SEXUAL ORIENTATION

I. Sexual orientation vs. homosexual conduct.  By and large, those who morally 
criticize homosexuality, criticize the latter not the former.  This sometimes goes 
together with a denial that there is any such thing as the former.

II. Within the moral critique of homosexuality, there is a distinction between the 
favoring of outright legal proscription of homosexual conduct (public, private) 
and the favoring of different treatment of practicing homosexuals.
A. Anti-sodomy laws (Bowers v. Hardwick)
B. Different treatment laws
1. Gays in the military
2. Marriage laws that don’t recognize same-sex relationships. 

III. The major arguments for proscribing homosexual conduct in general is that it is in 
some morally relevant sense unnatural.  Other reasons given for proscribing 
homosexual conduct in public (or perhaps also in private) have to do with offense, 
or with giving others (children, especially) inappropriate role models.  But these 
arguments may themselves depend to some degree on the premise that 
homosexual conduct is morally wrong, or morally “suboptimal.”

IV. One version of is religious, depending on premises about God's intentions, as 
interpreted within some religious tradition or other.For example, Roman Catholic 
doctrine holds that in order to accord with God's will, sexual activity must include 
a "procreative" element.  Therefore, homosexual conduct violates God's will.  
Would it violate the separation of church and state to argue for a legal 
proscription (or even for public moral criticism within the society at large) of 
homosexual conduct on these grounds?

V. Another version does not rely on theological premises, but proceeds on the basis 
of premises about natural function and design.  We can think of things having 
functions through a process of natural selection.  Here is a simple argument.

1. The natural function of sexual organs is procreation.
2. Homosexual conduct is a use of sexual organs for something other than their 
natural function.
3. Therefore, homosexual conduct is unnatural.
4. Therefore, homosexual conduct is wrong.

VI.	What about this argument
A. Is 1 obviously true?  It certainly seems likely that procreation is a natural 
function, but that it is the only one?  (Question, what does natural function 
mean here?)  Note, by the way, that there is some evidence that sexual 
orientation is at least partly genetically determined.  If that were true, how 
would that affect the plausibility of 1?
B. Does 3 follow from 2?
C. Does 4 follow from 3?  One worry might be that there is a fallacy of 
ambiguity: that ‘unnatural’ must mean one thing for 3 to follow from 2 
and another for 4 to follow from 3.

VII. There may be a  general problem with any argument of this sort, namely that they 
attempt to derive a moral conclusion from purely factual premises--an 'ought' 
from an 'is'.  It can be objected to no such argument can be valid, since an 'ought' 
cannot be derived from an 'is'. 
A. If so, the argument would need to be reformulated to include a moral 
premise.  We would have to add something like:

2’.  It is wrong to use any part of the body for anything other than its 
natural function.
B. If, however, this argument establishes that homosexual conduct is wrong, 
it also establishes that any nonprocreative sex is wrong, including that of 
infertile heterosexual husbands and wives, as well, of course, as any 
protected sex, masturbation, etc.
C. Can the argument be saved from these objections?

VIII. Another line of thought agrees that there is nothing wrong with private 
homosexual conduct, when it involves consenting adults, but that forms of public 
homosexual expression are offensive and wrong, even though comparable 
heterosexual expression in public would not be wrong.  Can this view by 
supported? 
A. It seems clear enough that there may be a difference in whether (many) 
others are actually offended. Is this adequate to support the argument?  
Wouldn't this have also been true about couples of mixed race not long 
ago (or perhaps even today)?
B.	If actual offense isn't a justification, don't we then need something like 
“justified offense" or, whether a "reasonable person" would be offended?  
Are there any grounds for offense if homosexual conduct is not itself 
wrong?