Published and Forthcoming Works

conditionally accepted Pension Returns and Popular Support for Markets in Post-Pension Reform Latin America (tables and figures here) British Journal of Political Science

Forthcoming  Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation and WTO Dispute Initiation in Developing Countries. (with Timm Betz) International Organization

Forthcoming Does It Pay To Be Poor? Testing for systematically underreported GNI estimates - (w/ Alison Beatty & Morten Jerven) Review of International Organizations

Forthcoming The Influence of Interest: Real US Interest Rates and Participation in Bilateral Investment Treaties (w/ Timm Betz) Review of International Organizations

2015 Can Foreign Stock Investors Influence Policymaking? Comparative Political Studies 48(1)35-64

2014 What We Talk About When We Talk About Foreign Direct Investment.International Studies Quarterly 58(4), 805-815

2014 (With Jane Lawrence) What's The Risk? Bilateral Investment Treaties, Political Risk and Fixed Capital Accumulation  British Journal of Political Science. 44(1), pp. 107-121

2012 (with Holli Semetko and Margaret Scammell) “Leaders on the Campaign Trail: The Impact of Television News on Perceptions of Party Leaders in British General Elections” in Sage Handbook of Political Communication, Holli Semetko and Margaret Scammell, eds.. Sage Publications Ltd

2010 (w/ Jeffrey Kucik). “The International and Domestic Determinants of Insider Trading Laws”(with Jeffrey Kucik). International Studies Quarterly 54, 657–682

2010 “Wpływ polityki inwestycyjnej OFE na ład korporacyjny w Polsce” (The impact of OFE investment policies on the politics of Polish corporate governance) (w/ Eric Reinhardt) Better Government Programme, Ernst and Young Poland

Press Coverage of “Wpływ polityki inwestycyjnej OFE na ład korporacyjny w Polsce” (In Polish) Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita

2009 “Why Should I Believe You: The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties”International Studies Quarterly. 53(1) 73-102.


Selected Working Papers and Projects

The Ownership Society? Pension Reform and the Financialization of Mass Politics (Book Manuscript - under contract at Oxford University Press, in revisions)

Prospectus draft first chapter

Salvation by Good Works?: Offshoring, Corporate Philanthropy and Public Attitudes Toward Trade Policy (W/ Jane Sumner) Under Review

Abstract: We explore the relationship between “offshoring” and attitudes towards free trade.  Offshoring is a deeply unpopular among Americans; we hypothesize that priming Americans to think about it will dampen their enthusiasm for free trade. We test this hypothesis using a survey experiment in which we randomize exposure to a press release for a new product, ask our respondents to rate their enthusiasm for the product, and ask a series of ostensibly unrelated political questions. The press releases mention that the product is made abroad, but are not overtly political, and we make no effort to connect it with any of our political questions. We find support for our hypothesis. Individuals that read the press release before being asked about their trade preferences were significantly less likely to support free trade than respondents who were asked about their trade preferences before reading the press release.  We also find that our press releases’ effect on trade attitudes is substantially mitigated when it also mentions the offshoring firm’s philanthropic efforts in their local (American) community.  This is consistent with Brunk’s (2010) finding that distaste for offshoring connects to a sense that it represents an unethical lack of consideration for local communities. It also connects this paper with a larger literature on the effects of corporate social responsibility initiatives.




Calling the Shot: The Political Economy of Inflation Targeting (w/ Alton Worthington)

Abstract:  Inflation targeting – the use an explicit, forward looking inflation rate as the target for monetary policy – has become popular among central bankers as a mechanism for alleviating self-fulfilling inflationary expectations in the private sector.  Despite this, the jury is still out with respect to inflation targeting’s effectiveness.  At its core, inflation targeting is an observable promise to conduct monetary policy in a way that is not necessarily politically expedient. Inflation targeting's success is tightly bound to the credibility of that promise. We propose that inflation targeting will only be successful when the monetary authority is sufficiently independent from the government, and when this independence is made verifiable by democratic institutions.  While the importance of pairing inflation targeting with independent and transparent monetary institutions is well established, it remains untested in the extant literature and, indeed, cannot be tested with commonly used identifiers of inflation targeting regimes.  We test our hypothesis using an alternative identifier of inflation targeting regimes and cross-national survey data on inflationary expectations in the private sector.  We find that inflation targeting is only effective in democracies with independent central banks.

The Wages of Sin: Foreign Debt Load , Inflation Credibility and Institutional Efficacy

Abstract: Excessive foreign currency debt liabilities are usually thought of as a bad
thing, not least of which because the need to preserve public and private balance sheets prevents monetary authorities from managing output through inflation. I argue that there is an upside to this: foreign currency debt liabilities act as a clear and credible signal that monetary authorities will not pursue inflationary policies for electoral gain, easing private sector inflationary expectations in the process. By making inflation less attractive, the presence of foreign currency debt also has implications for when we should expect fixed exchange rates, inflation targets and central bank independence to have an effect on private sector inflationary expectations. These institutions work by raising the costs of running inflation that would otherwise be attractive to governments. They should be less relevant to inflationary expectations when inflation is already known to be politically unattractive. I test these hypotheses empirically by extending Broz and Plouffe's (2010) model of inflationary expectations. My results suggest that the combination of an open capital account and foreign currency debt 1) lowers inflationary expectations, and 2) significantly diminishes the effect that exchange rate fixes or inflation targets have on inflationary expectations.