

Bashevkin, "Interest Groups & Social Movements," in LNN

- I. Organized groups:
 - A. At core of democratic debate:
 1. *Critics*: attacked as selfish & destructive of dem. process
 2. *Supporters*: celeb'd as crucial, constructive act's in proc.
 - B. Synonyms:
 1. Pressure grps, interest grp, lobby, & organized interest
 2. Social movement organization, social movement
 - C. Definitions:
 1. Interest Groups (IG's):
 - a. *B*: "what IG's & social movements share is a set of norms, beliefs, or values that keep the 'interest' intact. These shared orientations are glue binding together the group constituency, leading it to act as a coherent entity...collectivities that have as their basis a shared outlook, identity, or framework of reference" (135)
 - b. *Truman (1951)*: 'IG' refers to any group that, on basis of 1 or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes... (pp. 135-6)
 - c. *Wilson (1990)*: org's, sep. from govt though often in close partnership, which attempt to influence pub pol.
 2. Social Movements (SM's):
 - a. Bashevkin:
 - (1) Like IG's except "more pro-change, more challenging, *vis-à-vis* institutional status quo" (138)
 - (2) Protest groups that mobilize their adherents in more system-challenging ways than do IG's or parties
 - b. *Kitschelt*: social movements tend to follow experience of marginalization
 - c. *Blumer (1951)*: collective enterprise to establish new order of life, meaning a fundamental cultural shift that will either be pursued or opposed by SM adherents
 - d. *Bashevkin*: Less formal than interest grps, more heterogeneity of views typically within SM's than IG's (largely because former are typically broader)
 3. Substantive distinct's b/w party-IG-SM not always clear
- II. Interest Group Functions:
 - A. Social roles of IG's
 1. *Truman*: these [shared attitudes] afford participants frames of reference for interp. & eval. events & behave
 2. Like prtys, function as soc. networks as well as pol. org's
 - B. Electoral roles of IG's:
 1. Evaluate competing candidates
 2. Help fund candidates
 3. Mobilize voters
 - C. Policymaking roles of IG's
 1. Influence or pressure govt decision-makers, but not seek office (distinguishes them from parties)
 2. Provide information to policymakers
 - a. Where voters/citizens stand on issues
 - b. Information (possibly biased) about issue itself
 - D. *Wilson*: IG's provide institutional linkages b/w govt (state) & major sectors of society
- III. Substantive Q's regarding interest groups & movements

- A. Why some grps more diff. to org than others? **[Pap Top]**
1. Mem's Hetero/homo-geneity: SE homog & unity views
 2. Size of the groups (Olson) **[LoCA]**
 3. Coercion/suasion & Selective benefits (Olson)
- B. What explains difference in *means* employed by different groups with shared interests?
1. Means: Some form parties [Green parties]; Others IG's & lobbies [Sierra Club]; Others adopt "politics by other means" [Greenpeace]. **[Pap Top]**
 2. Hypotheses:
 - a. Bashevkin: groups form strategies based on their institutional & ideological settings **[Such as?]**
 - b. History? "diffusion of innovation"
 - c. Intensity of views?
 - d. Power config. of alternative & orthogonal views?
- C. What explains gen. ↑ # & importance of I.G.'s? **[Pap]**
1. Decline of parties [elaborate]
 2. Education & affluence => greater resources & abilities => lower relative cost to mobilize groups
 3. Advances in communications & transportation tech=> increased efficiency in organizing
- D. What explains variation across space & time in activities of I.G.'s? (differing uses of *Voice*?) **[Paper Topic]**
1. Change over time in US
 - a. Traditionally I.G.'s in US politics lobbied elected politicians in national & state capitals, ↑'ly they...
 - (1) Work in coalitions to lobby bureaucrats
 - (2) Present their arguments in court
 - (3) Go directly to pub *via* media interviews & ads
 - (4) Try to influence elections as well as traditional attempt to influence policy at legislative stage
 - b. What might explain these changing activities?
 - (1) Increasing professionalization of interest groups
 - (2) Societal changes? [Such as...]
 - (3) Voting-behavior changes?
 - (4) [Other ideas?]
 2. Why lobbying bureaucrats relatively more prevalent in FR than US? **[Generalize => Good Paper Topic]**
 - a. Differing nature of electoral competition?
 - b. Size of role of bureaucratic implementation on net effect of policy?
 - c. [Other ideas?]
- E. Social Movements more willing to use extra-pol., even illegal, means than IG's. Why? [tautological?] **[Pap?]**
1. Do mobilization needs of IG's & SM's differ?
 2. Does nature of IG's & SM's goal differ?
 3. Differing opp's to achieve their ends? [see Kitschelt's point above about SM's resulting from marginalization]
- F. What explains differing success of various grps of interests in achieving their ends? **[Paper Topic]**
1. *Tarrow (1983)*: brdth & flexblty grp's *tactical repertory*
 2. History, *e.g.*, novelty of SM's or IG's aims or tactics?
 3. Institutional differences in political process? [Such as...]
- IV. "Models" of Group Activity

- A. *Power-Elite Model*: Mills (1956), Hunter (1953)
1. Small elite, sometimes covert, controls govt, limiting opp's for "average" citizens' political participation
 2. How does such a minority dominate majority in a dem?
 - a. Size, homog, intrst unity of grps serve their coherence
 - b. Relative soc., pol., & econ. power of elites enables them to dominate uninformed, excluded masses
- B. *Pluralist Model*: Truman (1951), Dahl (1961)
1. Struggles among competing grps=essence dem pol; govt maj role=estab & mntn orderly rltns among them
 2. "*Vectors of pol. inputs*" image: multiple (vector) forces push govt; resultant (vector) of those forces=>policy
 3. Multiple points of access for diverse interests => group participation in public policymaking is virtually assured
 4. What explains ° to which alter. collective demands met?
 - a. Emphasis on (relative) internal group characteristics, especially organizational resources.
 - (1) S-E status, media access or control, education, & skill of group leaders
 - (2) Internal organizational cohesion
 - (3) Strategic social position (in political issue-space rel. to other I.G.'s)
 - b. Later work discerns **4 key variables determining policy success of a group**
 - (1) *Group Resources*: financial & human resources positively related to policy influence
 - (2) *Group Cohesion*: organizational control, unity, & discipline positively related to influence
 - (3) *Leadership Expertise*: policy & administrative knowledge always helps
 - (4) *Grp Representativeness*: favorable strategic position & /or comprehensive grp standing in policy domain
 - c. **Basic Argument/Assumption Pluralist Model**: open, fair competition naturally favors groups w/ highest net "score" on these factors
- C. *Plur. Critics*: Schattschneider; Bachrach & Baratz
1. Non-decisions & agenda setting
 2. Govt & bureauc interested, ≠neutral, actors in process
 3. Insiders v. Outsiders: some groups excluded
 4. Basically reject image of govt as neutral arena in which grp interests fairly compete & policies neutrally emerge.
- D. *State- & Institution-Centric* (Katzenstein; Krasner; Evans; Skocpol): **3 key vars: state prefs, capacity, & auton**
1. Policymakers can & do develop **preferences** that differ from those of constituent groups
 2. Relative degree of **autonomy** of state from societal groups determines degree to which they may differ
 3. **Capacity** ≡ ability of bureaucratic state to execute its actions & so logically depends on ability to concentrate, coordinate, & exploit govtal resources
- E. *Corporatist Model*: (Schmitter, Lijphart)
1. "“system of interest rep in which constituent units org'd into limited # singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered & functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (sometimes created) by state & granted deliberate representational monop. w/in respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls leader selection, demand articulation, & [supporting activities]’ Schmitter (1979)” (149).

2. Core Characteristics:
 - a. IG's operate as integral parts of, rather than external influences on, govt activity
 - b. State at apex of corp sys, org's a hierarchy w/in which interests operate regarding govt & other interests
3. Important Aspects:
 - a. Incorporation of insider groups (with perhaps some exclusion implied) so that favored groups play a structured & significant role in policymaking
 - b. Competition among grps much more limited than in pluralist sys; state's role is more assertive & sustained
4. [Ex.: *Tri-Partite Barg*: Govt–uni. lab–uni. employer]
5. Contrast “liberal” or “societal” corporatism from “state” corporatism [“from below” v. “from above”]

F. All actual country-times could be characterized to some degree by each of these models of politics, but...

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| 1. US most nearly pluralist? | 4. Jap hybrid statist & corp? |
| 2. Britain bit more statist? | 5. Germ more purely corp? |
| 3. France lot more statist? | 6. Swe & Austria most corp |

V. Empirical “Findings”

- A. Bashevkin claims that business groups generally most influential in most systems
 1. Note the difficulty of establishing any such claim
 2. [If business groups most influential, why are they among the most critical of govt policies?]
- B. Most of work confirms importance of internal characteristics of grps to their success
- C. Most also find “political opportunity structure”—attitudinal or institutional environ w/in which groups operate—are key to strategies, success, etc. Thus, influence rests on combination of internal assets & external situation [a pretty banal conclusion at this level of generality]
- D. Groups adapt rapidly to their institutional circumstances: they seem to go where it matters in their system (e.g., Congress then courts in the US), subject to their abilities to go there. **[Paper Topic]**
- E. Evidence from transitional democracies indicates that democratic group competition does not emerge simply from establishment of rules allowing it
 1. Pre-transition traditions are key
 2. Pre-transition group organization also central

VI. Discussion: How could we evaluate common claim that “special interests” as opposed to avg citizens & /or their elected representatives hold power?

VII.