# Price Regulation, Price Discrimination, and Equality of Opportunity in Higher Education: Evidence from Texas 

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#### Abstract

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## APPENDIX A. Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A1. Tuition In Public 4-year and 2-year Colleges in Texas
Fall Semester, In-state/district students, 15 Student Credit Hours


Notes: Public University sample includes approximately 640 programs observed each year. Sticker price was obtained from course catalogs and archival sources and captured separately for each identifiable program (with a distinct tuition or fee), residency status, undergraduate level, academic year, entering cohort, and number of credit hours. Community College sample includes average institution-level price for all community colleges in Texas. Tuition rates not available for 2008.

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Figure A2. Resource Differences by Field, 2000


Notes: Excludes fields with fewer than 10 programs. Full sample includes 641 programs.

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Figure A3. Resource Differences by Field, 2000



Notes: Excludes fields with fewer than 10 programs. Sample includes 641 programs.

Figure A4. Distribution of Predicted Program Earnings, 2000


Notes: Full sample includes 643 programs, though this distribution omits 68 programs that have fewer than five students enrolled from the 2000 cohort. Programs weighted by number of enrollees from 2000 high school cohort. Program-level predicted earnings control for poor, demographic controls, and standardized achievement test scores. Earnings premium is in reference to high school graduates who did not attend a Texas public university.

Figure A5. Earnings Differences by Field and Institution, Robustness to Controls



Notes: Full sample includes 643 programs, though this graph omits 68 programs that have fewer than five students enrolled from the 2000 cohort and also does not display any fields or institutions with fewer than 10 observations. Programs weighted by number of enrollees from 2000 cohort when computing $50^{\text {th }}$ percentile.

FigureA6. Distribution of Students Across Programs, 2000 and 2008 Cohorts


Notes: Ventile of program earnings estimated via equation (1), controlling for poor, demographic controls, and standardized achievement test scores. Sample includes all 2000 graduates from Texas public high schools that enrolled in a Texas public university within two years of high school graduation.

FigureA7. Change in Enrollment of Poor and Non-Poor Students Across Programs, Robustness


Notes: Estimates in figure come from one hundred separate regressions of indicators for enrolling in a program in each ventile on a dummy for Poor, Post X Poor, Time (linearly), Post, and the stated controls (if applicable), as described in equation (2). Bars plot the coefficients on the Post X Poor interaction. "None" is our specification which includes no controls. "Demog" is our specification which includes controls for student race, ethnicity, sex, and limited English proficiency. "Test+Demog" is our preferred specification, which controls for student race, ethnicity, sex, limited English proficiency, and standardized math test scores. "App" specification includes 33 indicators for whether the student applied to each university and 33 indicators for whether the student was accepted to each university, on top of controls from the base model. "HS FE" specification includes high school fixed effects on top of the controls from the preferred model.

Figure A8. Event-Study Estimates in Levels
A. Average Earnings of Program Enrolled in

B. Likelihood of Enrolling in Top 20\% Program

C. Likelihood of Enrolling in Bottom 20\% Program


Notes: Model includes a full set of year fixed effects, a dummy for poor interacted with year effects, race/ethnic indicators, indicator for limited English, and scaled reading and math scores. Figures plot the year fixed effects (non-poor group) and the year fixed effects plus the poor-year interactions (poor group). The year 2003 fixed effect is omitted and serves as the reference category. Outcomes are predicted earnings of the university program the student first enrolled (Panel A) and indicators for this program being in the top (Panel B) or bottom (Panel C) 20\% of predicted student earnings. Standard errors are clustered by high school cohort.

Figure A9. Net Tuition Over Time, Separately by Program Earnings Ventile


Notes: Graph plots student-level averages of tuition minus need-based grant aid in the Fall for programs in each ventile, separately for poor and non-poor students. Grant aid does not include merit, categorical, or other institutional aid that does not require a needs analysis.

Figure A10. Resource Changes vs. Tuition Changes


Notes: Each dot represents an estimate of the change in two outcomes for a single ventile.

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Figure A11. Grant Aid Changes vs. Tuition Changes


Notes: Each dot represents an estimate of the change in two outcomes for a single ventile.

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Table A1. TEXAS Grant Program Characteristics Over time

| Panel A. Eligibility, Aggregate Numer of Recipients and Amounts, by Program Year |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Initial |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Yr. EFC | \# of | Max. | Average |  |
|  | Max. for | Recipients (new | Award | Amounts | Amount |
| FY | Priority | and continuing) | Amount | Disbursed | Disbursed |
| 2000 | $\$ 5,000$ | 6,108 | Actual T\&F | $\$ 2,315$ | $\$ 14,160,014$ |
| 2001 | $\$ 5,000$ | 9,780 | Actual T\&F | $\$ 2,529$ | $\$ 24,820,124$ |
| 2002 | $\$ 5,000$ | 26,982 | $\$ 2,688$ | $\$ 2,685$ | $\$ 72,798,233$ |
| 2003 | $\$ 8,500$ | 42,713 | $\$ 2,950$ | $\$ 2,827$ | $\$ 121,341,457$ |
| 2004 | $\$ 8,500$ | 40,379 | $\$ 3,140$ | $\$ 2,879$ | $\$ 116,628,000$ |
| 2005 | $\$ 4,000$ | 38,947 | $\$ 3,590$ | $\$ 3,301$ | $\$ 128,814,417$ |
| 2006 | $\$ 4,000$ | 38,823 | $\$ 4,180$ | $\$ 3,815$ | $\$ 148,340,997$ |
| 2007 | $\$ 4,000$ | 34,523 | $\$ 4,750$ | $\$ 4,261$ | $\$ 147,309,274$ |
| 2008 | $\$ 4,000$ | 35,633 | $\$ 5,170$ | $\$ 4,737$ | $\$ 169,063,824$ |
| 2009 | $\$ 4,000$ | 39,686 | $\$ 5,280$ | $\$ 4,864$ | $\$ 193,445,513$ |
| 2010 | $\$ 4,000$ | 41,828 | $\$ 6,080$ | $\$ 5,546$ | $\$ 232,419,667$ |
| 2011 | $\$ 4,000$ | 48,474 | $\$ 6,780$ | $\$ 6,182$ | $\$ 300,349,881$ |
| 2012 | $\$ 4,000$ | 53,335 | $\$ 7,100$ | $\$ 4,770$ | $\$ 254,936,425$ |
| 2013 | $\$ 4,000$ | 55,880 | $\$ 7,400$ | $\$ 4,676$ | $\$ 261,915,170$ |

Panel B. Participation and EFC Distribution in Analysis Sample, by Cohort
EFC Distribution among TEXAS Grant Recipients

| Entering <br> cohort | EFC=0 | EFC |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2000 | $38 \%$ | to 2000 | 2001 to 4000 | 4001 to 6000 | EFC >= 6001 |
| 2001 | $29 \%$ | $35 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $3 \%$ |
| 2002 | $29 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $15 \%$ |
| 2003 | $35 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $17 \%$ |
| 2004 | $42 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $9 \%$ |
| 2005 | $40 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| 2006 | $47 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| 2007 | $48 \%$ | $28 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| 2008 | $46 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| 2009 | $62 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  | $1 \%$ | $1 \%$ |

Notes: Top panel refer to fiscal year and include amounts for initial and continuing grant recipients. Dollar amounts are in nominal terms. Source: Texas Grant Report to Legislature June 2016. Author's analysis of Financial Aid Data.

Table A2. Summary Stats of Program-Level Panel Data

|  | All programs and years |  | All programs, 2009 |  | Low-price program, 2009 |  | High-price program, 2009 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Mean | SD | Mean | SD | Mean | SD | Mean | SD |
| Semester price (\$2012, 1000s) | 2.853 | 0.793 | 3.691 | 0.583 | 2.923 | 0.176 | 3.945 | 0.427 |
| Total ugrad enrollments | 4,790 | 5,080 | 5,300 | 5,468 | 1,822 | 1,741 | 6,411 | 5,782 |
| Lower level | 1,773 | 1,970 | 1,907 | 2,024 | 676 | 764 | 2,301 | 2,142 |
| Upper level | 2,937 | 3,645 | 3,285 | 3,991 | 1,068 | 1,329 | 3,993 | 4,290 |
| Number of faculty per ugrad enrollment (/5) | 0.101 | 0.471 | 0.091 | 0.059 | 0.094 | 0.070 | 0.090 | 0.055 |
| New hires per ugrad enrollment (/5) | 0.004 | 0.049 | 0.004 | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.008 | 0.004 | 0.006 |
| Total faculty salary per ugrad enrollment (/5) | 2,989 | 14,645 | 2,814 | 1,999 | 2,375 | 2,118 | 2,948 | 1,945 |
| Number of courses per enrollment (/5) | 0.094 | 0.138 | 0.089 | 0.144 | 0.137 | 0.274 | 0.074 | 0.051 |
| Number of sections per enrollment (/5) | 0.220 | 0.184 | 0.221 | 0.223 | 0.265 | 0.405 | 0.206 | 0.112 |
| FTE salary overall | 30,586 | 9,509 | 31,817 | 11,110 | 26,609 | 7,917 | 33,394 | 11,460 |
| Professor FTE salary | 45,201 | 12,677 | 53,330 | 15,627 | 43,915 | 15,093 | 55,651 | 14,881 |
| Assoc Prof FTE salary | 34,012 | 9,042 | 39,675 | 12,102 | 34,573 | 6,188 | 41,140 | 12,969 |
| Assist Prof FTE salary | 30,673 | 10,087 | 35,655 | 11,090 | 31,239 | 7,437 | 36,813 | 11,597 |
| New hire FTE salary | 31,266 | 13,449 | 33,528 | 12,051 | 29,594 | 9,566 | 34,376 | 12,375 |
| Average class size | 30.18 | 15.17 | 29.68 | 14.54 | 25.17 | 11.09 | 31.12 | 15.21 |
| Predicted program earnings (raw) | 0.303 | 0.278 | 0.303 | 0.278 | 0.122 | 0.197 | 0.361 | 0.276 |
| Predicted program earnings (controls) | 0.252 | 0.217 | 0.252 | 0.217 | 0.116 | 0.175 | 0.296 | 0.211 |
| Number of unique programs | 641 |  | 641 |  | 295 |  | 346 |  |
| Number of observations | 6410 |  | 641 |  | 295 |  | 346 |  |

Notes: Sample statisitcs weighted by number of students enrolled in program from the class of 2000. Many characteristics will have fewer observations due to missing data.

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Table A3. Earnings Estimates for Specific Programs, 2000 High School Graduates

| Adjusting for demographics and test scores |  | Adjusting for demographics, test scores, application/admissions behavior |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Log earnings premium | Number of students | Top 10 |  | Log earnings premium | Number of students |
| UT Austin | 52. Business | 0.76 | 631 | Texas A\&M Galveston | 14. Engineering | 0.62 | 30 |
| Texas A\&M | 52. Business | 0.74 | 703 | Texas A\&M | 92. Economics | 0.56 | 41 |
| Texas A\&M Galveston | 14. Engineering | 0.72 | 30 | UT Austin | 52. Business | 0.51 | 631 |
| Texas A\&M | 15. Engineering Technologies | 0.71 | 64 | Texas A\&M | 52. Business | 0.47 | 703 |
| Texas A\&M | 14. Engineering | 0.71 | 901 | Texas A\&M | 14. Engineering | 0.45 | 901 |
| Texas A\&M | 92. Economics | 0.70 | 41 | UH Clear Lake | 52. Business | 0.44 | 35 |
| Texas Tech University | 15. Engineering Technologies | 0.67 | 36 | Texas Tech University | 15. Engineering Technologies | 0.44 | 36 |
| UH Clear Lake | 52. Business | 0.67 | 35 | Lamar University | 14. Engineering | 0.42 | 121 |
| Sam Houston State | 15. Engineering Technologies | 0.65 | 26 | Texas A\&M | 15. Engineering Technologies | 0.39 | 64 |
| UT Austin | 14. Engineering | 0.63 | 885 | Texas A\&M University Corpus Christi | 15. Engineering Technologies | 0.39 | 39 |
| U Houston | 14. Engineering | 0.62 | 292 | UT Dallas | 52. Business | 0.37 | 163 |
| Bottom 10 |  |  |  | Bottom 10 |  |  |  |
| Texas A\&M University Kingsville | 42. Psychology | -0.18 | 35 | Texas A\&M University Commerce | 45. Social Science | -0.34 | 26 |
| Midwestern State University | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.18 | 48 | Texas Tech University | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.36 | 148 |
| Tarleton State University | 23. English Language | -0.19 | 31 | Texas Woman's University | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.37 | 42 |
| West Texas A\&M University | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.21 | 81 | U Houston | 23. English Language | -0.38 | 59 |
| Midwestern State University | 45. Social Science | -0.22 | 35 | UT Austin | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.40 | 206 |
| Lamar University | 45. Social Science | -0.22 | 29 | UT El Paso | 45. Social Science | -0.40 | 28 |
| UT El Paso | 45. Social Science | -0.26 | 28 | Texas Southern University | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.42 | 33 |
| Prairie View A\&M University | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.32 | 30 | Prairie View A\&M University | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.46 | 30 |
| Texas Southern University | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.33 | 33 | UT El Paso | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.54 | 65 |
| UT El Paso | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.44 | 65 | Tarleton State University | 23. English Language | -0.55 | 31 |

Notes: Number of students in the above table refers to the number of students from our sample enrolled in these programs from 2000 high school cohort

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Table A4. Specific Programs in Each Predicted Earnings Ventile
(Only programs with at least 100 students from high school class of 2000)

| Ventile 20 (Top 5\% of enrollment) |  | Log earnings premium | Number of students |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| U. OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN | 52. Business | 0.756834 | 873 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY | 52. Business | 0.741412 | 751 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY | 14. Engineering | 0.711975 | 1019 |
| Ventile 19 |  |  |  |
| TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY | 14. Engineering | 0.594146 | 366 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN | 14. Engineering | 0.631361 | 813 |
| LAMAR UNIVERSITY | 14. Engineering | 0.589594 | 133 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY | 11. Computer and Information Science | 0.586123 | 135 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN | 11. Computer and Information Science | 0.541886 | 321 |
| UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON | 14. Engineering | 0.616315 | 237 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT DALLAS | 52. Business | 0.581707 | 156 |
| U. OF HOUSTON-DOWNTOWN | 52. Business | 0.549304 | 144 |
| Ventile 18 |  |  |  |
| TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY | 52. Business | 0.469502 | 1003 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIV-KINGSVILLE | 14. Engineering | 0.476993 | 111 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT DALLAS | 11. Computer and Information Science | 0.511318 | 159 |
| UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON | 52. Business | 0.507564 | 726 |
| Ventile 17 |  |  |  |
| U. OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO | 52. Business | 0.427202 | 270 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.463787 | 1099 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON | 91. Nursing | 0.442971 | 101 |
| TEXAS WOMAN'S UNIVERSITY | 91. Nursing | 0.435848 | 116 |
| TEXAS STATE UNIV - SAN MARCOS | 52. Business | 0.462685 | 608 |
| Ventile 16 |  |  |  |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY | 40. Physical Sciences | 0.403948 | 121 |
| SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY | 52. Business | 0.390754 | 493 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON | 14. Engineering | 0.401623 | 343 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY | 30. Multi/Interdisciplinary | 0.376928 | 734 |
| UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON | 51. Health Professions, minus nursing | 0.381286 | 215 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN | 40. Physical Sciences | 0.398223 | 102 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIV AT GALVESTON | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.393067 | 114 |

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Table A4. Specific Programs in Each Predicted Earnings Ventile
(Only programs with at least 100 students from high school class of 2000)

| Ventile 15 |  | Log earnings premium | Number of students |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY | 26. Biology | 0.35496 | 425 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON | 52. Business | 0.338882 | 475 |
| LAMAR UNIVERSITY | 52. Business | 0.355361 | 181 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN | 26. Biology | 0.367627 | 528 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY | 4. Architecture | 0.350294 | 120 |
| TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY | 11. Computer and Information Scien | 0.347627 | 119 |
| TEXAS STATE UNIV - SAN MARCOS | 30. Multi/Interdisciplinary | 0.353864 | 256 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO | 14. Engineering | 0.361831 | 150 |
| Ventile 14 |  |  |  |
| UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS | 11. Computer and Information Scien | 0.316478 | 158 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY | 45. Social Science | 0.32932 | 238 |
| STEPHEN F. AUSTIN STATE UNIV | 52. Business | 0.315243 | 434 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY | 23. English Language | 0.314094 | 125 |
| UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON | 30. Multi/Interdisciplinary | 0.314496 | 110 |
| STEPHEN F. AUSTIN STATE UNIV | 91. Nursing | 0.315027 | 143 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY | 31. Parks \& Rec | 0.322999 | 169 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN | 30. Multi/Interdisciplinary | 0.319695 | 492 |
| Ventile 13 |  |  |  |
| UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS | 52. Business | 0.312661 | 811 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT DALLAS | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.291534 | 166 |
| TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY | 19. Family and Consumer Sciences | 0.282151 | 235 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN | 9.Communication, Journalism | 0.300599 | 324 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIV-CORPUS CHRISTI | 52. Business | 0.286421 | 176 |
| TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY | 51. Health Professions, minus nursin | 0.30923 | 408 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN | 45. Social Science | 0.292939 | 222 |
| Ventile 12 |  |  |  |
| TEXAS STATE UNIV - SAN MARCOS | 26. Biology | 0.273267 | 170 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY | 9.Communication, Journalism | 0.279515 | 104 |
| STEPHEN F. AUSTIN STATE UNIV | 51. Health Professions, minus nursin | 0.26533 | 209 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY | 42. Psychology | 0.281518 | 219 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.271732 | 2067 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO | 11. Computer and Information Scien | 0.271584 | 151 |
| SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY | 30. Multi/Interdisciplinary | 0.280551 | 223 |
| Ventile 11 |  |  |  |
| U. OF TEXAS-PAN AMERICAN | 30. Multi/Interdisciplinary | 0.255236 | 177 |
| TEXAS STATE UNIV - SAN MARCOS | 51. Health Professions, minus nursin | 0.257261 | 128 |
| STEPHEN F. AUSTIN STATE UNIV | 30. Multi/Interdisciplinary | 0.252774 | 191 |
| UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON | 26. Biology | 0.250025 | 253 |
| SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY | 43. Homeland Security | 0.248724 | 304 |
| TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY | 4. Architecture | 0.252416 | 273 |
| UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS | 30. Multi/Interdisciplinary | 0.248585 | 189 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN | 42. Psychology | 0.257893 | 207 |
| TARLETON STATE UNIVERSITY | 52. Business | 0.264949 | 209 |
| TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY | 9.Communication, Journalism | 0.249035 | 294 |

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Table A4. Specific Programs in Each Predicted Earnings Ventile
(Only programs with at least 100 students from high school class of 2000)

| Ventile 10 |  | Log earnings premium | Number of students |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TEXAS STATE UNIV - SAN MARCOS | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.229603 | 692 |
| PRAIRIE VIEW A\&M UNIVERSITY | 91. Nursing | 0.245463 | 120 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.231254 | 264 |
| SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY | 13. Education | 0.245777 | 113 |
| TEXAS STATE UNIV - SAN MARCOS | 9.Communication, Journalism | 0.235092 | 219 |
| ANGELO STATE UNIVERSITY | 52. Business | 0.231611 | 163 |
| UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON | 9.Communication, Journalism | 0.233144 | 102 |
| STEPHEN F. AUSTIN STATE UNIV | 11. Computer and Information Science | 0.231451 | 142 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY-COMMERCE | 52. Business | 0.234772 | 118 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO | 30. Multi/Interdisciplinary | 0.245648 | 198 |
| Ventile 9 |  |  |  |
| TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY | 30. Multi/Interdisciplinary | 0.19969 | 100 |
| TEXAS STATE UNIV - SAN MARCOS | 31. Parks \& Rec | 0.228398 | 142 |
| U. OF TEXAS-PAN AMERICAN | 14. Engineering | 0.229355 | 163 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON | 26. Biology | 0.216236 | 201 |
| WEST TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY | 52. Business | 0.214884 | 159 |
| TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY | 31. Parks \& Rec | 0.190173 | 114 |
| UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON | 42. Psychology | 0.225448 | 147 |
| Ventile 8 |  |  |  |
| STEPHEN F. AUSTIN STATE UNIV | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.184776 | 309 |
| UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.170931 | 399 |
| UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.162854 | 482 |
| TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY | 45. Social Science | 0.163918 | 105 |
| PRAIRIE VIEW A\&M UNIVERSITY | 52. Business | 0.164168 | 179 |
| Ventile 7 |  |  |  |
| TARLETON STATE UNIVERSITY | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.144712 | 202 |
| TEXAS A\&M INTERNATIONAL UNIV | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.146506 | 127 |
| LAMAR UNIVERSITY | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.149164 | 410 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY-COMMERCE | 30. Multi/Interdisciplinary | 0.15386 | 102 |
| UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS | 26. Biology | 0.146522 | 163 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIV AT GALVESTON | 26. Biology | 0.160241 | 104 |
| U. OF HOUSTON-DOWNTOWN | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.146414 | 470 |
| SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY | 42. Psychology | 0.149385 | 119 |
| Ventile 6 |  |  |  |
| TEXAS STATE UNIV - SAN MARCOS | 45. Social Science | 0.144579 | 127 |
| TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY | 42. Psychology | 0.119664 | 154 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIV-KINGSVILLE | 52. Business | 0.14345 | 124 |
| U. OF TEXAS-PAN AMERICAN | 52. Business | 0.116592 | 358 |
| SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.125919 | 127 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT EL PASO | 52. Business | 0.128472 | 211 |
| U. OF TEXAS-PAN AMERICAN | 51. Health Professions, minus nursing | 0.127493 | 336 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIV-KINGSVILLE | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.116254 | 129 |
| SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY | 9.Communication, Journalism | 0.138233 | 124 |
| TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY | 51. Health Professions, minus nursing | 0.134407 | 121 |

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Table A4. Specific Programs in Each Predicted Earnings Ventile
(Only programs with at least 100 students from high school class of 2000)

| Ventile 5 |  | Log earnings premium | Number of students |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| U. OF TEXAS-PAN AMERICAN | 91. Nursing | 0.088538 | 137 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIVERSITY-COMMERCE | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.099854 | 156 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIV-CORPUS CHRISTI | 26. Biology | 0.091717 | 190 |
| UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS | 42. Psychology | 0.0944 | 184 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT EL PASO | 13. Education | 0.095916 | 101 |
| TEXAS STATE UNIV - SAN MARCOS | 42. Psychology | 0.092641 | 124 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON | 45. Social Science | 0.095301 | 59 |
| TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY | 26. Biology | 0.108173 | 121 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT BROWNSVILLE | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.07872 | 173 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO | 26. Biology | 0.096274 | 363 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO | 42. Psychology | 0.082556 | 153 |
| Ventile 4 |  |  |  |
| ANGELO STATE UNIVERSITY | 30. Multi/Interdisciplinary | 0.065623 | 113 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO | 4. Architecture | 0.035616 | 104 |
| UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON | 45. Social Science | 0.070085 | 137 |
| STEPHEN F. AUSTIN STATE UNIV | 9.Communication, Journalism | 0.067484 | 129 |
| ANGELO STATE UNIVERSITY | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.063743 | 361 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT EL PASO | 51. Health Professions, minus nursin | 0.065665 | 111 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON | 4. Architecture | 0.054068 | 108 |
| TEXAS A\&M UNIV-KINGSVILLE | 26. Biology | 0.069663 | 116 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT EL PASO | 14. Engineering | 0.026901 | 256 |
| Ventile 3 |  |  |  |
| U. OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO | 9.Communication, Journalism | 0.021003 | 118 |
| UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS | 9.Communication, Journalism | -0.0114 | 270 |
| MIDWESTERN STATE UNIVERSITY | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.008185 | 159 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT EL PASO | 30. Multi/Interdisciplinary | -0.00714 | 119 |
| UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS | 45. Social Science | -0.00041 | 115 |
| TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY | 30. Multi/Interdisciplinary | 0.022367 | 268 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO | 24. Liberal Arts | 0.015896 | 455 |
| Ventile 2 |  |  |  |
| SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.03009 | 190 |
| TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY | 24. Liberal Arts | -0.05045 | 168 |
| U. OF TEXAS-PAN AMERICAN | 42. Psychology | -0.06245 | 104 |
| UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.06302 | 193 |
| STEPHEN F. AUSTIN STATE UNIV | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.05159 | 139 |
| TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY | 52. Business | -0.02561 | 145 |
| TEXAS STATE UNIV - SAN MARCOS | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.04912 | 241 |
| Ventile 1 (bottom 5\% of enrollment) |  |  |  |
| U. OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.13624 | 222 |
| TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.14105 | 156 |
| U. OF TEXAS AT EL PASO | 24. Liberal Arts | -0.13846 | 558 |
| UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS | 50. Visual/Performing Arts | -0.1499 | 538 |
| U. OF TEXAS-PAN AMERICAN | 24. Liberal Arts | -0.14312 | 104 |

Table A5. Robustness to Different Inference Procedures

|  | Clustering on |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Cohort | Poor X Cohort | Institution |
| Robust |  |  |  |
| Poor | -0.0370 | -0.0370 | -0.0370 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.0000) | (0.0006) |
| PostXPoor | 0.0129 | 0.0129 | 0.0129 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.0526) | (0.0134) |
| Observations | 580,253 | 580,253 | 580,253 |
| Block - Bootstrapping |  |  |  |
| Poor | -0.0370 | -0.0370 | -0.0370 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.0000) | (0.0003) |
| PostXPoor | 0.0129 | 0.0129 | 0.0129 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.0852) | (0.0139) |
| Observations | 580,253 | 580,253 | 580,253 |
| Wild - Bootstrapping |  |  |  |
| Poor | -0.0370 | -0.0370 | -0.0370 |
|  | (0.0040) | (0.0040) | (0.0080) |
| PostXPoor | 0.0129 | 0.0129 | 0.0129 |
|  | (0.0000) | (0.0880) | (0.0240) |
| Observations | 580,253 | 580,253 | 580,253 |

Note: P-Values are reported in parentheses. Controls include gender, race/ethnic indicators and indicator for limited English, and scaled reading and math scores. Sample includes students in the high school classes of 2000 to 2009 that enroll in a Texas public university within two years of high school graduation. Outcome is the predicted earnings of the university program (institution X major) the student first enrolled in. Predicted earnings is estimated using 2000-2002 cohorts and applied to all cohorts (see text).

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Table A6. Characteristic of Program Attending Two Years After Initial Enrollment
Robustness

|  | Base Model <br> (1) | No controls (2) | Drop LOS/CS Schools <br> (3) | Drop LEP <br> Students <br> (4) | Drop top 30\% of graduating class <br> (5) | Poor = always FRPL <br> (6) | Poor = ever FRPL <br> (7) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| A. Average Predicted earnings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Poor | $\begin{gathered} -0.0556^{* * *} \\ (0.0020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1075^{* * *} \\ (0.0030) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0612^{* * *} \\ (0.0021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0371^{\star * *} \\ (0.0018) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0533^{\star * *} \\ (0.0028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0388^{* * *} \\ (0.0027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0594^{* * *} \\ (0.0030) \end{gathered}$ |
| Post X Poor | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0121^{* * *} \\ & (0.0025) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0025 \\ (0.0037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0150^{* * *} \\ & (0.0028) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0124^{* * *} \\ (0.0018) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0125^{* *} \\ & (0.0046) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0150 * * * \\ & (0.0025) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0086^{* *} \\ & (0.0028) \end{aligned}$ |
| B. Top 10\% of Programs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Poor | $\begin{gathered} -0.0200^{* * *} \\ (0.0021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0423^{* * *} \\ (0.0025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0230^{* * *} \\ (0.0024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0154^{\star * *} \\ (0.0016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0072^{\star *} \\ (0.0023) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0143^{* * *} \\ (0.0031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0178^{* * *} \\ (0.0019) \end{gathered}$ |
| Post X Poor | $\begin{gathered} 0.0027 \\ (0.0035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0028 \\ (0.0033) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0067^{*} \\ & (0.0035) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0039 \\ (0.0032) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0076^{*} \\ & (0.0034) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0060 \\ (0.0045) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0033 \\ (0.0038) \end{gathered}$ |
| C. Top $20 \%$ of Programs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Poor | $\begin{gathered} -0.0369^{* * *} \\ (0.0013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0704^{* * *} \\ (0.0017) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0488^{* * *} \\ (0.0022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0359 * * * \\ (0.0021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0186^{* * *} \\ (0.0020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0212^{* * *} \\ (0.0037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0320^{* * *} \\ (0.0016) \end{gathered}$ |
| Post X Poor | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0094 * * * \\ & (0.0023) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0024 \\ (0.0024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0111^{* *} \\ & (0.0037) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0069 \\ (0.0041) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0158^{\star * *} \\ & (0.0035) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0172 * * * \\ & (0.0044) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0141^{* * *} \\ & (0.0026) \end{aligned}$ |
| D. Bottom 20\% of Programs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Poor | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.0687^{* * *} \\ (0.0033) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0314^{* * *} \\ (0.0014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0110 * * * \\ (0.0027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0500 * * * \\ (0.0036) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0147 * * * \\ (0.0031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0054 \\ (0.0040) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0154^{* * *} \\ (0.0020) \end{gathered}$ |
| Post X Poor | $\begin{gathered} -0.0260 * * * \\ (0.0065) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0171^{* * *} \\ (0.0035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0193^{* * *} \\ (0.0040) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0332^{* * *} \\ (0.0064) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0218^{* * *} \\ (0.0049) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0243^{* * *} \\ (0.0047) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0179 * * * \\ (0.0028) \end{gathered}$ |
| E. Bottom 10\% of Programs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Poor | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.0471 * * * \\ & (0.0028) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0317^{* * *} \\ (0.0005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0142^{* * *} \\ (0.0015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0241^{* * *} \\ (0.0020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0202^{\star * *} \\ & (0.0020) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0051^{*} \\ & (0.0027) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0131^{* * *} \\ & (0.0012) \end{aligned}$ |
| Post X Poor | $\begin{gathered} -0.0162^{* * *} \\ (0.0048) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0131^{* * *} \\ (0.0022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0132^{* * *} \\ (0.0024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0126^{* * *} \\ (0.0038) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0152^{* * *} \\ (0.0028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0088^{* *} \\ & (0.0028) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0082^{* * *} \\ (0.0017) \end{gathered}$ |
| Controls |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Demographics | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Test Scores | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Time Controls Obs. | Time, Post 580,253 | Time, Post 580,253 | Time, Post 534,366 | Time, Post 570,688 | Time, Post 306,645 | Time, Post 580,253 | Time, Post 580,253 |

Notes: Controls include race/ethnic indicators and indicator for limited English, and scaled reading and math scores. Sample includes students in the high school classes of 2000 to 2009 that enroll in a Texas public university within two years of high school graduation. Outcome is the predicted earnings or indicator for predicted earnings rank of the university program (institution X major) the student first enrolled in. Predicted earnings is estimated using 2000-2002 cohorts and applied to all cohorts (see text). Standard errors are clustered by high school cohort.

Table A7. Distribution of Students Across First School

| First School | Test score in Top 30\% of high school |  | Test score in bottom 70\% of high school |  | Full Sample |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Frequency | Percent | Frequency | Percent | Frequency | Percent |
| Sul Ross State University Rio Grande College | 83 | 0.03 | 178 | 0.05 | 261 | 0.04 |
| Angelo State University | 4,871 | 1.73 | 8,612 | 2.5 | 13,483 | 2.15 |
| Texas A\&M University-Commerce | 3,091 | 1.1 | 5,013 | 1.46 | 8,104 | 1.29 |
| Lamar University | 6,079 | 2.16 | 10,449 | 3.03 | 16,528 | 2.64 |
| Midwestern State University | 3,115 | 1.1 | 6,036 | 1.75 | 9,151 | 1.46 |
| University of North Texas | 16,588 | 5.88 | 24,048 | 6.98 | 40,636 | 6.49 |
| The University of Texas-Pan American | 10,973 | 3.89 | 15,854 | 4.6 | 26,827 | 4.28 |
| Sam Houston State University | 8,606 | 3.05 | 16,717 | 4.85 | 25,323 | 4.04 |
| Texas State University-San Marcos | 15,168 | 5.38 | 22,714 | 6.59 | 37,882 | 6.05 |
| Stephen F. Austin State University | 8,143 | 2.89 | 15,344 | 4.45 | 23,487 | 3.75 |
| Sul Ross State University | 793 | 0.28 | 2,408 | 0.7 | 3,201 | 0.51 |
| Prairie View A\&M University | 2,328 | 0.83 | 9,454 | 2.74 | 11,782 | 1.88 |
| Tarleton State University | 4,706 | 1.67 | 9,580 | 2.78 | 14,286 | 2.28 |
| Texas A\&M University | 44,837 | 15.9 | 22,492 | 6.53 | 67,329 | 10.75 |
| Texas A\&M University-Kingsville | 3,285 | 1.16 | 6,439 | 1.87 | 9,724 | 1.55 |
| Texas Southern University | 1,823 | 0.65 | 9,068 | 2.63 | 10,891 | 1.74 |
| Texas Tech University | 20,272 | 7.19 | 25,657 | 7.45 | 45,929 | 7.33 |
| Texas Woman's University | 2,288 | 0.81 | 5,287 | 1.53 | 7,575 | 1.21 |
| University of Houston | 15,325 | 5.43 | 20,620 | 5.99 | 35,945 | 5.74 |
| The University of Texas at Arlington | 12,183 | 4.32 | 14,373 | 4.17 | 26,556 | 4.24 |
| The University of Texas at Austin | 45,821 | 16.25 | 14,771 | 4.29 | 60,592 | 9.67 |
| The University of Texas at El Paso | 7,754 | 2.75 | 12,305 | 3.57 | 20,059 | 3.2 |
| West Texas A\&M University | 3,895 | 1.38 | 6,146 | 1.78 | 10,041 | 1.6 |
| Texas A\&M International University | 2,545 | 0.9 | 3,172 | 0.92 | 5,717 | 0.91 |
| The University of Texas at Dallas | 6,430 | 2.28 | 4,579 | 1.33 | 11,009 | 1.76 |
| The University of Texas of the Permian Basin | 1,453 | 0.52 | 1,838 | 0.53 | 3,291 | 0.53 |
| The University of Texas at San Antonio | 14,298 | 5.07 | 26,116 | 7.58 | 40,414 | 6.45 |
| Texas A\&M University at Galveston | 1,373 | 0.49 | 2,179 | 0.63 | 3,552 | 0.57 |
| Texas A\&M University-Corpus Christi | 4,976 | 1.76 | 7,263 | 2.11 | 12,239 | 1.95 |
| The University of Texas at Tyler | 3,432 | 1.22 | 3,563 | 1.03 | 6,995 | 1.12 |
| University of Houston-Clear Lake | 563 | 0.2 | 913 | 0.27 | 1,476 | 0.24 |
| University of Houston-Downtown | 2,112 | 0.75 | 7,660 | 2.22 | 9,772 | 1.56 |
| University of Houston-Victoria | 222 | 0.08 | 300 | 0.09 | 522 | 0.08 |
| Texas A\&M University-Texarkana | 218 | 0.08 | 292 | 0.08 | 510 | 0.08 |
| The University of Texas at Brownsville | 2,354 | 0.83 | 2,994 | 0.87 | 5,348 | 0.85 |
| Total | 282,003 |  | 344,434 |  | 626,437 |  |

Sample includes all students in the high school classes of 2000 to 2009 that enroll in a Texas public university within two years of high school graduation. Sample is slighlty larger than sample used in analysis because it is not restricted to students in the "balanced panel" of programs or to those that have non-missing control variables.

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Table A8. Distribution of Students Across Majors

| First Major | Test score in Top 30\% of high school |  | Test score in bottom 70\% of high school |  | Full Sample |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Frequency | Percent | Frequency | Percent | Frequency | Percent |
| 1. Agriculture | 5,365 | 1.9 | 8,564 | 2.49 | 13,929 | 2.22 |
| 3. Natural Rescouces and Conservation | 1,315 | 0.47 | 1,893 | 0.55 | 3,208 | 0.51 |
| 4. Architecture | 4,541 | 1.61 | 4,912 | 1.43 | 9,453 | 1.51 |
| 5. Area, Ethnic Cultural, and Gender St | 158 | 0.06 | 156 | 0.05 | 314 | 0.05 |
| 9.Communication, Journalism | 10,631 | 3.77 | 15,663 | 4.55 | 26,294 | 4.2 |
| 10. Communications Tech | 155 | 0.05 | 149 | 0.04 | 304 | 0.05 |
| 11. Computer and Information Sciences | 7,423 | 2.63 | 6,321 | 1.84 | 13,744 | 2.19 |
| 13. Education | 1,129 | 0.4 | 2,405 | 0.7 | 3,534 | 0.56 |
| 14. Engineering | 33,049 | 11.72 | 15,940 | 4.63 | 48,989 | 7.82 |
| 15. Engineering Technologies | 2,242 | 0.8 | 3,344 | 0.97 | 5,586 | 0.89 |
| 16. Foreign Languages | 1,180 | 0.42 | 1,087 | 0.32 | 2,267 | 0.36 |
| 19. Family and Consumer Sciences | 2,682 | 0.95 | 4,413 | 1.28 | 7,095 | 1.13 |
| 22. Legal Professions | 612 | 0.22 | 906 | 0.26 | 1,518 | 0.24 |
| 23. English Language | 5,507 | 1.95 | 5,923 | 1.72 | 11,430 | 1.82 |
| 24. Liberal Arts | 41,578 | 14.74 | 58,791 | 17.07 | 100,369 | 16.02 |
| 26. Biology | 27,840 | 9.87 | 23,343 | 6.78 | 51,183 | 8.17 |
| 27. Math | 4,088 | 1.45 | 2,124 | 0.62 | 6,212 | 0.99 |
| 30. Multi/Interdisciplinary | 17,894 | 6.35 | 26,820 | 7.79 | 44,714 | 7.14 |
| 31. Parks \& Rec | 6,588 | 2.34 | 13,276 | 3.85 | 19,864 | 3.17 |
| 38. Philosophy | 610 | 0.22 | 435 | 0.13 | 1,045 | 0.17 |
| 40. Physical Sciences | 5,615 | 1.99 | 4,074 | 1.18 | 9,689 | 1.55 |
| 42. Psychology | 10,724 | 3.8 | 15,236 | 4.42 | 25,960 | 4.14 |
| 43. Homeland Security | 4,342 | 1.54 | 11,147 | 3.24 | 15,489 | 2.47 |
| 44. Public Admin | 966 | 0.34 | 1,905 | 0.55 | 2,871 | 0.46 |
| 45. Social Science | 8,142 | 2.89 | 9,891 | 2.87 | 18,033 | 2.88 |
| 49. Transportation | 48 | 0.02 | 97 | 0.03 | 145 | 0.02 |
| 50. Visual/Performing Arts | 13,486 | 4.78 | 17,639 | 5.12 | 31,125 | 4.97 |
| 51. Health Professions, minus nursing | 12,599 | 4.47 | 18,049 | 5.24 | 30,648 | 4.89 |
| 52. Business | 41,027 | 14.55 | 51,939 | 15.08 | 92,966 | 14.84 |
| 54. History | 912 | 0.32 | 1,777 | 0.52 | 2,689 | 0.43 |
| 91. Nursing | 8,241 | 2.92 | 14,933 | 4.34 | 23,174 | 3.7 |
| 92. Economics | 1,314 | 0.47 | 1,282 | 0.37 | 2,596 | 0.41 |
| Total | 282,003 |  | 344,434 |  | 626,437 |  |

Sample includes all students in the high school classes of 2000 to 2009 that enroll in a Texas public university within two years of high school graduation. Sample is slighlty larger than sample used in analysis because it is not restricted to students in the "balanced panel" of programs or to those that have non-missing control variables.

Table A9. Contribution of Institutions and Majors to Enrollment Shifts
Initial Program Chosen

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| A. Program-Specific Predicted earnings |  |  |  |  |  |
| Poor | -0.0861*** | -0.0415*** | -0.0370*** | -0.0182*** | -0.0165*** |
|  | (0.0018) | (0.0021) | (0.0019) | (0.0015) | (0.0018) |
| Post X Poor | 0.0057** | 0.0063** | 0.0129*** | 0.0073*** | 0.0116*** |
|  | (0.0023) | (0.0022) | (0.0018) | (0.0017) | (0.0020) |
| B. Institution-average Predicted earnings |  |  |  |  |  |
| Poor | -0.0896*** | -0.0466*** | -0.0406*** | -0.0118*** | -0.0188*** |
|  | (0.0016) | (0.0020) | (0.0019) | (0.0013) | (0.0018) |
| Post X Poor | $0.0083 * * *$ | 0.0085*** | 0.0122*** | 0.0044*** | 0.0108*** |
|  | (0.0021) | (0.0019) | (0.0019) | (0.0013) | (0.0017) |
| C. Major-average Predicted earnings |  |  |  |  |  |
| Poor | -0.0026** | 0.0020* | 0.0011 | 0.0015 | 0.0015 |
|  | (0.0011) | (0.0010) | (0.0008) | (0.0010) | (0.0010) |
| Post X Poor | -0.0035* | -0.0031* | 0.0009 | -0.0010 | 0.0012 |
|  | (0.0018) | (0.0017) | (0.0017) | (0.0019) | (0.0016) |
| Controls |  |  |  |  |  |
| Demographics | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Test scores | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Application, admission indice | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| High school FEs | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Time controls | Time, Post | Time, Post | Time, Post | Time, Post | Time, Post |

Notes: Controls include gender, race/ethnic indicators and indicator for limited English, and scaled reading and math scores. Sample includes 580,253 students in the high school classes of 2000 to 2009 that enroll in a Texas public university within two years of high school graduation. Outcome is the predicted earnings or indicator for predicted earnings rank of the university program (institution X major) the student first enrolled in. Predicted earnings is estimated using 2000-2002 cohorts and applied to all cohorts (see text). Standard errors are clustered by high school cohort. Our preferred model is specification 3.

Table A10. Institution-Specific Changes in Enrollment, Application, and Admission

|  |  | Coeff | ost X Poor for | come: |  |  | Coeff | ost X Poor for | come: |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | Pr(Admit \| |  |  |  |  | Pr(Admit \| |
| Institution (ranked by institution-level | Predicted | Pr(Enroll) | Pr(Apply) | Apply) | Institution (ranked by institution-level | Predicted | Pr(Enroll) | Pr(Apply) | Apply) |
| predicted earnings) | Earnings | (1) | (2) | (3) | predicted earnings) | Earnings | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Texas A\&M University | 0.49 | 0.0076* | 0.0264*** | -0.0249 | Tarelton State Univerisy | 0.18 | -0.0015 | -0.0029* | -0.0349 |
|  |  | (0.0035) | (0.0044) | (0.0229) |  |  | (0.0010) | (0.0014) | (0.0206) |
| UT - Austin | 0.40 | 0.0233** | 0.0246*** | 0.0688** | Lamar State University | 0.18 | 0.0087*** | 0.0119*** | 0.0059 |
|  |  | (0.0080) | (0.0050) | (0.0227) |  |  | (0.0016) | (0.0016) | (0.0064) |
| UT - Dallas | 0.37 | -0.0009 | 0.0020 | -0.0044 | Texas A\&M University - Corpus Christi | 0.17 | 0.0023*** | 0.0122*** | 0.0160 |
|  |  | (0.0007) | (0.0012) | (0.0274) |  |  | (0.0006) | (0.0019) | (0.0163) |
| Texas A\&M University - Galveston | 0.37 | -0.0002 | -0.0009*** | 0.1038*** | Texas A\&M University - Kingsville | 0.17 | -0.0090** | -0.0087** | 0.0035 |
|  |  | (0.0006) | (0.0002) | (0.0137) |  |  | (0.0029) | (0.0029) | (0.0052) |
| University of Houston | 0.31 | -0.0013 | 0.0017 | 0.0107 | University of North Texas | 0.14 | -0.0066*** | -0.0044 | -0.0449** |
|  |  | (0.0032) | (0.0038) | (0.0071) |  |  | (0.0018) | (0.0033) | (0.0190) |
| Texas Tech university | 0.30 | 0.0046* | -0.0007 | -0.0281 | UT - Brownsville | 0.14 | 0.0165** | 0.0212*** | 0.0000 |
|  |  | (0.0021) | (0.0043) | (0.0288) |  |  | (0.0062) | (0.0053) | 0.0000 |
| UT - Arlington | 0.25 | 0.0124*** | 0.0118** | 0.0193* | UT - San Antonio | 0.14 | -0.0292*** | -0.0219*** | -0.0145* |
|  |  | (0.0033) | (0.0041) | (0.0099) |  |  | (0.0064) | (0.0048) | (0.0069) |
| Texas Woman's University | 0.25 | 0.0014** | 0.0034** | 0.0319* | Texas A\&M University - Commerce | 0.13 | 0.0014* | 0.0035*** | 0.0150 |
|  |  | (0.0006) | (0.0014) | (0.0164) |  |  | (0.0006) | (0.0010) | (0.0228) |
| Texas State University | 0.25 | 0.0012 | -0.0062 | 0.0540** | Midwestern State University | 0.09 | -0.0000 | -0.0039*** | -0.0174 |
|  |  | (0.0015) | (0.0049) | (0.0199) |  |  | (0.0007) | (0.0009) | (0.0240) |
| University of Houston - Downtown | 0.24 | -0.0068*** | -0.0042 | -0.0179** | Angelo State University | 0.08 | -0.0012 | -0.0043** | 0.0935** |
|  |  | (0.0020) | (0.0024) | (0.0055) |  |  | (0.0011) | (0.0014) | (0.0329) |
| UT - Permian Basin | 0.24 | $-0.0021^{* * *}$ | -0.0013 | -0.0370* | UT - Pan America | 0.08 | 0.0017 | 0.0596*** | 0.0083 |
|  |  | (0.0006) | (0.0009) | (0.0178) |  |  | (0.0075) | (0.0143) | (0.0071) |
| Sam Houston State University | 0.22 | -0.0035 | -0.0070 | 0.0125 | West Texas A\&M University | 0.07 | 0.0010 | -0.0004 | 0.0268 |
|  |  | (0.0027) | (0.0039) | (0.0173) |  |  | (0.0010) | (0.0009) | (0.0353) |
| Texas A\&M University - International | 0.22 | -0.0018 | 0.0060 |  | Sul Ross State University | 0.06 | -0.0030*** | -0.0048** | 0.0135 |
|  |  | (0.0030) | (0.0035) | (0.0267) |  |  | (0.0009) | (0.0016) | (0.0178) |
| Stephen F. Austin State University | 0.20 | 0.0024 | 0.0100** | -0.0435** | Texas Southern University | -0.02 | -0.0018 | -0.0061 | 0.0004 |
|  |  | (0.0019) | (0.0035) | (0.0155) |  |  | (0.0041) | (0.0061) | (0.0013) |
| Prairie View A\&M University | 0.19 | -0.0010 | 0.0064 | -0.0071 | UT-EI Paso | -0.04 | -0.0126** | -0.0112*** | 0.0014 |
|  |  | (0.0021) | (0.0036) | (0.0043) |  |  | (0.0042) | (0.0028) | (0.0020) |
| UT- Tyler | 0.19 | -0.0026** | -0.0025** | -0.0198 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.0011) | (0.0009) | (0.0255) |  |  |  |  |  |

Notes: Each cell is a separate regression. All specifications control for gender, race/ethnic indicators and indicator for limited English, and scaled reading and math scores. Sample includes 580,253 students in the high school classes of 2001 to 2009 that enroll in a Texas public university within two years of high school graduation. Outcomes are indicators for enrollment at, application to, admission to, or conditional enrollment at each institution. Universities are ranked here by their predicted earnings in table 7. Standard errors are clustered by high school cohort

Table A11. Means of Institution-specific Enrollment and Application Outcomes

| Institution (ranked by institution-level predicted earnings) | Predicted Earnings | Outcome Mean: |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{gathered} \operatorname{Pr}(\text { Enroll }) \\ \hline(1) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\operatorname{Pr}$ (Apply) | Pr(Admit Apply) (3) | $\operatorname{Pr}($ Enroll $\mid$ <br> Admit) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (2) |  | (4) |
| Texas A\&M University | 0.49 | 0.101 | 0.165 | 0.754 | 0.682 |
| UT - Austin | 0.40 | 0.100 | 0.139 | 0.778 | 0.745 |
| UT - Dallas | 0.37 | 0.018 | 0.029 | 0.655 | 0.617 |
| Texas A\&M University - Galvest | 0.37 | 0.006 | 0.008 | 0.948 | 0.523 |
| University of Houston | 0.31 | 0.058 | 0.078 | 0.837 | 0.618 |
| Texas Tech university | 0.30 | 0.074 | 0.120 | 0.802 | 0.564 |
| UT - Arlington | 0.25 | 0.043 | 0.047 | 0.887 | 0.655 |
| Texas Woman's University | 0.25 | 0.012 | 0.014 | 0.810 | 0.639 |
| Texas State University | 0.25 | 0.062 | 0.096 | 0.739 | 0.574 |
| University of Houston - Downtc | 0.24 | 0.015 | 0.012 | 0.934 | 0.806 |
| UT - Permian Basin | 0.24 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.961 | 0.706 |
| Sam Houston State University | 0.22 | 0.040 | 0.070 | 0.636 | 0.576 |
| Texas A\&M University - Interna | 0.22 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.910 | 0.704 |
| Stephen F. Austin State Univers | 0.20 | 0.038 | 0.065 | 0.899 | 0.496 |
| Prairie View A\&M University | 0.19 | 0.018 | 0.017 | 0.958 | 0.701 |
| UT- Tyler | 0.19 | 0.012 | 0.013 | 0.898 | 0.649 |
| Tarelton State Univerisy | 0.18 | 0.020 | 0.021 | 0.873 | 0.756 |
| Lamar State University | 0.18 | 0.027 | 0.028 | 0.978 | 0.702 |
| Texas A\&M University - Corpus | 0.17 | 0.020 | 0.031 | 0.893 | 0.526 |
| Texas A\&M University - Kingsvil | 0.17 | 0.015 | 0.020 | 0.993 | 0.554 |
| University of North Texas | 0.14 | 0.067 | 0.088 | 0.879 | 0.576 |
| UT - Brownsville | 0.14 | 0.009 | 0.008 | 1.000 | 0.681 |
| UT - San Antonio | 0.14 | 0.066 | 0.086 | 0.966 | 0.621 |
| Texas A\&M University - Comme | 0.13 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.809 | 0.675 |
| Midwestern State University | 0.09 | 0.015 | 0.014 | 0.951 | 0.640 |
| Angelo State University | 0.08 | 0.021 | 0.026 | 0.752 | 0.807 |
| UT - Pan America | 0.08 | 0.044 | 0.032 | 0.948 | 0.785 |
| West Texas A\&M University | 0.07 | 0.015 | 0.014 | 0.888 | 0.788 |
| Sul Ross State University | 0.06 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.907 | 0.637 |
| Texas Southern University | -0.02 | 0.017 | 0.025 | 0.997 | 0.572 |
| UT - El Paso | -0.04 | 0.032 | 0.030 | 0.991 | 0.855 |

Notes: Sample includes 580,253 students in the high school classes of 2001 to 2009 that enroll in a Texas public university within two years of high school graduation. Outcomes are indicators for enrollment at, application to, admission to, or conditional enrollment at each institution.

## Appendix B. Data on Program-level Resources

To measure program-level resources we utilize previously unused administrative data on all the course sections offered and faculty in each department at each institution since 2000. This information is obtained from Reports 4 and 8 published by the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board. We construct various measures of resources, quality, and capacity (average class size, faculty per student, faculty salary per student, capacity of course offerings) for each program at each institution in each year before and after deregulation. We aggregated the merged course-faculty micro data to the level of academic program at each Texas university from Fall 2000 to Fall 2009. Since the breadth of academic programs vary by institution, we standardize them using 2-digit Classification of Institutional Program (CIP) codes. Two-digit CIP codes often translate to what are conventionally known as "departments" (e.g. Mathematics and Statistics) but sometimes are broader ("Social Sciences" or "Engineering"). We have separately broken out Economics and Nursing from their larger categories (Social Science and Health Professions, respectively) as they are sometimes housed in units which price differently. We restrict our analysis to programs (defined by 2-digit CIP codes) that enroll at least one student from each high school cohort from 2000 to 2009. Thus we exclude programs that are introduced or discontinued during our analysis window or that have a very small number of students. In practice, this restriction drops fewer than 5\% of the student sample across all cohorts. Our final program-level sample includes 641 programs tracked over ten years, for a total sample size of 6,410 . Some analysis will have fewer observations due to missing data on prices or program resources in some years. ${ }^{1}$

The program-level panel dataset is summarized in Table A2, with each observation weighted by program enrollment from the 2000 high school cohort. The average program has about 4,800 course enrollments, with the majority being upper-division. ${ }^{2}$ Average tuition is $\$ 2,853$ for the semester. Many resource measures we normalize by the number of course enrollments divided by five. This makes these measures on a per-student basis, assuming that each student takes approximately 5 classes in a semester. The average program has about 1 faculty member per 10 students and spends $\$ 2989$ on faculty salary per student. The average FTE salary of the main course instructor is $\$ 30,500$ per semester and the average class size is about 30 students per section. More expensive programs are larger, more lucrative (which we define later), and have greater levels of faculty salary per student, though also tend to have larger classes. A full description of how resources vary across programs is beyond the scope of this paper, but Figures A2 and A3 depict the resource differences across and within fields in our sample. Engineering tends to be among the most resource-intensive, with high-paid faculty, modest class sizes, and high faculty salary per student. Business, by contrast, has very large classes, which offsets the high faculty salaries. These patterns echo prior descriptive work by Johnson and Turner (2009). Interestingly, while there are consistent patterns by field across institutions, there is also substantial variation across institutions for a given field.

[^0]
## Appendix C. Control State Analysis

Our single-state analysis cannot account for any aggregate trends altering the representation of poor students relative to non-poor students at high-earning programs and institutions. For instance, if poor students were making inroads at high-earnings programs around the country because of expansions to Pell or other changes differentially affecting the enrollment of poor vs. non-poor students, our Texas-specific estimates may overstate the gains experienced due to tuition deregulation. To address this, we complement our main analysis with cross-state triple-difference comparison between Texas and other states that did not deregulate tuition-setting authority. We test whether the gap in predicted earnings of institutions attended by poor and non-poor students changes in Texas relative to other states after tuition deregulation in Texas.

Unfortunately comparably rich micro student data including extensive student controls does not exist for many states (and cannot be easily combined with our Texas data). Instead, we compare the public 4-year institutions attended by Pell students to non-Pell students in each state. We combine three data sources to characterize the average predicted earnings of institutions attended by Pell and non-Pell students at a state level over time. First, we start with the universe of public 4-year institutions from IPEDS, which includes total undergraduate enrollment. Second, we merge on the number of Pell recipients at each institution in each year. ${ }^{1}$ Finally, mean earnings of students working and not enrolled 10 years after entry for each institution was obtained from the College Scorecard data for the 2001 and 2002 entering cohorts. ${ }^{2}$ Having average mean earnings by institution for all institutions in the country was not possible prior to the release of the College Scorecard data in 2015. From these sources we construct for each state and each year the predicted earnings of institutions attended by Pell students and non-Pell students, as well as the difference. Across all years and states in our sample, the mean Pell-NonPell difference is about -\$2,650, but is $-\$ 4,640$ in Texas prior to deregulation. ${ }^{3}$ The question we ask is how this gap changes following deregulation in Texas.

Table C1 presents our results. In column (1), we approximate our main (micro-sample- based) analysis using data just from Texas. We find that the Pell-NonPell gap shrank by $\$ 270$ following deregulation in Texas. While not directly comparable to estimates from our micro sample, the pattern is directionally consistent with our earlier analysis. Pell students attended slightly more lucrative programs following deregulation relative to non-Pell students. ${ }^{4}$ The next five columns include other states, which are used to

[^1]control for aggregate trends that could have altered the Pell-Non-Pell institutional gap using a tripledifference. The coefficient on PostXTexas quantifies how much the Pell-NonPell gap in Texas changed post-deregulation relative to the Pell-NonPell gap in other states over the same time period. The pattern is remarkably robust across multiple specifications: Pell students in Texas gained relative to non-Pell students following deregulation at a greater rate than in other states. This pattern is robust to flexibly controlling for year effects (specification 3), weighting states by total enrollment (4), and restricting the control group to geographically proximate states (5 to 7). We exclude Florida in the last two specifications as that state also experienced deregulation towards the end of our sample.

## Table C1. Texas vs. Non-Texas Comparison of Change in Pell-NonPell Earnings Gap

| Dept variable: Difference in mean predicted earnings of institutions attended by Pell vs. NonPell students in state $(\$ 1,000)$ (= 4.64 in Texas in 2003) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Texas Only | Texas and Non-Texas States |  |  |  |  |  | Synthetic control method |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Texas |  | $\begin{gathered} \hline-2.348^{* * *} \\ (0.283) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.000737 \\ (0.0798) \end{gathered}$ |
| Post | $\begin{aligned} & 0.273^{* *} \\ & (0.102) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.133^{\star *} \\ & (0.0608) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PostXTexas |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.405^{* * *} \\ & (0.0608) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.410^{* * *} \\ & (0.0656) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.417^{* * *} \\ & (0.0832) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.601^{* * *} \\ & (0.175) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.531^{* *} \\ & (0.172) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.503^{\star * *} \\ (0.136) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.453^{* * *} \\ & (0.105) \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations | 11 | 527 | 527 | 527 | 142 | 131 | 164 | 22 |
| R-squared | 0.331 | 0.024 | 0.971 | 0.958 | 0.938 | 0.954 | 0.963 | 0.905 |
| Year FEs | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sample | TX only | All | All | All | SE | SE no FL | $\begin{gathered} \text { SESW } \\ \text { no FL } \end{gathered}$ | synthetic controls |
| State FE | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| Weighted | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No |

Notes: Sample includes 47 states from 2000 to 2010 (New York, DC, and Wyoming are excluded).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Specifications with multiple states are clustered standard errors by state.
Finally, we implement the synthetic control method described in Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010). This method finds a set of states whose weighted behavior most closely match the treated one (here, Texas) on a number of characteristics in the pre-treatment period. We match on the Pell-NonPell earnings gap (our outcome), the Pell share of students, the overall mean predicted earnings (for all students), and the number of institutions per student (to capture the level of differentiation in the public higher education sector). For Texas, this algorithm assigns a weight of $31.2 \%$ to California, $26.3 \%$ to Delaware, $12.3 \%$ to Mississippi, $10.4 \%$ to New Mexico, $2.4 \%$ to Virginia, $1.1 \%$ to Georgia, $1.0 \%$ to Oklahoma, and less than $1 \%$ to all remaining states. The Pell-NonPell gap for Texas and this synthetic control group is displayed in Figure C1. The two groups do not deviate much from eachother prior to deregulation, but diverge noticeably from 2004 onwards. The implied treatment effect of deregulation from this method is $\$ 450$ (reported in column (8) of Table C1), which is quite comparable to our standard triple difference estimates.
who are working and not enrolled, anywhere in the U.S.. Our Texas-specific analysis uses log earnings for all enrollees working in Texas ten years after enrollment. Finally, we are unable to control for changes in student characteristics, either in the earnings estimates or when assessing changes in program choice. So the estimates from the cross-state analysis are most comparable to column (1) in Table 3 that does not control for changes in student characteristics.

Figure C1. Texas vs. Synthetic Texas


To assess whether the experience of Texas (relative to the synthetic controls) is atypical of the variation one would see, we repeat the synthetic control analysis but assign treatment to all other 47 states as a placebo test. Figure C2 plots the treatment minus synthetic control difference for Texas (in bold) and all other 47 states (in gray). The Texas experience of modest and sustained gains for Pell students relative to non-Pell students is fairly unusual relative to what would be expected by chance.

## Figure C2. Texas-Synthetic Controls and Placebo States



All together, this analysis suggests that our main within-Texas comparison is not conflating deregulation with aggregate trends shifting the institutions attended by Pell vs. NonPell students. In anything, our results are strengthened by including other states as a comparison group.

## Appendix D. Program Size Analysis

Our main analysis suggests that the fraction of poor students that enroll in higher-earning programs in post-deregulation increases relative to non-poor students and that the fraction of non-poor students increases relative to poor students at lower-earning programs. This supplementary analysis will determine whether the relative increase in the fraction of poor students enrolled is a result of either enrollment growth in these programs with more growth in the poor student population, enrollment declines with nonpoor students leaving high-earning programs at a faster rate than their poor counterparts, or that the fractional changes are a result of poor students displacing non-poor students in the programs with higher earnings. For this analysis, we construct a balanced program-level dataset containing the number of juniors enrolled each program in each academic year, overall and by residency status. ${ }^{1}$ We also merge the predicted earnings for freshmen enrolled in these same programs from our main analysis.

To flexibly determine whether program enrollment changed following deregulation, we estimate the postderegulation deviation from enrollment trend separately for each program earnings ventile using models of the form:

$$
Y_{j t}=\beta_{1} \text { Time }_{t}+\beta_{2} \text { Post }_{t}+\delta_{j}+\varepsilon_{i t}
$$

$Y_{i t}$ is the $\log$ junior enrollment for program $j$ at time $t$, overall and by residency status. Time ${ }_{t}$ is a linear time trend, $\delta_{j}$ is a program fixed effect, and Post $_{t}$ is an indicator variable which takes a value of 1 for those observations that occur after 2006 and zero otherwise. We weight observations by the level of junior enrollment in 2001 in order to adjust for the influence of small and volatile programs and also cluster standard errors by program.

Figure D1 plots the ventile-specific coefficients on Time, which shows that overall enrollment in public 4year institutions has been steadily growing over time, particularly for programs in the bottom half of the earnings distribution. Higher-earning programs have seen very little growth over the decade. For nonresident students there is little evidence of changes in overall student enrollment, with slight increases in the middle ventiles (Panel B). Figure D2 plots coefficients associated with the Post dummy. This figure suggests that the enrollment of students in Texas - overall and non-residents - in the post-period do not differ substantially from the pre-period growth trajectory. Nor is there any obvious systematic relationship between the post-deregulation enrollment change and the earnings potential (as measured by the ventile) of the program.

Since ventile-specific estimates are noisy, we also estimate a more parsimonious model that assumes any differences across programs in the time trend or post-deregulation change are linear in predicted program earnings. Specifically, on the entire sample of programs we estimate the following regression:

$$
Y_{j t}=\beta_{1} \operatorname{Time}_{t}+\beta_{2}\left(\operatorname{Time}_{t} X \operatorname{Pred}_{j}\right)+\beta_{3} \operatorname{POST}_{t}+\beta_{4}\left(\operatorname{Post}_{t} X \operatorname{Pred}_{j}\right)+\delta_{j}+\varepsilon_{j t}
$$

where $\operatorname{Pred}_{j}$ is the level of predicted earnings for program $j$, after controlling for student demographics and test scores. The mean of this variable in our analysis sample is 0.29 . Again we weight observations

[^2]by the level of junior enrollment in 2001 in order to adjust for the influence of small but highly volatile programs and also cluster standard errors by program.

Table D1 displays the results from this pooled model, which echo the results shown in the figures. We find that overall enrollment is increasing over time for the average program (predicted earnings $=0.29$ ) and that total program enrollment increases just slightly above trend following deregulation (column (1)). These two features are most substantial for the least lucrative programs (with predicted earnings no greater than high school graduates), with little growth or change post-deregulation for the most lucrative programs. Non-resident enrollment, by contrast, experiences a steeper pre-deregulation growth rate and a more positive change post-deregulation, particularly for the more lucrative programs (though estimates are imprecise). This suggests that some of the programmatic changes following deregulation (e.g. higher prices and more spending) coincided with greater non-resident enrollment.

These program size patterns combined with our main sorting results suggests two proximate channels through which the relative shares of poor and non-poor students across programs are changing postderegulation. For the most lucrative programs, the lack of any aggregate enrollment change suggests poor students are (modestly) displacing their non-poor counterparts. For programs from the bottom half of the distribution of predicted earnings, there is growth in the enrollment of poor students and non-poor students, but enrollment for non-poor students is occurring at a faster rate.

Table D1. Differences in Program-specific Enrollment Trends, by Program Predicted Earnings

|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ <br> Non- <br> Resident |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| VARIABLES | Overall |  |
| Time | $0.0267^{* * *}$ | $0.0624^{* * *}$ |
| Time X Predicted Earnings | $(0.00535)$ | $(0.0147)$ |
|  | $-0.0653^{* * *}$ | $-0.0975^{* *}$ |
| Post | $(0.0186)$ | $(0.0394)$ |
|  | 0.0301 | 0.0848 |
| Post X Predicted Earnings | $(0.0201)$ | $(0.0585)$ |
|  | -0.0654 | 0.0699 |
| Constant | $(0.0661)$ | $(0.166)$ |
|  | $5.683^{* * *}$ | $2.595^{* * *}$ |
| Observations | $(0.0178)$ | $(0.0431)$ |
| R-squared |  | 3,583 |

Figure D1: Ventile-specific annual enrollment time trend
A. Overall

B. Non-residents

Percent changes in annual enrollment of students
for Texas Non-Residents


Notes: Each point on each figure corresponds to the coefficient on Time from a separate regression described in equation (1), where the log of junior enrollment (overall or for specific group) is the dependent variable. Sample in Panel A includes 556 programs from 2001 to 2008. Panel B omits programs that do not have at least one non-resident enrollment in each year, resulting in a sample of 82 programs. Standard errors clustered by program.

Figure D2: Ventile-specific post-deregulation enrollment change


Notes: Each point on each figure corresponds to the coefficient on Post from a separate regression described in equation (1), where the log of junior enrollment (overall or for specific group) is the dependent variable. Sample in Panel A includes 556 programs from 2001 to 2008. Panel B omits programs that do not have at least one non-resident enrollment in each year, resulting in a sample of 82 programs. Standard errors clustered by program.


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ There may be some discrepancies between the level at which the price and resource measures are captured. Tuition price is typically reported for each "school" or "college" within each university. We have applied this tuition level to all two-digit CIP codes that appear to fall within this school/college at this university. The school-CIP relationship often varies across universities. For instance, some universities include the Economics major in the College of Liberal Arts (typically a low-priced program) while others include it in Business (sometimes a high-priced program). Since we treat Economics as a stand-alone category, it receives the Liberal Arts or Business price depending on the university. Resource measures, by contrast, are generated from course-level data. CIP codes are directly available for each course from 2005 onwards. Prior to this, we generate a two-digit CIP code based on the course subject prefix or administrative code of the faculty member teaching the course. Faculty are assigned to CIP codes based on the most common major code among the courses they teach. Non-teaching faculty are assigned CIP codes based on the two-digit CIP code most commonly associated with each administrative code.
    ${ }^{2}$ Since the statistics are weighted by the number of enrollees from the 2000 high school class, these statistics give the program characteristics experienced by the "typical" student rather than the characteristics of the typical program. Thus the typical student will be in a much larger program than the typical program.

[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ This data comes from US Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education. We are grateful to Lesley Turner for sharing this data with us.
    ${ }^{2}$ The student sample includes financial aid students in AY2001-02 and AY2002-03 pooled cohort measured in CY2012, CY2013, inflation adjusted to 2015 dollars. Average earnings may be misleading to the extent that the average earnings of aided and non-aided students are different. We drop the state of New York, as the number of Pell recipients is not broken out by individual CUNY and SUNY institutions in the early years. Wyoming and the District of Columbia are also excluded because they do not have multiple public 4-year institutions.
    ${ }^{3}$ This average weights each state-year observation by the total number of students. Unweighted average is similar.
    ${ }^{4}$ Results may not be directly comparable to our main analysis for four main reasons. First, our main analysis relies on eligibility for free- or reduced-price lunch in 12th grade as the marker for poor. Results using Pell receipt as a marker for poor are similar, but not identical. Second, our measures of Pell and non-Pell enrollment do not distinguish by residency status or undergraduate level. These measures include both in- and out-of-state students, from freshmen to seniors. Our main analysis tracks the enrollment choices of students that attended public high schools in Texas and enrolled in university within two years. Treatment here will thus not be as "sharp" as in our earlier analysis. Third, the earnings measure pertains to the raw average earnings of students receiving financial aid

[^2]:    ${ }^{1}$ We determined residency status based on the receipt of in-state tuition; all students who receive in-state tuition are considered residents, and all other students are non-residents. From this measure, approximately $93 \%$ of our sample is made up of Texas Residents. We use Pell Grant receipt to distinguish poor from non-poor students as this measure is available for all enrolled students; free-lunch eligibility is only available for students that graduated from in-state public high schools. We drop programs that have zero total, Pell, or non-Pell enrollment in any year. Our balanced panel contains 556 programs from 2001 to 2008.

