

# Yoshikuni Ono

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## EDUCATION

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### University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan

- Ph. D. Candidate, Department of Political Science (degree expected May 2009)

**Dissertation:** “Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy: Bargaining within and across Parties”

**Dissertation Committee:** Arthur Lupia (Chair), William R. Clark, Anna Grzymala-Busse, Orit Kedar, and Daisuke Nakajima (Economics)

- M.A. in Political Science, 2005

### University of Tokyo, Tokyo, JAPAN

- Ph.D. student, Graduate School of Law and Politics 1999-2002  
Advisors: Ikuo Kabashima, Takeshi Sasaki
- LL.M. in Politics, 2001
- B. A. in Law and Politics, 1999

### Summer Institute on Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM)

#### University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan

- Summer Program (funded by NSF) 2006

### Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)

#### University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan

- Summer Program 2001 and 2003

## SPECIALIZATION AND RESEARCH INTERESTS

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- Comparative politics
- Japanese Politics
- Parliamentary democracy, coalition formation, legislative institutions
- Political parties, party system, intra-party politics, electoral systems
- Delegation of power, bureaucracy, institutional development

## SELECTED FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

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- **Rackham Predoctoral Fellowship** 2007-2008  
Horace H. Rackham Graduate School, University of Michigan
- **Roy Pierce Scholar's Award** 2007  
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan
- **Thesis Grant** 2006 and 2007  
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan
- **APSA Travel Grant** 2006  
American Political Science Association
- **Rackham Discretionary Funds** 2005  
Horace H. Rackham Graduate School, University of Michigan
- **Center for Japanese Studies Alumni Award** 2003 and 2005  
Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan
- **Summer Collaboration Fund** 2004 and 2005  
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan
- **Departmental Fellowship** 2002-2003  
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan
- **Fulbright Graduate Study Grant** (traveling expenses support) 2002 (declined)  
The Japan-U.S. Fulbright Program, The Japan-U.S. Educational Commission
- **Research Fellowship for Young Scientists** 2001-2002  
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, JAPAN (Japanese equivalent of NSF)

## PUBLICATIONS

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Yoshikuni Ono. 2009. "Spatial Theory and Voting Behavior." In Masahiro Yamada (ed.) *Tohyo Kodo Kenkyu no Furont'ia [Frontiers of Voting Behavior Studies]*. Tokyo: Brain-Shuppan (in Japanese).

Yoshikuni Ono. 2005. Book Review of Ofer Feldman's *The Japanese Political Personality*. *Kokkagakkai Zasshi* vol.118 (in Japanese).

Yoshikuni Ono. 2002. "Nonprofit Organizations and Policy Process: Public Interest Groups and Issue Networks in Japan." *Kokkagakkai Zasshi* vol.115 (in Japanese).

Yoshikuni Ono. 2000. "Legislative Activities of the Members of the Diet." In the Ikuo Kabashima Seminar (ed.) *Gendai Nihon no Seijika Zo [Members of the Japanese Diet: An Analysis of Their Political Activities, 1990-1998]*. Tokyo: Bokutakusha (in Japanese).

## WORKS IN PROGRESS

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- "Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy: Bargaining within and across Parties."
- "Barriers to Rent-seeking Activities: Police-patrol or Fire-alarm Oversight."

## RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

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- **Research Assistant** 2006-2007  
Graduate Student Research Assistant, University of Michigan
  - ◆ Assisted Professor Anna Grzymala-Busse in collecting data on oversight institutions.

## PRESENTATIONS

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Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association	2006, 2008
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association	2006, 2007, 2008
Annual Summer Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology	2008
Political Economy Colloquium, the University of Wisconsin-Madison	2007
World Congress of the International Political Science Association	2006

## MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES/ASSOCIATIONS

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American Political Science Association (APSA)  
Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA)  
Association of Japanese Politics Studies  
Japan Election Studies Association

## DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE

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- **Search Committee in Comparative Politics** 2006  
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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- **Government and Politics of Japan** 2004, Winter  
Graduate Student Instructor, University of Michigan
  - ◆ Assisted Professor John Campbell in teaching approximately 80 students, including grading exams.
- **Contemporary Political Issues** 2005, Fall  
Graduate Student Instructor, University of Michigan
  - ◆ Taught two 25-student discussion sections for Professor Lynn Rivers including leading discussions and grading assignments.
- **Introduction to American Politics** 2006, Winter  
Graduate Student Instructor, University of Michigan
  - ◆ Taught two 25-student discussion sections for Professors Arthur Lupia, Vincent Hutchings, and Ken Kollman, including leading discussions and grading assignments and exams.
- **The Use of Social Science Computer Programs (Graduate Course)** 2003 and 2004  
Graduate Student Instructor, University of Michigan
  - ◆ Taught approximately 20 graduate students, including giving lectures, advising students and grading assignments and exams.

- **Computer Lab Consultant** (Department of Political Science) 2003-2005, Winter  
Graduate Student Instructor, University of Michigan
  - ◆ Helped faculty, staff, and graduate students access and work with data sets, learn statistical software commands (such as STATA, R, SPSS and SAS), and solve computer problems.

## PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

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- **Journal Referee**  
*Political Research Quarterly*

## SKILLS

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- **Computers**  
Familiar with statistical software packages (STATA, R, SPSS, SAS)
- **Languages**  
Japanese (native speaker)  
Chinese and Cantonese (introductory level)

## References

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### **Dr. Arthur Lupia**

Hal R. Varian Collegiate Professor  
Department of Political Science  
University of Michigan  
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### **Dr. William R. Clark**

Associate Professor  
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### **Dr. Anna Grzymala-Busse**

Associate Professor  
Department of Political Science  
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### **Dr. Orit Kedar**

Assistant Professor  
Department of Political Science  
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### **Dr. John C. Campbell**

Professor Emeritus of Political Science  
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Keio University, Japan  
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# Dissertation Abstract

Yoshikuni Ono

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My dissertation, entitled *Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy: Bargaining within and across Parties*, reveals mechanisms underlying portfolio allocation both across countries and over time within countries. In parliamentary democracies that have coalition government arrangements, how portfolios (cabinet ministries) are allocated among political parties is an important question. How this question is answered largely determines which societal interests are represented in the actions of government. Some research on coalition governance predicts that portfolios will be allocated in proportion to a member party's seat share in the legislature (Gamson's Law). Other research predicts that the formateur party—the party formally given the first opportunity to build a coalition and typically the party of the Prime Minister—will get a share that is more than proportional to its seat share. However, I have obtained empirical evidence of portfolio allocation from many countries that contradicts both theories.

My dissertation begins with an empirical inquiry into portfolio allocation decisions in Western European countries. This inquiry reveals that, most of the time, the party to which the prime minister belongs neither receives a proportional share of cabinet portfolios, nor enjoys any other advantage in portfolio allocation. In most cases, the prime minister's party receives fewer portfolios than it should under prevailing proportionality and formateur-advantage theories. This empirical result contradicts the conventional wisdom. I continue this inquiry by examining portfolio allocation among rival factions in the long-dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan. The pattern there is also inconsistent with the conventional wisdom.

The rest of the dissertation develops a rigorous attempt to explain variations in portfolio allocation across countries and over time within countries. The core of this attempt is a theoretical framework that accounts for the variation of portfolio allocation in terms of the prime minister's "political strategy." The framework builds from a core premise: a leader's two needs—to form a coalition and to minimize intra-coalition disagreements—conflict with one another. This conflict affects the bargains that s/he will choose to strike with potential and existing coalition members. In conditions that are often satisfied in Western Europe, this conflict will lead the prime minister's party to accept fewer portfolios than proportionality would predict. The same is also true in Japan, taking into account the fact that party factions cannot withdraw from a party as easily as a party can withdraw from a governing coalition.

From this framework, I develop models that explain allocation patterns *among* parties in Western European parliamentary democracy and *within* a factionalized party such as the LDP in Japan. I then evaluate the models' predictions through a series of empirical analyses and case studies using data drawn from coalition governments in thirteen Western Europe countries and LDP factions in Japan. The empirical work demonstrates that my theoretical framework better explains variations in portfolio allocation across countries and over time within countries than do proportionality or formateur-advantage theories. I show that the prime minister surrenders more cabinet portfolios to coalition partners when the governing coalition is internally divided than s/he does when it is unified. The results support the idea that the prime minister uses portfolio allocation as an instrument to accommodate both coalition formation and effective governance. These results also explain why in most of these countries, the share of portfolios given to the prime minister's party reflects neither proportionality nor formateur advantage.