PubPol/Econ 541

Class 14

Why Countries Restrict Trade

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Clarification from last time





Figure 5 Tariff on Imported Input to Production of <u>Non</u>-traded Final Good



Tariff on Imported Input to Production of Non-traded Final Good

Pause for News

Class 10: Policies and Institutions: National Other

Announcements

 Note that Paper 2 is due Nov 8. Confer with your team soon and look at the assignment, so that you can ask any questions.

Outline

- Multiple reasons
- Second best use of tariffs
- Political economy
- Why are trade barriers so low?
- Recent uses of protection

Pause for Discussion

Questions on KOM

- What benefits from free trade are not captured in the partial equilibrium model?
- The textbook mentions only two arguments against free trade: terms of trade and market failure. Can you think of others?

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Multiple Reasons

- See my Glossary:
 - Lists: Arguments for Protection
 - I list 26, and our examples later suggest more

Arguments for Protection

Balance of payments Cultural Decreasing cost **Domestic distortions Employment** Environmental protection Externalities Fairness Foreign investment Graham's Income redistribution Infant industry Labor standards

<u>Monopoly</u> National defense Noneconomic objectives **Optimal tariff** Patriotism Pauper labor Revenue Second-best Self-sufficiency Strategic industry Strategic trade policy Sunset industry Terms of trade

Multiple Reasons

- Details on just a few
 - Cultural: Sustain a distinctive culture that would be undermined by imports
 - Foreign investment: Use tariff to induce foreign companies to invest instead of export
 - Infant industry: Let new industry "learn by doing" behind tariff wall
 - Patriotism: Support our own producers

Pause for Discussion

Questions (not asked before)

- Which of these seem to have motivated Trump's tariffs?
- Which look like they may be legal under GATT/WTO?

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
- First, why do economists expect undistorted markets to do well?
 - To the extent that
 - Supply curves measure marginal cost (MC), and
 - Demand curves measure marginal benefit (MB),
 - Then market price equates these
 - MC=MB is the recipe for maximizing benefit net of cost
- But what if the curves <u>don't</u> measure these?
 - Then we say there are "distortions" and market price is not optimal.
 - The harm done by a tariff is an example of this.

- Our model says tariffs hurt if all else is perfect. What if there are
 - Market failures?
 - Distortions?
 - Externalities?
 - Imperfect competition?
 - Etc.

- Answer
 - A tariff can offset some distortions and therefore <u>may</u> raise welfare
 - But there is <u>always</u> another policy that will do better
 - Reason: A tariff creates two distortions (see our triangles of dead-weight loss)
 - One may offset a distortion, but the other makes things worse
 - Hence tariff is "second best"


- Example
 - Suppose production yields a "positive externality"
 - Production provides a benefit not captured (or charged for) by producers
 - A tariff stimulates production and so generates more of the externality – That's good!
 - For example, European farms make countryside attractive to tourists

Small country with positive externality



Positive Externality, E

Small country tariff with positive externality




- Welfare effects of a tariff, if set equal to *E*, starting from free trade:
 - Suppliers gain +a
 Demanders lose -(a+b+c+d)
 Government gains +c
 Externality benefit +(b+e)
 - − Country gain or loss +e −d

Specific Tariff *t=E*

- Result
 - Tariff raises welfare if e > d
 - That is, if
 - the benefit of increased externality exceeds
 - the demand-distortion loss of the tariff

- But there's a better policy: subsidize supply:
 - That leaves demanders facing world price
 - Lets suppliers be paid P_W +E
- Causes only <u>one</u> distortion, of supply, and – That is beneficial because
 - It corrects the distortion of the externality
 - Without also distorting demand

Small country production subsidy with positive externality



•	Welfare effects of a subsidy, if
	set equal to <i>E</i> , starting from
	free trade

—	Suppliers gain	+a
	Demanders lose	0
_	Government loses	–(a+b)
_	Externality benefit	+(b+e)
_	Country gains	+6

But note that:

- Tariff creates revenue
- Subsidy costs the gov't

Production subsidy *s=E*

- In general, distortions (market failures) distort only supply <u>or</u> demand
- A tariff can only correct one by hurting the other
- A more direct policy tax or subsidy on distorted behavior – will be "first best"
 - Except for budget implications

Pause for Discussion

Questions on KOM

- How does the theory of the second best provide reasons that tariffs may be beneficial?
- How does it also provide reasons why tariffs are not the best policy in such cases?

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Political Economy

- Explain policies based on features of the political process
 - Allow for
 - Voting
 - Lobbying
 - Other forms of political pressure by interest groups
 - But also allow policymakers to care about economic well-being as in our models




Figure 13.2. House voting on trade legislation, by party, 1890–2015. (Compiled by the author.)

Source: Irwin, p. 788


Political Economy

- Politics of tariffs in US 2024 election
 - See Ponnuru
 - Trump promises new tariffs
 - "End our gaping trade deficits"
 - "Bring back millions of American jobs"
 - "Bring trillions and trillions of dollars pouring into the United States Treasury from foreign countries"
 - Biden does not, but he's been aggressive on other trade-related policies
 - China policies
 - IRA subsidy conditions
 - Favors unions, who are protectionist

Political Economy


- Politics of tariffs in US 2024 election
 - Trumps "tariffs have become an item of bipartisan consensus."
 - But public is more positive on trade than the politicians and than they were 10 years ago
 - "Gallup finds that Americans are more likely to consider trade an opportunity, and less likely to consider it a threat, than they were 10 years ago."
 - "That's especially true among Democrats."

Share of people in the United States who think increased tariffs between the United States and its trading partners is a good thing for the country in 2019, by party



Support for US Tariffs on China (from poll Mid-May 2022)

Should the United States keep existing tariffs on China in place or reduce them to lower the prices of consumer goods? (%)



Pause for Discussion

Questions on KOM

 What is the "median voter theory," and why does it seem not to explain protection?

Questions on Baldwin & Magee "Is Trade Policy for Sale?"

- By what mechanisms do theorists suggest that political contributions result in votes for and against trade liberalization?
- Do businesses and labor groups in the US tend to contribute in favor of protection or free trade?
- What were the three Congressional votes studied by Baldwin and Magee? Which side – labor or business – had the greater effect on the voting?

Questions on Baldwin & Magee "Is Trade Policy for Sale?"

- What do they estimate as the "price" of one congressional vote against NAFTA or the WTO?
- Were campaign contributions the only thing that mattered for congressional votes on these trade issues?

Questions on Ponnuru, "The Politics of Trade Favor ..."

- Does Trump promise more tariffs?
- What does he claim tariffs will do?
 - Why are two of his claims contradictory?
 - And why are all proven wrong by experience?
- Why do politicians favor tariffs?
- Will there be lots of new tariffs?

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Why Aren't Tariffs Higher?

- Magee lists 6 possible reasons why tariffs are not higher:
 - X Politicians are not responsive to lobbying efforts
 - $\sqrt{2}$. Welfare costs of tariffs are higher than traditionally measured
 - $\sqrt{3}$. The GATT was successful in reducing trade barriers
 - $\sqrt{4}$. Free riding by firms hinders lobby organization
 - Solution Users of imported goods lobby against tariffs
- $\sqrt{\sqrt{6}}$. Protection is given, but by non-tariff barriers, which are high
 - Magee's view of the evidence
 - #1, 5 not important
 - #2, 3, 4 play a small role
 - #6 is most important: actual protection is much higher than tariffs

Pause for Discussion

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Questions on Magee "Why Are Trade Barriers So Low?"

- Does the main "political economy" model for explaining tariffs say that politicians care only about campaign contributions?
- Why does Magee give only partial credit to GATT negotiations in explaining the fall of tariffs since the 1930s?

Questions on Magee "Why Are Trade Barriers So Low?"

- How do the following terms or concepts figure in explanations for why trade barriers are low:
 - free riding;
 - peace;
 - imported inputs;
 - non-tariff barriers?

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- Some examples from earlier (not in this year's readings):
 - India considers tariffs on China after border conflict
 - Pakistan to "halt trade with India" after actions on Kashmir
 - Japan uses export controls on S Korea after Korea seeks compensation for forced labor in WWII
 - US bars arms exports to Hong Kong after China reduces Hong Kong independence

- More from earlier:
 - China puts tariffs on Australian barley after Australia seeks inquiry on origins of coronavirus.
 - US may stop cocoa imports from Ivory Coast for using child labor.
 - China blocked meat imports from Canada after Canada arrested daughter of Huawei founder.
 - China had a ban (and has now lifted it) on US chicken due to outbreak of avian flu.

- From last year:
 - US banned avocados from Mexico due to verbal threat made to US inspector in Mexico.
 - US threatened tariffs on countries using a digital services tax.
 - China suspended imports of many food products from Taiwan in response to Nancy Pelosi visit.

- From this year:
 - Mexico banned GM corn
 - India regulates imports of laptops

Message from much of this:

Countries often restrict trade to hurt other countries that they are angry at.

Pause for Discussion

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Questions on Krugman "Two Cheers for Carbon Tariffs"

- Why would Krugman favor a carbon tariff even if it were as economically harmful as a tariff usually is?
- Why does he discuss the economics of the value added tax?
- A carbon tariff set equal to a domestic carbon tax makes sense, but what if the domestic policy is regulation, not tax?
- Why does he give only two cheers, not the usual three?

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