Rules in War:
Study Guide to Walzer, Chapters 8-9

 

 

Aside from the question of which wars are just, moral principles dictate certain restrictions in the way a war is fought. We might (for the present) assume that refraining from waging unjust wars is the business of policy makers and focus now on the conduct of war, which is the responsi­bility of soldiers.

 

If the business of war is to win (partly to restore peace and end the bloodshed), why should there be any restrictions on the conduct of war? A moral realist, of course, would say that there are no ethical restrictions, only prudential (self-interested) ones. But Walzer discusses several approaches to moral restric­tions on the conduct of war.

 

 

Sidgwick on Utility and Proportionality

 

In order for an act to be morally permissible in war, it must (a) be useful toward the end of winning the war, and (b) the harm done must not be out of proportion to the good achieved. These are basically utilitarian criteria, a weighing of the good against the bad consequences. Forbidden is excessive harm, but there are no rules absoluting prohibiting certain forms of behavior (torture, terrorism, biological weapons, etc.) so long they meet these utilitarian conditions.

 

Walzer finds this inadequate, though other standards (discussed below) will include this requirement and add others to it. According to Walzer some nearly absolute restrictions are needed. There are some good utilitarian reasons for adopting rules in war (not just Sidgwick's utilitarian approach)‑-see pp. 131-132‑-but Walzer claims that to know which rules are appropriate, we need a theory of rights.

 

 

The Doctrine of Double Effect

 

Central to the "war convention" (the agreed-to conventions about war, from which Walzer discerns some coherent moral principles) is the distinction between combatants and noncomba­tants. Combat­ants are subject to attack; noncombatants are not. But there are often acts in war that endanger civilians, and the question is whether and when it is morally permissible to kill many noncomba­tants to achieve a military objective.

 

The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) permits an act likely to have evil consequences if it meets four conditions. (See page 153.) One condition is like Sidgwick's "proportionality" requirement. The most important additional condition is that the intention of the person acting must be only the good effect, not the bad effect (which is also expected). For example, if one attacks a military target and expects that some civilians will also be killed, DDE requires that one's intention be only to kill combat­ants. The killing of civilians is an expected but unintended side (or secondary or "double") effect.

 

This doctrine would prohibit bombing a city with the intent to kill civilians to demoralize the enemy. It would permit bombing military targets, knowing that civilians will also get killed.

 

What if one has a choice: to bomb military targets and subject many civilians to danger or to take another, more focused action that would endanger fewer civilians but at greater risk to one's own soliders? Nothing in DDE requires the second action, but Walzer thinks this is a flaw in DDE.

 

 

Walzer's Revision of the Doctrine of Double Effect

 

Walzer proposes a revision in DDE to require not simply not to intend the deaths of civilians but also to require that one subject one's own soldiers to greater risks when necessary to minimize the expected (even if unintended) deaths of civilians.

 

This is in addition to the proportionality rule. That one kill no more people than necessary to achieve an end and that one weigh the number of deaths against the importance of an end is an obligation one owes even to enemy soldiers. (This follows from the moral equality of soldiers.) But with civilians the obligation is much greaterIt is soldiers who, through their fighting, put civilians at risk. It is the obligation of genuine soldiers (as opposed to mere killers) to minimize that risk, even if doing so requires taking on greater risks to themselves. The Richards case (p. 152) illustrates this very well.

 

Walzer does place a limit on how much risk soldiers need to take upon themselves. The limit of risk soldiers must taken upon themselves seems to be the point where further risk-taking would make the military venture impossible or too costly to be repeated. (p. 157). Presumably this is with respect only to military ventures that are truly crucial. If the military objective were not so significant, the operation that would result in many civilian deaths would have to be abandoned. This would be the case even under Sidgwick's proportionality rule. Sometimes Walzer's requirement to minimize deaths can be met, but it will be the proportionality rule that will prevent a military operation. (See footnote, p. 156.) Walzer seems to think that more often the proportionality rule would allow an operation that kills civilians, but it will be his rule to take “due care” to minimize risks that will prevent the operation.