THE CASE FOR ANIMALS HAVING EQUAL MORAL STANDING

I. Morality: Theory and Practice

A.  Practices towards animals under criticism:
1. Animal experimentation, both for science and for commerce
2. Animal food production
3. Animal skin production
4. Hunting and blood sports
B. The issues: pain and suffering (frequently avoidable) and other forms 
of devaluing
C. In sum, do animals have equal moral standing?
D.  Can moral theory or principle help us solve these problems?
1. Utilitarianism
2. Natural Rights Theory
3. Justice as Fairness (Contractualism)
E. Perhaps these problems will show that all these theories are 
insufficient.

II. It is uncontroversial that humans and other animals differ in moral standing in one 
respect:  Only human beings are moral agents—morally accountable for their 
actions.  At issue, however, is whether humans and other animals have equal 
standing as moral patients, i.e., as beings affectable by conduct.

III. The latter difference does not follow from the former difference.  E.g., very young 
children, the severely mentally ill, etc.  Nonetheless, both Natural Rights Theory 
and Contractualism hold that the former difference justifies the latter difference.  
Are either right?

IV. Singer and Regan think these theories are mistaken, largely because they provide 
a morally inadequate account of our relations to other animals.

V. Singer: Moral equality of human beings derives from a Principle of Equal 
Consideration of Interests: i.e., the same interests count equally, regardless of 
difference in other features.

A. This equality is moral not factual.
B. This fundamental moral equality is consistent with derivative moral 
differences.  For example, some people may be capable of having certain 
interests that others can’t—e.g. a neonate cannot take the same interest in 
whether its life has meaning that, say, an undergraduate can.
C. The principle just says that what moral weight an interest has doesn’t depend 
on whose it is, e.g., on whether it is a human’s as opposed to another animal’s.
D. It follows further that all beings who have interests are morally equal, in the 
sense that their interests count equally.

VI. What beings have interests?  Singer accepts Bentham’s answer: Any being that 
can suffer or experience pleasure or pain.  And its interests’ weight vary according 
to the degree of its pleasure or suffering.

A. It follows that it is no less wrong to inflict suffering on animals as it would be 
to inflict a comparable amount of suffering on human beings.
B. Consequently, if we want to know whether causing suffering to animals in 
producing food, animal experimentation, producing shoes or suitcases, or 
hunting, is wrong, we must ask whether we would think it wrong to cause a 
comparable amount of suffering to humans.  If we would, and unless its being 
wrong is due to some other interest of human beings that animals lack, then it 
is no less wrong with respect to animals.
C. For example, take animal experimentation.  
1.  First, we need to know whether the experiments are necessary to achieve 
their respective goals.  If they are not, if there are other means that don’t 
cause such suffering, then they are unjustifiable.  
2. Suppose, they are indispensable to accomplish the goal.  Then we need to 
ask whether the end justifies the means.  And to test that we should ask, 
Would it be morally acceptable to reach this goal by causing a comparable 
amount of suffering to human beings?
D. Or take food production.  Here we may not even get past the first step, since 
there seem to be alternative ways to have a healthy diet than by eating 
animals.  But if that is so, then how can eating animals be justified if the food 
industry causes significant suffering to animals.  (Consider chickens, for 
example.)

VII. Regan thinks that even this does not go far enough.  

A.  It amounts to Utilitarianism, and the problem with Utilitarianism, he thinks, is 
that it fails to recognize the dignity or inherent worth of beings who have 
interests.  What matters ultimately is not their experiences, but them.   
Utilitarianism also justifies wrongful violation of rights.
B. If one rejects Utilitarianism on this ground, one is left with the following 
possibilities: Either the only beings that have inherent value are human beings 
or animals have the same inherent value that we do.  (There is also the 
possibility that we and they both have inherent value, but we have more.  
About that in a minute.)
C. If we take the former strategy (e.g., Contractualism or Natural Rights Theory) 
we are left holding not only that other animals do not matter directly morally 
at all, but also that neonates, the severely retarded, and severe Alzheimer’s 
patients don’t also (since they also are not (normally) morally answerable for 
their conduct).
D. But that is morally incredible.  Suppose we say that other animals matter, but 
not as much.  What will our reason be?  Any reason we might point to as 
making a moral difference will also apply within the human species, having 
moral consequences we cannot accept.
E. We have no moral alternative, therefore, but to count all animals as having 
equal inherent moral value.
F. From this various practical consequences will follow, viz., that any use of 
animals for our purposes is wrong, since it is a violation of their inherent 
worth.