Jul 10, 2012 Filed in: News
For the 2012–2013 school year, I am visiting Microsoft Research New England
. I’m looking forward to lots of productive interactions with the permanent researchers, postdocs, and other visitors!
Apr 01, 2008 Filed in: Publications
Published in the European Economic Review, 52(3):387–412, April 2008
Abstract: This paper proposes a theoretical framework for studying the invention of new products when demand is uncertain. In this framework, under general conditions, the threat of ex post entry by a competitor can deter invention ex ante. Asymmetric market power in the ex post market exacerbates the problem. The implications of these general results are examined in a series of examples that represent important markets in the computer industry. The first is a model that shows how an operating system monopolist, by its mere presence, can deter the invention of complements, to its own detriment as well as that of society. The implications of policies such as patent protection, price regulation, and mandatory divestiture are considered. Three additional examples consider the ability of a monopolist in one market to commit to bundling an unrelated product, a pair of horizontally differentiated firms that can add a new feature to their products, and a platform leader that can be challenged in its base market by the supplier of a complementary product.
Published article (ScienceDirect subscribers only)
Working paper 8/24/2006 (older version but freely distributable)