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# Sybil Detection Using Latent Network Structure

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


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# Sybil Attack

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

- An **attack** to compromise a recommendation systems by forging identities.



# Recommendation System

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

How is that restaurant?



# Sybil Can Manipulate the Opinion

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How is that restaurant?



# Activities and Profile Characteristics

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- Pros
  - Proliferating signals to exploit
  - Practical benefits
- Cons
  - Cat and mouse game



# Structure of the Social Network

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

- Pros
  - Expensive signal to forge
- Cons
  - Stringent conditions



# Assumptions on Network Topology

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- Assuming distinct ability
  - **Honest nodes**: Well-mixed networks
  - **Sybil**: Limited connection to the honest
- Empirical results [Alvisi 2013]
  - Social networks don't have fast mixing time
  - Sybil are accepted as friends much higher than anticipated



# Alternative Assumptions

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## Previous Assumptions

- **Honest nodes:**
  - Well-mixed networks
- **Sybil:**
  - Limited connection to the honest

## Goal

- Recover all honest agents

## Our Assumptions

- **Honest nodes:**
  - 'locally' dense in low dimensional space
- **Sybil:**
  - relax to constant fraction of honest agent would be compromisable

## Goal

- **core space:** a **whitelist** of nodes
-



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# Low Dimensional Latent Metric Space

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- Intuition
    - Metrics space encodes the **similarity** between agents
  - Well-regarded network models
    - Watts-Strogatz model: **ring**
    - Kleinberg's small world model: **lattices**
    - Low distortion multiplex social network [Abraham2013]
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# Our Low Dimensional Assumptions

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- Dimensionality
    - Graph with pairwise distance
    - Requiring low **doubling dimension** having  $\mathbb{R}^d$  as special cases
  - Density
    - Every local region contains a random graph
    - Only require of constant fraction of nodes
  - **How realistic are our assumptions**
-


# Experiment Setups

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- Dataset Description
    - Facebook
    - Twitter
    - Wiki-vote
    - Epinion
  - Implementation
    - Use Spectrum embedding
    - Compute the core space
-


# Core Space in Facebook

- Graph properties
  - 4,039 nodes, 88,234 edges
  - Average degree 21.8
- Core space
  - Density  $> 10$
  - Connect to  $p$  fraction of nearby nodes



# Core Space in Twitter

- Graph properties
  - 81,306 nodes, 1,768,149 edges
  - Average degree 21,75
- Core space
  - Density  $> 10$
  - Connect to  $p$  fraction of nearby nodes



# Alternative Assumptions

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- core space: a **whitelist** of nodes
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# Compromisable Agents

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- Idea
    - Someone might accept all the friend requests
  - Honest nodes
    - Most of the nodes are **trustworthy**
    - A random portion of nodes are **compromisable**
  - Sybils
    - Cannot connect to **trustworthy** nodes
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# Assumptions Summary

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
Assumptions	Social network	Sybils
Previous Works	Well-mixed	Bounded connection to honest nodes
Our Work	Locally dense in low-dimensional space	Only connection to <b>compromisable</b> nodes

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# Detection Game

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
- Original Graph



# Detection Game

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
- Reveal the **trustworthy** and **compromisable** nodes



# Detection Game

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
- Adversary try to add **Sybil** nodes into the networks



# Detection Game

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
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# Detection Game

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
- Detection algorithm return a **whitelist**



# Detection Game

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- Detection algorithm return a **whitelist**



# Theorem

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
- If the total number of **Sybil nodes** and **Compromisable nodes** is smaller than some constant fraction the honest nodes, and the graph can be imbedded into locally dense low dimensional space, in the **detection game** for any adversary the **detection algorithm** can return a large whitelist without any Sybil
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# A Toy Model

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
- Network of honest nodes
  - 1 dimensional unit circle
  - $n$  nodes uniformly placed
  - Well-connected within distance  $\frac{1}{\log n}$
- Limitation of Sybils
  - Connects to **Sybil** or **compromisable** node
  - #Sybil =  $O(n)$ , #the Compromisable =  $O(n)$



# A Toy Model

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
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
# What can Sybil do?

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Connect to the compromisable




Form its own network




# What should detection algorithm do?

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Remove non-local edges



Remove low degree nodes



# Future Work

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- Can we do better if we have information of compromisable nodes?
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