Philosophy 315: Ethics of War and Peace             Professor Elias Baumgarten

      Challenges to Ethics

A central theme for Walzer is that moral judgments are possible; in particular, moral judgments are possible even about war and conduct in war. Walzer is therefore defending what might be called the “standard” view of ethics against challenges to it, such as the challenge of “realism” in chapter 1.

The “standard” view defined

There are criteria of right action that apply to all persons at all times in all places. These criteria can be justified rationally. Ethical criteria must adopt a purely impartial point of view, treating all persons equally. They spell out, in philosophical terms, the spirit behind such imperatives as the Golden Rule and “love thy neighbor as thyself” where “neighbor” includes any other person.

 

Both utilitarianism (consequentialism) and formalism (nonconsequentialism, rule-based ethics, rights-oriented ethics) fall within this “standard” view.

 

·     If a rule-based theory adopts a rule that includes exceptions as part of the rule, the theory is still being applied universally to all times and places. For instance, the rule “it is permissible to kill old people only in a society with scarce resources” would be considered correct everywhere even though it would not “take effect” in societies with abundant resources

·     Utilitarianism may judge it to be a person's duty to “sacrifice” the happiness of one person to benefit many others, but this still considers all persons equally because the effect on all persons must be considered in determining which act is the right one. A person's welfare may be sacrificed only it is outweighed by a greater amount of welfare for other people.

Challenges

Emotivism. All ethical claims are just expressions of emotion. Saying "torture is immoral" really means "I have negative feelings about torture." Thus reasoned argument does not have the same place in ethical inquiry that it is traditionally thought to have. (One could perhaps only talk about the consistency of one's emotions.)

Normative ethical relativism. There are ethical truths, but they do not apply universally to all times and places. What is true ethically depends upon (is “relative to”) the culture one lives in. What is ethically right is simply what is believed to be ethically right, and, as a factual matter, this differs fundamentally from one culture to another. [Walzer denies this factual claim, as it applies to issues of war and peace. Even if it were true that cultures disagree, Walzer might still deny that what is ethically right depends upon what is believed to be ethically right. Even if cultures disagree fundamentally on ethical issues of war and peace, one might argue that some cultures are right and others are wrong based on whether they have good reasoning to support their view.]

 

Ethical egoism. There is one universal ethical truth, and that is to do those actions that will benefit oneself. No one else needs to be considered, though one does need to consider one's own long-term interests. Thus it may be right to help others if (but only if) doing so will bring something good or avoid something bad for oneself.

     Group egoism is the ethical position that one's only moral obligation is to benefit one's own group. This is a relatively new term. It would include the claim that one's only obligation in pursuing foreign policy is to benefit one's own country; that is, to consider only the “national interest.” Like ethical egoism, it denies the traditional, purely impartial ethical point of view.

     Psychological egoism is not an ethical claim at all but a descriptive claim that persons always, as a law of human nature, act only in what they judge to be their own interests. Some think that if this is true, then ethical egoism is the only possible ethical theory (because someone cannot have a moral obligation to do something that is impossible for her to do).

 

Partialism. (A more subtle challenge.) One must consider not just oneself and one's group but all persons, but one can give priority to oneself and/or one's group; one need not be totally impartial.

Moral realism

Moral realism, as Walzer describes it through Thucydides and Hobbes, seems to apply both ethical egoism and psychological egoism to groups like “states.” It seems to involve two claims: (1) the descriptive claim that nations, as a basic law, always follow their own interests: the law of force, without moral restraints, governs international affairs; (2) the normative claim that nations have no obligation to act in any way other than to pursue their own interests using the law of force.

 

Moral realism would explain diplomatic efforts and appeals to morality as attempts to influence public opinion in ways that will be to a nation's advantage. On this view, a nation might abide by a so-called “moral law” not out of genuine ethical concern but only because it does not have the power to overcome the adverse effect of offending world opinion. But according to the moral realist, moral restraints do not have inherent value. There is no reason to let moral consider­ations (e.g., “this action would result in the death of many innocent civilians”) restrain a nation from acting in a way that would be in that nation's own genuine long-term interest.

 

Moral realism could be part of a general skepticism about ethics. But it could also involve a third claim, which implies an acceptance of traditional ethics in areas outside international relations (or perhaps outside war). That claim would be that international relations (or maybe only war) forms a “realm apart” where ethical norms are not applicable, though they are applicable in many other areas (like personal relations within a society). This view can be an outgrowth of ethical relativism. The claim would be that ethical standards must be culturally based, so there is no way to apply ethics to relations between cultures (or states).