THE CASE AGAINST ANIMALS HAVING EQUAL MORAL STANDING

Moral Conversation Project for next week:  Critically discuss Singer’s argument for a 
moral obligation to assist in the relief of world poverty.  In your view, how far does 
(should) this obligation extend?  What reasons can you give for your view? (B, 682-691)

I. The Problem

A. We have genuine moral questions about our obligations to other animals.
B. An adequate answer to these questions would have to derive from some moral 
principle or principles (a moral theory).
C. All the theories we considered have apparent problems:
1. Utilitarianism (counting animals’ subjective experience as mattering no 
more or less than that of humans)
a. At odds with current practice—is that evidence against it?
b. At odds with current beliefs about our obligations to animals—is that 
evidence against it?
c. Somewhat at odds with current moral beliefs more generally (e.g., 
Regan’s “Aunt Bea case”).
2. Lockean Natural Rights Theory (Libertarianism)
a. Less at odds with current practice—is that evidence for it?
b. If it entails that there are no moral obligations towards animals at all, 
then somewhat at odds with current beliefs.
c. If it entails we have no moral obligations to human beings who are not 
moral agents, very much at odds with current beliefs.
d. Other clashes with widespread moral belief?
3. Contractualism (Justice As Fairness)
a. Less at odds with current practice—is that evidence for it?
b. If it entails that there are no moral obligations towards animals, then 
somewhat at odds with current beliefs.
c. If it entails that there are no moral obligations towards human beings 
who are not moral agents, very much at odds with current beliefs.
d. Other clashes with widespread moral belief?
4. Regan’s Principle of Equal Inherent Worth of All Animals
a.  At odds with current practice.
b. At odds with current beliefs about our obligations to animals.
c. Other clashes with widespread moral belief?




II.	The Problem:  To bring our beliefs about individual cases and kinds of cases into 
“reflective equilibrium” with moral principles we have good reasons to accept.  Our 
moral problem is “solved” when we find a satisfying, principled stand on the particular 
issue that fits with other principles we accept, philosophical reasons we find convincing 
to accept these principles, and the implications that these principles have for cases.

		

	Reasons				Moral Principles




						

        Beliefs About Cases

III.	Cohen and Carruthers:  A satisfying solution to this problem can be achieved by 
modifying, or properly interpreting, Natural Rights Theory (Cohen) or Contractualism 
(Carruthers).  We can achieve RE (reflective equilibrium) between widespread current 
beliefs about our obligations to animals and one of these moral theories.

IV. Cohen

A. Response to I.C.2.b:  Although human beings are the only beings with rights 
(and, therefore, to whom we have rights-based obligations), all “animate life” 
calls for “a certain natural reverence.”
B. Response to I.C.2.c:  All human beings are equally of a kind that has the 
capacity for moral agency, therefore all human beings have the same natural 
rights, whether they themselves are moral agents (or have moral capacity) or 
not.
C. What exactly does the “natural reverence” for natural life require?  Whether or 
not animals have rights that are violated by causing them avoidable suffering 
might it nonetheless be wrong?
1. Cohen argues that it is not wrong to cause animal suffering if this is 
done in discharging moral duties to other human beings.  Some 
humans, e.g., doctors, “take on the obligation to support and heal 
others.”  Discharging their duties may require sacrificing and causing 
suffering to animals (for example, in animal experimentation).
2. If this suffering were avoidable, it might be wrong, but in animal 
experimentation for medical benefit, it usually is not.
D. Suppose we accept these conclusions for these cases, how would these 
considerations apply to other practices: wearing animals skins and furs, mass 
animal food production?

V. Carruthers

A. Response to I.C.3.c: “Slippery slope” arguments and human beings who 
are not moral agents.
B. Response to I.C.3.b: “Slippery slope” arguments, indirect arguments, and 
animals.
C. Still, can we accept that animals make no direct, intrinsic claim on us?