

## Beyond the Study of Nationalism

by

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Nationalism was a very hot topic among anglophone historians for many years, but recently it has started to surrender its prominence to other sites of scholarly inquiry and innovation. While articles and books on a wide variety of nationalisms continue to appear, the intellectual excitement and dynamism that marked this subfield throughout the 1990s appears to be gradually fading. This is not to say that anyone is questioning the centrality of the concept of “the nation” as a means of organizing identity in the modern world. If we still needed any reminders, the Balkan Wars taught us to hesitate before predicting the decline of nationalism as a historical force. And even if national identity were to someday erode against a torrent of postmodern fragmentation, historians would still be entitled to study the phenomenon as one of the central themes of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Nonetheless, the field of “nationalism studies” has lost a bit of its glamour, thanks primarily to its own success as an intellectual endeavor. To be more specific, the study of nationalism has developed to the point of challenging some of its own basic assumptions, thus transforming the field into something much more complicated, but much more interesting as well. On the most basic level, the proliferation of monographs detailing the many articulations of nationalism has revealed enough complexity and variety to make any quest for a single “theory of nationalism” appear quixotic. More subtly (and more importantly), historians have grown increasingly sensitive to the ways in which national identities – like all forms of identity – are expressed within multilayered systems of cultural and social discipline that *organize* our perceptual universe rather than merely *reflect* some underlying causation. The term “nationalism” is thus displaced from the subject to the object of our scholarly sentences: it has become hard to say “nationalism causes...” or even “nationalism is...”; instead, we speak of specific people in specific contexts “deploying” nationalism,

“utilizing” national imagery, and “imagining” nations. As we make this shift, nationalism becomes less useful as a means of making sense of the heterogeneity of social and political life. Once we could say, “Aha – I understand what is happening here, because I see that nationalism is at work.” More recently, scholars have been asking what specific historical actors are hoping to accomplish when they employ some rhetorical element from the vocabulary of nationalism, and how different people might perceive their own multifaceted selves when embedded in national modes of thought.

Anglophone scholarship on nationalism stood for decades in the shadow of two towering authors from the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century: Carlton Hayes and Hans Kohn.<sup>1</sup> They introduced two basic themes to the study of nationalism that persisted for many years – perhaps too many. First, both scholars drew a distinction between a good nationalism (marked by civic inclusion and a benign love of one’s country) and a bad nationalism (marked by aggression, chauvinism, and racism). This dichotomy reproduced itself over the years in both chronological and typological schemes, even among those who superficially eschewed explicit moral assessments. Kohn himself literally mapped out these two types of nationalism, locating the good nationalism in “the west” (which for him meant France, Britain, and the US), and the bad nationalism in “the east” (Germany and Russia). Though repeatedly debunked, the spatial embodiment of nationalism’s Janus face continues to resurface.<sup>2</sup> This clumsy geographical polarity becomes only slightly more useful (but even more pervasive) when cast as a terminological distinction between

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<sup>1</sup> The most important books of Carlton J. H. Hayes include: *Essays on Nationalism* (New York : Russell & Russell, 1954); *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1931); *Nationalism: A Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1960). Kohn’s key texts are *The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global History* (New York: Harper, 1962); *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (New York: Macmillan, 1944); *Nationalism, Its Meaning and History* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1955); *Prelude to Nation-States. The French and German Experience, 1789-1815* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967); *Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1946). Obviously, we cannot really speak of a self-contained anglophone scholarly tradition in the study of nationalism, given that one of the founding fathers of the subfield was from Austria. As we will see, many of the most influential texts on this topic (among anglophone readers) were written by scholars whose native language was not English, and a few were actually translations.

<sup>2</sup> In the 1970s, John Plamenatz resurrected Kohn’s old dichotomy in an oft-cited essay entitled “Two Types of Nationalism”, in *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*, ed. by Eugene Kamenka (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973), 22-37. More recently, a spatially located contrast between “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism has been offered by Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). Liah Greenfeld adds a few more categories to her typology, but retains a roughly similar scheme: Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). Andrzej Walicki uses the example of Poland to dispute the specific map drawn by Kohn and his followers, but he retains a typology dividing “political” from “ethnic” nationalism. See Andrzej Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 66-69.

“nationalism” and “patriotism”, both of which are presumed to coexist within every national community. However presented, this way of conceptualizing nationalism has allowed generations of scholars to naturalize and normalize national identity, while condemning the more virulent forms of nationalist ideology. This may be heuristically useful under certain circumstances, but drawing such distinctions carries the risk of obscuring the intimate bond between identity and ideology, between a subjective sense of nationality and a politicized deployment of national categories. Worse, bracketing “patriotism” apart from “nationalism” makes it harder to perceive the ways in which ideology inevitably penetrates identity.<sup>3</sup>

The second enduring element introduced to anglophone scholarship by Hayes and Kohn was the way in which they plotted nationalism’s history over time. Kohn traced the evolution of “the idea of nationalism” from the ancient Greeks to the Enlightenment, but characterized this long history as a prelude to the birth of “modern nationalism” around the time of the French Revolution. Hayes offered a slightly different narrative, but the general scheme was similar: in both cases, the emergence of national identity and the nation-state was an integral part of modernity. For Hayes, Kohn, and countless historians of nationalism to follow, the nation has appeared as the primary means of organizing collective identity in the modern world, supplanting earlier forms of community and polity.

The first historians of nationalism told this story within the genre of intellectual history, focusing on the ideologues of national and nationalist thought.<sup>4</sup> Eventually this approach was challenged by social scientists who tried to explain modern nationalism by linking it to broad forces of social change; nationalism was taken out of the realm of ideas, and grounded in seemingly more concrete social dynamics. The 1960s and 1970s thus saw a shift away from what we might call the “Herder-to-Hitler narrative,” towards an emphasis on industrialization,

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<sup>3</sup> An excellent deconstruction of the nationalism/patriotism dichotomy can be found in chapter one of Krzysztof Jaskułowski, *Mityczne przestrzenie nacjonalizmu. Historia i mit w walijskiej ideologii narodowej* (Torun, 2003). I have explored the genetic links between “good” and “bad” nationalism in the Polish case in *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in 19<sup>th</sup> Century Poland* (New York: Oxford, 2000).

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Edward Hallett Carr, *Nationalism and After* (New York: Macmillan, 1945); Eugene Kamenka, ed. *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973); Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1960); Aira Kemilainen, *Nationalism: Problems Concerning the Word, the Concept and Classification* (Jyväskylä, Finland: Jyväskylän Kasvatusopillinen Korkeakoulu, 1964); K. R. Minogue, *Nationalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1967); Boyd C. Shafer, *Faces of Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972); J. L. Talmon, *The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution: The Origins of Ideological Polarization in the Twentieth-century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

urbanization, and the corresponding transformations of political consciousness.<sup>5</sup> Karl Deutsch captured the positivist optimism of nationalism studies in the 1960s when he wrote, “To seek understanding means to seek a conceptual model of the processes of nationalism and nationality. We seek a model which will fit the known facts, and facilitate some prediction and control of events.”<sup>6</sup> Others would distance themselves from such scientific hubris, but common to nearly every scholar of the day was the conviction that modernization *caused* (in either a strong or weak sense of that word) nationalism. Although the contrast between intellectual and social history provoked many heated debates at the time, both approaches were united by a common historiosophical vision, according to which modernity carried nationalism with it into the world. Hayes summarized this conviction in a passage that could have appeared in almost any book on nationalism written from the 1930s to the 1990s:

[Nationalism] was a response to the industrialism and materialism of the age, and to the pseudoscientific propaganda which was spread nationally through the new mass movements, the new mass education, and the new mass journalism. It attended – and inspired – nationalist imperialism and intolerance. . . .It eventuated . . . in the world wars of the present century.<sup>7</sup>

1983 appeared to be the year in which the study of nationalism was transformed. In an extraordinary congruence of scholarly energy, three seminal texts appeared in that year: Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*, Ernst Gellner’s *Nations and Nationalism*, and Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s *The Invention of Tradition*. The English language translation of Miroslav Hroch’s *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* appeared two years later, and together these four books reframed the scholarly discussion of nationalism for years to come.<sup>8</sup> To this day, virtually every historian of nationalism is obliged to cite these seminal

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<sup>5</sup> Many works of the 1970s and early 1980s expounded the historiosophical vision of nationalism’s rise into and through modernity. Some of the most famous examples in English include John A. Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982); John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982); George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (New York: H. Fertig, 1975); Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1977).

<sup>6</sup> Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), 86.

<sup>7</sup> Hayes, *Nationalism, A Religion*, 93.

<sup>8</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm

volumes, and to agree or disagree with their basic arguments. Without in any way belittling the importance of these works, they were not quite as revolutionary (nor ultimately as controversial) as some of the ensuing polemics might suggest. In fact, we might even say that the importance of these four works did not lie so much in their novelty, but in the way they captured and summarized what had already become a consensus about nations and nationalism. Anderson's famous title purported to depict nations as "imagined," and Hobsbawm and Ranger characterized tradition as something "invented." These two loaded words were alone enough to spark debates about the degree to which national identity was (or was not) grounded in enduring social formations. Anthony Smith, for example, responded that a nation could only emerge if an ethnic community (which he called an "*ethnie*") was already in place. As he wrote in 1986, "not only did many nations and nationalisms spring up on the basis of pre-existing *ethnie* and their ethnocentrism, but in order to forge a 'nation' today, it is vital to create and crystallize ethnic components, the lack of which is likely to constitute a serious impediment to 'nation-building.'"<sup>9</sup> But as is so often the case with academic debates, the heat of the polemical exchanges obscured the broad terrain of consensus that linked most scholars of nationalism in the 1980s. Smith never questioned that modernization provided the solvents that converted *ethnie* into nations, and Anderson, Hobsbawm, et al. never really claimed that nations were as ephemeral as terms like "invented" and "imagined" might imply. In fact, the "class of 1983" grounded the process of "invention" firmly within inexorable social forces – so much so as to make their nations as "real" as any social formation could possibly be. The nations we see in these narratives are indeed created, but the agent of creation is History (with a very teleological capital "H"). They are imagined and invented only in the sense that they are rooted in a mutable historical narrative rather than an immutable natural order. As Gellner put it, "The roots of nationalism in the distinctive structural requirements of industrial society are very deep indeed. This movement is the fruit neither of ideological aberration, nor of emotional excess. . . . the movement is . . . the external manifestation of a deep adjustment in the relationship between polity and culture which is quite unavoidable."<sup>10</sup> Gellner might be more explicit than most in his evocation of historical

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and Terence Ranger, eds, *The Invention of Tradition* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1983); Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*, translated by Ben Fowkes (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

<sup>9</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 17.

<sup>10</sup> Gellner, 35.

inevitability, but he is hardly alone. Even though few serious scholars today would claim that national identity is hard-wired into the human psyche, it becomes no less “real” for being historicized. Hobsbawm argued in a later work that the nation had to be studied as a “concept” rather than a “reality,” but he explained that “concepts, of course, are not part of free-floating philosophical discourse, but socially, historically and locally rooted, and must be explained in terms of these realities.”<sup>11</sup> The “inventions” and “imaginings” of the 1980s, then, were far less provocative than they may have appeared at first glance.

If the novelty of that batch of scholarship has been somewhat overstated, the more profound changes that came in the 1990s may have been under-appreciated. Anglophone historians are still coming to terms with the much-discussed “cultural turn” that swept the discipline over the past decade.<sup>12</sup> Setting aside the unfortunate proliferation of jargon that surfaced as historians struggled to draw useful lessons from the likes of Foucault, Jameson, and Derrida, a great deal of outstanding scholarship has emerged in the wake of these interdisciplinary explorations. One unambiguously positive result has been to expand our field of vision to aspects of the past that once escaped our attention. The study of popular culture in particular has blossomed over the past decade, with fascinating implications for our understanding of national identity.<sup>13</sup> As Adam Lerner put it in 1993, “The nation comes to life in texts other than those which are ostensibly nationalist; it is sustained in the discourses of gender and sexuality, in discussions of economics and ecology, in the language of the everyday and of theory.”<sup>14</sup> If nothing else, the focus on “culture” (indeed, the very attempt to define that elusive term) has helped us transcend the old, increasingly sterile tensions between intellectual and social history.

But perhaps most profoundly, the “cultural turn” has transformed the study of nationalism by inspiring scholars to give renewed attention to the way historical narratives themselves are implicated in the construction and maintenance of national identity. The

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<sup>11</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 9.

<sup>12</sup> For a general overview of how historians have responded to the “cultural turn”, see the excellent collection of essays, *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture*, ed. by Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

<sup>13</sup> See, for example, Tim Edensor, *National Identity, Popular Culture, and Everyday Life* (New York: Berg, 2002).

<sup>14</sup> Adam Lerner, “Introduction,” in Marjorie Ringrose and Adam J. Lerner, eds., *Reimagining the Nation* (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1993): 1.

historiographical tradition which we have developed to understand nationalism has itself served the agenda of nationalism, both by naturalizing national identity and by obscuring a whole range of alternative forms of subjectivity (many of which are every bit as important in the “modern” world as national belonging).<sup>15</sup> Prasenjit Duara captured this argument succinctly with the title of his brilliant 1995 book, *Rescuing History from the Nation*. In Duara’s rendering of the emergence of nationalism in modern China, we see how history itself was utilized by nationalist activists to give their cause a sense of inexorability. “History” was necessarily marching forward to a world in which the nation-state was the natural, inevitable, and ultimately desirable means of ordering society and expressing popular will. Other forms of subjectivity – whether tribal or familial on the microcosmic scale, or imperial or religious on the macrocosmic scale – were relegated to subordinate positions, or scheduled for elimination altogether. A myriad of alternative forms of belonging and being were either embedded within a national discourse, or silenced as being un-national, and thus un-natural. This silencing was enabled by the force of historical narrative. In Duara’s words, “we have tended to regard History more as a transparent medium of understanding than as a discourse enabling historical players (including historians) to deploy its resources to occlude, repress, appropriate and, sometimes, negotiate with other modes of depicting the past and, thus, the present and future.” He takes history as an *object* of study, not merely a neutral *method* of study. This approach

denies that the movement of history is causally linear, that only antecedent causes produce effects within a cause-effect chain. It views history as transactional, where the present, by appropriating, repressing, and reconstituting dispersed meanings of the past,

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<sup>15</sup> Three edited volumes from the 1990s capture the way recent scholarship has focused upon the “fragments” or “fissures” within national identity: Homi K. Bhabha, ed. *Nation and Narration* (New York: Routledge, 1990); Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1996); Andrew Parker, et al., eds. *Nationalisms and Sexualities* (New York: Routledge, 1992). Perhaps the earliest scholarly work to explore the way nationalism structures normative behavior and silences alternative identities was George Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe* (New York: H. Fertig, 1975).

To see how this new wave of scholarship has transformed our understanding of nationalism in a wide variety of sites, see: Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Florencia E. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaușescu’s Romania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

also reproduces the past. At the same time, in investigating the process of appropriation, bifurcated history seeks not only to evoke the dispersed meaning but to disclose the ways in which this past may have provided the cause, the conditions, or the affinities which enabled the transformation.<sup>16</sup>

We have long been skilled at penetrating synchronic constructions of identity, and few scholars today would use labels like “race” or “gender” in an unreflective manner. Nowadays we accept these categories as cultural constructs – as (in a sense) “imagined,” just like the nation. But what distinguishes the nation from many other forms of belonging is the way in which it is embedded in historical time. If we successfully historicize gender, we undercut the claim that femininity and masculinity are natural and unalterable, but historicizing national belonging does little to challenge its power over how we perceive ourselves and others. To be sure, there has always been a naïve form of nationalism which has described natural traits as unchanging and eternal, but even in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the most powerful national discourses were themselves deeply historical. Nations were always “emerging,” “awakening,” “becoming,” “resurrecting,” “growing,” and even “dying”. They are nearly always portrayed as historically dynamic, and nearly always tied to some form of historiosophy. So when Benedict Anderson described the nation as “imagined,” he actually reinforced the power of a form of subjectivity which was always, anyway, in a state of “becoming.” In fact, Anderson himself discussed the existence of a modern mode of historical understanding, which he considered “the precise analogue of the idea of the nation.”<sup>17</sup> In his presentation, however, both nationalism and the historiosophy that goes with it are in turn produced by inexorable historical forces.

Once we direct our critical energies onto the historiosophy of national identity, as well as on the synchronic structure of national identity, we truly penetrate to the core of what it means to “be national.” Adjectives like “Polish” or “American” or “German” or “Irish” are never just sociological descriptions: they are understood to exist within a specific understanding of historical time. Only by problematizing that diachronic understanding, by revealing it as an ideological and cultural construction subject to contestation and (above all) to change, can we fully perceive how national identity functions. We need to get beyond the assumption that *with*

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<sup>16</sup> Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 5, 233-234.

*time* the ideology of nationalism must necessarily move in a certain direction, and that theorists of the nation must cope in predictable ways with the movement of time towards modernity. Accepting that sort of teleological mutability is nothing new. Instead, to understand nationalism and national belonging we need to interrogate the way people perceive historical time itself – the way they conceptualize history and prophecy, the means by which they plot their lives vis-à-vis the past and the future. These narratives both structure and limit how the nation can be imagined, and a closer look at the history of nationalism reveals that different narratives have been in play at different times and in different places. More precisely, multiple and competing narratives are always clashing, intersecting, and overlapping, in a never-ending process of conceptualizing and reconceptualizing the national self. Instead of describing the nation as a coherent “something” that changes over time, or as a byproduct of the movement of social formations through time, we ought to strive to illuminate the ways in which *both* nationalism *and* the historiosophy of the nation are contested and variable. Once we do this, we see that the nation and modernity are *mutually* constitutive: neither caused the other, because neither can be described as a force external to the other’s creation. Indeed, both are best portrayed not as coherent objects, but rather as spaces within which we formulate and argue about our sense of subjectivity. The march of historical time is not just the backdrop to the development of modern nationalism. Instead, the way in which modernity itself is perceived and positioned in time is shaped by how people talk about the nation – and visa versa.

This leads us to perhaps most profound innovation of the past decade of nationalism studies: a focus on the dialogical nature of identity politics. As noted earlier, in the 1960s and 1970s the key debate was between those who focused on intelligentsia elites, and those who studied the tectonic movement of social forces “from below”. The newest scholarship, in a nice Hegelian resolution, seeks a synthesis between these two contrasting approaches by exploring the ways elites attempt to impose vocabularies of order and social discipline on a “people” that never ceases to talk back in unpredictable ways. Partha Chatterjee speaks of a “coming together of two domains of politics” (the elite and the popular) and recognizes that “the language of nationalism underwent a quite radical transformation of meaning in the peasant domain of politics.” Elite nationalism, he concludes, was never able to “absorb and appropriate its other

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<sup>17</sup> Anderson, 31.

within a single homogeneous unity.”<sup>18</sup> But the methodological consequence of this observation (as Chatterjee’s own scholarly practice demonstrates) is not to abandon the study of elite discourse, or to describe well-formulated ideologies as if they were mere reactions to (or worse, reflections of) popular desires. Nor should we allow ourselves to imagine a clear dichotomy between the “ideologies” of intellectuals and the “practices” of the masses. Instead, we need to read the intelligentsia’s texts with an eye toward their struggle against the heterogeneity of social reality, a reality with its own well-formulated worldviews, its own discursive practices, and even its own distinctive ideologies. In fact, we are really dealing with more than two domains: there is too much variety within each of Chatterjee’s categories to sustain such a crisp distinction. It might be better to describe the intelligentsia’s search for coherence and singularity, set against a world of irreducible multiplicity. More than twenty years ago Theodore Zeldin directed our attention to the “makers of myths” who strive to “master variety and make it uniform,” and since that time we have grown accustomed to considering how discursive formations structure and limit the very choices we perceive, how the plurality of social existence can be disciplined in ways that limit the expression of “popular aspirations.”<sup>19</sup>

Scholars like Anderson or Gellner described how intellectuals responded to historical processes that seemed external to themselves; more recently historians have been trying to understand how people have created their own places in history even as they themselves moved through time. We are no longer faced with a clear “modernity” or a self-evident “process of modernization.” Rather, we see a cluster of confusing changes (industrialization, urbanization, cultural flux) and a social world of irreducible variety. When intellectuals, politicians, social activists, journalists, writers, artists, and others tried to make sense of that variety (and simultaneously, to discipline it), they drew upon the rhetorical resources of a well-established vocabulary of national identity. The result was a dialogical dynamic in which historicized means of self-perception were propagated, accepted, and even made hegemonic. But the resulting “identities” never ceased to be dialogical, and their place in historical time never became entirely fixed.

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<sup>18</sup>Chatterjee, *Fragments*, 159–60.

<sup>19</sup>Zeldin, 3. From a slightly different perspective, see the discussion of “elite discourse” in Verdery, “The Production and Defense of ‘the Romanian Nation,’” in Fox, 81, and Verdery, *National Ideology*, 6–7. For a general discussion of how “subalterns” are silenced and how one might go about recovering their voices, see Prakash; Mallon, “Promise and Dilemma”; and Cooper.