

Empirical Models of Context
Conditionality, (Inter)Dependence,
and Endogeneity

Linear Interaction Models

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(Here for further pedagogical slides & materials:

<http://www.umich.edu/~franzese/SyllabiEtc.html>)

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Overview

- Interactions in Pol-Sci: Ubiquitous, but more
- From theory to empirical-model specification: Arguments that imply interactions (& some that don't), & how to write.
- Interpretation:
 - Effects=derivatives & differences, not coefficients!
 - Std Errs (etc.): effects vary, so do std errs (etc.)!
- Presentation: Tables & Graphs, & Choosing between equivalent Specifications
- Use & abuse of some common-practice “rules”

Interactions in Pol-Sci Research

- Common. '96-'01 *AJPS*, *APSR*, *JoP*:
 - 54% some stat meth (=s.e.'s), of which 24% = interax (so interax \approx 12.5% or 1/8th total).
 - (N.b., most rest QualDep & formal theory, not counted, so understate tech nature of discipline)

<i>Journal (1996-2001)</i>	<i>Total Articles</i>	<i>Statistical Analysis</i>		<i>Interaction-Term Usage</i>		
		<i>Count</i>	<i>% of Tot</i>	<i>Count</i>	<i>% of Tot</i>	<i>% of Stat</i>
<i>American Political Science Review</i>	279	274	77%	69	19%	25%
<i>American Journal Political Science</i>	355	155	55%	47	17%	30%
<i>Comparative Politics</i>	130	12	9%	1	1%	8%
<i>Comparative Political Studies</i>	189	92	49%	23	12%	25%
<i>International Organization</i>	170	43	25%	9	5%	21%
<i>International Studies Quarterly</i>	173	70	40%	10	6%	14%
<i>Journal of Politics</i>	284	226	80%	55	19%	24%
<i>Legislative Studies Quarterly</i>	157	104	66%	19	12%	18%
<i>World Politics</i>	116	28	24%	6	5%	25%
<i>TOTALS</i>	2446	1323	54%	311	13%	24%

Interactions in Pol-Sci Theory¹

- Ubiquitous, but our Theories/Substance say should be even more; core classes of argument inherently interactive:
 - **INSTITUTIONAL**: institutions are inherently interactive variables:
 - Institutions funnel, moderate, shape, condition, constrain, refract, magnify, augment, dampen, mitigate political processes that...
 - ...translate societal interest-structures into effective political pressures,
 - ...&/or pressures into public-policy responses,
 - ...&/or policies to outcomes.
 - I.e., they *affect effects*≡*interaction*.

Interactions in Pol-Sci Theory²

- Views from across institutionalist perspectives:
 - Hall: “institutionalist model=>policy more than sum countervailing pressure from soc grps; that press mediated by organizational dynamic.”
 - Ikenberry: “[Political struggles] mediated by inst’l setting where [occur]”
 - Steinmo & Thelen: “inst’s...constrain & refract politics... [effects of] macro-structures magnify or mitigated by intermediate-level inst’s... help us...explain the contingent nature of pol-econ development...”
 - Shepsle: “SIE clearly a move [to] incorporating inst’l features into R-C. Structure & procedure combine w/ preferences to produce outcomes.”

Interactions in Pol-Sci Theory³

- Ubiquitous, but our Theories/Substance say should be even more; core classes of argument inherently interactive:
 - **INSTITUTIONAL**: ...
 - **STRATEGIC**: actors' choices (outcomes) conditional upon inst'l/struct'l environ., opp.-set, & other actors' choices.
 - **CONTEXTUAL**: actors' choices (outcomes) conditional upon environ., opp. set, & aggregates of other actors' choices.

Interactions in Pol-Sci Theory⁴


- Across subfields:
 - Comparative Politics *examples*:
 - Electoral system & societal structure \Rightarrow party system.
 - Divided government & polarization \Rightarrow legislative productivity.
 - Corruption depends institutional & societal structures.
 - International Relations *examples*:
 - System polarity & offense-defense balance \Rightarrow war propensity.
 - Terrorist targeting & counterterrorism responses depend “grievance” & resources
 - American Politics ...

Interactions in Pol-Sci Theory⁵

- Political Economy:
 - Electoral & partisan cycles depend on inst'l & econ conditions
- Political Behavior:
 - Gov't inst's shape voter behavior: balancing (Kedar, Alesina); economic voting (Powell & Whitten); etc.
- Legislative Studies:
 - Effects divided gov't depend presidential v. parliamentary.
- Political Development:
 - Effect inequality on democratization depends cleavage structure.

Theory & Substance: Everyone's Favorite "Model"

Economics Affects Politics and Society
Politics Affects Economics and Society
Society Affects Politics and Economics



Theory & Substance:

An Old (& still) Favorite “Model” of Mine

The Cycle of Political Economy

Examples of the Elements at Each Stage:

(A) Interests:

- Sectoral Structure of Economy
- Income Distribution
- Age Distribution
- Trade Openness

Elections:

- Electoral Law
- Voter Participation

Government Formation:

- Fractionalization
- Polarization

(B) Representation:

- Partisanship

Policy:


- Fiscal Policy
- Monetary Policy
- Institutional Adjustment

Government Termination:

- Replacement Risk

(C) Outcomes:

- Unemployment
- Inflation
- Growth
- Sectoral Shift
- Debt
- Institutional Change



Theory & Substance:

An Newer Favorite “Model” of Mine

- *Complex Context-Conditionality:*
 - Effect of (almost) everything depends on (almost) everything else.
 - E.g., Principal-Agent Situations
 - If fully principal, $y_1=f(\mathbf{X})$; if fully agent, $y_2=g(\mathbf{Z})$; institutions: $0\leq h(\mathbf{I})\leq 1$.

$$y = h(\mathbf{I})f(\mathbf{X}) + \{1 - h(\mathbf{I})\}g(\mathbf{Z})$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} = h(\mathbf{I}) \frac{\partial f(\mathbf{X})}{\partial x} \quad ; \quad \frac{\partial y}{\partial z} = -h(\mathbf{I}) \frac{\partial g(\mathbf{Z})}{\partial z} ;$$

$$\frac{\partial y}{\partial i} = \frac{\partial h(\mathbf{I})}{\partial i} [f(\mathbf{X}) - g(\mathbf{Z})]$$

(Complex) Context-Conditionality: (Hallmark of Modern Pol-Sci Theory?)

- Principal-Agent (Shared Control) Situations, for example:
 - If fully principal: $y_1=f(\mathbf{X})$;
 - If fully agent: $y_2=g(\mathbf{Z})$;
 - Institutions=>Monitoring & Enforcement costs principal must pay to induce agent behave as principal would: $0\leq h(\mathbf{I})\leq 1$.
 - RESULT:

- In words...

$$y = h(\mathbf{I})f(\mathbf{X}) + \{1 - h(\mathbf{I})\}g(\mathbf{Z})$$

...

...

- ...i.e., effect of anything depends on everything else!

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} = h(\mathbf{I}) \frac{\partial f(\mathbf{X})}{\partial x} ;$$

$$\frac{\partial y}{\partial z} = -h(\mathbf{I}) \frac{\partial g(\mathbf{Z})}{\partial z} ;$$

$$\frac{\partial y}{\partial i} = \frac{\partial h(\mathbf{I})}{\partial i} [f(\mathbf{X}) - g(\mathbf{Z})]$$

Not Every Argument Is an Interactive Argument

- Not Interactive:
 - \mathbf{X} affects \mathbf{Y} through its effect on \mathbf{Z} : $\mathbf{X} \Rightarrow \mathbf{Z} \Rightarrow \mathbf{Y}$
 - In (political) psychology / behavior, this called *mediation*. Interaction is called *moderation* in this literature.
 - \mathbf{X} and \mathbf{Z} affect each other: $\mathbf{X} \Leftrightarrow \mathbf{Z}$.
 - I.e., \mathbf{X} and \mathbf{Z} endogenous to each other. Note: irrelevant to Gauss-Markov (OLS is BLUE); merely implies care to what partials (coefficients) mean.
 - \mathbf{Y} depends on \mathbf{X} controlling for \mathbf{Z} , or \mathbf{Y} depends on \mathbf{X} & \mathbf{Z} : $E(\mathbf{Y}|\mathbf{X},\mathbf{Z})=f(\mathbf{Z})$, $E(\mathbf{Y}|\mathbf{X})=f(\mathbf{Z})$, $\mathbf{Y}=f(\mathbf{X},\mathbf{Z})$
 - I.e., the outcomes differ across 2x2 of \mathbf{X} and \mathbf{Z} .
- **Interactive**: **Effect of X on Y** depends on \mathbf{Z} (\Rightarrow converse: Effect of \mathbf{Z} on \mathbf{Y} depends on \mathbf{X}):

$$\frac{\partial Y}{\partial X} = f(Z) \Leftrightarrow \frac{\partial Y}{\partial Z} = f(X)$$

From Theory/Substance to Empirical-Model Specification

- **Classic Comparative-Politics Example:**
 - Societal Fragmentation, *SFrag*, &
 - Electoral-System Proportionality, *DMag*,
 - \Rightarrow Effective # Parliamentary Parties: *ENPP*

● “Theory”: $ENPP = f(SFrag, DMag, \cdot, \varepsilon)$

● Hypotheses: $\frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial SFrag} \geq 0$ $\frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial DMag} \geq 0$

$$\frac{\partial \left\{ \frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial SFrag} \right\}}{\partial DMag} \equiv \frac{\partial \left\{ \frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial DMag} \right\}}{\partial SFrag} \equiv \frac{\partial^2 ENPP}{\partial SFrag \partial DMag} \equiv \frac{\partial^2 ENPP}{\partial DMag \partial SFrag} \geq 0$$

- Empirical Specification: Lots ways get there...

A Typical Linear-Interactive Specification

- Want linear $f(\cdot)$ w/ these properties; many ways to get there:

$$ENPP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 SFrag + \beta_2 DMag + \varepsilon$$

$$\frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial SFrag} = \beta_1 \xrightarrow{?} f(DMag) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 DMag$$

$$\frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial DMag} = \beta_2 \xrightarrow{?} f(SFrag) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 SFrag$$

$$\Rightarrow ENPP = \beta_0 + (\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 DMag) SFrag + (\gamma_0 + \gamma_1 SFrag) DMag + \varepsilon$$

$$= \beta_0 + \alpha_0 SFrag + \alpha_1 DMag SFrag + \gamma_0 DMag + \gamma_1 SFrag DMag + \varepsilon$$

$$= \beta_0 + \alpha_0 SFrag + \gamma_0 DMag + (\alpha_1 + \gamma_1) SFrag DMag + \varepsilon$$

$$= \beta_0 + \beta_{SF} SFrag + \beta_{DM} DMag + \beta_{SFDM} SFrag DMag + \varepsilon$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial SFrag} = \beta_{SF} + \beta_{SFDM} DMag$$

$$\frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial DMag} = \beta_{DM} + \beta_{SFDM} SFrag$$

Interpretation of *Effects*:

Derivatives & Differences, *Not* Coefficients

- Standard Linear Interactive Model:

$$EN = \beta_0 + \beta_{SF} SF + \beta_{DM} DM + \beta_{SFDM} SF \times DM + \dots + \varepsilon$$

- Effect of *SFrag* on *ENPP* (is a *function* of *DMag*):

$$Effect(SF) \equiv \frac{\partial EN}{\partial SF} = \beta_{SF} + \beta_{SFDM} DM$$

$$\Delta EN = \beta_{SF} \Delta SF + \beta_{SFDM} DM \cdot \Delta SF$$

$$\equiv \frac{\Delta EN}{\Delta SF} = \beta_{SF} + \beta_{SFDM} DM$$

- Effect of *DMag* on *ENPP* (is *f* of *SFrag*):

$$Effect(DMag) \equiv \frac{\partial ENPP}{\partial DMag} = \beta_{DM} + \beta_{SFDM} SFrag$$

$$\equiv \Delta ENPP = \beta_{DM} \Delta DM + \beta_{SFDM} SFrag \cdot \Delta DM$$

$$\equiv \frac{\Delta ENPP}{\Delta DM} = \beta_{DM} + \beta_{SFDM} SFrag$$

Interpretation of *Effects*: NOTES¹

- “Main Effect” & “Interactive Effect”:
 - For example, β_{SF} = “*main effect* of **SFrag**”
 - ...**but** β_{SF} is merely the effect of **SFrag** at other variable(s) involved in interaction with it=0, so:
 - *Other-var(s)=0* may be extreme in the sample, or beyond sample range, or even logically impossible.
 - *Other-var(s)=0* substantive meaning of 0 altered by rescaling
 - E.g., by “centering” (centering changes nothing, btw...)
 - *Other-var(s)=0* may not have anything substantively *main* about it
 - Is no Main Effect or separately & Interactive Effect; is just the effect, which conditional, varies:

$$Effect(SF) \equiv \frac{\partial EN}{\partial SF} = \beta_{SF} + \beta_{SFDM} DM \quad ; \quad Effect(DM) \equiv \frac{\partial EN}{\partial DM} = \beta_{DM} + \beta_{SFDM} SF$$

Interpretation of *Effects*: NOTES²

- **COEFFICIENTS ARE NOT EFFECTS. EFFECTS ARE DERIVATIVES &/OR DIFFERENCES.**
 - Only in purely linear-additive-separable model are they equal because only there do derivatives simply = coefficients.
 - β_{SF} is not “effect of **SFrag** ‘independent of’...” & definitely not its “effect ‘controlling for’...other variable(s) in the interaction”
- Cannot substitute linguistic invention for under-standing model’s logic (its simple math)

Interpretation of *Effects*: NOTES³


- Interactions are logically symmetric:
 - For any function, not just lin-add.
 - If argue effect x depends z , must also believe effect z depends x .
- $$\frac{\partial \left\{ \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} \right\}}{\partial z} \equiv \frac{\partial \left\{ \frac{\partial y}{\partial z} \right\}}{\partial x} \equiv \frac{\partial^2 y}{\partial x \partial z} \equiv \frac{\partial^2 y}{\partial z \partial x}$$
- Interactions often have 2nd-moment (variance, i.e., heteroskedacity) implications too:
 - **Larger district magnitudes, $DMag$** , are “permissive” elect sys: allow more parties...
 - Fewer ***Veto Actors*** allow greater policy-change... (both need additional assumpts)
 - All of this holds for any type of variable:
 - Measurement: binary, continuous...
 - Level: micro or macro; i, j, k, \dots

Frequent 2nd-Moment Implications Interactions

- *DMag* permissive ele sys: allows more parties...

$$NP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DM + \varepsilon ; V(\varepsilon) = f(DM) , \text{ e.g., } \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 DM$$

- Few *Veto Actors* allows greater policy-change...



$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 VP + \varepsilon ; V(\varepsilon) = f(VP) , \text{ e.g., } \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 VP$$

- I.e., these are Rndm-Coeff &/or Het-sked Props...

Interpretation of *Effects*:

Standard Errors for *Effects*

$$ENPP = \beta_0 + \beta_{SF} SFrag + \beta_{DM} DMag + \beta_{SFDM} SFragDMag + \dots + \varepsilon$$

- Std Errs reported with regression output are for coefficients, not for effects.
 - The s.e. (*t*-stat, *p*-level) for $\hat{\beta}_{SF}$ is std. err. for est'd effect *SFrag* at *DMag*=0 (...which is logically impossible).
- Effect of *x* depends on *z* & v.v. (i.e., which was the point, remember?), so does the s.e.:

$$Effect(x) \equiv \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} = \beta_x + \beta_{xz}z \Rightarrow Est.Eff.(x) \equiv E\left(\frac{\partial y}{\partial x}\right) = \hat{\beta}_x + \hat{\beta}_{xz}z$$

$$\begin{aligned} Est.Var.\{Est.Eff.(x)\} &\equiv E\left[Var\left\{E\left(\frac{\partial y}{\partial x}\right)\right\}\right] = E\left[Var\{\hat{\beta}_x + \hat{\beta}_{xz}z\}\right] \\ &= V\{\hat{\beta}_x + \hat{\beta}_{xz}z\} = V\{\hat{\beta}_x\} + V\{\hat{\beta}_{xz}\} \cdot z^2 + 2 \cdot C(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_{xz})z \end{aligned}$$

- In words... More Generally:

$$V(\mathbf{x}'\hat{\beta}) = \mathbf{x}'\left[V(\hat{\beta})\right]\mathbf{x}$$

From Hypotheses to Hypotheses Tests:

Does Y Depend on X or Z ?

$$ENPP = \beta_0 + \beta_{SF} SFrag + \beta_{DM} DMag + \beta_{SFDM} SFragDMag + \dots + \varepsilon$$

<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Mathematical Expression</i> ⁹¹	<i>Statistical test</i>
<i>x affects y, or y is a function of (depends on) x</i>	$y=f(x)$ $\partial y/\partial x = \beta_x + \beta_{xz}z \neq 0$	<i>F- test:</i> $H_0: \beta_x = \beta_{xz} = 0$
<i>x increases y</i>	$\partial y/\partial x = \beta_x + \beta_{xz}z > 0$	<i>Multiple t-tests:</i> $H_0: \beta_x + \beta_{xz}z \leq 0$
<i>x decreases y</i>	$\partial y/\partial x = \beta_x + \beta_{xz}z < 0$	<i>Multiple t- tests:</i> $\beta_x + \beta_{xz}z \geq 0$
<i>z affects y, or y is a function of (depends on) z</i>	$y=g(z)$ $\partial y/\partial z = \beta_z + \beta_{xz}x \neq 0$	<i>F- test:</i> $H_0: \beta_z = \beta_{xz} = 0$
<i>z increases y</i>	$\partial y/\partial z = \beta_z + \beta_{xz}x > 0$	<i>Multiple t-tests:</i> $H_0: \beta_z + \beta_{xz}x \leq 0$
<i>z decreases y</i>	$\partial y/\partial z = \beta_z + \beta_{xz}x < 0$	<i>Multiple t- tests:</i> $H_0: \beta_z + \beta_{xz}x \geq 0$

From Hypotheses to Hypotheses Tests:

Is Y 's Dependence on X Conditional on Z & v.v.? How?

<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Mathematical Expression</i> ⁹²	<i>Statistical test</i>
<i>The effect of x on y depends on z</i>	$y=f(xz, \bullet)$ $\partial y/\partial x = \beta_x + \beta_{xz}z = g(z)$ $\partial(\partial y/\partial x)/\partial z = \partial^2 y/\partial x\partial z = \beta_{xz} = 0$	<i>t-test: $H_0: \beta_{xz} = 0$</i>
<i>The effect of x on y increases in z</i>	$\partial(\partial y/\partial x)/\partial z = \partial^2 y/\partial x\partial z = \beta_{xz} > 0$	<i>t-test: $H_0: \beta_{xz} \leq 0$</i>
<i>The effect of x on y decreases in z</i>	$\partial(\partial y/\partial x)/\partial z = \partial^2 y/\partial x\partial z = \beta_{xz} < 0$	<i>t-test: $H_0: \beta_{xz} \geq 0$</i>
<i>The effect of z on y depends on x</i>	$y=f(xz, \bullet)$ $\partial y/\partial z = \beta_z + \beta_{xz}x = h(x)$ $\partial(\partial y/\partial z)/\partial x = \partial^2 y/\partial z\partial x = \beta_{xz} = 0$	<i>t-test: $H_0: \beta_{xz} = 0$</i>
<i>The effect of z on y increases in x</i>	$\partial(\partial y/\partial z)/\partial x = \partial^2 y/\partial z\partial x = \beta_{xz} > 0$	<i>t-test: $H_0: \beta_{xz} \leq 0$</i>
<i>The effect of z on y decreases in x</i>	$\partial(\partial y/\partial z)/\partial x = \partial^2 y/\partial z\partial x = \beta_{xz} < 0$	<i>t-test: $H_0: \beta_{xz} \geq 0$</i>

Does Y Depend on X , Z , or XZ ?

<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Mathematical Expression</i> ⁹³	<i>Statistical Test</i>
<i>y is a function of (depends on) z, z, and/or their interaction</i>	$y=f(x,z,xz)$	<i>F-test: $H_0: \beta_x = \beta_z = \beta_{xz} = 0$</i>

Use & Abuse of Some Common ‘Rules’

- *Centering to Redress Colinearity Concerns:*
 - Adds no info, so changes *nothing*; no help with colinearity or anything else; only moves substantive content of $x=0, z=0$.
 - Specifically, makes coeff. on x (z), effect when z (x) at sample-mean, the new 0. Do only if aids presentation.
- *Must Include All Components* (if xz , then $x&z$):
 - Application of Occam’s Razor &/or scientific caution (e.g., greater flexibility to allow linear w/in lin-interax model), but
 - **Not** a logical or statistical requirement.
 - Safer rule than opposite & to check almost always, but
 - **Not** override *theory & evidence if (strongly) agree to exclude*
- *Pet-Peeve: Lingistic Gymnastics to Dodge the Math*
 - “Main effect, Interactive effect”: **the** effect in model is dy/dx .
 - Discussion of [coefficients & s.e.’s] as if [effects & s.e.’s].


Presentation: Marginal-Effects / Differences Tables & Graphs

- Plot/Tabulate **Effects**, dy/dx , over Meaningful &/or Illuminating Ranges of z , with Conf. Int.'s

$$- \hat{dy} / dx \pm t_{df,p} \sqrt{Var(\hat{dy} / dx)} = \hat{\beta}_x + \hat{\beta}_{xz}z \pm t_{df,p} \sqrt{V(\hat{\beta}_x) + V(\hat{\beta}_{xz})z^2 + 2C(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_{xz})z}$$

- Explain axes
- Explain shape
- Linear-interax:
 - Will cross 0 & be insig @ 0.
- Rescaling &
 - “main effect”
 - “centering”
 - Max(Asterisks)

Figure 5. Marginal Effect of *Runoff*, Extending the Range of *Groups*



Presentation: Expected-Value/Predictions Tables & Graphs

- *Predictions, $E(y|x,z)$:*

$$\hat{y} \pm t_{df,p} \sqrt{Var(\hat{y})} =$$

$$\hat{\beta}_0 + \hat{\beta}_x x + \hat{\beta}_z z + \hat{\beta}_{xz} xz \pm t_{df,p} \sqrt{\begin{aligned} &V(\hat{\beta}_0) + V(\hat{\beta}_x)x^2 + V(\hat{\beta}_z)z^2 + V(\hat{\beta}_{xz})(xz)^2 \\ &+ 2C(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_x)x + 2C(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_z)z + 2C(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_{xz})xz \\ &+ 2C(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_z)xz + 2C(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_{xz})x^2z + 2C(\hat{\beta}_z, \hat{\beta}_{xz})xz^2 \end{aligned}}$$

- Here's one place a little matrix algebra would help:

$$\hat{y} \pm t_{df,p} \sqrt{Var(\hat{y})} = \hat{\beta}_0 + \hat{\beta}_x x + \hat{\beta}_z z + \hat{\beta}_{xz} xz \pm t_{df,p} \sqrt{\mathbf{x}' \hat{V}(\hat{\beta}) \mathbf{x}}$$

$$= \hat{\beta}_0 + \hat{\beta}_x x + \hat{\beta}_z z + \hat{\beta}_{xz} xz \pm t_{df,p} \sqrt{\begin{bmatrix} 1 & x & z & xz \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \hat{V}(\hat{\beta}_0) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_x) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_z) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_{xz}) \\ \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_x) & \hat{V}(\hat{\beta}_x) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_z) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_{xz}) \\ \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_z) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_z) & \hat{V}(\hat{\beta}_z) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_z, \hat{\beta}_{xz}) \\ \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_{xz}) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_x, \hat{\beta}_{xz}) & \hat{C}(\hat{\beta}_z, \hat{\beta}_{xz}) & \hat{V}(\hat{\beta}_{xz}) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ x \\ z \\ xz \end{bmatrix}}$$

- Use spreadsheet or stat-graph software (...list coming...)

Presentation¹:

Choose Illuminating Graphics & Base Cases


- Interpretation same regardless of “type” of interax: *effect* always $\equiv dy/dx$, but present appropriately:
 - All combos Dummy, Discrete, or Continuous:
 - Dummy-Dummy \Rightarrow 4 (or $2^{\# \text{interacting variable}}$) points estimated, so box & whisker or histograms effective
 - Dummy-Continuous or Discrete(*few*)-Continuous \Rightarrow 2 (or $\#$ categories) slopes, so $E(y|x,z)$ as line or dy/dx as box & whisker or histograms effective
 - Continuous – Continuous (or DiscMany) \Rightarrow Effect-lines best or (slices from) contour plot (i.e., slices from 3D)
 - Powers (e.g., X & $X^2 \Rightarrow$ parabola) viewable as interax w/ self; certain slope shifts too (e.g., $dy/dx = a$ for $x < x^0$ & b for $x > x^0$ is x interact w/ dummy for condition)

Presentation²:

Choose Illuminating Graphics & Base Cases


- Interpretation same regardless of “type” of interax: *effect* always $\equiv dy/dx$, but present appropriately...
 - Always plot over substantively revealing ranges.
 - Especially with sets of dummies, have several (identical) specification options:
 - (full-set or set-less-1): choose which (& what base if use set-less-1) to abet presentation & discussion
 - (overlapping or disjoint): choose to facilitate presentation & discussion.
 - Scale Effectively: e.g., center only if & to extent that aids presentation & discussion (b/c centering does nothing else)

Presentation³: Choose Illuminating Graphics & Base Cases. Examples.




Dummy-Continuous Interaction: could also plot two $E(\text{Cands}|\text{Groups})$ lines, with c.i.'s, effectively.

Presentation⁴: Choose Illuminating Graphics & Base Cases. Examples.



Dummy-Dummy Interaction: could also plot four $E(\text{Supp}|\text{gender},\text{party})$ box-whiskers effectively.


Presentation⁵: Choose Illuminating Graphics & Base Cases. Examples.



Quadratic Model of Government Duration as Function of Parliamentary Support of Governing Parties.

Presentation⁶: Choose Illuminating Graphics & Base Cases. Examples.

Figure 14. Marginal Effect of *Parliamentary Support for Government*, Pairwise-Interaction Model, with 90% Confidence Intervals



$$GovDur = \beta_0 + \beta_{np} NP + \beta_{ps} PS + \beta_{pd} PD + \beta_{np ps} NP \times PS + \beta_{np pd} NP \times PD + \beta_{pd ps} PD \times PS + \varepsilon \quad [25]$$

Elaborations, Complications, & Extensions: Sample-Splitting v. (Dummy-)Interacting¹

- Split-sample (e.g., unit-by-unit) \approx Full-Dum Interax:
 - Subsample by binary (or multinomial, e.g., CTRY in TSCS) category to estimate separately \approx Include dummy for each category (or set-less-1) & interact each dummy with each x (and include x by itself also if set-less-1)
 - Coeff's same (or equal substantive content if using *set-1* dummies).
 - S.E.'s same except s^2 part of OLS's $s^2(\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1}$ is s_i^2 for splitting
 - Can make exact by allow s_i^2 (FWLS)
 - Subsample by hi/lo values some non-nominal var equivalent to *nominalizing* the extra-nominal info & dummy-interact;
 - I.e., wasting information, when usually have too little (non-parametric or extreme-measurement-error arguments might justify)
 - So usually a bad idea...

Elaborations, Complications, & Extensions: Sample-Splitting v. (Dummy-)Interacting


- Split-sample abets eyeballing, obfuscates statistical analysis, of the main point: the different effects by category.
 - What's s.e./signif. of $b_{1i}-b_{1j}$? Need:
$$s.e.(b_{1i} - b_{1j}) = \sqrt{V(b_{1i}) + V(b_{1j}) - 2C(b_{1i}, b_{1j})} = \sqrt{V(b_{1i}) + V(b_{1j})}$$
 - Luckily, $cov=0$, but, still, squaring 2 terms, sum, & root in head?
- Can choose *full dummy set* to mirror the split-sample estimates directly (& report that way, if wish) or the *set-less-one* to get significance of differences b/w samples directly (in the standard reported *t*-test)
 - Same thing, so choose for to optimize presentational efficacy.
- One advantage of hierarchical modeling is how it affords, naturally, various positions b/w these extremes.
 - E.g., can “borrow strength” across units.

Typical 2nd-Moment Implications of Interactions

- *DMag* permissive ele sys: allow more parties...

$$NP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DM + \varepsilon ; V(\varepsilon) = f(DM) , \text{ e.g., } \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 DM$$

- Few *Veto Actors* allow greater policy-change...



$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 VP + \varepsilon ; V(\varepsilon) = f(VP) , \text{ e.g., } \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 VP$$

- I.e., these are Rndm-Coeff &/or Het-sked Props...

$$NP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DM + \beta_2 SF + \beta_3 DM \times SF + \varepsilon ; V(\varepsilon) = f(DM) , \text{ e.g., } \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 DM$$

Sandwich Estimators

$$EN = \beta_0 + \beta_1 SF + \beta_2 DM + \varepsilon$$

$$\partial EN / \partial SF = \beta_1 = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 DM + \omega_1$$

$$\partial EN / \partial DM = \beta_2 = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 SF + \omega_2$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow EN &= \beta_0 + (\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 DM + \omega_1) SF + (\gamma_0 + \gamma_1 SF + \omega_2) DM + \varepsilon \\ &= \beta_0 + \alpha_0 SF + (\alpha_1 + \gamma_1) DM \times SF + \gamma_0 DM + \{\varepsilon + \omega_1 SF + \omega_2 DM\} \\ &= b_0 + b_1 SF + b_2 DM \times SF + b_3 DM + \varepsilon^* \end{aligned}$$

- Notice the compound error term:
 - $V(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^*)$ will not be $\sigma^2 \mathbf{I}$ even if $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$ is, so $V(b)$ doesn't reduce to $\sigma^2(\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1}$, so OLS s.e.'s wrong.
 - Be OK on average (unbiased) & in limit (consistent) if element of $V(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^*)$ “orthogonal to \mathbf{xx}' ”
 - But def'ly not because $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^*$ includes \boldsymbol{x} & \boldsymbol{z} , which part of \mathbf{X} !

Sandwich Estimators

$$V(\mathbf{b}_{LS}) = (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}' \left[V(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon} + \omega_1 \mathbf{S} + \omega_2 \mathbf{D}) \right] \mathbf{X} (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1}$$

- Brilliant insight of ‘robust’ (i.e., consistent) “sandwich” estimators:

- Only need formula that accounts relation $V(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^*)$ to “ $\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X}$ ”, i.e., regressors, squares, & cross-prod’s involved in $\mathbf{X}'[\cdot]\mathbf{X}$

- \Rightarrow “, robust” (or, in HM: “, cluster”) can work:

- $\hat{V}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}})_{RE} = \sigma^2(\mathbf{I} + \mathbf{xx}' + \mathbf{zz}')$ so track e^2 rel \mathbf{xx}' & $\mathbf{zz}' \Rightarrow$

White’s *heteroskedasticity-consistent s.e.’s*:

$$[\cdot] = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n e_i^2 \mathbf{X}_i \mathbf{X}_i'$$

- $\hat{V}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}})_{HM} = \sigma_0^2 \mathbf{I} + \sigma_1^2 \mathbf{xx}' + \sigma_2^2 \mathbf{zz}'$ similar, +grouping \Rightarrow *cluster*:

$$[\cdot] = \sum_{j=1}^J \left\{ \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n_j} e_{ij} \mathbf{X}_{ij} \right)' \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n_j} e_{ij} \mathbf{X}_{ij} \right) \right\}$$