Alex Silk


I am a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham. I completed my Ph.D. philosophy at the University of Michigan. I am interested in all things modal, conditional, context-sensitive, projective, and expressive. My dissertation was on the meaning of normative language—especially deontic modals—and how incorporating insights from philosophy of language and linguistics can illuminate classic questions in (meta)normative theory. I recently finished a book defending contextualism about a range of expressions that have figured in recent contextualism/relativism debates (below).

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  1. Discourse Contextualism: A Framework for Contextualist Semantics and Pragmatics. 2016. Oxford University Press UK.


  1. “Normative Language in Context.” Forthcoming. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 12. Winner of the 2015 Sanders Prize in Metaethics.

  2. “How to Embed an Epistemic Modal: Attitude Problems and Other Defects of Character.” Forthcoming. Philosophical Studies.

  3. “Normativity in Language and Law”: Forthcoming. In D. Plunkett, S. Shapiro, & K. Toh (Eds.), Legal Norms, Ethical Norms: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. Oxford University Press.

  4. “Contextualism in Metaethics.” Forthcoming. In T. McPherson & D. Plunkett (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics.

  5. “Nietzsche and Contemporary Metaethics.” Forthcoming. In P. Katsafanas (Ed.), Routledge Philosophy Minds: Nietzsche.

  6. “The Progressive and Verbs of Creation.” 2016. Journal of Semantics 33(1): 19–48.

  7. “Update Semantics for Weak Necessity Modals.” 2016. In O. Roy, A. Tamminga, M. Willer (Eds.), Deontic Logic and Normative Systems (DEON 2016), pp. 237–255. College Publications.

  8. “How to Be an Ethical Expressivist.” 2015. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91(1): 47–81.

  9. “Nietzschean Constructivism.” 2015. Inquiry, Special Issue: Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology, 58(3): 244-280.

  10. “What Normative Terms Mean and Why It Matters for Ethical Theory.” 2015. In M. Timmons (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. 5, pp. 296–325. Oxford University Press.

  11. “Accommodation and Negotiation with Context-Sensitive Expressions.” 2014. Thought 3(2): 115-123.

  12. “Evidence-Sensitivity in Weak Necessity Deontic Modals.” 2014. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43(4): 691-723.

  13. “Why ‘Ought’ Detaches.” 2014. Philosophers’ Imprint 14(7): 1-16.

  14. “Wither Anankastics?” (with Billy Dunaway). 2014. Philosophical Perspectives 28: Ethics, 75-94.

  15. “Truth-Conditions and the Meanings of Ethical Terms.” 2013. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 8.

  16. “Modality, Weights, and Inconsistent Premise Sets.” In A. Chereches (Ed.), Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 22, pp. 43-64. 2012. (SUPERSEDED: See the drafts “Weak and Strong Necessity” and “Modality, Weights, and Inconsistent Premise Sets” below for more up-to-date developments of the ideas in this paper.)


(Please do not cite or quote without permission. Comments welcome.)

  1. “Weak and Strong Necessity”: language. (This is an expanded and revised version of the sections in my 2012 SALT paper on weak and strong necessity modals, and of Chapter 3 of my 2013 dissertation.)

  2. “Deontic Conditionals: Weak and Strong”: language. (A previous version of this paper was published in Proceedings of the 19th International Congress of Linguists, Départment de Linguistique de l’Université de Genève, 2013.)

  3. “Evaluational Adjectives”

  4. “Expectation Biases and Context Management with Negative Polar Questions”

  5. “Modality, Weights, and Inconsistent Premise Sets”: language. (This is an expanded version of the section of my SALT paper on weights and priorities.)

  6. “Commitment in Mood and Modality”

  7. “Vagueness, Comparatives, and Scale Structure”

  8. “Agent-Relative Teleology, Conditional Preferences, and Centered Worlds”: ethics


  1. 1. Review of R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 6. Ethics 122(3): 622–627.

  2. 2. Review of P. Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

  3. 3. Critical Notice of G. Fletcher & M. Ridge (Eds.), Having it Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics. Analysis.