

Political Engineering and Party Regulation in Southeast Asia

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1. INTRODUCTION¹

Southeast Asia has been home to several dramatic transitions to democracy. In the Philippines the EDSA revolution brought down the government of Ferdinand Marcos and restored democracy after 14 years of dictatorship. More than a decade before EDSA a similar show of mass-discontent with authoritarian government brought down Thailand's military regime. While this particular democratic experiment was short-lived—military forces seized power again in 1976—the events of October 1973 signaled the end of long-lived military governments in Thailand. Elections returned in 1979, beginning a more gradual transition to democracy over the next two-and-a-half decades.² In neighboring Cambodia, that country's warring factions finally agreed to a UN brokered ceasefire and peace plan in October 1991. Despite threats from the still powerful Khmer Rouge 90 percent of eligible voters turned out to cast their vote in UN-organized elections in 1993, handing a surprise victory to the FUNCINPEC party and an electoral defeat to the Cambodian People's Party which had been in power in Cambodia since the fall of the Khmer Rouge. Finally, after decades in power Suharto was forced to step down as the President of Indonesia in 1998 in the wake of massive protests on the streets of Jakarta and demands from protestors, politicians, and parties that he step aside and allow a democratic political framework to be put in place.

These dramatic events demonstrated a domestic demand for democratic institutions and procedures that surprised some long-time observers of Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, and the Philippines. And yet, while opinion polls consistently show that most citizens of these countries support the ideal of democracy, there is also a sense that democratic government has often fallen short of hopes and expectations. One consistent theme in criticisms of the way democracy operates

in these countries is the perceived shortcomings of political parties and the party system. Ironically, in the eyes of many people, political parties, the hallmark of modern democratic government, have become the biggest obstacles to democratic consolidation and effective governance.³

My purpose in this chapter is to survey the party systems in Southeast Asia, focusing on the ways in which various engineering and regulation strategies have shaped (or failed to shape) the development and evolution of the party system in each country. If we are searching for a laboratory in which to study party regulation and party development we would be hard pressed to find a region as suitable as Southeast Asia. First, all of the states in Southeast Asia could comfortably be classified as divided societies with a history of conflict. In the Philippines and Thailand conflict has taken the form of unrest and insurgency in these countries' southern regions, where ethnic, religious, and language differences are a source of tension with the center. Cambodia is still recovering from three decades of civil war. Indonesia and Malaysia are societies divided by ethnic, religious, language, and regional cleavages that at times have given rise to violence. Even comparatively stable Singapore was home to ethnic riots and civil unrest in the not too distant past. Table 1 displays information on the ethnic and religious diversity for each of the seven Southeast Asian states discussed in this chapter.

Table 1: Ethnic and Religious Diversity

Ethnic Diversity					
	Majority	Largest Minority	Second Largest Minority	Other groups	Ethnic Fractionalization
Cambodia	Khmer 90%	Vietnamese 5%	Chinese 1%		.186
East Timor	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Indonesia	Javanese 40.6%	Sundanese 15%	Madurese 3.3%	Chinese 3-4%	.766
Malaysia	Malay 50.4%	Chinese 23.7%	Indigenous 11%	Indian 7.1%	.596
Philippines	Tagalog 28.1%	Cebuano 13.1%	Bisaya 7.6%	Hiligaynon Ilonggo 7.5% Bikol 6% Waray 3.4%	.161
Singapore	Chinese 76.8%	Malay 13.9%	Indian 7.9%		.388
Thailand	Thai 75%	Chinese 14%	Malay 2%	Khmer 2%	.431

Religious Diversity				
	Majority	Largest Minority	Second Largest Minority	Other groups
Cambodia	Buddhist 95%	Muslim 4%		
East Timor	Roman Catholic 98%	Muslim 1%	Protestant 1%	
Indonesia	Muslim 86.1%	Christian 8.7%	Hindu 18%	Buddhist 1%
Malaysia	Muslim 60.4%	Buddhist 19.2%	Christian 9.1%	Hindu 6.3%
Philippines	Christian 92.6%	Muslim 5.1%		
Singapore	Buddhist 42.5%	Muslim 14.9%	Christian 14.6%	Taoist 8.5% Hindu 4%
Thailand	Buddhist 94.6%	Muslim 4.6%	Christian .7%	

Sources: CIA World Fact book <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>; Joel Selway "Turning Malays into Thai-Men: Nationalism, Ethnicity and Economic Inequality in Thailand." Forthcoming. *Southeast Research*. The ethnic fractionalization measures, as the name suggests, measures the degree of ethnic fractionalization in a given country. The measure is bounded by 0 and 1 with higher numbers representing greater fractionalization. The data come from Fearon, J. D. 2003. "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country", *Journal of Economic Growth* 8, 195-222.

The region also provides interesting variation in terms of its political institutions, party systems, and the nature of regulation and reform efforts. At the macro level we see presidential democracies, (Indonesia and the Philippines), parliamentary systems (Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore), and hybrid regimes (East Timor). In terms of party systems the region contains dominant party semi-democracies (Singapore, Malaysia and Cambodia), multi-party democracies (the

Philippines, Indonesia, and until recently, Thailand), and single party states (Vietnam). We can also observe variation in the degree to which ethnic cleavages have given rise to ethnically-based political parties. While such parties are uncommon in most of the region Malaysia has had ethnically-based parties since before its independence. Finally, countries in the region have adopted a variety of reforms aimed at engineering certain outcomes in the party system, which have met with varying degrees of success.

I focus on political parties and the party system in seven of Southeast Asia's eleven states. These include countries which have experienced relatively free and fair elections (the Philippines, East Timor, Indonesia since Suharto, and Thailand) as well as those countries where opposition parties are allowed to compete and win seats in regular elections but the electoral playing field is tilted heavily against the opposition (Singapore, Malaysia, and Cambodia).⁴ I do not include those polities where elections are not regularly held, or where autonomous opposition parties are banned outright (Vietnam, Myanmar, Brunei, Laos). Table 2 lists recent Polity and Freedom House scores for all eleven Southeast Asian States for comparative purposes.

Table 2: Democracy in Southeast Asia

	Polity2 Score 2003 (Scale: -10 to 10)	Freedom House 2005 (Scale 7 to 1)
Thailand	9	2 (Free)
Philippines	8	2 (Free)
Indonesia	7	3 (Partly Free)
East Timor	6	3 (Partly Free)
Malaysia	3	4 (Partly Free)
Cambodia	2	6 (Not Free)
Singapore	-2	5 (Partly Free)
Brunei	NA	6 (Not Free)
Laos	-7	7 (Not Free)
Vietnam	-7	7 (Not Free)
Myanmar	-7	7 (Not Free)

Sources: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World*, 2005, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2006> (accessed March 10, 2007). Jagers, Keith and Ted Robert Gurr, *POLITY IV: Regime Change and Political Authority, 1800-2003*, 2006, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/>. Note: The polity scale runs from -10 to 10, with higher scores representing higher levels of democracy. The Freedom House score runs from 1 to 7 with lower scores representing a higher degree of political rights.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. I first review the role that parties and party systems play in modern democracies, highlighting the crucial part political parties play in conflict-prone developing democracies. I briefly discuss the two major institutional design approaches relative to managing conflict in divided societies—the articulation approach (which underlies the consociational model) and the aggregation approach (which is the foundation of the centripetal model). I argue that for the most part Southeast Asian States have favored aggregative/centripetal

institutions and political parties—with a few notable exceptions. In the third section I discuss other dimensions of the party system that are germane to democratic stability in divided democracies but have been neglected in the debate between articulation and aggregation. Specifically, I focus on the degree to which the party system is “institutionalized.” I define party system institutionalization, discuss the degree to which Southeast Asia’s party systems are institutionalized, and analyze the extent to which the goal of party system institutionalization is in harmony (or conflict) with the goals of the articulation and aggregation models. The fourth section of the chapter asks whether we can realistically expect parties in new democracies to gradually and organically develop from the ground-up. Arguing that we cannot, I discuss ways in which institutional designers in Southeast Asia have attempted to “engineer” certain types of parties and party systems through manipulation of constitutions, electoral rules, and party regulation. In the final section I briefly discuss examples of the unintended consequences of such engineering efforts.

2. PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS

Political parties play vital roles in modern democracies as aggregators, mediators, and solutions to collective action problems. During elections political parties provide a means of aggregating, organizing, and coordinating voters, candidates, and donors. Within the legislature parties are vehicles for solving collective action problems and coordinating the behavior of legislative and executive actors. Political parties also provide a means for balancing local concerns with national interests and long-term priorities with short-term political demands.

Political parties play an especially important role in the new and developing democracies. Indeed, the durability and success of democratic experiments often hinge on the health and strength of the democratic party system.⁵ Within developing democracies parties are often the most proximate and potent symbols of democracy to citizens and can either help build support for

democratic norms and institutions, or poison public attitudes towards the effectiveness and legitimacy of elected governments. Ultimately the distrust of political parties can undermine support for democracy. In addition, in the absence of strong parties and an effective party system there are may be greater opportunities for intervention by military cliques or charismatic figures. Finally, political parties are crucial tools for managing the conflict and upheaval that are an unavoidable part of democratic transition and economic development. The need for an effective party system is especially acute in divided societies with a history of conflict.

What kind of parties and what kind of party system produce the best chance of political stability, democratic consolidation, and good governance, particularly in conflict-prone societies? Briefly, there are two contending schools of thought that resonate with the broader debate between advocates of proportional institutions and advocates of majoritarian institutions (see also Bogaards' chapter in this volume).⁶ The first, which we dub the articulation approach, argues that democracy works best when societal cleavages are acknowledged as fundamental to political life in a given polity. Institutions should be created that allows for the representation or articulation of all major interests in society. (This lies at the core of the model championed by Lijphart, dubbed the consociational or power sharing approach.)⁷ To maximize articulation states should adopt a proportional representation electoral system and allow for (or encourage) the creation of ethnically-based political parties. Cooperation and accommodation then take place between party elites within the government.⁸

A second approach contends that constructing a political system on a foundation of contentious societal cleavages is inherently unstable. Instead, the aggregative approach advocates moving the focus of politics away from societal cleavages by creating institutions that encourage moderation, cross-cleavage accommodation and cooperation. This is the foundation of centripetal model.⁹ Two pillars of this approach are an electoral system that give candidates and voters

incentives to look beyond the confines of their particular groups,¹⁰ and a party system with broad-based parties or party coalitions that transcend cleavage boundaries.

The vast majority of Southeast Asian states have opted for institutions and regulations consistent with aggregative goals. The major exception is Malaysia between independence and 1969, which is cited by Lijphart as a model of consociational democracy.¹¹ While the country's majoritarian electoral system regularly produced a legislative majority for the ethnically-based United Malays National Organization (UMNO), UMNO did not govern alone. Instead, it entered into a tri-party alliance with parties representing Malaysia's two other largest ethnic groups, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). The three members of the "Alliance" ran coordinated campaigns during elections and each took a share of cabinet seats in-between elections. At the same time, UMNO was clearly the first among equals in the Alliance. The consociational elements of Malaysia's political system were dealt a major blow when a sharp dip in the Alliance's vote share in the 1969 elections triggered clashes between Malays and Chinese throughout Malaysia. In the wake of the violence a state of emergency was declared and parliamentary government was suspended. When elected government was finally restored in 1971 Barisan Nasional (BN) had replaced the Alliance. While BN contained the same three core ethnic parties (UMNO, MCA, MIC) along with a number of smaller parties, the veneer of power-sharing was largely gone. In this new alliance UMNO was clearly dominant and has remained so ever since.

The pre-1969 Malaysia case is the closest we get to consociationalism in the region, though even this case is not without controversy.¹² However, other states in the regions have used articulating institutions—namely, proportional representation (see Table 2). Cambodia, Indonesia, and the new East Timor system each rely on pure proportional representation to elect their legislatures. A handful of other states combine proportional and majoritarian rules in so-called mixed-member systems (Thailand, the Philippines, and the first East Timorese election).¹³

Yet even in the states that use proportional electoral rules there have been concerted efforts to limit the number of parties and reduce the partisan salience of social cleavages—consistent with a aggregative strategy. For example, Indonesia effectively bans regional or local parties from not just national elections, but from regional and local elections as well (more about this below). Other recent changes to Indonesian electoral rules have made it more difficult for smaller parties to compete.¹⁴ Similarly the move from a ‘largest remainder’ nationwide system to a ‘highest average’ provincially-based system in Cambodia harms the electoral chances of Cambodia’s smaller parties.¹⁵ The new East Timorese system also uses the ‘highest average’ formula and includes an electoral threshold of 3 percent specifically designed to “prevent an excessive party pulverization.”¹⁶

The desire to reduce political fragmentation, promote government stability, and reduce the salience of ethnic ties is also evident in the type of mixed member systems Southeast Asian reformers have adopted.¹⁷ Mixed-member systems consist of two tiers. The nominal tier is typically elected from single-member districts using the plurality rule while the list tier is elected from national (or regional) party lists using proportional representation. The higher the percentage of seats devoted to the PR list tier, the more proportional the outcome—e.g. the better the correspondence between votes casts and seats one. At the same time, large list tiers will also tend to inflate the number of parties and increase the chances that no single party will capture a majority. By contrast, a smaller list tier will tend to reduce the number of parties winning seats, but at the cost of greater disproportionality—i.e. larger parties will benefit at the expense of smaller parties.

Another thing to consider is whether the two tiers are linked. In mixed-member majoritarian systems the distribution of seats in each tier occurs independently. In other words, the number of seats a party gets in each tier is not dependent on what happens in the other tier. Mixed-member majoritarian systems favor larger parties. Those parties that can mount an effective national campaign receive an electoral bonus, but this comes at the cost of greater disproportionality and

fewer seats for smaller parties. In mixed-member proportional systems a party's share of list tier votes is used to determine its total number of seats in the legislature. In effect the list tier seats are used to correct for any disproportionality produced in the nominal tier elections. This has beneficial effects for representation, but at the cost of greater political fragmentation. Faced with these tradeoffs Thailand and the Philippines opted for reducing political fragmentation by keeping the list tier relatively small, and keeping the allocation of seats in each tier separate.¹⁸ (East Timor also used a mixed-member majoritarian system for its first election, but reserved a large number of seats for the list tier.)

Table 3 displays summary information about the electoral and party systems for seven democracies and semi-democracies in Southeast Asia. As discussed above, most states in Southeast Asia have leaned toward aggregative principles of electoral design and party regulation. Looking first at electoral systems, only Cambodia, Indonesia, and now East Timor use pure PR—the rest of the region employs either majoritarian systems or mixed-member majoritarian systems. This is reflected in a modest effective number of parties (ENP) in most countries, with most having 2-3 parties, and governments in which the largest party controls close to a majority of the seats.¹⁹ The exceptions are 2007 East Timor, Indonesia, which combines multiple cleavages with a very permissible electoral system, and pre-2001 Thailand, where the incentives for national party formation were very weak.²⁰ In these three countries ENP is quite high and the largest parties fail to secure even a third of the legislative seats. On the other hand, disproportionality in Indonesia, 2007 East Timor and pre-reform Thailand is the lowest in the region.²¹ The most disproportional system is Singapore's, which regularly turns electoral majorities into legislative supermajorities for the PAP. Finally, note the sharp reduction in the number of parties and the increase in disproportionality and the number of seats for the largest party in the wake of the Thai reforms. This is consistent with Reilly's argument

that when states in Asia have attempted to engineer their party system it has almost without exception been in the direction of less partisan fragmentation and larger parties.²²

Table 3: Aggregative Tendencies in SEA

	Electoral System²	% of PR seats	Effective Number of Parties	Disproportionality	% of Seats for largest party (last election)
Cambodia 1993 (1)	Closed-list PR (LR)	100	2.8	5.4	48.3
Cambodia 1998- (2)	Closed-list PR (HA)	100	3.2	7.3	59.3
East Timor (2001) (1)	MMM	~85	2.83	8.3	73.3
East Timor (2007) (1)	Closed-list PR (HA)	100	5.4	3.4	32.3
Indonesia 1999 (1)	Closed List PR (LR)	100	5.1	1.9	32.9
Indonesia 2004 (1)	Open List PR (LR)	100	8.3	1.5	23.3
Malaysia ¹ 1959-2004 (11)	Plurality w/ SMD	0	2.6	15.8	90.4
Philippines 1946-1969 (7)	Plurality w/ SMD	0	2.3	9.0	80.0
Philippines 1992-1998 (3)	MMM	~20	3.6	10.4	50.5
Singapore 1976-2006 (9)	Party Block Vote/SMD ³	0	1.2	20.8	97.6
Thailand 1986-1996 (5)	Block Vote	0	7.2	2.7	31.8
Thailand 2001-2005 (2)	MMM	20	3.1	11.1	75.4

Note: Number of elections in parentheses. ¹ BN is counted as a single party. ² LR= Largest Remainder method; HA= Highest Average Method; MMM=Mixed-member majoritarian system; SMD=Single member districts; MMD=Multi-member districts. ³ Until 1988 Singapore used only SMDs.

Sources: Author's calculations.

3. PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION

While the debate about articulative versus aggregative institutions continues in one part of the literature, another set of scholars has focused on another issue germane to new democracies: the degree of party institutionalization. The recent focus on institutionalization by certain scholars comes out of observations about the differences between the party systems that characterized first- and second-wave democracies and those that have emerged during the third wave of democratization. Sartori was one of the first to draw this distinction—categorizing countries as either having “consolidated” party systems, or no party “system” whatsoever.²³ Other authors have built on this work and proposed various definitions of party system institutionalization. I focus here on two key components of party system institutionalization, as formulated by Mainwaring and Scully.²⁴ These two components are common to many other authors’ definition of institutionalization.²⁵

1. The pattern of party competition. More institutionalized party systems exhibit stability in the patterns of party competition.

2. Party-society links. More institutionalized party systems have parties with strong roots in society and voters with strong attachments to parties. “Most voters identify with a party and vote for it most of the time, and some interest associations are closely linked to parties.”²⁶

Taken together, these two dimensions help us to assess where along the continuum of institutionalization a particular party system may fall. More specifically, fluid party systems exhibit instability in patterns of party competition. New political parties regularly enter the system, while existing parties exit. There is also a high degree of electoral volatility—the fortunes of individual

parties will vary greatly from election to election. Fluid systems also contain political parties with weak roots in society. Voters have few lasting attachments to particular parties and there are no enduring links between parties and interest groups.

Before discussing the degree of institutionalization in Southeast Asia's party systems it is useful to consider how institutionalization might affect democratic efficiency and effectiveness. The predominant view in the literature is that under-institutionalized party systems are a hindrance to democratic consolidation and good governance. To begin with, a lack of party system institutionalization can undermine the ability of the electorate to hold politicians individually and collectively accountable.²⁷ Weak institutionalization undermines accountability in two ways. First, in order to hold politicians accountable, voters have to be able to identify who deserves blame (or credit) for particular outcomes.²⁸ It is not enough that parties be identified with distinct ideological or policy positions. Instead, the real question is whether political parties have distinct collective identities. When parties are short-lived electoral alliances, when "personalism" trumps party label, when party switching is rampant, it is difficult for voters to identify whom to blame or credit for particular outcomes.

Weak institutionalization also undermines accountability by making it difficult to inflict electoral punishment in situations where blame *can* be assigned. The collective actor (the party) in weakly institutionalized party systems is ephemeral. If its electoral fortunes look bleak, it is likely to disappear and its constituent parts reconstituted in new or existing parties. Politicians and factions that are part of governments accused of corruption or incompetence are still able to return under a new party banner. Where incumbents develop local support networks tied to them as individuals rather than to the party they may be shielded from collective punishment.

Another reason a lack of party system institutionalization may be a concern is that where party institutionalization is low, the combination of disillusionment with the extant system and weak

party loyalties may provide opportunities for anti-system/anti-party politicians to rise to power.²⁹ Specifically, a high degree of party turnover, low barriers to entry, weak links between voters and political parties, and high levels of voter dissatisfaction in weakly institutionalized systems open the door for maverick politicians and/or radical parties. The rise of such political mavericks is certainly a familiar phenomenon in Southeast Asia, whether it is Thaksin in Thailand, SBY in Indonesia, or Marcos in the Philippines. In some cases, these politicians have been reformers with agendas in harmony (or at least not in direct conflict) with democratic norms and institutions. This seems to be the case with SBY in Indonesia, for example. In other cases, however, charismatic anti-party/anti-establishment individuals have undermined democratic norms and institutions. Marcos and Thaksin in Southeast Asia along with President Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Vladimir Putin in Russia are examples.

In short, where the party system is weakly institutionalized, the fluidity of the party system offers opportunities for individuals from outside of the existing party system to win office and subsequently to centralize power. What is more, the underperformance of democratic government in weakly institutionalized party systems can generate a demand for “stronger” leadership.

Where do the party systems of Southeast Asian states fall in terms of institutionalization? I will focus here on the two criteria discussed above—the stability of interparty competition and the extent to which parties are rooted in society. Stability and rootedness vary quite substantially across the region. I argue that Singapore and Malaysia appear to have the most institutionalized party systems, but both are at best semi-democracies, complicating the picture. The party systems of the “pure” democracies (the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand (pre-2006 coup)), all appear under-institutionalized, though there is some evidence that Indonesia is slightly more institutionalized than its two neighbors.

Stability of Interparty Competition

The most commonly used indicator of the stability or volatility of the party system from election to election is the measure of electoral volatility. Electoral volatility refers to the degree to which there is variation in aggregate party vote shares from one election to another. Where there is a stable pattern of inter-party competition, we expect to see the same sets of parties receiving consistent levels of support from election to election, reflected in a low volatility score (e.g., the Democrat and Republican parties in the United States). High levels of electoral volatility, on the other hand, reflect both instability in voters' party preferences from election to election and elite-driven changes to the party system such as the creation of new parties, the death of existing parties, party switching, party mergers, and party splits.³⁰

Electoral volatility is based on the net change in the vote shares of all parties from election to election. It is calculated by taking the sum of the net change in the percentage of votes gained or lost by each party from one election to the next, divided by two. $(\sum |v_{it} - v_{it+1}|) / 2$. A score of 100 signifies that the set of parties winning votes is completely different from one election to the next. A score of 0 means the same parties receive exactly the same percentage of votes across two different elections. The higher the volatility score the less stable the party system is.

The electoral volatility scores for Southeast Asian countries are listed along side the volatility scores of several other democracies for comparative purposes in Table 3. Three things are particularly noteworthy. First, Malaysia and Singapore stand out as the two countries in the region with the most stable party systems—no surprise given that these are both one-party dominant states. The vote shares of the PAP and BN change very little from election to election, reflecting both a high degree of stable support among voters for these parties and also the less than level electoral playing field that exists in both countries. Second, compared to much of the rest of democratizing

Latin America and Asia, the party systems of Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, East Timor and the Philippines are just as fluid if not more so.

A third noteworthy fact evident in Table 4 is Indonesia's volatility score relative to that of the Philippines and Thailand. It is interesting and somewhat ironic that Indonesia, one of the youngest democracy in the region and a country with very little experience with democratic elections, thus far has a less fluid party system than Thailand and the Philippines, each of which has a substantial history of relatively free and fair elections. Indonesia's electoral volatility score of 25.2 is 30 percent lower than the volatility score in Thailand and 32 percent lower than the Philippines' score.

Table 4: Lower Chamber Electoral Volatility

Country	Time Span	Average Volatility
United States	1944-2002	3.3
United Kingdom	1945-2001	6.8
Greece	1974-2000	10.4
Malaysia	1974-2004	10.7
Columbia	1958-2002	12.5
Singapore	1968-2006	14.9
Italy	1946-2001	15.1
France	1951-2002	15.3
Chile	1989-2001	16.7
Brazil	1986-2002	21.8
Mexico	1988-2000	22.7
South Korea	1988-2000	24.6
Cambodia	1993-2003	25.1
Indonesia	1999-2004	25.2
Argentina	1983-2001	25.1
India	1951-1999	25.5
Venezuela	1958-2001	31.4
Thailand	1979-2005	36.1
Philippines	1992-1998	37.3
Poland	1991-2001	46.6
East Timor	2001-2007	49.0

Sources: Author's calculations; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007.

Some scholars argue that the development of regular patterns of party competition is mainly a function of time. Voters' attachment to parties, information about the relative strength and


position of various political parties, and knowledge about institutional incentives take time to develop.³¹ Tavits, and Lupu and Stokes both find that volatility declines and party identities strengthen the more time spend under democracy.³² Likewise, Roussias, and Tavits and Annus find evidence for better strategic coordination by voters and candidates over time in new democracies.³³ By contrast, Mainwaring and Torcal, and Reich find no evidence for a decline in volatility and the number of parties over time.³⁴

Figure 1 compares changes in electoral volatility over time in six of the Southeast Asian cases. For countries that experienced a clear authoritarian interlude (the Philippines in 1972, Malaysia in 1969, and Thailand in 1991) I have broken the series into pre and post-authoritarian elections. Southeast Asia offers only mixed support for the argument that party system stability increases with a country's democratic experience. In nearly every case there is a sharp drop in electoral volatility between the second and third elections—suggesting greater institutionalization of the party system. However, beyond the third election the story is more complex. In some cases volatility continues to falls (pre-martial law Philippines), in some it rises (early Malaysia), in some it seems to stabilize at a low level (Singapore and later Malaysia), and in others there is no discernable pattern (Thailand post 1991).

Note too that longer authoritarian interludes, particularly those where the authoritarian regime tries to create a new party, seem more disruptive to the party system than shorter interventions. This is consistent with findings elsewhere in the party and transitions literature.³⁵ Under Marcos' 14 year rule existing political parties were repressed and a new state-backed party created—the KBL. Since democratic elections returned to the Philippines in 1986 we have seen a much higher rate of electoral volatility than prior to martial law. By contrast, the shorter authoritarian interludes in Thailand and Malaysia caused less disruption to the existing party system. Thailand's volatility rises modestly in the wake of the military's year-long intervention, in part

reflecting the rise and quick demise of the military backed party—*Samakkehi Tham*. Malaysia’s party system exhibits more stability after the two-year Emergency period. This reflects the fact the core partners in *Barisan Nasional* were the same parties that came together to form the Alliance. It is also indicative of a political and electoral environment more heavily biased towards *BN* after the crisis.

Figure 1: Change in Volatility over Time



Sources: Author’s calculations.

Party-Society Links

The electoral volatility figures in the preceding section also communicate something about the degree to which political parties in these countries are “rooted” in society. Where parties have strong roots in society there tends to be a degree of stability to electoral competition. As Mainwaring and Torcal state:

If most citizens support the same party from one election to the next, there are fewer floating voters, hence less likelihood of massive electoral shifts that are reflected in high volatility. Conversely, where parties have weak roots in society, more voters are likely to shift electoral allegiances from one election to the next, thus bringing about greater potential for high electoral volatility.³⁶

On this basis the Singapore and Malaysia party systems would seem to have the strongest roots in society—although once again the lack of a level playing field complicates the picture. On the other hand, the relatively high volatility scores for Thailand and the Philippines reflect the weak links between political parties and societal actors in both countries. Indonesia and Cambodia fall somewhere in between these two extremes.

Another way to assess the strength of voter-party links is to look at voter attitudes and behavior toward parties. In Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia voters continue to exhibit weak ties to existing political parties. There are several indicators of this. In Indonesia, a poll prior to the 2004 DPR election revealed that 58 percent of respondents were unable or unwilling to commit to a particular party in the upcoming election.³⁷ Even worse, in the Philippines less than a third of respondents reported being close to *any* political party, while in Thailand less than a quarter of those polled felt close to a particular party.³⁸ In addition, many voters in all three countries support a different party each election, and, when given the opportunity, split their votes between different parties in the *same* election.³⁹

Another indicator of party “rootedness” is the extent to which political parties are clearly associated with particular societal interests. Two questions are especially germane. To what extent do parties rely on different/distinct constituencies? Can we differentiate one party from another on the basis of its policy platform? By this score Malaysia has the most rooted party system—with

ethnically-based parties and a pan-ethnic ruling coalition that differs in important ways from opposition parties. Thailand and the Philippines lie at the other end of the spectrum, (with Singapore and Cambodia somewhere in between). In both Thailand and the Philippines, the ties between parties and identifiable societal interests have traditionally been very weak. Parties tend to be shallow alliances of locally-based and locally-focused politicians, rather than cohesive national political parties with distinct policy visions. In fact, what distinguishes these party systems is the enduring lack of national policy or ideological orientation.⁴⁰ Party platforms are notable for their absence of distinctive ideological or national policy content. An extreme example occurred in the run-up to a recent election in the Philippines. Several different parties, including parties in both the government and opposition, ended up hiring the same group of consultants to write their party platforms. Because of the strong similarities across all of the platforms, the consultants adopted a simple rule to keep each distinct—use a different font for each.⁴¹ As this anecdote illustrates, the major differences among parties are not differences in whom they represent or over the direction of national policy. Consequently, elections are not battles among different ideologies or party programs but rather struggles among personalities for the control of government resources.

An interesting question is how to view the strength of party-society ties in Indonesia. There is some evidence that some Indonesian parties have stronger associations with particular regions and societal/religious interests than the typical Thai or Filipino party.⁴² For other parties, however, the pattern of support is less obvious or the parties are still too young to enable us to make confident inferences. Dwight King has argued that the 1999 elections largely reproduced the religious, class, and regional voting patterns that were observed in Indonesia's 1955 election.⁴³ However, Liddle and Mujani find voter's attachment to local and national party leaders plays a much bigger part in shaping their decision than sociological variables.⁴⁴ To the extent King is correct, Indonesia looks as though it may be further down the road of party "rootedness" than either Thailand or the

Philippines (though perhaps not much further). If, on the other hand, Liddle and Mujani are correct, Indonesia does not look much different than Thailand and the Philippines on this dimension. In all three cases, loyalty is primarily to an individual candidate rather than to a particular party, region, or social group.

4. ENGINEERING PARTY SYSTEMS

Thus far I have discussed two dimensions along which to place parties and party systems in developing democracies: first, the way in which the system addresses social and ethnic divisions (articulation v. aggregation), and second, the degree of party system institutionalization. When we are talking about the relative virtues of articulation or aggregation institutions we are necessarily in the realm of institutional engineering. Can institutions play a similar role in facilitating, or hindering, party system institutionalization? Party systems in new democracies clearly vary in terms of the level and pace of institutionalization. But how do we explain this variation? How do strong parties and institutionalized party systems develop (or not) in new democracies?

These questions are behind an impressive amount of research about party formation, the development of party identity, and party institutionalization in new democracies across the globe.⁴⁵ Among the reasons cited in the literature for why strong parties might develop more or less quickly in new democracies are the behavior of the ancien regime,⁴⁶ the number of democratic (or partially democratic) elections a country has experienced,⁴⁷ the presence of ethnic divides,⁴⁸ and the timing of elections vis-à-vis the expansion of suffrage and citizenship.⁴⁹ The bulk of these studies confirm that the development of strong political parties and stable, effective party systems is often a long, slow process, if it occurs at all. But, what of political institutions and party regulation? Can they affect the speed or degree of institutionalization? Even if they play only a marginal role relative to other factors, the effects of institutional design on party system development are worth considering.

Especially given the fact that, as hard as institutional reform may be, it is inordinately easier than undoing history, changing social structures, or speeding up the passage of time.

Institutional design necessarily involves trade-offs between competing goals. Proportional institutions will tend to advantage articulation and stronger ties between political parties and voters.⁵⁰ At the same time there is a danger that articulation and rootedness might give way to recalcitrance and reification and that proportional institutions might produce hyper-inflated party systems, higher volatility, and government inefficacy. Aggregative or majoritarian institutions, on the other hand, may improve the chances for a small number of large, moderate and transcendent political parties, and by reducing fragmentation improve the chances for majority governments, but at the potential cost of poorer articulation and weaker links between parties and their constituents.

The countries in Southeast Asia have each dealt with these trade-offs in different ways but most have attempted to engineer and regulate the development of certain types of parties and party systems. In this section I draw on the previous discussion of articulation, aggregation, and institutionalization by breaking these engineering attempts into two categories—rootedness/articulation, and accommodation/aggregation.

Rootedness and Articulation

We see a variety of reforms across Southeast Asia aimed at increasing the representation for marginalized groups, strengthening the link between parties and the society/citizens they are supposed to represent, and increasing the value of party labels to voters and politicians. These include the adoption of mixed member systems, restrictions on party switching, and the elimination of intra-party competition.

In 1997 Thai reformers adopted a two tier electoral system to replace the block vote system Thailand had used for several decades. Reformers hoped that the addition of a 100 seat national

party list tier, elected using proportional representation, would encourage parties to develop distinct policy platforms, invest in the creation and maintenance of a party label, and encourage voters to place party before person—all rarities in the pre-reform era. At the same time they replaced Thailand's multi-member districts with 400 single-member districts and in so doing eliminated the intra-party competition that had in the past undermined party cohesion and the value of party label. The 1997 constitution also placed new restrictions on party switching—specifically, it banned the candidates from switching parties in the few months prior to an election, a common practice in pre-reform Thailand. Again, the goal of these reforms was to encourage the creation of more cohesive parties and the development of party loyalty by voters and candidates and to some extent they were successful at doing this.⁵¹

The first Asian democracy to adopt a mixed member system was the Philippines, which added a party list tier to its plurality electoral system after the fall of Marcos. As in Thailand 80 percent of the seats are elected using single member districts on a plurality basis, while the remaining 20 percent are chosen from national lists. Among the motivations for including a party list tier in the Philippines was a desire to give marginalized interests/groups such as women, youth, labor, farmers, and the poor, a greater voice and a seat at the policymaking table.⁵² However, the peculiarities associated with the Philippine mixed-member system (discussed in more detail below) have ultimately undermined its potential to facilitate greater representation and foster stronger links between political parties and marginalized citizens.

Indonesia, Cambodia, and East Timor, the only Southeast Asian states that use pure proportional representation for their national legislative elections, have also attempted various reforms designed in part to better root political parties in the polity. In 2004 Indonesia reduced the geographic size of each district along with the number of seats elected from each district. This was part of an effort to bring parties closer to the masses.⁵³ The adoption of more single seat districts in

Cambodia prior to the 1998 elections was also in part a response to demands for stronger links between political parties and local electorates.⁵⁴ East Timor's new party law attempts to reduce party switching between elections by requiring switchers to forfeit their seat in parliament (see Kadima's chapter in this volume for a discussion of party switching regulations in Africa).

Accommodation and Aggregation

The attempts to engineer better articulation and more rooted-parties have not occurred in isolation. Instead, they have often been packaged with other reforms specifically designed to promote cross-group accommodation and coordination and reduce the number of political parties in the political system. One popular regulatory tool is the requirement that political parties meet certain organizational hurdles to be eligible for elections. In Thailand parties were required to have at least 5,000 members, distributed across all of the country's regions. The Philippines similarly requires new parties to establish regional offices in a majority of the country's regions and to gain support in more than half of the cities and provinces where their candidates run.⁵⁵

Party list tiers in mixed-member systems have also been designed to encourage the formation of large national parties and discourage small parties. In Thailand parties were required to submit a single national list and the list tier seats were elected using a single nationwide district. The list tier seats were then awarded with out reference to the number of seats already captured by the party in the district election. This arrangement significantly favored large parties that are able to organize and compete nation-wide. Both Thailand and the Philippines also bar parties that fall below a predetermined threshold (5 percent in Thailand, 2 percent in the Philippines) from winning seats in the list tier. (East Timor also employs a 3 percent threshold for its parliamentary elections.)

The country making the most concerted effort at party system engineering is Indonesia. The diversity of Indonesia's population, the nature of its geography, and Indonesia's failed experiment

with democracy in the 1950s, all combined to instill in Indonesia's post-Suharto political reformers a keen desire to promote national parties over local, regional or separatist parties. Reformers tackled the challenge using a multi-faceted strategy. First, they installed strict rules on party formation, requiring that parties establish branches in one-third of Indonesia's provinces, and in more than half of the districts and municipalities or districts within those provinces. This dramatically reduced the number of parties eligible to stand for the 1999 election. These rules were then strengthened in advance of the 2004 elections. Parties are now required to establish branches in two-thirds of the provinces, and in two thirds of the municipalities within the provinces. In addition, each municipal party branch must have at least 1,000 members. Only 24 parties were able to meet this requirement for the 2004 election and of those that were successful, most drew support from multiple regions—just as reforms had hoped.⁵⁶ Reformers have also established an electoral threshold—parties that fail to capture more than two percent of the seats in the lower house of parliament, or three percent in the regional assemblies, cannot compete in the next election unless they merge with other parties to reach this threshold. Finally, Indonesia's effective ban on regional parties applies not just to national elections, but to regional and local contests as well. In other words, only national parties are allowed to compete in Indonesian elections—period. The net effect of these reforms is fewer, more national parties than we would otherwise expect given Indonesia's social diversity and very permissive electoral system.

Indonesia has also designed its system of electing its president in a way that privileges nationally-oriented candidates with broad bases of support. To begin with only parties that win at least five percent of the vote or three percent of parliamentary seats are permitted to nominate presidential candidates. The electoral system is a two round, majority run-off system. In order to win the first round a candidate must gain over 50 percent of the total votes and at least 20 percent of the

votes in half of Indonesia's provinces. If no candidate wins in the first round a run-off is held between the two strongest candidates, this time without the explicit distributional requirements.

Finally, Singapore uses an interesting electoral system that combines a handful of single-member districts with Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs), each with three to six seats. GRCs can only be contested by teams of candidates from the same party (or allied independents) and at least one member of each team must be from the Malay, Indian or another minority community. Voters cast a single vote for a team and the team with a plurality of the votes wins all the seats in that GRC. The stated purpose behind the use of GRCs is to ensure the representation of minority communities under the umbrella of broader, pan-ethnic parties. However, the move to GRCs came in the wake of minor inroads by small parties and individuals in single-member districts during the 1980s. Thus, the switch to GRCs is more properly interpreted as a strategy to undermine the capacity of the opposition and ensure continued victory for the PAP. The combination of winner take all multi-seat districts with the minority candidate makes it extremely difficult for even very popular opponents to challenge the ruling PAP party. Individual opposition politicians, even if they win the most votes in the GRC, cannot win a seat unless they are able to assemble an entire team strong enough to challenge the PAP. Formation of opposition party teams is made more difficult by the fact that opposition parties in Singapore are often ethnically-based.

5. CONCLUSION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF ENGINEERING

As useful a tool as institutional engineering and party regulation can be institutional reforms and regulations do not take place in a vacuum. These reforms will interact with each other and with societal and economic factors, often in unpredictable ways. As a result institutional reforms always have some unintended and unexpected consequences. It is possible to make some predictions and to have strong expectations about the effects of reforms, but there are always things reformers cannot

anticipate. The recent reform experiences of Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia each illustrate this principle.

Indonesia's efforts to promote national political parties and reduce political fragmentation may have the unintended consequence of retarding the development of strong links between political parties and certain voters. Indonesia's effective ban on regional parties for all elections, even local elections, may mean that a significant portion of the electorate—those with strong local or regional identities—are less likely to feel close to any political party, less likely to participate in elections, and perhaps ultimately less satisfied with Indonesia's developing democracy.⁵⁷

Turning to the Philippines, the development of the party list elections have not proceeded in the way some advocates of marginalized interests had hoped. In setting up the party list tier the drafters of the 1987 constitution made two decisions that have undermined the efficacy of the institution.⁵⁸ First, unlike most other mixed-member systems around the world the major parties in the Philippines were barred from competing for seats in the party list tier. This in effect meant that the major parties were immune from the incentives generated by the addition of a list tier. Second, the number of seats each party list group could capture was capped at three—thus reducing incentives to develop parties with national reach. These reforms have, in the end, produced some perverse side-effects. While the party list provision has probably resulted in more diverse interests being elected to Congress, it has also partially ghettoized those interests. Party list groups are too small to have a real voice in most policy debates, while mainstream political parties and politicians seem largely content to leave programmatic campaigning and the representation of marginalized interests to party list groups. The net effect of the party list in the Philippines is the further marginalization of the marginalized.

Finally, The drafters of the 1997 Thai constitution set out to correct some of the perceived weaknesses in the Thai party system. Specifically, they set out to reduce the number of parties and

promote the party cohesion and the development of national, programmatic parties. The move to single-member districts, the introduction of a national party list, and new incentives for cross-district coordination combined to drastically reduce the number of parties in the 2001 and 2005 elections.⁵⁹ The average effective number of parties in the pre-reform period was 7.2. This fell to 3.8 in 2001 and 2.6 in 2006. For only the second time in Thai electoral history a single party (Thai Rak Thai) captured a majority of the legislative seats in 2001 and then repeated that feat in 2005. In addition, new restrictions on party switching, an end to intra-party competition, and new leverage for the prime minister over factions within his own party enabled the head of Thai Rak Thai, Thaksin Shinwatra, to keep his party together for the entire parliamentary term. In so doing he became the first, and thus far, only prime minister to ever serve an complete four-year term. The 1997 constitution also increased the incentives and rewards for party-centered campaigns and programmatic appeals via the introduction of the national party list. In short, electoral reforms meant that a national programmatic appeal was a much more viable strategy than it had been under previous constitutions. Thaksin and his party improved their electoral fortunes by recognizing and capitalizing on these new opportunities.⁶⁰

In short, the constitutional reforms played a part in the rise and success of Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai.⁶¹ With a firm legislative majority and unprecedented leverage over his factional and party competitors Thaksin moved quickly to centralized political authority and turn the government into an instrument of the ruling party—a sharp departure from past norms. There were costs and benefits to this change. On the one hand the government was much more decisive than its predecessors and was able to quickly adopt a series of policies aimed at poor and rural voters. On the other hand, Thaksin's apparent use of government to enrich himself and his cronies undermined his support among some segments of the population, while his bid to centralize power eventually made enemies of the monarchy and military. Eventually Thaksin and his government were ousted in

a military coup in September of 2006. In the aftermath of the coup the new junta immediately set about to amend the constitution in an effort to reengineer the party system once again. While the details of the new constitution are still being debated it is clear that Thailand's conservative forces are attempting to engineer out the excesses perceived in the prior system. Specifically, they are trying to reduce the powers of the prime minister (e.g. by making it easier to switch parties, bring a no confidence motion to vote, and replacing the elected Senate with a partially appointed body), and discourage majority parties/encourage greater party fragmentation (e.g. by replacing the national party list with smaller regionally-based party lists).

In summary, the experience of Southeast Asia's developing democracies suggest that party systems can indeed be engineered—whether the goal is producing democratic stability in the presence of societal divides, or accelerating the pace of party system institutionalization. Institutional reforms throughout the region have enabled countries to reduce political fragmentation, promote the development of national parties, and strengthen the links between political parties and the citizens they represent. But institutional engineering is no panacea. Whether conscious or not reforms embody decisions about various institutional trade-offs and this means that all reforms come at a cost. Finally, the law of unintended consequences suggests that even the mildest of reforms should be undertaken with caution and due humility.

¹ Parts of this chapter draw on Allen Hicken, "Stuck in the Mud: Parties and Party Systems in Democratic Southeast Asia", *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 2(2), 2006a, pp. 23-46.

² This transition has been less than smooth as the coups in 1991 and 2006 illustrate.

³ Hicken 2006a.

⁴ See Case, William, *Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less*, Curzon Press, 2002.

⁵ Ironically, the durability of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes also depends on the building a strong, institutionalized party system. See: Jason Brownlee, "Ruling Parties and Durable Authoritarianism", CDDRL Working Paper, 2004.; Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?", *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, 1999, pp. 115-144.; Benjamin Smith. "Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence Under Single-Party Rule", *World Politics* 57(3), April 2005, pp. 421-451.

⁶ See Lijphart (2004) and Reilly (2002) for a review of this debate. Arend, Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies", *Journal of Democracy* 15(2) 2004, pp. 96-109.; Benjamin Reilly, "Electoral Systems for Divided Societies", *Journal of Democracy*. 12(2), 2002, 156-170.

For a review of consociational versus majoritarian institutions in Asia see Aurel Croissant, "Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia: A Comparative Perspective", in Aurel Croissant, G. Bruns & M. John, eds., *Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia*, Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2002, pp. 321-362.

⁷ Lijphart, Arend, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984.

⁸ The consociational model also argues emphasizes that each major group should get a share of power and the authority to block or veto policies that are of prime concern to that group's members. To do this one seeks to make ethnic/religious groups the building blocks of political parties and then ensure that each group is represented in a 'grand coalition' government.

⁹ Horowitz, Donald, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985.; Horowitz, Donald, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991.; Reilly, Benjamin, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

¹⁰ A plurality electoral system is the simplest version, but most advocates of centripetalism advocate systems which allow for preference voting and vote-pooling, e.g. the Alternative Vote, the Supplementary Vote, or the Single Transferable Vote.

¹¹ Lijphart, Arend, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1977. For a contrasting view see Horowitz 1985.

¹² Horowitz 1985.

¹³ Shugart, Matthew Soberg and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

¹⁴ Reilly 2006.

¹⁵ Ibid. While Cambodia uses a PR system over a third of its electoral districts are single-member districts. Elections in those districts are effectively plurality contests, which again favour large parties over small.

¹⁶ Official Gazette: Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, *Law NO. 6/2006: Law on the Election of the National Parliament*, Introduction, 2006.

¹⁷ Benjamin Reilly argues this is part of a broader Asian model of institutional design (Reilly 2006).

¹⁸ Both systems will be discussed in more detail below.

¹⁹ The effective number of parties (ENP) is defined as 1 divided by the sum of the weighted values for each party. This measure weights parties according to their size—parties with large vote shares are weighted more than parties with small shares. The weighted values are calculated by squaring each party's vote share (v_i): $ENP = 1/(\sum v_i^2)$.

²⁰ See Hicken, Allen, *Building Party Systems*, New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

²¹ There are a variety of ways to measure disproportionality. I use the average seat-vote deviation of the two largest parties—consistent with Reilly (2006). For other possibilities see Lijphart, Arend,

Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

²² Reilly 2006.

²³ Sartori, Giovanni, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. For critiques of this dichotomy, see Scott Mainwaring and Mariano Torcal, “Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory after the Third Wave of Democratisation”, in R. S. Katz and W. Crotty, eds., *Handbook of Political Parties*, London: Sage Publications, 2006, pp. 204-27.

²⁴ Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, “Introduction”, in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, pp. 1-11. The concept and operation are further refined in Mainwaring, Scott, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratisation: The Case of Brazil*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, and Mainwaring and Torcal 2006. Mainwaring and Scully also include legitimacy and party organization as part of their definition.

²⁵ Randal and Svasand refer to similar concepts using the terms “systemness” and “reification”. They also include *decisional autonomy* and *value infusion* in their definition. Vicky Randall and Lars Svasand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, *Party Politics* 8(1), 2002, pp. 5-29. For other work on party system institutionalisation see: Panebianco, Angelo, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.; Welfling, Mary B., *Political Institutionalization: Comparative Analyses of African Party Systems*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973.; Huntington, Samuel P., *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968.

²⁶ Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, pp. 7.

²⁷ Mainwaring and Torcal 2006.

²⁸ Powell, G. Bingham, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000.

²⁹ Mainwaring and Torcal 2006.

³⁰ Scott Mainwaring and Edurne Zoco, "Historical Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition: Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies", *Party Politics* 13(2), March 2007, p. 4.

³¹ Philip E. Converse, "Of Time and Stability", *Comparative Political Studies* 2(2), 1969, pp. 139-171.; Bartolini, Stefano and Peter Mair, *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates, 1885-1985*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

³² Margit Tavits, "The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe", *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2), 2005, pp. 283-198.; Noam Lupu and Susan Stokes, "Democracy Interrupted: Regime Change and Partisan Stability in Twentieth Century Argentina", unpublished manuscript, Yale University., 2007.

³³ Nassos Roussias, "Electoral Coordination in New Democracies", unpublished manuscript, Yale University, 2007.; Margit Tavits and Taavi Annus, "Learning to Make Votes Count: The Role of Democratic Experience", *Electoral Studies* 25(1), 200, pp. 79-90.; See also Robert J. Dalton, Ian McAllister, and Martin Wattenberg, "The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment", in Robert J. Dalton and Martin Wattenberg, eds., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 37-63.

³⁴ Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Gary Reich, "The Evolution of New Party Systems: Are Early Elections Exceptional?", *Electoral Studies* 23(2), 2004, pp. 232-250.; Gary Reich, "Coordinating Party Choice in Founding Elections", *Comparative Political Studies* 34(10), 2001, pp. 1237-1263.

³⁵ Barbara Geddes and Erica Frantz, “The Effect of Dictatorships on Party Systems in Latin America”, unpublished manuscript, UCLA, 2007.

³⁶ Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, 7.

³⁷ Asia Foundation, *Democracy in Indonesia: A Survey of the Indonesian Electorate 2003*, Jakarta: Asia Foundation, 2003, p. 98.

³⁸ *The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems: Modules 1 and 2*, 2007, available at www.cses.org.

³⁹ Paige Johnson Tan, “Party Rooting, Political Operators, and Instability in Indonesia: A Consideration of Party System Institutionalization in a Communally Charged Society”, paper presented at the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 10, 2004, unpublished.; Hicken forthcoming; Mahar Mangahas, “How the Voters Mix Their Candidates”, *Social Weather Stations: Social Climate*, April 1998, available <http://www.sws.org.ph/index.htm>.

⁴⁰ The only exception to this in the Philippines is parties on the Left—which generally have performed poorly at the polls—and some new party list parties, each of which can capture a maximum of three seats in the House. In Thailand the Democratic Party (with its roots in the Southern Thailand) and the newly formed Thai Rak Thai looked to be a partial exception. Unfortunately, the 2006 coup has deprived us of the chance to assess whether the ties between Thai Rak Thai and certain constituencies went beyond voter attachment/loyalty to the party leader, Thaksin Shinawatra.

⁴¹ Interview with consultant, July 2000. Anonymity requested.

⁴² Tan 2004.

⁴³ King, Dwight, *Half-Hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia*, Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2003.

⁴⁴ R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, "Indonesia's Approaching Elections: Politics, Islam, and Public Opinion", *Journal of Democracy* 15(1), January 2004, pp. 109-123.

⁴⁵ Lindberg, Staffan, *Democracy and Elections in Africa*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2006.; Grzymala-Busse, Anna, *Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Europe*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.; Geddes and Frantz 2007.; Joshua A. Tucker and Ted Brader, "The Emergence of Mass Partisanship in Russia, 1993-1996", *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1), pp. 69-83.

⁴⁶ Geddes and Frantz 2007; Lupu and Stokes 2007.

⁴⁷ Roussias 2007; Tavits 2005; Lindberg 1996; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007.

⁴⁸ Birnir, Jóhanna Kristín, *Ethnicity and Electoral Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

⁴⁹ Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Colomer, Josep M., *Political Institutions: Democracy and Social Choice*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.; Paul Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora, "Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines", *Journal of East Asian Studies* 3(2), May-August 2003, pp. 259-292.

⁵⁰ If we assume that a voter's propensity to develop an attachment to a particular party is some function of the distance between the voter's idea point and what she perceives as a party's position proportional rules should produce stronger voter-party links. This is because a) PR tends to produce parties that have distinct policy positions and b) the distance between voters and the nearest party is closer under PR compared to majoritarianism.

⁵¹ See Allen Hicken, "Party Fabrication: Constitutional Reform and the Rise of Thai Rak Thai", *Journal of East Asian Studies* 6(3), 2006b, pp. 381-408.

⁵² The law putting the system into effect did go into effect until the 1998 election.

⁵³ These reforms also reduced political fragmentation. Reilly 2006. See also Stephen Sherlock, “Consolidation and Change: The Indonesian Parliament after the 2004 Elections”, Canberra: Centre for Democratic Institutions, 2004, available at http://www.cdi.anu.edu.au/research/1998-2004/research_publications/research_downloads/Sherlock_DPR_2004.rtf.

⁵⁴ Reilly 2006. These reforms also reduced political fragmentation and helped the ruling party further sideline the opposition.

⁵⁵ Ibid.; C. Hartmann, G. Hassall, and S. Santos, “Philippines”, in D. Nohlen, F. Grotz and C. Hartmann, eds., *Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 195-238.

⁵⁶ Reilly 2006; Tan 2004.

⁵⁷ Jennifer Epley and Allen Hicken, “Region, Religion, and Representation: Electoral Behavior in Indonesia”, unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan.

⁵⁸ It is possible that this is exactly what some of the drafters intended.

⁵⁹ Some of these reforms were adopted with goals other than a reduction in the number of parties in mind. See Hicken 2006b for more details.

⁶⁰ Hicken 2006b.

⁶¹ While institutional reform was an important factor behind the rise of Thai Rak Thai, it was not the only factor. Thaksin’s wealth, the weakness of existing parties, and the fall-out from the Asian economic crisis also played a role. Nevertheless, the new constitution presented Thaksin power, opportunities and incentives that not of his elected predecessors had ever possessed. For a further discussion of relative effect of institutional reform in see Hicken 2006b; Michael H. Nelson, “Institutional Incentives and Informal Local Political Groups (*phuaek*) in Thailand: Comments and Allen Hicken and Paul Chambers”, *Journal of East Asian Studies* 7(1), 2007, pp. 125-148.; Allen

Hicken, "Omitted Variables, Intent, and Counterfactuals: A Response to Michael Nelson", *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 7(1), 2007, pp. 149-158.