My name is Billy Dunaway. I am a postdoc at the University of Oxford, and I work in ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language. I received my PhD in philosophy from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor in May 2013 with Allan Gibbard as my supervisor.
Brief descriptions of some of my work are below. Click on 'Papers' for more detailed information about the papers.
I can be contacted at william [dot] dunaway [at] philosophy [dot] ox [dot] ac [dot] uk. Comments on anything posted here are very welcome.
Supervenience Arguments and Normative Non-naturalism, forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Expressivism and Normative Metaphysics, provisionally forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics vol. 11.
Whither Anankastics? (with Alex Silk), forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives 28: Ethics.
Realism and Objectivity, forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by David Plunkett and Tristram McPherson.
Scepticism (with John Hawthorne), forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology and Theology, edited by William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino.
Modal Quantification without Worlds, in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 8. Also one of four finalists for the 2011 Younger Scholars Prize for Metaphysics.
The Folk Probably Do Think What You Think They Think (with Anna Edmonds and David Manley), in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (go here for a full description of the experimental philosophy meta–survey we conducted for this paper and its results).
Reference Magnetism as a Solution to the Moral Twin Earth Problem (with Tristram McPherson)
Ethical Vagueness and Practical Reasoning (currently undergoing revisions)
I am currently working on projects on vagueness, reference magnetism, realism, quasi-realism, Lewisian naturalness, defeat, and knowledge (most projects cover more than one area). Please see the Papers section for more detailed descriptions.