Theological Predication: Duns Scotus, Univocity, and Knowledge

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Abstract

One important question about theological language is whether predicates for divine perfections are univocal with ordinary predicates, or whether they have different but analogically related meanings. The debate over this question, both in contemporary and historical settings, has focused on whether each view is compatible with the truth of theological predications. But securing theological truth should be little consolation to a theory of theological language, if that theory is incompatible with knowledge of the relevant truths. In this paper I outline Duns Scotus’s introduction of epistemological considerations of this kind in the Middle Ages, which he held to favor of the univocal view. Then I argue that similar epistemological considerations also tell against the theory of theological language more recently advanced by William Alston.

A central question in philosophical theology concerns whether we can speak both truly and univocally about God. Our theological language is univocal just in case it has the same meaning as our ordinary non-theological language. But, given some common assumptions about the metaphysics of God—which I will outline in more detail below—there are straightforward arguments that no univocal predication to God can be true.

The central competitor to a univocal view of theological language and belief is the analogical view, on which the meanings of predicates in theological statements are analogically related to, but not identical with, their meanings in non-theological statements. Aquinas’s arguments for the analogical view in Summa Theologica 1a A.13 Q.1-12 focus on analogical predication being necessary for theological truths, since univocal predicates cannot be used to state theological truths. Rejoinders from friends of univocity then focus on establishing the bare possibility of univocal true predications.

But the mere possibility of saying or believing something true about God—with either univocal or analogical language—should not satisfy us. True beliefs

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1Another alternative might be the negative view, on which the only theological statements which have the logical form of a negation can be true. I will not explore this view much in what follows.

2These include Alston (1985, 1993), and Wolterstorff (2005).
might fall short of knowledge. Thus it is insufficient for a defense of univocity to show merely that true belief and assertion is possible. If these truths are not knowable, then unwelcome theological skepticism will follow. Likewise, a retreat to the analogical view will be pointless if analogical truths cannot be known.

This point is not original. In *Ordinatio* I.3, Duns Scotus enters the debate over theological predication by introducing explicitly epistemological terms, and wielding them against his contemporary Henry of Ghent, who was a proponent of a version of the analogical view. For Scotus, univocity is necessary for theological knowledge, because our reasoning with analogical terms must involve equivocations. The meanings of ordinary and theological terms are technically distinct on the analogical view. Thus any piece of reasoning to theological truths must involve an equivocation. Even if theological reasoning produces true beliefs, these beliefs will not be knowledge since they are held on the basis of invalid deductions.

I will explore Scotus’s arguments in greater depth in Section 1. Although I am not primarily concerned to engage in pure exegesis of Scotus’s views, his arguments are of intrinsic interest, and raise some interesting connections between epistemology, language, and metaphysics. So I focus in the opening section on some of the nuances of Scotus’s work to bring epistemic notions to bear on the debate about divine language. Sections 2 and 3 apply epistemological considerations to recent debates in Anglophone philosophy of religion. I will focus on a recent univocal account from William Alston which, I will argue, suffers from the same problems that best the analogical view: while it makes room for true theological predications, it precludes the possibility of theological knowledge. The considerations Scotus brought to bear against the analogical theory in Scholastic debates over theological language also serve as crucial benchmarks for any contemporary discussion of the issue.

Before beginning, a few preliminary notes are in order. While I will assume a background of the traditional debate between univocal and analogical views about theological language, I will not do much to spell out the nuances of analogical views. This is partly for considerations of space, and partly to emphasize what I take the primary contribution from Scotus to be, namely the connection between univocity and knowledge. Thus for instance I will not focus on the types of analogy found in Aquinas. Nor will I focus on his distinction between analogy in the thing signified by a term/concept (*res significata*) and the way in which it is signified (*modus significandi*). This does not mean that I take these issues to be unimportant, or irrelevant to the issues at hand.

Here is a second preliminary clarification: in drawing connections between Scotus’s arguments and contemporary work on divine predication, I will remain

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3 For this reason I will focus only on Scotus’s comments on univocity in his *Ordinatio*, and will not discuss his views in his *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*. See Pini (2005) for more on the relationship between these texts, and Marrone (1983) on the latter.

4 *ST* 1a A.13 Q.5.

5 *ST* 1a A.13 Q.3; see also Alston (1985: 161).
somewhat, though not entirely, neutral on controversial matters in epistemology. In particular, I will rely on the assumption that beliefs amount to knowledge when they are free from the risk of being false beliefs, in an appropriate sense.

This is not a view Scotus advocates. Nor is it free from controversy in contemporary epistemology. But it captures an important idea, which matters a great deal for Scotus, and for any attempt to connect a theory of divine predication to the possibility of knowledge: this is the idea that deduction via a logically valid inference is a means of extending one’s knowledge. In focusing on this feature of knowledge, we won’t need to delve into the finer workings of the analogical theory. As we will see, Scotus’s arguments proceed precisely by exploiting the fact that inferences about divine perfections are not strictly speaking valid, and so they do not extend our theological knowledge.

Finally, following Scotus and his medieval interlocutors, I will be concerned only with one kind of theological knowledge. This is what we can call natural knowledge of God, namely knowledge of God’s perfections arrived at on the basis of our prior knowledge of things in the natural (i.e., non-supernatural) world. It may well be that there are other routes to theological knowledge, for instance knowledge arrived at via supernatural illumination. The question here will be only whether some approaches to divine predication should be rejected on the grounds that they make natural knowledge of God unavailable to us.

1 Scotus on univocity and knowledge

Scotus’s discussion of predication of perfections to God begins in the context of a question concerning our knowledge of God. He says:

I ask first whether it is possible to know God. And I ask first: whether the intellect of man in this life is able to know God naturally.⁶

It is in the process of giving Scotus’s own answer to this question that we get Scotus’s arguments for the univocity of theological language. In the broadest possible outlines, Scotus’s view is that the answer to this question is affirmative—we can have knowledge of God naturally—and that this is only possible if our concepts through which we know things about God are univocal with concepts through which we know ordinary (i.e., natural) things.

This sketch needs to be filled out in many ways. I will mention only a few aspects of the broader picture.

1.1 The analogical theory: Aquinas and Henry of Ghent

An analogical view of divine predications is not lacking for motivations. God is different from ordinary creatures in a number of ways. Central to the Thomistic view about the metaphysics of God are the claims that God is infinite and, in

⁶Ordinatio I.3.1.1
addition, absolutely simple.\textsuperscript{7} This means (very roughly) that God’s perfections—
wisdom, goodness, knowledge, and the like—are not distinct from God’s essence,
and are not distinct from each other. God is thus metaphysically very different
from an ordinary object, which can have distinct features: color- and shape-
properties, for instance, are typically independent of each other and from the
objects that instantiate them. An object that is green an circular might have been
red and circular instead. Wisdom and goodness in God, on the Thomistic view,
are not like this since they are not distinct from each other—there is no world
where God is good but not wise, for instance.

For present purposes this brief summary Aquinas’s understanding of the
metaphysics of divine perfections makes clear that it is part of an inconsistent
triad, where the additional claims concern the mental or linguistic representations
of these perfections:

**Simplicity** God is simple.

**Truth** Predications of perfections (wisdom, goodness, etc.) to God and creatures
are true.

**Univocity** Predications of perfections to God mean the same thing (involve the
same concept) as predications of perfections to creatures.

Since Simplicity implies that God’s perfections are not differentiated, any true
thought or sentence that ascribes wisdom to God must ascribe all perfections to
God, otherwise it would misrepresent God, and hence be false. So Simplicity
is compatible with Truth. But it has substantial consequences for the way in
which the relevant predications are true. Humans can also be wise, but their
wisdom is differentiated from other perfections: someone might be wise but not
have knowledge, and so on. Thus the concept that represents the truth that God
is wise, if predicated of a creature, fail to represent accurately. Simplicity and
Truth entail the negation of Univocity.\textsuperscript{8}

Scotus’s immediate target when arguing against the analogical view of divine
predications is his contemporary Henry of Ghent. Henry largely accepts the
Thomist position, and like Aquinas rejects Univocity in favor of an analogical
theory of predication. Divine perfections are not represented by the same concepts
that represent perfections in humans, according to Henry, but the concepts are
nonetheless similar in a way since they bear the relation of analogy to each other.\textsuperscript{9}

Henry adds a twist to the analogical theory: even though the concepts by
which we entertain perfections in God and humans are different, they appear to be
the same. So we are often not aware that we are applying distinct concepts to God

\textsuperscript{7}ST 1a Q.3 A.1-8

\textsuperscript{8}Nielsen (1976) attempts to argue that the analogical view is also incompatible with Truth. This is
not the criticism I will be pursuing here.

\textsuperscript{9}For more on the details of Henry’s view on the matter, see Dumont (1998: 298 ff.).
and humans when we predicate wisdom of each. In Scotus’s words, Henry’s view is that “because of the very closeness of the analogy, they seem to be one concept”.

This suggests a role for analogous concepts of divine perfections in theological reasoning. If two analogous concepts wisdom-concepts appear the same, then it is natural to suppose that we would reason as if they are the same. For example from the premises that wisdom in creatures is a perfection, and that God has all perfections, one would conclude on this basis that God has wisdom. Of course ‘wisdom’ in the first premise and the conclusion does not mean the same thing: by the doctrine of analogy, they are related but technically distinct concepts. Henry’s thesis about the appearance of identity in these concepts explains why we would nonetheless reach the true conclusion that God is wise.

1.2 Scotus on univocity

I will return below to the criticism Scotus levels against this view on epistemological grounds. But first it is worth laying the groundwork for this criticism by focusing on two aspects of Scotus’s own view: his characterization of univocity, and the role knowledge plays in his discussion.

First, univocity. Scotus explicitly defines what is required for univocal uses of a term:

And lest there be a dispute about the name “univocation”, I designate that concept univocal which possesses sufficient unity in itself, so that to affirm and deny it of one and the same thing would be a contradiction. It also has sufficient unity to serve as the middle term of a syllogism, so that wherever two extremes are united by a middle term that is one in this way, we may conclude to the union of the two extremes among themselves.

Here there are two tests for univocity: CONTRADICTION (if two uses of F are univocal then affirming F of a thing and denying F of the same thing is contradictory) and VALIDITY (if two uses of F are univocal then the syllogism all As are F; all Fs are B; therefore all As are B is valid). The two requirements are not redundant. Take CONTRADICTION: it is a contradiction to affirm the concept F of a thing and to deny the concept F ∨ G of the same thing. That F is not univocal with F ∨ G is only accounted for by the second test: the syllogism all As are Fs; all F ∨ Gs are B; therefore all As are B is invalid. So VALIDITY rules out some concepts as non-univocal which CONTRADICTION will not.

CONTRADICTION also rules out some concepts as equivocal that VALIDITY does not. The syllogism all As are F ∧ Gs ; all Fs are B; therefore all As are B is valid even

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11Ordinatio I.3.2.30; Wolter (1987: 21)
12Ordinatio I.3.2.26; Wolter (1987: 20)
though the concepts $F$ and $F \land G$ are not univocal. CONTRADICTION is needed for this, since affirming $F$ of a thing and denying $F \land G$ of the same thing is a not contradiction.

This characterization of univocity in logical terms is not accidentally related to the epistemological arguments Scotus brings to bear in favor of univocity. Logical deduction is a means to extending our knowledge. When we become aware of the logical consequences of what we already know, we acquire new knowledge when we believe the consequences on this basis. This idea is central to Scotus’s opening question of whether we can have natural knowledge of God. When he asks whether we are able “in this life to know God naturally”, it is precisely theological knowledge acquired on the basis of a deduction from our natural knowledge that Scotus is in. But, crucially for Scotus, only univocal concepts for divine perfections make this kind of deduction possible.

1.3 Scotus on knowledge

Before we turn to Scotus’s arguments on the relationship between univocity and knowledge, it is worth noting some nuances of his use of epistemic vocabulary. Wolter’s translation of the portion of the Ordinatio where Scotus discusses univocity translates Scotus’s use of multiple distinct Latin terms as ‘know’ or ‘knowledge’. The most common term is cognoscere, as Scotus says in stating his own opinion “I say that what we know (cognoscuntur) of God is known through intelligible species of creatures”.

But Scotus also uses the verb intelligere, when Scotus says “we cannot say that the sole purpose or reason for the intelligibility of these substances is that we may know (intelligentur) them”. He uses the noun cognitio, for instance when he says “a knowledge (cognitio) of the divine being as infinite is, however, more perfect than a knowledge of Him as simple”. And finally Scotus also uses concipere, where he says “I say that it is naturally possible to have not only a concept in which God is known (concipitur) incidentally”.

There are several dimensions along which we might interpret the various Latin expressions rendered as ‘knowledge’ in the Wolter translation. First there is the difference between propositional knowledge and what we can call personal knowledge.

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13Williamson (2000: 117); Hawthorne (2004: 33)
14Aquinas agrees that we have natural knowledge: see ST 1a Q.12 A.12. I will simply note, but do not wish to engage here, with the distinction between knowledge of God’s existence, and knowledge of God’s essence (ST 1a Q.12 A.4). See Wippel (2015: 585 ff.) for some discussion.
16Ordinatio I.3.2.64; Wolter (1987: 31). non est finis istarum substantiarum inquantum intelligibles sunt ut intelligentur ab intellectu nostro.
17Ordinatio I.3.2.60; Wolter (1987: 28). cognitio enim esse divini sub ratione infiniti est perfectior cognitione ejus sub ratione simplicitatis.
18Ordinatio I.3.2.25; Wolter (1987: 19). dico […] quod non tantum haberi potest conceptus naturaliter in quo quasi per accidens concipitur Deus.
knowledge.\textsuperscript{19} The former is expressed by English sentences of the form ‘S knows that p’: statements like ‘John knows that it is time for dinner’, or ‘Sally knows that arithmetic is incomplete’. With propositional knowledge-ascriptions, ‘knows’ is followed grammatically by a clause containing a complete sentence. Personal knowledge, by contrast, is expressed by English sentences of the form ‘S knows NP’, where NP is a noun phrase. Some examples are sentences like ‘Anne knows Mike’ or ‘Stephen knows the pope’.

There is then a question about whether it is propositional knowledge about God, or personal knowledge of God, that is Scotus’s primary concern (and, moreover, whether he is using different knowledge-terms to track the distinction between propositional and personal knowledge). This amounts to the issue of whether Scotus’s initial question is whether we can naturally know that God exists, God is wise, etc., or whether it is the question of whether we can know God personally.

Some passages suggest that—at least with some of these terms—Scotus is interested in personal knowledge of God. For instance immediately after translating concipere as ‘knows’ in the passage quoted above, Wolter in the same passage translates a second occurrence of the verb—conципiatur—as ‘is conceived’. Scotus has first affirmed that God can be known—or conceived “under the aspect of some attribute”, and he goes on to assert “but also one in which He is conceived (conципiatur) by Himself and quidditatively”.\textsuperscript{20} Thus if we treat concipere as picking out a relation to an entity that is conceived of, it is very natural to interpret Scotus as interested here in how we have personal knowledge of God. Some secondary texts treat this as the primary point of dispute for Scotus; for instance Dumont (1998) characterizes Scotus’s arguments in terms of our ability to grasp God.\textsuperscript{21}

There is also a case that Scotus’s concern is similar when he uses intelligere to talk about our cognitive grasp of God. Scotus appears to treat it as a relation to a being and not a proposition: when he says “we cannot say that the sole purpose or reason for the intelligibility of these substances is that we may know them”, he is talking about knowing substances, which are not proposition-like bearers of truth and falsity. Further in the same passage intellegibilis occurs, modifying nouns referring to substances.\textsuperscript{22} The translation as “intelligible”—and not “knowledge”—suggests that the crucial notion here is whether certain objects are intelligible to our minds; that is, whether we can have personal knowledge of them.

\textsuperscript{19}Benton (forthcoming)

\textsuperscript{20}Ordinatio I.3.2.25; Wolter (1987: 19). \textit{sed etiam aliquis conceptus in quo per se et quiddiative concipiatur Deus.}

\textsuperscript{21}“Scotus rejected Henry’s revised theory as unworkable and argued that only univocity could ensure a naturally attainable concept of the divine essence”. (Dumont (1998: 298))

Non-propositional knowledge is also plausibly a central issue in the context of debates over the univocity of \textit{being}, which Scotus also argued for. See Dumont (1987) for a thorough discussion of this issue. Also see Langston (1983) for more background on Scotus’s views on objectual/personal knowledge.

\textsuperscript{22}et ideo si hoc non conveniret eis, non propter hoc essent frustra intelligibiles.
The foregoing is just a sampling of some evidence that, at least in certain passages, Scotus is concerned with personal knowledge, or some similar cognitive relationship to God. But there are several considerations which support the conclusion that propositional knowledge is also a focus of Scotus’s epistemic contributions to debates over theological language, and possibly closer to the central area of concern.

Scotus treats some knowledge-terms as obeying structural principles that can only be associated with propositional knowledge. For instance when criticizing Henry’s doctrine of analogy he draws out the consequences of the view for all of our knowledge and says: “He [viz., a philosopher] could not be certain that it [e.g., fire, or water] was the first being, for then he would have been certain about something false, and what is false is not strictly knowable”\(^{23}\).

Here he is undoubtedly discussing propositional knowledge, since Scotus appeals to the factivity of the notion to make his point: it is false that fire (or water) is a first being, so one cannot know it, since one can only know what is true. Propositions, but not objects or beings, are true or false; propositional knowledge is the only candidate subject-matter here\(^{24}\).

Most instructive for our purposes is the connection between the kind of theological knowledge Scotus is interested in, and the notion of a demonstration. Scotus is concerned not only with whether knowledge of God is possible, but whether we can come to knowledge as an Infinite Being by means of a demonstration when he says: “With a demonstration of fact, the existence of an Infinite Being, or the fact that something has infinite being, is the last conclusion to be established. The more perfect, however, are the last to be established by a demonstration of fact which begins with creatures. For their very remoteness from creatures makes knowledge of them from creatures most difficult of attainment”\(^{25}\).

Scotus specifies that natural knowledge of God is knowledge arrived at via a demonstration from our knowledge of creatures. A demonstration, at minimum, will require premises that logically imply the conclusion of a syllogism. The conclusion that is known on the basis of a syllogism is a proposition; it would be a category mistake to hold that logical implication holds between mere entities.

\(^{23}\)Ordinatio I.3.2.29; Wolter (1987: 20). Non enim erat certus quod erat primum, quia tunc fuisse certus de falso, et falsum non est scibile. Here Scotus uses another knowledge-term, scibile, which appears nowhere else in nearby passages, but I will assume it is continuous with his use of other knowledge-terms.

\(^{24}\)We do sometimes about taking a “true vacation” or American cheese not being “true cheese”. In these expressions what is being claimed to be “true” or not is not a proposition but some kind of ordinary entity. But these constructions are plausibly not meant literally: someone who only vacations for a weekend at a nearby campsite might desire a “true vacation” but would not deny that the camping trip is a vacation, in the literal sense. Also these uses of ‘true’ are not connected with knowledge in the relevant ways; from the fact that American cheese is not “true cheese” it does not follow that we cannot know anything about it. Thanks to Jon McGinnis for discussion here.

of beings. Knowledge of the existence of an Infinite Being on the basis of a demonstration—for which Scotus uses the verb *cognoscere*—is propositional, and not personal knowledge.\(^{26}\)

That Scotus is interested in what can serve as the conclusion of a syllogism, and thereby has distinguishing features of propositional knowledge, is not accidental. Theological knowledge can only be held on the basis of a demonstration with naturally known premises and a theological conclusion. A demonstration, moreover, requires the premises to logically imply their conclusion. Scotus treats analogical terms as equivocal, since analogically related meanings are strictly not identical. So the perfection terms in any syllogism, if they are analogically related will not be able to serve as the middle term of a syllogism. Reasoning to theological conclusions via a valid syllogism—that is, use of a demonstration—is not available on the analogical view.

### 1.4 Epistemic arguments in Scotus

It is worth putting more detail on this sketch of Scotus’s views on the connection between univocity and knowledge by syllogistic reasoning. Scotus’s fourth argument for univocity runs as follows:

Every metaphysical inquiry about God proceeds in this fashion: the formal notion of something is considered; the imperfection associated with this notion in creatures is removed, and then, retaining the same formal notion, we ascribe to it the ultimate degree of perfection and then attribute it to God. Take, for example, the formal notion of “wisdom” or “intellect” or “will” […] Because this notion includes formally no imperfection nor limitation, the imperfections associated with it in creatures are removed. Retaining this same notion of “wisdom” and “will”, we attribute these to God—but in a most perfect degree.\(^{27}\)

This is an example of a type of syllogism that we might expect to produce knowledge of God’s perfections. Its major premise is the Anselmian dictum that God has all perfections to the highest degree. The syllogism is valid only if the theological predications in the conclusion are univocal with the predications of perfections in the premises. Take, for example, a syllogism that has as its conclusion the claim that God has wisdom in the highest degree. Anselmian

\(^{26}\)Wolter adds in a note (p. 173, n. 17) that the notion of a “demonstration of fact” which Scotus refers to is a demonstration from empirical premises and so, unlike the traditional notion of an Aristotelian demonstration, does not require premises which are necessary first principles. However Scotus claims in his proof of the existence of God that his argument can be turned into a demonstration which uses necessary principles, since he can argue from the necessary premise that it is possible that something is an effect (Wolter p. 44). Which is the correct characterization of Scotus’s notion of a demonstration is not a question we need to answer here, since regardless it will require validity, which is what is relevant to propositional knowledge.

\(^{27}\) *Ordinatio* I.3.2.39; Wolter (1987: 24-5)
reasoning would involve a syllogism with the following as premises: (i) wisdom in humans is a perfection, and (ii) God has any perfection in the highest degree. The syllogism with the conclusion that God has wisdom in the highest degree is valid only if the occurrences of ‘wisdom’ throughout are univocal: “we first know (cognoscitur) something to be a pure perfection and secondly we attribute this perfection to God”.

So far we have focused on the validity (or lack thereof) of syllogisms with theological conclusions. But it is not validity per se that Scotus is interested in; rather he is interested in validity because conclusions arrived at in the absence of a valid deduction are epistemically problematic, as they fall short of knowledge. Scotus argues that the absence of available valid syllogisms with theological conclusions is not epistemically benign; instead it removes any epistemic support theological conclusions might otherwise have enjoyed:

> From the proper notion of anything found in creatures nothing at all can be inferred about God, for the notion of what is in each is wholly different. We would have no more reason to conclude that God is formally wise from the notion of wisdom derived from creatures than we would have reason to conclude that God is formally a stone.

Scotus’s view is that, on the analogical view, the premises concerning creatures and their perfections give us “no reason” to reach theological conclusions such as that God is wise. We might gloss this point by saying that, if we have no valid deduction from the premises to conclusion, our knowledge of the premises fails to support the conclusion to a degree necessary for knowledge.

The essentials of this argument are: (i) if theological predication is analogical, we cannot have demonstrations of (or valid syllogisms involving) theological predications. And so (ii) we will not have any (epistemological) reasons to reach theological conclusions on the analogical view: the reasons supporting analogical predications would be no stronger than the reasons supporting false conclusions (e.g., that God is a stone). Thus, (iii) if valid syllogisms are to provide propositional knowledge of God, theological predication must be univocal.

Note that none of this hinges on whether analogous predications can be true. Theological truth is the problem that has primarily occupied debates about

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28 Ordinatio I.3.2.38; Wolter (1987: 24)
29 Ordinatio I.3.2.40; Wolter (1987: 25)
30 In the background here is Scotus’s claim that there is some analogy between stone and God. His example is that the concept of stone is similar to God in some respect—it resembles the concept of God’s idea of stone. If mere analogy gave us sufficient reason to predicate of a concept of God, we would have reason to conclude that God is a stone, using this analogous concept.
31 Note that taking into account Henry’s additional layer on the analogical view makes Scotus’s argument even more compelling. If analogical concepts are not identical to natural concepts, but appear to be identical to them, then this kind of confusion will proliferate. We will not only use the appearance of univocity to infer all kinds of falsehoods; even when univocity is present, for all we know we are deceived about this, and hence should doubt that we are reasoning in a knowledge-preserving when even when performing the simplest deductions. This seems especially troubling from an epistemic point of view.
But the possibility of true theological predications is unappealing if these truths are unknowable. Scotus’s arguments concerning the relationship between known natural premises and analogical theological conclusions focuses on this second point: the invalidity of any syllogism connecting natural knowledge to theological claims leaves the possibility of the truth of the theological conclusion untouched, but it prevents us from using a syllogism to know the conclusion.

This is an epistemological approach to settling questions about divine predication. The interest of such an approach is not limited to the historical role of Scotus’s interaction with his contemporaries. Epistemological considerations are also immediately relevant to contemporary revivals of debates about theological language.

2 Alston on Aquinas and analogy

We opened Section 1 by noting an apparently inconsistent triad, where Simplicity, Truth, and Univocity are, on natural interpretations, incompatible. William Alston and Nicholas Wolterstorff published an exchange on St. Thomas’s views on the subject, exploring whether (and if so, why) Simplicity is incompatible with Truth and Univocity. There are many interesting aspects to this discussion, including the question of whether Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy is best described as finding the absence of univocity in the copula (Wolterstorff p. 221), the mode in which the predication is signified, or the thing that is signified by the predication (Alston p. 161 ff.). I will not dive into this interpretive question here, but wish instead to use Scotus’s method of introducing epistemological considerations in order to make one remark on Alston’s own view which emerged from this discussion.

Here is an overview of Alston’s own criticism of the analogical view. Alston claims that the analogical view is defective for two reasons: first, it does not provide determinate truth-conditions for theological statements and second, it makes it so that theological statements “cannot figure in reasoning in the way they are supposed to”. The first criticism is aimed at showing that Truth cannot be preserved on the analogical view, and so the alleged advantages over univocity are illusory. I wish however to grant that the analogical view is not inconsistent with Truth. Instead, I will focus on Alston’s claims about the role of predication.

32 This is related to another debate in scholarship on Scotus, which I have not touched on here. This is the debate over whether Scotus rejects the possibility of analogical predication entirely, or whether he simply rejects the claim that all theological predication is analogical. See Cross (2012) for a useful discussion and argument for the latter view. By emphasizing the epistemic character of Scotus’s arguments, as I have done here, we can see how he makes room for the possibility of analogical predication, since he is not committed to denying the truth of analogical predications.


34 Though for an overview and critical examination of the interpretive issues in the Alston-Wolterstorff debate, see Harris (2017).

of perfections in theological reasoning. This issue is close to the epistemological issues introduced in Section 1, and potentially more worrisome for the analogical view.

2.1 Theological reasoning

Alston’s claim is that, if theological predications are analogically related to ordinary predications, then theological reasoning will be inadequate, in a sense. Alston spells out this criticism in the following passage:

If ‘knows’ or ‘wills’ has a somewhat different meaning as applied to God and humans, then we cannot automatically transfer divine knowing or willing principles we know (or have reason to think) to hold for human knowing or willing […] we will have to ask for some further reason to think that principles true of knowing or willing in one sense are also true of knowing and willing in another sense.36

If Alston is claiming here that, on the analogical view, from the claim that human knowledge is $F$, we cannot immediately infer that God’s knowledge is $F$, then there is little to dispute Alston’s claim. For example it is plausible that creatures know on the basis of empirical evidence that objects in motion remain in motion unless acted on by an outside force. No one knows this unless they have made the relevant scientific observations, or learned from someone who has. This is a principle governing creaturely knowledge of the laws of physics. But it won’t follow from this principle that, if God knows that objects in motion remain in motion, then God knows on the basis of empirical evidence. While Alston is right that principles governing predication to creatures will need to be revised when applied to God, this is true regardless of the truth of the analogical view of divine predication. Even if ‘knows’ is univocal, it still won’t follow from the fact that creatures know scientific principles on the basis of empirical evidence that God relies on empirical evidence to know these principles.

The analogical view, of course, adds a special twist concerning the reason why these principles cannot be applied unmodified to God: ‘knows’, on the analogical view, means different things in the two predications. Applied to creatures, ‘knows’ means one thing (call it $\text{knowledge}_{\text{creature}}$), and applied to God it means something else ($\text{knowledge}_{\text{God}}$). There is no guarantee that if $\text{knowledge}_{\text{creature}}$ of physics is acquired on the basis of empirical evidence, then $\text{knowledge}_{\text{God}}$ is acquired on this basis as well. So we cannot reason by relying on the assumption that $\text{knowledge}_{\text{creature}}$ and $\text{knowledge}_{\text{God}}$ share the same features.

Alston is wrong, however, to think that this marks an epistemological divide between the analogical and univocal views. Even if ‘knows’ means the same thing when applied to God and humans, it could (and plausibly is) still true that only human knowledge of physics is acquired on the basis of experiment.

36 Alston (1985: 172)
Many principles that govern application of the univocal concept of knowledge to creatures will fail to apply when application of the univocal notion of knowledge to God is at issue. This argument does resemble Scotus’s epistemic argument against the analogical view in certain respects. It aims to show that an analogical view cannot sustain theological reasoning as a knowledge-producing process, presumably because such a process relies on the presupposition that there are some principles that there are some principles that govern both God’s knowledge and creaturely knowledge. But, as we have seen, even a univocal view will have to be careful to delineate which principles are common to both cases. Moreover, there presumably are some principles that are truth both when applied to knowledge_{creature} and knowledge_{God}. Even in cases of pure equivocation, some principles are common to both: for instance ‘a bank is a being’ is true regardless of which meaning we assign to ‘bank’. What remains to be shown is why, even if we use a true principle governing both knowledge_{creature} and knowledge_{God} in our theological reasoning, we fail to reason properly.

Alston has not shown that an account of good theological reasoning is impossible on the analogical view. A full criticism of the epistemic limitations of the analogical view would presumably show this. The connection Scotus draws between univocity and logical validity is a more promising route along these lines to a more devastating criticism of analogical theological predication, and I will develop this perspective in more detail below.

### 2.2 Deduction and knowledge

In order to dig deeper into the connection between univocity and knowledge, first a more careful characterization of the relationship between deduction and knowledge is in order. While the terms and framework that follow are not explicitly Scotus’s, and represent a somewhat opinionated stance on some epistemological questions, they provide a framework for assessing the overall relationship between theological language and knowledge, which will be important in what follows.\(^{37}\)

Begin with the idea that one of the distinguishing features of propositional knowledge, which sets it apart from mere true belief, is the absence of risk of a false belief.\(^{38}\) A belief that could easily have been false doesn’t constitute knowledge, even if it is a true belief. For example, suppose I believe that my phone will not get wet, as I stand by the side of a swimming pool, tossing my phone in the air. I might as a matter of fact succeed in not dropping the phone—and so successfully prevent the phone from getting wet, thereby making my belief true. But it should be clear in this case that, even if my belief is true, it is not a piece of knowledge. The risk of dropping the phone puts me at risk of having a

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\(^{37}\)Though see Dunaway (forthcoming) for discussion of passages where Scotus seems to endorse structural principles on knowledge that are related to those discussed here.

\(^{38}\)Unger (1975), Sosa (1999), Williamson (2000)
false belief about whether my phone will get wet. The risk of falsity—even if it
does not turn out to be realized—prevents my true belief from being knowledge.

This is just a simple framework, which requires a number of refinements and
qualifications. Within this framework there are some general features of the rela-
tionship between deduction and knowledge that will prove especially illuminating
in a discussion of the epistemic dimensions of theological predication. We noted
earlier that deduction is a means of extending one’s knowledge. If knowledge
requires the absence of a risk of false belief, then it is fairly straightforward
to explain why. Take any valid argument whose premises \( p_1 \ldots p_n \) are known.
Since the premises are known, this means that they are both true, and one’s
belief in them is free from the risk of false belief. That is, one couldn’t easily
have falsely believed \( p_1 \), one couldn’t easily have falsely believed \( p_2 \), and so on.
Call the conclusion that these premises logically imply \( C \). Since there is a logical
entailment from the premises to the conclusion, \( C \) must be true as well.

The important feature here is that if one believes \( C \) on the basis of the logical
entailment from the known \( p_1 \ldots p_n \), then one’s belief in \( C \) will be free from the
risk of error as well. One way to illustrate this feature of deduction is to think
of the worlds one could easily have believed the premises \( p_1 \ldots p_n \) in as nearby
worlds. Since one knows the premises \( p_1 \ldots p_n \), one not only has a true belief
about each premise in the actual world; moreover one has a true belief about each
of \( p_1 \ldots p_n \) in each nearby world. Since \( p_1 \ldots p_n \) entail \( C \), \( C \) is also true in each
nearby world. And if one believes \( C \) on the basis of the entailment from \( p_1 \ldots p_n \),
then one has a true belief concerning \( C \) in each nearby world as well, and so
there is no risk of false belief in the conclusion. Logical entailment preserves
propositional knowledge.

Knowledge-preservation is a special feature of deduction, and is not guar-
anteed to apply to other belief-forming methods. As Scotus points out, on the
analogical view our theological beliefs cannot be beliefs we arrive at on the basis
of a logical deduction. Since any conclusion with a theological predication will not
be univocal with the non-theological predications in the premises, the argument
will not be deductively valid. And without a valid argument to theological
conclusions, we are not guaranteed to know them. In fact, we can construct a
simple model on which we don’t know theological conclusions, if the analogical
view is true.

The outline of the model is as follows. Take an instance of an apparently valid
Anselmian syllogism:

Having power (in creatures) is a perfection;

\[ \text{having power (in creatures)} \rightarrow \text{a perfection} \]

\[ \text{For instance, not just any false belief in a nearby world will prevent actual true beliefs from}
\text{being knowledge. They have to be similar enough—just because I might misremember what I had}
\text{for breakfast, I don’t fail to know that there is a computer in front of me. And the knowledge-
\text{destroying errors have to be formed by relatively similar causal processes—I can know there is a}
\text{computer in front of me even if a convincing skeptic would have convinced me to disbelieve this,}
\text{were I to have talked to him. These details are discussed in greater length in Dunaway (2016) and}
\text{Dunaway and Hawthorne (2017).} \]
God possesses every perfection in the highest degree;

Therefore, God has power in the highest degree (i.e., is omnipotent).^{40}

According to the analogical view, the argument is not in fact valid since the occurrence of ‘power’ in the conclusion does not mean the same thing as the occurrence in the premises; it means power_{human} in the first premise, and it means power_{God} in the conclusion. Non-univocity of this kind gives rise to risk, even if one knows the premises and so believes them without risking a false belief. The reason is that the premises do not entail the conclusion, and so the conclusion can be false in nearby worlds even none of the premises are false in these worlds. In other words, one’s basis for believing that God has power_{God} in the highest degree doesn’t guarantee that one’s beliefs about power_{God} are true in all nearby worlds. So one risks a false theological belief by accepting the conclusion, even if one knows the premises. The analogical view does not entail that we have theological knowledge on the basis of the Anselmian syllogism.

Moreover, taking a page from the epistemological argument Scotus launched against the analogical view, which we explored in Section 1, we can claim something stronger: that risk in believing the theological conclusion is bound to be present, and so knowledge must be unavailable. There are many concepts that are analogical to our natural concepts, some of which apply to God but others which do not. Scotus’s example of God’s idea of stone is one example: it is a concept that is analogous in some way to our concept stone, but is falsely predicated of God. If we form theological beliefs not by strict deduction, but by predicating analogical concepts instead, we could easily predicate the wrong analogical concept. This would represent a risk that prevents even our true theological beliefs from being knowledge: the analogical view entails that we lack theological knowledge, even if we reason impeccably with an Anselmian syllogism.

Note that Henry’s twist on the analogical view does not help the analogical view with these problems. Even if the inference to a theological conclusion appears to be logically valid, as Henry holds, there is still risk in believing the conclusion on the basis of the inference if it is not in fact logically valid. On Henry’s version of the analogical view, we will infer conclusions about knowledge_{God} on the basis of inferences from premises about knowledge_{creature}. These inferences will appear to be valid, but will not be; some apparently valid inferences of this kind will result in beliefs in false conclusions, when one uses an analogical concept that does not apply to God. So the result of Henry’s view is that one will continue to reason as if one is using truth-preserving inferences, and not know that one’s reasoning fails to preserve immunity from error. In fact one’s beliefs will be formed on the basis of a risk-introducing process. The result is more, not less, theological error.

Univocity, as Scotus defines it, avoids these problems. CONTRADICTION and VALIDITY, as logical properties of univocal terms, guarantee that inferences to theological conclusions will extend knowledge. For instance, knowledge_{creature}

^{40}cf. Cross (1999: 32)
is not univocal with knowledge_{God} in part because they fail to satisfy CONTRADICTION: it is not a contradiction to affirm that I know_{creature} I am typing, but deny that I know_{God} I am typing. By contrast, on the univocal view, CONTRADICTION applies and so it will never make sense to affirm the premises of a valid theological argument and deny its conclusion. The validity of the argument eliminates any possibility that the premises are true and conclusion false. There is, then, no risk of falsely believing theological conclusions on the basis of a valid argument when the premises are known—and so univocity has a strong case as a necessary condition on theological knowledge.

3 Extensions: skepticism with univocity

What the previous section does not show is that univocity is sufficient for theological knowledge. Epistemological considerations, as Scotus suggests, tell against analogical views. But some ways of implementing a univocal view will also run afoul of the same considerations. I will elaborate on this point by arguing that Alston’s own theory of univocal predication secures TRUTH and UNIVOCITY at the expense of theological knowledge.

3.1 Univocity: a case study

At the center of Alston’s view in “Functionalism and Theological Language” is functionalism about concepts. This is the claim that our concepts specify a functional role, and refer to something only if there is something that satisfies the relevant role. For example, our concept belief specifies a particular functional role which involves something like the following components:

- **Responsiveness** A state that tends to be formed in response to evidence;
- **Production** A state that tends to produce other similar states that are entailed by it;
- **Behavior guidance** A state that, when held in conjunction with appropriate desires, is such that it is part of the causal explanation for action.

(These are just part of a first-pass at the components of the functional role for belief; the full story will be much more complicated.) The concept belief, according to the functionalist view, is about beliefs (and not some other state, or nothing at all) because beliefs satisfy the functional role for the concept. In particular, they satisfy Responsiveness, Production, and Behavior guidance. This account of concepts is, in Alston’s view, quite general. It applies to our concepts of knowledge, wisdom, and action as well. The functionalist theory also allows for univocal theological predication, for reasons Alston emphasizes which I will spell out below.

To illustrate why Alston thinks the functionalist view of concepts allows for univocal theological predication, I will continue to focus on our concept of
belief, and in particular will limit my attention to its inferential role, which we summarized in *Production*. But it is worth emphasizing that similar points will apply to other aspects of the functional role of belief, and to other functionally-specified concepts as well.

Alston spells out the *Production* component of the belief-role in the following passage:

One of the functions that makes a belief that $p$ the state it is, is its tendency to enter with other beliefs into inference that generate further beliefs. Thus the belief that Jim is Sam’s only blood-related uncle tends to give rise to the belief that Sam’s parents have only one brother between them; it also tends to combine with the beliefs that Jim is childless and that Sam has no aunt to produce the belief that Sam has no first cousins.41

As Alston is aware, this gloss on *Production* as a component of the functional role of belief implies that on orthodox theological views, God cannot strictly speaking have beliefs. For instance it is an implication of Alston’s gloss on *Production* that the role is only satisfied by someone who forms beliefs in the implications of her other beliefs *over time* and, moreover, who believes these implications *on the basis* of their relationship to other claims she believes.

But God (on orthodox views) is not contained in time, so God cannot make inferences over time. And, given that God knows everything immediately, the notion of beliefs formed on the basis of other beliefs cannot apply to God. This means that the *Production* component of the functional role associated with our *belief* concept does not apply to God. Thus our ordinary concept *belief* isn’t applicable to God, on the functionalist view.

These are just the problems for applying one component of the functional role of one concept to God. There are other components to our concept *belief*, and there are other concepts besides *belief* that we might wish to apply to God as well. Alston is well aware of these difficulties. He discusses the difference between the functional roles human minds and God in light of God’s timelessness (p. 226), incorporeality (p. 225), infinitude (p. 226), the relationship between value and God’s action (p. 227), and omniscience (p. 228). The upshot is, as Alston notes, that the functional roles associated with most of our concepts do not apply to God. Strictly speaking, God doesn’t have beliefs.

But he does not take this to show that univocal theological predication is impossible. Instead we can simply modify our existing concepts to remove functional roles that do not apply to God. For instance even if the *Production* component of the belief-role doesn’t apply to God, there are still be other aspects of the functional role for belief that do apply to God. At the very least this involves having states that serve the role of accurately representing how things are, and are

41Alston (1985: 228)
related to each other by relations of logical implication.\textsuperscript{42} This is a \textit{stripped down} functional role for belief—it includes only a part of the full functional role of what we call “beliefs” in humans—but it is one that in principle applies to both, and satisfies the criteria for univocity.

To emphasize, the concept we apply to God when we ascribe beliefs is \textit{not} one that includes \textbf{Production} in the functional role it specifies. Instead it includes a stripped down version of \textbf{Production}, and the same goes for the other components of the functional role of belief, such as \textbf{Responsiveness} and \textbf{Behavior guidance}. The stripped down functional role will not require that the things they apply to exist in time, undergo change, and the like. We can truly say that God has beliefs in the same sense that humans have beliefs, so long as we are using a concept \textit{belief} that includes only the stripped-down role, and not the full role that is associated with \textit{belief} in ordinary English.

This gives us a theory of predication that preserves both \textbf{Truth} and \textbf{Univocity}. But just because it is a univocal theory, it does not necessary fulfill all of the desiderata that we might want out of a theory of theological language. Most importantly for our purposes, it appears to fail to meet the epistemological constraints that Scotus identified in response to the analogical view. I will spell out the argument for this below.

\subsection*{3.2 Univocity with risk}

Alston uses functional roles to specify two notions of belief (and anything else we might predicate of God): there is the \textit{full} functional role, which characterizes the concept expressed by the ordinary use of the term ‘belief’, and cannot be truly applied to God. And there is the \textit{stripped down} functional role, which characterizes the concept of a univocal use of ‘belief’ which applies to both God and creatures.

But there are many other functional roles besides the full and stripped down roles. By simply removing dimensions from the full functional role, we can arrive at any number of alternative functional roles that are both distinct from the full functional role (because some of the content of the full role has been removed) and distinct from the stripped down role (because they contain some content not in the stripped down role). Each of these characterizes an alternative notion of belief. To take one example: there is the stripped down role for belief includes none of \textbf{Responsiveness}, \textbf{Production}, or \textbf{Behavior guidance} in original form. (This is the concept Alston characterizes.) But a slightly less stripped down functional role modifies \textbf{Production} in the ways described above, and leaves \textbf{Responsiveness} and \textbf{Behavior guidance} in the role in original form. The alternative concept is not identical to the ordinary notion of belief because its functional role does not retain \textbf{Production}. But it is not Alston’s concept either, since its functional role is not the

\textsuperscript{42}Alston says: “It will still be true that whatever God knows, he knows all the logical consequences thereof, knows that all probabilistic consequences thereof are probable, knows that all contradic- tories thereof are false, and so on. That is, there is a certain structure to divine knowledge that corresponds to logical relationships.” (p. 228)
fully stripped down role, as it retains **Responsiveness** and **Behavior guidance**. It is a *partially stripped down* functional role for belief.

The partially stripped down role is an example of a third functional role that characterizes a distinct belief-like concept. It applies to human beliefs (since it is logically weaker than the full belief-role), but does not apply to God—if one were to use a concept characterized by the a partially stripped down role to believe that God has beliefs, one would believe something false. There are many other belief-like concepts that we can characterize in this way.

Partially stripped down concepts are disastrous for the epistemology of theological beliefs on Alston’s view. Recall the rough-and-ready heuristic we used for when beliefs amount to knowledge: beliefs that are at risk of being false are not knowledge. Any theological belief that is formed with a merely partially stripped down concept will be false: we need to reach all the way to a fully stripped concept in order to arrive at a concept that truly applies to God. A concept that is only partially stripped down will falsly imply that God is time-bound, has non-immediate knowledge, or something similar. Since there are numerous concepts like this, there will be many ways to form false theological beliefs.

If we are in the business of forming theological beliefs, it will be very easy to form a false belief using a partially stripped down concept. It will be incredibly easy to use one of the concepts characterized by a partially stripped down role, instead of using the concept characterized by the fully stripped down role. Reliably using the fully stripped down role to form theological beliefs requires serious theological acumen. For instance, it requires knowing that God is timeless, that God’s knowledge is immediate, and so on, and then using this knowledge to pare down the functional roles associated with our ordinary concepts, in order to arrive at new concepts that univocally and truly apply to God. Almost no one will successfully do this. And most of those that do this successfully will rely on a significant amount of luck to get it right.

So our theological beliefs, on Alston’s picture, will be at risk of being false. This is so even if we actually manage to form true theological beliefs. Being at risk of using a partially stripped down concept entails being at risk of forming a false theological belief. And so the risk of using alternative concepts is sufficient to prevent one form acquiring any theological knowledge. Alston has, in other words, shown that theological language can satisfy Truth and Univocity. But the cost is that almost no one has theological knowledge. Every theological belief could have been formed using a slightly different concept and so is at risk of being false. Scotus’s epistemological critiques of analogical theories of theological

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Note that if we actually form true theological beliefs, then *those very same* beliefs are not at risk of being false. But this is not enough to avoid risk of error and secure knowledge. True beliefs, formed with stripped down concepts, will have false counterpart beliefs that are formed with similar, but distinct partially stripped down concepts. This is what puts theological beliefs at risk, in the relevant sense. Take as an analogy someone guessing at arithmetical sums. They will sometimes form true beliefs. But despite the necessity of arithmetic they will still be at risk because there are similar (though not identical) guesses that are false. See Williamson (2000), and Dunaway (2016) for discussion and application.
predication can in principle apply, in general outline, to some univocal views as well. Simply by adopting a univocal view of theological language, we do not thereby guarantee theological knowledge.44

4 Perfection and simplicity

While univocity might not guarantee knowledge, it can be distinguished from the analogical view by making theological knowledge possible. I have not shown here that they can successfully deliver on this advantage. But there are alternative versions of univocal views, and Scotus provides one: we use the Anselmian method of conceiving of ordinary notions like belief, knowledge, etc. held “in the highest degree” to apply to God. We thereby arrive at predications which could not have easily been different (using something other than the “in the highest degree” modifier would result in a substantially different methodology). Perhaps this approach is compatible with our having theological knowledge through univocal predication. I will not pursue the issue further here.

A second lingering issue, which deserves further discussion, is the relationship between Simplicity and theological knowledge. As we noted at the outset, the motivations found in Aquinas for rejecting Univocity are not epistemological, but are metaphysical instead. They derive from a picture on which it is metaphysically impossible for predicates to apply to God in the way they apply to creatures, since there are no distinctions between God’s perfections and essence, while such distinctions do inhere in creatures. Strictly speaking this is compatible with Scotus’s epistemological arguments for univocal predication, which can be understood as a conditional claim: if we are to have any theological knowledge, predicates for divine perfections must be univocal. The conditional does not necessarily undermine the Thomistic motivations for analogy, since the conditional claim is consistent with the falsity of its antecedent. The metaphysical thesis that God is simple might, for all we have said here, entail that we don’t have any theological knowledge. Accepting both does not result in an inconsistency. Rather if both are true we would find ourselves in an unfortunate epistemological situation, where the nature of theological truths makes it impossible to know them naturally.

I have not asked here whether we should accept that Aquinas’s version of Simplicity. This version conflicts with Truth and Univocity, but Scotus proposes modifying the doctrine of Simplicity to make it compatible with these other...
claims, and claims that these modifications allow for theological knowledge.\footnote{Cross (1999: 29-30; 42-45) gives a useful summary of the differences and similarities between Scotus and Aquinas here; see also Dumont (1998: 315-320) for more on Scotus’s own view of simplicity. Hall (2009: Ch. 1) takes a different approach, and suggests that there is no disagreement between Scotus and Aquinas over the metaphysics of God.} But the question is an important one in light of the epistemological considerations we find in Scotus since if he is right, then resolution of debates about the proper understanding of the simplicity of God will bear immediately on the possibility of theological knowledge.

Even without delving into the finer details of Scholastic debates over divine simplicity, the same problem can arise in different forms. Motivations for analogical theological predicates are typically metaphysical in nature, focusing on the fundamental differences between God and creatures, concluding that any true theological predications cannot have strictly the same sense as true predications of perfections to creatures. Epistemological considerations along the lines of Scotus’s arguments favor univocity. We might not find both of these considerations compelling. But if we do, there is no logical need to resolve them—we can accept both, so long as we are content to live with the theological skepticism that follows.

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