4

How Do Rules and Institutions Encourage Vote Buying?

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As this volume demonstrates, vote buying is a complex phenomenon, in terms of both its causes and its consequences. Chapter 3 discusses a variety of conditions that lead to a market for votes, including the availability of cost-efficient alternatives to vote buying. In this chapter, I explore a few of the political and institutional factors that can make vote buying a more or less attractive strategy for parties and candidates vis-à-vis some of these alternatives. In doing so, I discuss only briefly various structural and cultural explanations of vote buying, such as level of economic development, cultural norms, and the prevalence of patron-client networks. Each of these certainly plays a part in shaping the mix of electoral strategies that parties and candidates choose to employ. However, in this chapter I focus on the ways in which various rules and institutions can affect the incentive and capacity to buy votes.¹ I do not discuss here the logistics of vote buying—how candidates and parties organize vote brokers, avoid detection, and minimize slippage. These issues are dealt with at length in Chapters 3 and 5.

Why focus on institutions if they are only part of a chain of variables that can motivate or discourage vote buying? First, certain institutions have independent, predictable, and discernible effects on vote buying incentives. While they are only one piece of the puzzle, they are an important piece. Second, although institutional reform is by no means easy, institutions such as electoral rules and campaign finance regulations are arguably more malleable than cultural norms or levels of development in the short to medium term. As a result, institutional reform is often an important part of anti-vote buying campaigns (see Chapter 9).

I consider here the factors that motivate candidates to adopt personal electoral strategies, including vote buying. These include candidate-centered electoral systems, access to government resources, and decentralized party nomination and funding procedures. Each candidate for elected office must select an electoral strategy (or mix of strategies) by determining when
partisan appeals will be successful and when candidate-centered campaigns will be more effective.

Given strong incentives to adopt a personal campaign strategy, what sort of personal appeals do candidates choose to make? A variety of personal strategies are available to candidates, including relying on name and fame, voter intimidation, delivering (or promising) pork or patronage, or directly exchanging cash or goods for votes.2 Again, a mix of socioeconomic, cultural, and institutional factors influences the combination of personal strategies that candidates employ. In short, I argue that incentives to cultivate a personal vote interact with other variables to affect the probability that a candidate will choose to pursue vote buying.3 I do not contend that candidates and parties will never buy votes in the absence of such personal vote incentives; indeed, in the absence of those incentives they may still attempt to affect the outcome of an election via massive vote buying. Rather, I simply contend that vote buying is more likely (give certain conditions) where those incentives exist.

Political and Institutional Incentives for Pursuing Personal Strategies

There is no single root cause of vote buying. Socioeconomic factors such as income levels, education, and urbanization can shape the market for votes, as can societal patterns and norms (e.g., the pervasiveness of patron-client links). Vote buying is also located within a larger political order. For example, in Thailand and the Philippines, vote buying is fueled by the chronic neglect of poor and rural areas (see Chapter 9; see also Nelson 1998b; Sombat 1993, 1997; Anek 1997; Ammar n.d.). Likewise, the rules and institutions under which candidates must operate can also influence their incentives to purchase electoral support. Certain sets of institutions encourage candidates to focus their efforts on building personal networks of electoral support, with vote buying potentially playing a large role in those efforts.

Recently the literature on comparative parties and elections has begun to focus on the extent to which the electoral and party rules generate a party vote and party-centered campaigns versus a personal vote and candidate-centered campaigns (e.g., Katz 1986; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Ames 1995; Carey and Shugart 1995; Samuels 1999; Golden and Chang 2001; Hicken 2002; Golden 2003).4 In some democratic systems, candidates for public office distinguish themselves from competitors on the basis of partisan differences.5 In electoral contests, the party’s label and reputation constitute the key currency for candidates. In other systems, personal reputation and candidate-focused appeals supplant partisan appeals as the medium of exchange.
Candidate-Centered Electoral Rules

Certain features of the electoral system strongly influence candidates’ choice of strategy. At the most basic level, whether or not voters cast a vote for a party or party list or for an individual candidate affects candidate incentives. All else being equal, where electoral systems limit voters to a single choice among parties, as in closed-list proportional representation systems, candidates are more likely to rely on party-centered strategies. Conversely, where voters can cast votes for individual candidates or can cast multiple votes, the incentives to cultivate a personal vote tend to be stronger (Carey and Shugart 1995; Hicken 2002). However, the feature that has received the most attention in terms of personal vote and candidate-centered campaigning is intraparty competition (Shugart and Carey 1992; Katz 1986; Reed 1994; Lijphart 1994; Carey and Shugart 1995).

Intraparty competition occurs when members of the same party (copartisans) must campaign against each other within the same district. In many systems, a candidate’s party affiliation is a useful tool for both candidates and voters (Downs 1957; Popkin 1991). Voters can rely on partisan affiliation to help determine where a candidate stands on issues of importance to the voters, while candidates can use the party label to distinguish themselves from competitors. In electoral systems with intraparty competition, however, the party label is not a tool voters or candidates can use to separate one candidate from another, since there are multiple candidates from the same party in the race. In other words, an appeal to party policies and principles may not be sufficient when a candidate is directly competing against a copartisan. Voters must be given a reason to select a particular candidate over candidates from other parties and over (or at least before) candidates from within the same party. Thus, candidates competing in an environment with intraparty competition face strong incentives to cultivate a personal vote.

Intraparty competition arises in a diverse set of electoral systems. All electoral systems that (1) give each voter “the option of casting one or more votes directly for candidates” (Samuels 1999, 490), (2) allow for more than one candidate from the same party to run in a given district, and (3) award seats to candidates on the basis of their individual vote totals, have the potential to produce intraparty competition (Samuels 1999, 490). Probably the best-known examples of systems with intraparty competition are single nontransferable vote and open-list proportional representation. In the former, voters cast a single vote for a candidate in multiseat districts, and seats are awarded to candidates on the basis of the plurality rule. The single nontransferable vote system has been used in pre-1994 Japan, Taiwan, and post-1997 Thailand (for Senate elections) (Hicken and Kasuya 2003). In open-list proportional representation systems, voters have the option of casting a vote for a party list, or voting/indicating a preference for a specific candi-
date, or both. The number of seats a party receives reflects its vote share, but the distribution of preference votes among that party’s candidates determines who will fill those seats. Open-list proportional representation systems have been used in Brazil, pre-1994 Italy, Poland, and Chile.

Besides these two well-studied electoral systems, other candidate-centered electoral systems can produce intraparty competition. These include single transferable vote systems (e.g., Ireland, Malta, Australian Senate), block-vote systems (e.g., Thailand, Mauritius, Philippine Senate), and single-member district plurality systems, which use primary elections (e.g., the United States) or which allow multiple candidates from the same party to run in a district (e.g., the Philippines).

A variety of electoral systems present strong incentives to candidates to emphasize person over party. Given these incentives, how do candidates go about setting themselves apart from their copartisans? How do they cultivate a personal vote? One option is relying on name and fame to win the support of voters. Obviously, not all candidates can use this strategy, but it is often employed in candidate-centered electoral systems by the likes of entertainment and sports celebrities, well-known activists, or members of powerful families. Likewise, violence and voter intimidation can also be used to create personal support networks.

Another means of cultivating a personal vote is to emphasize policy or factional differences within the party (Cox and Thies 1998; Samuels 1999) (in fact, intraparty competition is often associated with the rise of institutionalized party factions). This is a common strategy in US primary campaigns, in which candidates often go to great lengths to paint their copartisans as too far to the left or right to be trusted by the party’s voters. In the 2004 Democratic presidential primary campaign, one candidate argued that he represented the Democratic (read: liberal) wing of the Democratic Party, while another is countered that he represented the electable (read: moderate) wing of the party (Newsweek Online 2003). The temptation for candidates to play up intraparty policy and factional differences presents party leaders with a dilemma. Leaders recognize the need for party members to cultivate a personal vote, but “would prefer that candidates not fight publicly over policy because this might make it less clear what the party stands for, perhaps reducing the number of voters choosing the party in the first place” (Cox and Thies 1998, 272). In short, fighting between copartisans risks undermining party cohesion and diluting the value of the party label.

One way out of this dilemma is for party leaders to allow or encourage candidates to cultivate a personal support network by directing (or promising to direct) pork and other particularistic forms of government largesse to a candidate’s constituents. This is a form of personal strategy common to virtually every democracy, but especially those with candidate-centered electoral systems. Particularistic benefits can come in several forms. These
include public goods targeted to specific geographic constituencies, \textsuperscript{9} constituency service (e.g., cutting red tape and other interventions with the bureaucracy), public sector jobs, and access to rents (via government contracts, licenses, etc.). Indeed, candidates typically use a mix of particularistic benefits to create and maintain personal networks of support (Ferejohn 1974; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Golden 2003).

Finally, candidates can cultivate a personal vote through vote buying. As this volume demonstrates, there are a wide variety of activities that can fall under the general category of vote buying. However, I wish to distinguish vote buying from pork or other forms of particularism, in terms of the nature of the exchange. Vote buying involves the \textit{individual}, \textit{immediate}, and \textit{private} exchange of goods, services, or cash for electoral support, usually in violation of legal norms (see Chapter 1 for more detail on this distinction).

In summary, candidate-centered electoral systems, particularly those with intraparty competition, generate strong incentives for candidates to eschew party-oriented campaign strategies in favor of cultivating a personal vote. The effects of these incentives are apparent in the electoral, party, and public policy arenas. Electorally, intraparty competition produces more expensive campaigns (Cox and Thies 1998; Golden and Chang 2001). On the party front, candidate-centered electoral systems tend to undermine party cohesion and party discipline (Reed 1994; Hicken 2002). Finally, governments in candidate-centered electoral systems tend to be more corrupt (Geddes and Neto 1992; Golden and Chang 2001; Golden 2003), tend to be more bureaucratically inefficient (Golden 2003), and tend to oversupply particularistic goods and services while undersupplying needed national public goods (Cox and McCubbins 2001; Hicken 2002; Golden 2003).

Electoral systems carry with them certain incentives for parties and candidates. However, even within a candidate-centered electoral system, a variety of other factors can mitigate the incentives to cultivate a personal vote, including party-specific characteristics and whether or not a party has access to government resources.

\textbf{Party Rules and Organization}

The way in which party leaders organize and manage the party has a lot to do with what sort of strategy candidates find attractive. For example, where a centralized party leadership controls nominations or access to the party label, members of that party are more likely to toe the party line and adopt a party-centered strategy (e.g., Carey and Shugart 1995).\textsuperscript{11} Conversely, if nomination control is decentralized or out of the party’s hands altogether (as is the case with open primaries), then candidates have much weaker incentives to privilege party strategies. These party features can vary independently of the type of electoral system (i.e., parties within the same electoral
system may differ in terms of their organization and hence in the types of strategies their candidates pursue).

A similar logic holds for control of campaign finance and access to pork. Where party members are dependent on a centralized party leadership for campaign funds or access to the pork barrel, they will be attuned to the preferences and priorities of party leaders seeking to promote and protect the value of the party label. Candidates who must generate their own campaign funds or who can easily and directly access resources for pork are better able to pursue personal strategies without the fear of reprisals from party leaders (Carey and Shugart 1995; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Samuels 1999). For example, in pre-1997 Thailand and post-1982 Brazil, legislators could obtain a significant amount of pork without the approval or input of party leaders (Hicken 2003; Ames 1995), while in pre-1973 Chile an extremely centralized party leadership controlled access to the pork barrel (Valenzuela 1977; Samuels 1999). All three of these countries used candidate-centered electoral systems, but the incentives to cultivate a personal vote were much stronger in Thailand and Brazil compared to Chile.

Access to Government Resources

In many candidate-centered electoral systems there exists a party (or parties) that is an exception to the norm of personalized parties—a party that is highly cohesive and actively promotes its ideological and policy distinctiveness. Often, these are parties that have been largely shut out of government. Without the resources of government, candidate-centered strategies that rely on these resources as the currency of campaigning are less viable. As an alternative, these parties may opt for party-centered strategies that emphasize the promotion and protection of the party’s label.12

Italy, Brazil, and Japan each contain examples of programmatic parties in the midst of candidate-centered electoral systems. All of these parties were consistently in the opposition. Miriam Golden and Eric Chang argue that Italy’s Communist Party, without access to the national government, overcame “the incentives to personalism” to create a “well-disciplined and centralized organization” (2001, 604). Brazil’s Workers Party did the same. “Because the [party] was not linked to government, was not formed from within the Congress, did not have an established team of well-known politicians, and generally lacked financial resources, it could not compete on the same turf as other parties by using similar tactics” (Samuels 1999, 512). Instead, the party opted to cultivate a strong and distinct party label. Finally, Japan’s Socialist Party, out of power for the entire single nontransferable vote period and unable to compete with the Liberal Democratic Party in the market for personal votes, “settled for the second-best solution of policy-based campaigns” (Cox and Thies 1998, 280).13
Competitiveness

The degree of electoral competition candidates face can also affect their incentives to cultivate a personal vote. However, the strength of this effect depends on the nature of the competition. Increased competition from copartisans is positively correlated with candidate-centered campaigning. The more intense the degree of intraparty competition, the more candidates will seek to cultivate a personal vote, all else being equal (Cox and Thies 1998; Golden and Chang 2001). Evidence of the effect of interparty competition, however, is mixed. Gary Cox and Michael Thies find that candidates do respond to tougher competition from other-party candidates, but also find that reaction to tougher intraparty competition is much stronger (1998, 287). In contrast, Golden and Chang find no significant relationship between the level of interparty competition and their proxy for candidate-centered campaigning (2001, 594).

To summarize, the types of strategies candidates adopt in their effort to win office vary depending on the surrounding institutional and political environment. Candidate-centered electoral systems, especially those with intraparty competition, generate strong incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote. The nature of party organization, candidate access to government resources, and the level of competition can also affect a candidate’s incentive to adopt personal rather than party-centered strategies.

Vote Buying vs. Alternative Personal Strategies

The fact that candidates must adopt personal strategies does not necessarily imply that vote buying will be the preferred vehicle for pursuing those strategies. Indeed, as discussed previously, a variety of means and methods can be employed by candidates in an effort to create personal support networks. Along with vote buying, these can include:

- targeting governmental pork and patronage to a candidate’s constituents
- relying on name and fame to cultivate a personal vote
- using patron-client relationships to engender loyalty and support
- emphasizing intraparty policy differences
- violence and intimidation (directed toward voters and other candidates)

This list is certainly not exhaustive, but each of these is a common method of cultivating a personal vote in candidate-centered electoral systems. It should also be clear that these strategies are not mutually exclusive. Patron-client networks can be mobilized in support of vote buying efforts, or voter intimi-
dation might be used to pressure voters into accepting money and voting as instructed. The question for the remainder of this chapter is: Under what conditions is vote buying one of the preferred methods for candidates? Careful research is needed to completely answer the question, but I discuss here some of the factors that shape whether vote buying will be a major part of a candidate’s arsenal. First, I argue that most candidates cannot rely solely on violence and intimidation, fame, and personal patronage—there are natural limits and risks associated with the use of these strategies. Second, concerning the question of vote buying versus pork or intraparty policy differentiation, I argue that a mix of socioeconomic, cultural, and institutional factors influences the expected utility of vote buying vis-à-vis other personal strategies. While a thorough test of the arguments is not possible here, part of the purpose of this volume is to help chart a research agenda for the future. In that spirit, I lay out several arguments about vote buying incentives—hypotheses that can be tested as the necessary data become available.

One way for candidates to cultivate personal support networks is by relying on name and fame and using personal resources to build patron-client relationships with potential voters. However, there are natural limits to the use of personal patronage or personal and family fame as a campaign strategy. Few candidates can rely on fame alone. Likewise, only a small fraction of the candidates in any given election have the means and influence necessary to act as a traditional patron. Cultivating client loyalty via the use of personal patronage takes consistent generosity over time, and most candidates lack the resources necessary for such a sustained investment. Even among those with the means to become traditional patrons, personal patronage is usually mixed with other strategies, such as vote buying (McVey 2000b; Arghiros 2000).¹⁶

Violence and intimidation, while not uncommon in the run-up to elections in many countries, is not a primary strategy for most candidates in most elections. Violence and intimidation on a scale large enough to achieve electoral success are costly. Most candidates lack the sufficient resources (money, men, and connections) to use violence as their primary electoral strategy. In addition, the use of violence and intimidation generally carries greater risks than other personal strategies such as vote buying. Violence against political rivals runs the risk of reprisal, and if caught, the penalty for violence and intimidation is usually greater than the penalty for vote buying. In short, the cost and risk of violence place some limits on their use and make other strategies, such as vote buying, relatively more attractive.

The Expected Utility of Vote Buying

Given the limits on violence, personal wealth, and fame as exclusive electoral strategies, let us consider why candidates may choose to buy votes
instead of or in addition to other strategies—for example, relying on government pork and patronage or emphasizing intraparty policy differences. The latter two strategies are evident in virtually all candidate-centered electoral systems, while vote buying is relatively less common (although by no means rare). To return to the questions posed earlier: How can we explain the prevalence of vote buying in some candidate-centered systems and not others? What factors affect the relative cost and benefits—the expected utility or opportunity cost—of vote buying vis-à-vis other strategies?

Structural, cultural, and socioeconomic factors can certainly shape the market for votes. For example, cultural norms of gift giving and the pervasiveness of patron-client links can create a social atmosphere conducive to vote buying. Socioeconomic factors such as the level of development/income and urbanization can also have a bearing on the incentives to buy votes.

Many scholars and policymakers draw a connection between the level of economic development and the prevalence of vote buying. They argue that the demand for and susceptibility to vote buying and other forms of clientelism is fueled by poverty (see, e.g., Anand 2001; Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2002). As incomes rise, the cost of vote buying will rise while the benefits decline, all else being equal, thus making other strategies more appealing. Specifically, as incomes rise, the marginal benefit to a voter of a given sum of money from a candidate decreases. To maintain a given level of support via vote buying, candidates must increase the amount of money they distribute. In light of this, candidates may find it more appealing to curtail vote buying and switch to alternative personal vote strategies that produce a better return.

However, there are reasons to be cautious about drawing too strong a link between economic underdevelopment and vote buying. On theoretical grounds, one might question the assumption implicit in arguments about the decreasing marginal utility of vote buying—namely that a candidate’s vote buying funds remain fixed or at least rise more slowly than average incomes. Alternatively, one might assume that a candidate’s capacity to buy votes increases commensurate with increases in average incomes. Development, in other words, means more resources for both voters and candidates. If this is the case, then development may have no effect on the prevalence of vote buying. Ultimately the relationship between development and vote buying is a matter for testing. Preliminary evidence from surveys in the Philippines and Brazil suggests that the link between income and vote buying is not as straightforward as some have supposed, but more empirical work is needed (Schaffer 2004; Speck and Abramo 2001).

Urbanization also has a negative impact on a candidates’ propensity to buy votes. If the development hypothesis holds, part of the reason for this will be the relatively higher incomes found in urban areas. However,
urbanization has an impact on candidate strategy independent of the income effects described above (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Shugart and Nielson 1999; Bloom, Craig, and Malaney 2001). First, the move to cities destroys the traditional patron-client networks through which candidate funds can be distributed, thus raising the cost of vote buying for candidates. Second, it is difficult to re-create patron-client relationships in urban areas. Due to the high price of land, urban voters are less likely to be homeowners and so move more frequently than do rural voters (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993, 39). Thus, candidates will find it relatively difficult to develop and maintain a core group of supporters. Third, urban voters tend to have a higher demand for public goods than do rural voters. As the attention of urbanites turns to issues such as traffic congestion, crime, and garbage collection, they begin to support candidates who campaign on local public-goods issues (pork).

While cultural and socioeconomic factors can influence the choice of personal strategy, it is important to remember that vote buying is embedded within a larger political order. Thus a variety of political and institutional factors can affect the expected utility of vote buying relative to other strategies. These include features of the electoral system and the strength of anti-vote buying legal measures.

Just as features of the electoral system can influence the decision to cultivate a personal or party vote, electoral rules and the nature of electoral competition can have a similar effect on the mix of personal strategies that candidates choose to employ. For example, electoral systems differ in their propensity to produce a supply of surplus votes. Where voters can cast multiple votes, each vote may not hold the same value. Voters may reserve some votes for the “true” expression of their preferences for candidates or parties, but view the others as extra votes, available for sale to the highest bidder. (See Chapter 9 for a discussion of the market for surplus votes in Thailand.) Thus, all else being equal, vote buying will be more likely where voters have multiple votes and a potential supply of surplus votes exists, than where voters cast a single vote.

Another electoral variable that can affect the expected utility of vote buying is district population size. All else being equal, the larger the district, the larger the amount of money required to buy a winning number of votes and the weaker or less dense the social networks needed to distribute money and monitor compliance (see Chapter 5).21 As vote buying becomes more costly and more difficult to carry out logistically, candidates face incentives to switch from individual-level vote buying to strategies aimed at larger numbers of constituents using government resources, such as pork barreling and patronage.22 For example, Gary Cox traces the decline of vote buying (and certain other personal strategies) in nineteenth-century England to the growth of electoral districts. As districts grew, a fixed amount of money “would buy a smaller portion of the total votes . . . if the average price of
votes was not less" (1987, 57). As a consequence, candidates reduced vote buying in favor of other vote getting strategies.

Note that there is some disagreement among scholars about the effects of increasing district size in Great Britain (see Chapter 3). It may be that there is a curvilinear relationship between district size and incentives to buy votes. In very small districts where patron-client networks and political hierarchies are entrenched, candidates may be able to command support from voters without resorting to vote buying. Increasing the size of these districts should undermine the ability of candidates to generate this “command vote” and increase the incentives to buy votes. As district size continues to increase, however, the incentives to buy votes should decrease as described above.

Perhaps the political factor that has the most direct impact on the expected utility of vote buying is the degree to which anti–vote buying rules and institutions exist and are enforced. Legislation prohibiting or at least strictly regulating vote buying is a first step, but this is clearly not enough. In Thailand, for example, vote buying has been illegal throughout the country’s democratic history, yet has reportedly grown worse in each election. Anti–vote buying rules have little effect if the punishment for vote buying is light or if the chance of being detected is slim. To seriously deter candidates from buying votes, anti–vote buying measures must raise both the probability of being caught and the associated penalty. Penalties can run the gamut, from small fines to lifetime bans from politics. Generally speaking, penalties that put vote buyers in jail or ban them from public office for a significant period are more costly to ambitious politicians than monetary penalties alone.23 There are also a variety of ways to raise the probability of detecting, reporting, and punishing vote buying, including strict campaign finance regulation and reporting requirements. Another common strategy is moving responsibility for administering elections out of the hands of elected politicians and into an autonomous or semiautonomous body (e.g., the Federal Elections Commission in the United States and the recently created Election Commission of Thailand). Once created, anti–vote buying efforts hinge on the funding, staffing, and powers that these bodies are given to monitor elections, investigate vote buying allegations, and administer penalties. Finally, one election is not enough to change candidate and party expectations about the risks and rewards of vote buying, as the case of Thailand demonstrates (see Chapter 9). In order to reduce the expected utility of vote buying, monitoring and enforcement must be consistent from election to election.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the roots of vote buying with special attention to political and institutional variables. In exploring the conditions under which
candidates have incentives to employ programmatic, ideological, or partisan appeals, and the conditions under which they have incentives to cultivate a personal vote, I find that candidate-centered electoral systems, weak parties, and access to government resources can motivate candidates to adopt personal electoral strategies, including vote buying. In considering the question of when vote buying will be included in a candidate’s arsenal as she or he seeks to cultivate a personal vote, I find that the expected utility of vote buying relative to other personal strategies, particularly pork barreling, is a function of a mix of socioeconomic, cultural, and institutional factors. While the effects of development are ambiguous, urbanization tends to undermine the incentives of candidates to buy votes. On the institutional side, surplus votes, small districts, and weak anti–vote buying laws contribute to a market for votes.

Notes

1. My focus is mainly on electoral and party rules (e.g., the rules of competition). However, it is important to note that rules of electoral governance (e.g., secret ballot, voting procedures, legal restrictions on vote buying) might also affect the propensity to buy votes. (See Mozaffar and Schedler 2002 for more on the distinction between these two types of rules.) For the most part, I leave the discussion of electoral governance to others.

2. I use Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins’s definition of pork (2001). They divide pork into public goods that are directed or allocated on the basis of political rather than economic calculations (morsels), and rents that are extracted from the government.

3. For convenience I will generally refer to the candidate as the vote buyer. In some cases, however, it may be others buying votes on behalf of the candidate (e.g., supporters, factions, or political parties).

4. There is lively debate in the literature on the link between electoral systems and corruption (see Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi 2003; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Chang and Golden forthcoming; Birch 2005). While there is some overlap in the logic that underlies the link between electoral institutions and corruption or vote buying, I will restrict my focus to the latter.

5. There may also be important differences between candidates and parties within a given system, as discussed in more detail later. See also Cox and Thies 1998; Samuels 1999; and Golden and Chang 2001.

6. Candidates may be elected solely on the basis of their individual vote totals, or party vote totals might determine a party’s seat allocation while candidate vote totals are used to fill those seats (or order the party’s list).

7. Under the single transferable vote, voters rank as many candidates as they wish, both within parties and across different parties. Any candidates who reach a certain quota of first-choice votes are deemed elected. The surplus votes (votes above the quota) of elected candidates are then transferred to the second-choice candidates as marked on the ballots. Once the vote transfers are complete, candidates who have reached the quota are declared winners. If seats still remain, the candidate with fewest votes is eliminated and his or her votes are transferred in a similar manner. This process continues until all the seats are filled.
8. On Japanese factions, see, for example, Reed 1994; Cox and Rosenbluth 1993, 1996. On Italian factions, see, for example, Golden and Chang 2001. On Thai factions, see, for example, Hicken 2002.


10. For an opposing view, see Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi 2000.

11. Of course, the party’s strategy might be to allow candidates to differentiate themselves via the use of personal strategies—à la the LDP in Japan.

12. The need to pursue this alternative strategy may motivate these parties to centralize power and rigorously enforce discipline, as described in the previous section. However, other strategies, apart from relying on a centralized, programmatic partisan strategy, are also possible, including the use of personal strategies that do not depend on government resources.

13. Not only do these parties differ from their counterparts in terms of organization and electoral strategy, but they also differ in terms of the types of candidates they attract. Programmatic parties tend to attract more ideological, policy-oriented candidates than do their candidate-centered competitors.

14. Consistent with its more programmatic nature, Cox and Thies (1998) find that this relationship does not hold for Japan’s Socialist Party.

15. Another dimension of competitiveness, quite apart from its effect on the incentives to cultivate a personal vote, is the closeness of the contest. Where electoral contests are close, hinging on the support of a small number of swing voters, the incentives to buy votes should be stronger, all else being equal. Here the electoral system should also play a role. Single-seat district, first-past-the-post systems, in which changes in a few swing votes can lead to a dramatically different outcome in a close race, should generate stronger vote buying incentives than do multiseat proportional representation systems.


17. For an interesting example of this argument from the Election Commission of Thailand, see http://www.ect.go.th/english/national/senate/nat7-13.html. Relying on patron-client relationships to explain vote buying, however, is not as straightforward as some have assumed. First, it is not clear that the “patron-client relationship” is an accurate description of the relationship between vote buyers (candidates) and vote sellers (voters) (see Nelson 1998a for an interesting discussion on this point). Second, even if one grants that patron-client relationships lie at the heart of vote buying networks, this still does not explain why patron-client links are primarily used to buy votes, as opposed to some other election-related purpose (e.g., intimidating voters or mobilizing supporters using nonmonetary means). In other words, why does vote buying dominate the exchange between voters and candidates rather than some other form of exchange (e.g., votes in exchange for pork, patronage, or policy).

18. This assumes that the amount of the money, not just the receipt of a gift, affects voter’s behavior.

19. Greater economic development can also undermine the value of personal strategies more generally. As incomes rise, so too does voter involvement in the broader national economy. Thus the impact of government policies on voters’ economic well-being also increases. Things like tax rates, exchange rates, growth rates, interest rates, and wage rates become more important to voters as their incomes rise. Thus the opportunity cost of voting for politicians who rely on personal strategies increases relative to voting for candidates who campaign on the policy position of a particularly party over a set of issues important to the voter. See Chapter 7 for more
on this point. See Chapter 6 for further discussion on the link between income and vote buying.

20. Note, though, that if the development hypothesis is correct, we should see strategies within urban areas varying according to differences in income levels. In fact, in his study of Thai elections, Sombat Chantornvong found just such a relationship. While noting that vote buying was not an effective strategy in most of Bangkok, he found that vote buying was a viable strategy in the poorer areas of the city (Sombat 1993).

21. District size can change due to the redrawing of district boundaries, population growth, or the enfranchisement of new voters. Large fluctuations in voter turnout also have the effect of increasing or decreasing the number of votes needed to win.

22. Population growth can eventually undermine even these personal strategies.

23. It is also possible to punish vote sellers, though examples of this are rare.