) + V(b_{1j}) - 2C(b_{1i}, b_{1j})} = \sqrt{V(b_{1i}) + V(b_{1j})}$$
  - Luckily,  $cov=0$ , but, still, squaring 2 terms, sum, & root in head?
- Can choose *full dummy set* to mirror the split-sample estimates directly (& report that way, if wish) or the *set-less-one* to get significance of differences b/w samples directly (in the standard reported *t*-test)
  - Same thing, so choose for to optimize presentational efficacy.
- One advantage of hierarchical modeling is how it affords, naturally, various positions b/w these extremes.
  - E.g., can “borrow strength” across units.

# Typical 2<sup>nd</sup>-Moment Implications of Interactions

- *DMag* permissive ele sys: allow more parties...

$$NP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DM + \varepsilon ; V(\varepsilon) = f(DM) , \text{ e.g., } \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 DM$$

- Few *Veto Actors* allow greater policy-change...



$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 VP + \varepsilon ; V(\varepsilon) = f(VP) , \text{ e.g., } \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 VP$$

- I.e., these are Rndm-Coeff &/or Het-sked Props...

$$NP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DM + \beta_2 SF + \beta_3 DM \times SF + \varepsilon ; V(\varepsilon) = f(DM) , \text{ e.g., } \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 DM$$

# Sandwich Estimators

$$EN = \beta_0 + \beta_1 SF + \beta_2 DM + \varepsilon$$

$$\partial EN / \partial SF = \beta_1 = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 DM + \omega_1$$

$$\partial EN / \partial DM = \beta_2 = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 SF + \omega_2$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow EN &= \beta_0 + (\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 DM + \omega_1) SF + (\gamma_0 + \gamma_1 SF + \omega_2) DM + \varepsilon \\ &= \beta_0 + \alpha_0 SF + (\alpha_1 + \gamma_1) DM \times SF + \gamma_0 DM + \{\varepsilon + \omega_1 SF + \omega_2 DM\} \\ &= b_0 + b_1 SF + b_2 DM \times SF + b_3 DM + \varepsilon^* \end{aligned}$$

- Notice the compound error term:
  - $V(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^*)$  will not be  $\sigma^2 \mathbf{I}$  even if  $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$  is, so  $V(\mathbf{b})$  doesn't reduce to  $\sigma^2(\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1}$ , so OLS s.e.'s wrong.
  - Be OK on average (unbiased) & in limit (consistent) if element of  $V(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^*)$  “orthogonal to  $\mathbf{xx}'$ ”
  - But def'y not because  $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^*$  includes  $\mathbf{x}$  &  $\mathbf{z}$ , which part of  $\mathbf{X}$ !

# Sandwich Estimators

$$V(\mathbf{b}_{LS}) = (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}' \left[ V(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon} + \omega_1 \mathbf{S} + \omega_2 \mathbf{D}) \right] \mathbf{X} (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1}$$

- Brilliant insight of ‘robust’ (i.e., consistent) “sandwich” estimators:

- Only need formula that accounts relation  $V(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^*)$  to “ $\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X}$ ”, i.e., regressors, squares, & cross-prod’s involved in  $\mathbf{X}'[\cdot]\mathbf{X}$ ”

- $\Rightarrow$  “, robust” (or, in HM: “, cluster”) can work:

$$V(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_i^*)_{RE} = \sigma_{\varepsilon}^2 + \sigma_{\omega_1}^2 x_i^2 + \sigma_{\omega_2}^2 z_i^2 \text{ so track } e^2 \text{ rel } \mathbf{x}\mathbf{x}' \text{ \& } \mathbf{z}\mathbf{z}' \Rightarrow$$

White’s *heteroskedasticity-consistent s.e.’s*:

$$[\cdot] = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n e_i^2 \mathbf{x}_i \mathbf{x}_i'$$

# Cross-Level Interactions

- At this stage, nothing much different (n.b., not many subscripts used above):
  - If CLRM assumptions apply, then unbiased, consistent, and efficient.
    - Two main issues of concern:
      - Parameter heterogeneity (incl. intercept): this can cause bias if pattern unmodeled heterogeneity relates to  $\mathbf{X}$ ,
      - Non-spherical error cov-mat: an efficiency & proper s.e.'s issue, not a bias/consistency one
  - As before: Effects, their variances, symmetry of interactive prop's, that neither *micro-* nor *macro-level* coefficients=effects.

# Cross-Level Interactions:

reg spend L.spend unem left growthpc depratio  
 cdem trade lowwage fdi skand skand\_unem

$$\text{spend}_{it} = \beta_i^0 + \beta_i^l \text{left}_{it} + \dots + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$$\beta_i^0 = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{skand}_i + u_i^0$$

$$\beta_i^l = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{skand}_i + u_i^1$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{spend}_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{skand}_i + u_i^0 + \gamma_0 \text{left}_{it} \\ + \gamma_1 \text{left}_{it} \times \text{skand}_i + \text{left}_{it} u_i^1 + \dots + \varepsilon_{it}$$

gathering terms :

$$\text{spend}_{it} = \alpha_0 + \dots + \alpha_1 \text{skand}_i + \gamma_0 \text{left}_{it} \\ + \gamma_1 \text{left}_{it} \times \text{skand}_i + (u_i^0 + \text{left}_{it} u_i^1 + \varepsilon_{it})$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial \text{spend}}{\partial \text{left}} = b_{\text{left}} + b_{\text{lftsk}} \text{skand} + u_i^1 \quad \& \quad \frac{\partial \text{spend}}{\partial \text{skand}} = b_{\text{skand}} + b_{\text{lftsk}} \text{left}$$

$$V(\varepsilon_i^*)_{HM} = \sigma_0^2 + \sigma_1^2 \mathbf{x}_i \mathbf{x}_i' + \sigma_2^2 \mathbf{z}_i \mathbf{z}_i' \quad \Rightarrow \quad \text{cluster: } [\cdot] = \sum_{j=1}^J \left\{ \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n_j} e_{ij} \mathbf{x}_{ij} \right)' \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n_j} e_{ij} \mathbf{x}_{ij} \right) \right\}$$

# From CLRM to Multilevel Model

$$\text{spend}_{it} = \beta_i^0 + \beta_i^l \text{left}_{it} + \dots + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$$\beta_i^0 = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{skand}_i + u_i^0$$



$$\beta_i^l = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{skand}_i + u_i^1$$

- If CLRM assumptions apply, then OLS unbiased, consistent, and efficient.
  - Two main issues of concern:
    - Parameter heterogeneity: (see pictures)
      - systematic &/or stochastic (fixed v. rndm intrcpt/coeff)
      - can cause bias if pattern unmodeled hetero relates to  $\mathbf{X}$ ,
    - Non-spherical error cov-mat: an efficiency & proper s.e.'s issue, not a bias/consistency one
      - But “mere inefficiency” can be serious.
      - And accurate std err's very important.



# From the CLRM to HLM

- Examples of parameter heterogeneity that covaries w/  $X$  values, so bias:



- Note: FE v. RE both theoretically could cause bias if cov w/  $X$ , but latter i.d.'d off orthog

# From the CLRM to RE Model

- Std. R.E. Model: Odd that std. lin-interact model:

- Assumes know  $y=f(X)+\text{error}$ :  $y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_x x_i + \beta_z z_i + \beta_{xz} x_i z_i + \varepsilon_i$

- But  $dy/dx=f(z)$  w/o error!:  $\frac{\partial y}{\partial x} = \beta_x + \beta_{xz} xz$

- So, try:

$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x + \beta_2 z + \varepsilon^0$$

$$\frac{\partial y}{\partial x} \equiv \beta_1 = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 z + \varepsilon^1$$

$$\frac{\partial y}{\partial z} \equiv \beta_2 = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x + \varepsilon^2$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow y &= \beta_0 + (\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 z + \varepsilon^1) x + (\gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x + \varepsilon^2) z + \varepsilon^0 \\ &= \beta_0 + \alpha_0 x + \gamma_0 z + (\alpha_1 + \gamma_1) xz + (\varepsilon^0 + \varepsilon^1 x + \varepsilon^2 z) \end{aligned}$$

- $\Rightarrow$  std. lin-interact...except compound error-term...

- Std. HLM: Same model, except  $x_{ij}$  &  $z_j$  &

- So std lin-interact, but w/ diff compound-error struct.

$$\varepsilon^* = \varepsilon_{ij}^0 + \varepsilon_j^1 x_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}^2 z_j$$

# From CLRM to Hierarchical Model

- Std. HLM: Same model, except  $x_{ij}$  &  $z_j$ , &
  - So a std. lin-interact too, but with different compound-error stochastic properties.

$$\text{spend}_{it} = \beta_i^0 + \beta_i^l \text{left}_{it} + \dots + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$$\beta_i^0 = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{skand}_i + u_i^0$$

$$\beta_i^l = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{skand}_i + u_i^1$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow \text{spend}_{it} &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{skand}_i + u_i^0 + \gamma_0 \text{left}_{it} \\ &\quad + \gamma_1 \text{left}_{it} \times \text{skand}_i + \text{left}_{it} u_i^1 + \dots + \varepsilon_{it} \end{aligned}$$

gathering terms :

$$\begin{aligned} \text{spend}_{it} &= \alpha_0 + \dots + \alpha_1 \text{skand}_i + \gamma_0 \text{left}_{it} \\ &\quad + \gamma_1 \text{left}_{it} \times \text{skand}_i + (u_i^0 + \text{left}_{it} u_i^1 + \varepsilon_{it}) \end{aligned}$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial \text{spend}}{\partial \text{left}} = b_{\text{left}} + b_{\text{lftsk}} \text{skand} + u_i^1 \quad \& \quad \frac{\partial \text{spend}}{\partial \text{skand}} = b_{\text{skand}} + b_{\text{lftsk}} \text{left}$$

# Properties of OLS under HLM Conditions

- Properties of OLS Estimates of Lin-Interact Model if truly RE/HLM:

$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_x x + \beta_z z + \beta_{xz} xz + (\varepsilon^0 + \varepsilon^1 x + \varepsilon^2 z) = \mathbf{X}\beta + (\varepsilon^0 + \varepsilon^1 x + \varepsilon^2 z)$$

- So, OLS coeff. est's still differ from truth by  $\mathbf{A}\varepsilon^*$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\beta}_{LS} &= (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'y = (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'[\mathbf{X}\beta + (\varepsilon^0 + \varepsilon^1 x + \varepsilon^2 z)] \\ &= (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X}\beta + (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'(\varepsilon^0 + \varepsilon^1 x + \varepsilon^2 z) = \beta + (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'\varepsilon^* \end{aligned}$$

- So, OLS coeff. est's unbiased & consistent:

$$\begin{aligned} E(\hat{\beta}_{LS}) &= E[\beta + (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'\varepsilon^*] = E[\beta + (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'(\varepsilon^0 + \varepsilon^1 x + \varepsilon^2 z)] \\ &= \beta + (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'E(\varepsilon^0 + \varepsilon^1 x + \varepsilon^2 z) = \beta + (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'[E(\varepsilon^0) + E(\varepsilon^1)x + E(\varepsilon^2)z] \\ &= \beta + (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'[0 + E(\varepsilon^1)x + E(\varepsilon^2)z] = \beta + (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'[0 + 0 + 0] = \beta. \quad Q.E.D. \end{aligned}$$

- Note: only works for models w/ additively separable stochastic component; not nec'y for others (e.g., logit/probit)

# Properties of OLS under HLM Conditions

- But, OLS s.e.'s will be wrong; not  $s^2(\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1}$ , but:

$$\begin{aligned}V(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_{\text{LS}}) &= V\left[\boldsymbol{\beta} + (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^*\right] \\&= V[\boldsymbol{\beta}] + V\left[(\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^*\right] + 2C\left[\boldsymbol{\beta}, (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^*\right] \\&= 0 + V\left[(\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^*\right] + 0 \\&= (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'V(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^*)\mathbf{X}(\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \\&= (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'\left[V(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^0 + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^1 \mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^2 \mathbf{z})\right]\mathbf{X}(\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \\&= (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'\left[V(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^0) + V(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^1 \mathbf{x}) + V(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^2 \mathbf{z})\right]\mathbf{X}(\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \\&\quad \text{(the covariance terms are assumed zero)}\end{aligned}$$

# Sandwich Estimators

$$V(\hat{\beta}_{LS}) = (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}' [V(\varepsilon^0) + V(\varepsilon^1 \mathbf{x}) + V(\varepsilon^2 \mathbf{z})] \mathbf{X} (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1}$$

- Not  $\sigma^2 \mathbf{I}$  (even if each  $\varepsilon^*$  component is), so whole thing doesn't reduce to  $\sigma^2 (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1}$ , so OLS s.e.'s wrong.
- Be OK on avg (unbiased) & in limit (consistent) if that term varied in way “orthogonal to  $\mathbf{X}\mathbf{X}'$ ”

– But def'ly not b/c  $[\cdot]$  includes  $\mathbf{x}$  &  $\mathbf{z}$ , which part of  $\mathbf{X}$ !

– =brilliant insight of ‘robust’ (i.e., consistent) s.e. est's:

- Only need s.e. formula that accounts relation  $V(\varepsilon^*)$  to “ $\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X}$ ”, i.e., regressors, squares, & cross-prod's involved in  $\mathbf{X}'[\cdot]\mathbf{X}$ ”

- $\Rightarrow$  “, robust” & “, cluster” can work (for RE & HLM, resp'ly)

–  $\hat{V}(\hat{\beta})_{RE} = \sigma^2 (\mathbf{I} + \mathbf{xx}' + \mathbf{zz}')$  so track  $e^2$  rel  $\mathbf{xx}'$  &  $\mathbf{zz}' \Rightarrow [\cdot] = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n e_i^2 \mathbf{X}_i \mathbf{X}_i'$   
 – i.e., White's het-consistent s.e.'s

–  $\hat{V}(\hat{\beta})_{HM} = \sigma_0^2 \mathbf{I} + \sigma_1^2 \mathbf{xx}' + \sigma_2^2 \mathbf{zz}'$  sim but grpng  $\Rightarrow [\cdot] = \sum_{j=1}^J \left\{ \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n_j} e_{ij} \mathbf{X}_{ij} \right)' \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n_j} e_{ij} \mathbf{X}_{ij} \right) \right\}$   
 – i.e., het-cluster consistent s.e.'s

# From the CLRM to HLM

$$y = \beta_0 + \alpha_0 x + \gamma_0 z + (\alpha_1 + \gamma_1) xz + (\varepsilon^0 + \varepsilon^1 x + \varepsilon^2 z)$$

$$V(\hat{\beta}_{LS}) = (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}' [V(\varepsilon^0) + V(\varepsilon^1 x) + V(\varepsilon^2 z)] \mathbf{X} (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1}$$

- $\Rightarrow$  appropriate “, robust” & “, cluster” can work
  - I.e., asymptotically std errs right...BUT need large  $n_j$
  - I.e., coefficients still inefficient.
    - Want/need efficiency, or  $n_j$  low? HLM/RE or FGLS/FWLS.
    - Note: similarity RE and HLM, RE & FWLS. As suggests, RE only helps efficiency and only rightly does so if that's all it does. (I.e., if the RE's orthogonal to X.)
  - I.e., “work” thusly for models with additively-separable stochastic components
    - As w/ all such “sandwich” estimators, logical disconnect in applying them to models w/o such separability.