Andrew M. Goldsweig (andrew at goldsweig dot com)

17.419

U.S. Political Boundaries

Nathaniel Pearlman (npearlman@frontieriec.com)

Benjamin Pearlman (bhpca@co.boulder.co.us)

 

The Case for Toledo, Michigan

            On July 12, 1835, Joseph Wood, the deputy sheriff of Monroe County, received an arrest warrant.  On July 16, Wood set about bringing to justice the object of the warrant, the habitually violent Two Stickney.  As Wood approached Stickney, the second son of Major Benjamin F. Stickney stabbed the pursuant officer in the left leg with a pen-knife.  The outlaw then fled from his home in Toledo south into the heart of Ohio (George 52), where a force of 250 men dispatched by Michigan Governor Stevens T. Mason dared not tread.

            Thus passed the only violence in the two-year-long Toledo War, the dispute between Michigan and Ohio that set their current border.  Deputy Wood attempted to enforce Michigan’s Pains and Penalties Act of February 12, 1835, which stipulated that anyone other than Michigan Territorial officers trying to enforce jurisdiction in Toledo should be subject to a fine of $1000 or 5 years imprisonment (Buley 2: 195). 

            Legal history supports Michigan’s claim to Toledo.  Study of the circumstances makes this appear abundantly clear.  Surveying errors and politics took the territory from its rightful governors.  A systematic explanation of the history of the conflict shall here allow justification of Michigan’s contention and explanation of her failure to bring it to fruition. 

The history of the dispute began in a fault of English colonialism; the colonies were chartered north to south between lines of latitude with no western boundaries.  Therefore, shortly after the United States began to govern themselves, they agreed upon a system to rule their sparsely inhabited western region.  “The congressional act creating the Northwest Territory [on May 13, 1787] retained the concept of three-to-five states [being formed from the area].  Congress further reserved for itself the right to form one or two states north of ‘an east and west line drawn through the southerly bend or extreme of Lake Michigan.’  Because this imaginary boundary, later known as the Ordinance Line, was drawn from a map placing the ‘southerly bend’ of Lake Michigan much farther north than it actually is, the boundary struck the west shore of Lake Erie near or north of the mouth of the Maumee River, the site of present-day Toledo” (George 9). 

The Ordinance also stipulated that when a territorial census found 60,000 residents, the territory could call a convention to draft a constitution and present it to the federal government as an application for statehood.  On November 29, 1802, the Ohio Convention in Chilliocothe adopted a constitution with this provision of Article 7, Section 6 (Doyle 24).  “In drawing up their northern boundary, the Ohio delegates selected the Ordinance Line of 1787, with one important proviso.  If further investigation revealed that the line fell south of the Maumee River mouth, the line was to be redrawn north of the mouth of the river with the consent of Congress” (George 10-11).  “There is a story to the effect that a hunter who happened to be present asserted that the southern end of Lake Michigan was actually further south than was indicated on the maps of the time.  Congress admitted Ohio to the Union in 1803 under this constitution but with no specific assent to the change stipulated in the boundary proviso” (http://www.geo.msu.edu/geo333/toledo_war.html).  Thus, Congress recognized the border as the original Ordinance line, accepting no redefinition of the line.  “In 1805, when creating Michigan Territory, Congress established the Ordinance Line as Michigan’s southern boundary” (George 15). 

            “Very little importance was given to the boundary question or which line should be adopted, for a number of years, but in 1824 and following, Ohio began to manifest considerable interest in this Wabash & Erie Canal project, and also to contemplate a canal from Dayton to Lake Erie in connection with the Wabash & Erie Canal” (Doyle 26).  The system of canals would link Toledo to the Ohio River, and thus to the Mississippi.  The site, chosen for its location on the navigable Maumee, was expected to eventually see a metropolis surpassing its neighbors, Detroit and Chicago.  Toledo’s population of 1000, compared to its neighbors’ 2000 and 300 respectively, was expected to skyrocket as it became the center of North American trade.  Farmers relocating west of the Appalachians soon discovered the fertility of flood plain of the Maumee, increasing the value of the land. 

            The involved parties had not intentionally left the dispute unresolved.  “Congress in 1812 passed a resolution directing the Commissioner of the General Land Office to cause it to be surveyed.  But in consequence of the hostile attitude of the Indians near the line, by reason of the war with Great Britain, the line was not run until the year 1817.  In that year, the line was run and marked by William Harris in conformity to instructions from the Surveyor General” (Way 8).  The product of this survey was skeptically received from the outset.  “Surveyor General [Edward] Tiffin [a former Ohio governor] had given his instructions to follow the provisions of the constitution of Ohio…” (Doyle 25).  Michigan was the victim of an unfair survey perpetrated by a clearly biased officer. 

“When Michigan brought pressure to bear upon Congress, President Monroe ordered another survey under the provisions of the act of 1812; this ‘east and west line’ was run by John A. Fulton in 1818.  Between the two lines lay the ‘Toledo Strip’ of some 468 square miles” (Buley 2:192).  “The sparsely settle area in dispute was governed by Michigan, although Ohio made a pretense at exercising duplicate jurisdiction” (Buley 2:194).  President Jackson “sought the opinion of his attorney general, [Benjamin F. Butler,] who upheld Michigan’s claim” (http://www.geo.msu.edu/geo333/toledo_war.html).  Ohio’s foundation clearly rested on shaky ground at this point. 

If Ohio found an ally in Tiffin, however, Michigan’s ex-governer, Lewis Cass, outranked him as Secretary of War.  At Cass’ behest, the council of Washington’s finest considered the case yet again.  “In 1832, Congress passed a law providing for a third survey of the Ordinance Line to be completed by December 31, 1835.  Andrew Talcott, captain of Army Engineers, was commissioned to undertake the project, and the actual survey was made by Lieutenants Washington Hood and Robert E. Lee, later General of the Confederate forces during the Civil War” (George 20).  Virtually following the Fulton Line, the Talcott line submitted to Congress in June 1834 strongly supported Michigan’s position. 

            In 1835, President Andrew Jackson appointed two special commissioners, Philadelphian Richard Rush of the Rush-Bagot agreement disarming the Great Lakes in 1817 and Baltimorean Benjamin C. Howard, to resolve the matter.   On April 7, after four days of study in Perrysburg, the two men announced that the Harris Line should be resurveyed at once and that the residents of the Toledo Strip should determine their status democratically.  Three Ohio surveyors, Uri Seely, Jonathon Taylor, and John Patterson, and fifty member of the Ohio militia worked from the northwest of Ohio into Henry County by April 25, when a posse from Michigan seeking to arrest the surveyors under the Pains and Penalties drove their party beyond the Fulton Line.  Nine of the Ohio troopers barricaded themselves inside a shack, hoping to maintain a footing in the region as Ohio Governor Robert Lucas brought his force of 500 to meet them.  A few warning salvos later, though, the estimated thousand Michigan men were able to apprehend the “rebels” under the act they sought to enforce. 

“When Cass left office as governor of Michigan Territory, President Jackson appointed John T. Mason to succeed him, and Mason installed his son, twenty-year-old Stevens T. Mason, as territorial secretary” (Catton 90).  Upon the elder Mason’s almost immediate resignation, the “Boy Governor” took power.  President Jackson named Pennsylvania lawyer George B. Porter to replace the minor, but his July 1834 death returned the young Mason to his position.  Under Stevens T. Mason, the border dispute escalated into the “Toledo War.” 

Mason was determined to achieve immediate Michigan statehood without sacrificing the Toledo question.  There was no question in his mind.  Having held a constitutional convention, he ordered election of senators and congressmen, sending them to Washington whether or not the State was federally recognized.  As Ohio’s Legislature apportioned $300,000 to defend her claim to Toledo, Mason pushed a measure for $315,000 through Michigan’s territorial council.  Much of this money allowed Brigadier-General Joseph Brown of the Third United States Brigade to ready his troops to strike against Ohio militia in the disputed area.  Andrew Jackson’s Secretary of State, John Forsyth, supported this action to President Jackson.  Michigan almost-Senator John Norvell was charged on March 23 by Mason with briefing the President about the situation.  Sympathizing with Michigan, the President dispatched Rush and Howard the following day. 

In opposition, to assert control over the area on whatever false grounds, Ohio Governor Robert Lucas and his state’s legislature “had created a new County out of a portion of the disputed territory and a portion of its own proper domain, and called it Lucas, after Gov. Lucas.  It had provided for the [Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County] to be held on the 7^th of September, at Toledo” (Way 40).  By arranging legal proceedings and municipality organization, Lucas thought he could guarantee Ohio jurisdiction over the area. 

Governor Mason, however, prepared to meet the Court with a militia of 1200 men.  A Michigan detachment of 100 went ahead with a General W. Wing to secure the city.  With only 100 soldiers of their own defending them, the Ohioans planned to hold their Court.  Under a deceptive Colonel Vanfleet, the Ohio lawmakers employed a clever trick in an attempt to legalize their claim to the city.  At 1 o’clock a.m., the Court opened in the Toledo School House.  Ten soldiers and 5 lawmakers snuck into the city under the cover of darkness, held court, and elected officers.  They stopped by a local pub for a few drinks, but fled before settling their bill when they heard of the number of opposing militia men stationed around the city.  By the time the Michigan troops arrived, the proceedings had been completed, and the officers had fled south toward the Fulton line.  Only a double salute fired by the Ohio militia near the line indicated their early-morning presence.  The Michigan troops, finding no opposing army, quickly sacked Ohio patriot Major Benjamin Stickney’s vegetable garden and returned north to their homes. 

The surrounding political environment also provides justification of Michigan’s cause, and explains why she was forced to surrender it.  Years earlier, with the Missouri Compromise, Congress had accepted the tradition of admitting states to the Union in pairs, one slave state and one free state.  In 1835, Michigan and Arkansas were represented in Washington in such a fashion.  Having counted a population of 85,856, Mason’s Michigan convened a convention in Detroit on May 11, 1835 to draft a constitution.  The federal decision was to admit Arkansas and to promise Michigan statehood upon resolution of her boundary dispute with Ohio.  Michigan quickly responded by chartering 9 counties named for President Jackson and the members of his cabinet.  This was unnecessary as many of them already supported Michigan’s right to Toledo. 

            Where it counted, though, Michigan’s voice was barely heard.  Ohio, a state since 1803, had senators and representatives.  At this time, Michigan had an observer in Congress.  In addition, Indiana and Illinois, states since 1816 and 1818 respectively, feared that Michigan would begin to question their northern boundaries, both north of the real Ordinance line.  The federal solution, similar to slavery decisions of the era, was to seek a position of middle ground, regardless of morality or circumstance.  The Indian Territory, including present-day Wisconsin, seemed a likely victim.  “Congress had received a number of petitions from persons in this region asking that the area south of Lake superior be organized as the territory of Huron….It was approximately the western three-quarters of the Upper Peninsula that was involved in the compromise (http://www.geo.msu.edu/geo333/toledo_war.html).   The Federal Government offered the new state the majority of its Upper Peninsula in exchange for the Toledo Strip, which ranged in width from 5 miles in the West to 8 miles in the East.  Furthermore, there was money involved; in that era, the Federal government could not hold on to funds beyond budget.  “The United States Treasury contained a surplus, and this was going to be distributed to the states, pro rata; if Michigan were a state, she would receive $400,000, but if she did not become a state immediately, that money would be gone forever” (Catton 92).  More realistically, 1836 was an election year, and Jackson wanted the electoral support of the state of Ohio, a department in which the Territory of Michigan was powerless. 

In April 1836, the Wisconsin Territory was born with its northeastern boundary as per the proposal of Senator Thomas Hart Benton, thus preparing compensation for Michigan.  The Arkansas-Michigan bills of June led to the “Convention of Assent” in Ann Arbor beginning on September 26.  After four days, delegates from around the state of Michigan rejected the proposal of territorial compensation.  Only the lure of $400,000 brought about the “Frost-bitten Convention” in Ann Arbor on December 14, which accepted the federal deal (Buley 2: 201-2).  Thus, by the conditions of the Clayton Act of June 15, 1836, Michigan joined the Union on January 26, 1837. 

The boundary dispute did not end in 1837.  “Not until 1915 was the land boundary satisfactorily surveyed and marked.  At that time a ceremony was held in which the governors of the two states, standing on either side of the boundary, exchanged handshakes (http://www.geo.msu.edu/geo/333/toledo_war.html).  Still, the issue lived on under water.  With oil prospectors and fisherman citing the resources of Lake Erie, the two states debated their underwater boundary until very recently.  Michigan held that the earlier settlements only referred to territorial land, and that territorial waters still stemmed from the Ordinance of 1787.  “In 1973, however, the United States Supreme Court upheld an earlier United States Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that had rejected Michigan’s claim and had awarded some 206 square miles of Lake Erie waters and bottomlands instead to Ohio” (http://www.geo.msu.edu/geo/333/toledo_war.html). 

The present location of the state boundary could serve as a conclusion to the matter.  Federal court litigation has yielded a final settlement to the Toledo War.  In the face under-representation and a biased federal government, the outcome was to be expected.  Although the evidence indicates that Michigan lost her rightful claim, the history is long past and shall not soon be changed.  In recent years, the Michigan militia, now a radically right-wing group of militants has sought to re-open the case.  The Harris line, they claim, if extended straight into Lake Erie, crosses Land before eastern Ohio.  The northernmost two miles of Cedar Point, an amusement park peninsula just west of Sandusky, should be immediately returned to Michigan, the militiamen contend.  The Toledo War has not, then, sunk to the depths of the realm of trivia.  Instead, a determined few, loyal to the cause, continue to fight on. 

            Conclusively, American political boundaries remain relevant and dynamic today.  As we consider proposals to split large states and unite smaller ones, as we choose our places of residence, and as we identify ourselves politically, we cannot forget the jingoistic lessons of the Toledo War. 

Works Cited

Buley, R. Carlyle.  The Old Northwest Pioneer Period 1815-1840.  2 Vols.  Indianapolis:  Indiana Historical Society, 1950. 

Catton, Bruce.  Michigan:  A Bicentennial History.  New York:  W.W. Norton & Company, 1976. 

Doyle, John H.  A Story of Early Toledo.  Bowling Green, Ohio:  Home Office, 1919. 

George, Sister Mary Karl.  The Rise and Fall of Toledo, Michigan…The Toledo War!  Lansing:  Michigan Historical Commission, 1971. 

“The Toledo War.”  Michigan State University Department of Geography.  http://www.geo.msu.edu/geo333/toledo_war.html.  Visited 1/23/01. 

“The Toledo War.”  Toledo Public Library.  http://www.library.toledo.oh.us/tprifile/chapter_three.htm.  Visited 1/23/01. 

Way, W.V.  The Toledo War.  Toledo:  Daily Commercial Steam Book and Job Printing House, 1869.