My name is Billy Dunaway. I am currently Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Missouri-St. Louis; before that I was a postdoc at the University of Oxford, and before that I received my PhD in philosophy from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. I work in the areas of ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language.
Brief descriptions of some of my work are below. Click on 'Papers' for more detailed information about the papers.
I can be contacted at dunawayw [at] umsl [dot] [standard educational domain name]. Comments on anything posted here are very welcome.
Reference Magnetism as a Solution to the Moral Twin Earth Problem (with Tristram McPherson), forthcoming in Ergo.
Ethical Vagueness and Practical Reasoning, forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly.
Luck: Evolutionary and Epistemic, forthcoming in Episteme.
Duns Scotus's Epistemic Argument against Divine Illumination, forthcoming in Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights, edited by Matthew A Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz (Oxford University Press).
Supervenience Arguments and Normative Non-naturalism, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2015).
Expressivism and Normative Metaphysics, forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics vol. 11, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau.
Whither Anankastics? (with Alex Silk), in Philosophical Perspectives 28: Ethics (2014).
Realism and Objectivity, forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by David Plunkett and Tristram McPherson.
Scepticism (with John Hawthorne), forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology and Theology, edited by William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino.
Modal Quantification without Worlds, in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 8 (2013). Also one of four finalists for the 2011 Younger Scholars Prize for Metaphysics.
The Folk Probably Do Think What You Think They Think (with Anna Edmonds and David Manley), in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2013).
Minimalist Semantics in Meta-ethical Expressivism, in Philosophical Studies (2010).
Review of Matthew Chrisman, The Meaning of 'Ought', Oxford University Press, forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy.
Grounds and Knowledge: Epistemological Arguments for Anti-realism (draft available on request)
Realism, Meta-semantics, and Risk (draft available on request)