

Separation scheme are undoubtedly... Not only have they many a... ties toward France, but... that no other power than Fr... will support them in their privi...
Many of their followers, espec... those who have personal ties with... States, would rather have... the Lebanon area who are no... for France as a mandatory p... are comparatively few. They inc... the Catholics of every desc... and of the Greek or Or... who would have been for a... had Russia not collapsed.
Another group prefer France to Brit... but there was evidence that many... if there were a certainty of accep... in all Syria surprising few, aside f... choice—nearly so many as... France. The fact is that the main... America were classed together with... distinct preference for America, but... were greatly preferred to France.
Orthodox and some of the G... were for Britain. The great majori... the Moslems were for Britain as sec... their first choice, were for America... second choice. France was first ch... for America or England as first ch... and France as second choice.
Moslems All for America.
Practically all of the Moslems, a... number about four-fifths of the popu... of Syria, are for America as th... first choice. It is true that there... little direct expression of this in Pa... since after their first declarati... at Jaffa the question of a manda... was held up and referred to Dam... Possibly this was done under... instructions from the Emir Faisal, w... may have been trying to hold the... for Britain. If so, the evidence... cere declaration for America is all... stronger, since the Congress read... unanimity for America.
As for the Christians, while compa... tively few declared directly for Am... as first choice—only a part of the P... and Syrian Orthodox and Ar... since they were brought by old ties... recent years to declare for Brit... or France, but a large proportion... Moned America as a second choice... stated that they would welcome a... while there were abundant assuran... that an American mandate would... satisfactory to practically all.
The members of the commission c... entertain no doubt of the genuinen... desire for the United States as m... the few of the commission's coun... earnest appeals, both by individuals... groups, and of the manifest enthus... shown on many occasions, in spite of... commission's discouragement of dem... strations and evocation of every form... ostentation. It was, furthermore, alw... possible to ask why a group or in... vidual objected to France or Engla... and to ask why a group failed to... declare for the United States. It is... course, also a fact that France, and... less openly England, were making b... for the mandate, while the United St... was not.

Reasons for Their Attitude.

The principal reasons advanced for d... siring an American mandate were as f... llows:

- i. Confidence in President Wilson mainly responsible for the freedom Syria and as championing the rights small and oppressed peoples.
 - ii. Gratitude to America for relief from the ravages and naked. Thanks to President Wilson and American aid, Syria in a thousand forms and with the great est emotion, independently of the desi as regards a mandate.
 - iii. The feeling that America can lead into the war for no selfish reason, and could be trusted to take care of a sma people in an unselfish way.
 - iv. The knowledge that America is a colonizing power, seeking to gover for the advantage of its own people, at to exploit the governed. The exampl of Cuba and the Philippines were fr quently cited.
 - v. The feeling that America can l relied upon to withdraw from the cou try when her work is done, which is ti case with no other power. The exper ence of Cuba was contrasted with th of Egypt and Algeria.
 - vi. The feeling that America is ric and abundantly able to advance th means for the desirable speedy develo ment of the country economically.
 - vii. A hearty approval of, and desir for the extension of American educati in the country. England has done litt educationally for Syria. While Franc has done much, she seeks to denatori alize the native peoples and mak Frenchmen of them. America, especia lly through the Syrian Protestant Co lege, has taught Syrian nationalism. Th American training and the Anglo-Saxo literature and civilization are regarde as morally superior to the French.
 - viii. A conviction that America wi be absolutely fair and just as betwee the different religions and sects. Franc would be expected to favor Christians especially Roman Catholics, and Eng land to favor Moslems.
 - ix. America is abundantly supplie with trained men, from whom expert can be supplied in various branches o science, industry, administration, an above all, education.
 - x. The Americans are "lovers of hu manity."
- Many British officials, not exceptin General Allenby, think the best solutio to be an American mandate over th whole of Syria. England might be ver glad to get out of the difficulties of th situation in this way. As for France she cannot desire to take the whole o Syria, when so much of it is utterly adverse to her. She also may ultimatel conclude that the best way out is com plete withdrawal. This would, perhaps not hurt her pride seriously if at th same time England were to withdraw and if her special prewar relationship be scrupulously continued.

III. Special Discussions.

It is evident that the French feel re sistent toward the British as not hav ing played a fair game in the Syrian area. Without going into historical de tails, the Sykes-Picot agreement pro vided that France should have own ership or influence in a large area, including Damascus and Cilicia, and ex tending to Sivas and Harput, while England should be in a similar positio toward the former Turkish area south east of this. At the present moment, France is weakened by the loss of al her sphere, while England, while en terly holds all that was then assigned to her, and extends her influence toward much of the rest.

American, by showing interest in Ar menia, and even by the sending of the Commission on Mandates to Syria, seems to the French to be an accom plishment of England in despoiling France. The French feel the English took advantage of their dire necessity, by reason of which they were obliged to keep practically all of their men in France, to occupy more than a due share of Syria and to seduce the affec tion of the Arabs.

They also resent the payment by the English to the Emir Faisal of a large monthly subsidy, which they claim cov ers a multitude of British and French hands while Arab agents do dirty work in their interest. They feel that in arming the Arabs, the British are again working against the French. They claim further that the British are more or less directly responsible for the undeniably strong anti-French feeling shown by practically all the Moslem and non-Catholic Christian elements of Syria. They feel that Britain has been unable to resist the desire to connect Egypt with Mesopotamia under one control as a bulwark of India, and as a new field for profitable commercial exploitation.

British Withdrawal Advocated.

It cannot be denied that some of the French contentions are difficult of refutation, and that the whole situation is such that British honor would seem cleaner if Britain were to withdraw wholly from Syria. Yet the aversion of the people to France, however it may have arisen, is so great and deep seated that England cannot leave Syria to France without seemingly abandon her friends to their enemies, a process which would probably react strongly in Egypt and elsewhere in the Moslem world. There is good reason for the position of many Englishmen who are strongly desirous that America should take the whole situation off their hands, including with the French and Arab enlightenment the promise of Zionism.

tem of churches, schools and monas teries. France has been a constant relation and small groups of resident citizens since the Middle Ages. French has long been the principal Western lan guage in Syria. France has taken special interest in the Syrians and intervened on their behalf in the Lebanon in 1860.

None of these relationships, however, are the least likely to claim terri torial or mandatory control, otherwise it could be held that America, through her missionary work and business relationships, had acquired a measure of political rights in India, China, South America and Syria itself. France her self could claim all of Turkey with nearly the same justification.

It would comprise all the missionary work in the world if the doctrine were admitted that the entire world is a political claims. No doubt the French have acquired many personal relationships and sentimental attachments. But there is no reason why any tie that France has had with Syria in the past should be severed or even weakened under the control of another mandatory power or in an independent Syria.

5. The "Greater Lebanon."

The latest policy pushed by the French in the Lebanon region contemplates complete separation of the country from Tyre to Tripoli, as far inland as the crest of the Anti-Lebanon, to be given to France in case the remainder of Syria should be another mandatory power. Such a plan is objectionable for many reasons:

- i. It is apparently contrary to the wish of the majority of the people in the Lebanon, who would prefer to remain united with the rest of Syria.
- ii. The Syrians outside the area are so opposed to the plan as to be inclined to make war rather than accept it.
- iii. If put into effect by overwhelming force, it would be a gross violation of the principle of self-determination, and probably never be attained, because of such questions as the just control of "Hollow Syria," where the Christians by their own figures own 65 per cent of the property, but only 20 per cent of the population; the water supply of Toms, which comes from territory claimed for the "Greater Lebanon"; the commercial access to the sea of the regions of Damascus and Aleppo. In short, the land is too small, and too intimately connected, to be capable of satisfactory division.
- iv. The separation off of the Greater Lebanon, especially if accompanied by a separation off of Palestine, would intensify the religious differences in Syria, which it is most desirable to diminish in favor of the growth of a nation.
- v. The tendency would be for Christian Syrians to concentrate in the Lebanon, Jews in Palestine, and Moslem Syrians in the remainder of the country.
- vi. The Government would countenance and probably conduct intrigue in the other regions.
- vii. The three areas would be implicitly hostile, and must either carry heavy burdens of armaments, or be protected at great expense by the mandatory powers.
- viii. The mandatory powers would themselves be in danger of hostility over the questions which would inevitably arise between the portions of a country and a people thus unnaturally severed.
- ix. A plan which would add to the Greater Lebanon the remainder of O. E. T. A. West, extending from Tripoli to Alexandretta, and give the whole to France, and at the same time give the interior to Britain, would intensify all the above difficulties, and would besides cut off Aleppo and Western Mesopotamia from access to the sea.

4. The Emir Faisal's Position.

Unless the attempt be made to rule Syria as a conquered country, or unless the experiment of republican govern ment be tried in the old land, the obvious plan is that the Emir Faisal should be head of the State, third son of the Sherief of Mecca, Hussein, who was recognized during the war as King of the Hedjaz, the Emir Faisal led the Arabs in co-operation with the Allies against the Turks, and entered Damascus in triumph. He spent several months in Paris, and returned a few weeks before the arrival of the commission. He had agreed with Clemenceau, in the labor of allaying the feeling against the French, but believing after a time that the French were playing false with him, he ceased his efforts. Shortly before the arrival of the commission in Damascus he endeavored to obtain declarations in favor of a British mandate. He assured the commission that he would be pleased with either Britain or America as man datory power.

The British Government has been advancing money to his Government for a long time, and at present allows it \$750,000 per month (\$150,000). Of this Faisal draws about \$200,000 per month for his personal expenses, staff, propaganda agents, &c. The balance is spent on the administration and the army of 7,000 and gendarmerie of 4,500, in supplement to the inadequate receipts of the State.

The estimate was made that the Prince could manage under settled conditions with a salary of \$125,000 per year, and that after a few years the country could carry itself by taxation, maintaining a very small army. This does not allow for carrying a portion of the Ottoman debt, nor for large expenditure on needed public improvements.

The present attachment of the popula tion to Prince Faisal varies in the different regions. Not many Christians declared themselves positively in favor of him. Some others said he is a good man, with bad advisers. Others favor him because of his membership in a powerful Moslem family. The Moslems of Palestine made almost no declarations in his favor. It was said that if he would come to Palestine, all Arabs would be enthu sially for him. In the O. E. T. A. East, and among the Moslems of the West, he was asked for, often with enthusiasm. An exception was found in some Moslems of the North, who said they do not know him.

Emir Faisal gave the impression of being kindly, genial and wise. Whatever was the case previously, he has had during the past two years been a man at Damascus and Paris an excellent political education. He desires the friendly co-operation of the Moslems and Christians of Syria, and wishes to promote the education of Moslem women. Some say that he is not as strong as the men around him, but he gave the impression of being able to maintain his leadership. He promises well as a constitutional monarch who would be amicably in co-ordination with a mandatory power. It should be provided, in case he remains the head of the Syrian State, that he renounce all rights of inheritance of the crown of the Hedjaz; otherwise serious complications might arise in the future.

5. The "Rights of Minorities."

One clause in the Damascus program promises full recognition of the "rights of minorities" in the Syrian constitution. On account of the evident fears of many Christians, based on the policy of massacre that has been employed so often in Turkey, the Commissioners took pains to inquire of many Moslem groups what they propose to do to insure the rights of the smaller sections of the population. The answer was matter of given, logically enough, that there would be no minorities, since all would be absolutely equal in the new State. But ordinarily the promise was made of constitutional guarantees.

There was discussion in the Damascus Congress of a proposal to grant Moslems one-half of the seats in the future legisla tive assembly, while the other half would be distributed among the rest of the population. What method might be used in apportioning seats to different groups and sects, as the Druzes, Maronites, Elhites, Nusairiyeh, Ismailians, Turks, Jews, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, &c., was not discussed; the mere enumeration suggests the difficulty of the problem.

Mention has been made already of the agreements made by Prince Faisal with the Druzes and the Greek Orthodox. He promised in return for the Greek Orthodox support that he would govern under seven conditions:

- (1) He would rule in the fear of God without despotism.
- (2) He would establish constitutional government.
- (3) He would respect all religions.
- (4) Equal rights should be enjoyed by all.
- (5) Public security should be guaranteed for all; the private carrying of rifles should be prevented.
- (6) Public instruction should be equal; Greek Orthodox schools should be on the same basis as Moslem schools.
- (7) No one should hold office because of family or influence, but only because fitted for the place.

These conditions are superior in form from the standpoint of a modern State to the Turkish system of recognizing a certain measure of autonomy and self-govern ment in various religious groups, thus perpetuating differences and making concessions which later become privileges and the source of friction. It would be better to aim at one system of education, wherein certain hours each

week should be set aside for religious instruction under special teachers for each group than to have several State supported school systems. But these are details for future adjustment. Suffice it to say that great readiness was shown by the majority group to provide adequately for the protection and rights of the other groups, and it remains only to bring this purpose into action.

It is desirable to bear in mind that the Moslem and Druze minority in the Lebanon is also in need of protection, and that in the event of a Jewish majority in Palestine, Moslems and Christians would need protection there. A former Governor of the Lebanon stated that a large part of his work was given to watching lest the Maronites and other Christians infringe the rights of the Moslems and Druzes.

6. "Complete Independence."

One item in the Damascus program deserves special attention, as going below the problem of a mandate, namely, the request for "complete independence." The protest against the applica tion to Syria of Article 22 of the Covenant is closely related to this. The feeling that the Syrians are in at least as advanced a condition as were the differ ent Balkan States when their independence was arranged for was present in the first Moslems whom the commission met in Syria, and the same note was sounded everywhere by some of the delegations.

The groups which were inclined to support this view in an extreme form were Bedouins, villagers of the south and east, and some of the younger Moslem men. The Syrian Union Party declared in this direction, and the few but prominent men and women related to the Arab Martyrs—the men who were executed by Jemal Pasha for intrigues against the Turkish Government—were very emphatic against any form of relationship to another nation; the Syrian Union Party ask that the League of Nations guarantee the independence and the Constitution of Syria. The declaration was made that when Syrians now abroad return, there will be a sufficiency of educated and trained men to govern the country well.

On the other hand, a large proportion of the learned men and of others from the older and wiser among the Moslems, recognized fully that some form of man datory control is necessary, since the Syrians have long been in subjection, few of them are educated and the country is poor and backward in its develop ment. The Christians and most other non-Moslem groups, are unanimous in the belief that a strong mandate is necessary for a considerable time, because they do not feel confidence in an Arab government, which in country four-fifths Moslem might be too favorable to the majority.

The nations in forming the league have pronounced in the Covenant that Syria should be under mandatory control. The commission did not find reason to recommend modification of this decision but abundant cause for holding it to be just. The failure of the Young Turkish attempt to conduct a self-gov-

erning State, in which Moslems and Christians should be equal makes it especially desirable that the new Syrian State should in its first years be watched closely, since it has the additional difficulty to be overcome of emergence from subjection.

The fourth article of the "Damascus Program" provides for the possibility of a mandate, defining it "as equivalent to the rendering of economical and technical assistance that does not preclude our complete independence." Here also the restriction may be too great. The mandatory power should have a real control over the Administration so as to eliminate as far as possible corruption, waste, inertia, serious errors of judgment, &c.

In spite of all that was said in favor of complete independence, it is alto gether probable that either America or Britain would be allowed without resistance as much control as the Council of the League of Nations judges to be wise. In fact, assurance was given on very high authority that the demand for complete independence is to an extent artificial, being in part motivated by the fear of a French mandate, and in part by apprehension of the conversion of mandatory control into permanent possession. If adequate assurances be had against both these possibilities, the objectors to a mandate, limited so as to secure its exercise in the interests of Syria, will be reduced to a small and impotent group. In time, when all things are ready, a true and lasting "complete independence can be awarded by the League of Nations.

7. Syrian Nationalism, Pan-Arabism, and Pan-Islamism.

The programs presented to the commission by all the Moslems and about two-thirds of the Christians of Syria were nationalistic; that is to say, they called for a United Syria under a democratic constitution, making no distinction on the basis of religion. In response to repeated questions in many places, it was steadily affirmed by the Moslems that they had no desire whatever for Moslem privilege in the government, nor for political union with the Arabs of the Hedjaz, whom they felt to be in another state of civilization. They asked regularly for the independence of Mesopotamia, and a few of them hoped for some form of political union with that area. A few asked for the independence of all Arab countries.

The commissioners often asked the question of Moslems, whether they considered the Caliphate to be at Stamboul or at Mecca. With very few exceptions they replied that it belongs now to King Hussein in Mecca: One or two said that it belongs still to the Turkish Sultan, and cannot be changed except by an agreement of all the Moslems in the world. All affirmed that King Hussein is in no sense their political head, but only their religious head. Prayers are said in his name, and certain seals for public documents bear his name.

Certain Christians, on the other hand, affirmed that the sentiment of Syrian Nationalism is new and feeble, and that

he expressions of it made before the commission gave a false impression. They claimed that the Christians who adhere to this view do so as making a desperate effort to live on good terms with the Moslem majority, and that the Pan-Islamic scheme, and would quickly abandon Syrian nationalism if they saw a chance for the success of either of these ideas. It would seem safe to assume that those who speak for themselves strike nearer the truth than others who assume to speak for them. Nevertheless, it is worth while to give consideration to the criticism.

The Turkish National Pact.

Pan-Arabism [this is the portentous program set forth in the Turkish Nationalist Pact. It would apparently eliminate both France and Great Britain from the confines of the former Ottoman Empire] in a narrower sense would unite under one independent Government the Arab-speaking portions of the former Turkish Empire. This would not necessarily be a theoretic Moslem State, though the large majority would belong to the different Moslem sects. It is hard to see how much a federated State, with its territory largely desert and lacking a centre and speedy communications, could be more of an enger to the world than the Turkey of which it forms a part.

In a larger sense Pan-Arabism would wish to add also the Arab-speaking belt across North Africa. Since this is held by three great powers, each of whom has a larger population and infinitely greater resources than the Pan-Arab area contains, its accomplishment against their will is a mere dream.

Pan-Islamism in a narrow sense would re-establish one Government in the former Turkish Empire by agreement of the two Moslem groups of north and south—the Turks and the Arabs. The commission found no sign of a desire for the re-establishment of the rule of Turkey over the Arabs. One former deputy in the Turkish Parliament did indeed suggest that an Ottoman prince might be chosen as king of Syria, but this was an individual opinion. On the other hand, there were many expressions of joy and thankfulness because of the end of Turkish rule. If there is any thought of a federation of Arabs with Turks or a political union of any sort the commission saw no trace of it. Still less was there any sign of movement toward the realization of a larger Pan-Islamic idea. The Turks had some thought of this early in the war, but it disappeared in favor of a Pan-Turanian idea on a racial or linguistic rather than a religious basis, from the time when Jemal Pasha hanged the leaders of the Syrian Arabs.

One may conjure up the picture of an attempt at restoring the Saracen Empire, by the stages of Syrian, Arabian and Mesopotamian independence, followed by federal union in a strong conquer ing state, which would then become imperialistic in the directions of Persia, Armenia, Turkey and North Africa; but the commission discerned no trace of such a notion, nor is it practically con-

ceivable under present world conditions. If the European civilization has sufficient wisdom to avoid further extensive self-destruction, it can with the greatest ease control the Moslem world; it is not necessary for those who labor to establish the League of Nations to contemplate the opposite possibility.

Western Attitude to Moslems.

The fundamental question in this connection, and indeed, in several other great immediate problems, is the basal attitude of the Christians toward the Moslem world: Shall this be friendly or hostile? In the war now ending Christian Governments gave their Moslem allies promises of fair treatment and full rights. Now the Moslems of Syria offer their hands to their non-Moslem fellow-citizens with the promise of putting religious separation out of sight. Shall they be taken at their word? Or shall they be told: We do not believe what you say; we do not trust you; we think it best to break our words with you, so that you may not have the opportunity to break your word with us?

The western world is already committed to the attempt to live in peace and self-destruction, with the Moslem peoples, and to manage governments in such a way as to separate politics from religion. Syria offers an excellent opportunity to establish a state where members of the three great monotheistic religions can live together in harmony; because it is a country of one language, which has long had freedom of movement and of business relations through being unified under the Turkish rule. Since now the majority declare for nations independent of religion, it is necessary only to hold them to this view through mandatory control until they shall have established the method and practice of it. Dangers may readily arise from unwise and unfaithful dealings with this people, but there is great hope of peace and progress if they be handled frankly and loyally.