Philosophy 152 Philosophy of Human Nature Darwall Fall 1996 SARTRE I I One way of getting into Sartre's thought is to consider him in relation to Aristotle. Aristotle argued that human beings have a telos that determines what we should do. Sartre denies that there is any such thing. The human problem is set by the fact that there is nothing outside of us that tells us what to do, or even makes it the case that we should do one thing rather another. There are no values in the nature of things (either deriving from our human nature or from God). Rather, as he says, "existence precedes essence." We make what we are to be by our choices. Unlike an artefact, like a knife, what we are to be is not given in our essence. (see p. 315) II But the human problem is also set by the fact that what we are to be is genuinely up to us. We choose it. We cannot escape our freedom-- we are choosing beings. III Two important facts follow from this, according to Sartre. A. When we represent our choices as unfree, we are deceiving ourselves. We ar involved in what Sartre calls "bad faith." We find our freed condition a terrible responsibility and we look for excuses--"I had to do it," "I don't know what came over me," "Something happened." In representing our choices in this way to ourselves we are evading our actual situation. We chose to do what we did. B. When we choose, we commit ourselves to values. We choose actions as good. This, indeed, is the source of our terror in regarding ourselves as free. We realize it is up to us what to choose. No one can make our choices for us. And no one can make up our minds about what is valuable other than we ourselves. But we can't choose not to choose (since that itself is a choice). So we have to choose. But to choose is to regard what is chosen as valuable. When we deliberate we are trying to figure out what is good. No one can make up our minds for us--we have to decide. But in deciding we commit ourselves to the conviction that what we chose really is valuable. IV Moreover, Sartre argues, we commit ourselves to the proposition that what we choose is not simply valuable for us. But that it is valuable period. And this means that we commit ourselves to its being choiceworthy for others also. Interpret: "To choose to be this or that is . . . good for all." (316) "Of course, there are many people who are not anxious . . . conferred upon the lie." (316-7)