

# *Cleavage Structure, Interest Groups, and Interest Intermediation*

## **I. Background Summary on Socio-Economic Development, Cleavage-Structure, & Politics:**

### **A. Basic Notion & Definition of Social Cleavage & Cleavage-Structure**

### **B. Typologies of Social Cleavages:**

1. *Ascriptive v. Functional Cleavages*
2. *Religious, Ethnic/Linguistic, Class/Economic, Regional/Geographic*

### **C. Characteristics of Social Cleavages & Cleavage-Structures Potentially Important to Key Elements of Democratic Performance**

1. *Salience of the Divide (“latent” — “manifest”)*
2. *Divisibility (“Bargainability” or “Compromisability”)*
3. *Relative Power of the Groups Involved*
4. *Fractionalization & Polarization (of Cleavage Structure)*
5. *Cross-Cutting v. Reinforcing (Cleavage Structure)*

### **D. Modernization & Democratic Perf; Key Hypotheses**

1. *Modernization & Participation, Govt Stab, & Soc Order*
  - a. Education & the “Modern Person” Arg.
  - b. Value-Harmonization Arg.
  - c. Increasing Density of Interactions (Increasing Interdependence of Individuals in Society) Arg.
2. *Impact of Modernization Depends (is complicated)*
  - a. Ratio of Econ Dev’t to Social Mobilization Arg.
  - b. Economic Dev’p at Time of Democratization Arg.

c. Pace of Development Arg.

**E. Why do some democracies function well & others not? Answer in this material emphasizes nature & severity of underlying potential conflicts as expressed in social-structure & the way they are expressed. This omits other important parts of answer, some of which we will emphasize later. For now, note:**

1. *History*: of oppression & repression & of homogeneity or heterogeneity
2. *Institutional Structure*: Checks & Balances, Regional Autonomy, Minority Representation in Parliament; Functional Representation of Minorities, Guaranteed Rights in Constitutions

**F. Social-Cleavage Patterns & the Party System: basic notion that party system, *i.e.*, number, sizes, & ideological positioning of parties, reflects somehow underlying social-structure. But relation moderated by:**

1. *Institutions operating b/w social structure & party system (most centrally, electoral institutions).*
2. *Party & other elite strategies, & history (loosely, inertia)*

## II. (GLM ch. 9) Lipset & Rokkan's Diachronic Model of Cleavage-Struct Formation & Freezing

A. Two stages, **Process of Nation-Building & Industrial Revolution**, each bringing two fundamental conflicts, form underlying cleavage structure. The nature of their resolution forms the party system.

### 1. **Nation Building I: Center v. Periphery**

a. Those seeking to standardize laws & consolidate power in

- nation-state (center) against those striving to maintain local powers & privileges (periphery)
- b. The struggle can end in:
    - (1) secession (Ireland from UK),
    - (2) absorption of periphery & its gradual fading as distinct (Bretton or Occitan in France),
    - (3) local autonomy (some Spanish & Italian regions),
    - (4) or retention of diffuse, persistent tension (e.g., Germany, except Bavaria which is more 3)
  - c. Only last two likely to result in this cleavage being reflected in party system

## 2. **Nation-Building II: Church v. State**

- a. Conflict b/w (Catholic) Church's claim of rights & privileges, esp. its supremacy in certain moral areas, *vs.* state consolidators; central issue often education
- b. Resolution depends centrally on nation's history & role in Protestant Ref. & later secularist movements:
  - (1) Where Protestant movements allied with state & won, party system does not usually reflect Church-State cleavage (e.g., UK, Scandinavia)
  - (2) Where Catholicism continued to dominate, Church-State cleavage tended to persist (e.g., Latin Europe)
  - (3) Where secularists most momentum (e.g., France), party system often evolved anti-clerical elements

## 3. **Industrial Revolution I: Urban v. Rural**

- a. Conflict b/w traditionally dominant rural interests & new commercial & industrial classes
- b. These have almost universally faded (basically because urban interests won), but...
  - (1) ...in some places agrarian parties emerged, & these often

persisted if leading strategists allowed party flexibility from its early aims & purposes, (e.g., Sweden, Finland)

(2) ...split has seen rebirth in reverse as urban decline began, (e.g., US, UK)

(3) ...some rebirth also in conflicts over agricultural protectionism (e.g., esp. Europe & Japan)

#### 4. **Industrial Revolution II: Labor v. Employers**

a. Increased concentration of production, & the accompanying increased organization of labor & employers as a group, led to almost-inherently-organized conflict

b. Resolution occurred by two patterns:

(1) Where workers rose & the bourgeoisie adopted an accommodative strategy, Socialist parties arose as the representatives of labor (e.g., UK, Sweden)

(2) Where workers rose & the bourgeoisie adopted a stonewalling and/or repressive strategy, Communist parties arose as the representatives of labor (e.g., France, Italy, Germany, Spain)

B. **Argument:** The pattern of how these conflicts arose in each country & how they had been or were being resolved at time mass democracy arrived was frozen. I.e., **cleavage structure is frozen in party system by mid-20<sup>th</sup> Century because:**

1. **Underlying conflicts persist & groups involved have developed collective identities**

2. Major new political entities typically can arise only w/ large increases in suffrage & **universal suffrage was mostly completed** by then.

3. **Political rules made by & so favor established parties**

4. **Established parties follow electoral strategies to isolate their supporters from outside appeals**

C. Perceived increases in **electoral volatility** in 1970s led some to seek **explanations for unfreezing**:

1. **Social-Structural Changes in Developed Democracies**

a. **Sectoral-Structure**: industrial decline, massive agricultural decline, massive service-sector rise

b. **Erosion of Class Boundaries**

(1) general education & more wide-spread higher edu

(2) changing work modes: relative ↓ manual labor

(3) increasingly widespread affluence (though relative disparities may have widened too)

2. **Changes in Patterns of Individual Voting Behavior: Decline of Structural Voting**

a. Decline of class voting & of religious voting but still recognizably different.

b. **Arguments**: suggested reasons for former listed above, to which add:

(1) secularization & decreasing coherence of views among religious & secular alike

(2) increased individuality & political sophistication

3. **Changes in the Issues about which those Individuals: *Dealignment v. Realignment***

a. **Realignment**: new parties & changing support among existing parties

(1) Some see a “New Politics” movement

(a) new, highly educated, young middle class

(b) distinctive new values & issues: environment, feminism, etc.

(c) new-left parties: greens, new communists; new-right: anti-government, xenophobic, protest

(2) GLM suggest this may be exaggerated

- (a) these new parties are still marginal electorally
- (b) parliamentary and/or electoral necessity implies increasing association of the “new” lefts & rights with “old” ones
- (3) Conclusion: “Realignment” is very limited, some new dimensions in a still-recognizable left-right divide. Great electoral stability remains across left-right blocks; instability is within blocks.
- b. **Dealignment:** non-partisan allegiances & no allegiances. Supposed evidence: (a) declining party identification, (b) rise of new parties & party-system fractionalization, & (c) increased electoral volatility. All of which are questionable.

**III. Dalton, Russell J. “Political Cleavages, Issues, & Electoral Change,” in LeDuc, Niemi, & Norris, Comparing Democracies, Sage (1996), & Citizen Politics, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., ch. 7-8, Chatham House (1996).**

**A. Broad Theme:**

- 1. Two prominent changes in link from socioeconomic structure to voting behavior
  - a. Traditional cleavages (esp. class & religion) transformed & weakened as predictors of individuals’ electoral choices
  - b. Changing bases of ideological conflict: the rise of “post-materialism”
- 2. These producing general rise in “issue-based” voting
  - a. Less based on socially pre-determined & structured competition
  - b. A new calculus of electoral decisions
    - (1) Individualistic
    - (2) Varying issue positions & weights thereupon

**B. The post-war era through late 60s to 70s**

1. Party competition & voting patterns structured around social divisions within a polity
  - a. Review Lipset & Rokkan's "Diachronic" Model & the Social-Cleavage/Party-System "Freezing" Hypothesis
  - b. **Expected to persist because...**
    - (1) Such cleavage structures long-lasting: underlying conflicts persist & grps developed collective ID
    - (2) Universal suffrage largely completed: new parties tend to form (only) when new grps enter electorate
    - (3) Political rules made by & so favor estab'd parties
    - (4) Established party strategies: often try to isolate their supporters from outside appeals
    - (5) Alignment with underlying social-structural groups advantageous to parties & voters [*How? See below.*]
  - c. Why were these divisions so potent?
    - (1) Represented & (re-)produced deep ideological divisions
      - (a) Class: conflict over nature of politics & economics, over very organization of society
      - (b) Religion: basic value-systems (right & wrong) in conflict
    - (2) Social groups enabled parties to institutionalize a basis for support
      - (a) Labor unions & firms provided organizational & people support
      - (b) Ditto for churches
2. **What does(reputation for) alignment of parties with social-structural groups do for voters & parties?**
  - a. The groups so divided provided a social & political reference & source of info for their members (voters)
  - b. They provide organizational structure, people, & political ally for parties

C. General decline in sociologically determined vote [n.b., see fig. pp. 172, 183-4, usually said post-1968 or so, but seems pretty much uniform since the war to me]

1. Simple Class-Voting Decline

a. **Define class voting:**

b. Blue/White collar divide appears to be decreasingly relevant as a predictor of party vote

c. **Explanations for specifically this cleavage decline:**

(1) Class division better defined by degree of job autonomy & authority

(2) Rise of the middle class “salariat” & affluent blue-collar worker

(3) Educational divide: skilled v. unskilled labor, human-capital rich v. poor

(4) Broad sectoral: public v. private; traded v. non; service v. industry v. agriculture

(5) Life-style differences: industrial v. yuppie

d. Even so, general decline in ability of such socio-economic status indicators to predict vote choices

2. Religious Voting “Decline”

a. **Define religious voting, two types:**

(1) Denominational voting

(2) Religious v. secular

b. **Explanations for specifically this cleavage decline:**

(1) Secularization

(a) Decreasing church memberships & attendance

(b) Ethical individuality—e.g. US Catholic Church

(2) Church/state, secular/relig conflict largely resolved

c. N.b.,



- (1) other structural voting, esp. religious/secular, seems to have persisted to much greater degree than has class voting
- (2) Dalton's broader claim of falling structural voting rests more solidly therefore on fact that divisions of relevance to declining proportion of population

### 3. Other Key Social Divisions

#### a. Region

- (1) Occasional, dramatic flare-ups
- (2) Still, some general fall in region's predictive power

#### b. Urban/Rural & Center/Periphery

- (1) Differences diminishing due to transport & communications revolutions
- (2) But still-present agricultural-industry-service divide

#### c. Race/Ethnicity

- (1) Prominent exception to general declining relevance of socioeconomic structure to one's vote-choice
- (2) Many societies are still homogeneous or nearly so, less relevant there obviously

## D. **General explanations (hypotheses) for decline of socioeconomic structure as predictor of vote choice**

### 1. Underlying conflicts have increasingly been resolved

- a. Nieuwbeerta (1995) finds that strength of class voting declines in the size of the welfare state
- b. [Note: this would also explain persistence of race-ethnicity & relative decline of other cleavages]
- c. Dalton dismisses this, though, noting:
  - (1) Periodic recessions bring economic issues back to front [doesn't this weaken his other claims?]
  - (2) Persisting poverty, homelessness [yes, but do these segments

of the population vote? It varies.]

- (3) Crime [not exactly clear to me how this fits with any of the above cleavages *per se*]
  - (4) Large differences remain on abortion, homosexual rights, & other “moral issues” [yes, but it’s exactly in this that religious/secular divide persists]
- d. [As is clear from my comments here, I think the case for “relative resolution of underlying conflicts” argument could be made more strongly. **Notice that deg. to which underlying conflicts “resolved” might explain relative decline of some types of struct voting & relative persistence or rise of others**]
2. Parties have broadened or have sought to broaden their appeals across cleavage lines
- a. Some evidence of platform convergence on broad socio-economic issues [e.g., industrial nationalization], but recently evidence indicates a reversal of that trend: increasingly polarized politics. Perhaps, the polarization is diminishing again? (Pragmatic left winning in US, UK, France, Germany?) Remains to be seen.
  - b. Dalton notes that voters, party leaders, & “political experts” still perceive large and/or clear partisan differences which would imply...
    - (1) ...that it’s not that voters don’t perceive or are unclear about partisan differences, nor that parties no longer express such differences, but rather...
    - (2) ...that the socio-economic status of the voter serves less as a determinant of how the voter will interpret & react to the different signals sent by parties & received by voters.
3. **Dalton’s preferred explanation** emphasizes structural & institutional changes that have produced a declining relevance of relatively fixed social characteristics for

contemporary electoral politics

- a. These social cleavages still very relevant to those deeply enmeshed in them, but that's fewer & fewer.
- b. Increasing proportion of population characterized by:
  - (1) "Fragmentation of life spaces" [Huh? Define]
  - (2) Less participation, membership, or involvement in "stable & bounded social structures" [?]
  - (3) Lifestyles becoming increasingly individualized & diverse [?]
- c. **[How about social fluidity & individual mobility across structured divides? Notice how this explains relative decline of class & less decline in religion & no decline in race/ethnicity.]**
- d. Dalton acknowledges that parties have contributed to & reinforced all this:
  - (1) By seeking to accommodate these changes in structure & institutions within the existing party structure they have eroded their core, established images/reputations
  - (2) But they do not wish to commit yet to any strong stand on the new issues.

## E. New Bases of Political Cleavages, *i.e.* Post-Materialism

### 1. Define/Examples of "Post-Materialism":

### 2. How did/do they arise?

- a. The rise of new issues benefitted from the decline of old ones: the "open space" argument
- b. *Vice versa*, the new issues cut across old divides, weakening their ability to divide: the "emergence of cross-cutting issues" argument
- c. Meanwhile, citizens everywhere have increasingly demanded more opportunities to participate more actively in policy-making: the general "further democratization of society &

- politics” argument
- d. Finally, notice that the new issues appeal exactly to those groups increasingly outside of traditional structured & institutionalized cleavages: young, new middle class, educated, non-religious, [others?]
  - e. [Other hypoths? esp. regarding environmentalism, are non-material problems increasing? affluence? education? cross-derivatives, i.e. implications of Maslow’s hierarchy?]
  - f. Before we proclaim “all new” divides, new cleavage patterns, though, we need to keep in mind:
    - (1) Not all of these issues are so terribly new, even if perhaps their current prominence might be unprecedented.
    - (2) Compared to the structured ideologies underlying class & religious cleavages, materialist vs. post-materialist framework (still) diffuse & imprecise: what beside their novelty links these concerns?

## **F. So what is the impact of all this change?**

1. **Decline in long-term partisan predispositions ==>**
  - a. Rise short-term factors like issues & image?
  - b. Rise performance-based voting, like econ voting?
  - c. Rise “candidate-centered” politics [define, *n.b.* US always more so perhaps? Why?]
  - d. Rise in “issue-voting”?
2. Issue-voting:
  - a. **Define Issue-Voting:**
  - b. Harder to study systematically because:
    - (1) Issues vary across elections & across individuals
    - (2) Multiplicity of issues at all times
  - c. Issues underlying old cleavages still around; new issues are

added thereto

3. Takes some time for, & its an uncertain process by which a new basis, for partisan competition can arise.
  - a. Grps must org to represent & mobilize interested.
  - b. Parties must establish positions, reputations, & images on those interests (in uncertain environ).
4. New Politics is orthogonal to old politics divides: Left v. Right, Religious v. Secular (or Cath. v. Prot. etc.)
  - a. The new divide is, maybe, sustainable society & libertarian values v. conservative social values & structured life choices.
  - b. **[Is this another dimension? or more like new manifestation or replacement of relig v. secular?]**