“Causal Distribution: The Logic of Counterfactuals Reflected in the Logic of Causation”
(Email me for a recent draft.)
“The Application of Constraint Semantics to the Language of Subjective Uncertainty”
Forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophical Logic.
(Email me for a recent version.)
“Ordering Supervaluationism, Counterpart Theory, and Ersatz
Forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophy.
“Conditional Excluded Middle without the Limit Assumption”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 85, no. 2 (2012): 301–321. DOI: 10.1111/ j.1933-1592.2011.00507.x
“The Language of Causation”
In Delia Graff Fara and Gillian Russell (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 716–728. London: Routledge, 2012.
In Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von Heusinger, and Paul Portner (eds.), Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning, vol. 2, 1538–1561. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2012.
“On the Treatment of Incomparability in Ordering Semantics and Premise
Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 40, no. 6 (2011): 693–713. DOI: 10.1007/s10992-010-9157-z
“How Not to Theorize about the Language of Subjective
In Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality, 249–269. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
“Lessons from the Context Sensitivity of
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 107, no. 5 (2010): 221–242.
“Structurally Defined Alternatives and Lexicalizations of XOR”
Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 1 (2010): 31–36. DOI: 10.1007/s10988-010-9074-1
“On Scope Relations between Quantifiers and Epistemic Modals”
Journal of Semantics, vol. 27, no. 4 (2010): 529–540. DOI: 10.1093/jos/ffq010
Philosophy Compass, vol. 3, no. 6 (2008): 1193–1207. DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991 .2008. 00177.x
I've changed my mind about some things discussed in this article. On weak modals, and on the limit assumption, see “On the Treatment of Incomparability in Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics” (above); on the force associated with modals see “Imperative Force in the English Modal System” (in preparation).
on Gibbard's ‘Rational Credence and the Value of Truth’”
Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 2 (2007): 179–189.
My dissertation (MIT, 2006). This contains (very) early versions of material in “Propositional Attitudes,” “How Not to Theorize about the Language of Subjective Uncertainty,” “Lessons from the Context Sensitivity of Causal Talk,” and the constraint semantics papers and presentations.
“Constraint Semantics and the Language of Subjective Uncertainty” (handout and slides)
Presented at the Chambers Philosophy Conference on Epistemic Modals at University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 16 April 2010.