THE CASE AGAINST A MORAL OBLIGATION 
TO HELP RELIEVE WORLD HUNGER AND POVERTY

I.  	NetAid  (www.netaid.org)

II. 	 Recall Singer’s argument:	

1. If we can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of comparable 
significance, we ought to do it.
2. Absolute poverty is bad.
3. There is some absolute poverty we can prevent without sacrificing anything of 
comparable significance.
4. We ought to prevent some absolute poverty.

A. As we noted last time, if this argument works, it would appear to prove 
something much stronger, viz.

4’.  We ought to appear any absolute poverty we can prevent without sacrificing 
of comparable significance.

‘Comparable’ here means:  compared to the badness of the poverty we could 
prevent, i.e., that we ought to sacrifice until the point where by sacrificing 
further we would be make the situation worse for ourselves than the poverty 
we could prevent is bad for the poor.

III. This is a very strong conclusion.  It is not only at odds with current practice, but 
also with most current beliefs.  This does not mean that the argument is unsound.  
But it does mean that there is a lack of reflective equilibrium between the 
argument and much current belief.  Hence the principle in premise 1 is not in RE 
with these beliefs.

IV. Consider now a revision of Singer’s argument:

1’.  If we can prevent something bad without sacrificing either anything of 
comparable significance or anything of very great value to ourselves, we ought to 
do it.
2. Absolute poverty is bad.
3’.  There is some absolute poverty we can prevent without sacrificing either 
anything of comparable significance or anything of very great value to ourselves, 
we ought to do it.
4.  We ought to prevent some absolute poverty.

This argument does not lead to 4’.

V. Consider now the example that Singer gives to buttress his argument: saving the 
child from drowning in the lake.  
A.  Both 3 and 3’ seem to be true in this case. 
B. However, suppose that what was needed to save the child was running into a 
burning building where there was .8 chance of saving the child and a .6 
chance of dying in the process.  (Suppose that there is a .4 chance of saving 
the child but dying from burns oneself.)	
C. If you attempt to save the child, then you “prevent” a 0.8 chance of the child’s 
dying (without your attempt) and the sacrifice to you is a 0.6 chance of dying 
yourself.   
D. This sacrifice to yourself is not comparable to the child’s sacrifice.
E. Therefore, 4’ would require you to make it.

VI. Ask yourself whether you find an argument from 1 or from 1’ more convincing.

VII. Hardin argues, in effect, that neither are convincing.  His case relies upon three 
major points.

A. The “Tragedy of the Commons”:  the phenomenon that, when rights to some 
good are not matched by responsibilities to maintain or supply it, then the 
quantity and quality of the available good declines.

Example:  Compare two methods of five people paying for lunch:
(a) Each pays for what he/she orders.
(b) Each pays for 1/5 of the total bill.
Which method is likeliest to lead to the lowest average bill?

B. Food and poverty aid creates a “tragedy of the commons”, since, in effect, it 
gives rights to food or other wealth independently of actual effort.  Likely 
consequences:  less overall food produced, and more famine, than would 
otherwise exist.

C. Worse, there will be a general erosion in the quality of life owing to more 
dramatic increases in population and consequent environmental problems.

VIII. Where would Hardin attack the two arguments we considered above?

A. Premise 3 and 3’?
B. Premise 1 and 1’?  
An argument against premise 1 and 1’ might go as follows.  Even if the 
situation confronting individuals satisfies condition 3 or 3’, the claim that it 
would be wrong to provide aid in this case (i.e., 1 or 1’) cannot be true, since 
if people were generally to act on the rule or policy of providing aid in such 
cases, this would have the harmful consequences discussed in VII.
C. General phenomenon:  There can be a difference between what action by 
individuals, in a certain kind of case, would have the best consequences, and 
which rule or policy, it would be best for people to accept and act on for that 
kind of case.  Hardin is worried less about the consequences of any particular 
giving of aid than the consequences of a general policy.

IX.	How might Singer respond to these objections?